IT is a mistake to think, as many do, that the Bolsheviks have ceased to be Bolsheviks; that they have changed their character and abandoned their aims and methods. Time and again we have been informed that Soviet Russia is returning to capitalism. Such information is utterly false. The assertion is the product of wishful thinking and, wilfully or otherwise, distorts all attempts to appraise correctly what is happening within the Soviet Union and what is her attitude to the rest of the world.
The Russian Communists from Lenin to Stalin, Molotov, and all the members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, aim at the achievement of world socialism. They are an integral part of a world-party working towards that goal, and are guided by its principles in all questions of policy both within the Soviet Union itself and also in its relations with other states.
Lenin was not in the least unclear on the matter. Stalin quotes from Lenin in his book on ‘Leninism’: ‘It is possible for socialism to triumph at the outset in a small number of capitalist countries, nay even in one alone. The victorious proletariat in such a land, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized socialist production, would rise against the remainder of the capitalist world, winning over to its cause the oppressed classes in other lands, inciting them to revolt against the capitalists, and even, when needs must, having recourse to armed intervention against the exploiting classes of their States.’
I am well aware that many books have been written, and that speeches and articles of Stalin and others could be quoted to prove that the Soviet Union ‘does not want an inch of anybody else’s territory’, that it wants peace, and to live at peace with the capitalist states. All these quotations are no doubt true and honestly meant. But they ‘date’. They belong to a specific period and are related to definite historic tasks. They are not, as is the quotation I have given from Lenin, statements which belong to the fundamentals of the theory which guides the Bolsheviks in their efforts to make history. They belong to the realm of practice in some particular phase of history, are true to its requirements in terms of the principal interests of socialism at that time, but are limited by the circumstances in which they are uttered.
Stalin quoted Lenin in the midst of a sharp theoretical discussion with Trotsky and his supporters in 1927 when these were combating the idea that socialism could be built in Soviet Russia without the support of at least a European Revolution. Stalin insisted that it could and that the Russians must consolidate their position within the Soviet Union and wait for more favourable circumstances than then existed to secure the extension of the Revolution to other countries.
The Bolsheviks do not subscribe to the view that socialism can be imposed on unwilling peoples. For the Red Army to march there must exist certain specific conditions. They regard revolution in any country as possible only when the conditions within that country are ripe for it, and have become ripe through the development of its own history. They also reject the idea that social revolution arises simultaneously in all countries.
Lenin once said to Arthur Ransome, who had referred to the general hostility to communist propaganda in foreign countries: ‘Tell them to build a Chinese wall round each of their countries. They have their customs’ officers, their frontiers, their coastguards. They can expel any Bolsheviks they wish. Revolution does not depend on propaganda. If the conditions of revolution are not there, no sort of propaganda will either hasten or impede it.’
In his day Lenin held the view, and Stalin and his colleagues agree with him, that socialist and capitalist states could and would exist side by side for some time. How long neither they nor anyone else could tell. But such a period, they believed, would occur—and it has occurred. At the same time every Bolshevik is convinced that the period, short or long, is nothing less than a truce between incompatible social systems. They believe that the co-existence of two mutually antagonistic social systems in the world can be only a temporary compromise.
Therein lies the fundamental reason for regarding the Soviet-Nazi Pact, or a Soviet pact with any capitalist state, as nothing but a matter of expediency and of temporary duration. From the first days of the Russian Revolution and through all the years of manœuvring by the Soviet Foreign Office, the Bolsheviks have never relaxed in the matter of preparedness. Convinced that a war would sooner or later be thrust upon them they have devoted unremitting energy to the organization of armed force. The slogan of the Red Army is ‘Always Ready’.
There are those who see in these facts and views of the Bolshevik leaders a complete justification for a concentration of capitalist forces to wipe out socialism before it becomes too powerful. The relations of Soviet Russia with the capitalist powers provide ample evidence that such a policy has been tried. The first wars of intervention led by Britain and France were clear attempts to stamp out the first Socialist State before it became a power to be reckoned with. I remember A. J. Cook once telling me of a conversation he had with Mr. Winston Churchill in which he took the latter to task for his anti-Soviet policy. Mr. Churchill justified his policy by saying: ‘It were better to smash the Bolshevik egg before it hatched than be compelled to chase Bolshevik chickens all over the world.’ Mr. Churchill may now have forgotten the incident but it aptly expressed his mind on the matter at the time and that of many other people.
The Bolsheviks, however, believe that only a decaying social system can be destroyed by force. They maintain that when a social system can no longer develop the forces of production and bring a more abundant life to the people, then that system is doomed. They hold that capitalism is such a system, decaying, fiercely striving not to die, but dying nevertheless, violently and terribly. And they believe that socialism has become an historic necessity for the human race. They regard it as the only means whereby society can bring the more abundant life to humanity.
They are thus strong in their sense of history and their place in it. They agree with Marx. ‘Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand.’
If history has not provided the conditions ripe for social revolution then they must wait for the ripening as well as work to hasten it.
Once this is clearly understood to be their attitude, both towards their own revolution and towards its development in other countries, then the apparent inconsistencies in Russian foreign policy, its frequent changes of direction, become intelligible.
Arising from their view of history and the place of their revolution in it, certain definite tasks fell upon the shoulders of the Bolsheviks from the moment they accepted the responsibility of leading Soviet Russia in world affairs. First they had to defend the revolution by all the means at their disposal and consolidate their political power. Having secured their power they were faced with the tasks of developing socialist economy and military power as rapidly as possible. This could not be done in five minutes. They were obliged to compromise with the capitalist states in order to gain time to develop their power on all fronts. Faced with a continuous worldwide conspiracy to unite the forces of capitalism against the socialist state, they took advantage of the conflict of interests between the capitalist states in order to impede all such efforts. Further, they were under obligation not to wait passively for the development of the social revolution in other countries but to aid it by all the means at their disposal.
How these principles have been applied I propose to show later. It will be obvious, however, that in a changing world the emphasis in their application will vary according to circumstance. The essence of all good strategy lies in knowing when and how to manœuvre to the greatest advantage according to the disposition, strength, and course of one’s opponents, while persistently steering to the goal ahead. The Bolsheviks have accordingly had to consider a number of important factors which, wrongly estimated, would lead to disaster. They had to consider the strength of the capitalist states with which they had immediately to deal. They had to know the political attitude of this or that capitalist state towards the Soviet Union, and the relations between the capitalist states themselves in that same attitude. They had to consider the power relationship of the Soviet Union to the capitalist world as a whole, lest some over-venturesome act led to a swift change of attitude of erstwhile ‘friendly’ capitalist states resulting in a united bloc of such states against the Soviet Union. With their wider revolutionary aims in mind they had to estimate the strength of the revolutionary trends among the working class and oppressed peoples within the countries governed by capitalism.
Hence, while it is not part of their method artificially to manufacture revolutions just because they aim at world socialism, it is an essential principle with them to estimate the relation of social forces to each other before deciding upon any course of action. The method of the Bolshevik leaders is essentially realistic. They have made mistakes in their estimates from time to time, and have paid for these as well as learned from them. But they must continue to make such estimates. A glance through any report presented by one of the leaders of the Soviet Union to a Soviet Conference or Congress will reveal their method of appraising historical developments and perspectives. Such reports serve as the basis for the concrete tasks which they set before the workers. It was Lenin’s method. It is Stalin’s method; and it must be reckoned with and understood if we are ever to understand their outlook and policy.
To illustrate Stalin’s application of this method I select his report to the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in 1928. I select this report because, after making an analysis of the world situation at that time and the perspectives immediately ahead, he sets down with great precision what he considers to be the course of action they must pursue. He says: ’Hence the tasks of the party are:—
‘(1) Along the lines of the international revolutionary movement.
‘(a) A struggle for the development of the Communist Parties throughout the world;
‘(b) A struggle for the consolidation of the revolutionary trade unions and the united front of the workers against the capitalist offensive;
‘ (c) A struggle for the strengthening of the friendship between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class of the capitalist countries;
‘(d) A struggle for a stronger alliance between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the liberation movement of the capitalist countries.
‘(2) Along the lines of the Foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.:—
‘(a) A struggle against the preparation of new imperialist wars;
‘(b) A struggle against the interventionist tendencies of Great Britain and a strengthening of the defensive capacity of the U.S.S.R.;
‘(c) An extension of our trade relations with the outside world on the basis of strengthening the foreign trade monopoly;
‘(d) Rapprochement with the so-called “weak” and “unequal” countries suffering oppression and exploitation on the part of the dominating imperialist powers.’
No one reading this programme can question that the Russian leaders have the definite aim of world socialism before them, or fail to observe how they limit the tasks before them according to their estimate of the immediate relation of social forces both at home and abroad. The apparent contradictions in their policy are simply due to the change of circumstances. They do not imply any departure from their ultimate aim.
An examination of Soviet Foreign policy will reveal that it is divisible into four distinct periods or phases, all of which correspond to profound changes in the world situation. The first period began with 1917 and ended in 1922. It was essentially the period when Soviet policy consisted mainly of revolutionary appeals to the masses of the world to come to the aid of the Bolshevik Revolution and overthrow their capitalist governments. This period ended with the termination of the wars of intervention in 1922.
The second phase is characterized by the struggle for peace and trade, almost at any price. Russia was exhausted after eight years of war, civil war and famine. The Soviet Government had to straighten out the economic situation, clear the ground of the wreckage, and accumulate reserves in order to start on the colossal task of transforming Russia into a predominantly industrialized country. For this purpose they were prepared to make concessions to foreign capitalists, pay exorbitant terms for credits and machinery, and hire the specialists of foreign industry on handsome terms. Their embassies were raided, ambassadors were assassinated and insults were poured upon them from press, pulpit, and platform in every country. But their policy remained throughout this period—peace, trade, formal state relations with all states who were prepared to come to terms.
The third phase opened with the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany. Litvinov was Soviet Russia’s Foreign Secretary. The essential feature of his policy was to prevent Germany being used as the spearhead of a capitalist bloc of all the Great Powers. Russia entered the League of Nations and made ‘collective security against the aggressors’ the principal feature of her campaign. Stalin named the aggressor powers—Germany, Italy, and Japan. This period ended with the resignation of Litvinov in 1939. Finally, there began the latest phase, of compromise with the aggressors under the banner of ‘strict neutrality’. With each of these periods or phases Of Soviet policy I will deal in greater detail later. It is sufficient for the moment to recognize them as possessing distinctive features of their own and to note how some outstanding change in the relation of world forces marks the end of one phase and the beginning of another.
The first—ending with the close of the wars of intervention—marked also the limits reached by the revolutionary wave which had swept across Europe. The Revolution within the frontiers of Soviet Russia was intact. Beyond those frontiers it was definitely on the ebb. The workers were retreating to defensive positions. The second phase lasted until the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany. This phenomenon changed the relation of forces throughout Europe. The Russians felt that war was now on their own doorstep. Pre-Hitler Germany had not threatened Russia. Hitler Germany rose to power as the European bulwark against Bolshevism. The new situation demanded new measures, and Russia entered the League of Nations which previously it had denounced as a ‘thieves’ kitchen’. This period ended with Europe on the brink of war, and with the Russians convinced that they were being manœuvred into a position in which they would have to bear the brunt of a war which could be rapidly transformed into a world war against them. They countered with the Soviet-Nazi Pact which opened the latest phase of ‘neutrality’. But the end is not yet. Meanwhile let us examine each phase separately.
Next: 3. The Struggle for Life