First Published: Theoretical Review No. 9, March-April 1979.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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Of late it has been quite common for the Western bourgeois press to lavish praise upon Deng Xiaoping and his cohorts in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for their rejection of Mao’s “disastrous, isolationist and Utopian line” and their introduction of China into the twentieth century. Time magazine has even gone so far as to name Deng its “Man of the Year.”
Although such strong support of a specific tendency within the Communist Party of a foreign country by the US bourgeoisie is cause for questioning that line, it is not necessarily grounds for condemning it out of hand. But it does suggest that an analysis of these policies would be useful.
However, a first glance at certain recent policies (and a first glance is all that is proposed here) suggests that rather than leading China into the twentieth century, the present leadership may well be leading China back into the nineteenth century.
What I mean here by saying “back into the nineteenth century” is the virtual reintroduction of certain political-economic-ideological forms which existed in China’s social formation and in China’s ruling elite at that time. Therefore, a short note on these forms and their development is in order here.
In the nineteenth century, after hundreds of years of virtually complete isolation from the West and from capitalism, China encountered Western capitalism in the form of trade and its accompanying ideological relations along its coastal areas. The first visible climax in this relationship was a military conflict between the Imperial Chinese government and the British (depicted in the Chinese movie “The Opium War” recently released in the US). The war, fought over the issue of whether British merchants had the right to import and sell opium in China against the wishes of the Chinese government (which saw it draining its financial resources and physically debilitating its population) is referred to by the Chinese as the Opium War and by the British as the Free Trade War. Regardless of its name, the Chinese were defeated in the war and forced to cede certain “concessions” to the British. These concessions were not merely the rights to trade and establish factories, but also certain sectors of certain cities actually became foreign “concessions,” in which Britain administered its citizens according to British laws. Following the British example, other capitalist nations began the process of militarily dismembering China and forcing concessions from the Chinese government. However, as foreign domination of the coastal cities, trade, manufacturing and even culture increased, China’s imperial government itself began to perceive the ultimate threat to both its own power base and to China as a nation.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the “Self-strengthening Movement” developed within the imperial ruling circles. Its object was to strengthen China sufficiently to rid her of Western imperialism while preserving the Confucian “essence” of China. Analyzing the basis of Western imperialism’s power as its technical and military skills, numerous individuals and factions within the imperial circles advocated full scale Westernization. Others objected, arguing that to become Western to fight the West was losing the battle in that the superiorities of Chinese (i.e. imperial and Confucian) society and culture – that which was being fought for in the first place – would be lost in the process.
Out of this struggle emerged the best known slogan and policy of the period – and a policy which was implemented to a large degree for a period of time – the policy of “Zhong xue wei ti, Xi xue yong,” or “Chinese learning as the essence (ti), Western learning as the tool (yong).” The theoretical basis of this position was that one could graft Western industrial and military technology onto China’s Confucial society without undermining the purity and morality of that society.
In its essence, such a policy is the ultimate antithesis of dialectical and historical materialism in that it argues that the superstructure can be totally immune from a basic transformation of the base. Certainly, this is not a surprising position for a group of nineteenth century imperial politicians. Nor is it surprising that these politicians discovered that the new technical and military factors which they introduced into society played a major role in destroying the very society which they had hoped to preserve and the only social formation in which they might have had a power base.
But it would be surprising for members of a twentieth century Communist Party to adopt such a position. In fact, a preliminary glance at numerous of i the policies adopted in line with foreign exchange seem based much more on such a position than on a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the dialectical relationship between the development of the base and the superstructure.
The basis of the present leadership’s position seems to be that because of China’s “socialist essence” (which means the creation of a socialist base, i.e. the expropriation of private ownership of the means of production), China can adopt what would otherwise be capitalist production relations, e.g. a bilevel educational system based on producing an increasing specialization of the production process, an increasing focus on profit in evaluation of factory management and performance, an increase in individual material incentives in various forms and an increasingly centralized and hierarchical decision making structure (at least for a certain period of time), without threatening the socialist nature of the social formation. Or, as Wang Roshi, deputy editor-in-chief of People’s Daily, put it (virtually paraphrasing the “ti-yong” slogan of the 1890’s) “We should acquire their science but reject their philosophy.”[1a] Although this may be possible, numerous facts suggest that the present leadership sees this process and contradiction as a much simpler process than is the case.
I. Policy: China will import billions of dollars of Western technology, including up to $60 billion from the US in the next year. This will include products, such as planes, as well as complete factories. Some of these factories will initially be foreign owned, but within about 15 years, will end up being completely Chinese owned. Other factories will be established by luring foreign capitalists to establish factories in China with lower labor costs and with the right to determine the skill, age and sexual makeup of the work force.
Present Leadership’s Assumption: This will lead to a rapid development of the most modern forces of production in China which will end up in the hands of the Chinese after a short period of limited exploitation at the hands of the foreign capitalists in order to pay for these means of production.
Other Possible Consequences: If, as the leadership assumes, these factories will be returned to Chinese state ownership within 15 years, then the foreign capitalists, in order to invest in such ventures, must be able to recoup the full cost of their investments plus the average rate of profit that they could “earn” on their capital elsewhere within 15 years. What type of production relations will this require in these factories and in others throughout China to produce such a high rate of surplus value? To what degree will the Chinese educational system have to be transformed to meet the demands of foreign capitalists for certain types of work forces?
In those factories initially completely owned by the Chinese themselves, what type of production relations will be established? How will these relations and the general treatment being accorded foreign capitalists affect the workers’ understanding of socialism as a transition period in which the direct producers increase their knowledge and control of the production process? How will workers influenced by the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward relate to the potential diminution of their role? How will such factors affect the working class’ image of itself as the master of society? What effects will the rights given to the increasing number of foreign capitalists, e.g. better living conditions, priviledged access to certain products (e.g. Coke will initially only be available in major hotels, not to the public), access to a golf course (once banned as a decadent sport) have on the working class’ self-esteem?
What demands will the by then expropriated foreign capitalists be able to make of China 15 years in the future when the factories require modernization and spare parts? What effects would subjecting a large sector of the production process to the demands of the maximization of profit have on the social formation as a whole?[2a]
II. Policy: In order to finance these imports, China would borrow billions of dollars from Western bourgeois financial groups and institutions, ranging from European banking syndicates to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Present Leadership’s Assumption: Such short term funds are necessary for rapid industrialization, and rapid industrialization will produce sufficient wealth to repay these loans without serious consequences.
Other Possible Consequences: With cash reserves of approximately $2 billion and a $60 billion shopping list for this year in the US alone, what type of transformation will China’s social formation require to repay such loans? How much further will this transformation be pushed by the demands of debt service (interest) when the experiences of numerous other non-socialist countries suggest that within 15 years, they are only repaying the interest, not the principle? What direct leverage will this give international capitalist financial circles in China’s production and reproduction processes? What are the indirect consequences of tying China’s economy so directly into the world capitalist system?[3a] What would be the possibilities and consequences of trying to break with this path because it became too encumbering, i.e. what would the consequences of cancelling foreign debts be on China’s internal and external development?
III. Policy: In order to more rapidly develop the forces of production, China’s national bourgeoisie must be reinvigorated. Hence, the policy of reconvening the Chinese People’s Political Conference, an institution for the representation of the patriotic national bourgeoisie, and the recent policy of returning capitalist rights, jobs and property which had been “unconstitutionally” taken from them during the Cultural Revolution.
Present Leadership’s Assumption: The national bourgeoisie can still play a vital role in rapidly developing production. The “socialist essence” of China is now strong enough to withstand the various pressures of these capitalists.
Other Possible Consequences: In the mid-1950’s, after the state takeover of private enterprises, Mao argued that the national bourgeoisie, even left with limited property rights and higher paying managerial jobs, was deprived of its social, economic and ideological power base, “like hair separated from the body,” it had nowhere to go but down. Twenty years later, should this national bourgeoisie still be where it was 20 years before or reconstituted to its earlier level of power which was further undercut during the Cultural (non-dinner party) Revolution? What ideological effect does this deference to the national bourgeoisie have on the working class? Will this tend to influence them to see the durability of capitalism and to orient their lives in that direction? What influences will the individualism and life style of the national bourgeoisie (and the foreign capitalists) have on proletarian ideology, culture and lifestyle in that the bourgeois approach is no longer subjected to such rigorous criticism as before?
IV. Policy: Numerous exchanges of Chinese and Western students are being established in order to increase the control of this crucial technical data and skills by the Chinese themselves and thus provide the technical skill basis for China’s takeover and management of these new forces of production.
Present Leadership’s Assumption: Chinese students studying in advanced capitalist countries will pick up advanced technical skills (yong) while ignoring the philosophy, culture and ideology (ti) of the social formations in which they live for several years. Thus, when they return to China, they will provide useful technical skills.
Other Possible Consequences: Returned foreign students have historically provided leadership to movements seeking to transform their native societies a-long certain of the lines that they have incorporated in their foreign studies. To what extent will Chinese overseas students pick up certain orientations, e.g. individualism, knowledge as “private property” to be used for individual gain, understanding of certain teaching, testing and management techniques, etc. in capitalist universities? To what extent will they be able to integrate themselves back into the society which they left, or will they tend to constitute a strata unto themselves, closer to each other than to the rest of the working class that they left?
V. Policy: At the end of his trip to the US, Deng allegedly gave assurances to Senator “Scoop” Jackson that he would soon publicly announce a policy of “free emigration,” thus satisfying the demand of the Jackson-Varick Amendment that a country must have a policy of “free emigration” to qualify for US credits and most favored nation treatment.
Present Leadership’s Assumption: If you are on the road to buying $60 billion of US goods in one year, you might as well take a short cut by announcing “free emigration” and get a “discount.” Such free emigration will have no deleterious effect on the Chinese social formation.
Other Possible Consequences: The consequences of a “free emigration” policy per se are one thing, but what is the effect of seemingly allowing that policy to be dictated by a right wing Senator within the imperialist US government apparatus? If such a policy is in fact implemented, who will be the most likely to leave China? Historical experience suggests that it may be just such technicians and specialists that the present leadership is relying on to speed up its industrialization, because it is just such people who can “get a better deal” in the West. To what extent would this have the effect of further transforming certain individual technical skills acquired at state financed institutions to “private property”, to be sold to the highest bidder? Given the proportionately higher material bids from materially wealthier countries, will this force the Chinese leadership to further increase the income differentials between specialists and common laborers in order to induce the specialists to remain in the country? What effect would such a development have on the social formation as a whole?
Final Thoughts: What are the consequences of these various policies? What are their theoretical sources and bases? To what extent might they be compared to the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union? Or does the vastness of the level of development of the socialist transition in the two social formations at the times these two sets of policies were put into operation negate the validity of such a comparison? Does this policy represent a return to the ideology of the 1890’s and perhaps even to its material consequences? While these few notes do not provide a basis for a systematic evaluation of this rather offhand analogy, it does tend to suggest that if, with Mao (and the forces associated with him at every level of the social formation) at the lead, the Chinese people stood up, then perhaps with Deng (and the forces associated with him at every level of the social formation) at the lead, the Chinese people will sit down again.
[1a] Beijing Review, #4, 3an. 26, 1979, pg 17.
[2a] See Charles Bettelheim, Class Struggles in the USSR, Vol. II.
[3a] Ibid.