


# Palestine!



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## ARAB REACTION, LEBANESE RIGHT THREATEN PLO

# What's Ahead For Palestinians in Lebanon

A conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has produced a ceasefire in Lebanon, forestalling what would have been the bloodiest battle between Syria and the Palestinian-progressive Lebanese alliance. The fact that the force behind the ceasefire came not from within Lebanon itself, nor even from Syria, is fresh evidence that the conflict in Lebanon is not only a clash between the local Lebanese and Palestinian parties, nor merely a conflict between various of those parties and Syria, but an inter-Arab conflict and even, in many ways, an international one. On the blood-soaked ground of Lebanon the future of the Middle East is being fought out—with bullets and artillery shells and with political and diplomatic activity too.

The ceasefire, ironically, emerged from a Syrian attempt to impose a military solution on Lebanon. On October 12 Syrian troops opened a major offensive against Palestinian and nationalist Lebanese territory in Lebanon. It seemed to be the assault which had been predicted—and threatened—for the previous month, in which Syria would move definitively to assert military hegemony in Lebanon, by seizing Sidon, western Beirut and Tripoli and the other areas held by the Palestinian and progressive forces. In preparation for the expected attack, progressive Lebanese and Palestinian forces were reported to have mined the roads to Sidon and to have placed Soviet-built SAM missiles in position to defend against Syrian air raids.

In purely military terms, there did not seem to be much hope

that the progressive forces could have held out in the long run against such an assault. Most of the fighters in the Lebanese nationalist front and in the Palestinian organizations are militia: they can defend their camps and neighborhoods against limited attack, but they could not be expected to hold off the well-equipped and well-trained Syrian army. Nor could these forces be pulled out of their localities and expected to fight effectively in large units in a conventional warfare of positions.

The struggle in Lebanon is not, however, a purely military one, and several factors emerged to show those in conservative Arab capitals who supported the Syrian intervention that the intentions behind the intervention could not be fulfilled at that point through all-out military attack.

### SYRIAN OBJECTIVES: HEGEMONY AND SETTLEMENT

The Syrian regime has been working to prevent the establishment of a progressive government in Lebanon and has been trying to bring about a Lebanese government—and a Palestinian entity—amenable to Syria's strategy in regard to settlement with Israel under the auspices of the U.S. Since last spring the Lebanese progressive forces and the PLO have been warning about a very concrete form of that danger—a Syrian plan to establish a federation of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinians, and then to conclude a settlement with Israel. The threat of a federation under Syrian domination was underlined

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Palestinians leaving captured Tal az Za'atar refugee camp, still determined to carry on the struggle.




# Israel Expands Into Southern Lebanon

In the last several months Israel has been creating a sphere of influence in southern Lebanon. Before the intense fighting of the civil war in Lebanon drew the Palestinian *fedayeen* from the south of Lebanon to the crucial battles further north, the border region had served as a base area for commando raids into Israel. As the commandos were drawn away from the south, Israel moved in, through a strong alliance with the right wing militias, determined to expel and prevent the return of Palestinian and progressive Lebanese armed elements. In the wake of the Riyadh agreement, however, Palestinian commandos were reported to be heading back to southern Lebanon, and a significant clash seemed to be shaping up.

Israel had moved on three fronts to create its sphere of influence—social, economic, and, most dramatically, military.

*Time* magazine reported on September 13 that Israel was training a battalion of rightist Lebanese near the Sinai desert for tank warfare, and planned to dispatch them back to Lebanon with 38 Sherman tanks. In October, the Observer Foreign News Service described the operations of the reactionary militias in southern Lebanon, who already had 26 of the tanks. Journalists in southern Lebanon wrote of phone hookups from reactionary posts in southern Lebanon to Israeli army positions in northern Israel, and reactionary officers boasted that the phones could be used to call in Israeli troops if the Lebanese militia was unable to handle a battle on its own.



Right-wing Lebanese soldiers on patrol with U.S.-made armoured personnel carriers, waving to Israelis at the border.

## U.S. ARMS TO LEBANON VIA ISRAEL

U.S. collusion with Israel to supply the Lebanese right, which has been observed repeatedly at least since last spring, is clear in the case of the new Israeli action in southern Lebanon. The Sherman tanks which Israel gave the Lebanese right for use in southern Lebanon were made in the U.S.—and U.S. arms are not supposed to be exported to a third country without U.S. government permission. The tanks were hardly the only U.S. military item given by Israel to its allies in southern Lebanon: an *Israel Sun* photo published in the *Jerusalem Post* showed rightist fighters in Southern Lebanon on an American-made personnel carrier, and the caption observed that the same model was in use in the Israeli Army.

The Israeli assistance to the Phalange and other right forces was important in their expansion of their hold on the villages of the south. The right has occupied a five to eight mile wide belt along most of the border, and, after the ceasefire was accepted by the Palestinians and Syrians just before the Riyadh meeting, the right launched an offensive to consolidate and expand their holdings.

## ISRAEL OPENS FRONTIER WITH A "GOOD FENCE"

Social aspects of Israeli activities have been important in construction of its sphere of influence. By mid-October, some 11,000 persons have been treated at Israeli military installations at the "Good Fence," as the Zionists are calling the newly opened frontier. The Israeli press accords extensive coverage to the more seriously wounded who are treated in Israeli hospitals. Public appeals for "aid to the Maronites" are being made in Israel; the Haifa Maronite Committee for Aid to Lebanon was reported to have collected funds from Arabs and Jews for shipments to Lebanon, including 8 tons of food destined, according to the *Jerusalem Post*, for "border villages and Christian fighting men."

An Israel Public Committee for Aid to Lebanon, in which the son of the late former Prime Minister Moshe Sharett is a "prime mover" has been established, and is active in work outside Israel. One of its leaders told the *Jerusalem Post* that "If, for example, Israel succeeds in getting the cooperation of the Lebanese community in the U.S. [through non-official "aid" to Lebanon activities] this could very well lead to a joint Jewish-Lebanese political lobby there."

## THE ECONOMIC FRONT

The economic aspects of the Israeli activities in southern Lebanon could have long-range significance. Already Israeli exports to Lebanon have reached a total of over \$200,000, mostly consisting of flour, sugar and agricultural supplies. Israeli authorities have made arrangements with certain notables in southern villages to oversee the trade to assure that none of the imports reach hard-pressed leftist or Palestinian fighters. Israel reportedly bought last year's tobacco crop from southern farmers for \$600,000, though the growers expressed some discontent over prices. Apparently Israel also plans to buy the current crop when it is harvested in February.

Three hundred workers from southern Lebanon are now employed in Israel, many of them in textile factories in Kiryat Shmona and Dubek. Israeli Labor Minister Moshe Baram recently announced that the limit on employment may be raised from 300 to 500. □

# On the Occupied West Bank

## NEW SIGNS OF HUSSEIN'S AMBITIONS

There are new indications that Jordan's King Hussein has not renounced ambitions to regain the West Bank in the event of Israeli withdrawal. He seems to have adopted a new "carrot and stick" approach to restore his political influence, which the last municipal elections on the West Bank indicated had dwindled significantly.

Hussein brandished the "stick" in August, when the Jordanian government, according to a UPI report, decided to stop paying the salaries of some 50,000 civil servants in the West Bank, many of whom have also been collecting pay from the occupation administration.

Just before that action, Hussein wielded the carrot, inviting to Amman the new mayor of Hebron, Fuad Qawasma, elected last April as a Palestinian nationalist and opponent of the Jordanian monarchy. The London *Guardian* described Qawasma's reception in Amman as "regal" and quoted rumors that Hussein had promised Qawasma approximately \$3 million in development aid for Hebron.

Jordan has apparently not transferred any new funds to the municipal councils of the West Bank since the April elections, though some funds promised to the previous councils are said to have been delivered.

Israeli radio reported that Jordan is deferring further aid to the municipalities of the West Bank until the situation in Lebanon is clarified.

According to a broadcast from Jerusalem on September 12, under the new "carrot and stick" policy, "Jordan will increase its aid to its supporters in the West Bank even to the extent of appointing some of them as ministers in its cabinet, but it will demand from them a political compensation, namely support for renewing the initiative for an interim agreement with Israel. On the other hand, Jordan may totally boycott its opponents, including some mayors, which it has refrained from doing so far."

The *Voice of Palestine* reported that Yasser Arafat had presided over a meeting of the Palestinian revolutionary command, attended by representatives of all the Palestinian

Israel soldiers on patrol in the West Bank.



resistance organizations, on September 13 to discuss the "suspicious Jordanian movements." The commentary expressed concern about the summoning of West Bank personalities to meetings in Amman. It further stated, "foremost of these [suspicious moves] is the return of the phenomenon of petitions and signature collecting." The motivation behind Hussein's actions, according to the *Voice of Palestine* is to gather support for a request which Jordan and Syria would make to the Arab states for reconsideration of the resolution of the Rabat Arab Summit conference in 1974, which affirmed that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and left no role for Hussein on the West Bank.

## PALESTINIAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST LAND EXPROPRIATION

Residents of a number of West Bank towns have protested action by the Israeli military government to seize their land for Jewish settlements. In the latter part of the summer, at least two groups of West Bank landowners were told that their property was scheduled to be "enclosed"—that is, set aside for Jewish settlement, and its use forbidden to the rightful owners. The military government informed people in Har Gila in Bethlehem that their lands were to be taken for an Israeli housing project, which will include villas. Property owners in Al'Ayzariyah, a village southeast of Jerusalem, were notified that their lands too would be seized for a housing project.

In Hebron, the military authorities on September 12 demolished a building which had been erected "illegally" by an Arab resident of Hebron near the Israeli settlement of Kiryat 'Araba. The settlers at Kiryat 'Araba have provoked increased tensions in Hebron by seizing the old Hadassah building in the Arab town for use as a synagogue.

People from Bayt Jala have held a number of sit-ins in municipal offices there to protest expropriations. On September 2 representatives from six villages in the area of Turmus 'Ayya met in the municipal offices of Nablus, to protest the "enclosure" of about 250 acres of land.

On the same day, residents of Al Bireh met and called for resistance to the efforts of the military government to expropriate, allegedly for military purposes, about 750 acres of land southeast of Al Bireh; they asked people to build on these lands, which have been "enclosed" by the military governor. Despite a later warning from the military governor of Ramallah, the Al Bireh people announced that they would refuse to obey the order prohibiting them from the area, and announced their intention to build a mosque on the property.

The occupation authorities quickly cracked down on the activities in Al Bireh, however, arresting the chief municipal building inspector, apparently for laying out a road toward the enclosed area. The mayor and municipal council members of Al Bireh held a sit-in in the offices of the military governor in Ramallah on September 13 to protest the arrest.

People on the West Bank are now reported to be preparing to send a delegation to the United Nations to protest the seizure of land, an act which the Geneva Convention brands as criminal during military occupation. □

## Palestinians

Con't. from page 1

by the ostentation surrounding the Jordanian-Syrian federation announced last winter: numerous officials have traveled from one capital to the other, and tangible progress has been made on a joint industrial development area on the border between the two countries.

Not until August 30, however, was the federation plan publicly discussed by Syria. Then an editorial in the official organ of the Baath Party, *Ath Thawra*, presented the federation scheme in favorable terms, and announced that a "new relationship" between Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the PLO was on the agenda for talks with then President elect of Lebanon Elias Sarkis, who would be in Damascus the following day.


At about the same time, the Syrian regime resurrected its demand for the ouster of Yasser Arafat from the leadership of the PLO, and continued to denounce the Palestinian leadership in the strongest and most improbable terms as "agents of Zionism and imperialism." Reports circulated that the Syrian regime was advocating Yasser Arafat's replacement by a committee of three—one of them, not surprisingly, Zuhair Mohsen, head of as Saqia, an ostensibly Palestinian organization closely linked to Damascus.

The federation plan seems to be aimed at providing a context, designed to be potentially acceptable to elements in Israel, within which the Palestine problem can be "solved" by relinquishing areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to "federated Arab" but not specifically Palestinian control. Apparently the Syrian regime also believes that the participation of Hussein in such a federation would help to circumvent the objections of Israel and the U.S., who insist that only Hussein can negotiate for the West Bank.

### SYRIA AND THE PROSPECT OF A U.S.-IMPOSED SETTLEMENT

Maxim Ghilan, editor of the Paris-based *Israel and Palestine* traces Syria's intervention in Lebanon to a meeting between Kissinger and Hafiz al Assad in Damascus on the eve of the signing of the second Sinai Agreement on September 4, 1975. According to Ghilan, after receiving Assad's refusal to endorse the Sinai Agreement:

"Kissinger explained to al Assad in his usual noncommittal way that Israel is just not ready to agree to any Palestinian state; and as the Arab differences are an increasingly important fact now, he, Assad, would do better to support King Hussein's



Areas of control in Lebanon.

efforts to recover the West Bank as part of the Hashemite Kingdom, instead of supporting fruitlessly the Palestinians. Kissinger then broadly hinted that the U.S. might support such a reappraisal....

"Then Kissinger listed conditions: 1) There could be no independent Palestinian state or national authority; 2) The PLO or other Palestinians would not be allowed to participate personally and actively in any discussions as an independent party to the dialog; 3) The Syrians would have to agree to this before further steps should be taken."

If Ghilan is correct in his information, it would clarify the significance of the federation plan as a means of bridging the gap between the U.S.-Israeli refusal to recognize the PLO, and the position of the Arab states confirming the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the Rabat Conference in 1974. The PLO, under the federation plan, could be merged into a larger Arab entity, dominated by Syria, in which Hussein would also be a member.

The Syrian expedition in Lebanon, then, becomes a preparation for the post-election Middle East settlement for which the U.S. government has, according to published reports, warned the conservative Arab states to prepare. Whether there is any serious intention in Washington to move towards imposition of a settlement, or whether the U.S. government has merely been stringing its friends in the Arab world along again—as it did with the Rogers Plan in 1970—remains to be seen. Whether the U.S. could force Israel to go along with any agreement ceding territory on the West Bank or in Gaza, without touching off serious political disruptions in Israel, which would weaken it to a degree dangerous to U.S. interests, is another question.

### SYRIA'S PLAN THWARTED BY RESISTANCE

Syria's intentions in Lebanon could have been realized if the Palestinians did not resist Assad's invasion last spring; the Syrian prime minister expected, according to U.S. envoy L. Dean Brown, that he would not meet significant opposition from the PLO. However, the Palestinian and progressive Lebanese forces have fought with great tenacity and courage, even when outweighed militarily: that is the great symbolic importance of the 53 day stand of Tal az Za'atar against the reactionary Lebanese militias, and the significance of the photos showing progressive forces in Sidon jubilant over captured Syrian tanks last spring.

Additionally, in the fighting on the Aleih-Bhamdun front, one of the dual prongs in the Syrian offensive, Palestine Liberation Organization troops showed that they could mount a spirited and very competent opposition to the Syrian army, even in conventional fighting.

The prospect of a protracted fight, with heavy Syrian casualties in house-to-house fighting in Sidon and Western Beirut was very unattractive to Syria and its supporters. The intent had been to achieve a quick domination, and a coherent Arab front united under Syria, not to leave the Arab forces still locked in bloody fighting when the time for negotiation was at hand. The intention had been to subsume the PLO under the Syrian leadership, not to obliterate the Palestinian movement. Syria had intended to strengthen the Arab position vis-a-vis Israel in order to obtain an advantageous settlement, although within the limits Syria was accepting. Now, disturbingly, Syria saw that Israel, its tacit ally in Lebanon over the past several months, began to take blatant advantage of the fighting preoccupying the PLO, and was establishing a sphere of influence in southern Lebanon, openly flaunting its links with the Lebanese right.

In the background to Syria's acquiescence to a cease-fire lurked the question of finances. The adventure in Lebanon is reportedly costing Syria \$1 million a day. Moreover, Iraq retaliated against the invasion by terminating shipments of oil to the Mediterranean via Syrian pipelines, depriving Syria of an annual \$272 million in transit fees. Syria had to trim its budget by a third this year, many development projects have been laid aside, and inflation is astronomical.

### THE RIYADH AGREEMENT

On October 16, with those strategic considerations pressing, the Saudi regime invited Hafiz al Assad and Yasser Arafat, reportedly in a rather peremptory fashion, to discussions in Riyadh with leaders from Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. A Saudi plane was dispatched to fly Yasser Arafat safely out of Lebanon, and the Palestinian and Syrian leaders agreed to a ceasefire.

In Riyadh, the outlines of an agreement took shape. The ceasefire was to be followed by withdrawal to positions held before the civil war, and the 2300 man Arab peacekeeping force now in Lebanon was to be beefed up. This force, to be placed under the command of Lebanese President Elias Sarkis—who had no troops heretofore to command, since the Lebanese army split and scattered—is to confiscate heavy weapons from the various parties, enforce the ceasefire, restore public services and oversee adherence to the 1969 Cairo Agreement. (That agreement, while upholding the right of the Palestinians to organize in Lebanon, restricted their armed presence to certain areas in the south and limited the armament of the refugee camps.)

An Arab summit conference in Cairo held shortly after the Riyadh meeting worked out the machinery to implement the Riyadh plan. The meeting did not spell out the composition of the peacekeeping force, but it was clear that Syrian troops would constitute, as Syrian Information Minister Ahmad Iskander later said, "the backbone" of the force. The force was first announced to have a planned complement of 30,000 troops, but the number was later reduced, according to a report in the *Middle East Economic Digest*, to 20,000. Yasser Arafat's offer of 5,000 men for the force was not taken up, though contingents from countries friendly to the PLO—North and South Yemen and Libya—are expected, along with Sudanese and United Arab Emirate troops.

The immediate effects of the Riyadh Agreement appear to have offered a respite to the Palestinian and nationalist Lebanese movements. The full-scale Syrian assault on Sidon, Western Beirut, Tripoli and other territory held by the Palestinian and progressive forces was averted, at least for the time being. The toll could have been awesome, and the long-range outlook was not good. Supply routes have been restored, alleviating a serious problem, and a breathing spell was achieved. In a limited way, the Palestinians have moved into some of the southern territory they lost, though they are very vulnerable there to Syrian restriction.

Politically, at the Riyadh and Cairo conferences with the Arab states reaffirming in practice their recognition of the legitimacy of the PLO, Syria laid aside—for the time being at least—its recent challenges to the composition of the PLO's leadership. The conferences may have enhanced the Palestinian and progressive position vis-a-vis the various alliances operating in and around Lebanon: the role of friendly Arab states, while still limited, is somewhat larger so that the PLO and the Lebanese left are not dealing with hostile Syria in isolation. In addition, contradictions may develop between Syria and the most reactionary of its allies in the Lebanese right. Sore spots have already appeared in regard to the stationing of Arab peace-keeping forces on territory held by the right, and in allowing Palestinian units back into some areas of southern Lebanon.

On the other hand, the Riyadh and Cairo conferences offered new proof that the inter-Arab context is very inimical to the ultimate interests of the PLO and the Lebanese left. The conferences passively legitimated the Syrian role in Lebanon. Furthermore, the reactionary Arab axis, which U.S. strategists have been banking on, emerged strengthened from the discussions. The breach between Egypt and Syria—the weakest link in the conservative alliance—seemed to be healed. The Syria regime had been denouncing Egyptian agreement to the Sinai Accords a year ago quite accurately as a betrayal of the Arab cause. Egypt had been condemning the Syrian invasion of Lebanon, also quite

## Need For Medical Aid to Lebanon Still Acute

Many of our readers have responded to the appeal in the last issue of *Palestine!* for contributions to medical aid for the Palestinians and progressive Lebanese. Donations were received, which are being used to purchase antibiotics for shipment to Lebanon. A nurse has volunteered to work in Lebanon as soon as transportation arrangements can be completed. A prisoner in Leavenworth wrote that a group there has been trying to arrange to donate blood for Lebanon.

The need for medical aid, we have been informed, is still very acute. Please send whatever you can today, and note that it is to be used for medical aid to Lebanon. Send contributions to: Palestine Solidarity Committee, Box 1757, Manhattanville Station, New York, New York, 10027.



accurately, as a betrayal of the Arab cause. But at Riyadh, the two regimes appeared to have been reunited.

Another factor which tended to enhance the reactionary axis was the obvious power of Saudi Arabia, whose initiative for a ceasefire met a quick and favorable response. And Kuwait, also an active member of the right alliance, has recently veered sharply to the right internally.

This growing power of the right in inter-Arab affairs bodes ill for the Palestinians. On the other hand, their own determination and will to struggle and that of their allies, the Lebanese left, is a factor which Syria and its supporters have found themselves forced to reassess. Their ability to persevere has been put to the test by a farflung alliance, the U.S., Israel, Syria and the Lebanese reactionaries. Within that alliance conflicting interests abound. Those contradictions, along with the will of the Palestinians, may yet prevent the realization of the Syrian objectives. □

## INHABITANTS TELL OF STEADFAST RESISTANCE

# The Struggle of Tal az Za'atar

The resistance of the people of Tal az Za'atar to siege and attack by reactionary forces has become a symbol of the will of the Palestinian people and the nationalist Lebanese to persevere in their struggle.

Tal az Za'atar was a symbol as well of the contradictions which brought about the bloody civil war. From the camp on a hillside just east of Beirut the skyscrapers of the city stood out against the startling blue of the Mediterranean. The Middle East regional office of many multinational corporations, Aramco, Chase Manhattan and others, were headquartered in luxurious office buildings, a monument not only to profits flowing back to centers of Western capital, but to the enormous fortunes which sectors of the Lebanese bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs from other Arab countries had made in real estate speculation since the early sixties.

Tal az Za'atar itself was covered not with the purple flowers and aroma of herbs suggested by its name, Arabic for "Hill of Thyme," but by the homes of the poor, a bitter contrast to the skyscrapers gleaming in the distance.

At the bottom of the hill over 20,000 Palestinian refugees lived in a camp established by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Here most families live packed into a single room in a concrete block home with a zinc roof, or in a shanty of large flattened tin cans. Throughout the camp, since 1969, the walls had been plastered with the posters of the Palestinian struggle.

Above the Palestinian camp proper, the hillside was striped with settlements of other poor people. The families of Syrians who had come to Beirut to find work—often poorly-paid labor in the port—lived in one area. Above them, in a settlement which has been swelling over the last few years, lived poor Lebanese. They were refugees of a sort too, many of them driven from their villages in southern Lebanon by Israeli air raids, or forced off the land by the capitalization of agriculture and the devastating economic changes wrought in Lebanon in the last decade and a half, which have engorged the upper classes with wealth and emiserated the poor.

Since 1970, the Palestinians of the camp and the Lebanese of the shantytown developed close links, ties which they needed to strengthen their defense against the hostile forces surrounding the camp. For just beyond the small factories and workshops which ringed Tal az Za'atar and exploited the cheap labor of its inhabitants were Maronite neighborhoods, strongholds of the reactionary Phalangist Party.

After al Maslakh, al Dekwaneh and other areas adjacent to Tal az Za'atar in the Belt of Misery around Beirut fell to the reactionary forces in January, 1976, their residents were massacred or expelled. Tal az Za'atar and neighboring An Naba' remained the only Palestinian-progressive Lebanese concentration in the area between the right-wing areas of Beirut and those in the mountains.

Following are excerpts from interviews with those who struggled in Tal Az Za'atar:

*Saleh Zaydan, a Palestinian military leader in Tal az Za'atar:*

Since March 11 the isolationist forces tried to impose a blockade on the camp, and allowed nothing in or out of Tal az Za'atar. [During the entire period, the siege was broken only a few short times, and resupply of the camp was very limited.] This attempt to strangle us, however, only strengthened our will to fight.

The launching of the latest attack by the isolationist forces



coincided exactly with the conspiratorial Syrian intervention, which had the effect of pinning down the forces of the Palestinian revolution in many areas, forces which had previously prevented the enemy from a major attack on the camp. From here we can say quite safely that the isolationist attack wouldn't have taken place without the political and military support of Syria.

Moreover, inside the camp, as Saiqa [a Syrian-sponsored Palestinian group] was loyal to the Syrian-isolationist alliance. As Saiqa helped the Syrian and isolationist forces by supplying information to them about weak points in the defense of the camp. . . . At one point the leader of as Saiqa came to me at 6:00 in the morning [after the fall of a position at the top of the hill] with one of the leaders of another organization. He said that they wanted a meeting of all organizations to discuss saving the population of the camp, and that in their opinion, what the situation demanded was negotiation with the isolationists to arrange the surrender of the camp.

I told them that what was demanded was that we fight, and that the fall of one position does not mean the fall of the camp. We called a meeting of all the resistance organizations, and by a majority, we agreed to continue to resist.

*With the attack on June 22, fifty-three days of suffering and struggle began for Tal az Za'atar.*

*Gibran, a military leader:*

All we had left for food was lentils; lentils were even used to make bread, because they were the only food available. The masses fought against the attack with such little food that it can really be said they fought the enemy with their lentils. The problem of water was more serious, however. We had only one

well, a deep one which required pumps to draw the water. After the electricity was cut off we used all the car batteries that were around to ensure a minimum amount of water, at least for the injured, and for the camp in general.

*Mohammed Dyab, age 30, a volunteer teacher in the camp:*

All those who used to go to fetch water knew that a cup of water might cost them a cup of blood. It was difficult to accept, but there was no choice. If there is a picture that never can be forgotten, it is that of the 40-year old woman who was shot in the shoulder while dragging the bucket away from the tap. She refused our attempts to take her to the hospital and insisted, "I will not go to the hospital until I see my children drinking."

*Dr. Youssef al Iraqi, who treated the wounded in Tal az Za'atar throughout the siege:*

After a while the hospital became useless because all of its entrances were subjected to isolationist machine-gun fire and shelling. Moreover, there had been cases of contagious gangrene. The best solution seemed to be to keep these cases in the hospital and remove the other patients to the 13 emergency centers already established in civilian houses in the camp. . .

As a result of the continuous heavy shelling, the medical depot was destroyed. We were left with no dressing material for wounds and had to use shirts and nylon, which as you know is harmful. We were also obliged to clean wounds with a mixture of salt and water because of our lack of medical supplies."


*Dr. Adel Aziz Labadi:*

About 60 men and women worked as nurses in these [13 emergency] centers. Most of them were killed by snipers while performing their duty, since they had to move about because of the nature of the work.

Those who survived [20 nurses] were rounded up by the isolationists and killed in front of us."

*Saleh Zaydan:*

We had established a centralized room for military operations



Tal az Za'atar Palestinian refugee camp.

for all the organizations of the Palestinian resistance and of the Lebanese nationalist front, the Communist Party and League for Communist Action also. The coordination was very good of course. Some capitulationist forces appeared among the leaders but their bases did not agree with them.

We established fortifications, simple fortifications, in all the positions with whatever we had, sandbags, wood, whatever came to our hands. We built some fortifications with reinforced concrete.

*When the camp was evacuated, the civilian population met brutality at the hands of the rightist Lebanese and Syrian troops:*

*Hind, 12 years old:*

They took the bandages from around her arms, thinking that she was concealing jewelry. The isolationist soldier discovered that she had been hit by shrapnel, so he hit her and spat on her face, because she disappointed him and had no jewelry.

*Mariam Riad, 40 years old:*

The Syrian forces said they were coming to take us elsewhere. But they seized Jawaher Shahrour of the Democratic Front and they killed her, and they grabbed Hanna and beat her. And I screamed, "Are you Zionists?" A soldier answered me back, "Shut up, give me your ring and get in the car."

They took us in a military car. . . and with them there was a Syrian soldier. . . And on the way we saw that one of the soldiers was a member of as Saiqa who was stationed at the barricades to look out for all armed women. And at every barricade they beat us and insulted us. We kept quiet them, but we're not going to forget what happened to us.

They took away the son of Umm Mar'i, 14 years old. They took him out of her arms and they opened fire with their machine guns on him. And Umm Mar'i is still crazed, crying night and day for Mar'i to come back from Tal az Za'atar. She screams, "Mar'i, you are going to come back my son, you are going to come back, Mar'i."

*After the reactionary forces entered the camp, they massacred the inhabitants and looted their homes.*

*A correspondent for the Manchester Guardian reported the day after the fall of Tal az Za'atar:*

The first thing that strikes you as you enter the camp is the all-pervading stench of death. Then, as you make your way into the camp's perimeter with the hordes of rightist looters—most of them wearing surgical masks because of the stench—you begin to see the bodies.

Bodies everywhere. In the twisting alleyways between the huts and shacks which made up the camp, scores of bodies lie twisted among the pathetic contents of their houses, all thrown out into the alleyways.

National Liberal Party official Danny Chamoun told journalists today that he estimated that there were some 1400 to 2200 bodies inside the camp, and judging from the areas of the camp which I saw, these figures seem quite likely."

*Fighters who broke out of Tal az Za'atar in the final hours of the siege expressed determination to continue their struggle.*

*Salam, a military leader in Tal az Za'atar:*

The national unity of the defenders, whether on the Palestinian level or the Palestinian-Lebanese level was a living example of the camps steadfastness despite the siege and assaults. . . .

Our exit from Tal az Za'atar, in spite of the isolationist siege, was not easy, for we were forced to wage a defensive battle. We were nonetheless able to break through gaps in the isolationist lines and to join positions of the nationalist forces in the mountains, to join our comrades in arms and to participate with them in the battle against the great conspiracy being executed in Lebanon, of which both the isolationist forces and the Syrians are the tools." □

## TOUFIQ ZAYAD DENGUNCES ISRAELI POLICIES

# Mayor of Nazareth Speaks in U.S.

The following commentary on the Israeli government's policies towards Arabs living within the 1948 borders of Israel is excerpted from a speech given by Toufiq Zayad, the mayor of Nazareth since December, 1975. Zayad is a member of Rakah, the Israeli Communist Party. Rakah is one of the targets of the recently released Koenig report which Zayad mentions in the speech. The speech was delivered to the Association of Arab-American University Graduates in New York City on October 2.



Toufiq Zayad

Last year the Knesset [Israeli parliament] approved the fascist program called Judaization of the Galilee. The plan of the Judaization of the Galilee has two major aims: the first, to deprive the Arabs of the remainder of their lands by means of confiscation and second, to change the demographic composition of the Galilee, which is inhabited by an Arab majority, by changing it into a Jewish majority. In short, the construction of the future of one people on the ruins of another.

## KOENIG MEMORANDUM

On September 7, 1976, the so-called Koenig memorandum was published in Israel. This is a racist document, presented by its author as a working program for the Israeli authorities concerning the Arab population.

Koenig has been the governor for 13 years of the northern district, where 250,000 Arabs reside, more than 50% of the Arabs in Israel. This memorandum is a typical model for the policy which has been practiced against the Arabs, and it reflects the official policy of the government.

## ISRAELI POLICIES: LAND CONFISCATIONS

Expropriation of Arab-owned lands is the basic strategy of Zionism which in turn is the working ideology of the Israeli rulers. The Arabs lost their lands not like one who loses a wet piece of soap. Their lands were detached from them by the power of special laws, by physical violence and by the use of armored cars and tanks of the Israeli police and army.

The number of Arab villages in the area on which Israel was established totalled 585. After the establishment of the state this number went down to 107. The population of the remainder of these villages was kicked out by force or ran away in fear of massacres similar to the Deir Yassin massacre. These villages were bulldozed and erased. The authorities forbade the villagers to go back to their old villages. They were regarded as absentees and the government took over their lands.

Since the establishment of the state of Israel, land confiscations were, and still are, a continuous process. Official statistics, which are somewhat diluted, show that the government has confiscated 6,500,000 dunams (1,625,000 acres) or one third of the area of the state of Israel before 1967.

In order to mislead world public opinion, the Israeli authorities declare that the aims behind these confiscations are the development and industrialization of Arab villages. But the Israeli government has always imposed on Arab villages a systematic policy of prevention of development.

Let's examine the bitter facts. Vast areas which have been expropriated and which were cultivated until the time of the confiscation are still without cultivation because of lack of Jewish manpower. It's preferable to have them without cultivation then returned to the Arab owners.

In all the Arab towns and villages, there is absolutely no industry. Nazareth, population 45,000, the largest all-Arab city

in Israel, has not even one factory. And factories which existed in it before were liquidated during the early days of the state of Israel. But, in the all-Jewish city of Upper Nazareth there are tens of factories which are regarded as the largest in their fields of production, such as textiles, food industry, and the assembling of cars.

Land was confiscated from Arab Nazareth in the declared aim for its development, but it became apparent that the aim was to construct a Jewish city while Arab Nazareth would be converted by the passage of time, into a neglected quarter.

The situation of public services in Arabic cities and villages is a tragic one. The goal is to impose retardation on Arab villages and towns, freezing their development, embittering their lives, and impoverishing them to weaken any influence they have on political and economic life in Israel.

## ISRAELI CULTURAL POLICIES

Along with the policy of Judaizing the land, the authorities have concentrated on a policy aimed at cultural and spiritual Judaization in order to create a generation that lacks any national consciousness. Immediately after the establishment of the state, the ministry of education replaced the educational programs in the schools. It cancelled anything that might bring up younger generations to love their homeland, to have national respect and to cling to great human values.

For example, a song which had been taught from generation to generation in the schools was cancelled because it smelled of love of one's country. It begins, "Peace unto you, oh my fatherland. How good it is to live and sing upon your soil."

The Israeli minister of education put into operation a policy of limiting Arab mental capacity—this is what we call mis-education. This policy has been defined by one of the previous advisors on Arab affairs for the prime minister. In the early 60's he said, "Our policy towards the Arabs is directed to make them an illiterate people by preventing the students from reaching the universities. If they were educated, it would be difficult to rule them."

While Arabs form 15% of the population in Israel, they are only 7.7% of the students in high schools and 0.9% in universities.

Another example of government discriminatory policy in education can be seen at the Arabic language faculties, where Arab students study their mother tongue through lectures in the Hebrew language.

## REPRESSION BREEDS RESISTANCE

In reality the cultural and educational Judaization policy, with all its ramifications, gives exactly the opposite [of its intended] results. The younger generations which were born and grew up in Israel, in Israel's short history are more conscious nationally, socially and politically. These same generations constitute the cornerstone of the Arab struggle in Israel for civil and national rights.

Today the Arab masses are leading an important struggle to achieve change. One of the most important facets of that struggle was the general strike [in reaction to the Koenig report] which took place September 28 and was a complete success.

The general strike on the Day of the Land [March 30, 1976] was a summit in this struggle. It was a new quality. It caused an earthquake that shook the state from end to end. The sanguinary assault [Israeli soldiers killed 6 Arabs] that was intended to teach the Arabs a lesson caused greater reaction than the strike itself. The funerals of the martyrs were attended by tens of thousands of people, Arab masses under the regime of oppression that affects all spheres of life. □

## ISRAELI OFFICIAL GIVES BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION

# Report Calls For Tight Control Of Arabs

Following are excerpts from a report by the Israeli Interior Ministry's chief administrator for the Galilee region, which calls for strict curbs on the Arab population in that area, where most of the Palestinians in Israel live. The report, written by Israel Koenig, who has been the Galilee District Commissioner for 13 years, was leaked to the press on September 7.

In response to the Koenig report, Palestinians throughout the Galilee held a general strike on September 28 (see further details in story on this page) Koenig was strongly supported, in contrast, by politicians and leaders of the Jewish towns in the Galilee region.

The publication of Koenig's report, "brought to the surface a long simmering controversy about Arab policies . . . of the government, noted the Jerusalem Post. Reaction in Israel included condemnation by the Mapam Party, which advocates "reducing friction" and "promoting integration" of Arabs into Israeli society; and others who supported Koenig's ideas but didn't want the memo published, noting the difference between the "blunt style" of a memorandum and a "more balanced and carefully weighed expression" that could be publicized.

Koenig's investigation was reportedly commissioned by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin late in 1975 and distributed among Israeli officials six months before it was made public. Koenig, a member of the National Religious Party, prepared the document in collaboration with officials of the Labor Party, the ruling party in Israel. Rabin insisted that the report not be discussed in parliament, and commented merely, "the government's policy on the question of Israel's Arabs remains valid." The Director General of the Interior Ministry, Haim Kubersky, explicitly defended the report and said there is no intention of removing Koenig from his government post.

The following is excerpted:

## GENERAL:

Until a very short while ago it was accepted by those dealing with Israel's [Arab] population that it had fully come to terms with the establishment of the State of Israel and had a high degree of identification with the state and had been drawn into its various frameworks . . .

Recently, certain phenomena have occurred which have challenged these assumptions and which have seriously questioned the loyalty of a large part of them to the state and to its very existence . . .

## A. THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM AND THE MANIFESTATIONS OF ARAB NATIONALISM:

The natural increase of the Arab population in Israel is 5.9% annually against a natural increase of 1.5% annually among the Jewish population. This problem is particularly acute in the northern district [Galilee] where there is a large Arab population. In mid-1975 the Arab population of the northern district was 250,000 while the Jewish population was 289,000 . . . By 1978 Arabs will constitute over 51% of the total population of that district . . . The Arab's increase will endanger our control of that area . . .

The Israeli Arab population has received a nationalistic

[Con't. on page 10]

## PALESTINIANS CALL FOR OUSTER OF TOP ISRAELI REGIONAL OFFICIAL

# Municipal Strike in the Galilee

Palestinians throughout the Galilee region in northern Israel staged a two-hour strike on September 28, protesting the report "Handling the Arabs of Israel" published by Israel Koenig, Israeli administrator of the region. Municipal and local council offices were closed throughout the area, and in some villages, schools and shops were also closed.

The strike was called at a meeting September 22 of 300 heads of Arab local councils representing 40 Palestinian communities. The representatives called for the dismissal of Koenig.

Rayek Jarjouran, Deputy Mayor of Nazareth, the Galilee's largest city, told the press that the strike was intended to alert public attention at home and abroad to the 28 years of Israeli government discrimination against the Arab population. The Koenig report, he said, was but a restatement of this policy. The strike was intended to show the Israeli government that the Arabs in Israel will not give up the struggle for their rights, he declared.

Sympathy strikes were also held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, areas occupied by Israel since the 1967 war. Commerce and transportation were totally shut down in the West Bank and schools in many areas were closed. Slogans against the military government could be seen on some houses and in the towns of Nablus and Hebron, Arab youths set up roadblocks and burned tires in the streets.



Three hundred Palestinian municipal leaders meet near Nazareth September 22, calling for Galilee strike.

The strike in the Galilee came just a half year after the general strike on March 30 "Day of the Land," the first such action staged since the area was seized in the creation of the Israeli state in 1948. The Day of the Land strike was held to protest the planned expropriation of several thousand acres of Arab land in the Galilee for new Jewish settlements, part of an Israeli government policy for "Judaization of the Galilee."

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**Israeli Report**

Con't. from page 10

leave less time for dabbling in nationalism. . . .

Make trips abroad for studies easier, while making the return and employment more difficult—this policy is to encourage their emigration.

Adopt tough measures at all levels against various agitators among college and university students.

**E. LAW ENFORCEMENT**

. . . the diligent maintenance of internal security with everything that this implies is of paramount importance to the nation and to Jews at large. . . .

**FORECAST**

One cannot ignore the percent of the Arab population—[Arabs are] 14% [of the total population in Israel]—in which the

violation of the law may assume a "revolutionary" quality. . . .  
**SUGGESTIONS**

Introduce law suits and put into effect a number of court sentences, particularly in the sphere of income tax and illegal building, which will deter the population from any thought about an escape from the hands of the law.

Increase the presence of various police and security forces in the Arab streets to deter extremist circles and those who are "sitting on the fence" and are likely to be drawn into uprisings and demonstrations. □

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