The United Auto Workers (UAW) Chrysler Council voted today to reopen the union contract. This lays the ground for further concessions to the Chrysler Corporation.
In our view the decision of the Council is most unfortunate. It puts the union in a most perilous position. Moreover, it conveys the false impression that there are no viable alternatives open to the workers and to the union which leads them.
In our view the Chrysler workers have a real fighting chance if only they can get themselves to reverse the disastrous course taken by the union leadership. There is still sufficient time. Chrysler workers themselves have yet to vote on the whole matter.
In order to put themselves in a fighting position however it is first necessary to consider the basic problem facing the union which has been obscured by the capitalist media and not understood by the union leadership and certainly not acted upon.
The Council decision was obviously made in great haste and under severe pressure. This can easily be seen from the telegram that Douglas Fraser, UAW president, and other union leaders sent to President-elect Ronald Reagan on the eve of the Council meeting and which undoubtedly was distributed to the UAW Council members and meant as much for their consumption as it was for the incoming Reagan administration.
"Our nation faces the literal collapse of one of its most crucial industries," said the telegram, "if we stand idly by and allow the condition to continue in the months ahead."
The telegram requests Reagan to immediately convene a so-called summit conference of the heads of the auto industry, the union, and others, and consider several measures that the UAW leaders are proposing such as federal rebates for purchases of new, American-built cars and other special assistance.
Invoking the image of a "literal collapse" of the auto industry is not likely to frighten the Reagan administration which itself is presenting a far more frightening picture of the U.S. economy in general and calling for emergency measures to avoid a so-called "financial Dunkirk," meaning a rescue operation which the workers of the whole country will be asked to pay for.
It was foolish and thoughtless of the UAW leadership to fire off this telegram and unworthy of a great union with a proud record of achievement. It is more typical of some small, new, inexperienced local union, which is harassed on all sides, not knowing what to do. If the union is to address itself to the Reagan administration at all, it is first of all necessary to present a reasoned and carefully thought-out program first to the Council and the membership and then to the incoming administration.
The union must first fortify itself in every way possible, wield the big stick that it has in its million-fold membership, and then confront the Reagan administration. In any case, they are sure to hear from the Reaganites anyway, under the prompting and direction of the bosses themselves.
It is ironic that during all these many months since Chrysler let out the word that it was failing, the UAW leadership has been completely passive, demonstrating nothing but inertia. Now, as this hasty telegram and hurried Council meeting demonstrates, the union leadership is descending from inertia into panic.
The meeting itself was woefully ill-timed. The plants are shut for the period of at least the holidays. The members of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board to which they presumably must rush with a new survival plan are out sunning themselves in the Bahamas. Treasury Secretary G. William Miller, chairman of the Loan Board is not due back until January 6, 1981.
With all his ranting and raving, Chrysler Chairman Iacocca has made it clear that the company has cash until March 1981.
The presumed basis for the indecent haste is that the Carter administration's Loan Board will be succeeded on January 20, possibly by a new Reagan Board. The UAW has been in existence long enough not to let themselves be bamboozled by such threats, of which this one is only a new version.
The union leadership must turn itself around and look to the other road, which presents immeasurably greater possibilities for the workers, than the one that is being pursued, which can only lead to frustration. But first, the real problem must be faced, not merely the problem of getting another loan guarantee. That is only a symptom of the problem.
The sum of money asked of the government is considered in all the financial, big business, and government circles as a piddling amount when one considers the magnitude of U.S. government obligations around the world, which run into the tens of billions of dollars. When stacked up against the size of Chrysler, the sum of money requested is small indeed to rescue the tenth largest industrial in the U.S.
The problem is that the auto industry, one of the real pillars of the capitalist industrial establishment, has outlived its so-called free enterprise stage and is now entering into the new stage of government intervention or government control -- that is, into state capitalism.
It is a new phenomenon for the industry and has very profound and important implications for the UAW. It is a new experience, one which the union leadership has not prepared itself for. They are resisting the need for a change of strategy.
In the old days, the late UAW President Walter Reuther used to say, "Free labor and free management working together can coexist and negotiate fair labor agreements without the intervention or the need of the government."
Now all that has changed, if it ever was all that true in the first place. When the Chrysler Corporation agreed to accept the loan guarantee from the U.S. government it in effect transferred its fundamental powers, as clearly stated in the contract statement with the Loan Guarantee Board, to the U.S. government. The U.S. government is in fact today the successor in interest to the Chrysler Corporation. The company cannot take any important step without its approval, not even for providing maintenance or office supplies.
What implication does this have for the union? It means that whereas in the old days the Chrysler Division of the UAW was negotiating with an individual auto company, it is now dealing with the collective strength of the U.S. ruling class, which includes General Motors and Ford.
Thus, when the union was dealing with an individual corporation it could muster its entire strength against the company, although it rarely had to. Now it is faced with a complex of industrial and financial corporations, which are the central directing force behind the individuals who constitute the Loan Board.
The objective position of the union in relation to Chrysler has thereby been radically altered and in the most fundamental way. The Chrysler Corporation is now merely the agent of the U.S. government. The union is thus directly involved in a struggle, not with just Chrysler, except in a nominal way, and not with a few individuals on the Loan Board. It is pitted against the capitalist state, the repository of the collective strength of the U.S. ruling class.
This is what the UAW leadership has to face up to. But it is still trying to convey the false impression to the workers that it is dealing with Chrysler and with Iacocca who, they say, is "shooting from the hip," etc., etc.
All this is camouflage. It is simply not true. Nor does it mean that the union does not have a problem knowing each specific instance when and to whom to address itself in the struggle of the workers.
It is quite easy for the Loan Board to pass the buck to Chrysler and vice versa. But the union must not lose sight of the changed relationship. The situs of power now is in the capitalist state whose temporary instrument is the Loan Board.
The UAW hierarchy has over the many years of its existence built up by custom and tradition a unique relationship with the heads of the largest corporations of the auto industry. Precisely because it is such a mighty union, the corporate heads have been most anxious to cultivate a personal relationship based on so-called trust. Over the years they have become accustomed to dealing with each other privately and even to address each other on a first name basis.
This close relationship between the labor leaders and the corporate heads was possible because of the relative stability of the industry and the growing conservatism of the union leadership. But now things have changed.
The UAW leaders, however, persist with their outmoded strategy, which was never good to begin with. The new relationships, the objective change, the transition from so-called free enterprise to state capitalist intervention -- all this has not sunk in.
Many workers were puzzled when Fraser and some of the UAW heads opportunistically veered away from Kennedy to Carter during the primaries. The reasoning of Fraser and others was that Kennedy had no clout with the big businessmen and therefore no clout with the Loan Board. Carter, Fraser reasoned, was himself a businessman and really did have clout with Treasury Secretary Miller and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker and, of course, those with whom Fraser was already on a first name basis.
Now that Miller and probably Volcker are on their way out, who are the traditional personalized contacts with now? The bald truth is that the UAW leadership is in reality dealing with a dehumanizing octopus. The personalities come and go as fast as the revolving doors of the capitalist establishment can move -- not at all unlike what happens in the large corporations.
Once it is recognized that the UAW faces not an individual corporation, which is now only nominally in control, but the collective strength of the ruling class, the security of the Chrysler workers' jobs will have become that much more safeguarded.
It follows from what we have said that the UAW Chrysler Council should not have been panicked into reopening the contract. Rather, it should have suggested, if not demanded, that the UAW leadership convene the international executive board for the purpose of getting the entire UAW million-fold membership enlisted in the battle of its life for the Chrysler workers.
Fighting for the Chrysler workers' jobs on the basis of the old one-at-a-time strategy is a dead end. It is simply inadequate. It is not possible to maintain any meaningful offensive without getting the full strength of the union behind it. What is needed is solidarity. It is the only thing the Loan Board will understand.
There are several important ways to do this. The first, of course, and most important is to convene an emergency conference of the UAW and put on the table the question of emergency support for the Chrysler workers.
This does not mean simply passing resolutions of support or financial or material help of one sort or another, which is good and sufficient under other circumstances, such as during a strike. But in order to save the jobs of the Chrysler workers and the very life of the entire union, it is necessary to demand the reopening of the GM and Ford contracts so as to free the workers of GM, Ford, and the entire union to extend that kind of help to the Chrysler workers which the auto bosses over the years have learned to understand and respect.
This alone will stop the auto barons from destroying the livelihood of the workers by piecemeal measures or at one fell swoop, as is possible with the Chrysler workers.
This would signify the recognition by the union leadership and the members that this is a life-and-death struggle and that the workers are in dead earnest. Since the ruling class as a whole stands behind the treacherous move against the Chrysler workers, the autoworkers as a whole have to stand together on an industry-wide basis and present a united front. Failing this, Ford will follow the example of Chrysler.
The union also has other advantages in its favor once it begins to wield the big stick. While it must be recognized that real power and authority over Chrysler have passed to the capitalist government as a whole, the ruling financial and industrial dynasties are by no means united. Rather they are divided by predatory, contradictory material interests.
There is no question that a large part of the ruling class would like to sink Chrysler. They calculate that this would help them in their competitive struggle with others. But there are others in the ruling class who fear that their interests will be damaged by a Chrysler bankruptcy.
The union has room too, however, but not to rely on the ruling class division as its fundamental weapon in a struggle. The ruling class as a whole holds to the view that the auto industry, as presently constituted, is obsolescent and has excess capacity for auto production on a scale unneeded in the light of the pervasive and continuing capitalist crisis.
Chrysler is, in the view of some, excess baggage, surplusage, and the industry would be better off without it, either by further consolidation, or merger, or some international venture with Volkswagen, Mitsubishi Motor Corporation of Japan, or Peugeot-Citron of France. This is all decidedly calculated with a view toward first throwing out half, if not more, of the present number of workers from Chrysler.
But there are others in the ruling class who fear the devastating effects of a Chrysler bankruptcy, either disguised or open, and who have huge financial stakes in its survival. These elements, however, cannot be accommodated by adopting their program of staving off bankruptcy on the backs of the workers. Rather, if they wish to survive, they had better line up with the union's program.
At all times, it must be remembered, the struggle in the ruling class on the fate of Chrysler is considered only from their class viewpoint and of the profitability of each of the component elements which constitute the side of management -- the stockholders, suppliers, tire manufacturers, and, above all, the bankers.
The side of the workers can only be considered properly by the workers' representatives themselves. They must, however, show strength and determination and vow to reopen the GM and Ford contracts with the UAW for the purposes of solidarity.
The virtual bankruptcy of the Chrysler Corporation and its takeover by the capitalist government have radically revised the contractual obligations of the UAW with the auto barons. By insisting on making the Chrysler workers bear the burden of management failures they have in fact wrecked the balance of forces on which the contracts between the UAW and the Big Three was based. This is a blunt fact which breaks through the legal niceties which cover the grim reality.
The UAW Chrysler Council meeting, which vowed resistance to any wage freeze and set other conditions, conspicuously failed to demand an amendment to revise the Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 to have labor members sit on the Board rather than all big businessmen, bankers, and their stooges.
They also took an unfortunate position in instructing the UAW leaders to merely review the financial situation of the company with the secretary of the treasury or other Loan Board representatives in order to confirm the true requirements that must be met by the company.
No! The right thing to have done is to demand that the company open its books to the union alone, for the union to verify the situation of the company and then to discuss, if need be, with the Loan Board.
If legislation is to be demanded by the UAW in connection with the Chrysler situation, it should be in the form of amendments which, among others, should state that in the event of the continuing failure of the company, the law should empower the union as the trustee, in receivership or bankruptcy for the purposes of operating and maintaining the company on behalf of the workers.
In the meantime it is necessary for the union leadership to pass down the word to the Chrysler workers that it is in earnest about its ability to take on the responsibility of really being the trustee capable of taking over from the capitalist government the running and operation of the Chrysler Corporation on behalf of the workers.
The union must show willingness and readiness in the event of any plan by the government and/or Chrysler to dismantle the plants, to maintain them idle, or to divide the assets. In a word, it must show readiness to take over.
Once the word is passed down to the workers the leaders will have no more difficulty in gaining support for the plan of action than the early leadership of the UAW had difficulty in getting support for the great sit-down strikes which originally made the union and gave it such a firm foundation.
Last updated: 29 April 2018