SINCE the first days of the Russian Revolution, in November, 1917, no topic has given rise to more confusion, bewilderment, and partisanship than that of Soviet Foreign policy. The press, the politicians and their parties, the churchmen and statesmen and writers, have vied with each other in presenting fantastic pictures of Russia, its revolution, its aims and relationship to the rest of the world. Little or no attempt has been made, however, to study Soviet Foreign policy objectively, to render an intelligible account of it, or to understand the motives governing its operation.
It cannot be denied that in the history of this policy there are contradictions which add to the confusion. Soviet Russia was born in Revolution. Its first calls to world revolution inflamed the hatred of its enemies and stirred the spirit of revolt among its friends. Within a comparatively short time it put the revolutionary clarion on one side and assumed the role of the commercial traveller seeking ‘normal trade relations’ and a compromise peace with the hated capitalist states. Later, its representatives entered the reviled League of Nations and donned the white robes of ‘International Simultaneous Disarmament’. Then it launched a crusade against Nazism and Fascism, pleaded, and manœuvred for ‘collective security against the aggressor’, only to stagger friend and foe alike by finally making a pact with Nazi Germany and exchanging the ‘indivisibility of peace’ for isolation and neutrality, when Britain and France came to grips with the aggressor it had so bitterly denounced.
Here is a sequence of events calling for realistic study and interpretation rather than the passionate shouting of partisans. But few people have found it possible to take up an objective attitude to Soviet Russia. The opponents of the Revolution have denounced each phase of Russian policy as a sinister portent of more sinister things to come. Its disciples, on the other hand, have dressed all phases in the garments of perfection, and, more often than not, have treated every aspect of policy as permanent, only to find themselves performing political somersaults which have destroyed the confidence of their followers and brought discredit on their judgment.
It will be asked: Do not these strictures apply equally to the Russian Bolsheviks, who are responsible for the policy resulting in such confusion? The Bolsheviks themselves do not think so. They have regarded each development as nothing more than a phase of a larger, more far reaching strategy. It is necessary to understand this larger strategy if we are to appraise correctly the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. and the possibilities which lie ahead.
This country needs allies more than at any time in its existence. We are fighting a war from which there is no escape except the escape of France. The Russian Bolsheviks are face to face with a war which they also cannot escape. When they signed the pact with Germany in the summer of 1939 they postponed their war but did not escape it. The present phase of ‘neutrality’ is as temporary as Russia’s membership of the League of Nations. And none know this better than they. The question before the world to-day is not ‘Must the War spread?’ but how will it spread, and what form will it take?
However true it may be (and I, personally, accept this view) that the war is rooted in capitalist imperialism, it has become, and will increasingly become, a war of the people of all lands against the most aggressive and reactionary form of imperialism known to history. Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan have thrown down the gauntlet of world domination. The question as to when they will make war on this country or that is a question of strategy, and finally no nation is excluded from their programme of conquest. Any country which attempts to bargain with them once the guns have been fired across its frontiers, can only do so to negotiate capitulation. Thus the conflict of imperialism has become the conflict of peoples for self-preservation against the new conquerors. And the alternatives confronting the people of this and all other countries are those of being conquered separately—or of collectively overthrowing the would-be conquerors.
Owing to the fateful blunders of politicians whose hatred of the Russian Revolution and all it signifies made them incapable of impartial judgment, we were thrust into the conflict under an almost fatal disadvantage. We rejected the repeated offers of a military alliance with a possible major ally who was strategically more favourably placed than any other to assist us against the common foe. Nor has the position changed very greatly since the outbreak of the war. Yet on almost every tongue in these islands is the question: ‘What will Russia do?’
It is the purpose of this book to answer this question and to reveal the underlying significance of the policy of the Bolsheviks. In order to do this I propose to define the fundamental aims of the Bolsheviks, the principles governing their foreign policy and the methods adopted in the application of these principles to changing circumstances. I propose then to examine the conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and her neighbours, and to define the conditions which will set the Red Army on the march.
It is my conviction, based upon a first hand knowledge of the philosophy of the Bolsheviks, a continuous study of the history of the Russian Revolution in all its aspects and a personal association with the Bolshevik leaders, that the ‘neutrality’ of the Soviet Union is only a passing phase, and not a principle of policy.
The Soviet Union will enter the second world war. Perhaps the circumstances and time of entrance will not be such as we desire. Much in that respect depends upon the people of this country. But enter the war she will. Nazism has no alternative but to obey its very nature, which is to expand by means of war. Bolshevik Russia stands in the way of this expansion and is the Nazis’ mortal enemy. Against the day of the oncoming fury the Soviet Union is preparing with feverish haste, lengthening the working day of her people and drilling them in preparedness while the Fascist powers preoccupy themselves with Britain and her allies.
Can we hasten the day when the U.S.S.R. will join with us in settling accounts with the enemy which seeks to enslave the world? It is my belief that we can. But it is essential, if we are to do so, that we should have a realistic understanding of the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks, their aims and their principles. To attempt to shed some light on these matters, which have been so wilfully made obscure, is the purpose of this book.
In conclusion, I wish to make my own position clear. I am a Marxist, a member of the Labour Party, and a sympathizer with the U.S.S.R. But I am not here attempting to make revolutionary socialist or pro-Russian propaganda. I do not ask the reader to approve of Russian foreign policy. My aim is to make it intelligible. The all-transcending issue is to destroy Nazism and all it stands for if life is to be worth living for any of us. This book has been prompted by my desire to help the common cause, and it is in this sense that I hope it may be judged.
Next: 2. The Aim of the Bolsheviks