

# **POLITICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL REVIEW**

**February 2007**

**Communist Party of India (Maoist)**

*The following is the political and organisational Review of the CPI(Maoist) which was unanimously adopted by the Unity Congress—9th Congress. The Review covers the period since the uprising of Naxalbari peasants armed struggle until the time of the Congress in January-February 2007. This give an overall picture of the development of the people's war during this period.*

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# **POLITICAL-ORGANISATIONAL REVIEW-REPORT OF THE MAOIST COMMUNIST CENTRE OF INDIA**

## **PREFACE**

The current international and domestic situation is highly favourable to revolution. In such a situation it is necessary to concretise the subjective preparations for revolution. Through the following organisational report our objective would be to help take ahead this very task.

Before proceeding towards our organisational review, however, it would befit us to state very briefly the positions that we adopted hitherto on political questions.

It is common knowledge that even while remaining involved in the process of advancing our political and military line in the light of the directives of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, we keenly and deeply observed certain changes that had been occurring from time to time in international and national spheres. While correctly analysing these changes, we took some important decisions. Accordingly, our positions on these issues were as follows:

In the wake of the coup in the Communist Party of China by the Deng clique and Deng revisionism, and the degeneration of socialist China into a capitalist country following the demise of great Mao, we described the Chinese party as a revisionist bourgeois party and China as a capitalist country; then as soviet social imperialism tore away its socialist mask due to its intensifying serious crisis, we termed it as simply imperialism instead of social imperialism, and as a weak superpower; thereafter, especially when we found no manifestation during the US attack on Afghanistan and Iraq of even the role that a weak superpower should have played, we withdrew our analysis of Russia as a weak superpower and thought it relevant to describe it as a strong imperialist armed with nuclear weapons.

Among the basic contradictions on the international plane, we withdrew the fourth contradiction, i.e. the contradiction between the socialist system

and the imperialist system that no more existed as a contradiction between two diametrically opposed systems (though it persisted as a contradiction between the imperialist system and socialist forces), and with the mention that ever since the success of the Russian revolution of 1917 this contradiction did exist until the demise of great Mao, we clarified that should revolution occur in a country once again, this contradiction would at once come to the fore as a basic contradiction.

As regards the question of era, since the beginning we have been considering the formulation adopted by the 9th Congress of the CPC, “the present era is an era of the total collapse of imperialism and worldwide victory of socialism” to be a principle of strategic importance. We have also been calling it an era of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. In those days, the erstwhile CPI (ML) too upheld this position on the question. For the present, in view of the larger interests of revolutionary unity, we have resolved to describe the era as one of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, an era that is divided into different phases and levels, with tremendous changes having occurred in economic and political spheres on both the international and national planes, since the second world war. All the same, we still maintain that it would be appropriate to accept the 9th CPC Congress’ above analysis as a correct strategic concept.

In January 2000, in order to further raise the level of the ongoing class struggle, we thought it necessary to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation from ultramodern revisionism, an opponent of Mao Thought in the guise of Mao Thought. It was with this understanding that we decided to use the term, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in place of the earlier Marxism-Leninism-Mao Thought, which we had been using to describe our guiding ideology and directive principles. Thus we realised on the one hand, the relevance of drawing a sharp line of demarcation with the ultramodern revisionism of CPI (ML) Liberation etc. and on the other, the possibility of uniting with genuine Maoists on the national-international plane. In fact, from the inception itself, our organisation considered as utmost important the analysis of our founder and leader, Comrade Kanhai Chatterji that in essence there was no difference between Mao Thought and Maoism, that there was no Chinese wall between the two, and that “thought” and “ism” were synonymous. It is in this perspective that we use the term, “Maoism” today.

Through experience we learnt that it was by doing so that we could further raise the level of our ongoing class struggle.

Thus, while adopting some necessary changes from time to time, we could continue the internal and external struggle, drawing a clear-cut line of demarcation with revisionism in theoretical and organisational matters, in order to build a theoretically and politically sound and well-systematised party. We went on to achieve successes in uniting with genuine Maoist communist revolutionaries at the international and national levels, as and when we could make headway in developing our political and military line since 2000 on defeating the opportunists within and outside our party through a long and arduous struggle. As far as uniting with Maoist revolutionaries at the national level was concerned, the signs of a qualitative leap became evident right since the beginning of 2003. The MCC's unity with RCCI (M) and RCC (M) in January 2003, the resolution of many of the main points on the question of our unity with the CPI (ML)(Peoples War) in February, the founding of the PLGA on 22 April, the unity between the CPI (ML)(2nd CC) and the MCCI in May, the unity with the RCCI (M-L-M) in September were clear instances of the above. Thereafter commenced the long-awaited initiatives towards transforming selected guerrilla zones (strategic areas) into base areas while giving concrete shape to our perception of Peoples Army and Base Area, and towards mobilizing various revolutionary forces together with the Revolutionary Peasant Committees to form Revolutionary Peoples Committees while developing the PLGA into a PLA, and towards building a United Front through the correct process and method.

Our organisation has a long history of development and expansion while adhering to the basic line and putting it into practice. Moreover, a number of documents have been published from time to time about the ups and downs, weak and strong aspects, losses and achievements, criticisms and self-criticisms throughout the period of our development and expansion. Such important documents as those regarding strategy and tactics, the armed agrarian revolutionary war and the building of an army and base area, our view on the elections, the problem of nation states and the tasks of communists, and the mass line, to be specific, can always be referred to. Having said that, the main objective behind the present political-

# **OUR PERCEPTION ON BUILDING THE PEOPLES' ARMY- BASE AREA AND THE INITIATION, DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF OUR WORK**

It is well known that the history of our organisation, steered under the able leadership of Comrade Kanhai Chatterji, commenced soon after the revisionist 7th Congress of the CPM held in 1964. After functioning in its wake in the form of Chinta and Dakshindesh group for some time, ultimately on October 20, 1969 under the leadership of Comrades Kanhai Chatterji, Amulya Sen and Chandrashekhar Das, our organisation took on concrete form as the Maoist Communist Centre. A basic document on Strategy and Tactics, authored by Comrade Kanhai Chatterji in May 1969 a short while before the MCC formation, became the basic political foundation of our organisation. It was in this document that for the first time Com. Kanhai Chatterji's view that "it was essential to draw a clear demarcation-line with revisionists as a whole" came to the fore concretely. Later, in accordance with the document on strategy and tactics, another invaluable article by Com. KC, Get Going with the Armed Agrarian Revolution; Intensify the Task of Building the Army and Base Area, published in 1970, was established as the orientation for our practical work. In our organisation this document, published in Dakshindesh and Lal Pataka, Special Issue No.1, has been considered a basic document, one that is adhered to in all our practical work. The most important aspect of this document was the point that in order to truly advance the Indian revolution, work should not be done spontaneously anywhere; instead the most favourable areas for building the army and base areas – those referred to as strategic areas – should necessarily be selected for our work. As far as our own work is concerned, it was with this view that we considered as the first strategic area, our Assam-Tripura Area, and as the second strategic area, the vast expanse spread over our Special Area formed with erstwhile Bihar and the western part of West Bengal.

For us, as well as for the revolutionaries at large, another important article by Com. KC on drawing a clear line of demarcation with parliamentist ideas and the line of the new and old revisionists of India entitled, *Struggle with all Might against Parliamentist Politics and Capitulationism; Hold Aloft the Banner of Protracted Peoples' War*, published in *Lal Pataka-12*, is an invaluable treasure. This article underscores our basic and fundamental line regarding our viewpoint on elections. It was on the basis of this line that our entire organisation was oriented towards negating the parliamentist path and boycotting the parliamentary polls, and even today remains firm on this line, advancing the path of armed struggle and gradually spreading and intensifying the agrarian revolutionary guerilla war. Experience has taught us that only by remaining firm on this line can we take ahead the Indian revolution towards ultimate victory.

In other words, just as we drew a clear line of demarcation on the question of line with revisionists, the building of a Peoples' Army and Base Area became the main focus of all our work. Meanwhile, it had already been spelt out through our document on *Strategy and Tactics* that since 1947 our country had transformed into one with a neo-colonial type of semi-colonial, semi-feudal system, and that there neither was independence of any sort, nor even a trace of democracy. The basic objective of the present stage of Indian revolution would be to uproot imperialism and its lieutenants, feudalism and comprador bureaucrat capitalism. The revolution would be a national and democratic revolution, referred to as new democratic revolution. The agrarian revolution would be the foundation or axis of this new democratic revolution. Rural areas would be the main centres of the revolution. At the same time, it would be essential to award special importance to the work in urban areas. Our enemy was relatively big and powerful, whereas the revolutionary forces of the people were weak. However, this strength and weakness were not to remain permanent. Bit by bit, the strength of the enemy would develop into weakness and the weakness of the revolutionary forces into strength. By virtue of its very nature, victory in our war would not be achieved at once; it would have a protracted character. The agrarian revolutionary guerilla war would be a strategic feature of this war, and it would remain so till its end. In the



beginning, revolutionary forces would be weak and in a state of strategic defence. They would then advance gradually and acquire a state of equilibrium with the enemy. Towards the end they would become more powerful and reach the state of strategic offensive. Guerilla warfare would be a principal feature of this war, and will remain so from the beginning to the end. However, for the decisive war, regular and mobile warfare would also be necessary. The state of positional warfare would arise only later, and for just a short time.

A study of the mutual relationship between agrarian revolution, peoples' army and base area in the light of the above strategic concepts, and MCC's perceptions on how to handle the relationship and on its military line were laid out concretely in Com. KC's document on the army and the base area.

It was stated in this document that, " Without agrarian revolution it would not be possible to build a peoples' army. Then, without the peoples' army it would not be possible to establish a base area. At the same time, without a base area it would not be possible to sustain a peoples' army, and without the peoples' army and base area it would not be possible to take the agrarian revolution to its culmination."

The above statement makes it clear that the question of agrarian revolution is a fundamental question for a predominantly agricultural semi-colonial, semi-feudal country with uneven development. If this question were to be ignored, it would be baseless to talk of any kind of revolution or change. The resolution of this very question would, in fact, create the basis of revolutions and changes in such countries. Without resolving this question, neither the question of liberation from imperialism, nor that of emancipation from class exploitation by the feudal landlords and the comprador bureaucrat bourgeoisie, nor liberation of nationalities can be resolved.

The question of agrarian revolution would not be a question of peasants alone. This is a question of the vast masses of the country. It cannot be resolved without the worker-peasant alliance led by the working class. The first task of the proletariat and the communist party leading it would be to consolidate and well-systematise the basis of the worker-peasant alliance. Towards this end, our work should be commenced and developed, in accordance with our strength and capacity, in selected strategic areas in

a well-determined and planned manner.

It was to put this idea into practice that our organisation raised the slogan: “Finest Revolutionaries Go To The Villages”, and began sending the greater part of the finest among our professional revolutionaries from the cities to the rural parts.

Our work in the rural areas began in the Dihi-Sonarpur area of 24 Parganas district, close to Kolkata. In Sonarpur we could build some militant struggles. These struggles, however, could not be advanced too far. Nevertheless, through this struggle we could gain some positive experiences of work in rural areas. On synthesizing these experiences, certain concrete directives could be deduced for our work in the rural areas. Accordingly, activists were sent as per our strength and capacity not only to 24 Parganas, Midnapur, Malda and Burdwan, but also to remote areas in the deep forests and hills of Assam-Tripura; Dhanbad, Hazaribagh and Gaya of erstwhile Bihar, and Gorakhpur in UP.

Our aim in the villages was to build agrarian-revolutionary movements and agrarian-revolutionary guerilla struggles, to develop them gradually, and to take ahead this process so as to develop the factors for building the party, peoples’ army and the revolutionary peasants committee. This task could be accomplished not through the movements and struggles of the opportunist, revisionist and parliamentist stream, but only through armed organisations equipped and enlightened with revolutionary theory and politics, and formed with the objective of armed struggle. Towards this end it was necessary, at the outset, to propagate the politics of agrarian revolution. Without doing so, it would not be possible to arouse the peasant masses for the agrarian revolutionary struggle. Moreover, a consolidated and well-organised party organisation, one that would constantly conduct and develop revolutionary movements and struggles, could not be built without cadres tested with steeling in the crucible of revolutionary struggles.

Therefore, while going through the above process, we could weave together the interrelated threads of propaganda, struggle and organisation, thus systematising the relationship. The few comrades, trained somewhat in urban work, who were sent to the villages in the then prevailing circumstances were first given directions on how to make the masses join

the guerilla war. The comrades were asked to go to the villages keeping this task in mind, and acquaint themselves with the basic problems there, while integrating with the peasants, especially the landless and poor peasants; prepare a programme for the revolutionary peasant struggle, while formulating the immediate and basic problems, and arm the masses and themselves with the existing weapons; on the basis of this programme, prepare a plan to arouse the masses with revolutionary politics; familiarise them with all kinds of work, including how to go about in a secret manner from the very beginning; in this way, while organising the most active and advanced sections as mobile armed propagators and organizers or as the backbone of the party, also organise them under the name of Revolutionary Peasants Committee; and under its leadership launch the revolutionary peasant movement and armed resistance struggle in basically secret, illegal and armed methods. With the above objective, the comrades were asked to vigorously raise two basic slogans as well as some other slogans. The two basic slogans were:

*(i) Land to the true peasants!*

*(ii) Power to the revolutionary peasants committees!*

The other slogans were:

*(i) Build Revolutionary Peasants Committees, and Self-Defence and Peoples' Militia Squads, and Guerilla Squads from village to village and area to area!*

*(ii) Without power in their hands, the people have nothing!*

The primary task was to arouse the masses with revolutionary politics on the basis of these slogans and to conduct to some extent conscious and direct movements and revolutionary peasant struggles. With those who have been tested through their participation in these, were to be formed Revolutionary Peasant Committees, as a transitional organisation to seize local power, as well as self-defence squads, peoples' militia squads and guerilla squads from village to village and area to area.

In accordance with the above directives, our work began afresh in some police station areas of 24 Parganas district and in Kanksa-Budbud-Ausgram of Burdwan district, both in West Bengal. Shortly a revolutionary

peasants struggle was built and new experiences were being gained. In particular, on taking lessons from the struggle in 24 Parganas, and in this light, carrying out the struggle of Kanksa-Budbud-Ausgram, there was a fresh uprising on a more developed plane than before. During the 1973-76 period (which included the Emergency period), at a time when revolutionary peasant struggles all over India were subject to vicious attacks, including encirclement and suppression, the revolutionary peasant struggle under MCC's leadership could boldly face the repression unleashed by the enemy, holding aloft the banner of agrarian revolution at Kanksa. That experience would undoubtedly find its place as a glorious chapter in the history of the Indian revolutionary struggle. As far as our own development was concerned, we could gather an extremely positive and rich experience on many basic issues related with the actual work of agrarian revolution. These included the importance of firmly implementing the mass line and class line; the importance of building able cadres from among the landless and poor peasants, and establishing them until the level of leadership; the importance of the formation of revolutionary peasant committees, including different levels of the party, and of conducting their activities; and the importance and method of building the military organisation gradually from the lowest level, i.e. self-defence squads, to regular guerilla squads; the importance of building various revolutionary mass organisations.

As the level of political and organisational (subjective) preparations in the area were not enough to match the massive attacks of the enemy, and the area was not vast enough to conduct the manoeuvres of guerilla war, the Kanksa struggle was forced to retreat. Even so, the experiences gained from the Kanksa struggle became the basis on which we were able to raise the agrarian revolutionary guerilla struggle in the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area to the advanced level that we witness today. Over the long course of the armed struggle waged under the leadership of the MCC, the Kanksa struggle has, therefore, been considered as our second foundation.

It was only by enriching the above experience through generalisation, and by traversing a course to implement our line and method of work more

firmly than we did before, that we could extend our struggle areas; develop a profound mass base through agrarian revolutionary struggles; while developing a local leadership mainly from among landless and poor peasants, build the organisational structure of the party organisation right from the cells and areas until the higher levels; develop the military formations from Self-Defence Squads and Peoples' Militia squads to Local Regular Guerilla Squads and thereon to Platoons, Companies etc, and declare the building up of the PLGA with efforts to develop it into a PLA . Thus, we continue, while developing the framework of the Revolutionary Peasants Committees from the village level to the area, district border and division levels, right up to the state level, to advance further during the current process of building guerilla base areas, towards qualitatively developing them into revolutionary committees of the disciplined and armed masses, equipped with revolutionary politics, that is into Revolutionary Peoples' Committees. Evidently, it was by firmly adhering to the above process and method that all our areas, including the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area could march ahead.

## **ON CONSOLIDATING AND WELL-SYSTEMATISING THE PARTY-ORGANISATION**

Building the party organisation, while proceeding with the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, meaning thereby its policy and approach, has been a challenging task for our organization. The line was decided long before. Once that was decided, the issue was to put it into practice. Comrades were sent to various places to do so. Practice has indeed been the issue that ascertains one's level of commitment to theory, and also the correctness of the theory. At the present stage, the objective of the Indian revolution remains to accomplish the task of building the Peoples' Army and Base Area through the path of armed agrarian revolutionary guerilla war and protracted peoples' war, and to accomplish the new democratic revolution while destroying the present semi-colonial, semi-feudal system. This objective can only be fulfilled by forming, while advancing on a definite path with that orientation, the three magic weapons: the party, the army and the united front. The factors of revolution can certainly not be strengthened, concentrated, expanded and developed unless

a definite path is adopted in order to fulfill the immediate and ultimate goals of revolution. This truth has emerged through our long experience of work. It has also emerged that our political and military line that was developed as many as 36 years ago remains correct and relevant even today, for it was by marching ahead with this line that we could achieve our objectives in practice and are still doing so. Further it has also emerged that it may be easy to talk and talk in words about revolution, but to put theory into practice after having accepted it in words, that is to set up a mutual relationship between words and deeds was never an easy task. It can, therefore, not be accomplished by one and all. It is only if one remains firm on revolutionary theory and puts it into practice over a period that one fetches recognition as a true revolutionary.

It is widely acknowledged that Comrade Kanhai Chatterji, Comrade Amulya Sen and Comrade Chandrashekhar Das were the founders, leaders and teachers of our organisation, and that Com Kanhai Chatterji was General Secretary of our organisation, who gave the orientation for our theoretical, political and organisational line as well as our practical work. Incidentally, we should necessarily mention here that a short while after the formation of the MCC, in November 1969 to be precise, one of our founders, leaders and teachers, Com. Chandrashekhar Das was killed by CPI goondas. Thereafter, Com. Kanhai Chatterji and Com. Amulya Sen remained at the helm. In 1978, with mutual consultations, they reorganised the CC all over again and strengthened it with comrades who had been tried and tested thus far during our work in Bihar-Bengal Special Area, West Bengal, Assam-Tripura and other states. Com. Amulya Sen and Com Kanhai Chatterji passed away in March 1981 and March 1982, respectively. After them, the theoretical, political and practical orientation was given by the CC they had formed.

The above concisely covers the work begun and developed by our stream on the basis of the concept of building the peoples' army and base area.

Now, let us go on to the measures adopted to strengthen the party.

## **THE ORGANISATIONAL LINE AND STRUCTURE SHOULD BE FORMULATED AND BUILT ONLY WITH THE VIEW OF PUTTING THE POLITICAL LINE INTO PRACTICE**

We have already mentioned that the present stage of revolution in our country, new democratic revolution would be successful only through armed agrarian struggle and protracted peoples' war. Towards this end, we have decided that only building the army and base area would be the basic, principal, central and immediate task at present.

The question now arises as to what should the structure of our party be like in order to accomplish the above task? Should it conform to the party structure of the Russian model (which means conforming to the strategy of insurrection), or to that of the Chinese model? From our analysis, we inferred that the party structure in countries like India should conform to the Chinese model. That would mean that the organisational structure would not conform to the current administrative structure (i.e. state, district etc). Instead, it would have the forms of special area/special zone, zone, sub zone, area etc, conforming to the strategic area selected according to the viewpoint and the needs of war and of building the army and base area.

In keeping with this very viewpoint, from the inception stage itself we adopted the organisational form of a strategic area, namely that of a special area committee, followed by regional, zonal, subzonal, area committees, cell etc. Experience has taught us that without the concept of Special Area (or Special Zone), the question of building the army and base area would only remain empty talk; it would never be put into practice.

On the lines of this concept, through our first and second central conferences in 1989 and 1996, respectively, we systematised the organisation serially from the highest committee down to the lowest level, that is, up to the basic unit, in accordance with the precept of democratic centralism. At present, the Central Committee remains the highest committee of our organisation, subordinate to which in serial order are the Special Area, State, Regional (incorporating three or four zonal committees), zonal,

subzonal and area committees, and the cells that, being at the lowest level, are the basic units. Besides, at the central level we have a Central Military Commission (CMC) and committees looking after some special departments. Further, a short time ago we had taken up a plan to form a Central Regional Bureau with CC members, each responsible for a vast area.

## **THE PARTY ADVANCES FURTHER AS THE CORRECT LINE WINS DURING INTERNAL STRUGGLE**

Since October 20, 1969, when our organisation came to be known as the MCC, the first internal struggle in our organization took place in 1974-75. The central question around which this struggle arose was: “We must rethink upon how correct is the policy to keep on waging the armed struggle right now in rural areas close to the city for sure, and for that matter in remote rural areas as well; MCC’s line is also ‘left’ deviationist, like CM’s line,” etc. etc.

Vigorous political, ideological and theoretical struggles naturally took place in opposition to such wrong thinking having revisionist trends. Finally, as this wrong line was altogether exposed politically, its handful few spokesmen fled the arena of struggle, parting ways with the organisation. There was no division in the organisation on the line question as a consequence of this internal struggle; instead with the isolation of those having revisionist trends, the organisation emerged more cohesive and consolidated than it was earlier.

Even after this, at times there were polemics within the organisation on some questions. These, however, could be settled through internal political struggle, discussion and political education, thus strengthening the organisation all the more.

Then since August 1999, a debate arose during a CC meeting around the question, “In what serial order should the portraits of our leadership be arranged, and what should be the Marxist-Leninist manner of doing so?” After a 7-day debate and argument-counter argument in the CC, it was concluded that the first portrait should be of whoever has made the greatest



contribution in determining our line and putting into practice. A written resolution was also adopted, signed by all the CC members (whereby we were to have Com. KC's portrait first, followed by those of Com. Amulya Sen and Com. Chandrashekhar Das. Later, however, "Ba" and "Bh" formed a clique within the party against this resolution, whereupon it became evident that they were not prepared to agree with the solution arrived at. Therefore, waging a two-line struggle became inevitable.

Meanwhile, the misdeeds of the traitorous Deng clique on the international plane, whereby Mao Thought was sought to be belittled and not to be portrayed as an advancement over Marxism-Leninism, and those of its ardent disciple in India, the Liberation group, whereby the historical and international importance of Mao thought was being sought to be totally negated, had already surfaced. Ever since then, our CC had been considering it necessary to draw a sharp line of demarcation with those who had been making a wrong interpretation of Mao Thought. As part of this thinking-process, an opinion was in the making within the CC since around 1997-98 itself that it would be proper to use the term, Maoism, instead of Mao thought. It was in this process that the CC, in its January 2000 meeting, was giving concrete shape to this opinion. After 6 days of debate and discussion, an important resolution was adopted, which said that it would be scientific, correct and appropriate to coin the term, "Maoism" in order to draw a sharp line of demarcation with the most-modern revisionism that puts forth its analysis as Mao thought. Eventually, it became apparent that there were serious differences even on this issue within the CC. Thus to resolve this as well, a two-line struggle was inevitable.

For the second time, a two-line struggle began within the organisation, basically on the above two issues, in a very severe and vigorous manner. Later, two more issues got added to these. They were:

- (i) Would it be correct to unilaterally cease the clashes with the PW?
- (ii) Would it would it not be correct to join the RIM?

A sharp and severe debate, that is two-line struggle ensued, focusing on the issue of adopting the term, "Maoism", even while the need to clearly distinguish between the right and the wrong on the other three issues also emerged. In this two-line struggle against the opportunist "Ba" and "Bh"

clique, the correct line ultimately won, with the entire membership in all states, but for a 2 or 3 isolated opportunists in West Bengal, remaining with us. Overall, we could take a leap ahead as a result of this struggle. The opponents, i.e. “Ba” and “Bh” clique made a leap backwards, taking flight from the arena of armed struggle, maintaining no ties with the armed struggle and degenerating into individuals having nothing to do but spread slander about the armed struggle.

Only after emerging successfully through this two-line struggle could our CC make headway towards fulfilling many of our tasks. Our achievements were as follows:

- (i) With the objective of taking ahead the struggle against the most-modern or ultramodern revisionism and of raising the level of revolutionary and armed class struggle, we adopted Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as the theoretical weapon blazing our path, and thus became capable of sharpening it even further.
- (ii) We became capable of achieving unity with the genuine Maoist revolutionaries on the national and international planes.
- (iii) We became capable of making a concrete analysis of exactly what phase the armed struggle under MCC’s leadership was in. On this basis, we also became capable of planning somewhat concretely as to how the army and base area would be formed.
- (iv) While we defined the present level of our struggle as an agrarian revolutionary guerilla war, we also became capable of forming our military organisation, according to our present level, as the Peoples Liberation Guerilla Army.
- (v) While we took ahead the work of the Revolutionary Peasants Committees, we were able to systematise our ideas on when and through what process we should form the Revolutionary Peoples Committees.
- (vi) We could adopt a plan of action to advance the process and procedure to form the United Front as a magic weapon.

It was due to the above achievements that we could take the leap forward.

## **WITHOUT STRENGTHENING THE PARTY ORGANISATION NEITHER THE BASIC, NOR PRINCIPAL, IMMEDIATE OR ANY OTHER TASK CAN BE ADVANCED**

It goes without saying that to make revolution, we need a revolutionary communist party, a party that would be formed with a revolutionary style and method, one based on Marxism–Leninism–Maoism and equipped with some other qualities. All these are theoretical aspects. Much has already been said on this issue and much will still be said. However, while discussing the conditions of the party, we would not like to merely reiterate the principles. We would rather discuss all those points that are confronting us today while strengthening the party. It would be more fruitful, therefore, to talk about the party from a practical standpoint.

What do we need to do today? We have to take the new democratic revolution of India towards victory gradually by building the army and base areas and extending the agrarian revolutionary guerilla war, that is, people's war. At this moment, what exactly do we need to do on the question of building the army and base areas? We wish to build our Local Regular Guerilla Squads, Platoons and Companies in largest possible numbers while well-systematizing our Self Defence Squads and People's Militia; to systematize our Revolutionary Peasant Committees and proceed with them towards forming RPCs; and to mobilize the masses in various organisations and step up the agrarian revolutionary guerilla war over a vast area. In this process, we wish to take firm steps towards building a strong base area.

Now, has our party become streamlined and efficient enough to carry out these tasks? The answer is no. In fact the truth is that our party organisation is not yet as strong as to intensify and raise the level of our agrarian revolutionary guerilla struggle; to build, in large numbers, our self defense squads, area militia squads and local regular guerilla squads, platoons and companies; to strengthen our Revolutionary Peasant Committees as an effective organization that is, as an embryonic carrier organization oriented towards wielding power; to advance further towards forming as a form of people's government, the Revolutionary People's Committees; to

build on various issues, the broadest possible revolutionary mass movements and mass resistance movements while mobilizing the broad masses in various kinds of mass organisations and to continuously expand our struggle areas, and to accomplish all these tasks in an efficient manner.

Therefore, it is our immediate task to make continuous efforts to strengthen the party.

## **STRENGTHEN THE PARTY THROUGH STRUGGLE AGAINST PETTY BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS**

Since India is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, we have a large petty bourgeois population. In our party, as well, we have a large number.

Therefore, at times, we find reflections of the petty bourgeois ideology in politics in the form of 'left' or right deviations and in the organisational aspects in the form of sectarianism.

The petty bourgeois way of living gives rise to subjectivism in thought, and due to one-sidedness and partiality, the political viewpoint of the petty bourgeoisie vacillates between 'left' and right, or gives rise to stagnation.

Due to the limited sphere of their mode of living, and in general, the petty bourgeois way of thinking, especially in a backward, economically and politically uneven and decentralized social environment, petty bourgeois persons in their organisational life tend to get caught up in individualism and sectarianism, and certain habits. Consequently, they get isolated from the common masses. When the petty bourgeois trend gets reflected within the party, then bureaucracy, patriarchal authoritarianism, individualism, heroism, semi-anarchism, liberalism, ultra democracy, partiality towards one's own set of persons, groupism and such ways of thinking emerge. As a result, on the one hand, the gaps in the party's relationship with the masses widen, and on the other, the internal unity of the party gets damaged.

The petty bourgeois ideology has three detrimental aspects. They are, subjectivism in ideology, 'left' and right deviation in politics and sectarianism in organisation. All these aspects can more or less be found in our organization. Undoubtedly, they are opposed to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism

and are reflections of petty bourgeois ideology.

In the interest of the party and the masses, it is most essential to overcome the obstacles of petty bourgeois ideology and to equip the party with proletarian ideology through the method of education.

## **FIRMLY PRACTICE DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM AND THE CORRECT METHOD OF LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE PARTY**

Comrade Mao tse-tung had said, “from the masses to the masses”. This should be the correct political line to be adopted. If this line has to really come from the masses, and moreover, go to the masses, then it would be not do to only have a deep relationship between the party and the masses (i.e., classes and people) outside the party. Having a deep relationship between leading bodies of the party and party members (i.e., organisers, cadre and common activists) is of primary importance. Secondly, having correct organisational policies is also important.

We in our party must certainly put this policy into practice. We must also be skilled in practicing this policy even in difficult conditions.

Every comrade knows that our party is a secret party engaged in armed struggle. We are constantly subject to all-round attacks by the enemy, including ‘encirclement and suppression’. In such a situation, should the party not be strictly secret it would not be possible to advance the armed struggle while facing every attack by the enemy. It is but natural that in a secret party, in reality, it is a somewhat difficult task to practice all the precepts of democratic centralism. Especially with excessive attacks by the enemy going on constantly, some difficulties do arise in minutely implementing democracy. Even so, in the present phase, as far as possible we must practice the policy of ‘from the masses to the masses’. We must also practice, as far as possible, the various precepts of democracy, such as having deep relationships between the party and the masses outside the party, and between the leading bodies, and the cadre and common activists. According to the constitution, delegates should necessarily elect various party committees during conferences of the respective committees. At times, General Bodies, Special Meetings or Plenums comprising senior

comrades can also be called on some special issues. In this way, in the given circumstances, efforts must be constantly made to practice democracy as far as possible.

As far as centralism is concerned, it would be centralism based on democracy. From experience, we understand that if the Party, right from the Central Committee to the lowest leading bodies, remains linked with the arena of struggle and with its problems, then the interrelationship between centralism and democracy would be practiced in a correct and lively manner. Otherwise there would be bureaucracy or authoritarianism in the name of Centralism and unsystematic and spontaneous methods instead of democracy.

Therefore, we must make every possible effort to practice the precise relationship between democracy and centralism within the Party in a concrete and lively manner keeping in view the circumstances.

Moreover, during our actual work, we must make efforts to practice the method of leadership as directed by Comrade Mao. The task of the leadership is not merely to issue orders, but also to help solve the actual problems that comrades may be grappling with.

Therefore, in order to strengthen the party, a major aspect is to implement the correct method of leadership and practice all the precepts of democratic centralism within the party in a lively manner

## **WITHOUT RAISING THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF PARTY ACTIVISTS THE PARTY CANNOT BECOME STRONG**

As is generally known, under the leadership of the Maoist Communist Centre revolutionary work is underway in some states and the revolutionary class struggle is intense in one or two states.

It is the Central Committee and under it, the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area Committee; North Bihar-North UP-Uttarakhand Special Area Committee, Lower Assam Zonal Committee, Bengal State Committee, Punjab State Committee, Orissa State Organising Committee etc. that basically provide leadership to the revolutionary class struggles. We also

have some committees of the zonal and area levels in UP, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu and Karnataka.

There are in all nearly 6000 party members of the MCC active at various places. Of these, more than 70 percent are from landless and poor peasants, about 15 percent from middle peasants, about 2 percent from rich peasants, nearly 5 percent from the working class and nearly 8 percent from the petty bourgeoisie. Adivasis and dalits constitute a major portion of our party membership.

Certainly, this is a positive aspect from the point of view of the class line. We must certainly maintain this aspect in future because without remaining firm on the class line, the revolution cannot succeed.

However, the actual problem before us is that since a great majority of our activists are from peasant families, and are adivasis and dalits, they are generally uneducated. Due to this, it is very difficult for them to learn through books. On the other hand, intellectual professional comrades within the Party are too few in number, as compared to the need. For this reason, the task of imparting Marxist education and Party education to the large number of worker-peasant activists remains a problem before us. Moreover, due to the continuing 'encirclement and suppression' campaign it appears somewhat difficult to arrange too many Party classes in our struggle areas. Due to these various reasons, the political level of common activists has not been advancing shoulder to shoulder with the concrete situation of the class struggle. Consequently, it seems as if the struggle has advanced ahead and the Party leading the struggle has fallen somewhat behind. This lag must be covered as soon as possible. Only by raising the political level of activists can this be done. Some concrete steps ought to be taken to raise the political level of our party activists. These may be:

- (i) Organising party schools according to a syllabus decided by the main leading committee of the particular state, according to the specific conditions there, for both senior and common activists;
- (ii) Deciding in advance the topics and the comrades who would be taking the class.

- (iii) Apart from various aspects of Marxism, a general understanding of geography, history and science should also be made part of the syllabus.
- (iv) Every time a party school is held, it should last for at least a few days. It is very necessary to hold special party classes of selected comrades under the guidance of the Central Committee. These classes should be organised with the objective of preparing the selected comrades to take classes further. Under the guidance of the Central Committee, it is most essential at the present juncture to hold classes for senior comrades of various mass organisations, including the all-India mass organisations. In this class we should have discussion on some advanced topics as well as points related to the line and our work style.

Furthermore, in order to raise the political level of the entire party, comrades of higher committees, right up to the highest committee, should pay special attention to raising their own political level as much as possible. They should not remain dependent only upon their experience. In order to decisively defeat various ideological and political lines causing confusions currently, they ought to study individually and collectively the significant writings of our great teachers. Without such study, we would not be able to defeat the theoretical moves that the current modern revisionists cast.

To some extent, we could improve the situation in the party that prevails today, and emerge stronger, if we would fulfill the above tasks well.

However, we have certain weaknesses as far as educating party activists is concerned.

First, although the problem of educating activists remains serious, yet some leading party committees would not be very serious about it. Secondly, party classes, though conducted once in a while, would not be continued regularly. Thirdly, there happens to be a lack of the tendency of having discussions on some topic or the other with the urge to gain knowledge everywhere and at all times. This weakness pervades various levels of the party and squads both.

In order to really raise the political level of our party activists, we ought



to be serious about the matter. We must encourage conducting discussion on some topic or the other, promoting the urge to gain knowledge, both in the party and the squads. We ought to create a political environment throughout the party and squads, and conduct classes for political education regularly.

We must remember that if the ideological-political level of our common activists does not advance, we may prove unable to wage political struggle against revisionism, especially that of CPI, CPM, Liberation and that of other lines. Besides, the possibility of various kinds of wrong trends and wrong styles and methods of work raising their head in the party may also increase. We must also remember that in case we fail to prepare some capable cadres theoretically and practically, we would be unable to form and run neither the party, nor army and revolutionary peasant committee, nor mass organisations and united front. So as to ensure that such a situation does not arise, we must pay special attention to raising the political level of our common activists. Adopting a casual approach towards this task would prove highly detrimental to us.

## **THE PRESENT STATUS OF OUR PARTY IN VARIOUS STATES IN BRIEF**

**The status of our party in the various states in which we are working is as follows:**

### **i. Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area Committee:**

Earlier, the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area was the second among our priority areas. This became the first priority when the possibilities that we were expecting in the Northeast got deferred. This special area included a part of the then Bihar (including today's Jharkhand), specifically the portion to the south of the Ganga, and several parts of West Bengal adjoining Jharkhand, such as the western part of Purulia, Bankura, Midnapur and a small part of Birbhum and Bardhaman districts. The entire area was divided into various parts where activists were deployed. The chosen parts had an excellent terrain with the view to conduct guerilla war. Moreover, the area was also rich in natural resources. However, it was very backward economically, politically and socially. It was with a perspective, way back,

to form a base area by preparing and developing guerilla war, taking Jharkhand as the focus and a considerable expanse all around it, which included the vast plains of central Bihar, that this special area was chalked out. In the then prevailing circumstances, the specific highlights of the perspective and foresight of our leaders were – correct selection of area, proper deployment of activists and equipping our activists with the understanding of building a movement and struggle while drawing a clear-cut line of demarcation with revisionism. The activists deployed at almost all areas began their work towards building a struggle. Each area experienced various phases of ups and downs.

Ultimately, as we continued with the agrarian revolutionary guerilla struggle, over a long time, we could form various levels of party committees from the Special Area Committee downwards up to the Area Committee and Cell levels, such as Sub-Zonal, Zonal and Regional committees. During the process of linking up one area with another and spreading into neighbouring areas, the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area did not remain limited only to these three states and only to the areas selected earlier. The area spread to most districts of Jharkhand and South Bihar as well as to Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Orissa, developing a good organisational base even there.

Taking as basic, principal and immediate, the task of building the people's army and base area while working in the guerrilla zone as a whole, our agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war advanced, fighting back against the attacks of feudal lords and their private armies, to give them a crushing defeat. In particular, glorious events such as thousands of peasant masses converging upon Dalelchak-Baghaura and Bara in Bihar in May 1987 and February 1992, respectively and Khukhra in Jharkhand in May 1992 in massive attacks on the reactionary strongholds there emerged as a feature of the raging revolutionary struggle. Castiest armies of feudals, like Brahmarseni Sena, Sunlight Sena, Savarna Liberation Front, Bhoomisena and other counter-revolutionary armies were smashed and gutted thereby in the red fire of agrarian revolution. A similar struggle now continues with all fury to destroy Rangier Sena, the joint army of all castes formed a few years ago. The stinging attack that the revolutionary masses launched upon Senari, then a stronghold of Ranvir Sena, was just such a recent instance.

Moreover, the concrete achievements that we have today were possible also while....

Moreover, the concrete gains as of today could be achieved through combatting and defeating one cruel massive campaign after another by the state machinery and its police and paramilitary forces. It was with this background that during the second meeting following the fourth conference of the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special, Area Committee, that we seriously gave thought to and analysed the situation. We determined exactly what level our struggle had reached and the various aspects related to this. We thus found that 80-85 percent of the special area of Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal had reached the stage of guerrilla zone. Accordingly, we decided our next important tasks. The central focus of these tasks remained the objective of transforming the guerrilla area into a base area as soon as possible. We implemented here and still continue to implement the entire strategy and tactics as demonstrated by Comrade Mao, particularly the policy of “counter-encirclement against our encirclement by the enemy.” This proved extremely useful to us and continued to be so.

It is beyond doubt that among the various levels of committees under the MCCI, the tremendously significant revolutionary class struggle, that is, the agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle of Bihar being led by the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area Committee has been playing a leading role among the struggles being led by our organisation. In reality, it was the socio-economic structure and the backdrop of feudal exploitation and oppression of Bihar and Jharkhand that had catapulted the class struggle here into playing a leading role in the arena of class struggle. Certainly, ever since a decision was taken, many years ago to build North Bihar as a Special Area and the North Bihar-North UP-Uttarakhand Special Area Committee was formally constituted 2 or 3 years ago, the intense, revolutionary class struggle under its leadership has become an important centre among the struggles led by our organisation. As a matter of fact, the brave peasant masses and brave comrades of Bihar and Jharkhand, by their first ever retaliatory mass actions against the unilateral attacks of the landlords of Bihar and their private armies going on since long targeting the oppressed and suppressed poor, have opened up the correct path. By taking this path, the unilateral attacks by the feudals of Bihar can now be combated

in a befitting manner. Such exemplary retaliatory mass actions, as mentioned above, are many in number. Besides, thousands of acres (nearly ... acres) of land belonging to landlords have been seized in struggles against feudals.

In the entire Jharkhand area as well as in Kidnaper, Banker and Purlieu of Bengal, the specific feature of the ongoing class struggle has been to strengthen the roots of the MCC among divas and non-divas masses with our independent initiative and independent agenda and thus advance the process of agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle, and to mobilise thousands of divas and non-divas masses with the orientation of class struggle and the aim of transforming Jharkhand into Falkland s the basis to advance the nationality movement.

The Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area Committee has led the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area. Advancing under the leadership of this committee, the struggle has steadily spread beyond Bihar to adjoining Uttar Pradesh and beyond Jharkhand to adjoining Chhattisgarh, and to some extent to Orissa.

At present there are two Regional Committees under the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area Committee. They are:

(1) Bihar-Jharkhand-Uttar Pradesh-Chhattisgarh Border Regional Committee, referred to generally as Bihar Regional Committee and (2) Jharkhand-Bihar-Bengal-Orissa Border Regional Committee, referred to generally as Jharkhand Regional Committee. Under each of the two Regional Committees there are four Zonal Committees.

Under the Bihar Regional Committee we have:

- (i) Northern Zonal Committee
- (ii) Southern Zonal Committee
- (iii) Bihar-UP Border Zonal Committee, or Sone-Ganga Zonal Committee
- And (iv) Chhattisgarh-Jharkhand Border Zonal Committee.

Under the Jharkhand Regional Committee we have:

- (i) Northern Chhota-Nagpur Zonal Committee,
- (ii) Southern Chhota-Nagpur Zonal Committee,

- (iii) Banka-Jamui-Bhagalpur Zonal Committee, and
- (iv) Midnapur-Bankura-Purulia Zonal Committee.

There are five to seven Sub-Zonal Committees under every Zonal Committee, and six or seven Area Committees under every Sub Zonal Committee. There are about.... party members under this Special Area, of whom more than 70 per cent are from landless and poor peasant classes, and nearly 20 per cent are women. As far as advancing women in every possible way is concerned, there is a need for us to take a special initiative to enhance the number of women party members.

Leading a population of about 8 crores, over an area of about.... lakh square kilometres, this SAC is in the main, up in arms against the state power at present. Therefore, we need to have many more party members. Towards this end, we would have to give party membership not only to professional revolutionaries, but also to non-professionals and lay stress especially on forming party committees at the village level and the occupational level. We should certainly not afford any relaxation but remain firm on the policy of forming all leading committees only with professional activists.

Further, this SAC has a serious problem by way of inadequate grip on building the party and struggles in urban areas. Without overcoming these lacunae, we would in the present circumstances, fail to take on the counter-revolution effectively. Therefore, we must, without delay, advance the task of preparing a solid party foundation in cities and industrial areas.

At the end of the year, 2002, the CC had, in view of the expansion and needs of the struggle, taken a decision to develop by all means as a distinct, independent area, the area under the Chhattisgarh-Jharkhand Border Regional Committee. Towards this end, a certain concrete plan was also worked out. Accordingly, the work and struggle has been advancing in this zone. However, it has yet not been possible to constitute a district special zone from this zone.

**ii. The Formation of another Special Area by the name of 3U, including North Bihar-Uttar Pradesh-Uttarakhand, has been an extremely important event for the development of Indian Revolution!**

As mentioned above, we had selection with the view to build the army and red base area, the Bihar-Bengal (now Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal) Special Area as a Special Area. Most of our work and struggle had then been advancing in South Bihar. Since 1990, a plan was adopted to advance our work and struggle in Northern Bihar. As efforts to implement the plan drew results, the eastern, central and western part of north Bihar finally emerged into a large area of agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle. Following the merger with the 2nd CC, our strength increased greatly, especially so in north Bihar and east Bihar. By now, we have covered almost the entire eastern part of north Bihar.

At present, the sharp and widespread agrarian revolutionary struggle, that had been going on since many years against the dreaded, big feudal lords of north Bihar, appears to be intensifying. Thousands of acres of land, including ponds and orchards, have been seized from big landowners. In this process, self-defence squads, Area Militia Squads and LRGs have been formed as the form of military organisation. Lately, a decision has been taken to advance the military formations up to the level of platoon. Programmes such as seizing weapons and everything in attacks upon the house of a dreaded landlord and some important raids and ambushes were implemented. In July, there was the excellent action of a raid on a police camp at Simrahani, wherein several weapons etc., were seized and all the policemen had surrendered. Revolutionary Peasant Committees at various levels were also formed, and the process of strengthening the women's, student-youth and intellectual and cultural fronts continues. Besides, an organisation in the form of platform has been formed to take up the basic problem in north Bihar, floods, and some other programmes are also being taken up.

Then in the wake of our second Central Conference of 1996, we adopted a plan to expand our work to some other areas of the country. Accordingly, efforts were made to advance work in the southern part of Uttarakhand (i.e. the Kumaon region). At this time, some active comrades of Uttarakhand, who were earlier with the Central Team, joined the MCCI. Hence, while selecting some districts where there was greater possibility of taking up struggle and sustaining it, we adopted a concrete plan to advance the work here and build a struggle, keeping in mind the objective of forming the

People' Army and Base Area. According to this plan, the work began to develop and expand, and a program of some small struggle was also adopted. While going through the three processes of propaganda, struggle and organization, we could, beginning with some party cell, ultimately go on to form Area and Sub-zone Committees and then a Zonal Committee. Recently in June, the Zonal Committee had its first conference with great fervour. Besides various levels of the party, a regular guerilla squad, or LRGS was fomed, and Revolutionary Peasant Committees were also formed, based on some villages and areas. Moreover, there are also various mass organisations of student, youth and women and a cultural organisation. At present, the work is being advanced, making it more concrete in the area, and with the objective of waging some struggle at a higher level.

Meanwhile, from North Bihar our work and struggle began to expand also to some areas of UP adjoining North Bihar. Later, we could obtain contacts even in Lakhimpur Kheri area. From Uttarakhand too we obtained some contacts in Pilibhit area, and work was begun here.

In this situation, the Central Committee made a review of the work in North Bihar, North UP and Uttarakhand, and the possibility of forming the Army and Base Area in this entire area. With this, we unanimously arrived at an important decision, keeping in view the overall interest of the Indian revolution, that we must now advance the work in this entire area, i.e., North Bihar, North UP and Uttarakhand, as a Special Area. This Special Area, in our view, had the following features:

- (i) The class contradictions are sharp in a large part of this area. Therefore, the class struggle may spread rapidly.
- (ii) The area has a dense population. It is an area that influences Indian politics. If we could launch a wave of armed revolution here, it would have a great impact upon central, northern and to some extent, also eastern India.
- (iii) This area is adjoining Nepal, where a fierce people's war rages under the leadership of CPN (Maoist).

It has however, not been possible to integrate as a whole, the entire area falling under the 3U Special Area. Therefore, we should concentrate on this and within a certain time frame we must make firm efforts to attain

the target.

Under this Special Area, there has been an extensive growth in terms of the work and struggle in the area under the North Bihar Zonal Committee. This encompasses the area from the eastern end of North Bihar, until beyond the western end, including some areas of UP. With our growth in this area in view, we have decided to divide it into three Zonal Committee areas, and to form a Regional Committee above.

Thus, we now have the following party committees at the lower level within the 3U Special Area:

- (i) North Bihar Zonal Committee,
- (ii) Uttarakhand Zonal Committee and
- (iii) Eastern Northern UP Sub Zonal Committee.

### **iii. West Bengal**

As we have already explained before, the Dihi village area under Sonarpur police station in 24 Parganas district of West Bengal was the first place where our organisation started work in a rural area. Thereafter, taking lessons from the experience of the Sonarpur struggle, we chalked out a plan to expand our work in the Sunderbans and other parts of 24 Parganas, Howrah-Hooghly, Malda, Birbhum, Kanksa-Budbud-Ausgram of Bardhwan, and parts of Midnapur, Bankura and Purulia, and among the workers in the industrial areas of Howrah-Hooghly.

Our perspective was to have a Kolkata City Committee and a committee for the industrial area of Howrah-Hooghly in the urban and industrial areas. For the rest of our area of work, our perspective was to develop a guerrilla zone. Here, we set up our work in a configuration of zones, i.e. 24 Parganas Zone, Howrah-Hooghly-Midnapur Zone, Bardhwan-Birbhum-Nadia Zone and so on, and commenced work so as to conduct a revolutionary peasant movement and guerilla struggle. Later, while expanding our work further, we included Dinajpur, Darjeeling, and Jalpaiguri, that is, the North Bengal area into the fold of our work.

In the course of development of the work, various Zonal Organizing Committees and a West Bengal State Committee were constituted with



the leading sections.

In 1975 we too faced the ire of the nationwide emergency clamped by the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Nevertheless, in the post-1970-71 period when the revolutionary struggle was forced a retreat, the flames of the armed agrarian revolution continued to rage in Kanksa, despite the massive state terror of the emergency period. Thereafter, with the coming to power of the Janata party and the formation of the Left Front Government in West Bengal, that is, in 1977-78, the revolutionary peasant struggle in the Sunderban area of 24 Parganas intensified to some extent. Thereafter, however, as we could not adequately retaliate against the enemy's encirclement and suppression campaign, this struggle also could not advance. In this period, the kind of work we did was limited to observing some occasions on particular dates and taking up some light programmes. As an inevitable outcome of this, the mentality of avoiding struggle, stereotype methods of work and getting caught up in a state of stagnancy emerged as the main problems.

The history of the subsequent period was that of the then Secretary of the West Bengal State Committee, "Ba" not putting into practice the basic line of the MCC to build the armed agrarian revolution, as carried in Issue No. 1 of Dakshindesh. The situation in West Bengal could change only after the "Ba"- "Bh" clique that emerged within the CC was expelled from the party.

In 2002 the W. Bengal SC led by 'B' was dissolved and in its place a new ad-hoc committee was constituted. Thereafter, following the unity of the MCCI with the RCCM in January 2003 and with the 2nd CC in May 2003, the organisation increased in strength, and in July 2003 the conference of the W. Bengal SC was held successfully, thereby electing a new SC. According to the planning of this new committee four Zonal Committees have recently been constituted. They are as follows:

- (1) Howrah- Hooghly-Midnapur Zonal Committee,
  - (2) Burdwan-Birbhum-Nadia-Murshidabad Zonal Committee,
  - (3) North Bengal Zonal Committee,
  - (4) Greater Kolkata City Committee (equivalent to Zonal Committee)
- etc.

Besides the above committees, a Howrah-Hooghly Industrial Area Party Committee has also been in existence.

Under every Zonal Committee there are some Sub-Zonal and Area Committees as well as Cells. These committees have recently taken up the task of some struggle. Under the leadership of these committees, some self-defence squads, peoples' militias, LRGS etc. and village and area level committees of the KKC have been formed. Some successful actions and programmes for the annihilation of reactionary enemies have also carried out successfully. Alongside the above, programmes of mass movements have also been carried out through mass organisations.

In such a situation, some important plans were chalked out for W.Bengal. It was decided to immediately take up struggle where the possibility for the same was the greatest. It was also more or less decided where our strategic area would be to wage a sustained struggle in the state, and what would be the tasks towards that end. Even so, stereotyped thinking and method of work, and lack of the firm will to break the stagnancy continue to be the main problem in W. Bengal.

#### **iv. Assam-Tripura**

Geographically difficult-to-access, economically and politically backward, and socially eager to fight for self-determination, taking up arms, this region has been highly favorable for initiating and sustaining the armed agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle against imperialism and feudalism. It was with this perspective, that our organisation had selected this area as the first priority area among all the strategic areas at the very inception stage. The special social features of all the north-eastern states of India and proximity of Red China had also inspired us to allot first priority to this region. On this very basis, we had sent a part of our selected best revolutionaries here. In Tripura three of our local leaders were even martyred. However, we could not achieve favourable results right away. Although there were many reasons for this, the main reason was that before working patiently to integrate with the masses, taking up their issues, either small or big, to develop some sort of movement, we were confronted with an extensive "encirclement and suppression" campaign conducted by the police and the armed forces. That was why we could not achieve

favourable results right away.

Nevertheless, finding no possibility to develop our work on the lines which we had been looking forward to, we withdrew most of our cadres but for a small part which we left there, and deployed them elsewhere.

Reviewing the previous work and by taking lessons, the CC once again started work there in a planned way in 1990. Assam was divided into three parts - Upper Assam, Lower Assam, and the Barak valley. We thought of forming another area of work by combining the areas of Tripura that were adjacent to the Barak valley and the Kachhar area of Assam. Learning from the previous experiences and from the experiences of our work among another nationality, we applied them to the land of Assam and achieved good results. In many districts of Lower Assam the organisation began developing a firm grip. Gradually, some local youth became active as PRs in our organisation. Local party committees, KKC's, and self-defence squads, area level peoples' militia squads, and LRGSs began to take shape. The struggle against brutal usurious exploitation, feudal oppression began. The process of linking with this struggle the questions of the language, education, culture, and the questions of equal right and equal status of the nationality began. Also the struggle against robbery and dacoity, and against the social evils like rape began. During the process of these struggles, moneylenders and goonda forces martyred our comrade Mukul in an attack. We undertook an action to avenge this loss, as a result of which the enthusiasm of the masses was further aroused.

We now have a Zonal Committee that was elected at a Conference, with a party structure comprising of two Sub-zonal Committees and four Area Committees below it. As part of the military organization, we have Self-Defence Squads, Peoples Militia Squads and two LRGS. In addition, we also have KKC's at the village and area level and an organisational structure of mass organizations, such as a women's organisation, a student-youth organisation, a cultural organisation and a resistance forum-type of organization. However, the condition of these mass organisations is not good enough, as was desired.

In January 2004, in advancing the struggle our LRGS along with the SDS has snatched four rifles and a stein gun from the forest security

guards. In the history of Assam this event carried out by a Maoist organisation is an important event, which is carried out with the local leadership from the area of a nationality. Getting influenced by this event the ULFA has sent a message of congratulation and also proposed to jointly fight against the common enemy. From this it is proved that by developing the struggle with our own independent initiative, the development of friendly relation with the forces fighting the nationality struggles is possible.

In Tripura, we do not have much work, except for some strong sympathizers and some contacts. After this initial success, however, our next step, that remains to be taken, would be to accomplish the important and necessary task of developing a struggle, sustaining it and developing a guerrilla zone. For this, it is important to adopt the method of carrying out plans in the time frame that may have been specified. Thus, it is necessary to lay stress on strengthening the Party, the Army, the KKC's and other mass organisations and at the same time, ever expanding the struggle area.

## **v. Orissa**

This is one of the backward states of India. Most of the area here is set amidst difficult-to-access hills and forests. The state has been afflicted with extreme poverty and administrative negligence. Our work started here in the districts of Cuttack and Jagatsinghpur etc. Some PRs emerged in these districts. Some activists were sent with them to launch work in the remote and backward areas of Novapara, Balangir etc. Work was later begun in some areas of Sambhalpur, Deogarh, Mayurbhang, Keonjhar, Sundergarh and other districts. Meanwhile, in the Sambhalpur-Deogarh area, some programme of the struggle, such as annihilating the class enemy and seizing guns from the enemy, were successfully carried out. In this way, our work in both the plains and forest areas has extended. At present, a State Organising Committee has been functioning here, with some Area Committees functioning below. At some places, some units of KKC's are functioning at village level, and in Deogarh-Sambhalpur area an LRGS has also been constituted. In addition, mass organizations for work among women; student-youth, cultural activists and intellectuals are also in existence. A resistance platform type of organisation also exists here.

## vi. Punjab

It is well known that Punjab has a glorious legacy of armed struggle against imperialism and feudal kings and nawabs. Therefore, even today Punjab occupies an important place on the map of the peoples' war presently raging in the country. Especially with the comprador ruling classes clamouring about the success of the green revolution, the growth and extension of the Maoist party and the revolutionary struggle in Punjab is a development that has a great influence on the Indian revolution.

The RCCI (Maoist), as is common knowledge, has been carrying on revolutionary work in Punjab since long. In four districts, there has been intense work to some extent and in an equal number of districts there has been work capable of creating some influence. Now with the emergence of the MCCI, following the unity of the MCC with this group, a Punjab State Committee has been formed, comprising some leading comrades of that state, and those who have some knowledge of the prevailing socio-economic conditions and some experience of building and steering movements in accordance with the specificities of Punjab. Under this committee, there exists the organisational structure of the party in the form of some Area Committees and some Cells. Moreover, in some districts, the party has considerable influence among worker and peasant masses and there is also a strong organisation of the peasants and workers functioning. The mass organisation known as... Forum is particularly popular and has wide influence. There are also some mass organisations working among women, youth and intellectuals. Efforts are on to work among urban workers, but no organisation of workers could yet be built in factories. There could also not be any headway in work among students.

On the question of building and spreading the revolutionary struggle in Punjab, we have to advance in the face of such thinking as, "There would be no armed revolution or armed struggle in Punjab and that there would only be some mass movements." We have to struggle vigorously against such thinking. In our understanding, whatever development has taken place in Punjab in the name of capitalism, is distorted capitalism, and the semi-feudal basis still exists in various forms. In reality, the problem of land for the peasants has not yet been solved, and among the peasants there is a

strong desire for land. In our view, distorted capitalism has developed in Punjab to some extent, but the semi-feudal mode of production still maintains influence and control.

Therefore, it is possible to develop and spread armed struggle in Punjab as part of the strategy of protracted peoples' war, taking into account the specific economic-political and social aspects of the state. According to this analysis we have chalked out a plan of work for Punjab. This entails beginning with the programme of developing mass movements and revolutionary movements according to the specificity of Punjab, gradually developing the activities for armed struggle by forming an area of armed struggle over a vast area and Local Regular Guerilla Squads (LRGS). Taking this as an immediate objective, it was decided that the...area of Punjab would be built as a strategic area in order to sustain the struggle. Meanwhile, to some extent there is an extensive mass base and some struggles have been waged thus far. In such an area, one LRGS has been formed; a decision has been taken to increase its numerical strength.

Our main problem, however, remains that of the lack of Professional Revolutionaries. That is why we have at present given the greatest stress on developing the PR mentality and on developing PRs. Positive results have already started emerging. Finally, our understanding remains that the way in which the armed struggle would have to be advanced even in the specific situation of Punjab and how this part would be coordinated with the whole under the strategy of protracted people's war adopted for the country as a whole by the all India party, shall have to be decided. And to give this a practical shape is a challenge for the communist revolutionaries of India that every revolutionary must accept.

## **vii. Delhi**

This is the capital of the country and also a centre of the exploiting and ruling classes, both Indian and foreign, and moneybags, both new and old. It is also the centre of the country's art forms, both old and new. For revolutionaries, not to have an eye on the strong and impregnable fortresses of reactionaries would only betray their one-sidedness. Therefore, according to the dialectical law, "know your enemy, know yourself," it is most essential for revolutionaries to know Delhi and to carry out revolutionary work there,

so that it may be possible to penetrate this fort at the opportune moment. As Delhi is the capital of India, and since at the central level, it is a question of seizing power throughout the country, the basic precondition for carrying out all our work here is to strengthen our party organisation by giving utmost importance to strictly secret methods of work.

Even today there is feudal grandeur in and around Delhi. The masses reel under the crudest forms of feudal atrocities and exploitation. The bourgeois development in this area has got intertwined with the feudal hegemony and tradition, taking on the most vicious form.

Our work in Delhi is based upon the working class. Although we have not been able to spread much of our party work among the working class, yet we do have some party cells among the workers. There is also a trade union organisation among the workers, and we are in fact conducting the trade union movement among workers in some factories. Apart from this, we also have some work on the youth, and intellectual and cultural fronts. We have a City Committee here (which is equivalent to Zonal Committee). Also, State Committees of several mass organisations are active here. Most importantly, a Delhi City (Zonal) Committee was recently constituted through a Conference. Besides, a youth organisation was also formed at an all-Delhi level.

Some activities are also being carried on from here in the adjoining districts of Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.

### **viii. UP – MP – Rajasthan Border Area**

In this area as well we have a Zonal Organising Committee, which is in a very preliminary stage.

### **ix. Tamilnadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Haryana etc.**

**Tamilnadu:** We have been carrying on our work in Tamilnadu through some contacts for the last five years. There has been some growth, particularly in Paadukottai, Aarangtangi, Dindigal, Madurai and Dharampuri districts. Some contacts have been found among students, peasants and workers, and efforts are on to develop professional revolutionaries and organise people's militia from them. The work here has been going on

under the aegis of a Zonal Committee (Organisational). A nine-member peoples' militia has also been formed here.

**Karnataka:** We have developed some contacts in different areas of Karnataka over the last five years. We have some contacts among peasants and student–youth in some areas around Bangalore, in Gadak, Belgaum and some parts of North-West Karnataka. Here too the work has been going on under the aegis of a Zonal Committee (Organisational), and a peoples' militia comprising seven has also been formed.

**Maharashtra:** We have been advancing, while establishing wide contacts in Mumbai, New Mumbai, Marathwada and Solapur of Maharashtra over the last five years. Efforts are underway to advance party work here by building and widening our contacts among peasants, students and intellectuals. Here the party work is being directed by forming several party cells.

**Haryana:** We have been carrying out our work by maintaining contacts in some areas of Haryana for the last four years. We have contacts here among peasants, workers, student–youth and intellectuals. Efforts are on to expand our work in districts like Faridabad, Rohtak, Hissar, Sonapat through an Area Committee and some Cells.

## **x. Regarding our Urban Work**

We know that cities are strongholds of the enemy. This means that the cities are strong centres of imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism. The fundamental centres of enemy's financial, political, cultural and military power are cities. The enemy is relatively weak in the rural areas as compared to the cities. Then the vanguard of revolution, the working class also resides in the cities. The working class and its vanguard organisation, the communist revolutionary organisation or party can ensure its ultimate victory, that of making successful the ongoing struggle to build up a classless and exploitation-free society through establishing proletarian dictatorship only when it would accomplish the new democratic revolution in India and establish the people's democratic dictatorship, and towards this end it would have to lead the armed agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle and protracted people's war in the country side. From this it is clear that the task of leading the agrarian revolutionary



guerrilla struggle or protracted people's war in the countryside is not the task of peasants alone, but the task of the urban workers, students and intellectuals and various people of the cities. It is here that the question arises of making the countryside the focus of our struggle. This, however, does not mean that less attention should be paid to urban work. In fact it is our declared policy to give appropriate importance to this work. Our basic document of 1969, on the Strategy and Tactics of Indian revolution contains such an orientation: "Building up of revolutionary war and establishing the people's army and red base areas in the country side is the not the task of peasants and the rural masses alone. From the cities the workers, students and youth must participate in this task, in the form of organisers, in the form of soldiers." The task of the working class and the party in the city, besides extending assistance in the form of money, weapons, medicines, food stuffs and other things to the countryside, is to engage a major part of the enemy force in the city and continue the red resistance struggle and revolutionary struggle with the objective of creating hurdles in the military actions of the enemy. Their important task is to continuously conduct ambushes on the vehicles of enemy soldiers and their transport system, and to weaken their communications and supplies system, and launch attacks on the army camps, ordinance factories and supply depots. Not doing so would enable the enemy to send all his forces to the countryside, which would be harmful to the revolution.

It is clear from the above that we will have to explain the importance and significance of armed agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle and protracted peoples war to the working class as well as the various sections of the petty bourgeoisie in the cities, namely students, youth, teachers, professors, doctors, lawyers, engineers, journalists, litterateurs, working women, drivers, cleaners, small shopkeepers, shop assistants, government employees etc. Towards this end, besides organising all the classes of the cities for agitations on various burning issues, special emphasis must also be given to organising the party and guerilla squads, so that when the work in the countryside develops to a substantial level and our strength develops up to a certain stage, then the already struggling force may not find much difficulty in seizing the city.

It is a considerably weak aspect of our work that we lag far behind in

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the matter of developing work in cities sufficiently. In order to overcome this situation, that is to overcome our weakness in city work, it is essential to pay attention to a few points so as to strengthen the situation of our party.

1. First of all we have to keep in mind that cities are a powerful base camp of the enemy, and that severe exploitation, injustices and atrocities on the part of the imperialists and the comprador bourgeoisie continue in the cities and so do the activities of all kinds of reactionary and revisionist parties. Therefore, we should not give a free hand to the exploitation, repression and servility of the class enemy and comprador parties in the cities. Rather we should give due importance to developing revolutionary activities in the cities.

2. We have to obtain a deep understanding on what is the line of the MCCI to carry out urban work. We should also study the chapter on urban work in our document on tactics. Besides, we must also study comrade Lenin's articles, *What Is To Be Done?*, documents on the revolutionary trade union movement in China and our, *More Against Economism*. Through this study we should obtain a correct understanding on the importance, and the orientation and method of work among the working class in the cities.

3. We must understand well the need to draw a clear line of demarcation with the known revisionists and pro-establishment naxalites in all matters, including the political and organisational orientation and method of work, and also make creative and serious efforts to draw this line of demarcation clearly during our actual work.

4. We have to accord the topmost priority to select such areas in cities where our work can advance most rapidly and at the same time also adopt a consistent plan with a cadre policy to implement the same.

5. The line of protracted peoples' war and the work and struggle in cities is a question of basic principle. Instead of adopting the wrong policy, until the cities are encircled from the countryside, of making vain efforts to organise "insurrection" or the "last" battle in the city, that would cause the maximum losses to our revolutionary forces, the struggle in the cities should be subordinated to the struggle in the countryside.

6. We will have to make advance preparations for the liberation of

cities at the opportune moment while encircling the cities from the countryside after liberating the countryside.

7. An important task of the working class and the parties of the cities is to organise and activate the fighting forces and the creativity of the masses against the enemy in various ways, starting with different forms of resistance and revolutionary struggles to various other methods in order to engage the major part of enemy forces in the cities and to create hurdles for the enemy's military activities so that the enemy is rendered incapable of deploying its full force or almost its full force against the revolutionary forces in the countryside. Attacking the enemy's military vehicles and transport systems regularly in a guerilla way, crippling day in and day out the enemy's communications and supplies systems, attacking at opportune moments the enemy's military camps, ordinance production centres and supply depots, and many other kinds of tasks would be part of the revolution struggle.

8. We must completely abandon the thinking that until the cities are encircled from the countryside, we have not much work in cities, and merely occasional processions, seminars, meetings and cultural functions may take place. On the contrary, we will have to build at first small and by and by, bigger movements on the problems of the working class and the problems of all other toiling masses, taking up minor but burning issues locally and general problems like unemployment, rising prices, usury, addiction, obscenity, corruption etc. We must develop such peoples' movements into a resistance movement. We have to make preparations right from the beginning for the Red Guard movement and conduct guerrilla actions as and when demanded according to our basic orientation. We always have to be alert in order to smash the police, goondas and mafia gangs. We have to strictly apply the revolutionary style in matters like moving about and staying here and there. Then apart from the other activities, an important task of the City Committee to build Seven Squads according to our declared policy.

9. We have to advance the city work by adopting the method of staying in the slums of workers and localities of working people. Going to the workers, eating with the workers, staying with the workers, understanding the problems of the workers, taking part in the workers movement, equipping

the workers with revolutionary politics – in this way we adopt the process of integrating with the workers.

10. Apart from laying special emphasis on building a strong party and party committee system in the city we should give special stress upon our work on different fronts, particularly the workers front and students, youth, intellectuals, cultural and women's fronts.

We hope that by doing the above we would be able to overcome our present weaknesses in the cities and to develop upon the present condition of our party work there.

We must remember that our inability to advance our urban work rapidly would cause damage to our struggle in the countryside and force a retreat, which we do not want at any cost.

## **IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OUR MILITARY LINE BE NECESSARILY DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CORRECT POLITICAL LINE**

There is no doubt about the fact that as the agrarian revolutionary armed resistance struggle advances in India, the role of the military struggle as a practical expression of the political struggle has gradually been acquiring the principal role and will continue to do so. Therefore, not only is a correct political line necessary, but determining a correct military line in accordance with the political line is also necessary. Our military line can advance basically from two fundamental points. First, our army can be only of one type, that is, it will have to emerge as a weapon which will remain under the theoretical leadership of working class and will involve itself in the struggles of the masses and build the red base area. Secondly, our war can be only of one kind, that is, it will have to be so united a war, in which we will have to concede that the enemy is big and powerful and we are small and weak. Therefore, in this war we have to use our strong aspect against the enemy's weak aspect, and totally rely on the people's strength in order to achieve the development, sustainability, expansion and victory of the army.

Our armed squads must oppose the solely military approach in all affairs. They must oppose the thinking that army does not meddle with politics, and we have to staunchly oppose the theory of roving rebels that denies the principle that it is only the politics that directs the army.

## **FORMATION OF THE ARMY ORGANISATION – PLGA**

“Without a Peoples’ Army, the masses have nothing.” Ever since our inception, our entire revolutionary work till date has remained centred upon building the peoples’ army and base area on the basis of this perception. So far we have been successful in forming the PLGA and are presently engaged in developing guerrilla zones into base areas in certain areas.

We had begun our work in the orientation of this directive, “Arouse and organise the common masses in, to some extent vast areas, one by one, launch the struggle to develop red resistance struggle and uproot feudalism. Through the course of just this struggle, gradually strengthen, consolidate and expand the party and the guerrilla army (Self Defence Squads, Local Peoples’ Militia and Local Regular Guerilla Army) on the one hand, and gradually strengthen, consolidate and expand the struggle area, on the other. While further intensifying the agrarian revolution and by gradually centralising the Local Regular (Guerilla) Army, form the Regular Central Guerilla Army”(Lal Pataka – I). Further it has been said about the next course, “With the growth in size and the heightening of the struggle to an advanced level, ... these Local Regular Armies (Local Regular Guerilla Squads) would not be able in isolation to hold out against enemy attacks, and in these circumstances, ... while mobilising and organising with these very forces at the centre, a Central Regular Guerrilla Army would be formed ... This very Central Regular Guerrilla Army would be the preliminary form of a regular Red Army”(Lal Pataka –I). It is further said that, “Generally speaking, a stable Base Area cannot be established in just one leap. Capturing any one area or establishing control over it would only be the result of smashing the effective power of the enemy. A temporary Base Area can be built up only through determined struggle, and only after power changes hands several times can a temporary base area be converted in to a stable Base Area”(Lal Pataka – I).

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According to the directives of the above orientation, we conducted the agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle and the struggle to uproot feudalism in a vast area of Bihar–Jharkhand–Bengal under the leadership of the Bihar–Jharkhand–Bengal Special Area Committee. Only by passing through this process of struggle were we able to build Self Defence Squads, area level Peoples’ Militia Squads (the basic force); Local Regular Guerilla Squads and Special Guerrilla Squads (the intermediate force); and Platoons and Company (the main force). On the basis of this development, we could organise the PLGA in 2003 out of these three kinds of forces, basic, intermediate and main, and announce the formation of PLGA. Meanwhile, we could develop the level of our struggle to the level of Guerrilla Area and adopt a plan of action to advance through a process from the Guerrilla Area to Guerrilla Base Area so as to build a Base Area.

This army has also been supplying food, arms and ammunition, and various other materials. It can thus be said that this army is capable of waging a protracted war with independent initiative. Through the process of struggle against deprivation, this army has been acquiring resources. From absolutely nothing has started the struggle and organisation of this army and the process of arming itself with weapons. It is for this reason that this army has the grit to fight and hold out even in adverse situations. This army wages war by firmly grasping the basic principle about war taught by Com Mao, **“Preserve your forces, destroy the enemy’s.”** The strongest basis of this army comprises its revolutionary ideals, integration with the masses, and the spirit of service and devotion towards the masses as well as the art of waging the guerrilla war. This army has imbibed Com Mao’s views about the Red Army, **“...Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy’s military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organising the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up Party organisations. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organise them, arm them, and help them to establish**

**revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.”**(Mao, *On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party*).

Presently, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army has been formerly announced. The fact is that this has not happened all of a sudden. It has been formed with comrades who have passed through various tests, such as waging numerous minor and major struggles; arousing, organising and arming the masses while living with them; involving them in struggles and winning their hearts by being at their side in efforts to solve their problems. The army has emerged, developed and expanded, and continues to do so through the difficult, strenuous and long process of facing every attack of the enemy and forcing him to retreat in the face of our staunch retaliation, advancing from minor to major struggles, smaller to bigger formations, from backward and undeveloped weapons to equipping ourselves with modern and advanced weapons seized one after another from enemy, and from a narrow to a larger sphere. It has been fighting to achieve a great political objective, and has been it also procuring all the other materials that it needs from the arena of struggle itself.

The experiences we gained while conducting the armed struggle over the last few years can be briefly put as follows:

1. Be the phase that of defence, or equilibrium or offence, the aspect of attack would always be the principal aspect. There would be quantitative differences in the offensive actions from one phase to the other.
2. Only by keeping in mind the aspect of attack as the principal aspect, can we maintain the plan, initiative and execution of the war in our hands and by flexibly arranging the formations of the army can we successfully conduct active resistance or retaliatory actions.
3. We should never engage in a fight without a correct plan, full preparation and total activeness, and only a correct plan, full preparation and total activeness would ensure victory.

Subsequently, the PLGA has indeed played and has been playing a glorious role in the growth and spread of the agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war in India. Creatively applying Comrade Mao’s advice; “You fight in your way, we fight in ours; we fight only when we can win and we withdraw

where there is no possibility of our winning,” the commanders and fighters of PLGA have conducted daring and brilliant raids and ambushes one after another, and demonstrated advanced techniques of guerrilla war and smashed the enemy’s ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaigns one after another, thus developing guerrilla war step by step. Recently, they have conducted many glorious and heroic raids and ambushes of exemplary nature as part of their military manoeuvres in areas such as Jharkhand, Bihar, Chattisgarh (northern part), UP (eastern part), Assam, W Bengal etc. Some instances of the brilliant war actions were the raids in Tekari and Pritsheela (Gaya-Bihar), Bhurigurari and Mali (Aurangabad-Bihar), Pehsaul Bazar (Darbhanga-Bihar), Devkuli Dham (Shivhar-Bihar), Simrahani (West Champaran-Bihar), Khoradih (Mirzapur-UP), Matari, Dudhmania, Kataras, Baniyadih, Bagodar, Navadih, Teesri, Gorhar, Tundi, Topchanchi, Chandrapura, Dembotand, Bara Jamda (All of them in Jharkhand), and a forest office (Kamrup-Assam) etc. and ambushes in Churchoo, Palamau, Satganva, Saranda (December 2002), Palma, Tundi etc. (All these in Jharkhand). As part of the above process, the PLGA gave an indication of a qualitative leap in the growth and spread of the developing agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war in India by accomplishing a daring and brilliant ambush of a higher level in Saranda on April 7, 2004. Similarly, the historic raid in Koraput carried out by the PGA led by the PW is also an indication of a glorious leap in this sphere. Through such activities both of these guerrilla armies are rapidly advancing in the direction of developing in the form of consolidated and fully developed PLA.

In order to strengthen and consolidate the PLGA, a Central Military Commission, Special Area Military Commissions and Regional Military Commissions have been formed, comprising the experts in military affairs and the secretaries of concerned committee. All the military commissions at the lower level shall work under the guidance of the Central Military Commission. Commands at Area, Sub Zonal and Zonal levels will also be formed. In the Area Command we have a representative from the Area Committee, and the Commander and Deputy Commander of the LRGS active in the area. In the Sub Zonal Command, there would be one or two representatives from the Sub Zonal Committee, and Commanders of all the LRGS and SRGS. In the Zonal Command, we would have a



representative from the Zonal Committee, the Commander and Deputy Commander of the Platoon and a representative of the Regional Military Commission

The following are the tough and major challenges that the PLGA faces today:

1. The first challenge for the formation and development of the PLGA is to build a new type of a true Red Army or the embryonic form of People's Liberation Army on the basis of the above-mentioned directive and orientation given by Comrade Mao. This means, above all, that the PLGA should be built as a true people's army committed to the interests of the masses and the nation, and to the lofty goals of new democracy, socialism and communism. Therefore, we must lay the greatest emphasis on building the PLGA on the foundations of correct Maoist ideology and politics. So as to do so, special emphasis should be laid on building party branches within the military formations and on their continuous activity.
2. It will be small in number when compared to the enemy's military power. Its organisational shape has so far been built only up to some platoons and few companies. It needs to be considered how the level can be raised at least up to battalion formation in the shortest possible time.
3. Its basic forces are organised and systematised up to a very limited measure, and wherever they have been formed, there is no proper account of them (the number of units, the quantity of weapons and ammunition etc. has not been maintained). This should have to be earnestly done as soon as possible and systematised.
4. The arrangement for the supply of articles of daily use and foodstuff, clothes, uniforms, shoes, umbrellas, bags, torches, soap, oil, ammunition, weapons etc. should be made mainly by the guerrilla army itself, and all these things should be arranged for through seizures from the enemy during the fighting. Moreover, production should be organised in the Guerrilla Base Areas.
5. The political and military training of all the three forces of the PLGA, particularly that of the basic forces remains quite negligible. Timely

and regular arrangements would have to be made for the same.

6. The PLGA should help in organising various other factors for building the Revolutionary Peasant Committees and Revolutionary Peoples' Committees.
7. In order to strengthen and raise the level of war the skill would have to be developed for attacking the bigger forces of the enemy with our bigger formations.
8. The Guerrilla Zone would have to be expanded in waves, and in order to transform the Guerrilla Zone into a Base Area we would have to advance with full preparation to smash the military forces of the enemy in Guerrilla Zones.
9. By all means the overall leadership and control of the party over PLGA must be consolidated and ensured. We have to apply in letter and spirit comrade Mao's dictum about the Red Army having to remain under the discipline of the party, politics commanding the gun, and in no case should the gun be allowed to command politics and the party.

Military Commissions and the concerned party committees, particularly the Central Committee should take special initiative to make PLGA accept the above challenges. We can thus say that problems would indeed be encountered while developing the PLGA, but the potentialities are immense.

That our Central Committee has been able to develop its perception on the military line and publish a military manual on the basis of a review of the developments since the very beginning in our perceptions and practice related to the military line since date, and a synthesis of the experiences of Russia and China, particularly the experience of the Chinese revolution and the Red Army, and the current experiences of Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, particularly those of Nepal and the CPI (ML) (PW) in India was a good thing.

This development of ours can be considered as a concrete manifestation of the decisions and measures taken by us in the year 2000 and after, while struggling against the representatives of erroneous views. In spite of all the factors being present even before, we had not able to carry out the

above development earlier. We could achieve this success after ultimately defeating the anti party 'Ba'-'Bh' clique through to the end.

Much, however, remains to be done in this field as yet. The Central Committee and the Central Military Commission would now have to make all efforts to accomplish the remaining tasks.

## **ADOPT SUITABLE TACTICS TO FOIL THE “ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION CAMPAIGN” UNLEASHED UNDER THE JOINT OPERATIONAL COMMAND CONSTITUTED BY THE ENEMY**

It is evident that the enemy has been conducting the “encirclement and suppression” campaign with the nefarious designs of crushing the revolutionary class struggle, i.e. the agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle. Whether in Jharkhand or Bihar, in Chhattisgarh or West Bengal, or in Assam or UP, wherever there is a revolutionary class struggle the enemy has unleashed brutal atrocities. In fact, the enemy is hell bent upon maintaining his rule by the force of the gun alone. It is as clear as the light of day that it is the armed force or the gun that is real, and that the rest, that is the talk of democracy, independence etc. is mere hypocrisy and fraud.

The truth of this fact emerges very clearly when one takes a look at Jharkhand, Bihar, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Assam etc. Under the garb of ‘democracy,’ a brutal repression campaign has been continuing here against the masses struggling for their dignity, freedom, land and all economic and political rights. Over the last many years, ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaigns have been continuing under various names, these repression campaigns still continue under one name or the other. Armed forces, such as the CRPF, BSF, Commando Force, STF etc. and the armed forces of different states are involved in all these operations. Clearly, the enemy is forced to increasingly rely on its advanced and powerful armed forces equipped with the most modern weaponry. On the contrary, it is also clear that the revolutionary forces have also been advancing while contending with the enemy’s forces.

In order to carry out all these operations, the paramilitary forces are stationed in large numbers at those district headquarters that in their terminology are supposed to be terrorist-affected, and armed forces are deployed at various police stations in large numbers. Next, under the supervision of police IGs and DIGs, and under the direct command of SPs and DSPs, the armed forces and commando forces, equipped with modern weapons, encircle villages, be it day or night, arresting en masse the people, particularly the youth. Either one village, or several villages at once are encircled. Moreover, cruel and brutal atrocities are let loose by way of arresting people at will and without warrant, beating them up, molesting women, plundering household articles and doing to death a large number of activists and revolutionary masses in fake encounters.

During the rule of the BJP-led NDA Government, a widespread, brutal repression campaign has been unleashed under the supervision of the Union Home Ministry, as per the directives of US imperialism, against all the revolutionary struggles, according to a central plan under the joint operational command comprising of and senior officers of central intelligence agencies, Chief Secretaries and the DGPs of the nine states of Jharkhand, Bihar, Andhra, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. This continues relentlessly and ruthlessly under the rule of the Congress-led UPA Government.

Eliminating 'naxalism,' which means crushing the revolutionary struggle, has now become a one-point programme for the governments of all the nine States as well as the Union Government. Thus, they have arrived at a common understanding among themselves on exchanging the experiences of the measures they adopt in suppressing the naxalite movement in their respective state, on maintaining live contact among the nine States as well as between the States and the Centre, and on employing advanced technology to exchange various information about naxalites. The centre has sanctioned a substantial amount to carry out the planned repression campaign.

So in the background of the above situation it is very important for us right now to adopt appropriate tactics to foil the evil designs of the enemy. And the appropriate plan according to Mao's dictum would be, "When the

enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy takes rest, we harass him; when the enemy gets tired, we pounce upon him; when the enemy retreats, we chase after him.” In accordance with the above, the method that we have been laying the greatest stress upon is to launch a counter-attack against the enemy when he penetrates our area to conduct his “encirclement and suppression” campaign, through the form of powerful ambush while he is marching along. Such tactics have yielded good results so far.

## **REVOLUTIONARY PEASANT COMMITTEE**

It has been our priority to draw a clear line of demarcation with revisionism on the basis of this dictum: “If the people have no political power, they have nothing.” If the propaganda of revolutionary politics is not conducted from this angle right from the beginning, it is not possible to make the masses conscious and organise them against the other parliamentary political parties and revisionist parties or groups. When and how will the masses awakened, organised and armed with revolutionary politics establish their political power? What will be the organised form of this political power? This is a fundamental and essential question for revolution. We have deeply thought over it. We understand that to solve the question of seizure of power, there is no way but to uproot the present power. Neither can both powers exist simultaneously, nor can stable peoples’ power be established by uprooting the present power with a single stroke. There will be a phase of grabbing power from each other. Peoples’ power will first be established in some areas temporarily; it will then get transformed gradually into stable peoples’ power. It is at this stage that the concept of Base Area would emerge.

If one remains standstill at the above thinking, the solution to the problem would remain in abeyance. Then the question that arises is will peoples’ power be established only after the present power is shaken off, even if temporarily, that is even for some time or for a few days? Will the period between one power being uprooted and the other being established be one of powerlessness? Or what will it be like? After serious discussion on these questions, we concluded that whenever and in whatever measure we strike at the power of the enemy, then and in that measure we would be able to exercise our power. Then came the question of what would be

the form of organisation to exercise power. Will the party organisation itself do this job, or will it be the responsibility of the military organisation, or will various types of organisations of the masses do it together right from the beginning? A number of such questions naturally arose.

Through discussion on such numerous questions from various angles, we could arrive at a concrete conclusion about the form of power and the form of organisation. In the final analysis, the question of revolution is inextricably linked with the question of power. The question of revolution is linked with the contradiction between productive forces and the relations of production, and the solution of this contradiction. Among the productive forces, labour plays the decisive role along with the means of production. The working class and the peasantry are the two fundamental elements that play the role of labour among the new democratic productive forces. It is their unity alone that would be able to transform the backward means of production into developed means of production, and enable them to produce as per the overall requirement for the development of society. Only by establishing their ownership over the means of production and the production and the means of distribution and the system of distribution, would the new democratic system be established. This would not be possible unless the productive forces establish their rule over political power. At present the agrarian revolution is the axis of new democratic revolution. The fundamental force of agrarian revolution is the peasantry, particularly, the poor-landless peasants, that is, it is the advanced section of this class that would have to carry out the main responsibility of the struggle aimed at seizure of power. As we arrived at this conclusion, we decided two slogans for the peasant committee. "Land to the True Peasants" and "All the Political Power to the Revolutionary Peasant Committee." On the basis of these slogans, the responsibility of fulfilling two tasks fell upon the Revolutionary Peasant Committee. One was to mobilise the peasantry to solve the land problem, and the other, to seize power and establish its law and rule to exercise the power.

A revisionist concept regarding the peasant movement had taken roots since the very beginning in the Indian communist movement that the peasant movement has nothing to do with the seizure of power and that the focus of peasant struggles should only be the land question and raising some

paltry demands. We fought against this revisionist concept, linking the land question with the question of political power, and made the question of power the principal agenda of revolutionary peasant struggle. It was with this view that we brought forward the Revolutionary Peasant Committee as the main form of organisation. In this way, we mainly introduced the question of smashing the old power and law and its state machinery through agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggles, and while doing so building the power of the Revolutionary Peasant Committee and strengthening it step by step.

As we started the process of forming peasant committees with the above understanding, our political propaganda during our work among the peasants focussed since the very beginning on our perception in this regard. Thus, from the very beginning we made serious and conscious efforts to practice the Maoist class line and mass line. We relied on the landless and poor peasants, while developing their initiative we forged unity with the middle peasants, won over a section of rich peasants as well, and in this way, from the very beginning made all possible efforts to organise a class-based united front against feudal landlords under the leadership of landless and poor peasants. Gradually, on the basis of this political foundation, the process of forming the Party, Army and Revolutionary Peasant Committee began and went ahead in the areas. The form of this organisation was not completely secret like the party. Yet, it came into existence primarily in the form of a secret organisation. Its organisational structure and the process of organising it were conducted in such a secret style that would not conform to the constitutional provisions and laws of the enemy. Besides it maintained direct links with the peasants in agrarian struggle and other kinds of social struggles. It remained closely linked with the Party, the Army organisations and the struggle for seizure of power, and directly exchanged help and cooperation with them.

In the different parts of the country - in a number of villages of Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area; North Bihar-UP-Uttarakhand Special Area; West Bengal; Assam; Chhattisgarh; UP-MP-Rajasthan Border Area and Punjab-Haryana etc. - the name of the Revolutionary Peasant Committee and its two slogans have today gained considerable popularity.

The organisation has spread to various villages and vast areas. In the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area it has been decided to organise it at the State level, far above the village, area (police station-border), block (district-border), division (commissionary) levels. In all the other areas, it has become an immediate necessity for us to form and consolidate it from top to bottom and to activate and energise its units at all levels.

Under its leadership, thousands of hectares of land have been seized and distributed; orchards, trees, lands etc. have been captured, and constructive projects, such as digging wells, ponds, building check dams and schools etc have been undertaken.

In order to develop and consolidate it, the various levels of party committees should without delay attend to the following problems and solve them:

1. Since this organisation has its own constitution and regulations, it is essential that a workshop should be organised, according to it, with the elected representatives of the different levels of committees. The aims, objectives and methods to build organisation should be explained at the workshop, and efforts should be made to see that committees at different levels are organised within a fixed time frame. This process should be started from the top.
2. The publication of its state level organ should be considered.
3. Under its auspices, a forum for peasant movements should be formed in order to bring the backward and middle peasants under our sphere of influence, organising movements on demands, such as against the arbitrary rates of land revenue, tax, land rent, electricity etc., for the proper determination of rates of foodgrains, for procuring agricultural implements at just rates, for foiling the reactionary policies adopted by WTO etc.
4. Under its leadership the organisation and its leaders should be trained to start the process of movements on questions like health, education, etc. along with the movement for redistribution of land, agricultural production, development and control, buying and selling, and production and cooperation movement.



## Revolutionary Peoples' Committee

The Revolutionary Peoples' Committee comes forth at that stage of the struggle to establish revolutionary peoples' power when we reach the stage where we could almost smash the hegemony of the present power in the particular area. In such a situation, the Revolutionary Peasants Committee would develop into a Revolutionary Peoples' Committee as an organ of power comprising the representatives of the working class, the army and others representatives of the people.

Activities are being carried out to root out the military power of the enemy in the areas selected as Guerrilla Base Areas. Attacks are being organised on the targeted reactionary agents, landlords and police force of the enemy. It would also be necessary to root out their economic, political, and cultural domination and influence. Towards this end, it would be necessary for us to present before the masses our economic policy by linking it with the question of continuing war and raising the standard of living of the masses, and to establish and enhance our control on production. For this it would be necessary to build such production units on small scale and prepare the local market for the consumption of their products, as an agricultural production cooperative society, consumer cooperative society, marketing cooperative society, cooperative bank, small and medium industries, including the textile industry, agricultural implements production industry, industry to manufacture shoes, umbrellas, soap, oil etc, press industry, arms and ammunition production industry, explosives production industry etc. We would have to carry out both trade and import-export inside as well as outside the Base Area. The enemy would encircle such an area not only at the military level, but also at the economic level, and would step up the pressure. We would have to smash it lock, stock and barrel. Who would carry out all these tasks? It is here that the need of a Revolutionary Peoples' Committee, i.e. a committee of the United Front of different classes, that would run the government machinery in that area. For this very purpose, an institution comprising of the representatives of workers, peasants, the army and the representatives of different mass organisations should be established. This would be called the Revolutionary Peoples' Committee.

It is our responsibility to make the vast masses aware of our understanding and policy in our selected areas. The men and women, children and the old people, the youth, and all the sections associated with different professions, workers, peasants, student-youth, intellectuals, cultural artistes and all the other toiling masses inhabiting every village and the whole area should be involved in the necessary and appropriate organisations. Moreover, in order to carry out the above tasks on war footing, we would have to widely launch various campaigns, such as a propaganda campaign, an organisation building campaign, campaign to control the production and distribution system and a campaign to develop war to a higher stage. In order to carry out the above, knowledgeable activists and experts on different aspects need to be sent from all areas so as to extend broad cooperation.

The Revolutionary Peoples' Committee or Revolutionary Peoples' Council would be the institution meant to carry out the government machinery in Guerrilla Bases or Red Areas, and would in future develop into a new democratic government on uprooting imperialism-feudalism and establishing a new democratic state.

The Revolutionary Peasant Committee that we begin with, and the Revolutionary Peoples' Committee and its highest form, the new democratic national government would not be detached from one another. The two would be related to each other. With this understanding in view from the beginning to end, we have been and would ever be capable of building and developing the revolutionary struggle by drawing a clear line of demarcation with revisionism and of advancing the struggle to its highest stage, that of the seizure of power, centrally.

## **Peasant Movement Forum**

There is a considerable section among peasantry that supports the Revolutionary Peasant Committee, but hesitates and fears to integrate with its theoretical-political activities. From a class analysis, it emerges that the landless-poor peasants would play the main role in peasant revolution. Among the other peasant sections, the larger section of the middle class apart, some of the well-to-do middle peasants and rich peasants assume vacillating character. Such vacillating friends, despite being ridden with

problems, do not openly participate in the fight for seizure of power. We would have to win over all these vacillating sections. Therefore, a few years ago, the CC decided to build an organisation of the type of Peasant Movement Forum in order to carry out issue-based movements. This organisation would function under the auspices Revolutionary Peasant Committee. It will launch the movements on different issues, raise legal and open demands such as land revenue hike, tax, adequate provision for irrigation and electricity, hike in electricity and irrigation rates, fixation of prices of crops, reasonable rates for agricultural implements and subsidy cuts for the peasants, anti-WTO etc. So far, such a forum has been organised at some places at the local level, and it is also taking up some programmes. It would now have to be better systematised.

### **Advance the mass movement and mass organisations equipped with the orientation of protracted peoples' war while drawing a clear line of demarcation with the long prevalent Gandhism and revisionism**

It is well known that in the matter of mass movement and mass organisations we have a well-knit policy. Behind this well-knit policy there has also been a strong political basis. Without this political basis it would not be possible to determine the aims and objectives, orientation and programme of a mass movement and mass organisations in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country like India. We must draw a clear line of demarcation between mass movements and mass organisations equipped with three different orientations: (a) the insurrectionary orientation; (b) the parliamentary orientation; and (c) the orientation of armed agrarian revolution and protracted peoples' war. In order to conduct the activities of mass movements and mass organisations in the correct direction in semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, we would necessarily have to opt for and practice on the lines of such mass movements and mass organisations that are equipped with the orientation of protracted peoples' war.

On the question of mass movements and mass organisations, our differences with the new and old revisionists are not on the question of whether or not we have to conduct mass movements and mass

organisations. Anyone who would know even the ABC of Marxism would know that the work of mass movements and mass organisations has to be done. It is, however, not sufficient to say only this much. This does not explain what the orientation of mass movements and mass organisations would be. The debate, therefore, remains centred on which of the above three orientations we would have to adopt. If one takes into account the overwhelming influence of Gandhism and revisionism that prevails in India since long, and the tendency to conduct movements (?) merely to get elected as MLAs, MPs and become Ministers, or to make a few economic gains, then without taking a clear-cut stand on the matter of the line of demarcation, we cannot hope to be part of the revolutionary ranks.

The second important point on the question of mass movements and mass organisations would be that in a society where independence and democracy do not exist, where processions and mass mobilisations on minor issues, i.e. the right to speak and to listen are denied, and widespread torture and arrests are resorted to, where the ruling groups have adopted an extremely dictatorial attitude, in such a society we cannot do without giving serious thought to the question of the methods, forms and style of work of mass movements and mass organisations. Our activities in the field of mass movements and mass organisations should be determined only while giving due consideration to these facts.

The third important point on the question of mass movements and mass organisations would be that our thinking should not always be based on legal, open and minimum programmes, but in the current environment of ruthless dictatorship, mass movements and mass organisations should be conducted by secret ways to some extent so as to avoid the intelligence and police wings.

Summing up the above, we can say that at present the main objective of all mass movements and mass organisations should be to help build war.

Drawing a line of demarcation with the capitalist countries, Com. Mao had said, on the question of orientation and form of struggle and organisation in semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, “...**war is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of organisation. Other forms such as mass organisation and mass struggle are also extremely**

**important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war. Before the outbreak of a war all organisation and struggle are in preparation for the war, ... After war breaks out, all organisation and struggle are coordinated with the war either directly or indirectly...**” (Mao, *The problems of war and strategy*)

This statement of Com Mao clarifies the aims and objectives of mass movements and mass organisations. However, when right-opportunist trend started emerging in the guise of correcting the ‘left’ line, its spokesmen often stressed this extract, “Other forms such as mass organisation and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked.” We do not object to this. Our contention has been that Mao’s emphasis, in connection with mass organisations and mass movements, was that “their purpose is to serve war.” This, though clearly outlined by Com. Mao in the above statement, has often been completely ignored. We hold that ignoring this fundamental point and only parroting that “mass organisations and mass movements are indispensable” is nothing but opportunism.

It is clear from the above extract that mass organisations and mass movements are meant only to serve war; before the war breaks out, to prepare for it; and after the war breaks out, they are to be coordinated with war directly or indirectly.

As it is our fundamental objective to build war, it is essential at present to build mass movements and mass organisations with an objective of serving war. Since our struggle has now been advancing towards building Base Area from Guerrilla Area, the mass movements and mass organisations in the struggle areas would have to coordinate with that struggle directly, and outside the struggle areas they would have to coordinate indirectly with that struggle.

A specific feature in India is that armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. The present situation happens to be the best evidence of this fact. In such a situation, while carrying out the tasks of mass movement and mass organisation, we would have to follow the policy outlined by Mao, “**Every Party member should be prepared to take**

**up arms and go to the front at any moment** “ (Mao, *The Problems of War and Strategy*)

Another important point about mass movement and mass organisation is that it is very essential to deeply grasp the following advice of Com. Mao and to implement it according to the specificity of India. Com. Mao said, “**In most parts of ... , Party organisational work and mass work are directly linked with armed struggle; there is not and cannot be, any Party work or mass work that is isolated and stands by itself.**”(Mao, *Problems of war and strategy*)

Although our thinking and understanding about mass movements and mass organisations has been such for a considerable period, yet we have had many shortcomings on the questions of giving practical shape to mass movements and mass organisations in accordance with the above thinking and understanding.

The lack of competent cadre and correct method and style of work is the main problem in running Revolutionary Mass Organisations

It is well known that various mass organisations are active in different states under the Central Committee. Although the development of mass organisations in various states is not alike, yet mass organisations, whatever be their form and extent of growth, are active everywhere. In particular, workers organisations, women’s organisations, cultural organisations, organisation of intellectuals, student organisations and youth organisations have gained recognition among the common people through their work. Besides all these mass organisations, the.....struggling forum comprising of representatives of different mass organisations has emerged as a widely recognised forum.

Along with some programmes based on the respective agendas of different mass organisations, our rallies and mass meetings on different issues, protest demonstrations against police atrocities including assassinations of activists in fake encounters, capital punishment in the garb of law, protests against police atrocities, mass mobilisation centring on the question of release of political prisoners, observing different historical occasions, particularly May Day, Great November Russian Revolution Day, Anti-imperialist Day, International Women’s Day, Martyrs’ Day of March

23, 22nd April Com. Lenin's birth anniversary etc. have been the occasions to organise mass programmes through mass organisations.

Apart from this, anti-election programmes in different forms along with election boycott and area-level or state level "bandh" on various issues are some of the particularly significant programmes carried out by our mass organisations. Also, processions, protest demonstrations and rallies against slander, conspiracy and police repression against the just peasant moment and against decadent culture have also been important programmes of our mass organisations.

Moreover, widespread propaganda and agitation against the policies and programmes of World Bank, IMF, globalisation, and against the new economic and industrial policy, and new educational policy are also a significant aspect of our mass organisations.

The above are our good aspects, the positive aspects. It is our responsibility to advance, extend and develop these aspects.

However, we have some shortcomings on the question of mass movements and mass organisations. They are:

1. Lack of such able activists who can carry out mass organisations and mass movements efficiently and creatively;
2. Lack of immediate agenda one after the other to conduct the mass movements with continuity;
3. Lack of plan to maintain the organisational structure of mass organisations more or less in accordance with their manifesto and constitution; and
4. Weak functioning of the fraction committee as the link between the mass organisation and party organisation for directing party members active in mass organisations.

We would certainly have to struggle against revisionist manifestations within us in order to overcome the above shortcomings. The activists involved in the mass organisations would have to remember that in a country like India where there is neither independence, nor democracy; where struggles of the masses even on ordinary demands are trampled upon by the heels of the police and army; special attention would have to be paid to advance

revolutionary mass movements and mass organisations with a correct perspective. They would have to think creatively on this issue and draw a clear line of demarcation with revisionist, reformist and Gandhian mass movements and mass organisations. They would have to build mass movements and mass organisations equipped with the orientation of armed agrarian revolution, protracted peoples' war and the seizure of state power.

## **THE POSITION OF DIFFERENT MASS ORGANISATIONS**

### **Workers' Front**

We lag far behind in building struggle and organisation on this front in accordance with our understanding. A major reason for this has been our persistent weakness in advancing our revolutionary work in cities. Had we accorded due importance and grasped our party line on forming the Party, Red Guard and United Front in the cities, we could certainly have improved upon the present situation in spite of the numerous problems.

There are many big and small industrial cities, in the area of our work - Bihar, Jharkhand, Bengal, Assam, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, UP, Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Uttarakhand, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra etc. Workers here face many serious problems, such as closure of industries, retrenchment, various kinds of cuts, various draconian laws denying minimum rights including the right to strike and so on. Particularly, the policies of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation being implemented by imperialism and their Indian comprador ruling classes are inflicting severe and direct attacks on the urban working class. Consequently, there is widespread resentment among them against imperialism and their lackeys that erupts from time to time in various forms of struggle. In such a situation, there exists a strong basis to build a powerful workers movement and organisation by concentrating on urban workers. We have, however, not been successful in doing so. This has been our particular weakness. We must give thought to overcoming this weakness without delay.

In spite of all these weaknesses, as far as the question of working on the workers front is concerned, a recognised trade union organisation named workers ... committee has been active among the workers in districts like



Dhanbad, Ranchi, Bokaro, Giridih, Hazaribag, Gaya, Rohtas, Aurangabad etc. in Jharkhand-Bihar. This conducts movements on day-to-day problems of workers. We also have work among railway workers in Bihar-Jharkhand. In particular, our work and the workers movement under our leadership have a good influence in the ... railway workshop and the railway workers of .... Besides, there is also a political mass organisation, named workers ... union in Jharkhand-Bihar that conducts movements on political issues of workers and also exposes and opposes the pro-imperialist policies of the ruling class, such as the policy of privatisation, modernisation and globalisation; the new economic policy, industrial policy and education policy that are being implemented under them; the anti-worker repressive laws and their repressive attitude.

Our work continues among the workers of some factories in the engineering sector, jute mills and leather industries in the vast industrial areas of West Bengal (Kolkata, Howrah, Hooghly, 24 Parganas, Durgapur, Asansol etc), and some workers movements are also conducted. Besides, we have work more or less among corporation employees, government employees, a pharmacist association etc. Yet we have a lot to do to liberate the workers movement from the clutches of the revisionists. This would need the special attention of the party.

In Delhi as well we have a trade union named ... workers front that directs various kinds of movements on the workers problems, such as lock-out, retrenchment and various other problems of workers. We also carry out some joint programmes with others in the workers movement.

We have started some efforts to work in some tea gardens and oil refineries of Assam. Similarly, we have some work in factories in Marathwara and Thane areas of Maharashtra.

So also we are making efforts to work among the workers of the industrial area of Ludhiana. There is also a militant organisation named Kendu Patta Mazdoor Sangharsh Samiti (struggling committee of kendu leaf workers) in Jharkhand; Bihar and Bankura-Purulia in West Midnapur of Bengal, adjoining Jharkhand; and the northern area of Chhattisgarh, under whose leadership a wage hike movement in the work of kendu leaf collection has been going on for nearly two decades. The struggling

association has good influence in all these areas.

On the workers front we publish two magazines carrying the titles, “Mazdoor Hastakshep” and “Mazdoor ka Aahvan.”

The measures that we would have to take in order to overcome our weaknesses on the workers’ front are:

1. We would have to work among both organised and unorganised workers. While giving greater stress to work among unorganised contract workers and workers of small factories, we would have to give due importance to work among the workers of the organised industries. We would also have to carry out the trade union movement on the different demands of workers while building unions as and when necessary.
2. We would have to give special importance to work among workers of coal mines and other mines, among tea workers, and the workers of textile and jute industries.
3. We would have to give special importance to work in the communication, power, steel, ordinance and other industries.
4. We would have to go to the workers as theorists, propagandists, agitationists and organisers; not as economists or as a bandwagon of spontaneous movements.
5. We would have to give due importance to building advanced political mass organisations for advanced workers.
6. We would have to build movements on different problems affecting peoples’ lives as well as those of workers and on special issues related to the national and international situation. While building the movement on workers’ problems, we would have to make efforts to unite with peasants and forge a strong worker-peasant unity.
7. We would also have to organise the rural area in the vicinity of industrial area and the cities, and also strive to start a dialogue with workers coming to the cities from rural areas and through them make efforts to build organisation there as well.
8. The advanced workers would have to go to the peasants, understand

their problems, integrate with them while equipping them with politics.

## **Immediate Agenda on the Workers Front**

We have to remember that it is not possible to activate and move the workers front without some immediate agenda of agitation. An outline in the form of an immediate agenda is being presented here, basing on which, efforts should be made to build the movement by linking them up with the specificity of each industrial sphere:

1. Against the new economic and industrial policy.
2. Against retrenchment, lay-off, lock-out, compulsory retirement or golden hand-shake, and for different rights including just wages.
3. Against various policies against workers' interests.
4. Against the bills being introduced to restrict the workers movement.
5. Against all the black laws.
6. Against the pollution of environment in the industrial sector.
7. Against the widespread liquor vends, intoxication, and usury in workers areas.
8. Guarantee of security for the lives of the workers and also for their right to education, health care and housing.
9. For the implementation of democracy and democratic functioning in trade unions.
10. For support to the revolutionary peasant movement and against the police repression.
11. Against all divisive policies, such as communalism and casteism and against communal elements who instigate riots.
12. Against unprecedented price rise and rampant corruption.
13. Concentrating on the basic problems related to peoples' lives and national life.

We would have to select 2 to 4 points from the above agenda for the movement and conduct a propaganda campaign. The propaganda campaigns

would have to be carried out through forms such as handwritten posters, wall writing, leafleting, corner meetings, processions, gate meetings at factories, collieries, orchards, plantations, group meetings in the residential sites of workers etc, and depending upon the fighting mood and level of the consciousness of the workers the movement would have to be given shape. The forms of agitation that can be adopted according to the particular conditions would be: raising slogans in front of the gate, raising slogans while demonstrating in front of the offices, gheraoing high officials and offices, protest demonstration, daily work stoppages for a fixed time, token strike for a day and simultaneous road blockades, road obstructions, strikes etc.

## **Women's Front**

Women comprise one half of society. They are victims of social, economic and political inequality. This miserable plight of women, shackled in slavery, had started with the origin of classes in society, with the end of the matriarchal age and establishment of male-dominated, patriarchal society, and got aggravated with the arrival of the stages of feudal and capitalist society. The dreams of social progress remain a mirage for her and for the mass of exploited classes. This vexed issue was ultimately resolved. The question of emancipation of women is interwoven with the struggle of the proletariat based on Marxism, through which socialism would be established under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and would then develop into a classless and exploitation-free communist society.

On the basis of this perception, the emancipation of Indian women is a part of the emancipation of the women of the world. For this emancipation, it is essential for women to take part in the ongoing anti-imperialist anti-feudal struggle. Only by taking part in the raging armed agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war and protracted people's war in India, can women ensure their own emancipation and the emancipation of the vast masses of the exploited classes. Therefore it is necessary to have women join not only the party organisations, but also all the principal and secondary forms of the struggle and organisation in large numbers. This has been the concrete directives and orientation of our organisation regarding women. Our early thinking has been to organise women in general and specific organisations.

Since women are divided into two classes on the basis of class divisions in the society, and are also subject to the problem of inequality on the basis of gender discrimination, it is necessary that besides having them join all types of class organisations, special organisations of women also should be built.

Despite the above, there is relatively a big gap in the extent of their equality in our organisation. There may be several reasons for this, but one reason is the prevalence of such thinking among male comrades that the work of women organisation is the task of women comrades alone. Another factor is the sense of ownership still existing among males owing to their upbringing in our age-old old society and the existence of the patriarchal attitudes and behaviour. The mentality of dependence and the lack of firmness in women is another factor. In society the toiling women have to suffer the merciless oppression of all the powers-that-be that men of the oppressed class suffer, such as political oppression, religious oppression, the oppression of caste and tribe etc. However, women are victim of another oppression, male oppression. That is why the courageous role of women is very important for revolution.

In Jharkhand, Bihar, Bengal, Assam, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, UP, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Maharashtra, Delhi etc, almost everywhere efforts are on to have the maximum number of women join the organisation. However, we find that wherever the class struggle has been advancing to a higher level, women have been joining the organisations in larger numbers as compared to the other areas. In various areas under both Regional Committees of the Bi-Jha-Ben SAC, women are active as professionals in a good number. Some of the able women comrades are playing an important role at various levels of the party as well as in the military organisations as Platoon Commanders, LRGS Commanders, Section Commanders etc. Women comrades are also playing a leading role in the Revolutionary Peasant Committees. They have played and are still playing a brave and glorious role in facing the police repression as well. In our party, women representatives can be seen in SAC, Regional Committees, in many Zonal, Sub-zonal and Area Committees, in the PLGA and in committees of peasant organisations, working class organisations and organisations such as resistance forums. The number of women professionals under the Bi-Jha-Ben SAC is about .... Moreover, the number of women non-professional

members is many times that of professionals.

Similarly a good number of women professional comrades are also active in the North Bihar-Uttar Pradesh-Uttarakhand Special Area. The number of non-professionals is many times more. Professional and non-professional women activists are more or less active also in Chhattisgarh, Assam, Punjab, West Bengal, Orissa and Delhi. In short, according to the condition of the revolutionary class struggle at various places, professional and non-professional women activists are active. As such it may be said that the possibilities of forming and conducting women organizations are good.

Our women organisation has been leading the movement by taking up various issues related to the women question according to the organisational strength, capacity and situation, such as equal rights and equal dignity for women; equal wages as men for equal work; opposition to tilak-dowry system, killing daughters-in-law, molestation of various types, atrocities related to patriarchy, addiction, callousness of government health department etc. etc. Besides, our women's organisation has been offering powerful resistance to police atrocities and injustices, building various kinds of movement and constantly struggling against the various draconian laws, such as POTA, and against restrictions on demonstrations and public meetings. Despite imposition of various bans and restrictions, our women's organisation has been celebrating 8th March, International Women's Day with great enthusiasm and fervour, making this a special event. Observing other important days, such as May Day, 7th November Russian Revolution Day, 23rd March Martyr's Day has also become a special feature of our women organisation.

We should now lay stress on ensuring particularly women's participation at various levels of the party, training them by organising workshops on various subjects on various occasions, giving special training regarding struggles and military art within specified time frame, so that women activists can develop in every aspect.

One of our weaknesses is that just as we have been able to develop some models of our work among women in rural areas, we have not able to do so in the cities. As a result, we have not been successful in bringing

a substantial number of toiling and intellectual women into our organisation. We would have to overcome this shortcoming without delay.

We should continuously carry on the struggle against various manifestations of patriarchy within the organisation.

In our opinion, it has become essential in the present circumstances to build the women's organisation, based on the correct orientation, at the national level. Moreover, we should make every effort to publish an organ of the women's organisation and should develop the necessary material basis for the same.

## **Youth Front**

In any society, the main responsibility of that society lies on the shoulders of young men and women, and they gladly carry it. The responsibility of social change, i.e. social revolution also falls on their shoulders. Every class of society also imposes faith in its young generation. In fact their role in the party, the PLGA, the Revolutionary Peasant Committees, the Revolutionary Peoples' Committees and in any other mass organisation cannot be ignored, but it is also necessary to build their own independent organisation. Keeping this necessity in view, we continued the attempt to build independent youth organisations in almost all states. The broad young masses of the country are facing massive unemployment. Resorting to the policy of globalisation, imperialism and its compradors have snatched away all the means of independent employment of the people, especially of the youth of all semi-colonial, semi-feudal countries like ours and handed them over to a handful of big companies. Things like chutney, pickles and water have been taken over by a handful of persons. The youth have only one way to be saved from being forced to remain without any orientation and live in an anarchic situation – immerse themselves into the struggle against imperialism-feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism in order to solve their problems themselves in the light of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, integrating with the worker-peasants and dedicating their talents to restructure the society while organisationally utilising their creative capabilities.

We have a youth organisation working in the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area, and our some youth organisations active in North Bihar,

Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Orissa and New Delhi. They also have their own manifesto, programme and constitution. Despite this, however, they have not been developing too well. Various State Committees and Special Area Committees should pay proper attention to this. Under the banner of this organisation, we can take up various issues independently as well as through joint programmes such that the movement can be given a broad shape.

Keeping in view the revolutionary tradition of this section of the masses, it is necessary for the CC to pay proper attention towards them as an immense source of cadre-building.

## **Student Front**

The student masses are considered the oarsmen of the nation's future. Wherever there has been a change or revolution in the world, student masses have played a remarkable role in it. The history of our country is no different. Students are the section of society that shoulders the responsibility of learning. Whatever they may learn is learnt from the society as well as for the society. They carry out in the society whatever it teaches them, even if it may be in the interest of social progress and change. The ongoing class struggle in class-divided society also divides the students community and entrusts them with the task of strengthening their class unity to wage a merciless class struggle against the enemy and build a class society. It is the responsibility of the party today to organise all such youngsters in society, who are forced to be deprived of their right to be students at their age, for the struggle to achieve this right, and also to organise them for the revolution, as well as to organise those students, who are forced to be deprived of equal rights of education, as an essential constituent of the new democratic revolution. Students have also to shoulder the task of joining a revolutionary organisation and get involved in the process of bringing about a radical change in the present semi-colonial, semi-feudal society and in its education system that together obstruct social progress and change. It is the special task of students today to usher in development on to the path of progress and change for the society and its constituents, the young students themselves, in the direction of the loftiest goal, through the phase of establishing a new democratic social system and its education



system in place of the present pro-imperialist, pro-feudal social system and its education system.

Our organisation has been working among the students keeping this goal and purpose in mind. The basic goal of our student organisation is to oppose the amended and reshaped policies made in accordance with the present age of imperialism by the comprador Indian ruling class in the name of new economic policy, new industrial policy and new education policy, as well as the old elitist educational policies. Without doing so, it would never be possible to implement a new democratic education policy.

We have work among students in almost all the areas of our work. Independent student organisations also exist. We have been waging struggles on issues more or less related with student problems on the basis of an independent programme, and on other social issues jointly with other organisations in society. Our party has, however, not been able to do the needful to draw this important section of the masses into the revolutionary movement in large numbers and in a powerful way. That is the reason why we have not been able to produce the sharp leadership and the organised mass of cadres that should have emerged through the student movement. Without doing so, we find that it would be quite difficult to create a situation of a nationwide upsurge. Therefore, we must complete this task in a much more organised manner. At the national level there is an organisation named A2, where we would necessarily have to play a more active role.

## **Intellectual's Front**

This community would have a very important contribution in revolution. This is a very sensitive section. Actions and reactions of any event affect this section faster than any other class or section. They are capable of effectively presenting their sentiments in society very soon. So, in a situation where the revolutionary struggle has been continuously advancing today, intellectuals could play a big role in organising worker-peasants, developing other mass movements, including the revolutionary peasant movement and the revolutionary cultural movement. Com. Mao had said, "**Without the participation of intellectuals, victory in the revolution is impossible.**"(Mao, *Recruit Intellectuals in large numbers*).

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In our country, except a limited few intellectuals, who work for the

interests of imperialism, feudalism and comprador bourgeoisie, or have sold out their talents to them, the larger number of intellectuals want a change in the present social system. The number of intellectuals integrating with the worker-peasants is at present far too less, however, as compared to the need. Yet, people from this section do come forward enthusiastically in the phase of growth of the revolution, tries to participate in it with their mite and play a good role. Therefore, it is necessary for the proletariat and its party to bring into the party a large number of intellectuals and enhance their role in revolution while eradicating their class weakness. Keeping in view the big necessity of this section in order to advance the tasks of revolution, adequate stress would have to be given to this aspect.

## **Cultural Front**

Culture is known to be the mirror of any society. The semi-colonial, semi-feudal culture in our country today appears to have reached the deepest recesses of decadence in its service of imperialism and its compradors. On the contrary, the various revolutionary political forces fighting with the objective of new democratic revolution are spreading a new cultural radiance. Having taken birth in the nursery of armed agrarian revolutionary guerilla war and protracted people's war, the new democratic and revolutionary culture is now flowering and growing. Just as the revolutionary war is the war of the common masses and the common masses are its carriers, revolutionary culture too is the culture of the common masses and the common masses are its carriers. Culture is a reflection of the economics and politics of society; and in turn culture also helps in the development of economics and politics. Revolutionary politics is today creating revolutionary culture; and revolutionary culture is in turn helping in the growth of revolutionary politics. Thus, just as it is necessary to give revolution an organised and systematically developed form in all spheres, it is also necessary to give culture an organised and systematically developed form in all fields. Just as we are engaged in carrying out our task of building various types of struggles and organisations in most of our areas of work, we are also engaged in enhancing art and culture by giving it an organised and systematic form. Cultural organisations are active with this objective in Jharkhand and Bihar. As part of these efforts, a cultural organisation named Jharkhand ... is very popular in Jharkhand. Besides this, cultural

organisations also exist in North Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Punjab, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, UP etc, and the material conditions for the same exist in rest of the places. It is for the party to systematise its organisational structures in all states, build both, professional and non-professional cultural teams in greater number, impart training to them by organising workshops, and send them among the masses. The experiences of various areas, including Jharkhand-Bihar, shows that such an organisation helps in the development of revolutionary consciousness of the masses, and instils a fighting spirit in them. It also makes a significant contribution towards expanding the party.

There is a national organisation named, A1 which is a platform of several cultural organisations. Our participation is good even here. It has to be made more systematic and active.

### **Organisation of teenagers**

Since the very beginning we have been concentrating with great care upon girls and boys of small age. We think it our duty to get them to join in the revolutionary struggle and to nurture them with perseverant efforts. If this is not done, then there is the danger of the present generation getting isolated from the future generation. Experience shows that by nursing and grooming children at such a tender age with love, and developing them with revolutionary education, they get revolutionised very rapidly. They understand their rights and sense of duty very naturally and easily, and carry out their duties more honestly than youngsters older than them. They also imbibe their military training easily. Class-consciousness and class hatred against the enemy grow in them very rapidly. Among the masses they easily become worthy of love. They are simple at heart. On being provided an able leadership capable of giving them motherly and fatherly affection, their development occurs in very soon and very well. These adolescent boys and girls get practical training by working in a cultural team and such other work, and on growing older they join the military organisation on undergoing military training. Then as time passes, they take up various responsibilities of the party and the PLGA.

From our experience we learn that we should nurse and groom this generation with great care throughout the organisation. We should initiate

this process right from now in order to prepare them as oarsmen of the future.

## **Frontal Organisations**

Several frontal organisations are active under different names at the state and national levels. In various states we have frontal organisations formed by taking together our own different mass organisations, such as Jan ... Manch, Gan ... Manch, Jan ... Morcha, Lok ... Morcha etc. Then there is a frontal organisation, SR, built at the national level by taking together the frontal organisations of 18 states. This organisation has its manifesto and programme, and it issues the boycott elections call among the common masses. It also raises its voice powerfully against various forms of state terror; against capital punishment; against all draconian laws, including POTA; against WTO; against the war launched by U.S. imperialism. To the extent possible, this organisation organises movements on various issues concerning the nation's life and lives of the common people. Its constituent organisations also carry out programmes according to their strength and capability in various states. On the whole, it can be said that this organisation can play an effective role in building a militant mass movement on the entire national scale. Through this process we could get some forces, which would facilitate the building first an embryonic form of the strategic united front, and thereafter on the national level. We have yet not been able to conduct our activities through this organisation to the desired extent. Therefore the CC should make special efforts to overcome this shortcoming without delay, and hold regular meetings of the fraction committee of this organisation.

## **GIVE SPECIAL STRESS ON FORGING THE UNITED FRONT AS A MAGIC WEAPON OF THE REVOLUTION**

It is common knowledge that one of the three magic weapons of the revolution is the United Front, under the leadership of the party, built with all the revolutionary classes and all the revolutionary parties. As this is a

weapon of revolution, it is essential that it should be built during the armed struggle and with the purpose of waging the armed struggle. There is no scope for doubt that the working class of India and the vanguard of the proletariat, the Communist Party would be the leader and organiser of this United Front (or democratic front). Without the theoretical, political, organisational leadership of Communist Party, the revolutionary front cannot be forged, and revolution cannot be successful.

In the new democratic revolution, the peasantry, especially landless and poor peasants, are the principal ally of the proletariat. The alliance of worker-peasants under the leadership of proletariat is the basis of the anti-imperialist-anti-feudal broad united front. Without the leadership of the proletariat and without the firm fighting unity of worker-peasants, it would not be possible to forge a broad United Front of all revolutionary classes and revolutionary parties.

Today when agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war is intensifying step by step in many areas of the country, when the guerrilla struggle is marching ahead towards forming base areas from the guerrilla struggle areas, a firm alliance of the working class and the peasantry, particularly landless and poor peasants, is certainly being established as a firm basis for forging the united front. On the basis of this firm foundation, the process of forging a class front with the workers, and landless and poor peasants, middle peasants and a section of the rich peasants and various sections of the petty bourgeoisie-middle class is also marching ahead. The small and middle bourgeoisie would also join this front, but they would join at a certain stage of advancement of the revolution.

In such a situation, the formation of an embryonic form of the United Front as a preliminary and basic process of building the United Front at the national level is necessary, and this must remain mainly secret. Only by continuously developing this embryonic form, would it get transformed into the form of a full-fledged United Front. The leadership of this United Front would mainly be secret, but the activities of the front would generally be open.

## **A TACTICAL UNITED FRONT WILL HAVE TO BE FORGED UNDER THE LEADERSHIP AND AUSPICES OF THE STRATEGIC UNITED FRONT**

There are many issues in our country on which various ruling class parties have been grinding their own axes. The ruling groups carry out various policies and programmes as per their policy of “divide and rule” on the problems of casteism, communalism, religious minorities etc.

In the above background, when agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggles are being waged on a broad scale as the practical form of the revolutionary class struggle in vast areas of the country, with the PLGA and PGA also having been formed, it would be necessary and proper for us to take up, and indeed we are already taking up some programmes on the above issues, while drawing a clear line of demarcation in every aspect (the issue, form and method of the struggle) with the revisionist and parliamentary parties, politically exposing the various policies adopted by the ruling clique. The aim of these programmes should also be to rally more people behind the ongoing agrarian revolutionary struggle in the country, and to make them understand that the ultimate solution of all such problems would emerge only through the revolutionary class struggle. The initiation of giving organizational shape to this tactical front should also be done at the local level and from the areas where our struggle is intensive and has a broad impact.

This tactical front would be forged and run only under the leadership and auspices of our strategic united front. All the joint activities or tactical alliances that do not serve the protracted peoples’ war would be totally meaningless. All over work among various mass organisations, nationality organisations, various revolutionary and petty bourgeois organisations would be evaluated only in this perspective.

Furthermore, we should try to conduct a united programme with whoever is ready to fight against the common enemies of the people anywhere, whenever and as far as possible, there, then and to that extent. Even while waging a united programme, it is our utmost important duty to oppose reformism, and anti-people and anti-communist activities.

## **ENRICH THE CORRECT LINE OF THE MCC THROUGH ACTUAL PRACTICE ON THE NATIONALITY QUESTION**

It is well known to all that semi-colonial, semi-feudal India is a multinational country. The people of various nationalities are economically, politically, linguistically, educationally and culturally in different stages of development, and also have their own specific peculiarities and national traditions. On the one hand there are one or more somewhat developed nationalities, and on the other there are such nationalities too, that are forced to live in somewhat backward conditions and could not as yet get organised as a nation.

In the advanced nationalities of the country, influential, reactionary and comprador big bourgeois classes, in collusion with imperialism, have since long been perpetuating ruthless exploitation and atrocities on other nationalities and minority national groups.

All Marxist-Leninists know that the problem of the present nationalities is an international problem, an inseparable part of the national liberation revolution. Besides, the nationality problem in present times is basically a peasant problem. The overwhelming majority of any nationality is the peasantry. The peasant masses are the principal army of a nationality movement. Should they be ignored, it would be impossible to build a powerful national movement. Refusing to accept this would amount only to minimizing the democratic spirit and strength inherent in the nationality movement. Therefore, the nationality problem in present times cannot be separated from the new democratic revolution. While being an inseparable part of the national and democratic revolution i.e. new democratic revolution, the nationality movement is also an inseparable part of the world proletarian revolution.

In our opinion, it would be a mistake to negate the revolutionary role of the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie in the nationality movement. Generally, the national bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes are the ones who initiate the nationality struggle with their class interests. In present times, however, the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie

cannot provide leadership to the national struggle. They cannot lead the nationality struggles through to their ultimate victory; they would betray them midway, or utilize the nationality struggle like all other struggles for their narrow class interests. For example, Laldenga, the leader of the Mizo National Front has done this and at present, some leaders of the Jharkhand movement are doing the same. It is clear as daylight that leaders of the parties related to the Jharkhand movement have made compromises with the oppressor ruling class and their government, forsaking the interests of the Jharkhand movement.

Moreover, the petty bourgeoisie does not ever hand over the leadership of the nationality struggles to the communists, nor is it possible to establish the leadership of the proletariat or the leadership of the communists over any struggle without opposing the bourgeois or petty bourgeois politics and without arousing the masses with the revolutionary consciousness. Communists can establish their leadership over the nationality struggle, as in other struggles only by keeping revolutionary politics in command, by very patiently freeing the masses from the influence of petty bourgeois narrow nationalism in the light of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and maintaining their initiative, and political and organisational independence. Only by doing so, can we combine the struggles of the nationalities with the stream of the new democratic revolution of India and of world revolution. Only thus can we wage the nationality struggle while coordinating it with internationalism and equipping it with the class outlook along the correct path of national revolutionary struggle. This is what we mean by the leadership of the communists in the nationality struggle.

Our organisation has, while determining since the very beginning a clear-cut line and tasks on the nationality problem and the duty of communists, advanced work in nationality-populated areas. Even on this question there are some important articles written by our leader Comrade K.C. between 1968 and 1982. Our organisation is today committed to give practical shape to the very line that Com KC had formulated.

We should analyse the results of implementation of the said policy in practice in Jharkhand. We have been able to build a revolutionary agrarian struggle by focussing on an agrarian revolutionary agenda, including the agenda of minor and major struggles on various problems by starting to



raise the daily problems of masses on our own initiative and independent agenda, according to the specificity of the concrete situation of this backward area, according to the level of thinking and consciousness, and fighting mood of the masses. In this process, the revolutionary peasant committees came into existence as a popular and an influential organisation in large areas of Jharkhand. The masses have seized more than 20-30 thousand acres of land under the leadership of the Revolutionary Peasant Committee so far, and the struggle for the protection of forests and for establishing the possession of the masses over the forests continues. In the period of agrarian revolutionary guerilla struggle, the building of platoons and companies i.e. PLGA from the self-defence squads, peoples' militia squads and some LRGS has been a significant aspect in a nationality-populated area. With the help of this PLGA, the people have dealt and are still dealing powerful blows to the private armies of the class enemies. Besides, other mass organisations are also playing an important role. Along with building the struggle with our independent initiative and independent programme, we are trying to forge a united agenda with various organisations of the Jharkhand movement whenever, wherever and to whatever extent possible. Efforts are continuing to gradually strengthen the unity through constructive criticism of the narrow class ideology and the counter-revolutionary words and deeds on the basis of correct goal and path. The concrete truth is that our relations with the fighting cadres of Jharkhand are becoming closer and closer day by day. Experience has shown us that primarily depending upon the independent initiative and independent programme and with political and organisational independence, a united programme can be launched jointly with the Jharkhand-loving fighting cadres and masses, and very patiently they can be freed from the influence of the petty bourgeois politics and petty bourgeois narrow nationalism step-by-step, and can be directed along the path of correct revolutionary nationality struggle enriched with the class consciousness.

The struggle, that has been built under the leadership of our organisation in the nationality-populated area and is now marching forward, has been able to draw out able communist cadres from among the backward oppressed nationalities. These cadres, as the vanguard of the working class, are consistently making efforts to draw away the broad masses of the

nationalities from the petty bourgeois reformist and opportunist leadership of the nationality struggle, and transform them in the course of class struggle.

It is clear as daylight that the revolutionary movement of Jharkhand and the armed agrarian revolutionary movement led by our party, in which workers, peasants and other toiling masses of the Jharkhand region have been extensively participating and have completely mingled with, has been identified as the Lalkhand movement. The activists and the masses that are participating in this movement are also being referred to as Lalkhandies.

Yes, we never hesitated in being identified and introduced as the Lalkhand movement and as Lalkhandies, rather we feel proud of it. We would rather say that this brings out the success of the correct line on the nationality movement.

The basic thing of this line is that along with our independent initiative and independent agenda, we had both unity and opposition with the movement of nationalities. In fact we have been trying to implement a united agenda in the fight against the common enemies, and while debating with and criticising the anti-people and anti-communist activities we took both the processes forward.

Therefore it is the duty of our party in a nationality-populated region to try to solve our contradiction with various groups of various nationalities with flexibility and it should unite with common activists and masses of the nationality movement, barring the handful of reactionaries, and strive to develop as many communist activists as possible and strengthen the base of the party by bringing them in the party, and advance the agrarian revolution and liberation struggle of the nationalities together towards the common goal. However, a question would certainly arise that with the existence of a strong party to a certain extent, with there being independent initiative and independent agenda and a strong mass base to a certain extent, and the opportunist and capitulationist character of the leaders of the nationalities having been exposed, should we build or not an organisation to advance the struggle to take up the demands and aspirations of the nationalities? After the opportunist-capitulationist leadership of Jharkhand movement has forsaken the basic interest of the struggle, and after the exposure of the utterly corrupt character of the leaders among people,

shall we build an organisation to advance the Jharkhand struggle or not?

On giving deep thought to this question, the central committee took an important decision. The decision was that when the conditions necessary for building such an effective organisation are fulfilled, we must now, of necessity, build such an effective organisation related to the Jharkhand movement.

We are happy to announce that to advance the Jharkhand struggle and to build a Jharkhand free of exploitation, that is Lalkhand, a front has formally been formed several years ago with great enthusiasm.

Through the line and practice of MCCI on the Jharkhand struggle, the political bankruptcy not only of CPI, CPM and Liberation group, but all other parties donning the mask of Marxism, has been clearly exposed in the Dhanbad area of Jharkhand.

Meanwhile, we have very recently been able to advance to a certain extent the nationality struggle with the correct orientation even in North-East India. It is true that many difficulties and complexities do exist in North-East India. Yet we are advancing, facing these difficulties and complexities and proceeding to solve them. To further advance our work in North-East India, we should pay attention to the following points:

- (i) We must wholeheartedly support and help the armed struggle for the right to self- determination of the nationalities of North-East India.
- (ii) Whenever, wherever and to whatever extent possible, we must wage the struggle against the basic and common enemies, uniting with the battles of self- determination and at the same time, continuing in a flexible manner the debate against the anti-people and anti-communist activities.
- (iii) In order to establish unity between nationalities, that is to unite the toiling masses of backward and underdeveloped nationalities and toiling masses of advanced nationalities, against common enemies, we must find out their common and general problems, give them importance and advance the work and movement.
- (iv) We must be alert to foil the conspiracies of imperialism and attempts

of all the parliamentary parties, such as the CPM, Congress, BJP and other electionist parties to create splits and discrimination between the people of nationalities and the broad toiling masses.

- (v) We must expose the arch reactionary role of all reactionary parties, particularly the CPM, who are against the interests of the masses of the nationalities.

We hope that by paying the required attention to the above points, we shall be able to advance the nationality struggles in the correct direction, while carrying out our independent initiative and independent agenda.

## **IT IS AN URGENT DUTY TO BUILD SEVEN DEPARTMENTS AS SEVEN SQUADS FOR ACCURATELY WAGING THE PEOPLES WAR**

**We are all well aware that to make revolution, it is essential to have a revolutionary party. Under the leadership of such a Party, a powerful Army and United Front are essential. All the three are called the magic weapons for accomplishing the revolution. Com. Mao said, “The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.” (*Problems of War and Strategy*).**

According to this teaching, we too would have to build the state machinery of the people or build the rule of people by smashing the dictatorial state machinery, army, police and bureaucracy of the reactionary ruling groups through war.

If we actually have to wage a war, then the Party and the Peoples Army would be the first and second important weapons. It is certain that the party that would build the war would also have to shoulder the responsibility of some other important tasks, or else it would either be impossible to build and conduct the war or remain mere idle talk. These important tasks are called the building of seven squads. Thus the party that would want to build and conduct the war would have to make special efforts along with all the other tasks, to also build the seven squads.

Why do we call them squads? That is so because the line of our revolution is such that unless we go about our work with the mentality of building war, we would not be able to take even a step along the path of revolution. Since our war is basically a guerrilla war and since we must remain very mobile in the early period in fighting against a powerful enemy, we must necessarily think about building the above seven types of departments in a mobile situation as we would build of squads, not in any other way.

These seven squads would be: (1) Propaganda; (2) Press, literature and party education; (3) Courier; (4) Den, pocket, shelter; (5) Espionage; (6) Ordinance and technical (including production unit) and (7) medical.

## **CONTINUE THE EFFORTS FOR THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS RELATED TO CENTRAL ORGAN**

It is a fact that our CC has not yet been able to run our central organ the way it should be run. That is why we have not been able to continue its regular publication.

Our organs are published, even though irregularly, in Bengali, Hindi and some other languages. However, about the publication of the organ in English there is not worth mentioning. Moreover, the publication of our organ in Assamese, Oriya and Punjabi has also virtually not materialised. This happens to be our great weakness. Particularly when we want to introduce the line of the MCCI to the Maoist revolutionaries of all over India in order to unite with them, this weakness is extremely detrimental.

We are aware that we are quite far from Lenin's definition of the organ. That is why we are seriously thinking of overcoming our grave shortcomings. We shall take some measures by and by in order to overcome this shortcoming. For example, in spite of the innumerable problems that may encounter, organising regular meetings of the editorial board and of the team of translators etc. etc.

We would appeal to senior cadres as well to write articles and try to send them. Our comrades should be adept at writing political and theoretical articles.

But we must keep in mind that the way of living in cities far from the battleground on the pretext of publishing the organ regularly would not work. On the contrary, we would have to make the rural areas the centre of everything. Some difficulties would arise in doing so, but avoiding the rural area to get around such difficulties would not be permissible. We have to find the solution for the difficulties keeping in mind the line of protracted peoples war.

Furthermore, it would also be necessary to manage the publishing department so that we could efficiently produce the necessary Marxist literature as per the planning of the Central Committee. With great Mao and Mao's China no longer in existence, we must publish all the necessary writings and books ourselves. Therefore it is an essential task for the future to advance our work in this direction.

## **MAINTAIN THE TRADITION OF SIMPLE LIVING AND HARD WORK IN THE PARTY ORGANISATION AND ADOPT THE STYLE OF BEING ALWAYS MODEST AND HUMBLE**

It is well known that when it comes to the style of living as well, there are two classes, two kinds of outlook. The proletariat is habituated to living a simple life and doing hard work. Naturally, the qualities of simple living and hard work in the party of proletariat are most important.

However, it is evident from history that leaders of phoney communist parties, donning the name of Communist Party, have from the very beginning been practicing the bourgeois style of life, that is, an easy-going and luxurious life. In reality, in so-called communist parties, the style of simple living and hard working would be totally non-existent.

The most amazing thing, however, is that even the pro-establishment Naxalities in our country, who talk of Naxalism and Mao, have a distaste for the style of simple living and hard work. It seems that in their opinion, the style of simple living and hard work is nothing but a 'left' deviation.

In fact, even in the revolutionary camp, much is said about simple living and hard work, but there are people who avoid practising it. Therefore

we would have to continuously struggle against these wrong trends, the trend of not living a simple life and working hard.

Comrades, we should never forget the communist life-style of simple living and hard work of our teacher and founder comrades. The style, established by those of our departed leaders, is our revolutionary tradition. We have inherited this tradition. Therefore it is our pious duty to retain this revolutionary and communist tradition.

In fact, style of simple living and hard work should be developed as a culture in our party organisation. All comrades, beginning from the central leadership, have to be habituated to such a life-style. Each one must work in accordance with his/her age. Everyone shall have to keep firm and maintain the habit of walking long distances on foot. For a party waging armed struggle it is essential to maintain this quality.

Moreover, being modest and humble is another quality of a communist. We should never forsake this quality. There are, nevertheless, some shortcomings in this regard in our organisation. We should all constantly struggle against this shortcoming and make every effort, every moment, to maintain the tradition of remaining humble and modest. We must never allow arrogance and the big brother attitude (dadagiri) to grow.

We should not think in such a way as, “We were correct, we are correct and shall remain the most correct of all.” We should think that we do have some shortcomings, and while constantly fighting against our errors and mistakes, we must proceed towards being more and more correct.

We must always struggle to defend and develop the revolutionary traditions of the MCCI, such as the communist qualities of simple living and hard work, and being modest and humble.

## **PLAIN SPEAKING ABOUT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

Comrades, considering the growth today of the revolutionary struggle in various areas, particularly in Jharkhand, Bihar, North Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Punjab, UP and Uttarakhand, has our CC become so efficient and capable enough as to be able to give leadership in matters of theoretical, political, organisational and military activities? No, it is true

that it has not become so.

In fact, in every phase, that is at every twist and turn of the advancement of the struggle, the weakness of the Central Committee has emerged clearly in providing political, organisational and military direction and orientation, and in waging timely theoretical, political and ideological struggle against the wrong line and in writing articles, documents etc.

It is not sufficient for the members on any committee, particularly the highest committee, to work only in one area wholeheartedly; on the contrary, along with work in an area, there should be a division of various responsibilities among each member to carry out efficiently the tasks of the seven squads, namely press, propaganda and literature, courier, medical, espionage, weaponry and such departments. We should understand well that even while advancing the revolutionary struggle, should the above departments not be given shape and substance, there would inevitably be obstacles in our further advancement. Moreover, there should be a division of responsibilities of various fronts among the committee members. In today's situation, when on the one hand, the task of achieving correct unity among communist revolutionaries and on the other, that of taking the ongoing armed struggle to a higher level has fallen on our shoulders, then there should be a division of all such responsibilities and tasks even within the CC.

It is very necessary to pay attention to another aspect. As the revolutionary class struggle advances, it is very necessary for the leadership to be more dynamic, creative, diligent, devoted, active and capable in every respect. All these qualities can be achieved only step by step with the utmost effort. A casual attitude and stereotyped methods of work would be obstacles towards this end. We must wage constant struggle against these attitudes. We must adopt the method of struggling against our weakness ourselves.

Comrades, the CC calls upon you all to make constructive criticism about the functioning of the CC and about our CCMs. Only on passing through the process of criticism and self-criticism could we get more tempered and be quite capable of solving even the most difficult problems.



## ON THE PROCESS OF UNITY WITH REVOLUTIONARY FORCES

It is known to all that on behalf of the MCC, we have been holding talks with many communist revolutionary groups as part of our unity efforts since 1977. To succeed in this effort we have from the very beginning been firmly following two or three basic policies:

- (i) According to the policy of unity-struggle-unity, we held talks with the purpose of achieving unity on the very basic political questions, giving more stress on the points of differences, and making all efforts to achieve a common understanding on those points.
- (ii) Besides discussing the political points, we also discussed about what one does or wants to do in practice.
- (iii) We did not talk not with a big group mentality. Instead we did not make any such difference as between small group and big group, giving equal respect and importance to all etc. etc.

We achieved both types of experiences, positive as well as negative, during our long unity efforts. We kept trying to develop upon the positive achievements, and ultimately in 2003, a qualitative leap occurred in our unity efforts. The unity process of MCC with several Maoist revolutionary groups reached a culmination. How could this success be attained? Experience has taught us that while discussing the political-organisational-military line it is very necessary to give equal respect and importance to all groups that we were talking with, without making any difference between small and big groups, adopting an attitude of learning from their strong points. This was in fact the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist outlook to achieve correct unity with genuine Maoist revolutionaries.

**We would hereby present a brief report on the leap that occurred in our unity efforts:**

### **RCCI (Maoist)**

The history of the RCCI (Maoist) has been linked with the period after the historical struggle of Naxalbari. After passing through a number of complicated problems, including the process of splits and divisions, in

November 1983, following the parting of ways with the reformist and economist line of UCCRI (ML), the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist) came into existence. This group came to be known as the RCCI (M). The activities of this group were basically in Punjab.

Our contact with this group was established in 1998 and the mutual relations between the two organisations gradually became close and after one or two formal bilateral meetings, it was decided by mutual consensus that after deciding the points of unity and difference, a debate should be held to ascertain whether there is a possibility of enjoining into one party. On that basis, talks were begun on various points in a cordial atmosphere, and during the talks we came to an agreement on some basic subjects, whereas on some other issues there could not be agreement. It was found that the points of agreement were so strong that a merger between the two was possible. Finally, on the 1st of January 2003, unity was established between the RCCI(M) and the MCC, and a joint press statement was issued on behalf of both organisations. After the merger, the name of MCC was changed to MCCI. As far as the question of uniting with Maoist revolutionaries is concerned, the merger of MCC with the RCCI(M) was underscored as our first successful step. Many revolutionaries also welcomed this merger.

## **RCCM**

The history of RCCM has been inseparably linked with the history of MCC. Therefore the comrades of this group have been an inseparable part of revolutionary and glorious traditions of the MCC. The then Secretary of the State Committee of West Bengal, “Ba” and the CC representative appointed to supervise that State, “Bh” had adopted extremely bureaucratic methods in trying to resolve some internal dispute that had arisen within the State Committee. This caused utter dissatisfaction within the State Committee, due to which some comrades broke relations with MCC in 1999, and formed the RCCM. The formation of RCC (M) on breaking from the MCC without there being any particular political difference of opinion was a sad event in the long political life of the MCC. That was how we always viewed this matter.

After the parting of ways, the RCCM tried to do some work for 5-6

years. Subsequently, after the expulsion of the “Ba-Bh” group from the MCC, the RCCM established contact with the MCC and the MCC also decided to hold talks with RCCM.

Subsequently, talks began on a bilateral level and the differences were solved through criticism-self criticism. Thus, it merged into the MCC again. As far as the question of uniting with Maoist revolutionaries is concerned, the merger of RCCM into MCCI also emerged as an important step.

## **CPI (M-L) 2nd CC**

This organisation was a part of the CPI (ML) that came into existence after the demise of Com. Charu Mazumdar. The history of the 2nd CC has been linked with the glorious and revolutionary tradition of the CPI (ML) formed under the leadership of Com CM. After 1978, this group came to be known as the pro-Lin Piao group, and around 1980-82, it also built some armed struggle in some areas of Bengal and Bihar, which, however, could not advance. Owing to the question of Lin Piao, it remained isolated also from almost all the other ML groups. Moreover, this group also underwent the process of many internal crises and splits. The group of the 2nd CC, with which we have had relations since long, tried to build an armed peasant struggle in some districts of East Bihar. The struggle was indeed built up to a certain extent, but the struggle could not develop further.

We held several rounds of talks with this group, and could also arrive at agreement on some basic political issues. Due to their stand on the Lin Piao issue, however, the talks often got disrupted and could not advance. Meanwhile, an intense two-line struggle on the question of holding unity talks with communist revolutionaries, especially with the MCC arose within this group. Finally many of their leaders and activists revolted against their General Secretary, and expressed their desire to hold unity talks with our party. As this process advanced further, they took a decision to drop the question of Lin Piao. There was not much hindrance in unity on the remaining basic questions. Some points of difference related to history, however, remained, which were not hindrances in our merger. Finally, in May 2003 the unity-process between the CPI (M-L) 2nd CC and the MCCI was completed. The importance of this unity was greater than that with the

other groups. Following the formation of the CPI (M-L) in 1969, especially as the MCC had not joined the CPI (ML), this was the first merger of the MCCI with any constituent of the CPI (ML). That was why this event had great political significance. In the process of combining the two streams, the ML stream and the MCC stream, into one big torrent, this unity was a milestone event.

### **CPI (ML) Naxalbari**

This organisation was once part of the CPI (ML). Following the demise of Com CM, it eventually emerged as the CRC. This group followed a line that proved totally detrimental to the Indian revolution. Finally, the basic leader of this group betrayed the revolution and joined the ruling group. Later, a part of this group formed the Maoist Unity Centre, and in the year 199 , together with another group, formed the CPI (ML) NB.

This group held more than 5-6 rounds of bilateral talks with us and the points of unity and difference were also decided. On this basis, the MCCI was of the opinion that in spite of some points of difference that remained, it was now possible to complete the merger process between the two. However, the NB could not yet take such a decision. For this reason, it is not possible to say anything for sure about the possibility of an early completion of the merger process between our two organisations.

### **CPI (ML) JANASHAKTI**

This was an organisation that began the stream of armed struggle under the leadership of Chandra Pulla Reddy after breaking away from the inner struggle of communist party in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It was not part of these CPI (ML) in the early days. Later it joined SNS and others, and thus deviated. Then it got splintered into several groups. Recently, one of its groups, being influenced by the unfolding revolutionary struggles under the leadership of PW and MCCI in Andhra, Bihar etc, reviewed the work of their organisation, and thought of moulding themselves into this stream. On this basis, they offered holding talks with us. Two or three meetings were also held with them in the recent past. A meaningful result of these talks can also be seen. It can be said that we are still in the phase of holding talks with them.

## **EXPOSE THE POLITICAL BANKRUPTCY OF THE CPI (ML) LIBERATION**

It is evident that the leaders of the Liberation group have made opposing the revolution their overriding goal.

The main political task of the Liberation group now is to politically oppose the line of boycotting elections and continuing the armed revolution that came into existence through the historical struggle of Naxalbari, and became the line of Indian revolution, or in other words, to oppose the politics of Naxalbari, its style and method of work and its path with any and every pretext. The Liberation group has, in fact, become a follower of the path of elections by forsaking the line of armed revolution, i.e. line of armed agrarian revolution, area-wise seizure of power and protracted peoples' war. In fact, the specific feature of the most-modern revisionism has been to oppose, in the aftermath of the Naxalbari struggle, the generally accepted basic lines of the revolutionary camp on the issues of character of state, stage of the revolution, friends and enemies of revolution, election boycott etc., to oppose the above in words and in deeds. In other words, to say things like "Mao tse-tung thought has no particular importance," and oppose tooth and nail the Maoist line and Maoism in the name of Mao is a specific feature of most-modern revisionism. The biggest irony of CPI (ML) history is that the very line for which Com. Charu Mazumdar had been fighting up to his last breath, is being opposed today in the name of Com. Charu Mazumdar, and the Head Office (i.e. Delhi office) of the Parliament devotee, Liberation group has been named after Com. Charu Mazumdar. Had Com. Mazumdar been alive, he would have had to use the terms, "renegade" and "illegitimate children of revisionism" for such persons.

Anyway, let us look at the arena of class struggle. The Liberation group has given the slogan of "Nationalisation of the Land" with the devious design of opposing the revolutionary peasant movement developing on the basis of the slogans, "Land to the True Peasants" and "All Political Power to the Revolutionary Peasant Committees" in the countryside and to mislead the peasants. As has been said earlier, the slogan of "nationalisation of land" in the present exploitative system would benefit none other than the feudal interests. The slogan would protect the interests of none other than

the landlords, jotedars and rich peasants.

In urban industrial areas, the line, style of work and method of Liberation group is similar to all revisionists including CPM. We all know that Liberation group has been raising the slogan of 'Left Confederation' since some time back and behind the rhetoric of this left confederation, has been colluding with CPI and CPM. Meanwhile CPI, CPM and Liberation group, together, have launched a slander campaign against the ongoing revolutionary peasant struggle and have been conducting other counter-revolutionary activities.

As far as the question of our relations with CPI (M-L) [Liberation Group] is concerned, we have to dwell upon history to understand them. In 1982, when unity talks on the question of joining IPF were about to break at the central level with CPI (M-L) Liberation group led by Vinod Mishra, their representative clearly said that their CC had decided to expand their work in the direction of Aurangabad and Navada districts (which was our area of specific work). After hearing this decision, with the intention that tension did not arise between two organisations, our CC sent a letter on 12 April, 1982 to CC of Liberation group to reconsider their plan of expanding their areas so as to pass through our areas. They, however, did not think it fit to reply. Then we sent them a reminder. After one year, they informed us through a brief letter that their work was going on all over Bihar. Therefore, if there was some work of MCC in some pocket, then the MMC people should sit and talk with the Bihar State-level committee of Liberation, but on the whole, they did not feel the need to bring about any change in their decision. In fact, they meant that when the whole of Bihar was theirs, where did MCC come in?

It was evident that the Liberation group had replied to our letter in the spirit of dadagiri (big brother attitude) that is, thinking that they were the dada in Bihar.

First the arrogant attitude of being a big group, then spirit of dadagiri, and now, ultimately the inevitable role of an aggressor – such was the attitude of the CPI (ML) Liberation group towards us. When Vinod Mishra, the leader of CPI (ML) Liberation, was alive, he had said at a press conference that he would thrash up MCC so badly that they would be compelled to sit at a round-table meeting. These facts also made it amply

clear how aggressive the Liberation had become towards us. In reality, since the time the Liberation group became totally a parliamentary party by bringing about a basic change in their line, a large-scale infiltration of persons from the exploitative class and pro-feudal bullies began in a big way. Then the class character of the party changed first, and later, joining hands with the rulers, it was transformed into an opponent of the revolutionary peasant movement, an anti-people, and revisionist and reactionary party. With this change, the Liberation group made various revolutionary groups of Bihar the target of attacks and murdered some revolutionary comrades as part of a well-considered policy. It attacked the MCC as well and continuously murdered our cadres and our masses, and becoming an informer of the police, connived with the police and the administration in their massacre at Matgarha (in which eleven of our activists were shot dead by the police). Then in Jharkhand by carrying out the “March to the Jhumra mountain to wipe out the MCC and the Lalkhandies,” the Liberation group clearly revealed their aggressive role. Such misdeeds are still being continued.

Our policy has been not to attack first, but if attacked, then it will be our right to counter attack in self-defence.

The MCC considers that revisionism is a bourgeois ideology and a bourgeois theory. And we should always be prepared to retaliate against every attack by revisionism.

It may be recalled that revisionism is the main danger in the present age, and therefore, we cannot take a single step ahead without constantly fighting against revisionism. Thus, we must carry out a continuous struggle against revisionism in order to uphold Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

## **RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS**

### **On our relations with the RIM**

This organisation, named Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) has been the organisation that took the initiative to form an international organisation by bringing together the Maoist forces of several

countries. Our relations with RIM were established way back in 1996. In October 1997, the first formal important meeting with the representatives of RIM was held. In this first meeting, there was a debate on our mutual understanding on some basic political issues, such as the evaluation of the imperialist crisis, the question of era, the question on the necessity of forming of international organisation, the question of the fundamental contradictions and principal contradiction at the international level, on Maoism etc. Both sides tried to understand each other's views. During this process a preliminary opinion was formed on where there was agreement and where there were differences between the two sides. It was decided to have further discussion on the points of difference at the next meeting.

The second meeting was held in September 1999. No discussion was, however, held in this meeting on the points of differences. The talks were centred on the mutual clashes between the MCC and the CPI (ML) PW, and the way to solve this. Further, we expressed our consent on the necessity of proceeding to form an international organisation. The opinion of our CC was that during the past 165 years of the communist movement there have been both positive and negative experiences on the question of the Communist International. In spite of this, it was necessary to proceed towards the formation of an international organisation in a new way, by taking the lessons from the past experiences, in order to give concrete shape to the slogans "Workers of the World Unite" and "Workers and Oppressed Peoples of the World Unite." We thought that although there were numerous problems on the question of an international organisation, it was yet necessary for us to take a positive decision in order to solve these problems while grappling with them. Then in November-December 2000 our third meeting with the representatives of RIM was held, whereupon a frank debate and discussion were conducted for several days on various points of differences, and finally a common understanding was formed on some basic points. In that meeting itself we presented thirty- two points for amendment on the three basic documents of RIM.

In April 2002, the fourth meeting was held with RIM, and it was in that meeting that the RIM gave membership to the MCC. From then on, the MCC existed as a member organisation within the fold of the RIM.

However, many problems still remain. Even so, we had taken the

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decision of implementing the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist policy of continuing talks and debates with the RIM for the solution of the problems through the policy of unity-struggle-unity.

### **On our relations with the CPN (Maoist)**

Our relations with the CPN (Maoist) date back to 17-18 years ago. It was clear that the fraternal relations between us were very strong, and remained based on mutual cooperation.

It is known to the whole world that the peoples' war was initiated in Nepal under the leadership of CPN (Maoist) in 1996, and the peoples' war gradually became more and more intensive. Today the peoples' war rocks not Nepal alone, but also the entire South Asia. Not only that, the red flag of peoples' war that loftily flies high atop the peaks of the Himalayas under the leadership of CPN (Maoist), has generated new enthusiasm in the Maoist movement the world over. We know that U.S. imperialism and its ardent follower, the expansionist Indian government, are making every possible effort to crush the peoples' war of Nepal. Foiling the above evil designs and helping the ongoing peoples' war would mean to broaden and intensify the peoples' war in India. We shall certainly continue to pay special attention to this aspect of help. Besides, we shall also pay special attention to the task of exchanging views between two of us on political issues from time to time.

### **The formation of CCOMPOSA in South Asia has been a very significant aspect for the development of the revolutionary movement in entire region**

It is known to all that South Asia is currently passing through a period of revolutionary struggle. In particular, the ongoing peoples' war in Nepal has been playing a special role in it. Moreover, the agrarian revolutionary guerrilla struggle, that is, peoples' war under the leadership of MCCI and CPI (M-L) PW has been growing more and more intense in large areas of India. At the same time, with Maoist Parties taking birth in Bangladesh, Bhutan etc, possibilities of growth of the armed revolution can be visualised. It can be said in a nutshell that South Asia along with the whole of Asia have emerged as a storm centre of revolution.

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In such a situation, in 2001, an organisation called the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), with eleven organizations of Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and other countries, was formed centred upon South Asia. As a result, we have now to think in terms of establishing on the scale of South Asia cooperation between the advancing revolutionary struggles and extending help to each other. Although there is still no uniformity of thought among all the members regarding the goal, purpose and programme of CCOMPOSA, yet we have been able to and are continuing to take up some programmes at the initiative of CCOMPOSA. An irregular magazine is also being published on behalf of CCOMPOSA. In our appraisal, with the formation of CCOMPOSA, imperialism, particularly US imperialism and all the comprador ruling groups of South Asia have taken fright, and contrarily, the revolutionary masses of South Asia are happy and glad over this development.

Today, when all the reactionary rulers are uniting in the name of opposing terrorism under the leadership of the ringleader of imperialism, U.S. imperialism, the role of CCOMPOSA and the necessity of giving it a concrete shape have increased manifold. It is hoped that the next step and tasks of CCOMPOSA would be determined with this in view.

## **SOME OF OUR SPECIFICITIES**

During the forty years from the second half of 1964 till the present day, our organisation first came to be widely known as the Chinta and Dakshindesh group; assumed the name, Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in 1969 under the leadership of our founder leader and teacher, Comrade KC; went on while following and carrying forward his line after his death in 1982, to unite with several Maoist revolutionary groups in 2003, and acquired the name, Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). Meanwhile, all over India, MCCI earned recognition as a front-ranking, main revolutionary organisation.

The question is what have been the specific features of the MCCI that enabled us to emerge through numerous unfavourable circumstances from the stage of inception as a very small organisation, and assume the form of the relatively large organisation that it has become today.

## **First Specific Feature**

Drawing a clear line of demarcation theoretically and practically with revisionists on political and organisational and every matter. This is such a point, which if not solved in a proper way, would stand in the way of advancing towards building a correct line and correct revolutionary struggle, and could confront us as an hurdle even if we could make some advance to an extent.

## **Second Specific Feature**

The document *Strategy and Tactics* presented in 1969, provided such a strong foundation, on whose strength we could, while analysing the concrete situation of India, reject the path of elections and the question of participating in elections, and adopt the path of armed agrarian revolution and protracted people's war as the only path of liberation.

## **Third Specific Feature**

While adopting an outlook to advance the protracted peoples' war, always stressing from the very beginning that to carry out the primary, principal and central task of building the Peoples' Army and Red Base Area, some favourable areas would have to be selected as strategic areas, in accordance with our strength and capacity, we made and are still making efforts to advance our work by adopting a concomitant cadre policy.

## **Fourth Specific Feature**

In order to constitute the leading bodies of the body, we could take the combination of theory and practice as the correct method of leadership, and with those comrades who had advanced through this process, we could form a team of leading comrades (however few they might have been in number). On this basis we could more or less maintain a continuity of leadership. In spite of some very difficult situations following the demise of Com KC and Com Amulya Sen, there was no division in our organisation; instead we could uninterruptedly advance their line while forging better unity in the organisation.

## **Fifth Specific Feature**

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While firmly carrying out the class line and the mass line, we could

prepare such sons and daughters of the soil from among the basic classes (however few they may be in number), who are today providing capable and adept leadership to the party and revolution.

We have noted above only some of our many specific features. As a matter of fact, only while remaining steadfastly on the correct line and policy, and correct method and style; drawing a clear line of demarcation on political and organisational matters with the revisionist standpoint and path; adopting the course of revolutionary struggle on the basis of revolutionary theory; uniting with genuine Maoist revolutionaries and taking the Indian revolution ahead with firm determination towards victory, was our organisation built, soon after the revisionist 7th Congress of the CPI (M) in 1964, as the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in 1969, and as the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) now since 2003.

## **POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS**

Our journey had commenced with the objective of drawing a clear-cut line of demarcation with revisionism and of building the three magic weapons of revolution on having determined a revolutionary line, so that after the successful completion of the new democratic revolution of India, the path could be paved for the world proletarian revolution. All that we could do towards achieving this goal could be called our positive achievements. These are following:

1. In this long period, we were able to defeat the old and new revisionism inside and outside of organisation in theory and practice, and were successful in advancing and developing our revolutionary theoretical line on the basis of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
2. We were also successful in advancing our strategic and tactical line, and were able to advance and develop it to the present situation.
3. We could adopt a strong party programme.
4. We were successful in uniting with genuine revolutionaries of the CPI (ML) and with genuine revolutionaries the MCCI. Besides, we were also able to unite with various Maoist forces.
5. In the international arena too we were successful in our efforts at uniting with Maoist revolutionaries.

6. Today, we are on the verge of achieving historical success in forming an All India Maoist Party.
7. In order to be efficient in all military matters, we have built a Central Military Commission (CMC). We formed the PLGA with the objective of forming a Peoples' Army and Base Area, and advanced our military line. Besides, we are now engaged in the task of building guerilla base areas.
8. We are in a position to play an effective role in rallying the various forces at our initiative in the building of a strategic and tactical united front.
9. We have been successful in expanding the armed agrarian revolutionary guerilla war and protracted peoples' war on our own independent initiative, and in advancing and spreading the revolutionary struggle.
10. We were able to wage struggles at one advanced level after another in all old and new areas of struggle, and in building able commands and commanders, and the army.
11. We were successful in building revolutionary culture.
12. We have also been engaged in constructive development of our economic policy and the task of economic production.

## **NEGATIVE ASPECTS**

Our journey since our inception has covered a long period till today, and it has been a very challenging journey. It was as challenging from inside as it was outside. There have also been some negative aspects during this long period. They are following:

1. The opportunist elements within our organisation, remained ensconced in the highest committee of our organisation for long time, which caused a substantial loss to the organisation, and the development in political and military spheres remained obstructed. In particular, the task of making the party more dynamic and active, while viewing it as a unity of opposites and implementing this law in a lively manner, was highly obstructed. The task of developing

all military aspects, the military line, military organisation, military activities etc. also was highly obstructed. This was a manifestation of treading the beaten track for long time.

2. For a mature communist revolutionary party-organization, remaining engaged in armed clashes for such a long time with another revolutionary organisation and not being able to work out a correct political solution at the earliest was also a negative experience.
3. Whatever the CC did in connection with educating the entire ranks on the party line and on other topics was less than the required.
4. In comparison with whatever achievements we could gain in our work in countryside in accordance with our line, the development of our work in the urban areas was far less.

## **EPILOGUE**

From the review of our long political and organisational work, it is evident that we have been successful in developing from a small group to an all India Party while advancing through the process of building and developing the armed agrarian revolutionary guerilla struggle and protracted peoples' war, and firmly practising the policy of unity-struggle-unity. Moreover, we are now at an historical juncture, having reached the stage of building of the Peoples' Army and Base Area. It also emerged that only in the process of adopting a correct line and carrying it out resolutely in practice, would it be possible to establish genuine unity with the real revolutionary and fighting elements, be it in the field of class struggle or in the field of self-determination of nationalities. A correct line could get established only through correct practice. Provided a line may be correct, it does not matter if it takes time to get established. The review so far reveals that in order to achieve unity it is necessary to persevere on the correct line. Deviating from the line merely for the sake of unity would be equivalent to abandoning revolution, whereas unity achieved while persevering on the correct line would be powerful and strong as rock.

Following the stereotype method for a long time would be an obstacle for the qualitative development of an organisation. Therefore, taking proper decisions at every stage of development in a creative way would advance

the phase of qualitative development. The decision of 1999 regarding the arrangement of the portraits of leaders; the decision of 2000 to unilaterally stop the armed clashes with the PW; the decision on using the term, “Maoism” in place of “Mao thought;” the decision of advancing the process of unity with genuine revolutionaries etc. were absolutely correct decisions taken at correct time. These decisions created a stir among all elements, both good and bad, inside and outside the organisation; it helped to separate out the bad elements and helped the good elements take a qualitative and historical leap. The above decisions energised us as does electricity, helping develop the military line of our party, form the PLGA and launch an initiative towards building a Guerrilla Base Area. The most amazing achievement was that these decisions instilled among good elements confidence upon their own strength and shattered their dependence on others. Today, our organisation has acquired importance in the national and international arena, and has become the centre of hopes and aspirations of the masses. The main reason for all this was nothing but adherence to the correct line and the correct method of work.

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# **SOME ASPECTS OF PARTY HISTORY**

## **MCCI Stand on Building a Unified Revolutionary Communist Party in India**

The unification of the MCCI and the CPI(ML)[PW], i.e. the great merger of these two revolutionary streams, is an historic event that has tremendous significance in the realm of the progress of the communist movement and the development of revolutionary struggles in India. Consequently, the necessity of a unified all-India Party guided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as a guarantee of the victory of revolution would be fulfilled.

It goes without saying that this unification is taking place at such a juncture when the international communist movement passes through a phase of crisis and poses a historic challenge to communist revolutionaries.

After the defeat of the Great Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian proletariat, led by the Bolshevik Party with the Great Lenin and Stalin at its helm, smashed the bourgeois state machinery through an armed revolution, establishing the world's first-ever political rule of the proletariat and building socialism.

Thereafter, the Communist party of China led by the great Mao Tse-Tung smashed the imperialist-feudal state through protracted peoples' war and built a new democratic state and socialist state.

In the wake of the Second World War, a huge socialist camp emerged with the countries of East Europe and North Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia etc, encompassing one-third of the prevailing world population.

However, soon after the death of great Stalin on the 5<sup>th</sup> of March, 1953, the rise of treacherous Khrushchev revisionism led to the political rule changing hands from those of the proletariat to those of the bourgeoisie, and in this way the Great November Revolution was defeated after 36 years or so. In the days to come, other states too abandoned the socialist road and took to the capitalist road.

In just the same way, after the death of great Mao tse-Tung on the 9<sup>th</sup> of September, 1976, the capitalist roaders of the likes of the Deng-Hua



clique which was laying in wait within the CPC captured state power from the proletariat and led socialist China to her degeneration into a bourgeois state. In the situation prevailing today the proletariat does not hold state power anywhere in the world and there is no more a socialist system anywhere.

In this phase of crisis for the international communist movement, when the principal danger remains that of revisionism, the great merger of the two revolutionary Parties in the interest of world revolution and the Indian revolution has posed a significant challenge to world imperialism and all reactionary forces and revisionists.

The two revolutionary Parties that emerged and developed in the country have constituted two independent streams. Although the two independent streams have had the same aims and objectives, yet they had not transformed into one great current for so long owing to differences on ideological, political and organizational questions. Some discussion is necessary today about these two independent streams.

Opportunism and revisionism had entrenched itself into the Indian communist movement from the very beginning. In the background of the merger of the two streams it is very much relevant to discuss this historical aspect of the struggle against the revisionism in the Indian communist movement and of the emergence and development of agrarian revolutionary politics in India in the light of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

Modern revisionism arose with traitor Khrushchev's slander, malicious propaganda and attacks on great Stalin at the twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, and promulgation of three venomous theories, that of "peaceful transition," "peaceful competition" and "peaceful co-existence," and thereafter, theories such as "the state of the whole people" and "the Party of the whole people" in the 22<sup>nd</sup> Congress in 1961. These revisionist theories became the focus of a big debate that commenced in the communist movement the world over. Under the leadership on Mao tse-Tung, the CPC launched an open debate to expose Khrushchev's revisionism in order to defend the unity of the world communist movement and to defend Marxism-Leninism from revisionism. Through nine important documents in succession, it exposed the real nature of the anti-Stalin propaganda and

the poisonous weeds of Khrushchev's revisionism. It was this theoretical debate on the international communist movement between the Soviet Union and China that came to be known as the *Great Debate*. Under the influence of the Great Debate a worldwide polarization began in the international communist movement between the revisionist stream led by the CPSU and the revolutionary stream of Marxism-Leninism led by the CPC. This culminated in to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the *GPCR*. This brought about a new division on the entire world plane. New Marxist-Leninist Parties adopting Marxism-Leninism-Mao thought (now Maoism) as the guiding ideology began to take birth.

The ideological, theoretical and political struggle against revisionism in the Communist Party of India and the emergence and development of the revolutionary stream must be seen in the background of the continuity of the Great Debate and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The two-line struggle, with the Great Debate between the Soviet Union and China as its focus, eventually sharpened in the Indian Party. In the wake of the reactionary Indian Government's attack on China in 1962, this debate sharpened and deepened further. The Soviet Party supported the Indian Government, assailing China as the attacker. A section of the Party led by Dange, which had upheld Khrushchev's line during the Great Debate, supported the Indian Government. Some from the other section of the leadership (Jyoti Basu, Namboodripad and others) made a pretense of neutrality on the Sino-Indian border dispute in a bid to save their skin. Despite having said some things against Khrushchev's revisionism during the Great Debate, this section of the leadership was not in agreement with all issues in the line of the Chinese Party. Besides these sections, another upheld the Chinese stand and declared that the Indian Government was the attacker. Making the border dispute the basis, the Indian Government arrested under the India Security Act all but Dange's followers in hordes, who had supported China and called India the attacker. Among the leaders and cadres languishing in prisons in these fiery circumstances, the debate raged on questions such as on what should be the path of Indian revolution, would it be the parliamentary path or the path of armed struggle, would it be the path of Russian revolution or the path of Chinese revolution, on the question of Strategy and Tactics, and the causes for the failure of the

Telangana struggle and so on. In fact, the Party was divided in jail itself on ideological and political issues, broadly among two major sections: a large section of those occupying the leadership posts on the one hand, and on the other, a small section of the leadership comrades along with the larger section of militant cadres.

On coming out of the jails, some comrades, while opposing Khrushchev's revisionism and the Dangeists, also raised questions on the aim and path of the Indian revolution, the forms and methods of struggle and so on. They wanted to know why despite the fact that the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of China were formed around the same time, how is it that the Chinese Party could uproot imperialism-feudalism through a protracted peoples' war, seizing power and establishing socialism, while we lagged behind so much? Was a revolutionary situation not seen ever before in our country? Had the workers-peasants and toiling masses of India not taken up arms time and again against domestic and foreign exploitation, rule and oppression? Had not the common activists of the Communist Party of India presented shining examples of boundless courage, self-sacrifice and commitment? Even so why had the heroic struggles of the Indian masses failed again and again? Why could they not advance to victory?

Confronted with all these crucial questions, the then phoney pro-Chinese leadership, got wind of the vast section of party cadres' frame of mind of supporting the China. Thus this section of the leadership branded those who had supported Khrushchev's line as revisionist, cajoling the cadres that they themselves were also in support of the Chinese Party and in support of revolution. Cleverly, they avoided the above questions, kept insisting upon holding the Seventh Congress as a means to steer the Party away from revisionism and onto the road to revolution, and assuring cadres that there would be a debate on all these questions in the Congress. Finally in November 1964, calling for the 7<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, they split the Party.

Incidentally, it must be mentioned here that prior to the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress, there was a Calcutta District Conference on the documents that were to be placed before the Congress. Comrade Kanhai Chatterji was also a delegate at this conference. Branding the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress document as

revisionist, he presented a parallel document. When this document was put to vote, he had 11 votes in favour. As a result of his speech, in which he termed the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress document as a Dange-brand document, he was insulted in various ways and warned that his Party card may be snatched away.

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) was formed at the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress held with much grandeur. However, the Congress, invariably side-stepped all the statements made and questions raised by several cadres much before the Congress. On the question of the *Great Debate* they did not produce any document to take some concrete stand. In this way they adopted a centrist stance. As a matter of fact, the Party formed at this Congress was just another revisionist Party. Its leadership was in the complete grip of revisionists and opportunists. The Programme adopted by this Congress was nothing but a cocktail of right and 'left' opportunism with Khrushchevite revisionism bearing the label of Marxism-Leninism. In reality it was a revisionist programme from head to foot. It was so much so, that the leaders of the Party even refused to call India as the attacker on the question of the Sino-Indian war. Thus they continued playing the role of loyal agents of imperialism and feudalism, similar to Dangeists.

In this situation the genuine revolutionary section within the Party thought it justified to rebel. Since stepping out of imprisonment, Comrade Kanhai Chatterji and Comrade Amulya Sen, with Calcutta as their centre, and Comrade Charu Mazumdar and others, with Darjeeling as centre, had been conducting an ideological struggle against the Party leadership and the revisionist line of the Party.

The struggle against revisionism was carried on among the cadres of Calcutta, Howrah and Hooghly under the leadership of Comrade Kanhai Chatterji and Comrade Amulya Sen, and in Tripura under the leadership of Comrade Chandrashekhar Das. In order to wage an ideological struggle against revisionism in an effective and organized manner, they secretly formed a revolutionary centre within the CPI (M) soon after the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress was over in 1964. Under the leadership of this centre, a magazine by the name of "*Chinta*" was published since March 1965, wherein documents were published against revisionism, and it was circulated secretly in the

Party. Altogether 6 such issues were published from March 1965 to mid-1966. The topics dealt with in the documents published therein were as follows: (i) The class character of the Indian state; (ii) The path of Chinese revolution as the path of revolution; (iii) The role of PL 480 as a weapon of neocolonial exploitation; (iv) The Programme of the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress and the nature of the revisionist leadership, and Indian revolution and the peasant question etc. A debate ensued in the Party on the basis of these documents. The revisionist leadership took fright at this. In ‘*Desh Hitaishi*,’ the organ of the West Bengal State Committee of the Party, the leadership attacked the documents carried in “*Chinta*” through a series of articles claimed to be authored by Ashok Mukherjee under the title, ‘Revisionism and the Sectarian Trend,’ and distorted the statements in “*Chinta*,” propagating them among the party cadres. In the same vein, the attacks continued through the columns of their English organ, ‘Peoples’ Democracy’ and the Hindi organ, ‘*Swadheenata*.’ Despite all this, a debate spread throughout the Party, and even the mass organizations and supporters outside the Party began to debate. On assessing the situation, the secretly published “*Chinta*” was closed down and in its place was begun the publication of the open magazine, called, “*Dakshin Desh*.”

All the comrades, who upheld the ‘political line’ carried in “*Chinta*” first and “*Dakshin Desh*” later, were united into an organization. This organization came to be known then as the “Dakshin Desh” group.

At the end of 1966 the Dakshin Desh group came into contact with some comrades of Darjeeling district. In early 1967 (before the Naxalbari struggle) Comrade Kanhai Chatterji had a long talk with Comrade Charu Mazumdar. In those circumstances, despite having agreement on various basic issues, Comrade Kanhai Chatterji could not agree with the candidature of Jangal Santhal in the General Elections of 1967, both leaders felt mutual closeness. Both leaders felt the need to intensify the ideological struggle against revisionism on the one hand, and to carry ahead the work in the peasantry areas according to our capacity, on the other, and it was also decided to maintain close contact with each other.

The fact is that prior to the Spring Thunder Over India – the historic Naxalbari revolt in May 1967, until after the formation of the CPI (ML) in

1969, the Dakshin Desh group built an organization in Calcutta, Howrah, Hooghly, Midnapore, Burdwan, Birbhum, 24 Parganas and other districts. Alongside an organization was also built then in Assam and Tripura, and an initiative had been taken to start work in what was then Bihar by increasing our contact there.

Nevertheless, after the Naxalbari struggle, a Naxalbari Sanghush Sahayak Committee was formed to support the struggle. Comrade Charu Mazumdar and Comrade Kanhai Chatterji met again in September 1967. Along with other issues, the two leaders were in agreement on uniting under a Co-ordination the large number of cadres who had come out of the revisionist Party in revolt, rather than leaving them in an unorganized state. Thereafter, on 12-13 November, 1967 the All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries (AICCR) was formed. This committee adopted four important resolutions. Later on May 14, 1968 a manifesto was published under the name of All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR).

### **The Coordination Committee and Our Relations With It**

As a consequence of the staunch and unstinted support extended by the Chinese Party to the Naxalbari struggle and the unmasking of the CPM leadership it was most natural for an atmosphere of political tumult to be created all over the country. An unprecedented opportunity came forth for the formation of a truly revolutionary Party, well-equipped with revolutionary theory and the revolutionary style of work.

As was very natural, we had imposed faith upon the leaders of Naxalbari to play a vanguard role in this work. During the talks with Comrade Charu Mazumdar soon after the Naxalbari struggle, we had expressed the opinion we held that those who had come out in support of the Naxalbari movement should be brought into a Co-ordination rather than leaving them in an unorganised state.

However, we never had the view that among those, that had come to rally around the Naxalbari struggle, all had the similar opinions on matters of ideology, principle, style and method, or that all were genuine revolutionaries. It was precisely for this reason that even while expressing our opinion in favour of forming a Co-ordination Committee, we emphasized

that it was essential to follow a consistent policy and method of work in forging a revolutionary Party and revolutionary struggles. Uniting those who could be united through a process of building a Peoples' Army and Base Areas on the basis of a revolutionary policy and style, that is, bringing together only those who were revolutionary both in words as well as deeds, we stressed upon adopting a consistent policy to build a revolutionary Party in the true sense.

At the time when we had talked with Comrade Charu Mazumdar, he and others had agreed with this line.

After joining the co-ordination, we naturally proposed within and outside the Co-ordination that this line be carried out.

Concretely speaking, our objective was precisely to forge unity among genuine revolutionaries on the basis of a correct policy and style, and through the process of revolutionary practice, and also to dissolve our independent centre, gradually uniting under a single centre. It was with this objective that we joined the Coordination Committee in West Bengal, Bihar and Assam. In fact our entire practice was being conducted in the name of the Coordination.

Even in building the struggles in the rural areas, rather than taking the initiative independently, we naturally insisted that the Coordination should have a concerted plan and take the initiative, and that our practice and initiative should conform to the inevitable initiative of the Coordination.

However due to the formation of the Coordination Committee through the same old revisionist method, only some well-known politically corrupt opportunists of most States got the opportunity to barge into the highest level of the leading committees of the Coordination. These handful opportunists ensconced in the leadership of the Coordination opposed the above correct tactical line from the very beginning.

Owing to the opportunist deeds of the handful of opportunists ensconced in the leadership of the Coordination on the one hand, and the compromising policy of the liberalists on the other, far from carrying out the above tactical line, even several precise decisions taken in the Coordination could not be implemented.

When the opportunists ensconced in the leadership of the Coordination, which was formed to unite the communist revolutionaries all over India and to build a revolutionary Party and revolutionary struggles, continued with such kind of misdeeds, there naturally was opposition from communist revolutionaries and this opposition gradually went on to take on a bitter form.:

In order to face this increasing opposition and to continue their wrong policies and methods, the opportunists on the one hand kept getting mobilized into undeclared groups and cliques in various places within the Coordination and on the other, constantly kept accusing us of “groupism.” It may be mentioned here that at the advice of some comrades, we had at one time agreed to rally under the leadership of the Coordination while disbanding our organization and to hand over the “*Dakshin Desh*” magazine to the Coordination, but we had some conditions. They were, for instance, that we should function by adopting a correct policy; that a draft Programme must be produced in accordance with the first declaration of the Coordination; that instead of simply making a general appeal and allowing it to be left to spontaneity, a plan must be taken up to deploy our limited forces in order to build the armed struggle in the countryside (actually if this had been done more struggles like the Srikakulam struggle could have been built in South and North India); that the method of criticism and self-criticism and the method of waging ideological struggle should be implemented; that at least one comrade should be included into the magazines of the Coordination from among the editorial board of “*Dakshin Desh*” or a joint editorial board should be constituted; and that if differences arise on any basic issue, they should not allow to be concealed or suppressed, but should be taken up for discussion within the organization, and that the line adopted after the discussion within the organization should be accepted by all. However, they did not reply us then.

In these circumstances, especially when the opportunists were organized and mobilized in various undeclared cliques and groups inside and outside the Coordination, and the greatest aspect of all, where the method of conducting criticism and self-criticism and ideological struggle was not at all being implemented, at such a time to unilaterally dissolve our organization and close down the “*Dakshin Desh*” magazine would actually



have amounted to outright surrender to the opportunists.

In this situation, some handful of opportunists ensconced in the leadership resorted to a strange splittist organizational policy (inherited from the old revisionist Party). All those who opposed their opportunist line, especially the supporters of the line of “*Dakshin Desh*” (especially those in West Bengal, Bihar and Assam), were filtered out and a line adopted to reorganize the Coordination Committee.

In this way, it was with the direct and indirect support of the liberalists and owing to the conspiracies of the opportunists that the Coordination Committee got separated from us. It needs no mention that ever since then we have all along implemented the policy of keeping open our doors to unity with the Coordination and with the CPI (ML) [PW] later, (continuing to support their correct policies and activities, oppose their wrong policies and activities and conduct uncompromising struggle against the opportunists), on the one hand, and on the other, while going through the process of working on the basis of a correct policy and on a correct line, uniting all those who can be united, and taking an independent initiative to work according to a plan.

In fact until then there was no such question among us of laying stress upon taking up programmes according to a plan totally independent of the Coordination. This was the situation towards the end of 1968. Since the Naxalbari struggle our practice and our successes and failures were until then all linked in every way with the Coordination.

### **The Formation of CPI (ML) and Our Role**

Anyway, a few months after our relations broke off with the Coordination, without an objective evaluation of the work of the Coordination, all of a sudden the formation of the CPI (ML) Party was announced. Addressing a huge public meeting at Shahid Maidan in Calcutta on May 1, 1969, Kanu Sanyal declared that a new Party, the CPI (ML) had been formed in India on April 22, the birth anniversary of great Lenin. At the same time, he also declared that whoever remains outside the Party even after this would be considered anti-Party.

In spite of all this, even after the formation of a Party was declared, we maintained the hope that the leadership of the newly-formed Party

would review the overall situation. Even then we wished that a new unity would be forged on a new basis through the process of an objective review and criticism-self criticism. With this desire we also sent a letter to the then leadership of the CPI (ML).

Far from replying our letter even by way of cordiality, however, the higher committees of the Coordination Committee ..... were given recognition as the Organisational Committee of the newly-formed Party.  
.....

At the same time it is also true that even after recognizing the newly-formed CPI (ML) as a revolutionary Party, the Dakshin Desh group had offered some criticism on the style and method of forming the Party. With the desire to unite within the Party, a letter was also sent to the leadership of the newly-formed CPI (ML) calling upon them to first talk over the points of differences before we dissolve our group. The Party leadership, however, did not give a reply. Orally it asked us to disband our group and join the Party. The Dakshin Desh group saw this process as dangerous for Party democracy and a threat to surrender. For the present the group decided to remain separate from the Party.

In reality it was owing to the circumstances created after the formation of the CPI (ML) and failure of the attempts to unite with them that we formed the “Maoist Communist Centre” as an independent centre on October 20, 1969. To do so had in the prevailing circumstances become historically inevitable.

### **On the Unity of Communist Revolutionaries**

In order to make the new democratic revolution successful in India, genuine revolutionaries would certainly have to unite within a single centre. This is what history demands, what the revolutionaries demand and what the rank and file and masses demand.

In fact even after we formed a revolutionary centre independently in 1969, and later carried on our practice independently, we have been talking about genuine revolutionaries uniting and have also been making efforts towards this. However, we never took unity as merely an impulsive action or as a slogan. Unification is a practical matter which can be achieved only through a proper process, method and in the course of sincere efforts. The

agenda for unification today is not limited merely to old questions. In the circumstances today the important issues that have been thrown up are: (i) On the era today and Maoism; (ii) The tactical line or path and tactical slogans in the present phase; (iii) The correct policy on the question of 'participating in' and 'boycotting' Parliamentary and Assembly polls; (iv) Regarding the use of various forms and methods of struggle (legal and extra-legal, open and secret, peaceful and armed etc) and the correct approach towards tactical questions; (v) The objectives of mass movement and mass organization, their techniques and orientation; (vi) The programme of peasant struggles and their method and tactics; (vii) The objectives of the formation of the United Front and its methods; (viii) Propaganda-agitation and their methods; and (ix) The method of leadership.

In 1976-77 when the Party had been divided into several parts and after the end of the 'Emergency,' some groups of the CPI (ML) contacted us and appealed for unification. We too responded to their appeal accordingly. In the following phase unity talks were held with almost all small and big groups of the CPI (ML).

However, most groups raised such a rumpus over theory that unity talks were reduced to a kind of degenerate profligacy. On questions such as working consistently among poor and landless peasants for the area-wise seizure of power according to a concrete plan, deploying activists accordingly, viewing urban work as subordinate and subservient to rural work, determining the forms and methods of mass movement and mass struggle with the aim of building war, and determining the method of leadership, that is on practical issues they said unclear and incoherent things. Rather than placing forth the points of difference and forming a consensus on them as a means to achieve unification, they stressed only upon those theoretical issues on which there was broad agreement and hastily stumbled towards unity by any means. Engels compared this kind of unity with 'steaming broth' which on cooling off would appear as separate grains. Naturally, our differences with them became apparent and the unity talks ended with no concrete result. At that time we felt closeness towards the CPI (ML) [Unity Organization] and friendly relations were established with them. With mutual agreement we decided to carry on our respective practice in Bihar by dividing areas. Later, the 'Unity Organization' united

with another group to start work with the name of CPI (ML) [PU]. Unity talks began with PU around 1979-80 and continued by maintaining fraternal relations for several years. Later, as serious differences cropped up on some political and organizational questions, the unity talks broke down and tension and bitterness was created in the mutual relations of the two organizations since 1990. Later this took the form of mutual clashes.

### **The Process of Uniting With CPI (ML) [PW] and The Formation of an All India Revolutionary Communist Party in India, Guided By Marxism-Leninism-Maoism**

In October 1981 unity talks commenced at the level of the highest delegations of the CPI (ML) [PW] and the MCC. A lengthy discussion took place then for eight days between the two main leaders, Comrade Kanhai Chatterji and Kondapalli Seetharamaiah in an extremely cordial atmosphere. Both leaders accepted that a real basis does exist for the unification of the two organizations. Three or four months after that meeting the talks remained suspended owing to the arrest of KS. Later the talks continued with the PW leader Sathyamurthy. Then after KS was released, the talks resumed once again and various kinds of activities went on. Thereafter, the crisis in the Central Committee of the PW became apparent, due to which the unity talks remained suspended. During the crisis, the Central Committee of the PW suffered a split. Thereafter, in the unity talks with the PW led by KS since 1987-88, we could achieve unity on a many political and organizational issues. As a consequence, unified activity in the sphere of mass organizations at the national level could spread. Around 1990 agreement was reached in regard to Party unity on the name of the new Party, the Party organ, the series of photographs of leaders and on preparing unified documents for a Party Congress. Just when the two organizations reached the verge of unity, a crisis appeared again in the PW Party. So the unity talks could not proceed. Subsequently, the PW leadership removed KS from the Party due to anti-Party activities.

After that the unity talks resumed in 1992 with the CPI (ML) [PW] led by Comrade Ganapathy. The two organizations took the initiative in matters related to joint activities and A3 was formed. Later in the process of talks, serious differences arose on many international and national issues. After

several rounds of talks when the two organizations could not resolve these differences, the unity talks broke off in May 1995. In later years the Central Committee of MCCI reviewed the unity talks and the stalemate in the talks. In its November 2002 meeting it concluded through consensus that we had not shown enough patience while arriving at a decision regarding the unity talks and had been hasty. The break of talks at that juncture had certainly had some negative impact or the other on the revolutionary forces and the masses within and outside the country. Unity talks then began between CPI (ML) [PW] and CPI (ML) [PU] and in 1998 both parties were united.

After the unity between PW and PU, the clashes continued even with the newly-formed PW. This was a black chapter of the Indian revolution. Both the organizations failed to exercise control, causing the state of conflict to continue. Finally on January 7, 2000 the MCC made a unilateral declaration to end the conflict and the PW also responded in the same vein. RIM and other fraternal organizations had indeed played a role in this. Through several successive meetings the two Parties determined the means and method to ensure that the conflict may not recur. By and by the situation normalized and fraternal relations were re-established. In this new situation, the MCC proposed to start unity talks once again, and the PW leadership cordially accepted the proposal.

Finally in February 2003 unity talks resumed between high-powered delegations of both Parties in the presence of their Secretaries. The talks went on continuously for ten days in a revolutionary environment brimming with great warmth and zeal. Resolving to a great extent their differences on international, national and organizational as well as other issues, the two Parties could arrive at mutual agreement.

The leadership of both the Parties expressed deep anguish, and offered severe, deep and heartfelt self-criticism for the sharp conflict that went on for so many years, which took away the lives of such valuable comrades, and not only that, also caused great losses to the Indian revolution. With such deep realization and in the atmosphere of mutual confidence and trust, the leadership of both the Parties took an oath to prevent such a situation from arising ever again.

At this juncture of victory for the ideals of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the proletarian line, the possibility of achieving the long-cherished unity among revolutionaries in the revolutionary communist movement of India and of building an all India unified Party is about to bear fruit. Both the Parties are determined and also happy about fulfilling the demand of the revolutionaries in the country and the world, and that of our class and the broad masses. To precisely the same extent, imperialism-feudalism, revisionism and the entire reactionary and counter-revolutionary camp is terror-struck at this process of unison.

The building of a unified Party brought about by defeating sectarian, dogmatist, individualist and big-brother viewpoints and group mentality by both the Parties in the interest of Indian revolution and by the victory of the proletarian line is a milestone that would have very long-term implications. At this epoch-making juncture of transition being experienced by the great Naxalbari movement, the real existence of two revolutionary streams that emerged and developed independently is about to create through their Great Union, a new great, revolutionary torrent, such a great torrent that would undoubtedly accomplish the tasks of realizing the dreams of our great martyr comrades and forever erasing imperialism, feudalism and revisionism from the face of our country. This unified Party shall glow with the radiance of the new rising sun and shall create a new India. This much is certain.

# **POLITICAL ORGANISATION REVIEW OF THE CPI(ML)[PEOPLE'S WAR]**

The Maoist movement has now been in existence in our country for the last three-and-a-half decades. In the process the CPI(ML) has traversed a torturous path, giving thousands of martyrs to the great cause of creating an exploitation-free society. In this period it has tread a zig-zag path, facing great advances and serious set-backs. It has witnessed death-defying sacrifices too. Yet, it has advanced significantly over this long period. In this period of over 35 years it has brought lakhs of people under its influence beating back the vicious repression of the state. Though it faced a serious setback in 1972 it was able to revive, fighting back the right and left, principally right opportunist trends, who sought to divert the entire movement, while correcting the left errors of the earlier period. Through this entire period it also played a major role in fighting modern revisionism in the country as part of the worldwide struggle against modern revisionism in the International Communist Movement, which is the main ideological danger to communism worldwide. It kept flying the red flag of Maoism on the Indian soil, drenched with the blood of the most dedicated and self-sacrificing comrades - the cream of Indian society.

In the course and advance of the revolutionary movement in the country it built the armed guerilla forces of the people. For the first time ever in the history of the Indian revolution a people's army has been systematically built up, culminating in the formation of the PGA. Never before in the history of the country had a people's armed force fought an armed struggle with the reactionary Indian state forces so consistently for so long - over two decades, that too, by advancing the armed agrarian revolution with the aim of establishing base areas. In the process, the Party too got consolidated.

In addition we consolidated the gains of our movement and extended it to newer areas where the communist party itself was new to the people. Also, for the first time we formed revolutionary mass organisations and strengthened them in many parts of the country and thereby deepened the mass base of the Party.

A similar history has been witnessed by the MCC. And now these two major streams of Indian revolution are all set to merge to form a mighty river that will sweep away all the enemies to and accomplish the NDR as the first step in the long march to socialism and then communism. The task is huge and the responsibilities are immense. Given the size, population, complexity and geo-political position of our country, the victory of the democratic revolution in India will severely weaken the imperialist chain, acting to change the balance of forces not only in Asia but worldwide.

It is with this sense of responsibility and a self-critical approach that we present before the Party the Political and Organisational Review of the CPI(ML) for the entire period up to the present.

## **An Overview**

During the uproarious decade of 1960s that shook the entire world, the genuine communist revolutionaries in India too began their struggle against the entrenched revisionists inspired by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought. The Great Debate, initiated and carried out by the then CPC led by Mao Tse-tung against Khrushchev modern revisionism in the International Communist Movement (ICM), clearly marked this new beginning in the Communist Movement in India.

It is in this context that many genuine and staunch communist revolutionary forces along with many outstanding and front-ranking leaders in the ICM, like comrades CM and KC started emerging on the scene in the fight against revisionism. This fight was reflected in the 7th Congress of the CPI(M) held in 1964 in the form of two diametrically opposite roads—the road of parliamentarism and the road of protracted people’s war. Thereafter, the earth-shaking events of the GPCR further surcharged the political atmosphere in India. The clarion call of the great Naxalbari movement led by Com. CM proved to be a “**Spring Thunder over India**” as graphically described by the CPC. It greatly unmasked the ugly face of the revisionist leadership of the CPI, CPI(M) brand. The powerful slogans like “**China’s Path is Our Path**” and “**Mao Tse-tung Thought is Our Thought**” spread to the four corners of India and even other parts of the Sub-Continent. Naxalbari thus marked a qualitative rupture with age-old



revisionism in the Indian communist movement and firmly established the universal truth of MLM Thought in India. From then on, MLM-Thought had become a demarcating line between revisionists and genuine revolutionaries in India. Thus “**Naxalbari path, the only path of Indian revolution**” became an ever-resounding slogan. This movement further inspired and attracted a completely new generation of revolutionary communist forces from among the masses of workers, peasants, students, youth, women and intellectuals towards the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (then called MLM Thought, and henceforth, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism).

With the restoration of capitalism in the USSR the Soviet Union grew to be a social-imperialist country and a new superpower, challenging the might of the US. The communist movement in the world was split, with the bulk of the parties aligning with the Soviet modern revisionists. The CPC, under the leadership of Mao, challenged this new counter-revolutionary centre, both ideologically and politically polarizing all the genuine revolutionary forces of the world, particularly in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America into the pro-China camp. Simultaneously the US superpower was facing massive blows with the national liberation movement in Vietnam, which aroused all anti-imperialist forces throughout the world. National liberation movements raged throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The tumultuous events of the 1960s, starting with the Great Debate and culminating in the GPCR, brought forth a new polarisation among the ML forces all over the globe. New Marxist-Leninist parties began to emerge by taking MLM as their guiding ideology.

The armed peasant revolution that started in Naxalbari in 1967, was a great turning point in the history of the Indian democratic revolution. Naxalbari marked the turning point of the armed peasant revolution, after the revisionist leadership betrayed it in Telangana after 1951. It is a matter of pride for the CPI(ML) to have begun and continued the armed peasant revolution as heir to the heroic armed peasant struggles of Punapra- Vayalar, Tebhaga and the Telangana. The Naxalbari struggle was a leap over the great Telangana peasant armed struggle, because the Naxalbari struggle

was the fruit of intense ideological struggle and revolt against the entrenched revisionist leadership.

The armed peasant revolutionary struggle, which began in Naxalbari under the guidance of MLM, was the first serious blow against revisionism that had plagued the Indian Communist Movement like cancer. That is why the revisionists and the Congress rulers jumped into the arena to drown the armed peasant revolution in pools of blood. The peasant revolution inspired an entire generation across the country, as much as it frightened the ruling classes out of their wits. The spark of Naxalbari spread to various corners of India - Srikakulam, Mushahari, Debra, Gopi Vallabhapur, Lakhimpur-Kheri and Birbhum. Thousands of martyrs, the cream of Indian society, gave their lives for the revolution.

Although later the revolutionary movement suffered a setback for the time being, the bright red banner of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the flames of Naxalbari continued to shine in various parts of the country. By now, the seeds of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism were sown very deep in the Indian landscape. Fighting against right opportunism and left deviations the revolutionary movement regained its strength and began to advance to levels well beyond what was reached in 1972. The heroic sacrifices of those who fell to enemy bullets did not go in vain. The enemy's war of suppression was beaten back and the movement began to grow at a higher plane.

The history of the emergence and development of the CPI(ML)[People's War] and CPI(ML)(PU) are inseparably linked with this stormy period. During the last 35 years of history, we not only continued to uphold the shining red banner of MLM with pride, but also continued to apply it in our revolutionary practice in the concrete conditions of India. During this practice we forged and developed a revolutionary line by analyzing and synthesizing the positive and negative experiences of our movements on the basis of MLM. In this light we achieved many remarkable successes in continuing and developing the protracted people's war through developing agrarian revolutionary guerilla war in the countryside by mobilizing and relying on the peasant masses, especially the poor and landless peasants. We continued this struggle by resisting the continuous

severe repression and many suppression campaigns unleashed by the reactionary ruling classes with the support of imperialism.

It is in the course of advancing the people's war and implementing the line of building the people's army and establishing Base Areas that the two parties that had continued the legacy of Naxalbari and the CPI(ML)—CPI(ML)[PW] Nad CPI(ML)[PU)—merged into the unified CPI(ML)[PW] in August 1998. Both these parties have been part of the CPI(ML) that was formed on April 22nd, 1969. They had continued the revolutionary line adopted by the 8th Congress of the united CPI(ML) Party or the first Congress of the reconstituted revolutionary proletarian party of India, ie. CPI (ML). Both had adopted the Party Programme and the Party Constitution of the 8th Congress and summed up the experiences of the CPI (ML) since the Naxalbari peasant uprising and continued their entire subsequent revolutionary practice based on the lessons drawn from the synthesis of past experiences.

The new Party succeeded in developing a guerrilla army -the PGA- and guerilla zones whose direction was towards establishing a full-fledged PLA and Base Areas in the vast countryside of Andhra, Jharkhand, Bihar, Dandakaranya and Orrissa. This protracted people's war led by our Party is directed towards completing the New Democratic Revolution - the axis of which is agrarian revolution - through the strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside. The present summing up of the past 35 years of our glorious revolutionary history should be seen in this background.

In this period of three and a half decades, thousands of comrades of our Party and other Maoist organisations have given their lives in the course of the revolutionary movement in the country. These include many senior leaders of the parties and even a large number of intellectuals. Resisting the intense enemy's onslaught, the revolutionary movement is growing towards the development of Base areas. While analyzing the world situation from time to time concretely, the Party developed its ideological, political, organizational and military line. For the first time in the country it established the People's Guerrilla Army and the revolutionary people's political power, the embryonic form of the New Democratic Government at the local level. In the process the Party itself developed through a process of continuous

review in a series of plenums, conferences and other review meetings, finally culminating in the 9th Congress of the Party. Putting in continuous efforts to unify the Maoist revolutionaries in the country it achieved significant success, particularly through the merger of the two major CPI (ML) parties. It also played a positive role in establishing closer relations with various Maoist parties internationally.

Since the 1970 Congress, at the various turning points, we organized Plenums and Conferences to discuss plans and drive the entire Party to implement the line. This culminated in establishing and enriching the Party line finally at a Congress, bringing out basic documents of the Party. The basic documents sought to apply MLM to the concrete situation, so as to further develop it. These Conferences and Plenums also brought out Political Organisational Reviews at these important junctures that sought to analyze past practice, and take lessons from our achievements and shortcomings. Through out this period, the Party emphasized on adopting the Marxist-Leninist method of self-critical approach as outlined by Lenin:

“The attitude of a political Party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways to judging how earnest the Party is and how it in practice fulfills its obligations towards its class and the toiling masses. Frankly admitting a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analyzing the circumstances which gave rise to it and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it - that is the earmark of a serious Party; that is the way it should perform its duties; that is the way it should educate and train the class and then the masses.”

The present POR outlines the birth and development of our party, the major turning points in the protracted people’s war of India, the positive and negative aspects in the movement, and lessons to be learnt from the rich experiences over three and a half decades. Hence the present POR will cover a synthesis of the experiences of the reconstituted CPI(ML) party on the one hand, as well as the experiences of the two parties (PU & PW) that existed as separate entities prior to the merger for a long time, and the unified CPI(ML)(PW) on the other.

Over the last three and half decades our Party has traversed through five periods, each of which ended with a turning point in the movement.

Such a division helps us understand better on how, at each turning point, we had analysed the shortcomings in our practice and enriched the line in order to advance the revolutionary movement in the country. The five periods can be broadly categorized as follows:

- (1) 1964-67: The Great Beginning—the ideological and political preparations for the resurgence of the New Democratic Revolution in the country.
- (2) 1967-72: armed mass upsurge and formation of the Party.
- (3) 1972-77: Post-72 setback, summing up and preparations for a new upsurge.
- (4) 1977-March 2001: The Resurgence and Spread of the People’s War
- (5) Since 2001: Intensification of guerrilla war with the task of building Base Areas and process of the formation of a single unified revolutionary proletarian Party in the country.

## **PART-1**

### **CHAPTER-1**

#### **THE GREAT BEGINNING (1964-67)**

Before taking up the task of summing up the experiences of the past 35 years since the formation of our party, i.e., CPI (ML) in April 1969, let us briefly look back at the background in which the Party was reconstituted and the 8th Congress was held, the domestic and international situation at that time, and the significant changes that took place in the ML camp since then.

The genuine Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in our country had waged a relentless inner party struggle against revisionist leadership entrenched within the CPI during the 50s and early 60s and later against the neo-revisionist leadership within the CPI(M). The genuine revolutionaries in various countries, especially the CPC under the guidance of Com. Mao, waged an uncompromising struggle against international revisionism,

particularly modern revisionism, pursued by the CPSU. In China, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) was launched to foil the attempts of the Right Opportunists to restore capitalism. It is in this background that the Naxalbari armed struggle broke out pointing to the genuine path of liberation for the oppressed people of India.

Let us recapitulate these events briefly.

### **Com. CM's Eight Documents Laid The Ideological-Political Basis For The New Revolutionary Line**

Com. Charu Mazumdar's historic Eight Documents which appeared between January 1965 and 1967, laid the ideological-political basis for the qualitative rupture of the revolutionary stream within the Indian Communist Movement with revisionism and paved the way for the outbreak of the great Naxalbari uprising. These documents were a creative application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought in the concrete situation of India. These are historic in the sense that a sharp departure from parliamentary cretinism began to take place and revolutionary politics was resolutely put forward combating revisionism which was well entrenched in the communist movement in India until that time. A brief look at some of the major points mentioned in these documents shows this bitter struggle and the laying of the basis for the new Party. .

The first of these documents appeared as early as January 1965 under the caption: "*Our Tasks in the Present Situation*". In this, he stressed upon the need for secret organization and on carrying forward the agrarian revolution by boldly arousing the peasant masses.

Again, in an article written in August 1966, com. CM pointed out: "*.. this Party leadership is refusing to take the responsibility of the democratic revolution of India and as a result of that they are resorting to the cunning tactics of modern revisionism, that is, the path of being revolutionaries in words and an appendage of the bourgeoisie in deeds. .. the revolutionary party can come up only through the destruction of the present party system and its democratic framework. So to abide by the so called 'form' or "constitutional frame work" of this party, means to render Marxist-Leninists ineffective and to co-operate with*

*the revisionist leadership.”*

He further pointed out that “*to lead legal trade union or peasant association movement can never be the main task before the revolutionary cadres. Trade union or peasant association (Kisan Sabha) movements cannot be the main supplementary force in the present age of revolutionary tide. It would not be correct to draw from this the conclusion that trade unions or peasant associations have become outmoded. For trade unions and kisan sabhas are basically organisations to build up unity between Marxist-Leninist cadres and working class and peasant masses. This unity will be consolidated only when Marxist-Leninist cadres move forward in the work of building up the revolutionary party among the working class and peasant masses with the tactics of a revolutionary resistance movement. The revolutionary working class and Marxist-Leninist cadres will have to go forward in the face of peasant struggles to give active leadership to the peasants’ struggles through resistance or “partisan” struggles.*”

In another article entitled “***Take this opportunity***”, he wrote:

“In the present era, our main task will be on the basis of three main slogans.

First, unity of workers and peasants.

Secondly, the revolutionary resistance movement, armed struggle.

Thirdly, the building up of a revolutionary Party.”

The basic three points are, “(i) Worker-peasant unity under the leadership of the working class. (ii) Consciously establishing armed struggle on mass base, and (iii) firmly establishing the leadership of the Communist Party.”

In his last article during this period entitled: ***Carry forward the peasant struggle by fighting revisionism***, he laid the theoretical foundations for the united front in a lucid manner thus: “*The main cause of success of the Russian revolution was the correct application of the tactics of the united front. The question of united front tactics is equally important in India too. But the tactics of India’s democratic revolution will be different in form. In India also, in Naga, Mizo, Kashmir and other*

*areas, struggles are being waged under petty-bourgeois leadership. In the democratic revolution, therefore, the working class will have to march forward by forming a united front with them. Struggles will break out in many other new areas under the leadership of bourgeois or petty-bourgeois parties. The working class will also enter into alliances with them and the main basis of this alliance will be anti-imperialist struggle and the right to self-determination. The working class necessarily admits this right, together with the right to secession.”*

He also explained how the slogan of unity given by the present ruling classes means unity for the exploitation by monopoly capital: *“The slogan—”Kashmir is an inalienable part of India”—is given by the ruling class in the interest of plundering. No Marxist can support this slogan. It is an essential duty of the Marxists to accept the right of self-determination by every nationality. On the questions of Kashmir, Nagas, etc., the Marxists should express their support in favour of the fighters.”*

Thus many of the aspects of the revolutionary line of the new Party to be formed can be found in Com. CM’s Eight Documents that were written in the course of the Ideological-Political struggle within the CPI and CPI(M). They served as the theoretical foundation for the historic Naxalbari struggle. These documents also served as the political and ideological basis for the founding of the new Party and the further growth of the revolutionary movement. Not only that, com. CM also played a role in the international debate in the struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism. He was one of the first to categorise the Soviet Union as social-imperialist. He, together with some others laid the foundation to take the experiences of the GPCR to the other countries of South Asia.

### **The Naxalbari Uprising And Its Historical Significance**

For four months, starting with the peasant Convention on March 18, 1967, the peasants of the Siliguri sub-division in Darjeeling district rose up in revolt. In fact, the groundwork for the armed uprising was laid in 1965-66 itself when the ‘Siliguri Group’ of the CPI(M) brought out a series of leaflets that called on the peasants to initiate guerilla war in the Terai region. Bows and arrows and some rifles were collected in 1966. in late 1966 a



Revolutionary Kisan Committee was organized in Siliguri. They formed peasant committees, armed themselves and took up a campaign of land and crop seizure from big landlords and *jotedars*. On March 3, 1967 a group of peasants planted red flags in a plot of land and harvested the crop. A sea of red flags struck terror into the hearts of the landlords and the countryside reverberated with the slogan “March forward along the path of armed peasant revolution”. Any resistance by the landlords and their gangs was smashed and their lands and foodgrains were confiscated. By May 1967 it assumed the form of an armed peasant uprising against the state. On May 23, an Inspector was killed in Jharugaon village and on the 25th, nine women and children were killed in the police firing. The uprising continued until July when a massive and brutal offensive by the central para-military forces succeeded in suppressing the movement.

Though the uprising was suppressed in a short period, it assumed tremendous significance in the history of the Indian communist movement. It became a water-shed in India politics. It is not an exaggeration to say that Indian politics was never again the same after Naxalbari for its impact left no sphere untouched. The spark of Naxalbari soon became a prairie fire engulfing vast tracts of rural India like Srikakulam, Birbhum, Debra-Gopivallabhpur, Mushahari, Lakhimpur-Kheri, and so on. The armed peasant movement spread to over a dozen states in the next few years.

The CPC hailed the Naxalbari uprising as the **Spring Thunder over India**. On June 28, 1967 Radio Peking described this as “*the front paw of the revolutionary armed struggle launched by the Indian people...*” In an Editorial in *People’s Daily*, the official organ of the CPC on 5th July 1967, it described the “*rebellion of the peasants of Darjeeling area*” as “*a revolutionary storm*” and as a “*development of tremendous significance for the Indian people’s revolutionary struggle.*” It correctly observed that “*the Indian revolution must take the road of relying on the peasants, establishing base areas in the countryside, persisting in protracted armed struggle and using the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities.*”

It also called upon the revolutionary communists in India to “*boldly arouse the peasant masses, build up and expand the revolutionary*

*armed forces, deal with the armed suppression of the imperialists and reactionaries-who are temporarily stronger than the revolutionary forces-by using the whole set of the flexible strategy and tactics of people's war..”*

It prophesied that *“the spark in Darjeeling will start a prairie fire and will certainly set the vast expanses of India ablaze. That a great storm of revolutionary armed struggle will eventually sweep across the length and breadth of India is certain.”*

The Naxalbari uprising was an integral part of the worldwide revolutionary upsurge of the late 1960s. It was a product of the great ideological-political ferment that rocked the world led by the CPC under the guidance of com. Mao. The Great Debate between the revolutionary CPC led by Com. Mao on the one hand, and the revisionist CPSU under renegade Khrushchov on the other, had unleashed a process of polarization among the Communist Parties throughout the world. Every Party calling itself as Communist had to take a clear-cut ideological position either in support of the revisionist line of the CPSU or the revolutionary line of the CPC. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that had just begun in People's China too became a line of demarcation between the revisionists and the revolutionary Maoists.

As in other countries of the world, in India too, this struggle assumed acute proportions within the Communist camp. Naxalbari thus represented this sharp struggle between revisionism and revolution in the Indian communist movement as much as it did in the International Communist Movement. It became the rallying point for the revolutionary forces within the revisionist CPI and CPI(M) who began to initiate the process of the formation of a new revolutionary party. The revolutionaries within the CPI(M) held a meeting in Calcutta and formed the ‘Naxalbari Peasants Struggle Aid Committee’, which was to become the nucleus of the new Party. By placing armed struggle once again on the agenda of the Indian revolution it became a clarion call of the Maoists in the sub-continent.

Naxalbari also showed the path of armed struggle to the people of the country in practical terms. It not only made a clean break with revisionism in theory but also showed the way in practice. Thereby it also laid the

seeds for the people's war and the path of seizure of power by armed force. '*Naxalbari Ek Hi Raastha*' became the slogan of all the genuine revolutionaries of India and even in the whole of South Asia. The spark of Naxalbari set aflame the fires of revolution in Srikakulam, Birbhumi, Debra-Gopiballavpur, Mushahari and Lakhimpur-Kheri. The states of West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab, U.P and Tamil Nadu saw a big spurt in Naxalbari-inspired struggles and Maoist formations sprouted in nearly every state of India.

Such has been the historic significance of the Naxalbari uprising that became a line of demarcation between revisionism and revolution. As foreseen by the CPC under Com. Mao, the spark soon became a flame that engulfed the entire Indian sub-continent.

## **CHAPTER-2**

### **THE PARTY FORMATION AND THE ARMED PEASANT UPSURGE (1967-72)**

The upsurge generated in the country by the uprisings of Naxalbari, Srikakulam and other peasant armed struggles had an impact on the country that changed the face of Indian polity.

First, breaking out from the standard electoral path, these struggles showed a new path for the liberation of the country through the establishment of the embryonic form of people's political power with the perspective of base areas under the leadership of the Party.

Second, these struggles showed the way for the masses to build guerilla forces through the seizure of arms from the enemy forces and the formation of the people's army in embryonic form. Thirdly, they aroused lakhs of peasants, workers, youth, students & intellectuals, women, dalits, tribals, etc. with the politics of people's war.

Fourthly, they sought to organize the upsurge through the establishment of a leadership in the form of the Party of the proletariat. This was done step-by-step from the formation of the AICCCR till the formation of the Party in 1969. This became possible only by fighting all forms of opportunism and deviations that sought to deflect the movement from the revolutionary

path. Finally, this period inspired the people of the country with the path of heroic sacrifices, where thousands of comrades faced cruel tortures, imprisonments and martyrdom with unparalleled courage - an inevitable necessity for such revolutionary transformations of society.

## **Formation of the Party**

It is in the background of the spread of the Naxalbari-type of struggles as a prairie fire in the various states in the country that a single coordinating Centre and a centralized, revolutionary, underground party-a Leninist Party of a new type-became the urgent need of the hour.

The process of the formation of the new Party took two years after the outbreak of the Naxalbari uprising. But the ideological-political struggle for the formation of the revolutionary party can be said to have begun right from the time of the 7th Congress in 1964. As mentioned above, com. CM's Eight Documents between 1964-67 had provided the ideological-political basis for such a Party. Naxalbari and similar type of movements soon after accelerated the process of formation of the revolutionary party. The first organizational step towards the formation of the new Party was taken with the formation of an All-India Co-ordination Committee in November 1967.

The *All-India Co-ordination Committee* was formed with the revolutionary comrades from seven states who met in Calcutta on 12 and 13 November 1967. It issued a *Declaration* which was published in *Liberation* in December 1967. The formation of the All-India Coordination Committee was hailed by Peking (Beijing) Radio, which also broadcast the *Declaration*.

The Committee felt the urgent need for coordination of the various peasant movements that had erupted after the Naxalbari uprising. This coordination was to be the preparation for the formation of a Party of a new type. It had correctly observed in the *Declaration*: "*Revolutionary peasant struggles are now breaking out or going to break out in various parts of the country. It is an imperative revolutionary duty on our part as the vanguard of the working class to develop and lead these struggles as far as possible. With that end in view all*

*revolutionary elements inside and outside the Party working rather in isolation today in different parts of the country and on different fronts of mass struggle must coordinate their activities and unite their forces to build up a revolutionary party guided by Marxism-Leninism, the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. After the final and decisive betrayal at Madurai the situation brooks no delay. Hence, this urgent need for coordination.*

*So we, the comrades of different states, who have been thinking and fighting on the above line, have decided after meeting in Calcutta to form an All-India Coordination Committee. On behalf of this Committee, we declare that its main tasks will be:*

- (1) To develop and coordinate militant and revolutionary struggles at all levels, specially peasant struggles of the Naxalbari type under the leadership of the working class;*
- (2) To develop militant, revolutionary struggles of the working class and other toiling people, to combat economism and to orient these struggles towards agrarian revolution;*
- (3) To wage an uncompromising ideological struggle against revisionism and neo-revisionism and to popularize the Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, which is Marxism-Leninism of the present era and to unite on this basis all revolutionary elements, within and outside the Party;*
- (4) To undertake preparations of a revolutionary programme and tactical line based on concrete analysis of the Indian situation in the light of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Thought.*

Six months later, on 14 May 1968, on the eve of the first anniversary of the Naxalbari peasant uprising, the Committee reviewed the developments that had taken place since its first meeting. In view of the changed situation, the Committee decided to issue a new declaration and also to change its name to the *All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries(AICCCR)* with comrade SushitalRoy Chowdhary as its Convenor. The revolutionaries brought out the political papers '*Liberation*' in English and '*Deshabrati*' in Bengali.

By this time, the Burdwan Plenum was held and it was attended by the comrades from AP and J&K. By the time of the Burdwan Plenum the revolutionaries in West Bengal were expelled by the CPI(M) leadership. Both the delegations rejected the Plenum Draft and proposed an alternative draft but the Plenum adopted the same old revisionist line. It was in this background that the genuine revolutionaries all over India left the CPI(M), changed the AICCR into the AICCCR and began preparations for the formation of a new Party. Following the Naxalbari upsurge the revolutionaries revolted against the CPI(M) leadership and left it and joined the Co-ordination Committee.

The new *Declaration* of the AICCCR correctly explained the targets and friends of the Indian revolution and the path of liberation of the country:

*“Today, U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism, the big Indian landlords and the comprador-bureaucrat bourgeoisie are the main enemies of the Indian people, the four mountains that weigh heavily on the back of our toiling people.*

*“The People’s Democratic Revolution can succeed only by overthrowing the direct and indirect rule of these sworn enemies. Under the leadership of the working class, the peasantry, the main force of the revolution, must set up revolutionary base areas in the countryside, wage a protracted armed struggle, encircle the cities from the countryside and finally seize them and win ultimate nationwide victory. The firm alliance between the working class and the peasantry will serve as the basis of the united front which will include the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie.”*

It pointed out that *“Not conspiratorial methods but the mass line alone must be pursued if the enemies of the Indian people are to be overthrown.”*

The new *Declaration* reaffirmed that *“Revisionists of all hues—the Dange renegades as well as the neo-revisionist clique—have proved to be the lackeys of U.S. imperialism, Soviet neocolonialism and domestic reactionaries and are, beyond dispute, enemies of the Indian people. At Burdwan, the neo-revisionist leaders have put the final seal of*

*approval on an anti-Marxist, revisionist ideological-political line but, faced with the opposition of the revolutionaries and the people, they have grown more wily and crafty than before. Only opportunists, not Marxist-Leninists, can remain within this party which has adopted a stand that repudiates Marxism-Leninism, the thought of Chairman Mao, and rejects the road of violent revolution in favour of the parliamentary path. It has become quite evident after Burdwan that the neo-revisionists, like the Dange renegades, have joined the counter-revolutionary camp and, while paying lip-service to Marxism-Leninism, are engaged in actively sabotaging the agrarian revolution that is breaking out. Those who hold that there is yet scope for inner-party struggle are sowing illusions among the ranks of the anti-revisionist fighters and preventing them from consolidating themselves.”*

It appealed to all the revolutionaries to unite forces to build a new Party: *“In this historic hour we appeal once again to all revolutionaries throughout India, who accept the thought of Chairman Mao, to unite their forces and coordinate their struggles so that the victory of the Indian revolution may be nearer. Let us all rally under the red banner of Chairman Mao’s thought, let us apply his thought to the concrete conditions in India, and let us build up a true Communist Party of India in the course of revolutionary struggles of the Naxalbari type, for revolution cannot be victorious without a revolutionary party.”* It also urged *“all revolutionaries who have firm faith in Chairman Mao’s thought and have rebelled against the leadership of the revisionists and neo-revisionists, but who are still maintaining separate groups, to liquidate the groups and consolidate themselves within the All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries. They should realize that the existence of separate groups at this time is quite harmful to the cause of the Indian revolution.”*

Under the leadership of the AICCCR, State Coordination Committees were formed in about 13 states to coordinate and lead the growing waves of armed agrarian struggles in their respective states.

Under the leadership of Com. Charu Mazumdar who guided these movements, the AICCCR passed a resolution on Party Organization for

the building of a Party of a new type and the CPI(ML) took birth on 22nd April 1969, the hundredth birth anniversary of comrade Lenin. A coordination committee was formed to draft the Party Constitution and prepare for the Party Congress. The Party's formation was announced at a mammoth rally held in Calcutta. Just before the formation of the Party, a wave of student movement swept the campuses of Calcutta and the Maoist student wing—the Progressive Students Coordination Committee (PSCC)—captured almost all the student unions of the institutions in and around Calcutta. In AP, the students of Guntur Medical College were the first to come out in support of Naxalbari and form the Naxalbari Solidarity Committee. After conducting several struggles in various regions of the country and acquiring an all-India character, the Party held the 8th Congress in May 1970 and Com. CM became the Secretary of the Central Committee.

## **The 8th Congress of the Party**

The 8th Congress of the Party was held on 15, 16 May 1970 in Calcutta. It was the culmination of the consistent ideological-political struggle against the deeply entrenched revisionist trends that had begun after the publication of the first document of comrade Charu Majumdar in January 1965. It synthesized the experiences of the revolutionaries in various states in leading the armed peasant movements and their struggles against revisionism and economism.

By concretely applying the theory of MLM in the concrete conditions of India, the Congress had correctly analyzed the character of Indian society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal, put forward the general line of new-democratic revolution with a socialist perspective and advanced the strategic line of protracted people's war of surrounding the cities from the countryside. It introduced and adopted the Party Programme and Party Constitution. In addition Com. CM also introduced the Political and Organisational Report in his introductory speech. Also a concrete structure was given electing a central committee to lead the revolution. 35 delegates from all over the country attended the Congress and elected a 21-member Central Committee. The CC elected a nine-member Politburo and formed Regional Bureaus.



The historic Congress is a qualitative turning point in the annals of the Indian Communist Movement that brought to an end decades of revisionist practice and blazed a new revolutionary path for the Indian revolution. It was a repudiation of both the Khrushchevite revisionism of the CPI, and the neo-revisionism of the CPI(M), which characterised the Party since the 7th Congress in 1964 in the name of equidistance from the CPSU and the CPC. Both the CPI and later the CPI(M), had utterly failed to formulate a revolutionary programme, path, strategy and tactics for the Indian revolution and had got bogged down in parliamentarianism and class collaboration, thus betraying the Indian revolution.

It was the CPI (ML), which, for the first time, laid down the basically correct programme, path, strategy and tactical line for the Indian revolution after a concrete analysis of the concrete conditions in India and the world at large. This was made possible since the CPI(ML) was equipped with the most advanced scientific theory of the working class - Marxism-Leninism-Maoism— which the CPI had rabidly opposed, and the CPI(M) had refused to accept, as a guide to action. The CPI(ML) was a Party of new-type - an underground Party which rejected the parliamentary path, opposed all varieties of revisionism and finally advanced the line of protracted people's war of seizing power in the countryside and finally encircling the cities and achieving countrywide victory.

It is for this reason that the 1970 Congress of our Party assumed great significance as a path-blazer for the revolution in India. It consolidated the line and policies adopted by the revolutionary stream within the CPI(M) which reorganised itself into the AICCCR and later into the CPI(ML) in 1969 after repudiating the revisionism of the CPI(M).

The Congress adopted the historic Party Programme that laid down the revolutionary programme for the first time in the history of the Indian Communist Movement. It recognized Mao Tse-tung Thought as the Marxism-Leninism in the present time and considered the Indian revolution as part of the GPCR; it clearly stated that the Indian revolution has to pass through two stages—the new democratic and the Socialist; it reaffirmed the line of PPW, taken by the revolutionaries since the Naxalbari uprising, as the path of the Indian revolution in the new democratic stage; it identified

the four big mountains to be overthrown as feudalism, comprador bureaucrat capitalism, US imperialism and Soviet Social imperialism; it correctly identified the four revolutionary classes in the new democratic stage as: the working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie and that a strategic revolutionary united front should be formed with these four classes under the leadership of the working class with the worker-peasant alliance as the basis; it recognized the multi-national character of Indian society and called for support to all just struggles of the nationalities for their self-determination; it stressed on the importance of the secret party for leading the revolution in the country. Indeed, it was a historic Congress that established a new revolutionary line in the country with great clarity. As the first Congress of the reconstituted Communist Party in India, as the first Congress that completely broke with revisionism of all hues once and for all, as the Congress that had established the new revolutionary line for the Indian revolution, the 8th Congress stands out as unique and finds a permanent place in Indian revolutionary history.

### **Spread of The Movement — The Prairie Fire**

Like a prairie-fire, peasant armed struggles erupted soon in Srikakulam, Lakhimpur-Kheri(Terai), , Mushahari, Debra-Gopivallabhpur, Birbhum and other regions of the country, like Punjab, other parts of West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, UP, etc., following the path of Naxalbari. The armed revolutionary peasant struggles thus spread from Naxalbari to several parts of the country and had a strong base in the states of AP and Bihar, apart from the epi-centre of the movement in West Bengal.

The most prominent of these was the armed struggle in Srikakulam which erupted after the killing of comrades Koranna and Manganna by the landlords in Levidi village on 31st October 1967 when they were on their way to the conference of the Girijana Sangam. The armed peasant uprising of Srikakulam continued for three years with the peasants organizing themselves into guerrilla squads and carrying out raids against the landlords and the police, seizing lands, crops and property of the landlords. Parvatipuram Agency people's government was formed and functioned for sometime. But, by the end of 1970 the movement was suppressed by

deploying thousands of State police forces and the CRPF and unleashing fascist repression over the tribal population in hundreds of villages. Several leaders like comrades Panchadi Krishnamurthy, Vempatapu Sathyam, Adibhatla Kailasam, Nirmala, Subbarao Panigrahi, Chaganti Bhaskar Rao and Devineni Mallikarjun became martyrs in the course of this movement.

In Lakhimpur-Kheri in the Terai region in UP, peasants began to rise up against the notorious landlords in the first half of 1968. The movement continued to expand despite severe police repression and many landlords were forced to flee the villages.

In Mushahari of Muzaffarpur district in Bihar, land struggles began by mid-1968 and seizure of crops went on like a big campaign. Guerrilla units were set up to face the attacks by the landlords and the police.

In Debra-Gopivallabhpur in Midnapore district, it was the students of Calcutta University and some intellectuals who began to organize the peasantry in 1968 and initiated the armed peasant guerrilla struggle by 1969 forcing several landlords to flee the villages. In early 1971 police camps too began to be attacked. In Debra, thousands of peasants were mobilized in actions against the landlords. It further expanded to Singhbhum of Bihar and Mayurbhanj of Orissa, the bordering regions of Midnapore. The peasants, particularly landless and poor peasants were organised to revolt against landlords and to attack the state machineries. Armed squads of peasants were formed. Land and properties of landlords were seized, notorious landlords were annihilated and initiated armed guerrilla struggle.

The railway workers of Kharagpur division, adjacent to struggling areas, were organised leading to workers' movement. A section of the workers also participated in the peasant struggle.

In Birbhum, the struggle began to spread from mid-1968 with students and youth inspired by the Naxalbari uprising taking up the task of organizing the peasants against the landlords in the district. Guerrilla squads were formed and around 200 guns were snatched from the landlords and police. The movement began to subside by mid-1971 with the massive suppression campaign let loose by the police, Para-military and military forces.

As a result of these movements, the revolutionary authority of the

people was established in embryonic form through the formation of the Revolutionary Committees for the first time in the country. This was particularly significant in Srikakulam, Birbhum and also in other areas. Also, for the first time, arms were seized from the enemy forces and landlords, guerrilla formations in the embryonic form of the people's army took place. It is for this reason that the path of protracted people's war came into existence, not only through theory but also through the concrete practice of the above revolutionary armed struggles.

The people of Calcutta and adjacent areas resolutely came out in support of Naxalbari peasant uprising. The revolutionary call of Naxalbari uprising spread throughout the area in no time. The people's enthusiasm knew no bounds. The students, youth, workers and intellectuals in large numbers came out of the influence of revisionism and extended their voice of solidarity and formed the "*Naxalbari Krishak Sagram Sahayak Samithi*" mobilising thousands of people under its revolutionary red banner. It was a historic step that forged unity of the revolutionary people.

The students, youth, workers and intellectuals stormed the streets of greater Calcutta in protest against the government measures to suppress the uprising. At the call of the NKSSS thousands of people were mobilised in hundreds of public meetings protesting against the brutal atrocities unleashed by the UF government and resolutely expressing their solidarity to Naxalbari uprising.

Inspired by the peasant uprising the workers intensified the then ongoing "gherao" movements to achieve their democratic rights. It spread throughout the industrial belts even in the office areas endangering the control of bureaucrats, owners and big business houses.

The student community revolted against the revisionist party like CPI(M) and CPI and revisionist led ASFI and SFI. Post Graduate Student Federation (PGSF) came to the forefront, mobilised vast majority of the students and youth, and played a historic role in spreading revolutionary politics. They propagated and popularised the revolutionary politics of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Most significant slogans that they raised and put into practice were –

### **(1) Go villages —**

In response to this slogan, thousands of students and youths left the cities and towns, spreaded throughout rural areas of West Bengal and adjoining rural areas of Bihar and Orissa. They integrated with the landless and poor peasants, imparted revolutionary politics, explained the significance of Naxalbari uprising and mobilised the peasants to develop anti-feudal struggle.

### **(2) Review of past history —**

They called upon the intellectuals particularly historians, sociologists, social scientists to review the past history and reveal the anti-imperialist anti-feudal struggles of the people particularly those of peasantry. It helped people know their relentless struggles to achieve freedom and people's democracy.

### **(3) Statue Breaking Movement —**

The statues of the heroes of the so-called Bengal renaissance became target of attack as they did not raise their voice against brutal suppression campaign of Britishers and landlords. Some of them even supported the colonial rulers and their henchmen. This revolt against official history took the form of statue breaking movement and imparted scientific outlook in the study of past history.

### **(4) Arms seizing campaign —**

Seizure of arms from the class enemies and the police was taken up as a big campaign. Students and youth participated in this enthusiastically.

These revolutionary struggles and activities also influenced a good number of drama groups, novelists, writers, composers and intellectuals. Hundreds of revolutionary dramas were played; songs were composed; novels and stories were written and published, and the revolutionary culture pervaded throughout the state. Even a good section of these cultural activists went to rural areas and strengthened the revolutionary peasant struggles defying all atrocities of ruling exploiting classes and their government.

Although the struggles and campaigns in Calcutta city inspired the masses, it gradually petered out due to overemphasis on the urban guerilla

war.

### **Martyrdom of Com. CM**

On July 16, 1972, comrade CM was arrested from a shelter in Calcutta after obtaining information from a courier through brutal torture. Comrade CM was suffering from cardiac asthma at the time of his arrest. He was not allowed to see anyone during the 12 days of police custody. He died in the early hours of July 28 in the police lock-up. So scared was the police even after his death that the whole area was cordoned off and no one was allowed to come near his dead body except his immediate family members.

Comrade CM's martyrdom was a great loss to the Indian as well as the world revolution. It had brought to a close the first glorious chapter in the history of the reconstituted CPI(ML) and the revolutionary movement in India that was initiated on a sound ideological-political foundation after decades of betrayal by the revisionists.

## **CHAPTER-3**

### **THE POST-72 SETBACK AND PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW UPSURGE (1972 -77)**

This crucial period can be analysed based on four major aspects:

*Firstly*, it was the toughest times for the communist revolutionaries in the history of the communist movement in India. Every communist in the Marxist-Leninist- Maoist camp was put to the test - as to who would withstand the enemy onslaught and who would capitulate; who would stand firmly with the oppressed masses and who would flee to the enemy camp; as to what lesson they would take, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist or revisionist; as to who would really take initiative to re-organise the people for the People's War or merely indulge in debates; and who would emerge as genuine and capable leaders or as pseudo ones.

*Secondly*, it was a period of political and ideological confusions in the midst of enormous repression by the State's forces. This was compounded by desertions, betrayals, splits and inactivity.

*Thirdly*, it was also a period that witnessed great and heroic sacrifices, enormous courage in swimming against the tide and persistence of the armed struggle in some pockets.

*And lastly*, it was a crucial period for reviewing the past, taking lessons, initiating efforts for the reunification of CRs, making preparations for a new upsurge on the one side, and exposure of opportunist elements on the other.

### **Setback Of The Movement And Party Splits**

Owing to political and organisational weaknesses, including tactical errors, severe repression and big losses, inexperience, disruptive acts of right opportunists internally, and the resulting setback and political/ideological confusion, the Party began to split. The Party's first split took place in November 1971 by the betrayal of SNS. Within a year after the martyrdom of Com. CM, it broke up into several splinter groups. Within just the span of two years after the 8th Congress a large number of CCMs became martyrs, some were arrested and some others detracted or betrayed. The remaining two CCMs, comrades Sharma and Suniti Kumar Ghosh, did not have live relations with state committees.

The post-72 phase in the revolutionary movement in India has thus seen the splintering of the Party into several small groups, some of which gradually became consolidated into independent parties having their own distinct lines and practice. While some of them claimed themselves to be the real inheritors of the revolutionary legacy of the glorious struggles of 1967-72 and formed new CCs, some others proclaimed their desire for unifying all the revolutionary forces and reorganising the CPI(ML).

The 1972 setback and the disintegration of the party into several splintered groups was the darkest chapter in our party's history. The absence of a centre for Indian revolution due to the disruption of the CC naturally gave rise to isolated groups and parties which were confined to limited areas/states until 1980

The revival of the movement in some parts of the country led by the new centers of the erstwhile CPI(ML)[PW] and CPI(ML)[PU], and some others on the one hand, and the MCC on the other, raised new hopes

among the revolutionary masses. Some of the groups of the CPI(ML) became defunct, some became splintered further and some turned revisionist by the 1980s.

### **DV-TN-CPR Group:**

With the impact of the Great debate, DV, TN and CPR were leading an internal political struggle with the CPI(M) leadership to some extent. After the Naxalbari struggle, in the Palakollu Plenum held in February 1968 and in the Burdwan Plenum held in April 1968, they put alternative documents opposing modern revisionism. DV, TN, CPR though they supported Naxalbari, did not recognize the Soviet Communist Party as revisionist. They did not have a clear cut stand on- 1) China as the centre of World Socialist Revolution 2) Accepting MLM as a guiding ideology, 3) Accepting the PPW as the path of Indian revolution 4) Boycott of elections. Apart from not having a clear-cut stand on these, they were of the strong opinion that they should not come out immediately from the CPI(M). However, DV, TN, CPR and others who earlier formed a secret State Committee within the CPI(M), had to eventually come out from the CPI(M).

There was much pressure on the state leadership from the Srikakulam district committee to guide and help to initiate and advance the armed struggle,. The leadership half heartedly accepted to lead the movement but put many hurdles in initiating the armed struggle. They hesitated to join the AICCCR. Owing to the enormous pressure by the Srikakulam comrades, and considering the opinions of the 'Naxalbari Solidarity Committee', the State Committee led by DV decided to join the AICCCR with a slender majority of one vote. They ultimately joined in November 1968. Though they agreed on the basic points of the AICCCR after intense discussions, later developments prove that they had several reservations on the election boycott issue, on the existence of a revolutionary situation and on the tactics concerning People's war, and the methods of party formation, etc, etc.,

The practice of DV-TN-CPR continued in accordance with their own perceptions. As a result of that, the AICCCR had to cease its relations with the AP state committee. In opposition to the political understanding of the AICCCR, TN 1) condemned a raid on the police station by the revolutionaries in Kerala 2) gave nominal support to the Srikakulam armed



struggle, 3) TN vacillated in putting his resignation for the AP Assembly.

As these three were in opposition to the basic understanding of the AICCCR, the All India Committee on February 1969 wrote a letter disassociating with the APCCR. After this, DV, TN, CPR formed their own APCCR.

Very soon they began to oppose the armed struggle in Srikakulam. They advocated for confining to only self-defense against landlords and not to take up armed struggle against the State forces. They argued to confine the military formations to mere village self-defense units and not for forming armed guerilla squads and seizing arms from the enemy to wage the guerrilla war. They released their “Immediate Programme” in April 1969.

The DV -TN- -CPR group formed armed self-defense squads in the Godavary Valley but was soon split on the question of taking up arms immediately even against the landlords. CPR formed his own Party and set up armed self-defense squads.

### ***MAOIST COMMUNIST CENTRE***

The MCC, while supporting the Naxalbari struggle, did not join the CPI (ML) because of some tactical differences and on the question of the method of Party formation. Its history can be traced to three phases.

The first phase can be stretched from 1964 to 1968 and began when the revisionist line was established at the first Congress of the CPI (M). Functioning as the ‘Dakshin Desh’ group (after the Bengali magazine brought out by it) it led a revolt against the revisionist line and established a secret revolutionary centre to develop a revolutionary line. The two main founders of this group were Amulya Sen and Kanai Chatterjee. It was a period primarily of ideological struggles. While doing so, the major comrades were already playing a leading role in the trade union front, student front and youth front. The leading comrades too were linked to the workers and peasants movement. The theoretical issues raised in this period were: (i) drawing a clear line of demarcation with the revisionists in the political and organisational fields, (ii) linking the daily revolutionary practice of Indian revolution to the theory, (iii) developing a political and tactical line not merely

as a formality but giving it a concrete structure in various spheres of activity and ( iv ) based on these revolutionary policies, style and method, and in the course of revolutionary struggles and guided by a revolutionary theory, to build a revolutionary party.

The second phase, which stretched from 1969 to 1978, was a period of implementation of the party's line, policies and plans. It was a period of gaining practical experience towards the path of establishing the 'Red Agrarian Revolutionary Resistance War.' It was initiated by two articles printed in Dakshin Desh (Lal Pataka in Hindi) entitled 'The Perspective of Indian Revolution' and 'The Tactical Line of Indian Revolution-perspective', and, the formation of MCC on October 20, 1969. Work was begun on this basis in the Sundarbans, 24 Parganas, Hoogli, Midnapur, Kanksa, Gaya and Hazaribagh. Of these experiences the most encouraging was that of Kanksa and Hazaribagh. Here a wide movement was built on issues like wage hike, seizure of crops, fertiliser problem, confiscation of grains from landlords and against various forms of political and social oppression Also a wide mass movement was built, some notorious landlords punished and steps were taken towards disarming of the enemy and arming the people. Some guerilla squads and self-defence squads were also built and through the Kanksa struggles the concept of the Revolutionary Peasant Committees first developed. In the 1972-77 period the movement faced enormous repression.

The third phase, which stretched from 1979 to 1988, was a period of taking the lessons both positive and negative of the second phase and enriching both the theory and practice. In this phase the MCC focused on Bihar; and with the perspective of building a people's army and base area, the Bihar-Bengal Special Area Committee was established, the 'Preparatory Committee for Revolutionary Peasant Struggles' was formed and soon Revolutionary Peasant Councils emerged. In this phase militant struggles developed and the landlords' authority smashed, thousands of acres of land seized and distributed to the landless, and property of the landlords seized and distributed. But it was in this period that the two founding members of the organisation passed away - Amulya Sen in March 1981

and Kannai Chatterjee in July 1982.

Now the movement has grown to a number of districts of Bihar including Hazaribagh, Giridh, Gaya, Aurangabad and others. Today, the MCC is a force to reckon with in Bihar.

### **Three trends in the ML camp:**

In this period the forces belonging to the CPI(ML) and other Communist Revolutionary groups became clearly polarised into three broad trends in the late 1970s :

*The first trend* consisted of the revisionists represented by the renegades SNS, Kanu Sanyal, Ashim Chatterjee; the right deviation-ists like TN-DV, CP Reddy etc., all of whom launched malicious attacks on the Naxalbari movement and on Com. Charu Mazumdar. They deviated from the basic line and programme of the Party. All these parties began to participate in parliamentary elections by the end of the 1970s. Although some of these maintained armed squads, they were immersed neck-deep in reformist practice and did not have a concrete programme with the aim of seizure of political power. (Over the last couple of decades this trend witnessed continuous splits resulting in liquidation, disintegration and passivity or even betrayals. In the course of time many of the genuine revolutionary sections/elements joined the third trend).

*The second trend* was represented by the left adventurist groups, such as those led by Mahadev Mukherjee and other pro-Lin Piao groups as well as some anti-Lin Piao groups like the Vinod Mishra group for the first few years after the martyrdom of com. Jowhar. This latter organisation gradually turned to its opposite by the early 80s pursuing the parliamentary line. These left adventurist groups dogmatically upheld the annihilation tactics a line, rejecting the need to take up any other forms of struggle and organization except armed struggle and refused to take any lessons from the past mistakes. This trend barely exists today as many were killed by the enemy or became passive, while the remaining either joined the first or the third trend.

*The third trend* was represented by those ML forces which summed up the past basically from a Marxist-Leninist view-point, assimilated all the

positive aspects of the Naxalbari movement and line of the CPI (ML), repudiated the left-sectarian tactics and began to engage them-selves in serious revolutionary practice with a mass line. The AP State Committee of the CPI(ML) led by Com.KS, Com. Shar-ma of Punjab, Com. Suniti Ghosh from West Bengal and later the CPI(ML)(PU), and some other groups belonged to this trend. All of these belonged to the original CPI(ML).

Besides the CPI(ML) groups, another important revolutionary organization that belonged to the third trend was the MCC. In the initial period after the setback, the forces belonging to the third trend were relatively small. However, by following the correct line of PPW and uniting the revolutionary forces from all the above trends, they finally became consolidated into two major streams within the Maoist camp - that of the CPI(ML) represented by the CPI(ML)[PW] and that of the MCCI.

After the disruption of the CC elected in the 8th Congress and in the absence of a new CC, there was no scope at all for holding the 9th Congress. This is a peculiar situation unheard of in the history of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. After the setback, there was no continuity of leadership for a long period and, in the absence of the CC, uniting the Party at the All India level became a mere subjective wish for a long time.

Splits and unity of groups and individuals became a special characteristic of Indian revolutionary politics in the post-1972 period. No two groups could achieve lasting revolutionary unity due to dogmatism in matters pertaining to M-L-M ideology, narrow sectarianism in organisational matters, left or right opportunism and petty-bourgeois egoism in the leadership.

## **Summation Of The Setback And Its Lessons**

Before taking up a review of our movement after the 1980s and drawing appropriate lessons, we must remind ourselves of the achievements and shortcomings and lessons from the Naxalbari uprising, the post-Naxalbari upsurge throughout the country, and the subsequent setback. This is summed up in “**Our Self-critical Report**” {*Summing up the Past let us Advance victoriously along the Path of Armed Struggle*}, which is an important History Document of our Party, since its formation till 1972. This was

written in 1974 by the AP State Committee, while it was in the COC. This was enriched in 1980 at the time of formation of the CPI(ML)(PW). The positive achievements of the 8th Congress were stated as follows in the SCR:

1. Correct assessment about the nature of Indian society.
2. Correct analysis of the fundamental contradictions and the principal contradiction in Indian society.
3. Correct assessment of the stage and character of the ongoing Indian revolution.
4. Correct assessment of the political strategy i.e. as to who are our friends and who are our enemies.
5. Correct understanding of the path of the Indian revolution.
6. Recognising the fact that the victory of the people in the Democratic Revolution in India is impossible without eliminating the influence of the revisionist parties.
7. Recognising that Soviet Social Imperialism too has come to the fore as a dangerous enemy of the world's people in the guise of communism.
8. Recognising the need to resolve the nationality question in accordance with Leninist theory with the aim of uniting the people of all nationalities for self determination including secession.
9. Recognising that liberation is possible only through armed struggle and that without a people's army, the people have nothing.
10. Accepting Marxism-Leninism-Mao Thought as the guiding ideology.

The “**Self-critical Report**” therefore came to the conclusion that as a result of these positive aspects the following points got established on the Indian political scenario: (i) a severe blow was struck to revisionism, (ii) armed struggle came on to the agenda (iii) the ongoing armed struggle resulted in a revolutionary change in the thinking of the exploited masses and the youth in general (iv) in areas of sharp struggles the people got tempered in battle (v) it catalysed more militant forms of struggle throughout the country, which refused to stay within the bounds set by the bourgeois

leadership (vi) a growing prestige of the party throughout the country.

Although the understanding about the character and stage of the Indian revolution and about its political, and military strategy was correct, the tactics, method and style of work to implement the strategy are not in accordance with MLM Thought. These defective aspects in our Party understanding at the time of the Congress have resulted in several losses. The following, in short, were the negative points in our understanding at that time, according to the SCR.

1. Wrong understanding of the nature of the era.
2. Wrong assessment of the international and national situation at that time.
3. Neglect of Party organisation. In other words, an attitude that the prevalence of a revolutionary situation alone is enough for the victory of revolution.
4. Issuing immature calls and slogans in struggle in accordance with the above wrong understanding and assessments.
5. Thinking that annihilation of class enemies is the only form of struggle and the only way to create revolutionary enthusiasm among the people.
6. Wrong standpoint of equating the building of mass organisations and mass struggles with revisionism
7. Wrong attitude towards the national bourgeoisie, rich peasantry, and the United front.
8. Undue stress on guerilla warfare in cities.
9. Bureaucracy at all levels of leadership.
10. Wrong standpoint that there should be revolutionary authority to any individual.

#### **The Lessons And New Tasks:**

- 1) Marxism-Leninism-Mao Thought is the theoretical basis guiding our thinking
- 2) That revisionism must be combated through to the end.

- 3) To be firm on the general line of the Party
- 4) To eradicate Past mistakes in Our Understanding & Combat Left Deviations Firmly
- 5) Stressed the importance of United Front work, and warned that in the matter of UF “there is the danger of becoming victims of right deviation again, in the name of opposing sectarian trends”.
- 6) To build “*mass organizations and mass struggles*”; the main aim being “to organize the people for revolution”.
- 7) To build the Party of a new type and to “conduct the inner-party struggle in a Marxist way”.
- 8) Conduct thorough education within the Party, specifically in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (then called Mao Thought).
- 9) To work for the unification of all genuine Marxist-Leninist Party organizations and Groups.
- 10) Not to negate partial struggles entirely and link these to the armed struggle.
- 11) To build the Red Army and base Areas.

On the whole, the SCR played a major role in the revival of the revolutionary movement and laid the basis for the reunification of the genuine communist revolutionaries within India. **Firstly**, it helped the Party come out of the previous left adventurist trend and educated new forces for rebuilding the movement and helped to reorganise the party on a proper basis. **Secondly**, it helped the polemical debate against both right opportunism (which was rampant in the period of setback) and left sectarianism, particularly the former. **Thirdly**, it helped to lay the theoretical basis for a resurgence of the movement. **Fourthly**, by strongly upholding the achievements of the earlier period, though critically, it facilitated the process of the re-unification of communist revolutionaries. **And lastly**, by taking a balanced approach on the role of comrade CM, it helped give a rational understanding of the role of leadership in the communist movement.

## Com. CM's Role In The Indian Revolution

Soon after the martyrdom of com. CM there were basically two incorrect trends in the Communist Revolutionary camp - one that vilified him and made him solely responsible for the set-back that occurred and the second that negated looking at any of the flaws that had occurred. The "*Self-Critical Report*" negated both these trends.

### *CM's Major Contributions:*

The *Self-Critical Report* analysed com. CM as a great Marxist-Leninist, who brought the politics of people's war for the first time to the country. Outlining his positive aspects the *SCR* says "*com CM is the foremost amongst those who rebelled against revisionism, which had been firmly rooted in the Party since the last 40 years*". It adds that it was basically he who led the comrades to follow the Chinese path in the Great Debate and apply MLM to the concrete practice of the Indian revolution. It was only by upholding these positive contributions were it possible for the movement to rebuild itself and regain strength.

Comrade CM primarily worked amongst the Jalpaiguri peasantry from the 1940s and became a popular leader amongst them. When a warrant was issued for his arrest he went underground. At the outbreak of World War II the party was banned and he did secret organisational work amongst the peasantry and became a member of the CPI Jalpaiguri district committee in 1942. During the great famine of 1943, he organised the seizure of crops in Jalpaiguri. In 1946 he participated in the Tebhaga movement and organised militant struggles of the peasants in North Bengal. This movement had a profound impact on him and shaped his vision on armed peasantry developing a revolutionary movement. Later he worked amongst the tea garden workers of Darjeeling district.

After the Palghat Congress in 1956 his ideological differences with the party widened. During the Indo-China war he was again put in jail. Though he joined the CPI (M) in the split, he found the leadership dodging the key ideological questions. He then wrote the '*Historic Eight Documents*' - which formed the political-ideological basis for the emergence of the Maoist movement in India.



He was the first of the few revolutionaries who initiated the peasant uprising of Naxalbari recognizing it as the symbol of an ever-growing revolutionary situation and as the prelude to the armed revolution of the peasantry in India which has the aim of seizing State power from the feudal and comprador bourgeois classes.

He played the main role in applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the democratic revolution of India and in formulating the correct path for the revolution. In **The Great Debate** he took an active role in fighting modern revisionism and supporting the line propounded by the CPC and was one of the prime comrades to bring Maoist ideology to the country.

He took the initiative in setting up the AICCCR in order to coordinate and further advance the armed revolutionary struggle of the peasantry raging in many parts of the land. He played the main role in bringing together all those who were prepared to take part in the peasant revolution with the Naxalbari inspiration and in establishing the CPI(ML).

Yet, in spite of this positive role, comrade CM had some serious shortcomings. The **SCR** had correctly identified these shortcomings thus: *“A certain amount of egoism also developed in Comrade CM, with the series of victories in the course of the struggle when, after the establishment of the AICCCR, the flames of Naxalbari began spreading to many parts of the country. The undue extollation and wrong and exaggerated reports by some of the comrades around him has further developed it. Thus he developed greater confidence in his own individual decisions rather than in collective decisions. It only helped him in departing more and more away from Marxist-Leninist ideology and dialectical ways of thinking. It also helped in making the functioning of the CC suffer and in the principles of Democratic Centralism getting violated. .... His egoism also prevented him to come out with self-criticism from inside and outside the Party and come out with self-criticism. ....This made him more bureaucratic and helped the Party to go further on the wrong line”* (Pgs. 44, 45)

Yet, given his huge contribution to the Indian revolution, the **SCR** concluded *“He is principally a Marxist-Leninist and a great revolutionary; the most beloved leader of the exploited masses, who*

*moulded the Indian revolution into a correct path*". (pg 46)

### **ATTEMPTS TO REORGANISE THE PARTY:**

By November 72, of the 12-member AP State Committee only one remained to regroup the forces, the rest had been either killed or arrested. Com. Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, together with some leading members of the state, reorganised much of the fractured units. Earlier, in March 1972, the existing three members of the state committee (two of whom were arrested in November) sought to correct the errors of the Naxalbari period by maintaining its revolutionary essence. This committee decided to build mass organisations, take up the class struggles of the masses and spread to new areas by building mass organisations, wherever possible. It also decided that the annihilation of class enemies should be conducted only as part of the class struggle.

In August 1973 the Party launched its political magazine '**Pilupu**' (The Call) to rally the revolutionary forces. This magazine, besides dissemination of the stand of the Party on national and international issues, conducted an ideological-political battle to repulse the attacks of the right opportunists within the CPI (ML) and from those outside APCCCR. '**Pilupu**' played an important role in defense of the CM-line and repulsed the right and 'left' deviations rampant in the movement at that time and for steering the movement onto a correct path.

As there was no state committee in existence in AP, in August 1974 it was decided to reconstitute a three-member committee comprising Com. KS (representing Telangana region), Com. Appalaturi who had just escaped from jail (representing coastal Andhra) and Com. Mahadevan, who had just come out on bail (representing Rayalaseema).

Besides reorganising the Party in AP, the APPC led by KS made attempts to contact central committee members from West Bengal and other states after Com. CM became a martyr. It contacted com. Mahadev Mukherjee, who formed a Central Committee under his leadership. Owing to his outright sectarianism, there was no scope for even a dialogue, not to speak of any wider discussion on the question of re-establishment of the CC, etc., with com. MM. Of the four central committee members from

AP elected at the 1970 Congress two were killed and two were in jail. In January 1974 Com.KS attended a meeting of a reconstituted Central Organising Committee comprising Com. Sharma (elected secretary of the COC) of Punjab, Com. Suniti Ghosh of Bengal and Com. Ramnath of Bihar, of which the Coms. Sharma and Suniti Ghosh were original CC members elected at the 1970 Congress.

The COC resolved to undertake thorough self-critical evaluation of the past and formulate tactics; to unify all the splinter groups into a single Party as far as possible; and then to conduct a Congress to elect a Central Committee. There were in all three self-critical reports. The COC was unable to come to any agreement on the three separate reviews presented. At the September 75 meeting it was decided to withdraw these reviews and instead produce a tactical line. It was hoped that this tactical line would strengthen unity through practice and act as the basis for a common self-critical review. The tactical line, entitled '**Road to Revolution**', though prepared after intense discussion, did not help unity. At the May 1977 meeting, the Bihar and West Bengal representatives—Ramnath and Suniti Ghosh—resigned, and the AP representative did not attend due to the arrest of KS. Thus due to political differences the COC could not forge into a single organisation and, with the collapse of this first attempt to reorganise the Centre, the AP comrades concentrated on building a strong agrarian revolutionary movement in the state.

## **PART-II**

### **CHAPTER-4**

#### **THE RESURGENCE AND SPREAD OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR (1977-2001)**

The quarter century from 1977 saw the gradual revival and spread of the armed agrarian revolutionary movement to new areas in AP, Dandakaranya, Orissa, Bihar-Jharkhand, West Bengal, Maharashtra etc. The epi-centre of the revolutionary movement in AP shifted from Srikakulam to North Telangana. This period saw the formation of the CPI(ML)[PW]

and CPI(ML)[PU] and growth of the revolutionary movement under their leadership while most of the groups of the CPI(ML) degenerated into reformist, Parliamentary parties, or Right opportunism.

Having faced a set-back in 1972, after taking lessons from the earlier period through a thorough review, and in the light of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, the Party, primarily led by the erstwhile CPI(ML)(PW) and the CPI(ML)(PU), gradually regained strength. The entire Party was educated in the new understanding, systematically consolidated and expanded. In the process it developed unity with some other genuine forces and established stronger centres. Slowly the Party's influence began to grow in many parts of the country. Internally too it was able to overcome crises, defeating the right opportunist lines that emerged, thereby strengthening itself politically and ideologically. It also developed and deepened its relations with fraternal parties abroad. Finally the two major streams of the CPI(ML) merged in August 1998 to form a single Party under a unified Central Committee. In the wake of this merger a number of other genuine revolutionaries also joined the process.

In these two decades the mass base of the Party significantly developed making a breakthrough in the anti-feudal peasant revolutionary armed struggle. It also expanded its influence amongst students, youth, workers, women, dalits and intellectuals. It was also able to deepen the anti-imperialist movement in the country through propaganda, agitation and struggles. Overall, the Party's mass base was strengthened and extended to new areas.

In these two decades the revolutionary movement advanced through numerous twists and turns. The Party, analyzing the changes that have taken place in the country, internationally and in the movement, has accordingly changed its tactics, taking the revolutionary movement in the country forward, as a part of the international proletarian movement.

Most importantly in this two decade period it developed the armed guerrilla squads and armed itself, seizing arms from the enemy. The armed formations gradually grew in strength and were able to beat back the enemy

onslaught, thereby sustaining the armed struggle throughout this period. Through this it was also able to build the PGA and set up the embryonic forms of the organs of People's Power in some strategic areas of the country.

Finally, it waged a continuous ideological and political battle against revisionism and neo-revisionism combating both the Soviet and Deng varieties. Within the country it had also countered all forms of right opportunism and propagated widely Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the line of protracted people's war.

## **Reorganization And The Development Of Erstwhile PW**

Although several changes had occurred in the APSC in the decade of the 1970s, it made serious efforts to bring the Party cadres out of left adventurism by basing on the self-critical review.

After the COC became defunct in 1977, the APSC did not immediately make attempts to unite with other revolutionary groups. The past experience had shown that attempts at unification without building any significant movement, only basing on a review of the past, was proving futile. Therefore the APSC concentrated upon building an extensive revolutionary movement in AP basing on the SCR. As a result of this, it could not only build powerful statewide revolutionary movements among students, youth, literary and cultural fronts, but also developed the revolutionary peasant movement in Karimnagar, and Adilabad districts. These were recognised as powerful, anti-feudal struggles not only in AP but also in the entire country. It was only then that the APSC initiated unity measures based on the successful development of the movement. The outbreak of the movement vindicated the correctness of the self-critical review, which could then act as the basis for unity efforts. Hence, basing on the SCR and the movement built based on the lessons drawn, attempts for unity with other ML groups like the Party Unity, and TN State Committee of the CPI(ML) began when they approached the APPC lead by Com. KS.

## **Polemical Debates**

During the post-72 period, polemical debates raged fiercely in the ML

camp in India. We fought against SNS, Kanu Sanyal, Ashim Chatterjee, Nagbhushan Patnaik and others who concentrated their attack on the armed struggle, Party line and com. CM.

Hence, at that historical juncture, it became the foremost task of the genuine revolutionaries to expose these revisionists and Right opportunists who claimed themselves to be revolutionaries while negating the historic significance of great Naxalbari and other movements and the line represented by the CPI(ML). The APSC led by KS took it as its task to defend the revolutionary line of the CPI(ML) even as it undertook a self-critical evaluation of the past. It mainly carried out the polemical debates through its organ '**Pilupu**' from 1973 onwards.

In these articles, we exposed the right opportunist line of the TN-DV and CPR groups, their concept excludes and avoids armed struggle against the State for a long time and confines the struggle to anti-feudal militant mass struggles. We refuted their legalist-reformist trends and asserted that all these would ultimately lead to their participation in parliamentary elections. We were proved correct when these groups began their parliamentary journey by 1977. The right opportunists also attacked the left line in the name of implementing the mass line. But they did so in a reformist and revisionist way by negating the key factor of people's war and the seizure of political power by armed force. Even their "resistance struggles" were not linked to the seizure of power and setting up of Base Areas.

We also criticized the "Left" adventurist trend of both the pro-Lin faction led by Mahadev Mukherjee, and the anti-Lin faction of VM. We explained how it was wrong to reject the mass organisations and mass movements in the name of line of annihilation of class enemies. We maintained that annihilation of class enemies is but one of the forms of struggle and cannot be the 'only form' or the Line as asserted by the '2nd CC'.

These left sectarian groups also did enormous damage to the movement as they acted to ruin most of the potential revolutionary forces that opposed the reformists and rightist opportunists. The pro-Lin and anti-Lin groups attracted many comrades of the M-L camp but were unable to take them

forward and regroup them because of their sectarian line and practice. They, in effect, caused much damage through losses, splits and disintegration.

In essence both these trends, right and the 'left', negated the revolutionary mass line. The first drifted into reformism and revisionism, the latter into disintegration.

While fighting both the right and the "Left" trends, principally the Right opportunist trend, we enriched our line and developed the correct tactics in our '**Our Tactical Line**' after a thoroughgoing evaluation of the positive and negative aspects in the Party line and taking appropriate lessons as summed up in our '**Self Critical Report**'.

### **Telangana Regional Conference:**

The Telangana Regional Conference was held in February 1977 to conclude the discussion on the Party line and to adopt the Road to Revolution and the SCR documents. This was the culmination of the reorganization of the scattered revolutionary forces and defence of Naxalbari and Srikakulam armed struggles, comrade CM and the revolutionary line of the 8th Congress of the CPI(ML) through polemical debates in the preceding five years.

The Conference reviewed the growing Telangana movement and elected a leadership. In this conference three major decisions were taken - (i) to broaden the party 's base amongst the masses (ii) to hold a series of political classes to train the big influx of new cadre and (iii) to send squads into the forest for launching armed struggle. Finally, the eight districts of Telangana, excluding Hyderabad, were divided into two regions and two regional committees were elected.

### **Change In Tactics -The August 1977 Resolution:**

In the Parliamentary elections of March 1977, the fascist Indira Gandhi was utterly routed and the Janata Party came into power. The Emergency was lifted. The Janata Party came into power by opposing the Emergency and by campaigning for the restoration of democratic rights. It released most of the revolutionaries on bail. The ban on the Party was lifted. To take advantage of the changed political situation and implement the decisions of the first Telangana Regional conference, a document -

“*Present Political Situation and our Tasks*”- was prepared. This document, which came to be known as “*August resolution*”, was passed after extensive discussions in different districts and provided proper tactics to the party during this period.

Com. Mahadev, State committee member was killed by the enemy in 1976. In March 1977, Com. KS, State Committee secretary, was arrested. Com. Appala Suri was the only one who remained in the State Committee. So the State Committee was reorganised in August 1977, taking in three more members. Several District Committees were formed. But Com. Appala Suri was soon arrested along with a copy of the August Resolution and gave a statement that he was differing with the “*August Resolution*”. Criticising that the leadership was giving up armed struggle in the name of change in tactics Com. Rawoof along with some others left the Party from jail itself.

History proved that the change of tactics taken in accordance with the changed situation and the then concrete conditions of the movement, formulated in the August Resolution, were correct. Both comrades Appala Suri and Rawoof, who opposed the resolution from different angles, proved wrong. It is not an exaggeration to say that it is only by utilizing the then situation according to the changed tactics formulated in the August resolution the Party could develop into a significant force in the post-Emergency period. The resurgence was the result of the creative tactics resulting from the *August resolution*. Instead of harming the development of armed struggle, the changed tactics developed a wide mass base to rejuvenate the armed struggle. The dogmatism of com. Appalasuri and the sectarianism of com. Rawoof harmed the party and did not lead their parties to any development. It was, however, wrong to have used the phrase “temporary suspension of armed struggle” in the August Resolution that created needless apprehensions and confusion in the Party and the ML camp.

In accordance with the change in tactics, the PC started the *Kranti* (Revolution) fortnightly as its official organ and started printing revolutionary literature openly. ‘*Radical March*’ was brought out legally as a monthly magazine of the RSU and RYL. These organs played a key role in educating the Party ranks, and students and youth politically



Through the documents entitled, “Do not dilute revolutionary politics in the Mass organisations in the name of building broad-based united mass organisations” and “A letter to the executive members of RSU” - mass organisations were given correct revolutionary direction and the Radical student and youth organisations were built throughout the state. The word **Radical** became a synonym for revolutionaries. In February and June 1978, the State conferences of the RSU and RYL were conducted. In January 1978, the SC brought out the document, *Coming Assembly elections and our tasks*, and organised an election boycott campaign. The call - **Boycott the fraudulent assembly elections - Get prepared for agrarian revolution**, inspired the oppressed masses throughout the state. In the summer holidays of 1978, the SC gave a call to the students and youth to take up the ‘**Go to villages campaign**’ in order to integrate with the rural poor and to spread the politics of New Democratic Revolution and its axis, the armed Agrarian Revolution. And from then on, every year until 1984, student and youth undertook this campaign confronting arrests and police harassments. While the first campaign in 1978 involved around 200 students, the number grew to 1100 students and youth by 1984, organised into 150 propaganda teams, which took the politics of agrarian revolution to 2419 villages.

The rapid growth of the revolutionary student movement, the radicalization of student and youth in AP and their integration with the rural peasant masses, unnerved the ruling classes. The RSU had spread to 18 out of the 21 districts of AP and organized state-wide strikes of students on various issues. It captured the students unions in several colleges in the state and organized political movements against imperialism, war, communalism and in support of the working class, peasantry and nationality movements. It actively participated in the ‘**Boycott Election Campaigns**’. It took the initiative to form the AIRSF. By the beginning of 1985, the ruling classes began their all-out attack against the student and youth organizations along with the offensive against the peasant and working class movement. The mass organizations began to function in total secrecy from then on. Starting from September 1977, the JNM also conducted a state-wide campaign. The political campaign during all this period, and the struggle and organisational activities in student and youth fronts became the

preparatory ground for the peasant struggles in mid-1978.

The Party thus utilized the immediate post-Emergency period effectively by unleashing a wave of struggles of the working class, peasantry, students and youth and massive campaigns by the cultural and literary organizations throughout the state. Civil Rights Movement also gathered momentum prior to and immediately after the lifting of the Emergency. The tactics taken up by the Party during this period greatly helped in the resurgence of the revolutionary movement by consolidating and expanding the revolutionary mass base among the various sections of the people and making the preparations for waging armed struggle at a higher plane. The legal and illegal forms of struggle and organization were effectively combined. The Party maintained its secret structure intact while organizing open as well as underground mass activity through legal, semi-legal and secret mass organizations and a combination of these forms depending upon the enemy tactics.

### **Out Break Of Karimnagar And Adilabad Peasant Struggles:**

In June 1978, the peasant struggle of Jagityal rose like a hurricane. Within three months, the government unleashed brutal repression and declared Jagityal and Siricilla tehsils as Disturbed Areas in October. The State Committee made a comprehensive plan to extend these struggles and consolidate amidst the repression. As a result, the peasant struggles erupted all over Karimnagar and Adilabad within a short span. By the end of 1979, Party work in student, youth, worker, peasant and literary fronts extended to every nook and corner of Andhra Pradesh. The wave of the Karimnagar and Adilabad peasant struggles was the result of long efforts to transform the Party from the left adventurist line to the correct revolutionary line- made through the resolutions of the State Committee meeting of February-March 1972, Self-critical Report of 1974, first Telangana regional conference of January '77, and the August '77 resolution.

As the revolutionary activities extended, recruitment in to the Party increased. The jailed comrades were released. Most of them came through various struggles, and were new to the Communist Party. The State Committee started a consolidation campaign in July 1978. Though this campaign was successful in consolidating the Party, it failed to build the

local level party units with part-timers. Despite this lacuna, the Party organisation extended rapidly between 1977-79. By 1979, 120 PRs were working in our Party. Satyamurthy in 1978 and KS in 1979 came out from jails and were taken into the State Committee.

By the end of 1979, developing Karimnagar, Adilabad, Warangal, and Khammam into a guerrilla zone with the perspective of establishing Base Areas, and laying the foundation for the protracted people's war, came as the immediate task before the Party. The movement in Andhra Pradesh was then at four levels: 1) The above four districts where peasant struggles should be organised and turned into a guerrilla zone; 2) other districts of Telangana and Rayalaseema where anti-feudal struggles had already started; 3) South Coastal districts where socio-economic conditions are different, utilising the legal opportunities, propaganda programmes and work in agricultural labour and poor peasants were taken up; and 4) Work in towns and cities as part of the strategy of protracted people's war.

### **FORMATION OF THE PW:**

The CPI(ML) (People's War) was formed on 22nd April 1980 by merging of the APSC, and the TNSC. Later, in May a group of genuine revolutionary forces of Maharashtra joined the CPI(ML)(PW). The Party then had a few Party members in Karnataka. The position of the Party in these states by that time was as follows:

The movement in TN could not develop after the martyrdom of Com. Appu one year after he was elected the TNSC Secretary in December 1969 (he was also elected as a CCM in the 8th Congress) and the arrest or loss of several leaders. The TNSC did not make any review of the movement from the State Conference in December 1969 up to 1980.

In the period covering the decade of the 1970s, the Party in Tamil Nadu split into four groups. One faction joined the Vinod Mishra group and another followed the SNS line. The third group pursued the CM line and by 1979 recognised the need for mass organisations to some extent. However, it pursued a sectarian standpoint in the main. This group split once again in 1977 with one faction following Com. Kannamani and the other rallying under the leadership of Com. Manickam. This latter group united with the

APSC to form the People's War Party in April 1980.

At the time of the formation of the People's War Party in Tamil Nadu, there was no leadership that had the confidence of the Party rank and file and the people in the state. The leadership did not have a grip over the situation in Tamil Nadu. Between 1977 and 1979, the movement in Tamil Nadu was in the process of revival and was not yet a recognized force. Such was the situation in Tamil Nadu at that time.

In Maharashtra, Party units emerged in 1972 due to the coming together of some comrades who were attracted towards Naxalbari and Srikakulam struggles. Some comrades broke away and formed a separate unit in 1975 in opposition to the then Maharashtra leadership who participated in the SNS-CPR merger. Influenced by the struggles in Karimnagar and Adilabad this unit established links with the APSC and joined the PW and held a Bombay City Conference in June 1980, which adopted the Party's basic documents.

The APSC was a major constituent of the COC till the COC became defunct in May 1977. The APSC began to reorganise the Party in AP after the setback based on the self-critical review (SCR) prepared in 1974 which summed up the past by taking lessons from the Naxalbari setback. In the three years between 77-80, the APSC of the CPI(ML) built a strong mass movement which spread to most of AP, particularly a powerful agrarian revolutionary movement in the districts of Karimnagar & Adilabad at the time of the formation of the PW in 1980. It built a fairly broad mass base among the peasantry in Telangana and among the students, youth and intellectuals all over AP

This, in brief, is our Party's history up to 1980. After the formation of the PW in 1980, the movement spread to entire Telangana, North Andhra and Dandakaranya.

## **PERSPECTIVE OF BUILDING GUERRILLA ZONES AS A PART OF BASE AREA:**

The PW commenced its rural work with a concrete plan and perspective of transforming the backward region of NT into a Guerrilla Zone and to develop the adjoining Dandakaranya region into a Rear with the perspective

of transforming it into a Base Area in the course of consolidation of the movement and intensification of the armed struggle. Such a perspective was drawn up by the APSC under the leadership of comrade KS, in 1980 itself keeping in view the mounting repression.

In fact, State repression began in September 1978, i.e. within a few months after the initiation of the peasant struggles and police camps began to be set up on a massive scale. The Jagityal & Siricilla taluqs were declared in October as 'Disturbed Areas'. Keeping in view the prospects of massive onslaught by the enemy's armed forces, the Party drew up first the Jagtyal Perspective and later the Guerrilla zone perspective entitled, "**Get prepared to take the Karimnagar and Adilabad peasant struggles into a newer stage**". It drew up a concrete plan to transform NT and DK into guerilla zones with the aim of establishing Base Areas and began to implement it in real earnest. Accordingly, armed peasant squads were sent to the forest in NT, Eastern Ghats of AP and to bordering Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh(now this area is Chhattisgarh). Gradually an extensive mass base was built in Dandakaranya according to plan, and a separate Forest Committee was formed in February 1987 covering the forest regions of the Adilabad and the East Division (comprising of the Districts Vishakapatnam and East-Godavary) in AP and parts of Maharashtra, M.P. and Orissa.

It is due to this perspective and concrete plan and consistent persuasion and direct leading role of the higher committees, that we could expand the armed struggle over a wide contiguous area and develop three guerrilla zones in NT, DK and AOB regions in the process. This, in turn, had immense influence over struggles in the other regions and states. Armed struggle also spread to the South Telangana region, Rayalaseema and later to some backward parts of the South Coastal districts in AP. Guerrilla zones also came into existence in the South Telangana and Nallamala regions of AP by the time of the 9th Congress in 2001. The plan that was developed for DK, NT and AOB as guerrilla zones with the aim of establishing them into Base areas was a turning point, in the revolutionary movement of India, led by the PW.

## **Two Major Internal Crises Of The Party**

Four years after the formation of the PW a crisis broke out in the CC. In fact, it was decided to hold the 9th Congress within a year after the constitution of the CC in April 1980. But it was postponed due to the deliberate delay on the part of Veera Swamy (VS)-Manickam, the CC members from TN, in writing the state POR and not holding the state conference of TN. It was once again decided in the CC meeting in May 1984 to hold the Congress in the first quarter of 1985 after a Political Resolution was adopted due to changes in the international situation. But due to the crisis created in the Party by the opportunist clique led by Satya Murthy (SM) and VS in the beginning of 1985, the Congress could not see the light of the day. Thus the first CC of the erstwhile PW which was formed in April 1980 and functioned till the beginning of 1985 and became paralysed during the crises of 1985-87 and finally dissolved itself in April 1987.

The main reason for the crisis should be seen in relation to solving the problems confronting the movement. The movement at that time confronted several questions concerning the tactics to be adopted in order to further advance the armed struggle. The Party leadership was not in a position to find a correct solution to these questions and, instead of addressing these questions seriously, a section of the Central leadership created a crisis in the Party in 1985 through conspiratorial methods. To cover up their weaknesses in advancing the movement and not preparing themselves for undertaking self-criticism of their failures, the SM-VS clique in the CC put forth an alternative line cloaked in “Left” phraseology but actually Right in essence. But the anti-Party methods pursued by the liquidationist-opportunist clique prevented a thoroughgoing two-line struggle against their wrong line. The movement could advance only after defeating this anti-Party clique and the Party, by and large, was united more firmly around the Party line.

The conditions necessary to engender the crisis were present in the process of formation of the CC itself. Although it was correct to bring the revolutionaries together, there were serious lapses in the ideological, political and organisational preparations before forming the CC such as: not preparing

the Political Resolution; not preparing the political and organisational report (POR) of Tamil Nadu for the decade of 1970s, and, not taking a decision on the organisational changes necessary for a united Party in conformity with the Party constitution. Thus there was no complete unity of thought prior to unity.

After a lapse of over 3 years when the four State Units of AP, Tamilnadu, Karnataka & Maharashtra functioned separately without a central leadership, a new centre - COC - was elected in the Central Plenum in Aug, 1990.

But once again an internal crisis broke out in the Party in mid-1991 due to the opportunist- KS-Bandaiah clique which could not play any role in advancing the movement by adopting the appropriate tactics. To cover up its failures and to push forth its subjective assessments and Right opportunist tactics on some political issues, the KS-Bandaiah clique resorted to anarchic and ultra-democratic methods and tried to split and liquidate the party. The entire Party, barring a handful of opportunist elements, stood unitedly in waging a principled struggle against this clique and defeated its disruptionist designs. The crisis dragged on for nearly a year until this clique was expelled from the Party in June 1992.

The second inner-Party crisis and the methods adopted to fight it, served as a great education campaign and rectified the Party's style of work, developed collective leadership and team functioning in the CC and strengthened the functioning of all Party Committees based on democratic centralism. It raised the ideological-political level of the entire Party and drew up new tasks.

To sum up, the Party rank and file struggled against the opportunist cliques led by the then CC Secretaries during the inner-Party crises of 1985-87 and 1991-92, defeated their disruptionist designs and stood firmly united. Both times, the Party succeeded in countering the enemy's severe suppression campaigns and emerged stronger than before. This became possible due to the political education imparted to Party cadres, rectification campaign taken up in the Party against weaknesses and deviations, and the high level of revolutionary commitment of the Party rank and file and their firm adherence to armed struggle.

For instance, there was a consistent struggle against the alien class trends such as bureaucracy in 1981 and against the “*six evils*” - opportunist alliances, bureaucracy, legalism, tech violations, financial extravaganza and misbehaviour with women comrades - in 1984. A rectification campaign was taken up against the “*six evils*” from 1984 until 1987 in AP. As part of this Rectification Campaign, criticism-self-criticism was conducted in all Party committee meetings and political classes and discussions were held for all the Party cadres on Party history to learn from it and rectify the *six evils*. Most of the documents related to Party history were published in five volumes and education was taken to the entire Party in AP and DK.

### ***The Lessons To Be Learnt From The Inner-Party Crises:***

1. Ideological, political and organisational preparations required for achieving unity among the revolutionaries should be completed prior to the finalisation of the merger. The deeper the mistakes committed in these preparations, the more the chances of emergence and development of opportunist tendencies and deviations after the merger.
2. The Leadership should function abiding by the principles of democratic centralism. An effective collective work style and specific individual responsibility are the hallmarks of democratic centralism in a committee's functioning. We should correct our petty-bourgeois shortcomings; we should lead the class struggle; and we should uphold the practice of criticism and self-criticism.
3. If the party leadership has to wage a struggle against the opportunistic tendencies arising in a part of the Party leadership or individuals, they must follow correct methods. Cadre who has been subject to deviations should be rectified with Leninist methods. Only then would it be possible to isolate the liquidationists and keep the majority of comrades, who are influenced by the liquidationists, firmly and unitedly stand behind the Party. Nobody can succeed in this struggle without first shedding their petty-bourgeois tendencies; they may even lose.
4. All the Party cadre should have a critical outlook at various issues in opposing and fighting against anybody, including the leaders, who resorted to acts inimical to Party unity. Bias, superficiality,



mechanical views and such undesirable tendencies should be smashed with the dialectical and historical materialist viewpoint and vigilance of the party cadre.

5. Serious efforts should be made to enhance the consciousness among the cadre regarding Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and to provide training on the Party line and class struggle. Depending on our experience in the light of MLM, we have formulated some guidelines in the POR of 1995 AISC and made some amendments to the Party Constitution on how to conduct the inner party struggle in the party for achieving greater unity by defeating wrong line or deviations.

### **Assessment on Comrade Kondapalli Seetharamaiah (KS):**

KS played a very prominent role for about five decades in the politics of the Indian revolutionary Communist movement particularly after comrade CM became a martyr in 1972. Playing the leading role ideologically, politically and organisationally for two decades in our Party, he finally got expelled.

To correctly assess the revolutionary movements or the leaders, we have to analyse them from the viewpoint of dialectical and historical materialism. When we examine the role of KS historically, we can see his revolutionary role as well as the opportunist, liquidationist role. Only thus can we make a correct analysis and avoid the mistake of supporting his negative role in light of his positive role or rejecting his positive role in the light of his negative role, and correctly see what tendency was prominent in which phase.

**Contributions:** KS safeguarded the revolutionary line of the Party and the Party unity and exhibited political vision in carrying forward the tradition and tasks of the Naxalbari and Srikakulam struggles at a time when the major part of the Andhra state committee was lost and the CC was not in existence and the Party was facing internal and external attacks of rightist opportunism, and revisionists and splits after the martyrdom of com. CM. He showed tremendous faith in MLM, propping up the Party ranks in Andhra and made them stay in the struggle when Naxalbari, Srikakulam and other struggles were being crushed one after another by the fascist

enemy forces, and thousands of Party activists and leaders were becoming martyrs, several leaders were abandoning the revolutionary camp and a considerable number were lodged in various jails across the country.

KS effectively repulsed the attacks by the opportunists like SNS and Tejeswara Rao, Kanu Sanyal, and rightist oppor-tunists like TN-DV-CPR who were making a treacherous attack on comrade CM, and upheld the positive points in the revolutionary struggles and the fundamental and basic line of the Party.

Analysing the mistakes that caused the set back, and the victories achieved historically, KS prepared the Self-critical Report. He rejected the negative points and upheld the positive ones, and made stren-uous and patient efforts from 1972 to 1977 to educate and to train up the Party ranks and laid the foundations to rejuvenate the Party. To lead the masses in revolutionary war he recognized the role of revolutionary mass organisations and even convinced Com. CM to build mass organisations. This was his greatest contribution in reviving the revolutionary movement in Andhra Pradesh.

KS exhibited great organisational acumen in building a mass based revolutionary militant Party by leading revolutionary struggles and expanding the movement in the light of the SCR. He guided the north Telangana movement, devised the guerrilla zone perspective under the direction of the Party's basic line and laid the foundation for the Dandakaranya movement. This was one of the major contributions of KS in applying the Party's basic line to the specific conditions.

KS had the major credit in forming the CC of CPI(ML)(People's War) in 1980. He educated the Party about the problem of nationalities in our country from a Marxist-Leninist outlook and to take the correct attitude in practice. KS provided the leadership to the Andhra state committee and the Central committee in politically and organisationally strengthen-ing the Party by defeating the arguments brought forward by various opportunists in the country in the garb of MLM between 1973 and 1982.

KS played a major role in the 12th and 13th Andhra Pradesh state conferences in 1980 and 1987, and in uniting the movements of Andhra and Dandakaranya to take them forward. The tactics to repulse the

undeclared war started by the state and central government in 1985 were devised by the Andhra state committee under the leadership of KS.

The opportunism of SM-VS clique, which conspired to destroy the Party under the garb of the CC majority, was successfully defeated by the Andhra and Karnataka Party units under the leadership of KS. Thus, KS played a leading role in almost all the achievements of the Party from 1972 to 1987.

***The negative aspects:*** The negative factors, which were not prominent before, gradually grew and became obstacles to the progress of the movement. In the second half of 1980s, he became a victim of dogmatism and failed to understand the ever-changing situation and the revolutionary movement from a dialectical materialist viewpoint.

Individual functioning became a serious problem with KS. There are historical reasons for the growth of individual functioning of KS. The state leadership was virtually wiped out during the Srikakulam struggle, and KS had to take all decisions by himself in the process of rebuilding the Party from 1972 to 1979. There was a new state committee in 1980, but except for SM, all other members came into the movement from the influence of Naxalbari and Srikakulam only and had little knowledge in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and little experience in leading class struggle. They merely remained the followers of KS. Members of the Central Committee were no different. Meanwhile the movement grew widely by 1980. Party membership increased. Number of committees grew. But, KS did not make systematic efforts to rid himself of the individual functioning.

The movement progressed and brought several serious problems before the Party. KS was not prepared to resolve them after discussing in the committee or to think up solutions for new problems as the team leader. Limitations in resolving the problems, staying away for long from the movement, a strong negative tendency of individual functioning, dogma, spontaneity, and subjectivity coupled with the limitations imposed by old age and ill health were the major reasons behind this transformation. These problems not only rendered him helpless in resolving the problems like he did before 1985, but he also gradually began to adopt an anti-Marxist view regarding the problems being faced by the Party. A contradiction arose in

the APSC between his individual functioning and the newly emerging collective functioning, which gradually became a conflict. Instead of resolving the problems of the movement with Marxist Leninist functioning and collective leadership, KS sought revenge against those who criticised him, turned the internal relations of the Party hostile.

KS could not accept the emerging collective leadership and its initiative, as he was used to individual functioning with patriarchal attitudes. He developed an inferiority complex due to his failures caused by his limitations. By 1989, he was not tolerating any criticism, and was resorting to attacks on comrades who criticised him, by indulging in non-organisational methods. KS tried to cover up his limitations caused by old age and ill-health by attacking others. KS never realized this serious weakness nor made self-criticism.

KS assumed that with the military aggression of American imperialism on Iraq in 1991, the world war had begun. He equated both without realising the differences between an imperialist world war and other wars in form, magnitude and intensity.

KS lost contact with reality, got separated from Party and people, and was looking at things subjectively. When reality confronts and others did not accept his assessments, he was resorting to attacks with the feeling that his revolutionary authority was falling. Careerism added to his problems. The entire Party rallied to save KS by 'curing the disease to save the patient'. He, instead of conducting self-criticism, intensified his anti-Party activities and split the Party. Nevertheless, we must take his revolutionary positive role as an ideal to be emulated. And we must reject his negative role, particularly seen in the later period. Up to the late eighties he was our true leader and positive teacher. Later he was our negative teacher. The greatest lesson to be learnt from the history of KS is that comrades who commit serious mistakes cannot continue in the revolution if they do not rectify themselves through the process of self-criticism.

## **Development of the Political-Military Line of the Party**

The political-military line of the CPI(ML) was the result of a consistent, uncompromising polemical struggle with the revisionist line of the CPI and

the CPI(M) and concrete class struggle that took the form of Naxalbari-Srikakulam and other armed uprisings. The new revolutionary line emerged only through a complete rupture with the old revisionist line. The line was further enriched in the long course of development of the protracted people's war in different parts of the country. It is the synthesis of the experiences of class struggle, armed struggle, and of the polemical struggles with the various shades of revisionism and with the Right and "Left" trends in the revolutionary movement, of the ups and downs, ebb and flow, setbacks and upswings. In short, the present line of the Party enriched by the 9th Congress is basically the line adopted by the 8th Congress in 1970, which was continuously developed over a period of three decades of armed struggle in the country. It is linked to the forging of the three magic weapons of the revolution-the proletarian Party, People's Army and the revolutionary United Front.

The various Conferences, Plenums, special meetings, committee meetings had continuously summed up the experiences, assimilated the positive and rejected the negative aspects of the movement, and drew the appropriate lessons and tasks from time to time. The significant among these were: the first Telangana Regional Conference of 1977, 12th State Conference of AP in 1980, 13th state conference of 1987, the All India Special Conference of 1995 of the erstwhile PW and the Central Conferences of PU in 1987, 1993 and 1997.

In the course of long revolutionary practice, we have formulated new tactics, when we were confronted with a new situation. We have summed up our practice from time to time. We have enriched our basic documents in the Party conferences and Congress. After the 8th Congress, we prepared many important documents. They are: "*Present situation and our tactics*" (August 1977 Resolution of APSC); SCR-1980; OTL-1980; Jagityal Perspective-1978; GZ Perspective-1980; APPOR-1980, CC resolution on CPC-1983; Political Resolutions-1980, '84, '92; AISC documents of 1995; two-line struggle documents of CC-1985 and several circulars issued from time to time by the CC and state committees. Apart from this five volumes of party documents were published as a part of the rectification and education campaign and many polemical and other important attacks in PW and other magazines. By all these we have developed our Party line and strived

to raise the ideological-political-organisational-military level of our Party.

The essence of the political line was developed by comrade CM in the Eight Documents and adopted by the 8th Congress. It affirmed that the Indian revolution would go through two stages and that the present stage was New Democratic revolution with agrarian revolution as its axis, that the path of the Indian revolution was the path of protracted people's war, that the enemies of the democratic revolution were imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucrat capitalism, and that the motive forces of the revolution at the present stage are working class, peasantry, petty-bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. It called for the building of the people's liberation army and the establishment of the Base Areas in the backward strategic regions in the country. It rejected the parliamentary path and the participation in parliamentary elections in the name of tactics. It emphasized upon building the secret Party from the very beginning.

However, there were serious deviations with regard to tactics although the Party Programme and strategy were essentially correct. The deviations were related to the rejection of the various forms of mass struggle and mass organizations and treating annihilation of class enemies as the only form of struggle, boycott of trade unions, overemphasis on urban guerilla warfare, left adventurist tactics of attacking bourgeois educational institutions, boycott of bourgeois courts, etc. The tactic of annihilation of class enemies was elevated to the status of a line at the 8th Congress, which caused much damage to the movement and led to isolation of the revolutionary forces in course of time. The enemy could suppress the movement with relative ease by deploying a massive police force and also infiltrating the revolutionary forces in a planned way and wrecking the Party from within.

The mistakes in the Party's political line were rectified in the SCR of 1974 and the new understanding was reflected in the practice in AP after the setback. Several mass organizations were built and class struggles were initiated in a big way based on revolutionary mass line. The militant revolutionary mass movements in AP became a model in other states too.

At that point of time during the 1970s, some of the erstwhile ML groups like those of Kanu Sanyal, TN-DV-CPR, PCC of SNS and so on, criticized

the line of the 8th Congress by branding it as “Left Adventurist”, “Left Sectarian”, and even “anti-people”. They all spoke unendingly about mass line and how the CPI(ML) under comrade CM deviated from the mass line but in essence all these groups actually advocated a revisionist or right opportunist line. They counterposed mass line to the line of PPW. At the other extreme were some ML organizations such as the 2nd CC, Vinod Mishra’s Liberation, etc., that refused to make any criticism of Comrade CM’s mistakes, dogmatically insisted on his “revolutionary authority”, rejected every form of mass organization and mass struggle, and hailed the annihilation of class enemies as the “only form” of struggle (the “Liberation” group, swung to the other extreme and joined the camp of revisionists by the early 1980s).

As against these wrong standpoints of the various ML groups, the APSC, and later, the CC of the CPI(ML)[PW], defended the revolutionary line of comrade CM and the 8th Congress, frankly identified the shortcomings and began to rectify these boldly. It is due to this Marxist-Leninist dialectical method and approach that the line could be further enriched and also tested in practice.

A more concrete analysis of the Indian society was taken up by the PW and the PU, the specific characteristics of the revolutionary war in India and the similarities and differences with the conditions in pre-revolutionary China were studied which contributed to the development of the political and military strategy and tactics. Concrete study of the peculiarities and special features of the country such as the caste question, nationality question, adivasi question, women’s question and the question of religious minorities had helped in drawing up specific tactics to mobilize them into the new democratic revolution.

### **Concrete application of the line of PPW:**

As comrade Mao said, *“The seizure of power through armed forces, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and highest form of revolution. But while the principle remains the same (for all the countries), its application by the party of the proletariat finds expression in various countries according to the varying conditions”.*

In the protracted people's war, it is very crucial to build the people's army in the backward countryside where the enemy is weak and establish liberated areas so as to make the new democratic revolution a success. Strategic regions such as the forest region of Dandakaranya with favourable terrain for waging guerilla warfare were selected for setting up Base Areas and work began with concrete plan to transform it into guerilla zones first through the intensification of anti-feudal and anti-State struggles. The strategic regions would serve as key areas for the preservation and accumulation of the guerrilla forces, for extending and transforming into a people's army, and for defeating and eliminating the enemy forces. These regions have the necessary resources for the revolutionary army to survive and develop, and possess favourable conditions to establish a liberated area. Therefore, the first step of developing these as formidable guerrilla zones by building guerrilla units were taken up, with the higher goal of forming liberated areas.

As part of the process of applying the line of protracted people's war to the specific conditions of our country, the APSC had taken the decision to take the flourishing peasant struggles in Karimnagar and Adilabad to a higher stage, and gave a call - "*Get prepared to take the Karimnagar and Adilabad peasant struggles into a newer stage.*" With the task of building guerrilla zone in the adjoining two districts of Warangal and Khammam, where there was relatively less class struggle, along with the above two districts.

As part of the efforts to implement the plan of building the four districts of Karimnagar, Adilabad, Warangal, and Khammam districts (northern Telangana) into a guerrilla zone, seven armed peasant guerrilla squads were sent to the strategic area (Dandakaranya) on the borders of AP, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh in 1980.

We conducted peasant struggles and built political movements on several issues of various sections of people in north Telangana and Dandakaranya in a militant way during the period 1980-84. We extended to newer areas and raised the consciousness of the masses. By 1983, while the Party in Khammam suffered a serious setback, Nizamabad developed as a struggle area, and by the end of 1984, Adilabad was separated from northern



Telangana and made part of the Dandakar-anya organisation.

In 1985 the central and state governments launched an undeclared war on us. To fight back this **undeclared war** we have formulated the **defensive war** tactics in May 1985. 1985-87 was a black period when we suffered many losses and the enemy had an upper hand. Between 1987-88, rebuilding the mass organizations and consolidating the mass base and the squads as well as forming new squads in plains and forests, we could withstand the enemy by attacking with arms in various forms. Starting from the middle of 1988, the mass resistance and armed resistance movement gained the upper hand by the end of 1989 and thus defeated the “undeclared war” of the government. Armed struggle was intense during this period. Counter-attacking the government forces and their agents continued to be the main programme.

We broke the enemy’s first major offensive of 1985-87 by organizing ambushes such as the Daragadda ambush in East Division and the Allampalli ambush in Adilabad in 1987 which together wiped out 18 policemen and seized several rifles. These daring ambushes demoralized the enemy and stalled the enemy advance for some time while they boosted the people’s morale and helped unleash a wave of militant mass struggles and armed actions by the people from 1988.

In 1990, utilising the contradictions among the ruling classes, we changed tactics and consolidated the mass base, built extensive mass struggles, expanded and consolidated the armed units, and extended the movement.

We fought another undeclared war launched by the central government in the three states (AP, MP and Maharashtra) from the end of 1990, with ‘defensive war’ tactics. During this period we faced severe losses of leadership in AP. Starting from 1985. AP, MP, Maharashtra and Orissa police machinery have been modernised and turned fascist as never before. On the other hand, people’s armed resistance too has grown.

Again, from the end of 1990, the armed offensive by the enemy was stepped up throughout AP, a ban was imposed on the CPI(ML)[PW] and the mass organizations in May 1992. Fake encounters grew phenomenally and there was a virtual reign of white terror all over North and South Telangana regions and East Division. The Party confronted this brutal

offensive boldly through defensive war, organized ambushes and raids, both opportunity and deliberate, and mobilized the people's militia units in some places into armed actions against the police and state property. Armed clashes with the police and paramilitary forces have become more intense and emerged as the main form, while the clashes with the local enemies became secondary.

In the planned retaliation and resistance by the guerilla squads of PW during the 1990s, several police stations and camps were raided and weapons were seized. After the series of raids in 1996 like those on Karkagudem and Sirpur(U) police stations-cum-APSP-CRPF camps, several camps and police stations were withdrawn by the government from the interior areas. Ambushes deterred the police and para-military from venturing into the interior areas. Special forces that were brought from other states such as the Punjab Commandos received severe blows as in the ambush in Lenkalagadda in December 1994. The heroic armed resistance by the guerillas gave a fillip to the mass movements which increased after 1995. Class struggles on various issues and Land occupation struggles became a common feature and organs of people's democratic power along with various people's committees emerged in several villages of North Telangana. The initiative of the oppressed masses was released after we won a few victories against the police.

Basing on the principles of guerilla war as laid out by Mao, we evolved various forms according to the local conditions. The special feature of the revolutionary war in India is that the Communist Party here does not have a people's army unlike in China and people's army has to be built up from small guerilla squads and gradually expand to higher military formations. Due to the absence of a separate people's army, the armed guerilla squads have to undertake both organizational and military tasks and responsibilities for a long time. Likewise, the establishment of Base Areas will take relatively longer time and guerilla zones will exist for a longer time in India due to the absence of a strong people's army and the superiority of the centralized Indian state.

In the document '**Guerilla zones—Our Perspective**' and '**Strategy-Tactics**', we analysed the conditions in the various regions in the country,

categorized the strategic areas into three types and formulated the tactics to be taken up in the three types of areas. This concrete analysis had enriched our understanding of guerilla zones and Base Areas and helped the various state committees in selecting the perspective areas for developing guerilla zones with the aim of establishing Base Areas.

In this period, apart from north Telangana, and Dandakaranya guerrilla zones, our movement has grown throughout Andhra Pradesh. There are variations in different areas with regard to the social, geographical conditions and the intensity of class struggle and the state of people's consciousness. Enemy has also intensified efforts to enhance repression in all the areas to crush the movement by armed methods. Therefore, by the end of the 1980s, armed squads were formed not only in north Telangana and Dandakaranya, but in the other areas of Andhra Pradesh as well.

In the course of the protracted people's war waged under the leadership of our Party we gained rich experiences concerning the forms of struggle and forms of organization, and our practical and conceptual understanding of guerilla war, people's army, people's political power, guerilla zones, guerilla bases and Base Areas had further enhanced. In the guerrilla zones, the guerrilla army, and the guerrilla war will be the main forms of organisation and struggle. As the People's Guerrilla army goes on consolidating, the guerrilla war intensifies.

We synthesized our rich experiences of armed struggle and concluded that in the Guerrilla Zones there will be, in the main, a contention for political power between the enemy and us. There will be the destruction of enemy's political power, and construction of people's political power. But **destruction is main construction will be secondary**. When the guerrilla forces put up a tough fight and gain the upper hand over the enemy's forces, people's power will be established. On the other hand, when the guerrilla forces are forced to retreat in the face of severe enemy onslaught, the enemy will reestablish his rule. Therefore, there is a severe contention for power in the guerilla zones or, in other words, the political power in the guerilla zone changes hands often depending on the armed strengths and mass support of the guerillas and the enemy i.e., it remains in a state of flux for a long period until the guerillas liberate it completely from the hands of the enemy

and transform it into a Base area.

**Hence, dual rule will not go on in one area simultaneously.** It is either the rule of the guerillas or that of the enemy classes. Power may change hands more frequently but cannot remain in the hands of both classes in the same place at the same time. Hence, during the course in which the guerrilla war develops and the people advance to the battle field on an extensive scale, in order to consolidate the peoples' political power in the guerrilla zones, we should start the work of developing guerrilla bases as part and parcel of base areas in strategic areas, which are unfavourable to the enemy and where the mass base and terrain are favourable to us.

The guerrilla war will be more protracted in the plain areas. But very temporary guerrilla bases can be developed and political power can be built for a short time in areas in the plains where the terrain is favourable, taking advantage of seasons. During the same time guerrilla war can be developed, arousing the people by carrying on the programme of agrarian revolution, and increasing recruitment in a big way and developing the people's guerrilla army. The establishment of power in the plains will be very unstable and will be in a wave-like manner. Organs of political power will get formed in some villages where the people's consciousness is developed. But one should keep in mind that it is not possible to develop these political organs and to establish people's power until the state wherein the people's guerrilla army defeats the enemy in a big way sets in.

Organising workers, students, youth and intellectuals in the towns of guerrilla zone areas was taken up as an important task and clandestine methods of work were developed in the urban areas. The work was oriented to serve the interests of the people's war in the countryside and in close coordination with the rural work. Towns served as supply centres, as recruiting centres for cadres, technical staff, medical personnel and others, as centers of solidarity to the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist movement in the villages. Anti-imperialist political movements were developed to some extent. Extensive campaigns were undertaken to refute enemy's malicious propaganda against the revolutionary movement.

However, the work in the urban areas had several lapses and serious losses of leading cadres occurred that resulted in the gradual decline in the

urban movement in AP where it was relatively strong until the mid-1990s.

### **The AISC and its significance in the development of the Party line:**

The All India Special Conference, after thoroughly analyzing the significant political, economic and social changes that had taken place nationally and internationally since the 8th Congress, and the experiences gained in the revolutionary movement and the Party over the past 25 years, passed the amended Party Programme and Party Constitution, the documents on Strategy and Tactics, Guerilla zones—our Perspective, and the new Political Resolution (Present Political Situation and Our Tasks). It also approved the 1980 Self-Critical Review regarding the past, taking it as a basic document. It also reviewed the one-and-a-half decades of practice through Political Organisational Reviews and brought out a central Political Organisational Report. The AISC enriched the political, organisational and military line of the Party through this process of upholding its basic line, while simultaneously analyzing the developments in the different spheres and our prolonged practice, all in the light of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. This success of the Conference is a first significant achievement after the 8th Congress.

In the prolonged two-and-a-half decade gap since the 8th Congress, facing enormous difficulties with many twists and turns, victories and defeats, and a new resurgence since 1978, there emerged a leadership at all levels in the process of rebuilding, consolidation and development of the Party. In the process of the AISC this leadership got elected at district, state and central-level Conferences. It was the first time since the 8th Congress that a leadership was elected democratically throughout the Party, as a campaign. This was the second significant achievement of the Conference.

In addition the AISC thoroughly discussed on the two Party crises and took lessons. This assessment gave a better understanding on how to conduct two-line struggle in the Party on the basis of democratic centralism within the framework of unity-struggle-unity with the aim of achieving a higher level of unity, and the perspective of defeating the wrong line or rectifying wrong deviations and thereby unifying the party on the sound basis of correct experiences and a correct line. This was the third significant achievement of the AISC.

The AISC also formulated important tasks for the Party, by taking into consideration the growing excellent revolutionary situation in the domestic and international arena, the level and the direction of the movement and the challenges that are confronting it. One of the three important tasks decided was the strengthening of the three magic weapons, principally with the aim of building the People's Army and Base Areas to march forward victoriously. The AISC also formulated statewide tasks basing on the concrete situation in the respective states, in the light of the above general direction. This too was a significant achievement of the AISC.

In the light of the above background and significant achievements the AISC remains as an important turning point in the history of CPI (ML)[PW].

## **REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL TACTICS OF THE ERSTWHILE PW**

The political review of our Party during the period from 1969-80 was made in the *Self-Critical Report* document. Before taking up the review of the political line and practice of the Party since 1980, let us briefly look into the national and international developments since the 8th Congress.

At the time of the 8th Congress, American imperialism and Soviet-social imperialism came to the forefront as the main enemies of the world people. While the former was the mainstay of colonialism and the chief bulwark of reaction ever since World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as a dangerous enemy to the world people due to its garb of socialism and owing to its late entry to the imperialist arena.

For two decades after the 8th Congress of our Party, the two Superpowers looted the world, especially the Third world, at will; armed themselves to the teeth with the deadliest weapons of mass destruction; brought the world to the brink of another disastrous world war on some occasions, as part of their game plans to divide the world among themselves.

At the very time when the 8th Congress was being held in 1970, the American imperialists were bombarding Vietnam and Kampuchea without let up.

As oppression and exploitation by the Superpowers increased,

resistance and struggle of the world people too mounted. In the decade of the 1980s the Superpowers gradually began to decline and by the beginning of the 1990's the Soviet Superpower collapsed and the US Superpower was not in a position to exercise its hegemony over other major imperialist powers. The decline of the Superpowers indicates the depth of the imperialist crises.

Another related development of significance in these two decades has been the rise of Japan and Germany as imperialist economic powers contending with the US for capturing the world market. From the position of meek submission to US imperialism, they have become independent powers by gradually increasing their economic strength and political influence and, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, became direct rivals to US imperialism. The balance of forces in the imperialist world had changed considerably over the two decades since the 8th Congress of our Party.

Although the objective revolutionary situation in the world has been growing day by day since the 8th Congress, there was no corresponding growth of the subjective forces. Moreover, there were further losses to the revolutionary camp in this period.

The demise of Com. Mao in 1976, the usurpation of key posts in the party and state apparatus by the modern revisionist Deng clique and conversion of socialist China into a capitalist country deprived the world proletariat of leadership. This was a serious loss to the world proletariat, oppressed people and all the revolutionary forces and to the world socialist revolution.

Within our country too there have been significant developments in the past two decades. The pro-Soviet tilt of the Indian ruling classes displayed during the Bangladesh war in 1971, continued for 15 years. Although the Congress party won an absolute majority in parliament in 1972, it had to confront a serious economic and political crisis very soon and had to impose an Emergency throughout the country in 1975. The Congress Party, which had ruled undisputedly for nearly three decades, lost its monopoly of power by 1977 when it lost the election to the Janata Party. From then on political instability has become a permanent feature at the Centre. The dog-fight within the ruling classes both at the Centre and between those at the centre

and the states as well as between the various factions of the ruling classes within a state have reached unprecedented levels.

The nationality struggles that had been going on in parts of North Eastern India at the time of the 8th Congress have spread to other parts of country in the past three decades.

The introduction of modern methods in agriculture by the imperialist and Indian comprador ruling classes in the name of the so-called green revolution had further sharpened the contradictions in the rural areas. The imperialist stranglehold over the country's economy led to the tightening of their grip over Indian politics too.

Although the revolutionary forces were not in a position to utilise the ever-intensifying crisis in the 1970's, they emerged stronger in the decade of 1980's by utilising the revolutionary situation to some extent. Despite the fact that revolutionary movements have emerged in some regions of the country, the revolutionary forces were still weak at the All India level and they were divided into various groups and parties too

In this period the CPI(ML)[PW] had taken up big campaigns against imperialism, especially Soviet social imperialism. The Party exposed the Russian intervention in Kampuchea, its invasion of Afghanistan etc., and exposed its apologists such as the CPI and CPI(M).

The Party took initiative in trying to establish relations with the various fighting nationalities- Assam, Naga, Manipuri and Jammu Kashmir etc. The Party had strongly opposed the Indian ruling classes' intervention in Sri Lanka to suppress the Tamil Eelam struggle. Consequently, the struggling nationalities saw the PW as their friend and comrade in arms against the main enemy.

### **Political shortcomings:**

The Party had also committed some serious mistakes during this period as reflected in the political tactics contained primarily in the three political resolutions until 1991, namely:

1. The anti-Soviet United Front Resolution adopted at the 12th A.P. State conference in September 1980 and later approved by the CC



in March 1981.

2. The 1984 Political Resolution.

3. The resolution adopted at the Central plenum in August 1990

We had some wrong assessments and understanding regarding the Superpowers, Three World Theory, and the danger of World War, mechanically applied Mao's path of protracted people's war to the World Socialist Revolution, and so on. The stand on the CPC was also taken in 1983, much after it had turned revisionist.

Although we could guard ourselves from falling into the revisionist mire like SNS and VM, nevertheless, we too had made certain subjective assessments regarding the contemporary world situation. Though we made some important changes in the revisionist understanding of the CPC regarding *Three World Theory*, there still remained some incorrect understandings.

### **Three World Theory (TWT) and the Anti-Soviet UF call:**

We had given the call for an Anti-Soviet UF without the conditions having matured. This was not only an impracticable call but had also led to confusion among the party cadres. Overemphasis on war danger was an important factor for giving the immediate call for UF. Comparing the Soviet Union with Hitler's Germany prior to Second World War and characterising it as more aggressive, more dangerous and more ferocious and the principal source of war, we concluded that world war was imminent and that in order to avert the war we had to form the broadest UF against the Soviet imperialists.

With regard to the TWT, we made a critical evaluation of the CPC's understanding but some wrong understanding such as, overassessment about the role of the Third World governments in the fight against imperialist superpowers, continued to reflect in our political tactics until almost a decade after the formation of PW.

### **Over-Emphasis on the danger of World War:**

We expected that World War was inevitable due to the acute contradiction between the two Superpowers and that third round of

revolutions will follow the Third World War. We did not stress that the revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which served as **the storm-centres of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism**, and other factors can prevent or postpone War.

PW's understanding at that time was that the emergence of Superpowers was the climax of imperialism and that they would not lose that status unless destroyed through war or revolution. From 1987-1992, we mainly lagged behind in educating the party in time by closely studying and analysing the developments in the world such as the changes in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev came to power, the developments in East Europe, the emergence of Germany, Japan and other imperialist powers as strong economic powers etc. Hence, we continued to stress on the immediate danger of world war even after the collapse of the Soviet superpower.

We had also asserted that both the Superpowers were contending severely for hegemony over our country where as in fact the Soviet Union to a large extent, was finding it difficult to maintain its interests in India while America and various other imperialist powers stepped up their schemes to increase their hold over the market and the Indian state.

### **On the question of the principal contradiction in the contemporary world:**

We had a correct understanding in general but at one point of time we stated that the principal contradiction was between the two Superpowers and their lackeys on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other. This was corrected in the 1992 Political Resolution. But once again in the '95 AISC we decided to drop the principal contradiction in the world since we felt that it was not possible to decide which was the principal contradiction in the contemporary world and that comrade Mao too had not identified the principal contradiction. It was in the 9th Congress in 2001 that this lapse was rectified and the principal contradiction was firmly established as that between imperialism and oppressed nations and people.

### **The 1992 Political Resolution:**

The above incorrect understanding about the world situation was rectified

in the Political Resolution of May 1992. The '92 PR analysed the concrete changes in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Superpower, the depth of the all-round crisis of imperialism and the new world-wide imperialist offensive through the neo-liberal policies of Globalisation, Privatisation and Liberalisation particularly since 1991.

The '92 PR also correctly noted the dangerous growth of the Hindu fascist forces in the country and how the Indian ruling classes and imperialists were keen on bringing the BJP to power by utilizing the communal card to create a sense of insecurity and impose fascist rule. It called on the entire Party and the masses to resist imperialist globalisation, Hindu fascist offensive and the growing State repression and suppression of the just and democratic people's movements.

Based on the above understanding in the PR, some steps were initiated to build joint fronts with other revolutionary forces and other anti-imperialist forces against imperialist globalisation and state repression. We organized demonstrations against Dunkel Draft and the WTO. A circular was also issued by the COC immediately after the demolition of the Babari Masjid by the Hindu fascist forces led by the BJP on 6 December, 1992 calling for the formation of broad-based united fronts at various levels against Hindu fascist forces.

There were also attempts to achieve close coordination with the nationality movements. Solidarity meetings were held in support of the nationality movements and against the fascist suppression of these movements by the Indian state.

However, all these measures fell short of the actual requirements that arose due to the serious impact of the new policies of LPG and Hindu fascist offensive since the beginning of the 1990s.

To sum up, we can say that we had tried to intervene in some of the important political events in the country such as Parliamentary and Assembly elections, dismissal of NTR's government by the Central government led by Indira Gandhi, demolition of the Babari Masjid, policies of imperialist globalisation, liberalization and privatization, etc., nationality movements and the state repression against them, struggles by the various sections such as adivasis, dalits, women, religious minorities and other social sections

for their just demands, working class struggles, and so on. We utilized the changes in the political situation to our advantage particularly during the post-Emergency period in 1977, partial relaxation in repression in the first half of 1990, and during 1995-96. We used the new situation to make preparations for greater advances in the people's war. However, we could not effectively intervene politically in many events that took place in the country during this period. Our efforts to stop the offensive of the Hindu fascist forces in all spheres, and particularly their attacks against the Muslims and other religious minorities, were feeble. Thus though we had correctly identified the concrete political tasks in the new situation after 1991, we failed to mobilize and drive the entire rank and file of the Party and the masses at large in implementing the tactics effectively.

## **CHAPTER-5**

### **Formation And Development Of The Erstwhile PU**

The CPI (ML) (Party Unity) was formed in November '78 by a handful of com-rades who came out of jail. While in prison, they individually and collectively developed similar ideas on some basic issues concerning the review of the past. All were active in the CPI (ML) under CM's leadership and later some joined into the 2nd CC led by Mahadev Mukherjee. After getting released from jail, they tried to unite with any of the revolutionary groups on the basis of the past review. But those efforts failed and they realised that their effort could not be materialised without developing revolutionary struggles on the basis of the past review. This realisation led them to form an organisation and hold a conference. It was held in November 1978 and adopted three documents- on the historic significance of CPI(ML), on Unity, and another on the line of annihilation. Efforts were on to unite with like minded revolutionaries. In this conference, it was decided that an organization be formed to lead the struggles. Accordingly a leading committee was formed. It was decided to build revolutionary peasant movement in the then South Central Bihar, which was chosen for strategic purposes. Work also began in other parts of the Bihar and Nadia and Murshidabad areas of West Bengal.

When PU was formed in 1978 three resolutions were taken. First one,

on CPI (ML). The resolution on CPI (ML) says that it upheld party's ideological, political line, party's formation and party programme's basic line taken by the Party Congress of 1970. It also upheld the outstanding role played by Com. Charu Majumdar fighting revisionism and neo-revisionism, in establishing ideological-political basis of the Indian revolution and armed struggle and in leading the Naxalbari struggle and formation of the Party. It also pointed out that though the party programme was basically correct, there were some lacunae remained, such as the wrong assessment on the question of Era and world war, overassessment of the then international and national situations, the concept of quick victory, rejection of taking part in the mass organisations, i.e., TU activities, student unions, Employees' union, other mass organisations and mass movement etc, etc. The other resolution was adopted on annihilation line. This resolution repudiated the annihilation line adopted by the 70 Congress. This was considered as general tactical line which would resolve all the problems facing the revolution. This resolution while repudiating annihilation line, adopted annihilation of class enemies as one of the forms of struggle. The third resolution was on the unity line. It assessed the then situation of the ML movement and stated that there were broadly three trends in the ML movement. First one was the right deviationist - liquidationist line which on the plea of rectifying left mistakes of the past gave up the revolutionary essence of Naxalbari and CPI(ML). This out and out revisionist line was adopted by SNS, Kanu Sanyal, Ashim Chatterjee etc, etc. Second one was not recognising any mistakes of the past and continued to practice those erroneous policies and developed a 'left' opportunist line led by 2nd CC. The third one represented those who acknowledged the past mistakes and took initiative to rectify those mistakes and develop the line through serious practice.

The document on Unity advocated for unity with this third trend identifying them as communist revolutionary camp such as APSC, COC, MCC etc, etc. It also identified that the right opportunism and liquidators pose the most serious and main danger to the movement today, while fighting both right and left opportunism and dogmatism. This helped in enriching the SCR and Tactical Line documents prepared by the APSC and incorporating some of these aspects when these were made into joint

documents of APSC and PU in end of 1979.

The first unity of PU was with the Communist Kranthikari Sanghatan (CKS), a small organisation, which was one of the members of the AICCCR of Bihar. CKS did not join in the CPI(ML), because of the differences between CKS and SNS, who was the then secretary of the Bihar state committee. There was a split in the CKS and one section which had some work bordering Aurangabad and Palamau districts, merged with the CPI(ML)(PU) to form CPI(ML)(UO) in 1980.

In 1980 unity with APSC failed. In January 1982, the UO and a section of the erstwhile COC, CPI(ML), led by Coms. Sharma and Appalasuri merged to form the PU. Both these organizations had wide agreement on ideological matters of Marxism-Leninism-Mao thought and a number of basic issues such as strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution, the domestic and international political situation, despite some difference on some important issues like the state character of China. The COC was holding that China was still a socialist, while PU in 80 itself declared China as a revisionist. It was decided that final decision on the question of China will be taken later by the joint organisation after study. Both the organizations were constructively self-critical towards certain major drawbacks in the past line.

Some more small organizations too merged with the PU. A fraction of CPI(ML)[CT], known as the Co-ordination centre,(or Sangram group) Punjab united with the PU in 1990. The Bihar fraction of the CCRI(ML), a small organisation of West Bengal, united with PU in 1988.

This was how the erstwhile PU evolved in the resurgence period.

In 1987, PU held a Central Conference. It is most significant in two aspects. One, that it fought against a right deviationist line placed by the then GS and two it adopted new party programme and constitution which incorporated some of the important new aspects in the programme, while retaining the salient features of '70 program. It incorporated the aspects of the 78 resolutions and also assessment of some new objective conditions while upholding the basic line 1970. The salient features of '87 programme were: a) character of the Indian society is semi-colonial, semi-feudal, b) Indian big bourgeoisie's comprador nature, c) Indian ruling classes are big

comprador bourgeoisie and big landlord classes; d) targets of the revolution – imperialism including social imperialism, comprador big bourgeoisie and big landlord class; e) Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung Thought is the ideological basis; f) Seizure of power through protracted people’s war, building up guerrilla zones, base areas and people’s army. It also incorporated some new aspects in the programme, such as, a) in the overall structure of semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, there have been some changes in the agricultural sector, particularly through abolition of the old Jamindari system and “green revolution”. Within the very semi-feudal structure there has been infiltration of capitalist elements, as a result of this, one type of capitalism – distorted, stagnant and marked by feudal remnants – has developed on a regional basis in some areas such as Punjab. This change has led to the emergence of some new classes in rural areas. b) Comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie is the ruling class and one of the obstacles in the way of development of our country and revolution. It is the main vehicle of imperialism. It is one of the targets of the revolution. That is why it included the contradiction between comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the broad masses as one of the major/basic contradictions of the Indian society. We characterised the Indian CBB as subservient to imperialism and that it has got distinct identity and not merely a mechanical puppet of imperialism, that it enjoys “comparative independence of bargaining-power and manoeuvrability with imperialism and social-imperialism” in aspiring for growth within the framework of basic dependence. This comprador monopoly bourgeoisie serves imperialism in order to serve itself. While deciding this as a major contradiction, Party Unity overassessed the aspect of manoeuvrability and bargaining power of the CBB. Its over-emphasis on the question of relative independence of the CBB caused much apprehension in the communist revolutionary camp about PU’s understanding of the Indian state character. Their characterization of the CBB gave an impression that of an “independent” class. This became a major political difference between PU, PW and MCC. So it also decided that on the question of unity it will remain flexible on this point. So in 1998 in unity with PW it accepted the proposal to drop this contradiction. c) It also identified “majority of small and middle bourgeoisie are national bourgeoisie. Though they are dependent on imperialism and comprador

bourgeoisie to some extent.” d) It identified Indian working class will play more important role than China in our revolution as development and size of the Indian working class is considerably big etc. etc.

The PU built a significant anti-feudal struggle in Magadh region of Bihar by the mid-1980s after which it began to extend to Koel-Kaimur (Palamau district). The movement's direct influence spread across thousand villages in the four districts of Magadh region. Half of the villages had Village Committees of Mass organisation- MKSS - and Gram Raksha Dals were formed in over 200 villages. Four to five armed guerrilla squads with full-timmer& pert-timmers were functioning around this time. The notorious private army of the landlords such as Bhumi-sena was defeated through armed mass resistance with the help of the armed squads. Squad was occasionally seizing arms from police forces. This led to a historic mass upsurge in the entire Magadh region. Over 50 arms were also seized from the landlords.

The State began its suppression campaign as early as 1983 when the police conducted an armed attack on the State Conference of the MKSS in which dozens of comrades were injured. The first fake encounter took place just prior to the Conference when an activist of the MKSS was shot dead by the police. In 1985 the Bihar government deployed a Special Task force to suppress the movement. But this only gave rise to a more massive resistance by the masses, with lakhs of people getting mobilised all over against the atrocities of the STF. Mass rallies and meetings were held all over the region in which thousands participated. In one such meeting held jointly with other ML Parties around 50 thousand people turned up after which the STF was forced to retreat temporarily. But on April 19, 1986, the State enacted a mini-Jallianwallah Bagh by brutally attacking a meeting in Arwal massacring 23 people and injuring 70 others. Responding to the call by the joint front of various revolutionary and democratic organisations thousands marched to the State Assembly protesting against this massacre and 40 thousand people were detained all over Bihar. A few days prior to the rally the MKSS was banned by the State government.

By 1985 there were over 2000 activists of the MKSS at the village level and around 20 thousand membership. Social boycott of landlords,



crop seizures, strikes, holding people's panchayats, annihilating of goondas etc., were the common forms of struggle adopted. In the wake of the rout of the private armies and repression by the State, the people's movement began to acquire an anti-State character around the 90s'. The time was then ripe for advancing the slogan of building the guerrilla zone and establishing organs of people's power in the Magadh region with the perspective of building the people's army and Base Areas in the KK region. But the '87 Central Conference only summed up thus: "*the development of peasant struggle in South-Central Bihar border region deserves the party's attention.*" The failure to advance the slogans in time and formulating concrete plans conforming to the needs of the struggle, led to stagnation and later decline of the movement.

Although the Party entered Palamau district in 1978 itself recognising its strategic importance, it was in 1985, that the Party's activities spread to three blocks of Palamau, and one block of Rohatas district in Koel-Kaimur region and two squads were functioning. By 1988-90 there was a mass upsurge in KK region too. Some squads were also formed in this period. But due to lack of a concrete plan to build a guerrilla zone in KK region and the arrest of a major section of the leadership, the movement entered a period of stagnation after 1991.

In the history of the PU, there were two major inner-Party struggles; the first one in 1987 and the second in 1997. The alternative line which came up in 1987 threatened the very basic line of the CPI (ML). Though the advocates of this line assessed subjectively and said that there were fundamental changes in the semi feudal relations as capitalist relations have developed in agriculture and agrarian revolution is obsolete. After having said this, they did not put concrete tactics though its logical culmination would have been an armed insurrection. However, this line was defeated at the 1987 Central Conference of PU and the line of Protracted People's War with agrarian revolution as the axis of the New Democratic Revolution was reaffirmed. The Party was thus unified on a higher basis.

Some vital questions on the party line were raised by a COC member in 1993, it was placed before the 93 conference but not taken up seriously.

The Bihar State Conference of 1996 evaluated the failures in advancing the struggle in Magadh region in 1985-86. But this was also rejected by the COC. It culminated as a full fledged struggle at the '97 Central Conference when a review of 18 years was taken up as part of the unification process with PW. Critique Document was not passed at the Central Conference in spite of the approval by the majority in the Bihar State Conference, some valuable and correct criticism made by the critique document were incorporated in the POR by the Central conference. The two line struggle of 1997 led to the enrichment of the PU's political line and also had a positive impact on the unity process between the PU & PW.

The influence of alien class trends in the erstwhile PU is reflected in the decisions and tactics of the leadership at critical turning points in the course of the development of the movement or in continuing the same old forms of struggle and forms of organisation. Particularly subjectivism and Right trend are seen in not giving the slogan of building the Guerrilla Zone in Magadh-Koel Kaimur region in time, and, after taking up the task, not making concrete plans to fulfill it. Likewise, during the mid-1980s, after mobilising the peasantry in Nadia in West Bengal into struggles in a big way, not advancing the struggle to the higher stage also reflects the subjectivism and the Right trend in the Party leadership. In some important political issues too, such as inordinate delay in declaring the CPC and "Liberation" group as revisionist, liberalism is seen on the part of the leadership. Liberalism is also seen in not checking legalism, non-professionalism, and ultra-democracy in some regions. These alien class trends led to the retardation and stagnation in the movement in some areas.

Alien trends such as subjectivism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy were quite strong at the time of its Central Conference in 1997 but only spontaneity, liberalism and legalism were identified. But no serious efforts were made to rectify these wrong trends in time, which showed a negative impact on the movement.

## **The Political Short-Comings:**

### **1) Over-assessment of the prospects of unity between the ML groups:**

PU made the mistake of over assessing the prospects of unity between the ML groups while making an underassessment of the differences between the ML groups. There was a mistake in evaluating the direction of the development of different ML groups in course of time. This over assessment was corrected in 1989 by fixing criterion for the communist revolutionaries with which PU could unite.. The result of the Over assessment resulted in illusions which caused pessimism when the unity failed to materialize. Also we did not think of assessing the practice of each ML party, thinking that it would suffice that if we agree with their sum up of the past.

### **2) Right Trend with regard to CPC, Liberation, and guerrilla zone:**

There was a right trend in the Party leadership in not condemning revisionism of the C.P.C. in time, and on not assessing the revisionist character of “Liberation” in time; in placing armed struggle and armed organisation in a subservient position to mass organisation and mass movement for a period of time; in developing the Guerrilla zone in a concrete manner and driving the whole party organisation towards this.

#### ***a) Failure To Take A Stand On The Revisionist CPC:***

Although the erstwhile Unity Organization took a correct stand regarding the degeneration of the CPC by 1979 itself, and declared that revisionists had usurped power in China by 1980 itself. It had compromised on the issue after the formation of the PU following the merger with of the COC. It did not take a stand even after Deng came to power and began to negate Mao Thought and the GPCR openly and it became crystal-clear to the entire world though it decided to upheld GPCR. It was only in 1989 that it came out with a clear stand on the CPC.

In the bilateral unity agreement between the UO and COC, for the sake of unity, it was agreed to continue with a stand that China was a socialist country, pending further study. But conducting the study and coming out with a detailed assessment was inordinately delayed. In the 1987

conference too, the Party had not arrived at a concrete stand on China. The 1987 conference draft resolution contained the assessment that China was no more socialist and revisionists usurped power. But just before the adoption, it was dropped, as there could not be any debate. The hesitation of the leadership in taking a stand was the prime reason.

The hesitation of the leadership in taking initiative, conducting study and debate, and arriving at a conclusion also has been a result of hesitation in accepting the fact that even in China, socialism has been reversed. This hesitation in taking a decision a stand and in being bold in study and debate amounts to liberalism on the part of the leadership.

This undue delay in declaring the CPC as revisionist caused much damage to the political credibility of the PU, created confusions in the revolutionary camp and increased its distance from other revolutionary groups. It had also affected the unity process with erstwhile PW. The latter discontinued its attempts for merger Talks with the erstwhile PU after the failure in 1979-80 mainly on account of the PU's not taking a correct stand on the CPC.

#### ***b) Liberal Attitude Towards Liberation Group:***

It became clear to the revolutionary camp in the country as far back as 1981-82 that the Liberation group led by VM was traversing a Right opportunist line and fast drifting towards revisionism. By 1985 it began to dabble in Parliamentary politics and was preparing to transform the Party into a legal revisionist party. It had abandoned armed struggle despite maintaining some armed squads for its opportunist aims.

Even when it was clear that unity with such a Party was out of the question, the erstwhile PU leadership pursued a liberal attitude towards the Liberation group and entertained the idea of possible unity with it. ML-unity sentiments too dominated their thinking rather than seeing the degeneration of the Liberation into Right opportunist politics. *This was the biggest lacunae.* It was only in 1987 that the erstwhile PU took a correct stand towards the VM group. Thus there was liberalism on this question.

After a serious setback in the movement, especially in the background of splits and the pessimistic atmosphere in West Bengal, the PU party, by

forging unity basing on the correct line of summing up the past and preserving basically all the revolutionary aspects of the CPI(ML), and steadfastly sticking to the correct line, developed into a modest organization almost from a scratch. It took correct steps of concentrating in South Central Bihar and could develop a peasant armed struggle to reckon with in a very short period. By 1982, the PU extended to four states- Bihar, Bengal, Punjab, and Andhra Pradesh. Despite the emergence of a right deviation within the party, the PU also had the tradition of fighting with this deviation. By the 1990s, the PU could create its niche in the revolutionary camp with the formidable support of a mass base and the restarted unity efforts with PW which culminated in Unity and formation of a new PW by August 1998. The PU party has proved that if based on a correct line and we work resolutely practicing that line, we can overcome even very difficult situations and hurdles and can emerge as a strong revolutionary force.

*c) Regarding Concrete Planning Of Guerrilla Zone:*

While upholding that China's path is our path, PU correctly emphasized the different objective situations between the then China and present Indian situation. PU reiterated the specificities of India saying that from which the concrete strategy would follow. The specific features of PPW in India were discussed in the 1987 conference. PU also rightly stressed to concentrate on some strategical areas. According to this understanding only, the PU entered the Palamau area. The PU consistently argued that the then South Central Bihar would become forward post of the struggle. “..the development of peasant struggle in South Central Bihar border region deserves party's serious attention. This will be consistent with our building armed peasant struggles”. After having said this, we failed to develop the perspective in a concrete manner.

Though we said in the 1987 conference about gradual changing character of the movement from anti-feudal to anti-state and the perspective to develop of going from armed resistance struggle to guerrilla zone to base areas .However the leadership failed to develop concrete and conscious plans of transforming these areas into guerrilla zones. The Leadership failed to imbue the ranks with this perspective. The period after the 1987 conference was the opportune time, as the Party emerged victorious defeating the wrong line, to take the perspective of building of guerrilla

zones to the ranks. As a result we became victims of spontaneity. This was one of the important reasons for stagnation which set in the movement. **The failure to develop guerrilla zone was a serious short coming.** We took this issue only in the course of the 1993 conference. In essence, we upheld as the central task of the party would be to establish base areas through PPW which was put forward in the “70s programme, and pointed out that due to very wide unevenness in the development of socio-economic conditions, in the initial period of GZs could be developed in the favourable geo-political areas only and in all areas. But we ourselves could not prepare concrete plan to develop GZs with the orientation of guerrilla bases.

And after that, in 2001 following the 9th Congress of the Party, we made concrete planning for the development of the guerrilla zone and guerrilla bases for Koel-Kaimur region.

Apart from this main short coming, there were trends of legalism present in the Party. That was an important problem in Bihar, Bengal and more so in Andhra too. There was no sharp self -criticism on this trend within the CC. This right deviation, though we began to correct, resulted in failure to politicize our cadre on the basis of concrete planning for building the guerrilla zone and to acquire a clear political vision for the development of struggle to a higher plane.

- 3) **There was an over reaction to the Left line of 1970 due to a subjectivist outlook.**
- 4) **The central P.O.R. of the erstwhile P.U. made self-criticism that although the unity with the A.P. State Committee failed to materialize the jointly accepted S.C.R. and Tactical Line should have been accepted as a basic document.**
- 5) **The period after 1995 was the right time for taking up a Rectification campaign throughout the Party, but we failed to grasp the depth of the alien class trends and to chalk out concrete measures for conducting a Rectification Campaign throughout the Party.**

## CHAPTER-6

### Unity between PW And PU

Both the CPI (ML) [PW] and the CPI (ML) [PU] gave the utmost importance to the question of unity from the very beginning. Both emphasized for the unity of genuine CR organisation, irrespective of they are part of CPI(ML) or not.

During the '70s the PW considered unity among the genuine ML parties an urgent task as explained in *Our Tactical Line*:

*“since building a strong, united party is the largest issue we are facing, it is the principal task of our party to unite the true ML parties, groups and individuals under one umbrella” (Our Tactical Line).*

In order to implement this task, a criterion was drawn up in 1980 that divided the ML forces into those who participated in elections and those who boycotted them.

In accordance with the above categorization, unity talks were held between the APSC of the CPI (ML) and the CPI (ML) (PU) in 1979-80. They came to a common understanding on the evaluation of the past, on the Tactical Line, but unity could not materialize due to differences on the concept of the Party and on forming the CC and holding the Congress. The PU insisted that various CPI (M.L) organisations were only groups, in spite of practicing democratic centralism, and that they were part of the original CPI (ML) and hence could not be considered as Parties. It held that the Party could be formed only after the unification of the major revolutionary groups of the CPI (ML) and only then the CC could be formed.

The PU proposed that merger could take place first and the debate on the above question could be taken up later in the unified Party on the basis of democratic centralism. The PW felt that the concept of forming a unified Party and a CC was an important question, and hence it would not help real unification of the two Parties if there was a serious difference on the very question of forming the CC and holding the Congress. Going by the record of several attempts for unity and ensuing splits among the CPI

(ML) groups during the 1970s, the PW insisted that the differences on the question should be resolved first before the merger and that only thus democratic centralism can be really implemented. Developments during the 1980s and 90s vindicated the stand of the erstwhile PW. Most of the factions of the original CPI (ML) either degenerated into revisionist parties or went out of existence.

In the process of unity between the APSC, TNSC and PU, when differences arose with PU, both APSC and TNSC went ahead to form the PW in April 1980. Later the PU party also merged with com. Sharma's COC group of Punjab. After this development some effort was continued by the Liberation group but it was not fruitful due to the wrong politics of Liberation.

The PW and MCC met for the first time in 1981 and, since then, cordial relations existed between the two parties. Gradually both opined there was a basis for unity, and coms. KS and KC initiated unity talks. So naturally both the parties gave first priority to continue the talks. After the failure of the unity talks between the PW and PU there was no regular relation between the two. Later, at the end of the 80s', when the PU took a firm stand on the question of China, regular contacts were resumed. It was only in 1991, that the PW again decided to meet and exchange views with the PU on various ideological and political issues. But, instead of exchanging views and arriving at a common standpoint, the PW delegation led by com. KS put for-ward an impractical proposal before the PU delegation to organise a unity convention with the PU, MCC and PW and to hold a Congress by the end of August 1992. Though the PU comrades also accepted this proposal, it could not be implemented because it was impractical. This proposal, though, was immediately rejected and withdrawn by the COC of the PW.

When joint activities started between the four parties in 1992/93 (PW, MCC, PU and MRPW) some positive understandings were achieved among all the four, the unity talks between the erstwhile PW and MCC were going ahead at this juncture. At this time, PU proposed for tripartite unity talks. But PW and MCC opined that it was not possible to consider PU's proposal at that juncture because the unity talks between PW and



MCC were already going on since long and there were some serious political differences between PU and MCC. That was why PW and MCC could not accept the PU's proposal for tripartite unity talks. So, merger talks continued between PW and MCC only. However, these merger talks failed in 1995. After this, in the course of exchange of opinions on the domestic and international situation between the delegations of PW and PU, both the parties opined that there was a common understanding between them on many political aspects and hence unity talks were started in 1996.

Accordingly discussions were held between the two parties. The PW insisted that as a pre-requisite for unity both parties must make a thoroughgoing evaluation of the past and prepare the PORs. The PW completed this at its Special Conference in 1995, while the PU adopted its POR at its Special Conference in 1997. And after achieving unity on all the basic documents, they merged on a principled ideological-political-organisational basis thereby completing the unity process by forming a single centre unified CPI(ML)[PW]- the Central Committee (Provisional). Preparations for the 9th Congress also began in this process.

Of all the mergers since the disintegration of the Party in 1972, the merger between these two parties is the most significant in the Indian revolution. This merger has enthused the revolutionary camp both within and outside our country. With this unity, the process of unity of most of the genuine revolutionaries who have been continuing in the revolutionary legacy of the CPI (ML) are now unified in our Party.

In short, we can say that the two erstwhile parties, constituting the unified CPI(ML)[People's War], have continued the revolutionary legacy of Naxalbari, imbibing all the positive aspects; upholding the 1970 Programme most steadfastly defending the CPI(ML) and the glorious struggle it had led, against the rabid attacks and malicious slander by the so-called ML parties in a Maoist guise, most of whom claim to be the real inheritors of the CPI(ML); firmly upholding MLM, and waging resolute struggles against the revisionists of various hues; consistently adhering to the revolutionary mass line and building powerful mass movements linking them to the armed struggle; persisting along the path of protracted people's war creatively applying the Maoist strategy to the concrete conditions in

India and rejecting entirely the parliamentary form of struggle in the concrete conditions of India; building a secret Party with an underground structure with PRs forming its core; enriching the political line of the CPI(ML) adopted by the first Congress through their respective experiences in advancing the people's war in India, and most important of all, building a powerful revolutionary movement in AP, DK and Bihar amidst the suppression campaigns unleashed by the enemy forces. Thousands of our Party cadres and people had laid down their lives facing the enemy boldly.

However, it was recognized by the new Party that the process of unification of the genuine CRs was not complete since a major force, the MCC, remained outside the CPI(ML) stream. Hence, we must strive to hold talks with the MCC. At the same time, we have to hold talks with the various organisations in the Marxist-Leninist camp on ideological and political matters while carrying on united activity against the common enemy. Keeping in view our standpoint vis-à-vis the various revolutionary organisations, we decided to expose the weaknesses in their political line as part of the political discussions with them.

It was decided that in the course of advancing our revolutionary movement, while stressing to unite with the still existing genuine revolutionary organisations and individuals, we should also try to rally under our Party banner all those forces in the various right opportunist ML organisations who still retain some revolutionary zeal.

## **FORGING THE THREE MAGIC WEAPONS OF THE REVOLUTION**

What has been our achievement in forging the three instruments of the revolution or the three magic weapons as explained by comrade Mao? The correctness or incorrectness of the political-military line of the Party is reflected in the progress made in the construction of the three magic weapons of the revolution and in the overall advance of the people's war in the country. Let us sum up these developments from the time of the 8th Congress to the 9th in order to get an objective understanding of the actual situation.

The revolutionary movement led by our Party had spread to several

states in the country over the years - Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Punjab, Haryana and a few other pockets. It has become a force to be reckoned with in the Indian political scene. The unified CPI(ML)[People's War] is the real inheritor of the original CPI (ML) and the glorious legacy of Naxalbari and took shape in the course of advancing the people's war in India based on the 1970 Programme.

## **BUILDING A GENUINE PROLETARIAN PARTY**

After the martyrdom of com. CM in July 1972, there was no Central leadership, i.e., the CC. Most of the Party Committees too, from top to bottom, were damaged and the Party was split into many splinters in every state; the revolutionary upsurge receded and all the peasant struggles suffered a setback. In this most difficult period our foremost task was to come out of it, to rebuild the Party from scratch.

We had started to reorganise our Party by taking lessons from the past gained with tremendous sacrifices of the martyrs. We have combined this effort with practice of the revolutionary mass line to build a new upsurge. The resurgence started with the Karimnagar and Adilabad peasant revolutionary struggles, spread to all over to AP in many fronts and to Dandakaranya within a few years.

The reorganization and resurgence had brought a new generation of people from various walks of life into the Party. The resurgence also remoulded most of the old cadre, who played a great role in building and leading the movement. In the course of struggle in a few years, hundreds of Party members were trained. Party committees were setup. A new leadership had emerged mainly at the state and district levels.

The erstwhile PW reorganized by adhering to the basic line of the 8th Congress and taking lessons of the past and experiences of resurgence. This had not only been the basis for the CPI(ML)[PW] formation in 1980, but for all the later mergers of genuine revolutionary communist forces. In spite of some shortcomings, in our unification of genuine Communist revolutionary forces in India, the methods we followed were basically correct.

We not only learnt tactics from our past experience but also from the experiences of revolutionaries world wide. We resolutely adhered to the principles of Marxist tactics, and at the same we strived to develop tactics creatively too. While holding fast to the basic line of PPW we boldly changed tactics in 1977 August and in 1990 in AP. Many a time in several states we intervened in spontaneous struggles and advanced them. We adopted different tactics in various areas in different fronts depending upon the socio-economic-political conditions and the level of the movement with the aim of building the three magic weapons and establishing base areas. It is one of the conditions for the leadership to lead the revolution successfully to have thorough-going knowledge and grip over tactics. In spite of attaining some achievements in tactics, there is need to emerge as a strong Party for leading the revolution victoriously.

Our Party, since its inception in 1969, has been a clandestine Party, waging People's War, with an aim to seize political power by overthrowing the exploiting ruling classes. Our Party developed in the course of decades of bitter armed struggle, by facing a cruel war of suppression campaigns. Thousands of martyrs including many great leaders gave up their lives by shaping the bright, red path of revolution. In spite of gaining great experience in clandestine functioning, we committed several mistakes in strict underground functioning and suffered many big losses. We have to develop more scientific methods and strictly adhere to the principles of secret functioning. We have to effectively coordinate open and legal work with secret and illegal work and strive to rectify our non-proletarian class trends to implement these in a disciplined way.

Our Party got steeled in the two major inner-Party crises and achieved greater internal unity. The method of self-criticism, criticism has become an integral part of our party's life. We identified wrong trends at the time of the AISC and later in the 9th Congress. We should strive to wage a consistent fight against petty-bourgeoisie tendencies and to rectify these in time.

## **Unification Of the Revolutionaries as an important component of Party Building:**

The erstwhile PW, while on the one hand, had been concentrating and putting in efforts to strengthen the AP, DK movements, on the other it gave importance to the unity process with the MCC in the 80's. But as it faced two internal crises and a severe onslaught by the enemy the Party's attention got distracted from concentrating on Unity talks. But it did not abandon the aim of unity.

Since 1977, we emphasized on first building the movement and uniting the revolutionary forces on the basis of this, instead of going for unity talks just on the basis of documents. This understanding proved correct. The movement we built during 1977 and 1992 in AP and DK attracted the attention of revolutionaries countrywide. The numerous forms of people's struggles, and the resoluteness of the people and Party in facing the enemy's counter offensive, made the revolutionaries repose confidence in the Party. The efforts made by the Party in developing the peasant movement in AP and DK and taking it to a higher stage of developing these into guerrilla zones attracted Maoist forces throughout India. Many revolutionary forces that were looking for an alternative began to contact the Party through various sources.

In 1993, the CC of erstwhile PW held talks with the Maharashtra PW, which had separated since 1987. We completed the unity with Maharashtra PW in 1994. Even when divided, there were no basic differences between the two. The AISC opined that had the all India Plenum been held to solve the internal crisis of 1985-87, history would have taken a different course.

The comrades who came out from parties which were right deviationist (some were left deviationist) in West Bengal, Haryana, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Kerala started understanding the Party line through intensive study, when they came in touch with us. The CC, in order to consolidate these forces, brought out the following guidelines in 1993:

- 1) We need to thoroughly discuss our basic Documents with those who came out from different parties. We need to take their opinions and amendments on the basic documents.

- 2) Those comrades who came out and want to unite with us, should write the reasons for their coming out and they should write a political organisational review concerning their past. These PORs should be discussed and finalized.
- 3) Party membership should be given to them and depending upon their development, their level should be determined.
- 4) Whatever the level of the party committee formed, it should comprise only of PRs. If there is a team, a Co-ordination team should be formed and after two years, depending on the development, we should form full-fledged committees.
- 5) The CC gave directions that if any minor differences are there, they can join us after recording their differences, but this should be avoided if there are differences on basic aspects.

With the above understanding, during 1994-95, after conducting extensive discussions, after getting the PORs of the concerned groups/ parties, and holding plenums, mergers were finalized.

Successfully holding the AISC and consolidation of the Party in these newly extended states, gave the erstwhile PW an all India stature. It had Party units in AP, Chathisgarh(them MP), Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar(including the present Jharkhand), Haryana, etc. The merger between PW and PU increased the unified party's stature. The failure of talks with MCC at that juncture was definitely a negative development. After the propaganda for more than a decade that we are going to unite, the failure of the talks was really a disappointment for the revolutionary forces.

The three-and-a-half-decade history of Party building reveals several positive achievements while it also brings to light the serious problems we faced in building a genuine, proletarian Party in semi-colonial, semi-feudal India.

*Firstly*, the formation of CPI(ML) was a major breakthrough in the history of the Indian Communist movement. It had shown to the oppressed people of the country how a revolutionary Party should be- a Party that is strictly underground; comprises of the most committed, advanced elements forming the nucleus or the core; functioning on the basis of democratic

centralism in the real sense; and rectifying itself in the course of intensifying class struggle. While we succeeded in building a revolutionary Party with thousands of professional revolutionaries as the core, we failed in building a vast network of part-timers spread across various sections of the people. At that time it was a problem related to the concept and understanding regarding the part-timers. Party membership was given to those who came out to work full-time for revolution.

Though this wrong understanding was rectified in the later period and membership was given to part-timers, the role of part-timers is still not of much significance in the Party. The part-timer cells are few when compared to the vast influence of the Party on the oppressed masses in the country. The local Party leadership is thus still weak and there is a dependency of the masses on the PRs or the squads for solving their problems or in resisting the enemy. This has also given rise to several non-proletarian trends in the Party such as bureaucracy, individualism and subjectivism etc. Thus problem of building a vast network of part-timers woven around a stable nucleus of PRs continues in some form or the other even to this day in the Party.

*Secondly*, the formation of a single directing center for the Indian revolution has been plaguing us ever since the setback and disintegration of the CC in 1972 after the martyrdom of Com. CM. Most of the period under review was characterized by umpteen centers and further splits in the various ML organisations. Until their merger in 1998, both PW and PU made attempts independently to unite the various genuine CRs and there was some achievement respectively.

*Thirdly*, the Party succeeded to an extent in building relatively strong and able Party committees at various levels unlike in the initial period. The consolidation and strengthening of the central leadership was achieved in the course of a protracted struggle-both inner-Party struggle and the armed struggle against the class enemies and their state machine.

Lack of continuity of leadership had always been a serious problem in our Party building. The very first CC was disrupted in 1972 and it was only in 1980 that PW and PU established new Centres but both lacked an all India character. And the composition of the central leadership of PW had undergone changes continuously until it got stabilized after 1992. In the

history of the international communist movement we rarely find such problem of continuity of leadership at the central level.

This problem has been basically resolved since the past one decade and despite some serious losses of leadership, the central leadership had further consolidated and strengthened. It had evolved out of the serious inner-Party struggle against opportunist-liquidationist cliques in the Party led by SM-VS and later by KS-Bandaiah in the erstwhile PW, and against the Right Deviationist politics of Ashok in the erstwhile PU.

But the problem of continuity of leadership still persists at various levels in the Party. Due to confinement of the Party mass base to limited states, our Party's influence and acceptance is confined to those states where we have mass base.

*Fourthly*, attempts to strengthen the Party through taking up rectification campaigns to get rid of the various non-proletarian trends and ideological-political weaknesses have yielded positive results in some states and special zones. The Party leadership and the cadre have been able to grasp the deviations and weaknesses more deeply and come out of these to an extent but the problem persists seriously in some states and in a section of the leading committees too.

Despite some improvement over the past few years, the problem of subjectivism, liberalism, spontaneity, sectarianism, bureaucracy, legalism, patriarchy, etc., still haunt the Party at various levels. There is also the problem of lack of professionalism particularly in the erstwhile PU which has direct bearing on the development of the armed struggle. It is an urgent task before the Party to grapple with this in order to transform it into a genuine bolshevised proletarian Party.

*Lastly*, the Party's class basis, which was more petty-bourgeois in character in the initial period, gradually changed to that of the basic classes. The majority of the Party cadre hail from the most oppressed sections-the landless and poor peasantry-while the lower sections of the middle peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie constitute a considerable section. As a result of special attention paid to recruitment and promotion of cadre from special social sections particularly after 1995, the Party now has a good number of cadres from Dalits, women and Adivasis. However, there is



need for even more concentration on these oppressed sections especially in promoting them to leadership positions.

A major weakness in our Party building has been the lack of concentration on the working class. As a result, there are very few cadres from working class background. Although in a semi-feudal society like ours the peasantry is the principal source for recruitment, the huge number belonging to the organized and unorganized working class underscores the need to concentrate on this basic motive force and promote them into leadership positions so that they play their leading role in the revolution.

## **BUILDING THE PEOPLE'S ARMY**

Building up of the people's army has been a consistent problem in the history of the Indian Communist Movement. Leaving out the history of the pre-Naxalbari period when revisionism dominated, it was after the seizure of arms from the enemy forces by the people's guerillas in **Magurjan** that we first declared the formation of the PLA in embryonic form. This could not be developed due to the serious setback to the movement in 1972.

We are building the army from scratch and hence are facing much complexity in the work of building the People's Army. Due to this some serious mistakes are occurring. Owing to our shortcomings in concrete study, lack of the required theoretical knowledge on the military line, spontaneity in the functioning of the Party committees, we took decisions regarding squad formation from time to time on the basis of the needs but did not formulate a comprehensive plan for the formation of the People's Guerrilla Army.

Our party has been working from the beginning with the strategic concept of seizing political power through armed force and settlement of the issue through war. After the setback of the Naxalbari and Srikakulam movement, we have tried to build guerilla squads in Telangana before and after the peasant upsurge started in Karimnagar and Adilabad. We started building squads in DK in 1980 as part of the Guerilla Zone Perspective. From 1983 onwards we formed regular squads in North Telangana districts which were chosen as our Guerilla Zone Perspective. These squads performed both organisational and military tasks. Since then our party has

been developing guerilla squads and guerilla warfare.

Armed squads were formed in the Magadh region of Bihar from 1981. These were formed as armed peasant squads to confront the landlords and their private armies. They comprised of both guerillas and militia members. Along with these squads, temporary squads were also formed at times by merging the Party organisers keeping the organisational and repression aspects in view.

In the guidelines drawn up for developing NT and DK to higher-level guerrilla zones, we laid down certain conditions that platoons should assume the general form and that a centralised military command should be formed from bottom to top. We did not have an in-depth understanding about the plan to be implemented to fulfill the above conditions such as to develop the guerrilla forces into regular military formations; forming the required command; relation between the two; relation between the regular army and the militia; relation between the base area and the army; the relation between the army and political power etc. Hence, we could not take the decision to build the People's Guerrilla Army in 1995.

In the erstwhile PW areas, when the war intensified further and repression too seriously increased in comparison to earlier days the task of resistance also assumed greater significance. In fact, in some areas, we had formed special military squads as early as 1993 but these did not become a generalized form for a long period. LGSs, CGSs and platoons were also formed since 1995 but they were not brought under a separate military command. As part of the Special efforts to specialise and concentrate on the military, a separate sub-committee, central SCOMA, was formed in 1996. We tried to apply military theory to our practice and to develop the fighting capacities, techniques and skills of our guerilla forces. We also formed state SCOMAs in some states. All this resulted in specialization in the military sphere and improved our armed resistance. In fact, the CC of the erstwhile PW had correctly summed up the political, organizational and military situation and made the following assessment in the document "*Guerilla Zones—our Perspective*":

*"In the present situation, along with the military task, the political-organisational tasks too are acquiring importance. We have to develop*

*armed organizations which are sufficiently trained and skilled enough to face the enemy offensive. In order to efficiently carry out the political and organizational tasks on the one hand, and military tasks on the other, it is essential to form separate organizations for each and pay special attention for developing them.”*

Special Guerrilla Squads were formed to fight against the state from 1994-95 but we did not give them a generalised form at that time. The military formations increased further after the separation of the organizational and military squads in May 1999. We dissolved the CGS system in 1999, and the formation of platoons, SGSs and LGSs was taken up. Thus, by undertaking specialization, separate squads were formed for military and organizational tasks.

Yet, we did not have clarity on how to build the PGA and separate command structures. Hence, although the situation was ripe by the time of 1995 Special Conference itself, the task of forming the PGA was not taken up due to subjectivism and spontaneity in the CC. The decision to form the PGA was taken by the CC in August 2000 and was implemented on December 2, 2000.

In Bihar, in the erstwhile PU areas, “Commanders Committees” were formed in 1987 under the leadership of the RCs, and later transformed into the “Sainik Sanchalan Teams (SST)” in 1993. They fulfilled the military and fatigue needs of the squads. These coordinated the armed attacks. This was formed first in Magadh and later in Koel-Kaimur. Although these were formed with the understanding of command, they did not develop in the direction of command due to lack of concrete study and planning. In 1997, a Military Affairs Committee (MAC) was formed in Bihar by the erstwhile PU.

However in the course of development we acquired knowledge through direct and indirect knowledge and experience, which culminated in the formation of the PGA and a separate full fledged CMC to guide and lead the People’s army directly. This final clarity came to us through study and practice which was enriched in the 9th congress.

The People’s Guerrilla Army, by its very nature, draws its immense strength and sustenance from its indissolvable ties with the masses. It

becomes a mighty force by its close integration with the masses. The masses become active participants in political and military actions through mass political mobilisation and political-military training by the PGA.

In 1995, we took up the task of building the Organs of People's Political Power in NT and DK Guerrilla Zones and in the East Division. From the very beginning, we emphasized on the task to educate the people with the slogan : **“All power to the Revolutionary People's Committees!”** These Gram Rajya Committees (GRCs) or Revolutionary People's Committees gave leadership to the people as organs of people's political power at a time when the authority of the state along with that of the feudal forces and caste/tribal elders was undermined as a result of people's struggles and armed resistance. These organs established people's power in an embryonic form. Although GRCs were established only in a few villages, through these we began to develop an understanding among the people regarding the new political power. The consciousness of the people in the Guerrilla Zones has developed with a new outlook. Yet, we have to note that all this is only development in relative terms.

In the Guerrilla Zone of NT the GRCs became defunct due to severe enemy repression. It had also become difficult to build the GRCs in those areas in DK where the enemy repression was intense like Gadchiroli. If the GRCs are to conduct anti-state struggles effectively it is necessary to enhance the consciousness of the masses. We should enhance the consciousness of the people in order to defeat the government reforms. **The existence of the armed forces of the people is indispensable if the GRCs are to sustain the new political power and effectively confront the enemy.** If we do not link up the new political power with the PGA, it can't be sustained and developed further. As we could not grasp this aspect clearly, we could not sustain the GRCs.

The state is resorting to fascist repression on the one hand and reforms on the other in order to protect its administrative organs in the rural areas that are getting weakened in the course of advance of the people's war. It is only in the course of smashing state power by defeating state repression and reforms that the people's political power can be strengthened.

The People's Militia is the Base force in the PGA. Without the People's

Militia the PGA cannot develop. If our regular armed forces have to effectively counter the enemy the help of the militia is indispensable. When the militia, local squads and the regional forces are engaged in guerrilla actions against the enemy and indulge in acts of harassment, it will be difficult for the enemy to directly concentrate on our regular armed forces and inflict losses. It is the principal source for the recruitment into the regular army. Although we recognised the role of people's militia, we did not make much headway in building an extensive network of People's Militia due to which our resistance too did not become extensive.

Just as the armed forces such as platoons, SGSs etc., is indispensable at the higher level, the militia too is equally indispensable at the area level. The People's Militia is essential for establishing new political power in the villages and for the people to wage war against the enemy under the leadership of the GRCs. Without the militia it is not possible to suppress the local class enemies, check the informers, take up harassment activities against the enemy and arm the masses. Without the armed forces of the people, nowhere in history was it possible to achieve and sustain political power. Nor is it possible in the future. This is a truth that is vindicated by history.

## **Preparing the Masses for the People's War**

Mass organisations are absolutely indispensable for the victory of any revolution. It is through the mass organisations that the masses get organised, are drawn into the class struggles and come to realise through the struggles that there is no other alternative before them but to overthrow the state power of the exploiting classes and establish in its place their own political power in order to liberate themselves from all oppression and exploitation. Our Party had recognised the importance of the mass organisations in organising the masses for revolution soon after the setback in 1972 and began building them from the mid-1970s after rectifying our past left sectarian errors under the guidance of MLM.

While recognising the importance of mass organisation and mass struggle, we had always kept in mind that in the revolution as a whole, it is war or armed struggle against the state, that will be the main form of struggle, and army, the main form of organisation.

As Com. Mao had pointed out :

*“... War is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of organisation. Other forms such as the mass organisation and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war. Before the outbreak of war, all organisation and struggle are in preparation for war...”*

This means from the very beginning, our orientation, perspective and the method of building mass organisations and mass struggles should be to serve the preparation for war. If this direction is lost, our mass organisations and mass struggles are bound to get bogged down in legalism and economism, and we will be unable to prepare the masses for the seizure of political power. The mass organisations which are built without such a perspective would be unfit to advance the revolution.

While mass organisations and mass struggles serve the armed struggle and war, the latter, in their turn, help to further advance the mass movement. Such is the dialectical inter relation between mass struggle and armed struggle. The forms of mass organisation and mass struggle change continuously with the advance of the armed struggle. Every advance made in armed struggle helps the mass organisations to expand and deepen their base and to advance the mass movement further. Our Party’s experience has proved this beyond any doubt.

As a result, mass organisations developed its strength in quantity and quality; from few fronts to many fronts; in various sections of the people, and expanding to new areas and new states. Masses were mobilized in thousands and even several lakhs in various struggles through the mass organisations. They built a good mass base for the party, created a great number of leadership cadre and contributed them to the party and the people’s guerrilla forces, and to a number of fronts. In the development of our revolutionary movement all the mass organizations played a significant role, sacrificed several hundred leaders and members and achieved political prestige, influence and popularity.

With the above orientation our mass organisations changed their forms of organisation—open, semi-open, legal, semi-legal, secret, semi-secret,

transforming them from one form to another, according to the nature of the class struggle, type of front, aim of work, level and ebb and flow of the movement, and the level of the repression, basing on the consciousness of the people. Forms of struggle were also taken up with this understanding only. The general forms were strikes, land seizing, demonstrations, rallies, meetings, dharnas, social boycotts, people's courts, famine raids, property seizing of land lords and other class enemies, bandhs, etc.

All of our mass organisations were steeled in the midst of armed struggle mainly. These played a great role as the centers of mass political education for the people's war. Mass organisations' leadership also played a greater role in polemical debates with right opportunist mass organisations' leadership. The valiant struggles shook up the base of feudalism, and threatened their ruling classes and their armed forces. The struggles of oppressed sections in thousands of villages and several cities have struck at the hegemony and the economic, political and social oppression by the ruling classes. They played a great role in smashing the socio-economic and political domination of landlords and establishing themselves as people's political power. Afterwards, they have started to become the foundation for the Organs of Revolutionary People's Political Power, mainly the peasant and women and youth mass organisations.

In AP, NT and AOB, we succeeded in breaking the lull of 1992-'94 when the massive enemy offensive created serious obstacles to our work among the masses. But gradually we overcame the difficulties, acquired the skill and adopted the tactics of building the mass organisations and mass movement in the midst of white terror. Thus in spite of the re-imposition of the ban on our Party and mass organisations in July 1996 after a brief period of nominal relaxation of the ban in 1995-'96, and a more massive enemy offensive from the beginning of 1997, we were able to advance the mass struggles on various issues on a considerable scale.

The post-1995 period has seen a resurgence of mass movements in several states led by our revolutionary mass organisations or by the various cover organisations formed through our initiative. Struggles of the peasantry were taken up on a big scale in AP, NT, AOB, DK, and Bihar and to a lesser extent in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka and Punjab.

Struggles of the workers were taken up in AP, NT, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Punjab and Delhi; women's struggles in AP, NT, AOB, DK, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, struggles of students and youth in some of the states. The most significant among these struggles were the anti-state struggles of the peasantry.

There was also a spurt in anti-state struggles on various peasant issues in all these states. Throughout NT, AOB and AP, the peasantry waged struggles for remunerative prices of agricultural produce, against the rise in fertilizer prices, against the supply of substandard and spurious seeds and pesticides, on the issue of power-cuts, low-voltage and high tariffs, against the negligence of the government in providing relief to the victims of natural calamities, against the scrapping of subsidies, against the relaxation of prohibition on liquor, scrapping of subsidies and hike in prices of agricultural inputs, against imperialist exploitation through WTO, Terminator seeds etc. Struggles were also taken up on several other issues like exorbitant rates of interest by moneylenders and finance companies, exploitation by forest contractors, government bureaucrats and police, against oppression of women, dalits, other backward castes and religious minorities. Thousands upon thousands of people were mobilised in these struggles which were organised at the village, Mandal, Area and district levels.

In DK struggles were taken up against the loot of various minerals such as copper, bauxite, iron ore from Balaghat, Rajnandgaon and Bastar etc. Adivasis were mobilised with the slogan of 'Jungle Bachao' to stop this rapacious loot by the Indian comprador big bourgeoisie and imperialists. Massive struggles were taken up against migration of outsiders into Adivasi areas, against famine and the negligence of the government, for increase in tendu leaf rates, bamboo rates and for other forest produce, against atrocities on women and so on. Land seizures continued in the rural parts of DK. Tens of thousands of people participated in demonstrations for the hike in tendu leaf rates and against famine.

In spite of the massive enemy offensive several struggles were taken up in AP, NT, AOB, DK, Bihar, Jharkhand and other parts of the country such as Dharpuri-Salem in Tamil Nadu, Raichur in Karnataka, in Bihar-



Bengal-Orissa border region, etc. That is why the state had to step up its attacks further by deploying more special police forces and para-military forces specially trained and equipped with the most sophisticated weaponry. It drew up a plan for better coordination and cooperation between the five states of AP, MP, Maharashtra, Orissa and Bihar, formed a Joint Coordination Committee headed by the central Home secretary in June 1998 and a JOC in April 2000 and is thinking of extending the ban on the Party and mass organisations to other states. At the same time, the state is also taking up reforms and dole programmes in a big way in order to divert the masses from militant revolutionary struggles.

While our mass organisations in the initial period functioned openly in some areas of AP for a short period in the main they functioned secretly. In some other areas where class struggle was weak they worked openly while in Dandakaranya our mass organisations were underground and work secretly from the start. Though the mass organisations were officially banned in AP for the first time in 1992, there was an undeclared ban since 1980 in North Telangana, from 1985 in entire AP, and from the initial days in entire Dandakaranya. In Bihar the MKSS was banned in '86. In spite of this, meetings and rallies with thousands to few lakhs of people have been taking place continuously in these states.

We have different forms of organisation and struggle in different states and in different regions within a state at any given point of time. Moreover, the conditions in the same region or state do not remain static but keep on changing continuously thereby bringing to the fore the need for effecting corresponding changes in the forms of organisation and forms of struggle. This is the most important feature that should be taken into account in evolving appropriate tactics in each region or state and at each given time. Unless we adopt a dialectical approach to the forms of struggle and forms of organisation, we are bound to fail in building effective mass organisations and powerful mass movements.

However in course of practice, we have done some mistakes when we faced new situations, which hindered their development and the movement. In this long period our achievements were primary, and shortcomings were secondary. These short comings are as follows: Failure

in consolidating the forces which came into these struggles; low level of membership; failure in developing continuity of leadership for mass organisations, failures in coordination between higher and lower bodies, failure in coordination in secret and open work, sectarian trends in mass struggles, over emphasis on open work before 1984, spontaneity in building mass organisations and mass movement, lack of planning in extending to new areas, etc. Generally these shortcomings apply to state and all India mass organisations.

The weaknesses in the Party committees at various levels, lack of clarity, specialization and experience in the particular field as well as the prevalence of spontaneity and the enormous work pressure on the committees are preventing them from timely and proper guidance to the mass organisation committees at their respective levels. One major problem faced by the Party committees in giving close guidance to mass organisations is the enemy's concentration in the areas and the white terror through encounter killings of the MO leadership.

There is a mechanical understanding in some of the Party units regarding the forms of struggle and organisation. There cannot be rigid or fixed forms of struggle and organisation. They keep on changing according to the changing conditions and stage of the struggle. Copying mechanically the forms prevalent in one region in another region will produce even adverse results. Even in the same region the forms practiced today may not be the same tomorrow. Creatively applying tactics to changing conditions and quickly changing from one form to another is a skill that should be acquired by the various Party committees and the mass organisation leadership.

Legalism in our mass work is manifested mainly in two forms: **one**, in the form of placing Party leaders as the leaders of open mass organisations and continuing them in that positions over a long period of time; and **two**, relying on legal/open methods of work and legal/open struggles to solve the sectional demands and other demands of a general democratic character. Legalism arises from an overestimation of the prospects of legal or open mass movement in India and due to lack of clarity regarding the protracted nature of people's war in our country.

Petty bourgeois individualism and egoism, anarchical attitudes and a

lack of discipline, a sectarian approach, bureaucracy etc., are some of the commonly found features in the leaderships of the mass organisations.

Cover organizations are indispensable in areas where our mass organisations are not allowed to function openly. We may also form these organisations in other areas according to necessity. The purpose behind forming cover organisations is to keep our forces unexposed to the enemy while carrying on open mass work. We must keep in mind that cover organisations are not a substitute for the legal or underground mass organisations. We must form the Party units within the cover organisations and direct them.

Although the attempts to form cover organisations in AP, NT and AOB began since 1985, it was only in the post-'95 period that we achieved some progress. We succeeded in mobilising a large section of the people through the cover organisations thereby foiling the attempts of the ruling classes to render the people leaderless by imposing a ban on our mass organisations.

Some of the shortcomings in running cover organisations are: these are exposed due to loose talk; huge mass mobilisations by the Party to the programmes of the cover organisations thereby leading to their exposure; calling exposed speakers to the meetings of cover organisations; meeting the leaderships of the cover organisations in the areas thus exposing them to all the Party and squad members and the people of the nearby villages; the Party and squads getting involved in struggles led by the cover organisation and even issuing threats to the enemy in order to make the struggles a success; selecting progressive or radical-looking names for the cover organisations; giving our slogans and singing our songs on the platform of the cover organisations; forming cover organisations overnight thereby drawing the attention of the police; and so on. Sufficient number of able and experienced PRs and organisers are not allotted for work in the cover organisations.

Building the strategic UF at whatever level will depend upon the growth of the armed struggle and the organizational strength of the Party among the various sections of the population. The four-class UF will develop from the lower levels to the higher levels up to the All-India level in a process. However, it will take a qualitative leap once the armed struggle extends to

a wider area in the country and the establishment of organs of political power on a considerable scale. The development of the UF from the lower to the higher levels depends on the strength of our armed forces and the organisational work among the various oppressed classes in the society. The organs of power at the area level will be the nucleus of our UF. On the basis of this, we must form a broad-based UF at the area/regional level consisting of the four classes based on worker-peasant alliance. Attempts should be made to bring all anti-feudal, anti-imperialist classes into this UF.

Although the formation of the NDF at the All India level requires a relatively strong People's Army, a strong Party with countrywide political influence, and a considerably wider area of armed struggle with organs of people's political power at various levels, we should strive to form the revolutionary UFs at the village, area, regional and state/special zonal levels depending on the strength of our Party, army, revolutionary mass organisations, and extent and depth of our armed struggle. All our tactical alliances or UFs in the form of joint activity with various organisations belonging to the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist classes at whatever level should be subordinate to the aim of building the strategic UF i.e. the NDF.

We did not concentrate properly on the UF work and there was no specialization at any level. This had a serious negative effect on UF activity. We failed to allot forces for intervening in the spontaneous people's movements or in building joint forums with other organisations. Hence we did not succeed in winning over the forces belonging to the revolutionary classes. Sectarianism is also quite serious in the movement, leadership and the lower levels in the party. This is seen in two forms; one, not going for joint activity on the common issues with other organisations even when they showed interest and two, engaging in sectarian activities which led to the breaking up of joint action committees.

Due to the ban on our Party and mass organisations, our comrades who are allotted for UF work have to work under severe limitations. Hence it is only by persevering in patient and persistent work over a long period of time that we will be able to establish our leadership over the united front.

## Party Work In Urban Areas

Our work of in urban areas till 1995 was mainly in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and West Bengal. The urban movements of other states by then were still in a preliminary stage.

The *Self Critical Report* document rectified the mistakes of left adventurism of the 1970s concerning the urban movement. It emphasized that tactics in urban areas should be in consonance with the line of protracted people's war. In Andhra Pradesh, the party was functioning under the guidance of the APSC circular of 1973: '**Our Work in Urban Areas**', and the CC document of 1980: '**Our Tactical Line**'. In practice, the party suffered some losses by going contrary to the basic perspective laid out in the above documents. But, it achieved some good results by overcoming the limitations and wrong understanding of these documents.

At the time of formation of the CC in 1980, the student movement was the principal urban movement. Our Party had some strength among the workers in Hyderabad and Vishakhapatnam cities but did not yet take root in other areas. We just began working among the youth (though we were working also in the literary and cultural fields, civil rights and employees, they are not covered under the present review). Between 1980 and 1984, the student movement spread to almost all the district centres and several tahasil centres. In the Singareni Collieries, SIKASA (Singareni Karmika Samakhya) emerged as the most influential of all the trade unions with effective organisers. Workers movement became active also in Hyderabad, Warangal, Vishakapatnam and other towns. Warangal town emerged as the strongest centre for the student and intellectual movements in addition to the youth movement.

In the first campaign of repression that began in 1985, our student, youth and workers' movements received a major setback. Facing repression by the end of 1984 itself, these organisations continued in some form even after 1985. Most of the organisers at district and tahasil centres were either retreated by us or killed in fake encounters. The Local organisation was disrupted and some fields were totally given up. But since 1986, we built secret organisations among students, youth and workers. In coastal and Rayalaseema areas, too, which faced relatively less intensive repression,

we suffered massive losses, even worse than Telangana which took the brunt of the brutal repression, because of weak Party forces and lack of proper guidance from the state leadership. In the brief period of respite for a few months in 1990, thousands of urban people participated in open activities. The workers movement picked up to some extent, and so did the student movement.

In the second enemy offensive campaign since 1991, the enemy eliminated the exposed elements among the workers. On the whole, though secret organisation has been the principal method since 1985 and we gained several victories, our urban movement has shrunk considerably due to the failure of the leadership to take correct decisions during enemy repression, and Party suffered severe losses.

Our Tactical Line, in essence was the same as that of the 1973 circular. The OTL suggested that the organisational form of trade unions would undergo transformation according to the course and development of the struggle and the tasks to be implemented. It emphasized the need for building secret mass organisations. Further, the document suggested that we should build anti-imperialist struggles, solidarity movements and armed self-defence squads; and the advanced elements from these movements should go to the rural areas to build peasant revolutionary movements. OTL reiterated in a more straight forward manner the suggestions made by the 1973 document on our line, development of mass organisations and mass struggles.

These documents correctly emphasized the importance of urban areas and the need to concentrate our efforts on the workers key sectors, to integrate their struggles with the peasant armed struggles, and to also pay special attention to the work among students, youth, intellectuals and middle classes. As a result of this approach a major breakthrough was made in the student movement and also the workers movement in the Singareni coal fields and later the working class in Hyderabad.

Though we rightly gave priority to the armed peasant struggles, and built urban movement, we failed to allot leadership to specialize in urban work. As a result, though several organisers and PRs worked in the urban movements prior to 1984, our forces could not be properly allocated by coordinating our long-term and immediate priorities. Though we developed several contacts in P & T, railways and RTC at that time, only a few

comrades were allocated to work for a short period, and were completely withdrawn in the name of failure to achieve quick results, shortage of organisers, or for other needs.

Though we said in *Our Tactical Line* of 1980 that we should not organise new workers' unions, we had to establish SIKASA in 1981 itself as a result of efforts made till then. No matter how spontaneous our practice has been, the decade-long experience gained in Singareni, Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam, Warangal and other areas where we concentrated our efforts, showed us that there is not only a need to join the unions with majority members, we should also fight for leadership, we should build new organisations in certain categories of organisations and we should not be adamant in the matter of building new workers' unions. In P&T, Railways, RTC, Teachers' Front, government employees, police, military and other such fields only, will we have to work in other unions for a long time.

When we look at the decade-long experience, the calls given by SIKASA, the struggles conducted or even the organisational forms, do not really fit the framework of a trade union though workers responded to its calls on a massive scale defying severe enemy repression. We confined our thinking on trade union organisation to those which ran with our politics and under our leadership, and therefore got alienated from the workers during enemy repression.

We should have taken up necessary organisational forms with totally unexposed elements to mobilise workers on a wide scale by utilising legal opportunities or should have worked by joining other unions where necessary.

Our *Tactical Line* emphasised on clandestine Party building. Since towns and cities are strong bases of the enemy, safeguarding the local leadership from exposure, and safeguarding the secret mechanisms is very essential.

Inadequate political and organisational training to the ranks, trends of economism, adoption of struggle forms which upset the secret organization, not creating layers in the organisational structure, not following 'tech' principles; lack of clarity on organising the urban movement as part of

PPW, lack of specialisation in urban work resulting in spontaneity in studying the urban movement and in taking decisions, loose recruitment, inadequate checking from above, giving prominence to quantity rather than quality—are some of the important factors responsible for the failures for a strong local organisation and for our party forces quickly getting exposed to the enemy.

### **9TH CONGRESS—ITS HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE IN ENRICHING THE PARTY’S POLITICAL-MILITARY LINE:**

The 9th Congress saw the emergence of an ideologically and politically mature party—a party of a new type—that had steeled itself in decades of intense class struggle. The party had acquired an All India character with its organisation in over a dozen states, a people’s guerrilla army - the PGA - and several departments.

The Congress saw the further consolidation and enrichment of the party line. While adhering firmly to the party’s basic line that was formulated in the 8th Congress in 1970, the 9th Congress made the necessary changes and enriched several concepts basing on the rich experiences acquired over the years and taking into account the political developments of the preceding three decades. It firmly fought both the “Right” and “Left” deviations that were seen in the forging of the three instruments of revolution - the party, Army and the UF - and in the formulation of tactics. It achieved a higher level of understanding regarding the concepts of people’s army, guerrilla zones, Base Areas and the revolutionary united front.

The 9th Congress thus rectified the shortcomings in the understanding of AISC of PW of 1995 and the Central Conference of PU of 1997 regarding the above concepts, emphasized the conscious role of the Party leadership in forging the three instruments of revolution and thereby created the ground for achieving a fresh breakthrough in the ongoing people’s war in the country.

The Congress correctly analysed the world situation, the all-round crisis of imperialism, the sharpening of the fundamental contradictions in the contemporary world and the focus of these contradictions by correctly



assessing the principal contradiction. Based on the analysis of the political situation the Congress identified the new tasks to be taken up at the present historic juncture.

The Congress addressed the ideological-political questions confronting the International Communist Movement today such as: the question of the formation of a new International, the guiding ideology of the proletariat, the General Crisis of Capitalism and its impact on the world, the question of the principal contradiction, the danger of war, the understanding on the nature of the present Era, the significance of national liberation struggles and the need to unify the two streams of the World Socialist Revolution, the danger of revisionism in the International Communist Movement, and so on. The Congress thus enriched the party's understanding on the above questions concerning the contemporary world situation and the ICM and adopted clear-cut proletarian stand-points.

The historic significance of the Congress lies in the circumstance that it was held in the background of the merger of the major revolutionary forces belonging to the CPI (ML) tradition. After the merger of the CPI(ML)(PW) and CPI(ML)(PU) in August 1998, and the merger of some breakaway groups and elements from other CPI(ML) organisations into our party, we can say that the unification of the genuine revolutionary forces originating from the CPI(ML) formed in April 1969 has been, to a large extent, completed.

The Congress firmly resolved to intensify the people's war and extend it to other parts of the country. It called upon the entire party to exert its utmost to establish liberated zones and chalked out concrete plans to achieve the same. It expressed its determination to achieve coordination with the ongoing national liberation movements in the country and to continue with the task of unification of the Communist Revolutionaries in all earnestness. It also identified the need to politically intervene in the issues of major political importance at the state and central levels and to build powerful mass movements with the perspective of forging a revolutionary united front. . It called on the party to cleanse itself of the various non-proletarian trends by undergoing a thoroughgoing rectification campaign and thereby proletarianise the party and make it fit enough to carry out the immense

tasks before the party.

### **Shortcomings identified in the 9th Congress:**

While the above are the positive achievements, both the erstwhile parties constituting the unified PW have several shortcomings and have committed some serious mistakes in the course of their respective revolutionary practice.

**Firstly**, we could not build a strong Party having both a core of PRs and a wide network of part-time PMs. The erstwhile PU lacked professionalism even in their leading Party committees which hampered the pace of the movement and gave rise to legalism in the Party.

**Secondly**, although armed guerrilla squads were formed, and even platoons and special squads in the case of the erstwhile PW, there was a lack of proper understanding on how to build the People's Army in the Indian conditions, where, unlike China, the Army had to be built from scratch. While the erstwhile PU failed to emphasise on the task of building regular guerrilla squads on a professional basis and hence had squads more with temporary or semi-permanent nature, the erstwhile PW, on the other hand, built all its squads and platoons on a permanent basis but failed to separate the military from the organisational squads in time, and in building an effective centralised command. This hampered the growth of a regular People's Guerilla Army under a centralised command.

**Thirdly**, organs of people's democratic power could not be established on par with the level of the people's war. In the Guerrilla Zones of NT and DK where conditions are ripe for establishing the organs of people's power, the erstwhile PW could fulfill this task only partially. In hundreds of villages, the old authority of the feudal forces was overthrown and the state much weakened, but the resulting vacuum could not be filled up by the New Power of the people. In the preparatory phase of Guerrilla Zones too the people's consciousness and preparedness for establishing their organs of political power has been lacking. This naturally led to the rise of trends such as economism and reformism in the movement.

**Fourthly**, we could not formulate appropriate tactics in time to counter the enemy's tactical offensives, and their reform and dole programmes,

etc. Lack of concrete study of the changing conditions on the ground and the lack of adequate plans in time resulted in a gap between our planning and the actual requirements. We did not adopt flexibility in the deployment of our forces and failed to take up the tactics of temporary retreat of our forces from some areas in face of massive enemy offensives. We could not implement the tactical slogans in the urban areas in the light of the tasks laid out in the Political Resolution.

**Fifthly**, we were unable to develop the needed perspective policy, and work methods, in respect of urban work, while taking into account the developing and changing conditions. Due to this we lost cadres in a big way in areas under repression, and we could not utilise our forces in other areas effectively.

**Lastly**, though there were several mass struggles in the various regions in the country, there was an overall failure in giving the mass struggles a political character, in linking them effectively to the ongoing people's war. The mass organisations had a limited membership and lacked mass character. In the case of the erstwhile PU, there was overemphasis on the prospects of legal movements and had laid more stress on building mass movements at the cost of building the Party and the armed struggle. Legalism emerged as a prominent trend in the mass organisations of the erstwhile PU while the erstwhile PW had some shortcomings in building the mass movement under conditions of extreme state repression.

The overall evaluation should be based on the policies adopted and the resultant practice in building up the three magic weapons of revolution—the Party, the people's army and the revolutionary United Front.

The 9th Congress, after summing up the past, drew the following lessons:

- 1) We must always keep Marxist-Leninist theory as the telescope and microscope in drawing up short-term and long term plans and perspectives and for studying the concrete objective realities. Neglect of theory and the concrete application of theory to the concrete conditions will lead us into a blind alley. This aspect has come out most glaringly on the question of building the People's Army in our country. Our experience has shown that reiteration of general principles alone is not enough and that the grasping of Marxism-Leninism-

Maoism is actually related to the concrete practice of advancing the revolution in all spheres.

- 2) We should always keep the objective of building and strengthening the three magic weapons of revolution in mind while drawing up our tasks from time to time in all spheres. All our work should be oriented towards this end from the higher to the lower levels of the Party. Neglect of this all-important task, has resulted in a relatively weak Party organisation, in only an embryonic form of army without a centralised command and halting United Front activity. Without strengthening the above three instruments of revolution, we cannot advance our People's War.
- 3) We should educate the entire rank and file of the Party on the importance of mass line in all our revolutionary work. It is not enough if the leadership alone understands this, or merely to state it as principles in our documents, literature and speeches is not sufficient. It should be grasped by the entire Party cadres through concrete application in our day-to-day practice and in the form of democratic centralism in the Party. Deviations from the mass line will lead to the neglect of building part-time Party cells, and broad-based mass organisations, mass movements and the United Front in the organisational sphere; sectarianism and subjectivism in the political and ideological spheres; and neglecting building the people's militia by arming the masses and a weak armed force and weak armed resistance within the military sphere.
- 4) We should always keep 'Politics in command'. The seizure of state power should be the goal of all our activity — whether in building the three instruments of revolution, or in conducting our day-to-day mass work, or in building the mass movement.  
Neglect of this central task will lead to economism in the movement and will confine the masses mainly to reformist practice.
- 5) The principal tasks drawn up by the Party should be fulfilled through special campaigns and time-bound plans from time to time. Without such a special drive under the direct supervision of the leadership, a qualitative improvement in Party membership, people's militia, organs of people's political power, counter offensives against the enemy

forces, rectification of deviations, etc., is not possible. The leadership should go down to the grass-roots, undertake concrete study of the situation and conduct the campaigns in accordance with the requirements. Reviews of the plans and campaigns should be taken up regularly.

- 6) The Party leadership should train itself and the entire Party to study the changing conditions in the course of advancing the People's war and formulate appropriate tactics and tasks from time to time. Refusal to analyse the changes in the situation will result in passivity and loss of initiative. Delayed assessment of the changes in enemy's tactics has resulted in heavy losses to our side and gave the enemy an upper hand. Political calls and policies should be formulated in time.
- 7) We must always be vigilant against the danger of alien ideological and political deviations within the Party and in the movement due to the influence of the surrounding society and the continuous influx of non-proletarian classes into the Party and the armed forces. Rectification should be taken up continuously in time-bound campaigns; criticism and self-criticism should be undertaken both within the Party and in front of the masses. The Party leadership should be accountable to the cadres and the entire Party to the masses.
- 8) Party committees should give real leadership to the Party and the movement of the concerned levels. They must acquire the skill and art of giving leadership, of resolving the problems confronting the movement in time, train up able revolutionary successors and ensure continuity of leadership and collective functioning should be consciously promoted at all levels. Leading Party committees should guard themselves against the danger of falling into spontaneity through proper planning.

# **PART-III**

## **POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEW OF POST-CONGRESS[DRAFT]**

### **INTRODUCTION**

While undertaking a review of the Party work and the development of the people's war and the three magic weapons during the past four years it is necessary to first understand the political developments during the same period. We have to assess the political situation both at the international and domestic level and our political conduct at various points of time.

Internationally, after the 9th Congress of the Party in February 2001, there has been a sea-change in the situation, especially after the attacks on WTC and Pentagon on 11th September 2001. US imperialism intensified its brutal attacks against the world people in the name of snuffing out terrorism. It first invaded Afghanistan in the end of 2001, and installed its puppet regime in Kabul after destroying Taliban. After an orchestrated campaign of lies about the so-called WMD alleged to be in the possession of Saddam Hussain, and arrogating to itself the right to maintain order in the world through preemptive strikes against any country that does not support its global hegemonic designs, US imperialism invaded Iraq in March 2003, brought indescribable misery, death and destruction to the people of Iraq. It has been threatening to invade Iran, Syria and other countries.

The acts of brutal aggression by US imperialism had aggravated its contradiction with the world people as well as with the other imperialist countries. The hatred of the people, especially the Muslim people, against US imperialists has reached an unprecedented degree during this period. The resistance of the people to the US imperialist aggression has become a worldwide phenomenon with daily attacks on the occupying US mercenaries in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

In India, the brutal fascist offensive by the BJP-led NDA government had been stepped up during this period against all sections of the people. The religious minorities particularly had become victims of continuous persecution by the Hindu chauvinist Sangh Parivar led by the BJP-RSS-

VHP-Bajrang Dal-Shiva Sena combine. The genocide of Muslims in Gujarat has shown the brutal fascist nature of these chauvinist gangs. The country had been further sold out to the imperialists during this period by the NDA government at the Centre and by the various parties in power in the states. Thousands of muslim youth had been eliminated in Kashmir valley. The people had become so disgusted with the policies and misrule of the BJP-led NDA government that it was trounced in the April 2004 elections.

In the past four years since the 9th Congress, we tried to formulate and implement plans, policies and tactics based on the higher level of understanding arrived in the 9th Congress regarding the concepts of people's army, guerrilla zones, base areas and the revolutionary united front

The 9th Congress derived lessons by reviewing the past practice in the light of MLM. It drew up the immediate ideological-political-organisational-military tasks for advancing the people's war in the country by taking into account the domestic and international situation, state of the subjective forces, situation in the various regions and enemy tactics.

The CCEM, CC, PB, CMC, RBs, CPB, SUCOMO, CMSC and SCOPE took all the important political-organizational-military decisions and tasks related to Party, Army and the United Front in the past four years basing on the enriched understanding and the above tasks drawn by the Congress. The major decisions taken in the past four years are:

1. Formation of PB, CMC, RBs, CPB, SUCOMO, CMSC, SCOPE; formation of Commissions, Commands and various departments in States/Special Zones; Carrying out education campaign throughout the Party on the documents adopted by the Congress and uniting the entire Party around the Party line; conducting the Rectification campaign throughout the Party and strengthening the party ideologically and politically;
2. Consolidation and expansion of PGA and intensification of the guerrilla war;
3. Building Guerrilla Bases as part of the process of establishing Base Areas;
4. Expansion and development of new perspective zones;

5. Consolidation and expansion of the Party;
6. Consolidation and expansion of mass organizations and building UF in various forms;
7. Political mobilization of the masses on political-tactical slogans;
8. Unity of the genuine Maoist revolutionaries, and so on.

Let us review the decisions and practice of the past four years based on MLM and the direction given by the 9th Congress so that we can make further advances in our people's war by strengthening the PGA and transforming it into PLA, establishing Base Areas and building a powerful united front under the leadership of our Party.

### **Positive Achievements and Weaknesses in brief**

To sum up, in the past four years after the 9th Congress, our positive achievements are primary while the negative aspects and weaknesses in the movement are secondary. It is important that we analyse the positive and negative based on the concrete objective and subjective situation during this period. If we do not take into consideration the overall condition of the enemy and our forces, and try to arrive at assessments based on whether qualitative breakthroughs are made or not, i.e., purely based on the results achieved, then we will become victims of subjectivism and will lose sight of the positive achievements.

Likewise, if we do not identify the serious weaknesses and shortcomings in the movement, then it will be impossible to rectify these weaknesses. Hence it is very important that we maintain the correct balance between these two aspects and make a sober assessment of what we could have done with the existing subjective forces and in the given concrete conditions in various states and at the central level.

What are the positive achievements during this period?

#### **1. Further consolidation and expansion of the Party:**

Overall, during this period, there has been a growth and further consolidation of the Party, PGA and the revolutionary mass organizations and an increase in the united front activity. The mass base of the Party had expanded and further deepened. The Rectification campaigns helped in



the further integration of the Party with the oppressed masses.

Though the growth in the Party membership and the number of professional revolutionaries was not very significant when seen as a whole, the quality of the cadres had improved in this period. The CC and the state committees, in general, had become ideologically, politically, organizationally more mature, and more experienced and were further consolidated into collective leadership teams. The number in the SC/SZCs and their quality has increased in some states.

Likewise, the district/divisional committees had also become further consolidated into collective teams and their ability to independently grapple with the issues confronting the movement has grown. Although the number of members in ACs increased in some states, overall, there is not much improvement of quality. In some pockets of some states village party committees have come into existence.

In spite of heavy losses in AP and NT, our party has become steeled in this period; the Party's numerical strength and quality on the whole has improved though in a few states there has been stagnation. We gained new experience through firmly adhering and implementing our line.

Non-proletarian trends, which were identified by the 9th Congress, were sought to be rectified through ideological-political education and remoulding as well as through further integration with the masses and deeper involvement in the class struggle. The Education and Rectification campaign had helped in the ideological-political development of the Party's rank and file. As a whole the Party became further consolidated during this period.

## **2. Formation and development of PGA:**

We gained rich experience in waging guerilla war after the formation of the PGA. The formation, strengthening, and expansion of commissions and commands is an important feature. Carrying out planned, time-bound programmes and involving the entire Party around the principal task such as TCOCs, as a part of intensifying the guerilla war with the perspective of building PLA and establishing Base Areas is a new experience.

There is an increase in the recruitment into all the three wings of PGA. The people's militia, which was quite weak at the time of the 9th Congress, had relatively increased in both numbers and quality. There is regular training to the militia, arming of the militia and involvement of the militia units in all types of activity against the enemy including active armed resistance. In fact, wherever there is considerable growth of the people's militia, besides the Secondary and Main force, and an increase in the coordinated armed resistance of the Main, Secondary and the Base forces, the enemy had failed to destroy the mass organizations, organs of people's democratic power, and the Party units in those areas. The growth and the active participation of the militia in the ongoing people's war is also an important factor that has contributed to the establishment and consolidation of the GB areas and organs of people's political power.

There is not only quantitative growth in the PGA but also in its quality—in its military fighting skills, training in different types of combat, waging guerilla war in different conditions such as forests, semi-forest, hilly tracts, plains, etc., analytical capabilities of the PGA leadership at various levels, coordinated actions and joint operations, and so on.

The period has seen the formation of military commissions at the Central and state levels, as well as operational Military Commands at the sub-zonal/regional and district levels. All the important tactical manouvres and operations were conducted directly under the leadership of the Commissions and Commands. This had greatly helped in bringing about a qualitative change in the type of military operations, enhanced the awareness of the Party as a whole in military matters, brought uniformity in military sphere in the Party as a whole, imparted politico-military education through classes, training camps and publishing military literature, and, most important of all, direct leadership was given by the Commissions and Commands to the PGA in the tactical manouvres and operations.

Good experience has been accumulated by the Commissions, Commands and the units of the PGA's three wings in the past four years, which needs to be further synthesized. We had also understood the war we are waging against the vastly superior Indian state in a better way and also how to wage the war in the concrete conditions prevailing in the country

that is characterized by glaring unevenness in socio-economic development and vast differences in the terrain.

### **3. Development of guerilla bases, guerilla zones, and expansion of armed struggle into new areas:**

In accordance with the decision of the 9th Congress and basing on the enriched understanding of the concept of guerilla zones, guerilla bases and base areas, we took up planned work in selected strategic areas within the guerilla zones to develop guerilla bases with the perspective of establishing Base Areas. Time-bound targets for completing the preparations were fixed and were fulfilled to a large extent. The development of the guerilla bases and organs of people's democratic power at various levels had reaffirmed the correctness of our political-military line. The armed resistance of the masses and their overall participation in the people's war had enhanced in the course of establishing the guerilla bases.

The past four years had given us rich experience in building the guerilla bases with the perspective of establishing base areas, in building and running the organs of people's democratic political power both at the village level as well as at the "Area" levels and the problems related to these.

The experience is very valuable, as it has trained the Party cadres in preparations, formation and running the people's government at the Village and Area level and to organize the masses against the enemy forces in defense of the people's power.

Guerilla war had further intensified and extended to new areas during this period. In AP, the Nallamala-Guntur forest region was developed into a guerilla zone within the target of two years as decided by the State Conference. Thus guerilla war had expanded to other parts of AP during this period and several tactical counteroffensive operations or campaigns were carried out. This expansion had assisted the ongoing revolutionary movement in NT and AOB.

In BJ, after recognizing the level of the movement of KK-Magadh region as a GZ, we had intensified guerrilla war against the state, with the immediate task of formation of GBs with the perspective of BA.

In BJO, the armed clashes with the class enemies had intensified and the guerrilla war against the state had grown more intense. A new battle zone is developing in the strategic region of Western Ghats in Karnataka. We had also expanded into some new areas in some states.

#### **4. Unification of genuine Maoist revolutionaries:**

Unity with the MCCI is perhaps the biggest achievement of the Party since the 9th Congress. It signified a qualitative leap in Party building and Army building in India and laid a stronger basis for the forging of a powerful revolutionary united front. Our Party, just like the MCCI, played a principled, positive role in the entire process of merger. The CC, particularly the PB, had to spend quite some time in studying the MCCI documents, conducting unity talks and bilateral discussions on various ideological-political-military-organisational issues, and in preparing the final joint documents for the unified Party.

In the 9th Congress, we took the decision to “*hold talks with the MCC and strive to maintain fraternal relations*”. However, we placed the blame for the clashes and the tense situation in Bihar-Jharkhand only on the MCC and did not make proper self-criticism for the mistakes on our part. We stated that the clashes were due to the antagonistic attitude adopted by the MCC and its attacks against the erstwhile PU for over a decade.

After the 9th Congress, starting with the first historic bilateral meeting between the two Parties in August 2001, there was a qualitative change in the relations between the two Parties due to realization from both sides on the urgent need for unity of the two major Maoist Parties of India that have been consistently pursuing armed agrarian revolutionary war in the country for over three decades basing on a correct ideological-political-military-organisational line.

Hence, with the proletarian spirit of achieving principled unity based on MLM, and in the greater interest of the Indian revolution, our Party’s high-level delegation, in spite of a serious political difference, boldly decided in the February ’03 bilateral meeting to withdraw the 9th Congress’s formulation regarding the fundamental contradiction between the CBB and the Indian masses from the common documents of the unified Party.

Our CC also approved this decision which reflected its high degree of political maturity. It took another year-and-a-half of bilateral discussions to finalise the common documents and the merger process.

## **5. Developing Political Tactics:**

There was a planned effort to build political mass movements around the political-tactical slogans adopted by the 9th Congress and we could succeed in developing such movements by forming broad-based united fronts in some states and at the central level. We exposed the policies of the ruling classes consistently and led the people in different movements against the neo-liberal economic policies and fascist attacks of the ruling classes, targeted the WB-IMF-WTO and the imperialists, particularly the US imperialists.

The understanding of the Party has developed further with regard to political intervention in a concrete given situation. Political exposures and mobilizations had grown.

The political tactics adopted in some states, especially the three zones in AP, as during the last elections, and during talks in 2002 and 2004, had a positive political impact on the people as a whole. We could derive political advantages through these political tactics, which helped further advance the people's war. We could utilize the contradictions within the ruling classes on some occasions.

Besides the above-mentioned major achievements during this period, there are also some more achievements such as our positive role in the international relations based on proletarian internationalism, particularly our bilateral relations with the genuine Maoist forces in the world such as the CPN(Maoist), CoRIM, CPP, TKP/ML, etc.; formation of CCOMPOSA and our participation in various international forums along with several other Maoist and other anti-imperialist forces; our consistent internal struggle against sectarianism in some of the Maoist forces with regard to building broad front against imperialism and uniting the various Maoist forces on a common platform; and so on.

To sum up, we can conclude that three major breakthroughs—merger of the two major Maoist Parties in our country and the formation of a

unified Party after years of splits and disunity, expansion and strengthening of the guerrilla army with the merger of the PGA and PLGA, and the formation of organs of people's political power at the village and area level signify qualitative leaps in the ongoing people's war in our country.

### **Our Weaknesses and Shortcomings:**

#### **1. Failure to stop further losses in NT and AP:**

At the time of the state conference of NT, we assessed that the movement has gone into the defensive. In the past four years there were continuous attempts to revive the movement in NT but we failed in achieving this.

In the CC-2 meeting we assessed that the movement in NT was in the ebb and that it would take a relatively longer period of time for the movement to recover. Basing on this assessment, we evolved specific tactics for implementation in the specific situation in NT. In October 2003, we tried to check further losses by consciously withdrawing a significant section of the comrades belonging to various levels from the Zone and shifting them to other strategic Zones. The enemy's all-round offensive was stepped up continuously but we were not able to effectively counter the tactics of the enemy. Our resistance to the enemy remained weak. Overall, our condition had further deteriorated in NT and we suffered heavy losses of our subjective forces including leadership some cadres during the period after the Congress.

In AP too, we suffered serious losses during this period as a whole. In the guerilla zone of South Telangana, our forces had become numerically weakened when compared to the strength at the time of the state conference. Although the tempo of the resistance is maintained in AP throughout this period, thereby keeping the morale of the cadres and people relatively high, our areas had shrunk and the cadre strength has come down to some extent.

#### **2. Weaknesses in Party building:**

Our continuous attempts to build party units at the primary level did not bring any significant results during this period in some important states such as AP and NT. In DK and AOB there was some growth in the

number of primary party units but the local leadership has to be developed further politically. Heavy repression by the enemy in these states became a big hurdle for the functioning of the party cells. Destruction of the party cells, then rebuilding them; again being destroyed by the enemy and once again rebuilding them...this is the process through which the party building has been going on in several states, particularly NT, AP and AOB, where the enemy repression is continuously growing. Surrender of several Party cadre besides serious losses of leadership at various levels had also contributed to our weakness in Party building.

We resolved in the 9th Congress to make special effort to build the Party and develop leadership from the basic classes and special social sections but the progress is not much satisfactory. Although we recruited a good number from Adivasis and women into the Party, very few of them are promoted to the leadership positions. Our Party is still weak in the working class, agricultural labourers, and the most oppressed sections of society such as Dalits, Muslims, etc. We have to more deeply review the shortcomings in our practice and rectify this by drawing proper lessons in this aspect.

### **3. Shortcomings in Urban Work:**

We decided to allot forces for specialization in urban work and prepared the perspective paper on Urban Work by 2002 itself but we did not achieve any significant progress in the urban front. Except in one or two states, there was no concrete planning by the CC and RBs to educate the leading cadres in their concerned states on the urban perspective or to allot forces for specialization in urban work. Thus lack of conscious effort and orientation on the part of the central leadership is a principal weakness in our work in the urban front.

Another serious limitation is the shortage of able and experienced organizers suitable for urban work. The problem of proper coordination and guidance from the Party leadership in the areas of armed struggle to the urban movement is another major hurdle for achieving progress in urban work. In these states due to the problem of imparting regular education and guidance to the urban cadre by the Party leadership and the severe constraints it had been facing in coordinating with the urban units in some

of these states, even the few recruits from the urban areas had to be shifted to the rural areas instead of absorbing them into the urban movement in a planned manner.

#### **4. Weakness in building political movements and responding timely to issues:**

The overall consciousness to build mass political movements on the major issues of the day has no doubt grown in this period among our Party cadres working in various fronts. However, given the growing favourable political situation in the country and the need for intervention in the political events occurring from time to time, the work in this front is far short of the requirements. Serious weaknesses continue in identifying the important political and mass issues and responding in time, in correctly analyzing the contradictions within the ruling classes and utilizing them, in tactically intervening in the political developments in the country and internationally, and so on. The Party committees at various levels still lack the necessary political initiative in this aspect.

#### **5. Weakness in making concrete class analysis:**

The problem of making concrete class analysis in the areas where we are working still persists. In areas of armed struggle where there has been a drastic change in class relations due to our struggle, our understanding has not changed accordingly. Hence we have to change the tactics in accordance with the changing class relations, mobilize the masses in class struggle, take up necessary forms of organizations and struggles and make the necessary changes in the functioning of the Party committees.

### **Strengthening The Party To successfully Lead The People's War**

Our Party's 9th Congress made a historic review of the past, drew lessons and formulated guidelines with the aim of strengthening the foundations for developing our Party into an able, proletarian vanguard organization for leading the new democratic revolution as an inseparable part of the world revolution successfully in our country. Our Party provided leadership to the people and the PGA in the past three and half years with the aim of achieving the goals set by the Congress.



It faced new challenges in the new situation. By confronting these challenges our Party acquired new experiences. Although there were significant achievements in the past four years in fulfilling the decided tasks, there were also some major failures. However, achievements are primary.

Achieving unity with the MCCI, intensifying the guerilla war and strengthening the PGA under our Party leadership, establishing people's political power in some pockets of guerilla zones at village-level as part of the aim of establishing base areas—these three victories have great significance in the history of the Indian revolutionary movement. These will have great influence on the development of the revolution in future. These are the result of the ideological-political-organisational-military effort that we made in order to fulfill the tasks adopted by the Congress.

Our failures in politically mobilizing the vast masses into militant, powerful mass democratic political movements and class struggles and thereby deepen the Party's mass base; in laying strong foundations and developing the urban movement in accordance with the 'urban perspective'; in consolidating the Party and PGA in accordance with the need of the movement and preserving our subjective forces, have hampered the fulfillment of the goals set by the 9th Congress. They had negative influence on the development of the people's war in the country.

The main reasons for our failures and for non-fulfillment of the goals set by the various committees are: failure to understand the Party policies, tasks and tactics in real spirit and firmly and creatively implement the same; not formulating the tactics and work methods appropriate to the changing situation and implementing them; enemy onslaught; non-proletarian trends, and so on.

Now let us analyze the revolutionary practice of our Party in the past four years in the light of MLM, and its development in the course of implementing the tasks set by the 9th Congress. For this the following aspects should be reviewed:

1. Consolidation of the Party committees,
2. Functioning of the Party Committees,

3. Tactics,
4. Strengthening the Party,
5. ERC,
6. Education,
7. Unity,
8. International Fraternal relations.

## **1. Consolidation of Party Committees:**

In order to fulfill higher political-military-organizational tasks decided by the Congress and to provide effective leadership of the Party to achieve the targets, we formed a large CC, a PB, CMC, RBs, Central Publishing Bureau, and two central sub-committees. Likewise, relatively greater number of members was elected to the state/special zonal committees. Secretariats and military commissions and commands at the state/special zonal level and regional/sub-zonal level military commands were formed. Committees were formed in some states/special zones for education.

For the first time in our Party history, we formed various new Bureaus, Commissions, Commands, sub-committees. Thus by setting up separate Party committees for specializing in a particular sphere, we overcame the situation where a single Party committee looked after the military, mass organizations and various fronts. These structures began to be set up in the course of holding the various Conferences that were held as part of the preparations for the Congress and continued to develop later in the course of consolidation of the Party. Most of these leadership structures developed as collective teams of our Party.

In NT and AP, due to the heavy losses in the severe repression by the enemy, we had to either dissolve or shorten SMCs and Regional/Sub-Zonal Commands. In order to consolidate the central and state leaderships and the commissions, commands, departments etc., as strong collective leadership or commanding teams, we have to take up specialized study in the concerned front; evolve the proper methods of functioning of each body and proper methods of coordination between the various bodies; provide direct leadership, gain experience and grip over the movement; and take new members in to the bodies where needed;

When we sum up the experiences of the past four years, we can certainly say that the tasks formulated by the 9th Congress are correct, that we had mainly succeeded in consolidating Party committees at various levels, and the Party leadership in the military front has also strengthened. We have to further consolidate these bodies and expand them wherever there is necessity. But most of the leadership teams of the mass fronts and of the departments in various fronts are still quite weak and we failed to consolidate them properly and also failed to reconstitute SCOPE.

We could not consolidate them or make them function in accordance with the needs and tasks of the movement due to the following reasons: spontaneity in the committee functioning; shortcomings in developing necessary tactics and work methods; severe losses of leadership and continuous repression; non-proletarian trends, etc.

When we keep the experience acquired in the past four years we find that the need for these bodies has increased even more. We have to develop and expand more and more leadership teams consisting of new elements and basic class leadership from the village to higher levels. Sufficient members should be developed in all Party committees and commands to provide Party leadership to all fronts. Secretariats should be developed from SCs to ACs. Collective team functioning should be further strengthened at all levels and thereby individual functioning should be rectified. Proper secret functioning methods and proper tech mechanism of all committees should be built to safeguard leadership from the enemy's multi-pronged onslaught. We have to ideologically-politically-organizationally consolidate and strengthen them by chalking out time-bound plans. For this we should reconstitute SCOPE and effectively use it to impart education in the Party. We have to take specialization as an urgent task from the Central to the Area level. We should give special attention to strengthen the Party and leadership of urban movement and the mass organizations. We should develop proper methods and mechanism for the coordination of open/legal and secret/illegal work.

## **2. Functioning of the CC:**

The 9th Congress reviewed the shortcomings in the functioning of the CC and suggested measures to rectify them so as to develop the functioning

in accordance with the needs of the movement. We made an in-depth review of the shortcomings that occurred in implementing the central tasks, in analyzing the concrete socio-economic-political conditions, enemy repression, level of the movement etc., from time to time and adopt appropriate tactics, and so on and decided to rectify this work style and method of functioning. We undertook this review by recognizing that developing the functioning of the CC is the key aspect for developing the Party as an able warrior skillfully using the two weapons of army and the united front for the victory in the revolution.

In the past four years there is positive development on the part of the Central and state committees, commissions and commands in implementing the central and other tasks, in carrying out the task through planned time-bound campaigns, and in functioning collectively. We had achieved significant developments in four years of people's war as mentioned in the introduction.

The CC, as the highest leadership committee in the Party, bears the principal responsibility for the positive and negative aspects in all the decisions and practice of the Party in the past four years. Hence it is essential to go into the ideological-political roots of the weaknesses and shortcomings in the functioning of the CC, particularly its role in leading and advancing the revolutionary war. Let us analyse its role and functioning in this period and conduct criticism and self-criticism for rectifying the weaknesses and shortcomings by going into the roots of the problem. This will be the decisive factor in uniting the entire Party and strengthening the leadership.

### **(i) Response to the political changes in the international and domestic situation:**

Within a short period after our Congress the September 11 incidents took place which shook the entire world and brought about a significant change in the world situation with far-reaching consequences. The US imperialists occupied Afghanistan and later Iraq by mobilizing some other imperialist powers and several comprador governments in the Third World countries. In the name of combating terrorism, the US and other imperialist powers and their compradors in the Third World unleashed a world-wide

campaign of brutal state fascist terror against the revolutionary and democratic movements and national liberation movements. The policies of LPG were more aggressively thrust on the various countries throughout the world and the interference by the World Bank-IMF-WTO and other imperialist agencies reached new proportions.

In India too, as part of the world-wide conspiracy, fascist acts like POTA were introduced; the nationality struggles, revolutionary movements and various democratic struggles were brutally suppressed; communal fascist attacks and massacres were organized against the Muslim minorities in Gujarat and elsewhere. Country-wide offensive was stepped up against the revolutionary movement. LPG policies were implemented on a far greater scale during the BJP-led NDA regime opening up every sector to the domination of the imperialist capital.

The World Bank and the imperialists, who made AP as their experimental state for implementing reforms and repression of the revolutionary movement, launched their multi-pronged attack through their trusted agent, Chandrababu Naidu. Hundreds of our cadre, leadership and sympathizers were killed in fake encounters. Thousands of peasants committed suicide

The PB, on behalf of the CC, analysed many of these developments and released circulars pointing out the political-organisational tactics to be adopted. It issued press statements from time to time on the developments. Our Party committees and mass organizations mobilized the people on most of these issues. In states where we have some strength we tried to build political movements on these issues. At the All-India level, some centralized programmes were taken up. We exposed US imperialism as the No.1 enemy of the world people, the anti-people nature of imperialist globalization, the great danger of Hindu fascism, and the fascist, authoritarian rule of the TDP regime in AP. All these won over some allies to our side and exposed the main enemies before the people at large.

However, due to the shortcomings in the functioning and coordination of PB, at times we could not promptly release the circulars and distribute throughout the Party. Likewise, we could not build powerful militant political mass movements at the central or state level. We could not combine these political propaganda and agitation effectively with the guerrilla war in order

to advance the people's war. By overcoming these weaknesses we will be able to achieve greater victories in our tactics and enhance the role of the masses in the people's war.

### **(ii) Implementing the Central task:**

It is a common Marxist principle that seizure of state power through war remains the central task in revolution in any country from the initial stages to the final capture of power. However, this principle has to be applied differently to different countries depending on the concrete conditions. Moreover, as part of applying to the concrete conditions of a country, the Party line, policies and tactics have to be formulated and developed in the actual practice of the revolution. And the necessary changes in tactics have to be made, even as the basic Party line remains unchanged, during the various phases of the revolution and in accordance with the ebb and flow of the movement and major changes in the international and domestic situation. The ability and skill of the leadership lies in developing the tactics necessary for the victory of the revolution and driving the entire Party rank and file, people's army and the masses to implement these tactics with unflinching determination. With the above understanding, let us analyse the effort made by the CC in implementing the central task in the past four years and identify the mistakes that occurred in practice.

We decided our immediate central task as building guerrilla bases in DK, NT, AOB, Koel-Kaimur as part of the process of establishing Base Areas in these zones by strengthening and expanding PGA and intensifying the guerrilla war. We drew up the ideological-political-organisational-military tasks from time to time in the past four years in order to implement the above central task. As part of this we strengthened the PGA and expanded it, strengthened the commissions and commands, enhanced the political-military training of the PGA, organized the TCOCs to defeat the counter-revolutionary war of the reactionary ruling classes. We succeeded to an extent in destroying the enemy forces, seizing weapons and improving the fire-power of the PGA, and bringing military formations up to company. We conducted classes and collective study on the S&T, central POR and other basic documents throughout the Party. A circular was released by

the CC on RPCs based on which the SC/SZCs worked out circulars and concrete guidelines for RPCs in their respective states. DKSZC prepared the policy programme for RPCs with the aim of consolidating the people's political power at the local level and developing it to higher levels.

At present the RPCs, as organs of new political power of the oppressed masses, are developing the political-economic-social-cultural life of the people. We are trying to expand them basing on the strength of the Party, PGA and the consolidated strength of the mass organizations and the unity of the masses in these areas. We achieved positive results in implementing the central task in DK and AOB. But in NT, with the further decline in the movement after the Congress, we had to temporarily shelve the plan of immediately forming the GBs. We are intensifying the guerrilla war in the GZs of Nallamala, KK and GO-BL. We are making preparations in the new perspective areas keeping the central task in mind.

However, although we made positive effort and achieved some result in implementing the central task and our understanding had grown in this respect, it is a fact that we could not fulfill the targets fully. The main reasons for this failure are our political-organisational-military shortcomings in advancing the central task and the following long-term weaknesses in the Party that are still persisting and which have to be overcome: weaknesses in enhancing the active role of the masses in the war thereby hastening the process of building a powerful army; in assessing the enemy offensive and defeating it; in adopting appropriate political tactics; in coordinating military actions and tactics with mass political movements and tactics; in concentration of the leadership on the task of establishing people's political power; problem of orientation in building the peasant movement; and in continuously expanding the movement areas based on a policy of consolidation-expansion.

There is also an urgent need for improving our fire-power and various types of equipment and technology to take on the superior enemy equipped with highly sophisticated technology, to increase the number and level of our military formations, and to solve the problems that are arising in the process of transforming guerrilla war into mobile warfare. We have to enhance the political consciousness and military skills of the Part members

and PGA forces who hail mainly from the peasantry. By studying and creatively applying the Maoist principles of people's war to our concrete conditions, by learning from our rich experiences, and striving hard to solve the problems of building the PLA and establishing people's political power, we can overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings.

**(iii) Shortcomings in studying the problems of the movement in time and implementing the resolutions:**

Our 9th Congress had identified the three major shortcomings in NT, i.e., failure to assess the changes in enemy tactics in time and adopting counter-tactics; failure to form the PGA in appropriate time; and failure to concretely study the changes in class relations in the areas of our armed struggle. We tried to rectify these shortcomings in the period after the Congress. However, we could not bring any qualitative change in the situation and, in fact, we suffered more losses in NT during this period but were able to sustain our organization in the zone in face of fascist repression.

The CC's study of the concrete condition and tactics to be adopted in NT in order to bring a resurgence of the movement is still partial. The CC has to study how to more creatively apply the principles of people's war to the concrete conditions in NT and AP, develop the tactics for such areas, solve the problem of involving the masses on a large-scale in guerrilla war and other forms of struggle in such areas of white terror, and thereby achieve a breakthrough in the people's war in the country. The CC has to accomplish this through concrete field study, collective study and discussion, and firm implementation of the resolutions adopted. The danger of Right and Left deviations in the Party can be defeated only by strictly doing the above.

We also failed to undertake the study of the agrarian relations and class analysis in Punjab and other advanced areas in the country though we resolved to do so in the Congress. This certainly has a negative impact on developing the movement in Punjab and other areas of advanced socio-economy.

The main shortcomings in the CC in implementing the decisions taken are: failure to run SCOPE for imparting ideological-political education to the Party and to reconstitute it after its dissolution in end-2002; failure to



bring out people's war regularly as an ideological-political weapon of the Party; failure to run SUCOMO effectively; and lapses in completing the social investigation of our struggle areas and to develop our tactics basing on these studies. Overall, when we keep the needs of our movement, our work in the ideological sphere has been inadequate. Hence this is reflected on all spheres of our movement. It is very much necessary for the CC to overcome the spontaneity and liberalism in its functioning and develop proper methods of collective functioning to overcome the above shortcomings.

Weaknesses are continuing in the work style of the CC firmly and effectively implementing the tasks and decisions taken throughout the Party. This is not only affecting the implementation of the decisions and tasks taken but is also resulting in making superficial and one-sided reviews. This is becoming a hurdle for learning from our experiences.

We are not able to achieve the desired results as we are not implementing some of the decisions taken in the various fronts in time and executing the plans effectively. We have to more seriously work out time-bound plans in the states once the task is taken in the CC, mobilize the entire Party to execute the plans with firm determination, and apply the plans creatively at the lower levels and mobilize the vast masses. The CC has to shoulder the responsibility of educating and driving the entire Party around the task. The individual CC members have to personally bear the responsibility of carrying this out in his/her area of work division.

#### **(iv) Functioning:**

The formation and functioning of a larger CC with three-in-one combination in line with the direction of the Congress to advance and expand the people's war, the formation of the various central bodies, solution of the problems of functioning and coordination in course of the work, and consolidation of these bodies is the foremost positive achievement. Another positive achievement in the functioning of the CC and other Party committees is the formulation of tasks and tactics by assessing the overall situation, fixing time-bound targets and carrying out campaigns to fulfill the major tasks. During this period PB concentrated mainly on achieving unity with MCCI, guiding the various RBs and central bodies, and releasing circulars and press statements on developments in the international and

domestic situation. It established and developed the functioning of the Centre. The ERC helped in rectifying the non-proletarian trends to some extent and improving the functioning of the various bodies.

Along with the CC, all central bodies held their meetings regularly. As our CC is a larger body and there is regular functioning of other bodies such as PB, CMC, RBs, CPB, there were three meetings of the CC in the past 3-½ years. The PB meetings were held regularly as planned. Due to the need for coordinating various works, repression and technical difficulties, spontaneity in the functioning, and other factors, RBs could not hold meetings regularly and could not allot sufficient time for the meetings. The CC and all the Central Bodies have to improve the methods of conducting the meetings such as making proper preparations, submitting comprehensive reports, fixing optimum duration for the meetings, rectifying the method of discussion and method of synthesis, implementing democratic centralism, taking more serious precautions in safeguarding the secrets of the Committee meetings, and rectifying our workstyle and method of conducting the meetings to keep on par with the intensity of enemy repression. These changes in the method of conducting our meetings are very essential for successfully solving the problems that our revolutionary movement is facing and for strengthening the central leadership, especially at a time when the enemy is hatching plans to specially wipe out our leadership.

The experience of the past four years shows that the decision to enlarge the CC and set up the various central bodies is correct and had helped greatly in fulfilling the objectives set by the Party Congress and for the development of the Party core. There were some problems in the functioning of the CC as the supreme collective leadership team of Party due to some shortcomings in old comrades and the gap between the old and new comrades. There were problems with regard to common understanding and assessment of the movement, particularly regarding the important tasks and problems faced by the movement, workstyle, coordination, lack of experience etc. Likewise, there were some problems between the central bodies related to the CC such as between PB and all other Central Bodies and between CMC and RBs, on such questions like rights and duties, coordination and mutual relationship. These problems are being resolved by enhancing our collective understanding regarding democratic centralism,

upholding the Party line and spirit, and rectifying the mistakes in functioning. The PB also could not concentrate on some planned tasks and some had to postpone some due to its involvement in the unity process during this period.

There is need to resolve some more major problems arising in the functioning of the CC by basing on the principle of democratic centralism and developing proper methods of work. These are:

- (i) Improving the coordination between PB and various Central bodies, and between the Central bodies and state committees and other departments;
- (ii) The question whether CCMs with dual membership i.e., those who are also acting as state secretaries, can express their difference of opinion in their concerned SCs;
- (iii) Developing common understanding in the entire CC regarding the movement in various states, particularly those in the guerrilla zones and areas of advanced class struggle;
- (iv) Problem of speaking outside the committee in such a way as to dilute the decisions of the committee or expressing one's own differences with the committee decisions after the meeting with other members;
- (v) Overcoming the strong trend of petty-bourgeois individualism along with liberalism in firmly implementing the decisions made;
- (vi) Developing the method and mechanism for conducting inner-Party struggle in a healthy manner and thereby rectify wrong trends and further enrich the Party line and achieve higher unity; and so on.

It is necessary to conduct inner-Party struggle and debate in a healthy, democratic method and reject the wrong trends and weaknesses by going into the ideological roots of the differences that arise in the Party, identify the problems arising while implementing the Party line and deeply discussing and taking up the study of these questions. The wrong opinions, wrong trends and methods that are of a serious character, cannot always be confined to organizational framework but may have to be elevated to ideological-political level and inner-Party debate conducted at various levels. Such debates should be conducted based on Maoist methods of unity-

struggle-unity.

During this period, inner-Party struggle broke out in Karnataka and West Bengal. In Karnataka, there was Right trend in a section of the state leadership regarding how to advance the armed struggle in the Perspective area in the state. There is influence of the phase theory regarding the preparations for armed struggle. The inner-Party struggle was conducted throughout the Karnataka Party based on healthy, democratic method and the struggle was resolved in a special Conference. In West Bengal, the state secretary Manik, and some others, raised some political issues in the state plenum which were defeated. Later, Manik and his handful of followers left the Party and fled from the revolutionary movement as they were not prepared to conduct the struggle within the Party. It is unfortunate that they did not try to adhere to the principle of democratic centralism or to wage inner-Party struggle in a principled manner but chose to liquidate the Party by hurling all sorts of lies and abuse and bring an alternative Right revisionist line in place of the line of PPW. However, even after they left the Party, we conducted polemical debate on some of the questions raised by them. Right and Left deviations and trends had appeared in some Party committees and individuals and in some cases these are being expressed in an anarchist, non-organisational manner. Such wrong methods and practice might ultimately lead to liquidationism and disruption. Hence we must educate the cadres to raise their views in proper democratic methods in their concerned Party units so as to conduct the debate in a healthy manner.

At the present juncture it is very essential for the CC to enhance its ideological-political-organisational-military abilities to lead the movement, analyse, and synthesise the experience to fulfill the growing needs of the revolutionary movement. For this, the CC and PB should develop as collective political centres and concentrate on developing their ideological-political depth, organizational-military abilities, creatively apply MLM to the problems that our revolutionary movement is facing in various states, drive the entire Party rank and file to implement the decisions and tasks taken by the CC and PB, identify and rectify the non-proletarian trends that arise in the Party from time to time and Bolshevise the Party, synthesise the experiences to further advance our people's war, and develop their overall abilities to provide direct leadership to the various Party committees

and fronts. The problem of holding PB meetings frequently persists due to the type of responsibilities that the PBMs are shouldering at present. Hence we must try to form a Standing Committee which can act as a regular Centre and give directions to the Party without any gap. Even if this cannot be done at least three comrades of PB should stay in the Centre and perform this task.

We do not have our Party units in many states and in some states where our Party Committees exist these are weak or at primary level. The efforts by the CC and PB to train all the Committees in the various fronts and departments will be a decisive factor for the development of the leadership of our Party.

Besides effectively running the existing departments, CC has to set up and develop them as full-fledged departments to fulfill the growing needs of the movement. It has to evolve the proper secret methods of coordinating with these bodies and set up the necessary mechanism for the purpose.

### **3. Tactics:**

Although the understanding of the Party has improved with regard to tactics, there is still great need to develop the ability to analyse the new and complex situation arising from time to time and adopt appropriate tactics. The continuing weaknesses in this aspect have to be overcome.

The most important and foremost duty and task of the CC is to give direct leadership to the people's war. Although we formed the CMC, SMCs and sub-zonal Commands with an important section of the central and state leadership in order to specialize in military matters and lead the war directly, the CC has to give ideological-political leadership in the military front.

The Indian revolution, principally the people's war in Andhra Pradesh, is continuously confronting the counter-revolutionary armed onslaught of the Indian ruling classes. Today a significant feature of the Indian society is that revolutionary war is confronting counter-revolutionary war.

It is an important task before our CC to synthesize the experiences of the three zones in AP in order to minimize our losses in AP and elsewhere, to resolve the problems faced by the movement in AP and also in other

States and to develop the people's war to a higher stage and expand it both in AP and throughout the country in a planned way. We can qualitatively influence the Indian revolutionary war and achieve tactical leaps depending on how correctly we can fulfill this task. The new document on S&T of the unified Party and also the experiences of the MCCI also will be of help for such a synthesis.

The main issues that are to be synthesized in the context of the movement in AP are:

- (i) Enemy's counter-revolutionary all round onslaught
- (ii) Political tactics;
- (iii) Ebb and Flow-tactics;
- (iv) Sufficient area for maneuver;
- (v) Offense-defense and retreat;
- (vi) Inter-relation between the three zones in AP and between different zones in the country

Let us analyse and synthesis these one by one.

### **(i) Enemy's counter-revolutionary all round onslaught:**

The movement in AP (i.e., all the three zones that constitute the state) has the longest history of sustained armed struggle in India. It has always been an inspiration to the revolutionary movement in the country and a continuous source of recruitment into the Party, PGA and for expansion into various areas in the country. Since the movement in AP has been the cradle of our movement and continues to play an important role in the Indian revolution, it is but natural that the enemy too has taken it as a special challenge to suppress the movement in AP. We have to keep this background in mind when making an assessment of the situation and adopt the appropriate tactics.

The state has been an experimental ground for all the tactics of white terror unleashed by the Indian State and imperialists since the past two decades or more. With the aid and guidance of the imperialists, the Indian ruling classes have launched a multi-pronged offensive first in AP itself

ever since the Congress government that came to power in 1991, and particularly since 1996 under the TDP led by Chandrababu Naidu. The World Bank had taken special interest and released a package of extensive reforms starting from laying the necessary infrastructure throughout the state, particularly roads and communications, initiating several so-called welfare and development schemes aimed at weaning away the masses from the revolution, and assistance for the modernisation of the police forces, and so on. Massive funds were also allotted by the successive Central governments for modernizing the repressive machinery and for achieving coordination between the police forces in AP with those of the Centre and the neighboring states.

The police force in AP had become more modernized, top officers received further training by the US, Britain and Israeli military and intelligence agencies, better coordination had been achieved between the police and para-military forces in AP with those in eight other states under the Joint Operational Command. The specially-trained Grey Hounds police forces and the cruel SIB had specialized in the techniques of fighting a covert war by employing covert agents, building a vast informer network, setting up and training the vigilante gangs, and numerous methods of enforcing surrenders, counseling of the parents of squad members, organizing attacks through Counter Action Teams (CATs), and so on. In the four years since the state conference of AP, NT and AOB, the repressive machinery in the state had been further strengthened.

The TDP was in power in AP until April 2004. During its regime, it had served as the most loyal agent of the World Bank, WTO and imperialists as a whole and tried to make AP an experimental state for the implementation of the reforms proposed by the World Bank. It unleashed the most brutal repression against the revolutionaries, particularly against our Party.

The methods of suppression employed by the State in AP need special mention as they are taken as the model by the other state and central governments, which are trying to implement them. There are differences in the scale of repression unleashed by the governments of AP, MP, Chathisgarh, MR, Bihar, Jharkhand and Oris-sa. An understanding of these

methods employed by the enemy in AP is essential not only to make a review of our own tactics in countering them and to objectively sum up the development of our movement in the state in the past four years, but also to counter the enemy effectively in other states.

### **State terror and state-sponsored terror in AP:**

A joint operational command (JOC) was formed with AP, MP, MR, Orissa and Bihar under the leadership of the central government. The ban on our Party and the mass organizations has been continuing since 1992 in AP.

As a result of this all-round attack our losses were heavy. Over 2500 comrades became martyrs in NT, AP and AOB alone since 1985 and ....in the past four years. They had unleashed a brutal military campaign against the revolutionary movement by arresting and torturing thousands of people and destroying houses and other property. We rendered ineffective the bloody campaign let loose by the central and state governments in AP in 1985 and 1991 to suppress our movement through our undaunted heroism and sacri-fices in blood. We are thus able to further advance our revolutionary movement.

The enemy, of course, has been continuously making preparations on a long-term basis to suppress our move-ment. Specialising in the counter-guerrilla strategy and tactics (i.e., strategy of low intensity conflicts), the AP government had set up the Special Task Force (STF) in 1985, and later Spe-cial Intelligence Bureau (SIB) to suppress the revolutionary movement. An informer network was set up in the struggle areas and basing on this information the Greyhounds forces launch their operations. These killer police gangs which are trained in the most sophisticated methods and techniques, conduct raids with sophisticated weapons based on the information supplied by the SIB.

Besides achieving progress in the mili-tary campaigns, they were able to carry out covert operations; converting anti-people lumpen elements, criminals and degenerated elements into informers and organising attacks and murders of several of our comrades through specially-formed killer squads such as Green Tigers, Kranti Sena, etc., consisting of renegades and cruel police men. The TDP government introduced the method of



counseling to encourage surrenders, through pressure on the family members. They have stepped up their psychological war and malicious propaganda against the revolutionary movement without a let-up through all means available to them.

**(ii) Political tactics:**

Once the general line of the Party is decided, the growth or decline of the movement will principally depend on the political tactics adopted from time to time and the forms of struggle and forms of organization that are taken up to implement the political tactics and slogans.

The importance of political tactics assumes even more significance in a state like AP where our Party has a long history of armed struggle and people expect our Party to provide leadership to their struggles. Given the massive offensive of the enemy there is a need for a counter-attack on our part in all fronts—political, military, moral, psychological and cultural. It is not enough, nor is it possible, to deal heavy blows to the enemy militarily given the vast difference in the balance of forces and the historical weaknesses of our Party and movement. We have to unleash not only political movements to isolate the enemy, but also unleash psychological war to demoralize the enemy forces, and take effective measures to counter enemy's psychological war. We must also convince the people and win over the vast majority morally to our side by showing the justness and legitimacy of our cause and the methods that we adopt to counter the enemy. Our revolutionary sincerity in carrying out the war that is thrust on the people by the exploiting and oppressing ruling classes, and our self-criticism and rectification of the mistakes that we commit in the course of the war, will also have a positive impact on the masses and it would be difficult for the enemy to justify his brutal offensive by pointing to a few incidents of indiscriminate violence on our part.

Hence political tactics

**(iii) Ebb and Flow-tactics:**

The movement in NT is continuing in ebb in the past four years. After the assessment by the state conference and Congress that it is in defence, SZC and CC drew up tactics to develop this movement and regain initiative.

However, it continued to suffer serious losses and had further weakened. In 2002 CRB, CC and SZC assessed that it had gone into ebb and made some major changes in tactics. Once again in 2003 the situation was discussed in depth and some more important changes were made in the tactics to be adopted. However, some of the tactics such as formation of the Platoons and Special Committees in the concrete situation prevailing in NT were not implemented in NT. In AP the squads took the form of Platoons after the decision in SC in December 2003 which helped in giving more confidence to our forces and in defending ourselves from enemy attacks. Although we are working with the understanding that relatively more time is required for overcoming the ebb situation in NT, we have not been able to achieve any major change in the situation. The situation is by and large similar in some parts of AP.

In order to understand the ebb situation in NT we have to theoretically understand the problem of ebb and flow in protracted people's war. Only then we can formulate proper tactics to bring the movement into flow once again and to avoid repetition of such a situation elsewhere.

The development of the revolutionary movement in our country will be uneven due to uneven economic and political development and historical reasons. The entire development of the Indian revolution proves this fact. When the movement surged ahead in one region many other regions remained in the initial phase or not yet made preparations for armed struggle. Such uneven development has also helped the ruling classes in unleashing brutal suppression campaigns in the one or two regions where the movement had gone to a higher stage by concentrating their forces and striving to isolate it. Thus the movement in many areas in India, particularly in the plain areas with relatively advanced socio-economic conditions and with stronger state infrastructure like roads and communications, will witness several ups and downs. The intensification of struggles in other regions will contribute to the resurgence of the movement in areas facing intense repression and heavy losses. In our Party history, particularly since 1978, we had seen this happening in several areas, districts and even regions in AP.

In the period after the Congress, while the movement in NT faced a situation of ebb, there is intensification of armed struggle in other areas of AP like Nallamala-Guntur-Rayalaseema region. Guntur-Nalamala became a guerrilla zone by 2002 and the attacks against the enemy forces increased considerably. In AOB, we achieved significant successes in our resistance against the state, foiled the enemy's attempts to destroy our GB area, took up several mass struggles on different issues of the people, and made some progress in consolidating the GB area. In this period our Party and the movement were further strengthened. During the period of talks, a wave of mass political mobilisations took place all over the state which shook the reactionary ruling classes. The ups and downs in our movement during this period created great impact on the political scenario in AP.

Thus we have to understand the overall situation i.e, the overall movement in AP and not come to conclusions about the movement in the state basing on the situation or tactics adopted in any one zone. In spite of the ebb in NT, the movement in the state as a whole has created a good political impact. The movement as a whole has sustained in spite of the massive fascist repression let loose in the three zones of AP which is unheard of since the period of Naxalbari.

There are several positive achievements in our protracted war in AP along with the shortcomings on the part of the leadership in conducting the guerrilla war, in enhancing the role of the masses and in carrying out consolidation. It is important to keep these positive achievements in mind while assessing the movement in AP and deriving appropriate lessons.

It is important to keep in mind that while we should adopt the tactics of self-defence when the movement in a zone is in ebb we should adopt different tactics in different areas of the zone in accordance with the conditions

While retreating part of our forces to strategically favourable areas, the remaining forces should put up active self-defence and resistance in some form or the other against the enemy even in the condition of ebb. Otherwise this will lead to flightism. While it is wrong to think of sticking on to the same area even in face of white terror, it is also wrong to think that we cannot offer resistance in the ebb situation. We have to make

plans to lure the enemy into our trap and also send smaller armed squads to other areas to hit enemy targets.

At the present stage of our revolution or the condition of our movement, we have to concentrate our forces relatively and intensify the guerrilla war in the strategic areas with the strategic outlook of building base areas, adopt appropriate forms of struggle and organization and mobilize the masses in a big way for this purpose. Our forms of struggle and organization, and work methods should be in accordance with the ebb and flow situations and also should have the objective of transforming the ebb into flow. We must intensify the class struggles, and political struggles of the masses to create a new wave in the movement and properly coordinate these with military tactics and orient them towards the war.

The situation in AP is quite complex with sudden outbursts in one region and relative lull in another region; ups and downs, advance and retreat following one another in quick succession; movement receding in one region while regaining and expanding in another region; and so on. This will go on for a long time, till we bring about a significant change or qualitative leap in the PPW of our country. Our Party should work in AP with this understanding.

**(iv) Sufficient area for maneuver:**

Presently there are four guerrilla zones in AP as a whole. While the GZ in NT is in ebb, there are serious losses and problems in other zones too although we are able to sustain the movement and foil the enemy's all-out attempts to suppress our movement. Overall, the movement in the state has not regained the military initiative or made qualitative progress. The enemy's offensive on the other hand continues to be stepped up with more and more coordination between the forces within the state as well as between the Centre and various states. The enemy has been trying to push us into smaller and smaller pockets and thus limit our organizational hold over the masses. The serious losses of leadership and cadre have reduced our total area of work in the state. Our failure to allot forces for extension to new areas with a long-term perspective has also confined us to small pockets though these are distributed over most of the districts in the state. There are gaps between areas within a zone and between the different

zones which is leading to serious problems in our movements from one zone to another. There is less room for the manoeuvrability of the PGA in face of severe attack by the enemy.

Hence the task of fulfilling the gaps and achieving contiguity between the zones and within the zones remains an urgent task before the Party in order to defeat the enemy offensive and keep our losses to the minimum. Given the present state of our subjective forces in the state it is clear that this cannot be achieved fully immediately but concrete planning should be made to achieve this goal over a period of time. In fact, our areas will shrink and subjective forces will reduce in ebb situations. Party, PGA and the people will face very difficult situation. Under such conditions, party leadership has to display utmost courage and confidence and adopt tactics with skillfulness and wisdom. In situations where we are confronted with huge enemy forces on a regular basis, we have to retain part of our forces to engage the enemy in guerrilla methods and send other forces to new strategic areas to open new battlefronts. We have to take up expansion while preserving our subjective forces and consolidating our movements to the extent possible.

Basing on the existing guerrilla zones, we must try to extend to the vast surrounding plain areas and develop them into red resistance areas and guerrilla zones. Cadre should be sent to the guerrilla zones in the strategic areas in order to transform them into Base Areas which will act as the rear for the defence of the movement in the plains and areas with relatively less favourable terrain. We should also plan expansion of our Party to the urban and suburban areas so as to rouse the vast urban masses, build powerful political mass movements and mobilize extensive support to the ongoing armed struggle in the rural areas. If this strategic understanding is lacking then we will commit many mistakes in our tactics and plans and lead to setback in the movement.

**(v) Offence-Defence and retreat:**

In protracted people's war the question of retreat is both strategic as well as tactical. Just as defence is inseparable from the tactics of offence, sacrifice forms an integral part of destruction of the enemy forces, retreat too is inseparable from advance. Though in general, advance, offence and

destruction of the enemy are the principal aspects of war, at times temporarily retreat, defence and sacrifice may assume primacy in the war. Able leadership directing the war will never lose sight of one aspect while carrying out the other and will always see their mutual dialectical relationship. This is even more relevant in our protracted people's war where, for a relatively longer period of time, a weak force is pitted against a vastly superior enemy and the war has to pass through several twists and turns. One-sidedness in understanding this relationship i.e., flexibility in strategy or rigidity in tactics will either lead to Right or Left deviations and harm the revolution.

The problem of retreat is a problem confronted in all guerrilla zones. This applies not only to the plain areas but at times also to the strategic areas. However, in strategic areas with favourable terrain, even when we retreat some forces temporarily in the face of massive enemy offensive, the all-out effort should be made to destroy the enemy by transforming the guerrilla war into mobile war and establishing guerilla bases with the perspective of establishing base areas and Base Areas. Although in the present condition there is a vast gap in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, and though our Base Areas might be relatively unstable, our effort and direction should be to establish stable Base Areas. The advance of the movement will depend on how skillfully the leadership grapples with the problem.

The experience of the various guerrilla zones and the course of development of the revolutionary movement in AP and NT show that guerrilla war becomes the principal form of struggle shortly after we begin work in the plains or in areas with relatively unfavourable terrain where class contradictions are sharp. But at the same time, it also shows the importance of retreat of part of these forces from these areas to the strategic areas in face of white terror. It is wrong to think that we can maintain higher military formations for long in these areas or liberate these areas quickly. Failure to shift a significant section of the leadership and cadre to the strategic areas while maintaining secret forms of organization in these areas had resulted in serious losses in NT and AP. It showed the weaknesses in our understanding regarding the relationship between strategic areas and other areas and between advance and retreat.

On the other hand, we must also have clarity that retreat does not mean absolute or permanent retreat but is only the preparation for future advance, that we have to continue resistance in different forms in those areas even after retreating a section of the forces, that we may have to make seasonal retreats or very temporary retreats from the point of view of self-defence, and that we may have to send forces from the strategic areas to the plains and even urban areas when required. There is also a wrong understanding of the tactics to be adopted in ebb situation and initiative to resist the enemy is almost completely lost and attempts to evolve new and creative forms of resistance are given up. This has a demoralising effect on the Party cadre and the masses. We must take the valuable lessons from our long experience and educate the entire Party, PGA and the masses about the relationship between retreat and advance and the strategic and other areas.

Overall, we must realize that in AP it is even more important to concentrate our forces on resisting the enemy in whatever form we can. However small the victories might be against the enemy they will enthuse the masses and maintain the tempo of the movement as a whole. Absence of resistance will lead to further decline in the movement and increase in surrenders and degeneration of the cadre and demoralization of the masses.

**(vi) Inter-relationship between the three zones in AP and between different zones in the country:**

NT and AOB were separated from APSC in 1995 and 2001 respectively keeping in view the objective and subjective conditions and the process of development of the movement in the three zones, the specific tasks of the three zones, and the problem of coordination between the three zones in the face of increasing enemy repression. These two regions were considered as special zones and independent SZCs were formed. These two committees worked under CRB in the period after the Congress. APSC was not included in CRB due to the difficulties in coordination under conditions of severe repression as it has no contiguity with the other two zones and keeping in view the political importance of the state, PB guided it directly. Until the merger in September 2004 when APSC was brought under CRB, the CC members of the three zones and the concerned PBMs

met separately during the CC meetings and took decisions related to the entire state and coordination of the three zones. The decision to form a coordination committee with one SZC/SC member from each zone under the leadership of CCM for the purpose of building a state-wide mass movement and political calls did not materialize. Throughout this period the enemy stepped up his offensive with centralized plans and better coordination with the Central and neighbouring state governments. Under these conditions the need for political centralization between the three zones as well as coordination in military, Party and mass organizations, had assumed greater importance despite the unfavourable situation that arose due to the growth in enemy repression.

In the concrete conditions of multi-national India, the states have great importance. We have to take this aspect also when drawing up tactics and plans in the course of protracted people's war. We have to take into consideration the importance of the existence of the states and the conditions in the neighbouring states while formulating the tactics, plans and policies for any zone. We must give importance to the aspect of coordination of the various zones in a single state as well as between the neighbouring states for advancing the people's war. Only when we work in the various zones with this outlook, we can build the revolutionary movement with a strategic orientation, defend ourselves from enemy attack, and advance the people's war. Only by properly understanding this strategic question we will be able to understand how the interrelationship between the three zones of AP or between AP and DK-OS-MR-TN-KN should be. We can thereby draw proper plans, policies and tactics in accordance with the changes in the situation. Failure to do so will result in lack of coordination in Party, military and mass organizational fronts and creates problem in evolving common political tactics, slogans etc., for the entire state. This will also lead to the isolation of the movement in each zone.

Hence the CRB should take it as an important task to ensure political centralization as well as coordination between these three zones. Whenever needed the CRB secretary should have separate meeting of the concerned CCMs of the three zones and take the necessary decisions.

Besides the coordination and political centralization of the three zones



of AP, it is also very much important to achieve regular coordination between the zones in AP and DK-OS and also make the necessary organizational changes and carry out regular military operations along the borders between them. The problems in coordination and political centralization have not arisen due to enemy repression though it had aggravated them. The problem is mainly related to strategic orientation and outlook.

#### **4. Strengthening the Party:**

After party congress, the party was further steeled in all fronts through the sacrifices of hundreds of capable leaders, commanders, brave fighters and able mass leaders and members. Our party lost- SCMs, DCMs, ACMs, PMs in all fronts; most of them are in 2 zones(AP-NT) of AP. Overall, party strength of all levels declined in two zones of AP state. There is a significant growth in DK, considerable growth in AOB and BJ and minimum growth or near stagnation in all other states. Overall percentage of growth in PRs and PMs is —————

In spite of severe losses, degeneration, retreats of a large number of different committee members and PMs in parts of AP due to the heavy repression, we could not develop new structures. In fact, we had to even dissolve some of existing structures. We formed and strengthened GPCs/LPCs LGSCs and various sub-committees of different fronts in some states.

We increased the number of members in SCs which became further consolidated. We can say, most of DCs are relatively consolidated. But we should take the task of further consolidating them. In spite of increase in the number of ACs and AC members still there is utmost need to consolidate them as the strong pillars of the party at area or grass root level.

With the growth in the number of Party cells and the number of part-time PMs, the local (village-level) Party leadership is becoming established among the people. In areas where the new people's political power has been formed the local Party committees are relatively better in providing leadership. In both rural and urban areas, where there is heavy enemy repression and there are lapses in secret work and in giving guidance to make the masses work actively, or lack of proper attention to this aspect,

the process of building the cells, getting destroyed by the enemy or becoming defunct, is continuing. Building the local Party in utmost secrecy and enhancing the quality of the members rather than number, is a precondition for building and developing the movement in any front. We have to work with the slogan of building Party cells in every front and provide leadership to the masses at the local level. In places where the number of Party cells and PMs had increased, we must work with the slogan of enhancing their quality.

We had achieved good results in those states where we took up the campaigns with the political slogan of recruiting the youth into the PGA in order to strengthen and expand it. There are also good results in some areas where we redoubled our effort to recruit the better leadership elements in the local Party cells, militia and mass organizations as professional revolutionaries. It is necessary to make all out effort to enhance such recruitment in all the states. The Party leadership should take it as a special task to achieve this by motivating the entire Party.

It is an urgent task before the Party to develop Party leadership in the most oppressed social sections, workers, urban youth, students and intelligentsia in order to bring about a change in the composition of the Party and provide leadership to all fronts. This is an urgent task where in states where our movement is restricted to remote areas.

There is improvement in the functioning of all Party committees in general. Most of the SCs are stable and their functioning is relatively better. The positive aspects as well as problems in the functioning of CC are also generally seen in SCs.

In the Party committees of various levels, there are shortcomings in varying degrees in firmly carrying out the central task and coordinating all other tasks with the central task, in making concrete plans to carry out the central task in the form of campaigns, in coordinating the open and secret work, and in building the movement by adhering firmly to the class line and mass line. This problem is relatively more serious in ACs. This problem is mainly due to the failure on the part of the leadership to give proper understanding to the ACs regarding Party building and political-organizational

work due to which more negative results are seen in the movement. The SCs and DCs should give political-organisational training and guide these committees in practice by studying and solving the problems at the grass-roots and thus overcome the problems.

We must concentrate on the task of establishing leadership to the MOs, Joint fronts and UF at all levels by allotting cadre and planfully developing them. We must strengthen the functioning of the Party Committees by developing necessary staff and departments. Party's leading committees must make special effort to check the surrenders/desertions from the movement, covert agents, police informers and killer gangs from degenerated elements.

In states where special bodies are formed for party education, the education of the DCs and ACs is relatively better. It is an immediate task of the CC to form a central political school and impart education in a systematic way to the entire Party cadre even under conditions of extreme repression. For this, we have to divide the Party cadre into three levels for the backward, intermediate and advanced elements, prepare the syllabus, and specially provide basic education in a simple style to peasant cadre. Likewise, we have to establish the necessary mechanism to provide education to cadre working in various special fronts. Also by improving propaganda in various fronts and ensuring that the magazines are educative and reach the cadre regularly in time we can bring change in the Party education.

Today, there is an urgent need for developing strong literary-cultural movements in all states and at all India level to disseminate communist culture, values and ideals and to proletarianise the Party.

Keeping in view the growing countrywide enemy offensive and the serious losses that occurred in the period since Congress, we must pay utmost attention to protect the leadership at all levels, particularly the protection of the central and state leadership. For this, we should strengthen the secret mechanism in accordance with the conditions from time to time. We should strictly implement the decisions previously taken to rectify the weaknesses and take concrete measures to strengthen our present defence

system. We should not forget that we paid dearly due to our liberalism in this regard and that this had a negative impact on the development of the revolutionary movement.

## **5. Education and Rectification Campaign:**

The 9th Congress identified subjectivism, liberalism, spontaneity as the main non-proletarian trends along with economism, sectarianism, bureaucracy and patriarchy in the Party and the movement. Earlier in 1999, rectification campaign was completed in AP to purge the Party of liberalism, subjectivism, spontaneity and economism. The 9th Congress gave the call for taking up rectification campaign in the whole Party to purge the Party of these non-proletarian trends. The CCEM, which was held immediately after the Congress, made concrete plan for rectification campaign.

In May 2001 three documents were released by the PB on Rectification Campaign. The first document dealt with the aim of the campaign, ideological and political roots of the non-proletarian trends and the methodology of conducting the rectification campaign: the second document analysed the ideological-political roots and the concrete forms of manifestation of the main non-proletarian trends in the Party—subjectivism, liberalism, spontaneity, economism, sectarianism and bureaucracy; and the third document dealt with the trend of patriarchy.

The ERC was taken up in AP, AOB, DK, MR, TN, in 2001 and 2002. In NT, the ERC was completed by May 2003. The B-J SC did not take up the campaign though classes were held. The KNSC had originally planned to take up the ERC immediately after the state plenum but it was delayed due to the crisis in the state committee and ensuing two line struggle in the party.

In AP, Rectification was conducted on patriarchy from SC to the lower level. The rectification was mainly based on the five years practice. On this occasion, the members of various committees put forth their self-criticism regarding the patriarchal trends in them. The education and rectification campaign enhanced the consciousness of the party on the whole.

In AOB also, the RC was conducted against the trend of patriarchy since the RC on the other trends was completed in 1999 when it was part of AP organization. The SZC took up the education programme on the central and state PORs and S&T from the DvCs to below first and then the rectification campaign was taken from the top to the lower committees and then to the masses.

Overall, the RC against patriarchy created a good atmosphere in AP and AOB and helped understand the issue deeply and identify the problems from an ideological outlook. It enthused the women particularly.

In NT, the RC could not be taken up due to severe repression of the enemy during the summer in NT. A circular was released by the SZC in August 2002 to rectify the weaknesses and wrong trends that surfaced in the Party and movement in NT. The campaign was completed by May 2003.

In DK, ERC was taken up in Dec '02-Jan '03. A circular was released by the SZC giving the guidelines on how to conduct the ERC. The campaign on patriarchy was taken up separately. The ERC helped in rectifying the workstyle, enhancing the ideological-political level of the rank and file of the Party in DK, and enhancing the preparedness for advancing the people's war with the perspective of transforming the zone into a Base Area.

In B-J, although circular on ERC was prepared in 2004, it could not carry it out in practice.

In Maharashtra, the ERC was taken up after discussing the CC circulars in the SC in Feb 2002 and identifying the mistakes in the SC. The ERC was carried out between March-August 2002 throughout the state.

In TN, the RC was conducted based on a review of the 10-year period of work from 1991 when the TN perspective was finalized. RC on patriarchy was taken up separately. The RC was conducted throughout the Party from Oct 2001 to April 2002.

The ERC was implemented in the states according to the concrete forms of manifestation and the degree of the non-proletarian trends that existed, and also depended on the severity of the repression and other problems and tasks that required urgent attention. On the whole, the RC

had helped us in getting a better understanding of the ideological-political roots of the problems and weaknesses that we have been facing and had helped to rectify them and enhance the ideological-political level of the Party rank and file. It helped in our closer integration with the masses by enhancing our understanding of class line and mass line and also in bringing a higher unity between the leadership and cadres. However, there has been formalism in some states as adequate attention is not paid to carry it out in a serious manner. Due to internal problems or weaknesses in some states it was not taken up or completed.

Keeping in view the composition of our Party, social conditions, level of the war, we have to take up rectification and education campaigns to fight against petty-bourgeois and other alien class trends and ideology. We should raise the Party's ideological political level by remoulding the world outlook and enhancing class consciousness, and by actively taking part in the practice and collective life of the Party. It is even more important to develop the proletarian base of the Party and bring more and more Party members from the working class which will be an important factor for coming out of the influence of petty-bourgeois ideology. The rectification campaigns should be taken up not only throughout the Party but also in particular states and districts.

## **6. Education:**

Ideological-political education of the Party rank and file was carried out through various methods depending on the levels and responsibilities of the comrades.

First, education was taken up in most of the states on the Congress documents and classes, study camps were held at various levels.

At the central level, SCOPE was reconstituted immediately after the Congress with the aim of imparting education by finalizing and releasing the pending Study Notes and preparing some new study notes for basic course. The SCOPE could not do much work and due to serious internal problems it was dissolved in November 2002.

Education Departments and Teams were set up at the state level in the states under CRB for imparting political education for the comrades at the

lower levels. These are called by different names in different states. These departments and teams took classes, prepared syllabus and study notes in accordance with the guidelines of the concerned state/special zonal committees.

Then there are the academic education teams also in the states under CRB which gave basic education to the comrades who are illiterate and have not completed even primary school education. Textbooks were prepared in these states and basic education classes have become a regular and continuous feature.

Education was imparted below by the SCs and DCs in all the states, collective study camps were conducted in some states to solve the important problems.

Party magazines and mass magazines played a good role in educating the entire Party and the advanced sections among the people in ideological-political issues. The various magazines in the national languages played a major role in educating the masses. However, there was weakness in bringing out the central theoretical organ of the Party, *People's War*, regularly. We also published a series of books, study materials and other literature on various ideological-political topics.

Education was given on the policy papers released by the CC such as the women's perspective and urban perspective but the latter was taken up only in a few states. In spite of these efforts there still exist shortcomings in our ideological-political education and propaganda.

## **7. Relations and Unity Process with MCCI (1981-2004):**

The two major streams of the Maoist movement in the country, that of the CPI(ML) and of the MCC, are all set to merge into a single Party. Though with differing histories, as both seriously sought to advance the people's war in the country through the armed struggle for the area-wise seizure of political power, they are today on the brink of merging into a single entity. In the past three decades of history the erstwhile PW and PU on the one hand, and the MCC on the other, have evolved into these two major streams comprising today the CPI(ML)(PW) and the MCCI. In these past two-and-a-half decades of association, the relations between

these parties have seen many ups and downs reflecting the varied shortcomings inherent in the revolutionary movement of the country. Learning from their bitter experiences, under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, the two streams have matured towards the formation of an all-India revolutionary communist party in the country. Marching along the path set by Naxalbari, and the new path put forward by comrades CM and KC, the Indian revolution has marched forward with significant strides.

In this period both streams have faced intense repression, thousands of comrades have been martyred, yet both have advanced the people's war in the country to a level never witnessed before in our history. Steadfastly sticking to the path of protracted people's war, intensifying the armed struggle towards the building of base areas, and marching forward towards building the People's Liberation Army and the two parties have laid a deep foundation for the New Democratic Revolution in the country as the first step in the long march to socialism and then communism.

But in this process of growth there have been certain dark spots which have, to some extent, tarnished the great revolutionary image of these forces. Particularly the uncomradely relations that evolved between us at particular periods, and the dark chapter (Kala Adhyay) of physical clashes, entails that we do serious introspection of the flaws on our side in the maintaining of relations and unity efforts, in order that we may draw lessons and achieve greater political maturity.

Though there were serious tensions between the erstwhile PU and the MCC from the early 1990s itself, tensions in an otherwise healthy and comradely relationship between them, these further deteriorated in the second half of the 1990s, particularly from 1997-99. The unity efforts and the mutual relations can be categorized broadly into four periods in order to better understand the problems in unification, the issues involved and to make a proper self-critical evaluation of the entire gamut of mutual relations and the delay in the unity process.

While traversing the history of the relations in this two decade period we can now briefly trace this past in order to get an understanding into this experience — both its positive and negative aspects.



## **Unity efforts between 1981-91:**

This period, overall, witnessed the initiation of the unity process between our two parties.. Relations were established with the MCC in end 1980 for the first time. From then till 1988, though regular meetings took place they were primarily confined to exchanging experiences, having formal discussions and maintaining fraternal relations. No serious efforts towards unity were made in solving the theoretical, political and organisational differences. The growth in unity talks did not significantly increase in this period partly due to: the arrest of Com. KS, death of the two top leaders of MCC-comrades Amulya Sen and KC—in a short span of two years, and a major crisis in our CC in 1985, with its dissolution in 1987.

In the Feb. 1983 meeting itself it was decided that issues of past history need not come in the way of merger of the two parties and even went so far as to decide the documents to be prepared for the merger of the two organizations. The meeting decided that the two CCs can jointly prepare a common agreed document containing the basic tenets of the party programme, constitution, strategy and tactics, fundamentals of revolutionary style and method of work and assessment of international and national situation. Though there were shades of difference as to the procedure to be followed towards the process of the merger the two organisations agreed to meet as soon as possible to facilitate the process.

In a letter dated May 1983 the then COC of the MCC sent some proposals to the CC of the then PW for finalization of the unity process between our two organizations. They suggested that a joint committee be formed to prepare the earlier mentioned documents and circulate these amongst the rank-and-file of the Party. They also suggested discussions with some other groups/parties and the completion of the whole process within 1984. In that letter they said that *“Our CC also decided that side by side this merger process our CC will work hard to unite the other revolutionary forces such as COC/PU; UCCRI(ML) led by Santi Ray and Satyan group in a single party centre. If it is not possible to unite any of them - then MCC and People’s War will be merged into a centre and declare the formation of a New Revolutionary Party. We have estimated to complete the whole process within 84”*. The CC of PW

replied by end of June making several suggestions to finalise the process of unity including suggestions for: taking concrete responsibility for the drafting of the two documents, proceeding for merger on a bilateral basis (not involving the other organizations suggested) and solving the organizational problems that arise in the course of the discussions for the merger.

After Com. KS came out of jail a meeting was held in September 1984 and a joint resolution was made to complete the merger process at the earliest and to form a unified CC. The bilateral meeting reviewed the unity process of the preceding four years and actually decided on a time schedule for the preparation of the documents. The meeting actually resolved that the documents be ready by Nov.15 2004 and amendments be sent to the other side by Jan15 1985. This meeting also decided on the details towards the procedure for the merger of the two organizations, that the merged Party be given a new name and that it brings out two central organs — called “*People’s War*” in English and “*Lal Pathaka*” in Hindi.

Unfortunately, the developments within the PW after this meeting hampered the unity process for a while. The crisis that hit the CC of PW virtually paralysed the functioning of the CC for almost two years. And in April 1987 the CC was dissolved. In the three years from 1987-1990 when the CC went out of existence the APSC made continued serious efforts for completing the unity process with MCC. The basis for this existed as the MCC took a correct approach towards the crisis and continued relations with the APSC. At that time the APSC also revived relations with the PU after the latter had openly condemned the CPC as revisionist.

Due to the non-existence of the CC, the APSC gave responsibility to KS to continue the relations with MCC. But due to his subjectivism he began arbitrarily changing his stand towards the procedure of merger stating that the preparation of documents was a waste of time and suggested some new criteria. KS’s limitations that had lately appeared were understood by both the APSC and also MCC, and so in the latter period contacts continued between them.

The MCC in July 1988 wrote that they planned their central conference in Mar/Apr 1989 where they will be discussing their *summing up report*,

and suggested that all the documents decided on be prepared by Nov/Dec. of that year for the proposed bilateral meeting.

In April 1989, a bilateral meeting took place between the MCC and APPC of PW. The entire PC attended with the intention of completing the merger process. Both sides reviewed in detail the ongoing process of merger talks in the preceding 8 years and unanimously adopted concrete steps to materialise the merger of the two organisations into a single united revolutionary party. The following five documents were adopted as basic documents for the merger. 1. Political resolution, 2. Resolution on CPC, 3. Party programme, 4. Party Constitution, and 5. Strategy and Tactics. 1,2 and 4 were to be prepared by PW while 3 and 5 by MCC. It was decided that amendments for the above documents should be sent to each other by the end of June 1989; and a meeting of Joint commission consisting of 4 representatives of PW and 3 representatives of MCC is to be held in September '89 to consider the proposed amendments and finalise and adopt the documents. After adopting the finalised documents as above, the joint meeting will issue the declaration of merger announcing the formation of the new party.

During the process of these discussions and bilateral meetings, the differences on two political points could not be resolved — that is on the question of the principal contradiction in the world and the assessment on the danger of world war.

Around the same time two members of PW delegation also met the PU delegation and both decided that together with MCC they should have a convention on the question of unity. In a letter to the MCC in April 1991 this was conveyed stating that the PU comrades had been asked to discuss with the MCC about the proposal for holding of the Convention. This decision was taken by KS due to his subjectivism and due to its impracticability it never occurred. The decision was opposed by both the MCC and the COC of PW when they came to know of it.

The unity process was to have been taken up in the bilateral meeting between MCC and PW that was scheduled for August 1991. This, however, failed to materialize due to the crisis in the COC of the PW and the bilateral meeting was postponed to June 1992. The PW informed the MCC that

due to some differences that had cropped up in the COC, it was not in a position to continue the merger talks until the differences were resolved. This was the time when the party faced an internal crisis where the main leader itself was involved.

The discussions with MCC in February 1991 after the formation of the COC, came to a stand still due to continuing differences. As the crisis broke out within a few months in our Party, we postponed the unity talks and continued joint activities in All India Mass organisations. The new leadership then asserted themselves and prepared new documents including a 15 years review of the movement. We again started the unity talks from March 1993 after we prepared our new political resolution.

Though both had different histories, in the process of the discussions in the 1980s, both parties came to a common understanding that they were traversing a similar path: both had a similar understanding on the Strategy and Tactics to advance the Indian revolution; both were seriously involved in advancing the armed struggle and the leadership of both were concentrating in the strategic areas and advancing the agrarian revolution with the aim of building People's Army and establishing base areas as the central task. Although earlier there were differences in understanding on the past history of the CPI(ML), through these discussions both came to a common understanding on the historic significance of Naxalbari uprising and the 8th Congress of the Party, as well as regarding the great role played by Com. CM. Apart from this, there was oneness in acceptance of the leaderships of both streams. This laid a solid basis for future discussions between the two parties, including the present rounds of discussions and culmination of the merger.

In this entire process lasting over a decade, the reasons for the delay, from our side, in the merger of the two organizations were: in the initial period, arrest of com. KM and the martyrdom of com. KC hampered the unity process; the first crisis in the PW CC and the dissolution of the CC badly affected the unity process; our wrong assessment on some important international political issues became major differences, which had become hurdle in achieving unity; and conducting the unity talks in a formal and non-serious fashion.

## **Unity efforts between 1992-95:**

The bilateral meetings to discuss the question of unity suffered due to the crisis in PW though relations continued without any break. At that time we decided that we would first solve the internal problem of the Party and then resume unity talks with the MCC. At the time of the Central Plenum of the Party in Aug. 1990, we decided to complete the merger process within two years. However, the MCC comrades could analyse the situation in the PW dialectically and took a decision to continue relations and advance the merger talks with the new leadership. But discussion of the basic documents had to be put off as the COC of PW was to finalise the Political Resolution in light of the changes in international situation in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Superpower. A series of joint activities were, however, taken up by MCC and PW as well as with the PU and MRSC-PW. It was decided in early 1992 to hold a joint rally against growing state repression, imperialist globalization. Accordingly, a rally was held in April, which had a positive impact on the broad left and progressive forces. Later this helped to form an all India political mass organisation .

The unity talks began again in March 1993 after almost a gap of two years. That meeting decided that the PW will send written amendments to the MCC on the following questions in the Party programme and Strategy and Tactics - on the question of fundamental and Major contradictions in Indian society, on the question of “All power to the revolutionary peasant committee”, on nationality question, on New Democratic state etc. and that PW will rewrite the Party Programme wherever it is felt to be repetitive. The MCC comrades will prepare all their amendments to the Political Resolution(PR) both major and minor by the next meeting in order to finalise the document

MCC will prepare amendments to the constitution. Regarding the formulation on the Indian state as semi-feudal and semi-colonial state of Neo-colonial type; MCC will send to PW the additional para which was mutually agreed upon in the earlier meetings. On the CPC document MCC will send PW their amendment with regard to Com.Stalin which they had proposed earlier. There was a detailed and heated discussion on the character of the present era and on the definition of Mao Thought given by

the 9th Congress of the CPC. It was decided to further discuss these questions in the next bilateral meetings.

In that meeting the MCC placed a note explaining its stand regarding the international situation, the position of Russia, America and other major imperialist powers, on the question of the danger of a world war, etc.

The bilateral meeting of July 1994 arrived at a common understanding on the character of the present era and the historical significance of Mao Thought and prepared a Joint Declaration. It was decided to educate the rank and file of both parties on this question.

The CPI(M-L)(PW) delegation submitted amendments to the two documents of the MCC "Programme" and "Strategy-Tactics". The MCC delegation agreed to send its amendments to the two Documents of CPI(M-L)(PW) "Constitution" and "Political Resolution", and also its opinions and amendments on the amendments of PW to the "party Programme" and "Strategy-Tactics" - by the end of December '94. The two parties discussed the Nationality struggles and the caste question and arrived at a common opinion regarding the same. It was also decided by both the delegations to finalise the deliberations for merger in the next meeting and that both sides should strive hard to merge into a single Party by resolving the existing differences between the two parties in the next meeting. It was also agreed upon to form a platform of revolutionary groups in case the merger fails to take place.

Amendments were sent by the MCC by January 1995. But they explained that it was not possible to place amendments on the PR of the then PW *"because the entire outlook and explanation is quite different as we maintain, especially regarding the position of Russia. In our March '93 meeting we told you that, we have to observe still some more time to come to a final conclusion on the present position of Russia. After observing near about two years, we are firm in our earlier position. So, until and unless we come to a common agreement on this issue, it will be worth nothing to put only few quotations of com.Lenin and from 9th or 10th congress of CPC."* A brief statement on the international situation was sent explaining their outlook and position.

The two delegations met in May 1995 and discussed the differences thoroughly but could not arrive at a common understanding. Finally, both sides identified the major political differences between the two Parties which stood in the way of unity.

Hence, in that meeting, representatives of both the parties unanimously decided to postpone the unity talks for some time and to have mutual co-operation “*because even though we achieved single opinion on MLM, Nationality Question and about the fundamental contradictions in our country, unity is not possible as there were differences on the following seven points*”. It was decided that both sides will take the points of difference in writing to the Party Members, study the writings of great teachers in depth and often discuss with each other the assessment on the international situation so as to achieve a common understanding through this process in future. The major differences of opinion were identified with regard to: 1. The assessment on economic, political changes in imperialism after the Second World War; 2. The definition of Super Powers; 3. Today’s status of Russia; 4. The condition of Japan, European Unions (particularly Germany) in present-day world; 5. The role of people’s struggle in the collapse of the status of a Super Power within the imperialist forces; 6. Three World differentiation in the present world situation; 7. The condition of the American Super Power.

The above-mentioned political differences were the actual cause for the failure in achieving unity at that juncture. However, after both the sides had come to the assessment that unity could not be achieved immediately, we could have simply noted down the differences, instead of closing the bilateral political discussions indefinitely. This had contributed to the unnecessarily delay in the unity talks and also had some negative impact on the future mutual relations. It is one of our shortcomings in the unity process.

### **1996-2000 Period( Strained relations):**

The MCC had rejected the proposal placed by the then PW in 1994, when the unity talks were still on, to build a joint platform of Communist Revolutionaries with the three parties — MCC, PW and PU — and to use the platform to coordinate the activity of the All India mass organisations

and other anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, anti-state activities. Consequently, the plan to bring all other genuine revolutionary forces into a united platform also did not materialise. After the failure of the merger talks between the PW and MCC in '95, the PW in 1996 and 97 again proposed for a joint platform along with the then PU but the MCC did not accept the proposal because of the strained relations between the then PU and the then MCC.

But in 1996, due to serious differences on how to build the all-India mass organization, MCC withdrew from it and cordial relations deteriorated. Yet bilateral meetings continued between the two. Meanwhile, in this period, joint activities and merger talks continued between the PW and PU. Even between the PU and the MCC bilateral meetings continued, mainly to settle local problems developing in Bihar.

But in spite of all this tensions increased and even drifted towards physical liquidations between the MCC and PU. At that time both the CC(P) of the PW and CoRIM in separate press statements appealed to the two warring parties to stop the clashes and settle the issues through discussions. But these continued.

Meanwhile, from 1996, the talks initiated with the PU earlier to exchange information and experience, developed into a process of unity talks culminating in the merger of the two parties in Aug. 1998. In the very first meeting of the joint CC(P) a resolution was passed to unilaterally stop the physical clashes. Though we stopped all attacks on the MCC for a 3-4 month period, as we did not inform our decision or the ground realities to the MCC, the situation did not improve. The clashes continued with increasing intensity between the unified PW and the MCC.

While on the one hand we were saying that the MCCI is in the revolutionary camp, at the same time, we wrote in our articles and propaganda material that a process had started in the MCCI and if the type of elements it began to depend on and the non-proletarian methods adopted were not rectified, it could shift away from the revolutionary camp. Even in our party-to-party correspondence we used provocative language against them. This incorrect approach to magnify some errors to paint a



black picture of the MCC further increased the distance between the two parties. This was petty bourgeois short-sightedness in not considering long-term interests, treating non-antagonistic contradictions as antagonistic contradictions, despite having been closely associated with the practice of the MCCI for two decades. Not only this, we were also fully responsible for the failed bilateral meet in 1999, which aggravated misunderstandings, paving the way for increasing clashes between the two parties.

### **Period from 2001 to 2004 (Historic Turning Point towards Unified Party):**

The clashes between the two parties created revulsion amongst the ranks of the Maoists not only in India, but also abroad. There were strong appeals from the International Communist Movement to stop the clashes and unite to fight the common enemy. In this background the MCC declared a unilateral ceasefire in January 2000. To this, in March 2000 we too answered positively and instructed all units to stop clashes immediately. However, while welcoming the move by the MCC in March 2000, we placed the onus of responsibility for the clashes on the MCC and declared that the clashes would stop automatically once the MC stopped its attacks. This was a serious mistake on our part as it placed the entire blame for the clashes on the MCC without identifying the mistakes on our side.

In March 2001 the 9th Congress of PW took place. In the Congress POR we correctly mentioned that “*we should hold talks with the MCC and strive to maintain fraternal relations*”. However, we placed the blame for the clashes and the tense situation in Bihar-Jharkhand on the MCC and did not make any self-criticism for the mistakes on our part. We stated that the clashes were due to the antagonistic attitude adopted by the MCC and its attacks against the erstwhile PU for over a decade.

But soon after this Congress the MCC sent a letter of congratulations to the CC of the PW on the decisions of the Congress. Though attempts were made in the 1998-2000 period to hold bilateral talks, none materialized. Just prior to the Congress, though comrades from both sides came to the contact it did not materialize due to the crisis in the MCC. Finally, after a long gap, the two delegations of both the CCs met in August 2001.

This was a historic meeting that set the terms to stop the clashes for ever. A resolution was passed to call the period of strained relations as a Black Chapter in the Indian revolution and both pledged never to repeat it. Both parties took responsibility for it and self-critically went before the public. This approach was welcomed by the entire masses of India, particularly of Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal states, the rank-and-file of both parties and the international communist movement. In this meeting a decision was also taken to begin joint activities. A number of such activities had a positive impact giving confidence to the cadres of both parties. Also joint meetings at the state level in Bihar-Jharkhand and a number of interventions by both the delegations of SACMs/SCMs and CCMs at the time of localized conflicts, helped ease tensions below.

In spite of such efforts, due to a long period of tensions stretching to about a decade, sporadic clashes occurred in some villages. Timely intervention by both the SAC/SC and CC, to a large extent, helped diffuse tensions.

After nearly a year towards normalization of relations high level delegations of the two CCs sat together in July 2002 to listen to each others latest political positions and plan for merger talks. Finally in a meeting in Feb.2003 the two high power delegations met and clinched most of the political, ideological, organisational and military issues and opined it was a historic meeting and a milestone in the merger process. At this meeting, which launched the first round of the merger talks, a comprehensive and whole-hearted self-criticism was put forward by both the delegations. Though most political issues were clinched, the MCCI de legation opined that the formulation of the 9th Congress of the PW regarding the fundamental contradiction between the CBB versus broad masses would be a hurdle in the unification process. Keeping the larger interests of unity as paramount and the future of the Indian revolution, the delegation of the PW took a bold decision to reserve it and not to include in the new documents and not to insist even in the Unified Party Congress.

The next meeting was fixed for Sept 2003. In this meeting we finalised the MLM document and prepared the draft outlines for the Strategy and Tactics Programme, and Political Resolution. The two delegations once

again met in Jan-Feb.2004 and finalized most of the above documents. It was decided here to conclude unity in Sept 2004. In the present meeting of the two CCs the stage will be set for the final merger.

### **Self Criticism Regarding the Strained Relations with the MCCI**

Ever since the end 1970s and early 80s onwards, for a long period, there have been cordial relations between the three main revolutionary parties in the country, the PW, the MCCI and the PU. At the end of the 70s, the then PU initiated to approach MCC and the then AP state committee of CPI(M-L) (which was a major constituent of CPI(ML)[PW] formed in 1980) for establishing contacts and hold unity talks. All the three Parties, applying MLM to the concrete conditions in India, put in serious efforts to develop Protracted People's War. They waged a consistent fight against modern revisionism, right and left deviations within the revolutionary camp, and upheld the revolutionary lines of Coms. CM. and KC respectively. In the earlier period the MCC General Secretary Com. KC, the erstwhile PU leadership and the erstwhile secretary of the PW, com. KS, had played an important role in bringing these parties closer. All the three sought to advance the Naxalbari line for the seizure of political power through protracted people's war. As a result, all the three emerged as the major vanguard organizations of the Indian revolution. Though our party and MCC belonged to two different streams of the Maoist movement in India, both focused on advancing the armed struggle in the country. **There have been cordial and comradely relations between all the three parties, based on proletarian principles and MLM** for the greater part of the period of the on-going revolutionary war. Serious efforts were made by all the three to unite and build a united revolutionary proletarian party in India.

This self-criticism is a continuation of the self-criticisms first put at the time of the bilateral in 2001 and taken down to the rank-and-file of the party and the masses. In 2001 it was an immediate self-criticism with the aim to stop the clashes. In 2003, after extensive discussion a detailed and serious self-criticism was put forward by both the CCs in the meeting, the essence of which was taken down in the form of a pamphlet to the masses. We are placing our self-criticism in writing.

The main reasons for the genesis and growth of tensions in B-J states between the then PU and the MCC was primarily on the following issues: **First**, while working in the same area the approach and outlook in handling contradictions among the people and dealing with problems that arose in the course of practice; **second**, the ideological and political differences between the two parties that were reflected in different practices. This resulted in growing tensions among the two parties from 1991, which became the starting point for the killings of each other till 2001. These problems were not solved in time and hence the tensions aggravated culminating in bloodshed, killings, burnings, etc by 1996. Later, when both our parties came together and initiated merger talks, even at that juncture, some sporadic incidents like threats and annihilations went on, due to our leadership's lacuna, in adopting the resolutions of the joint meetings and giving a class out look to the rank and file. This wrong approach of ours (till 1997 erstwhile PU later the new PW) resulted in blood shed of our own class brothers, which was avoidable had we adopted the proper Leninist style of work and Maoist guidelines to rectify our own mistakes. Instead of this, we adopted forms such as killing the sympathizers and lower level cadres, demolition of houses and destruction of the property of the village masses. For almost half a decade people of this area lived in an atmosphere of terror due to the clashes from both sides. We did not realize the serious consequences in time. **The Central Committee of the CPI(ML)[People's War], owns its share of responsibility for the lapses that had taken place on its part in implementing the decisions as well as for other short-comings like narrow interests, deviations from the proletarian stand point and bypassing of the principles in resolving the friendly contradictions with the MCCI by basing on the Bolshevik model.**

In the period of strained relations that took place in B-J we dealt with the clashes between our two parties more in local terms without taking into **account the negative impact it would have on the long-term interests of the Indian revolution** and overall fraternal relations between our two parties.

In the later period, when the erstwhile PW and the PU merged into a single Party in Aug.1998, the CC (P), in its very first meeting, passed a

resolution **to unilaterally stop all types of actions against the MCCI, as well as all kinds of propaganda that might aggravate the already tense atmosphere.** On this the CC (P) also convinced the Bihar state committee, which was primarily involved in the problem. But the CC (P)'s major failure was not to make this decision public by informing the press in Bihar and Jharkhand, other fraternal revolutionary groups, and not even the CC of the MCC. Though one of the reasons for not informing the MCC was the non-materialization of the bilateral meetings between the two, the responsibility for not giving the resolution to the MCC lies with us. We take full responsibility for this serious lapse and make our self-criticism. This had contributed to the continuing bloodshed between the two parties in BJ for two years with disastrous consequences. At that time we took a very casual approach saying "*what can we do, we are only retaliating in defense*". **This was a serious deviation from the proletarian approach towards a fraternal party.**

For nearly half a decade (1996-2001) in the B-J, the class struggle against the class enemy was badly affected. When, in fact, both the parties should have waged united fight against the enemy by advancing the guerrilla war jointly, we were involved in killing our own comrades, always pointing the accusing finger mainly at the other. **It was a dark chapter (*kala Adhyay*) for the Indian revolutionary communist movement.**

The erstwhile PU did some malicious propaganda through handbills in Bihar and, after the merger and the formation of the present CPI (ML)[PW], there were severe vituperative writings on the MCCI in our magazines and other propaganda literature. While on the one hand we were saying that the MCCI is in the revolutionary camp, at the same time, we wrote in our literature that a process of degeneration had started in the MCCI and if the type of elements it began to depend on and the non-proletarian methods it adopted were not rectified, it could drift away from the revolutionary camp. With this incorrect approach of magnifying some errors to give a black picture of the MCC we sought to prove the above point. We ignored the overall revolutionary character of the MCC. This was petty bourgeois short-sightedness in not considering the long-term interests, and treating non-antagonistic contradictions as antagonistic contradictions, despite having been closely associated with the practice of the MCCI for two decades.

This was the result of a **deviation from Marxist methodology** in assessing the situation and the problem, due to our petty bourgeoisie class approach.

Even when our own class people on both the sides opposed the retaliatory methods adopted by both parties, when intellectuals and progressive elements who support revolution appealed to us not to indulge in clashes, and different revolutionary groups and the M-L parties of our country and abroad appealed to resolve the clashes and work together to advance the Indian revolution, **we did not respond initially**. And when the MCC declared a unilateral cease-fire in January 2000, our CC, while welcoming the move by the MCC in March 2000, placed the onus of responsibility for the end to clashes on the MCC. This was serious mistake from our part. Only after much damage did we stop the clashes and start a new chapter in our relations, which is now culminating to merge into a single revolutionary party of India. During this period we too were responsible for not making serious efforts to hold bilateral meetings, so that we could stop the ongoing clashes through discussions. **This was because of lack of seriousness and sectarianism.**

#### **Our specific self criticism in this regard is:**

- 1) We assume our part of the responsibility for the blood-shed, for inflicting trauma and economic losses to thousands of families, and also for the loss of confidence to some extent in us in the revolutionary camp during the *Kaala Adhyay*. We assure the people and the revolutionary camp that **we will, hereafter, never resort to such fratricidal onslaught against our own class brothers.**
- 2) The killing of Com. Sathyanarain Singh in the early 1990s and some other mistakes too on our part contributed to the souring of the relations between our two parties. This is a result of **our political weakness.**
- 3) We deeply realize the serious blunder in giving the slogan: 'Wipe out MCC', in 1995 by the state Party Committee of Bihar. Though this slogan was withdrawn immediately by the then CC, it had a bad impact on the bilateral relations. The root cause of this **lies in our impetuosity and sectarian approach.**

- 4) The method of correspondence; the content of the articles and other propaganda material and the style in which we wrote these was incorrect. This wrong style arose because of our wrong assessment of the MCCI's character, **which was the result of our subjectivism.**
- 5) "*Our mistakes are less and our retaliation is in defence*". This was the sum and substance of our arguments and attitude. Instead of being self-critical, we showed our accusing finger towards the MCCI mainly. **This was our sectarianism and non-proletarian approach to resolve the problem.**
- 6) We got involved in the contradictions among the village masses. Basing on one group we used to attack the local MCCI's support base. Instead of solving the contradictions with a class approach with the aim of achieving the unity among the people, and solving the contradictions in a non antagonistic manner, we adopted a **parochial and non proletarian approach.**
- 7) Instead of resolving problems through polemical debates, time and again we became involved in and gave priority to retaliatory methods. Due to **lack of political vision** on the part of the leadership we trailed behind the arguments of the rank-and-file.

To sum up, the ideological and political roots of these mistakes lie in our subjectivism, sectarianism, and a short-sightedness, where narrow, local interests took precedence over advancing of the class struggle. This resulted in a deterioration of the relations between the two parties. In essence the non-proletarian tendencies — to be precise, petty bourgeois tendencies — dominated our thinking and practice while dealing with this issue. As a result, instead of the dialectical approach to resolve such problems, we handled the contradiction in a wrong way. We aver in this context that we will strain every nerve to rectify these non proletarian tendencies.

For this blood-letting, we pay our red salutes to all those martyred in these clashes, and pledge that we shall learn from this negative experience and never again take up arms against our class friends, no matter how sharp may be the differences. Political differences must be settled by polemical debates and by proving correctness of our politics through

revolutionary practice, but not through the gun. While reiterating our red salutes to all the martyrs killed on both sides, **we realize our mistakes, and beg forgiveness from all the families who have suffered as a result.** We, the CC of CPI (M-L)[PW], ask the revolutionary masses of India particularly the people of Bihar and Jharkhand to forgive us for the past mistakes which we have committed. Though we realized late our serious blunders, we assure you not repeat these types of suicidal acts.

We pledge to intensify the people's war realizing the dreams of beloved martyrs and apply the teachings of our great leaders Marx, Engles, Lenin, Stalin And Mao and advance the Indian democratic revolution to success and then on towards building a genuine and sustaining communist society. We pledge to rectify our mistakes and remould ourselves as genuine proletarian revolutionaries.

## **8. Relations with the Communist Revolutionaries of Other Countries:**

The revolutionary communist movement in India is an inseparable and integral part of the world proletarian revolutionary movement. The Indian proletariat is a detachment of the world proletarian revolution. Though it is the revolutionary communist party of a country that constitutes the principal aspect for carrying the revolution in a country to victory, it is also essential to have active support of the proletariat and oppressed people of other countries. Maintaining live relations with fraternal Communist Parties that are leading the revolutions in various countries, exchanging the experiences of the revolutions of different countries, imparting mutual advice in a constructive spirit and giving mutual aid and assistance, building solidarity movements, building united fronts and conducting united struggles against imperialism, and world reaction unitedly fighting revisionism and defending Marxism-Leninism-Maoism — such are the international policies to be adopted by a Communist Party. It is only through such a practice that the Communist Party of a particular country really upholds proletarian internationalism. It is with this understanding that our Party has been maintaining relations with fraternal parties abroad.

Our initial relations were with the CPN (Maoist) from long before the launching of the people's war in Nepal. Since long we have been maintaining



positive bilateral relations with them. The continuing people's war initiated by the CPN (Maoist) has created a positive impact throughout the world, and particularly in South Asia. In the spirit of proletarian internationalism the two parties have supported ongoing people's war in India and Nepal, assisted each other in many ways, exchanged experiences, and have issued joint statements against Indian expansionism. The developing close coordination between the two Parties finally resulted in the initiation and formation of the CCOMPOSA in June 2001.

CCOMPOSA was formed as a platform of Maoist parties from the countries of Nepal, India, Bangla Desh, and Sri Lanka to target Indian expansionism, deepen the coordination amongst all Maoist forces in South Asia, to intensify the people's war in South Asia, exchange mutual experiences and aid and express solidarity, propagate MLM etc. it was also agreed that the Forum will function on the basis of Consensus and not on the basis of democratic centralism. In spite of these guidelines, the CPN(Maoist) and some other participants of CCOMPOSA tried to impose their viewpoints on the others regarding the mention of the role and importance of RIM in the common Declaration. It was only after an year of struggle that the original objectionable formulation regarding RIM was at last removed from the Declaration in the Annual General Body meeting in July 2002.

The various Conferences of CCOMPOSA held until now had adopted the initial Declaration and passed various resolutions. CCOMPOSA has been issuing regular statements and propagating on issues in all the above countries of South Asia. A bulletin is being brought out which carries the reports of all the Maoist movements of the region.

Till 1995 our Party had fraternal relations with only the parties of South Asia. In 1996, we participated, for the first time, in a meeting of the ML parties outside our country. Till then the rightist and revisionist M-L parties who had been attending these forums had given the impression abroad the PW was some type of terrorist organization. By participating in the May Day seminar held by the PTB of Belgium in 1996 and submitting a paper on "Armed struggle in India – Our experiences", we introduced our movement to several fraternal parties working in various countries. Later,

in the same year, our Party representative participated in a conference organized by the MLPD in Germany and placed a paper explaining our party's standpoint on the unity of proletarian revolutionary forces worldwide. Through these two events we were able to dispel the incorrect impressions abroad regarding our Party and revolutionary movement.

By participating in these two meetings, we succeeded in establishing relations with some important Maoist parties of outside South Asia. We conducted an international seminar on "Mao and People's War" in December 1998 jointly with the Communist Party of the Philippines and the TKP/ML. Of all the international meetings held during the 90s, this seminar in particular, has much significance since it had helped in strengthening the relations with the genuine MLM organizations. The resolutions adopted by this seminar are qualitatively better politically than the resolutions of several other international platforms. It declared clearly that MLM Thought or Maoism as the higher stage of Marxism-Leninism. It placed people's war as the focus for the revolutionary agenda in the contemporary world.

After the seminar, our Party, along with the Communist Party of Philippines and the TKP/ML decided to work more coordinately and make attempts to organize a meeting of all genuine Maoists forces in the world; specifically those leading people's wars or those that are actively supporting them. Though there has not been much coordination since then, the three parties are jointly working in two international mass organizations — one, to fight for the democratic rights of people and forces of democratic and revolutionary movements; second, to unitedly fight against imperialism, particularly US imperialism throughout the world.

The three international meetings and maintaining the bilateral relations in which we had developed understanding about the various revolutionary movements. A common understanding and coordination between Maoist parties leading people's war *some* developed to some extent. The growth of our fraternal relations with organizations abroad has also helped in propagating our movement among the revolutionary forces and people in other countries. We have also propagated in our country about revolutionary movements of other countries.

## **Relations with RIM:**

Besides developing fraternal relations by participating in the various international platforms on a principled basis, we also developed fraternal relations with the RIM. The RIM had played an active role in fighting revisionism and upholding MLM immediately after the capture of power in China by the counter-revolutionaries in 1976 following the death of Com. Mao. However, it has an over assessment on the prospects of building an International, without taking lessons from the 3rd International. It incorrectly considers itself as a new embryonic centre of International based on democratic centralism. Thus, along with some other important political and organisational questions, we also have differences with the RIM on the question of the concept, feasibility and method of building a new International at the present juncture.

Our Party thinks that trying to build a new International based on democratic centralism under the present conditions in the world is premature and impracticable. It is not correct to proceed with the formation of another International without a deep study and review of the reasons for the dissolution of the 3rd International in 1943 and as to why the CPC under Com. Mao did not form a new International. Moreover, we think that RIM's insistence on the principle of democratic centralism for the functioning of the forum and considering itself as an "embryonic center of a new International", will not help foster the unity of the Maoist forces worldwide and shows a sectarian attitude.

## **International Tasks and Our Role:**

Today the Maoists of the world have two most important and urgent tasks before them. It is in both these that our Party has to play a role in order to undertake its internationalist duties. Both will be facilitated by building a wide network of the Party amongst Indians abroad.

The first and most important task is for all the genuine Maoist forces of the world to come under one platform. This platform can exchange ideological-political views, take up campaigns to defend MLM and socialism by countering all forms of revisionism and other alien ideologies, undertaking mutual assistance among the various parties, and conducting ideological

political debates to raise the political and ideological level of the international communist movement. This core of genuine Maoist forces can act to polarize other revolutionary forces worldwide into the Maoist camp.

The second important task is to help build and participate in the worldwide anti-imperialist movement and crystallize a correct orientation to it. If a core of Maoists is at its forefront, taking a clear-cut stand-point and actively leading the anti-imperialist struggles, it is only then that this would be possible.

Though our Party's role at the international level has been limited, we basically pursued a correct line in international relations and have helped facilitate the above two processes. We were able to do some propaganda about our movement at the international level and develop relations with genuine MLM forces. Yet there were some shortcomings primarily reflected in coordination with organizations abroad and in attaining sufficient details on the lines of the various parties abroad. An immediate task before us is to initiate effective work amongst the vast number of Indians residing abroad.

## **Building the People's Army for the Seizure of Political Power**

The overall development of our war since the 9th Congress, the positive and negative aspects of our PGA, the military commissions and command structures, the strong and weak points in our armed resistance against the Indian State, the role of the masses in the people's war, the progress as well as the problems that we are facing in the establishment of organs of people's political power and guerilla bases, etc., should be seen in the background of the review that we made in the 9th Congress regarding these aspects. Understanding the weaknesses and shortcomings historically is necessary in order to objectively assess the military work during this period.

The PGA was formed on 2nd December 2000 while the conditions for its formation existed at least from 1995. This lapse was identified in the 9th Congress. Even though we did not take up the task it is also a fact that we offered fierce and relentless armed resistance against the State, inflicted much damage to the enemy and foiled the enemy's offensives. And in the

course of advancing the people's war we lost several hundred comrades. Our failure to identify the tactics of the enemy in time and adopt correct counter tactics had a retarding impact on the overall development of the people's war.

The enemy began an all-round offensive from the beginning of 1997 by achieving coordination in all fronts. The central and state governments intensified their plans to suppress the revolutionary movement under our party's leadership. After the formation of JOC in April 2000 this plan was drawn up under the guidance of the US imperialists as a part of their LIC policy. At the time of the 9th congress the fascist forms of suppression that were being implemented in AP had spread to nine states.

In AP our state and central leaderships could not gauge the intensity and depth of the all-round enemy offensive and to formulate appropriate tactics at that time. As a result of this failure, we suffered serious losses. The leadership of the mass organizations became victims of white terror. The government itself set up and trained armed gangs to suppress our movement. An atmosphere of fear pervaded the state. The problem of covert agents had become quite acute within the party, PGA and mass organizations. Surrenders had increased. Under such difficult circumstances we formed the PGA on December 2, 2000, the day of the martyrdom of comrades Shyam, Mahesh and Murali.

It was in this background that the 9th Congress was held in February-March 2001. The Congress reviewed the movement and adopted new tasks. It decided to intensify the guerrilla war with the aim of transforming DK into a base area, intensify the guerrilla war with the perspective of establishing base areas in NT and AOB, to strengthen our subjective forces and intensify the guerrilla war in south Telangana and Balaghat – Gondia, to consolidate and develop the party and intensify the guerrilla war in BJ with the aim of developing Magadh – KK region into guerrilla zone, to complete the preparations for the guerrilla zone in Nallamala (Guntur – Prakasam – Kurnool), Rayalaseema and BJO regions. It also resolved to develop anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggles in the country.

We have been striving to implement the above tasks in the past four years. During this period the central and state governments have further

stepped up their counter revolutionary attacks countrywide under the leadership of the JOC. We are making efforts to defeat these attacks and successfully implement the above tasks. Let us briefly examine the positive aspects achieved in the military front in the course of implementing the above tasks.

Immediately after the Congress, we formed the CMC, SMCs and Sub-Zonal/regional Commands in some states, (district and area commands also in some states). The CMC and SMCs sent some guidelines to the PGA. They concentrated on political – military education, military training and directly led the PGA forces in the TCOCs. CMC brought out literature on military affairs. As the CMC and SMCs concentrated on specialization in military matters, our overall understanding of military matters has increased.

The work of establishing the people's political power and the guerrilla bases and extending them to the entire guerrilla zone in DK and AOB in order to transform the latter into base areas has begun elementarily. Preliminary consolidation of the organs of people's political power at the village level (Revolutionary People's Committees, RPCs) and revolutionary people's government at the area level has begun. These are going on as part of the aim of forming the district revolutionary people's governments in the process of establishing Base Areas.

In AP the guerrilla zone preparations have completed in Nallamala, which has become another battlefield after becoming a guerrilla zone. In BJ, the SC declared that the Magadh – KK region had reached the stage of guerrilla zone in 1995 itself and hence it drew up its plans to establish GBs. It carried out TCOCs with the aim of destroying the enemy forces and seizing the arms and thus could confront the joint offensive of the various state governments led by the JOC.

As a result of the recruitment campaigns of the PGA the main, secondary and the base (militia) forces had increased numerically. In the past four years 900 arms were seized from the enemy including 536 arms and 25000 rounds in the military campaign in Koraput in February 2004. This has improved the arms position of our PGA. Our guerrilla attacks had increased in South Telangana and Balaghat-Gondia and BJO Zone turned

into a new battle front as armed confrontation between our guerrilla forces and the enemy's forces became the main form of struggle.

### **Expanding the PGA:**

We took up campaigns in DK and AOB for consolidation of militia and to enhance the recruitment. As a result, the main, secondary and the base (militia) forces increased significantly in DK while in AOB the increase was considerable.

In AP and NT, the enemy's multi-pronged attack continued intensively. Our mass organizations, village party cells, militia and GRCs were hit very badly. Therefore, we could not take up the campaigns in NT. After the Congress, the serious losses in NT continued unabated and the movement became further weakened and faced a situation of ebb. In AP, as we took up the recruitment campaign only once, that too in a formal manner, the expected results could not be achieved. Though there has been some recruitment in the normal course of activity there was no planned effort or special drive for recruiting the better elements.

Overall, in NT and AP, although there has been continuous recruitment in spite of the heavy enemy repression, the cadre strength and military formations further decreased as the total losses and surrenders surpassed the total number of recruits. However, since we could utilize the political situation that occurred in AP state (NT, AP and AOB) during the period of talks, the subjective forces increased.

The recruitment into PGA increased rapidly in 2002 and 2004 in the KK-Magadh region of BJ. But the rate of recruitment dropped in 2003 and 2004 in the part of KK due to enemy repression. Due to severe losses and internal weaknesses the Platoons got reduced to half their strength. As there was no concentration on the base force, the militia could not develop to the required extent although there is good potential for its development.

In Balaghat – Gondia division, recruitment campaign was taken up once besides the normal recruitment, and there is some improvement in the main and secondary forces. In BJO, there had been some recruitment initially but the incidents in Chota Angaria and Lango had a demoralizing impact not only on the old cadres but also drastically affected new

recruitment. In the perspective area of Western Ghats in Karnataka, the formation of LGSs had begun during this period. Recruitment has also taken place to some extent.

When we compare the results of our recruitment over the past four years with our goal, we find that they fall far short of our requirements. Let us analyze the reasons for this.

1. In the continuous multi-pronged counter revolutionary attacks of the enemy in AP and NT, our mass organizations, party, militia and RPCs in villages suffered badly. As a result, class and mass struggles took place sporadically. The main reason for the lack of recruitment was the relative decline in the consolidated mass base due to constant enemy attacks and harassment. As the militia, the base force of the PGA, is not strong, the main and the secondary forces decreased considerably. It is only by building a strong militia and strengthening and expanding the secondary and main forces; we can confront the counter revolutionary offensive of the enemy.
2. In AP (NT, AP, AOB), some of those who joined the PGA had surrendered to the enemy, or became inactive, or turned into renegades or covert agents, or joined vigilante gangs. This had increased the confusion among the masses. One of the reasons for the losses that we suffered and for the infiltration of the enemy agents into our movement is lack of revolutionary vigilance in the party. That is, as the party leadership pursued a liberal attitude in undertaking deep study and investigation, lacked critical examination, it could not train the lower level party committees to maintain the revolutionary vigilance. The problem of loose recruitment is also serious due to the liberal attitude of the Party leadership.

Lack of vigilance and the persistence of the political – organizational weaknesses were utilised by the enemy to convert the weak elements in the Party as their covert agents. The losses and ebb in the movement; lack of understanding regarding the protracted nature of the PW; lack of clarity on maintaining and developing the quality of the Party in general, particularly in periods of severe repression, the weak proletarian base of our party, petty-bourgeois mentality that



tends one to easily surrender to the enemy's deceptive tactics, lack of determination to confront tortures, lack of preparedness for protracted, difficult struggles and for self-sacrifice for the interest of the basic classes—all these can be said to be the main reasons for the surrenders and degeneration. It is only by firmly fighting against the alien class trends that emerge in the party, PGA and mass organizations that we can overcome this problem of covert agents and surrenders. Ideological firmness, political clarity, organizationally consolidated mass base, and militarily undaunted courage will develop the PGA qualitatively to transform it into the PLA.

3. There is lack of special effort or concentration on the part of the leadership to impart ideological-political-military training to the new recruits as well as the senior cadre. Whatever training is imparted is insufficient and does not meet the actual needs of the ongoing war. This is resulting in an increase in non-proletarian trends in these new recruits, vacillations, and lack of preparedness to face hardships. Communist revolutionary attitude is an essential prerequisite to work in any front.

Overall, we gained rich experience in building and strengthening the PGA and learnt invaluable lessons during this period. Our commands, commanders and fighters of PGA gained rich and diverse experiences. Hundreds of our fighters, commanders and military leaders became martyrs; many of them laid down their lives while fighting heroically with the enemy forces. Their sacrifices written in blood have given us invaluable lessons and have become an eternal inspiration to our fighting forces and the vast oppressed masses of our country. By advancing the war, we showed the people of the country the correctness of our Party line of building the people's army, destroying the enemy forces, seizing the arms and arming the PGA and establishing organs of revolutionary political power in the backward countryside. The heroic actions of the PGA, and its role in defending the interests of the masses during these years has convinced the masses of the need for strengthening the people's army for achieving their liberation.

### **Strengthening of Military Commissions and Commands:**

In the state conferences held immediately after the formation of the PGA in December 2000, we formed state military commissions and sub-zonal military commands in DK, NT, AP and BJ. CMC was formed in the CCEM held immediately after the Congress. CMC sent some guidelines to the SMCs and the PGA. In AOB, there was Zonal command until 2002 and then the ZMC was formed along with sub-zonal commands.

Due to the multi-pronged attack of the enemy in AP as a whole, we suffered serious losses. The brunt of the enemy attack was borne by the comrades in NT initially but after the Alipiri attack the concentration of the enemy increased greatly in AP part also. We lost a good part of the leadership due to our lack of vigilance and the severity of the enemy offensive. As part of our plan to preserve our subjective forces, we made some drastic changes in the organizational forms in AP. Platoon form was adopted in AP from December 2003. As the state committees in AP and NT were reduced to shorter committees due to our plan of shifting a section of the leadership to other states, the SMCs were dissolved and the SC/SZC looked after the military matters. In NT, the Secretariat too was dissolved. In BJ we caused considerable damage to the enemy through our military attacks but we too suffered serious losses as we did not pursue proper methods, lacked regular functioning, and had shortcoming in educating the cadres.

As we had the aim of transforming the PGA into PLA in the future, we tried to improve the functioning of the Commissions and to increase the number of members. Though they improved to some extent, and military sense has developed, overall they are still weak and it will take considerable period of time before they can develop to the extent of functioning independently. They are yet to set up the necessary departments and staff.

Our Central and state military commissions carried out the following tasks:

- They acted as the Commands also in the concerned levels. In states where SMCs were functioning regularly the situation is relatively better. There the resistance to the enemy offensive was more planned and effective.

- Commissions provided direct leadership to the TCOCs. They carried out joint operations.
- They armed the PGA and tried to strengthen it.
- Military training was given to the PGA through mobile military school.
- They strived to bring about uniformity in the PGA.
- The CMC made attempts to specialize in studying military matters and to supply study material to the cadres.
- They played an important role in fulfilling the Central task drawn up by the Congress and strived to intensify and expand the guerilla war.

### **Shortcomings:**

Although four meetings were held after the formation of the CMC it has to develop collective understanding in political – military matters in accordance with the party’s political – military line. Some SMC meetings were not held regularly. They have to develop as collective teams under the collective leadership of the state committees. Due to shortage of staff and communication material, proper coordination could not be developed between the In-charge of CMC and CMC members as well as between the CMC and SMCs.

- We are still lagging behind in developing the PGA forces and Commands, in acquiring grip ideologically and applying it to practice as we did not allot time specially for the study of MLM, military, ideology.
- We are still lagging behind in strengthening the skills of the PGA by training them in combat methods, knowledge, skills and abilities in a systematic manner especially to suit the specific conditions of guerrilla zones and enemy movements. We haven’t succeeded in developing the necessary political and military outlook in the PGA. We could not give training to all of our forces through military camps corresponding to increase in recruitment.
- Due to our failure in implementing and developing our military skills and guerrilla tactics in accordance with the situation, we are still lagging behind in destroying the enemy and seizing arms during TCOCs and

separate actions.

- Mistakes are occurring in formulating appropriate guerrilla tactics in accordance with the situation by understanding the strength of the enemy and the weakness of our subjective forces. Mistakes are occurring in taking daily precautions, during travel, while camping, in knowing the latest information about the enemy and accordingly planning our movements, etc.

Mistakes are taking place in facing the stronger enemy, in fighting in a winning situation, in planning to win, in planning in accordance with our fighting potential, in postponing the actions that may not lead to victory, in luring the enemy with the help of the local militia and attacking him in a place not suitable for him but suitable for us, dividing the stronger enemy units and attacking, in acting as if to attack on east but actually attacking in west, in facing the enemy with firm determination, in concentrating for the success of opportunity, deliberate, area and night ambushes, and in completely annihilating the smaller (enemy) units.

Mistakes are happening in conducting the guerrilla war depending on the mass base, by integrating with and organizing the people, for our supplies, for collecting intelligence about the enemy while not letting the enemy know about our presence, for medical treatment of the wounded guerrillas, for blocking the enemy's supplies and medical aid, for disrupting the enemy's communication lines, in developing the collective mass resistance, in arming the people with the view that the people's armed power will supplement in achieving our central task ultimately, and in evacuating the villages and protecting the people when the enemy attacks them heavily. Mistakes are occurring in implementing the principle that the enemy intruded into guerrilla zones must not get out without paying the appropriate price.

### **Commands:**

Sub-zonal commands were in existence from the very beginning. Recently some district commands and area commands are formed and functional in DK, AOB, NT, AP, B-J, and Balaghat – Gondia. Efforts are on to form such commands in the places where they are not yet formed.

Meetings of the commands are being held regularly in some places only. The newly formed divisional/district, area commands in BJ are yet to acquire experience in practice.

Commands provided direct leadership in the TCOCs planned by state committees and SMCs, in separate military actions, and in preparations for and conducting joint actions. They conducted camps to raise the military level of PGA commanders and fighters, to bring uniformity and for military training.

There are weaknesses in firmly implementing the tasks formulated by commands. There is negligence in the study of theory to enhance the ideological and political strength. As a result mistakes are occurring in solving particular problems in the light of theory. There is liberalism also in rectifying ones own mistakes as well as in correcting the others mistakes. We must put in more efforts to conduct the meetings of platoons and SGSs regularly and thus to implement the party policies, military policies, decisions and discipline.

There is tendency to have subjective assessments about the enemy, particularly over assessment of the enemy, thereby lacking initiative on our part. It is necessary to understand the enemy's position and tactics, and creatively chalk out guerrilla tactics to defeat the enemy in time. As we have not paid attention to the aspect of utmost secrecy in maintaining dumps of arms, ammunition, gelatin, chemicals, etc., some had gone into the hands of the enemy.

### **People's Militia:**

In the past four years the militia units had increased in DK and AOB. The militia also participated in the resistance recently utilizing the period of talks. The militia units were formed to some extent in AP and NT. In B-J, Balaghat – Gondia, militia units have not been built in a systematic way. Overall due to enemy's fascist repression and lack of drive by the party committees village level militia units have not grown corresponding to the level of the movement. In many areas, militia units are yet to be formed. There is also neglect in arming the militia units that are already formed. Likewise, there is need for paying more attention to actively involve the existing militia units in actions to harass the enemy and resist in various

ways. On the whole, as the base force i.e., people's militia, is quite weak, our resistance to the enemy is also weak.

The central and state governments are stepping up their onslaught on the revolutionary movement in the cruelest manner. It is instigating murderous gangs and vigilante squads. It is unleashing violent attacks on all people's movements. Hence there is all the more necessity for the working class, peasantry and the oppressed masses to arm themselves. Without the armed people's militia it is not possible to defeat the murderous attacks by the vigilante gangs, police and other forces. We have to form small militia units in the plains with utmost secrecy. In strategic regions, militia units could be built at various levels and should be armed.

### **Arms and ammunition:**

Arms play an important role in enhancing the fighting capacity of the PGA and its ability to destroy the enemy forces. Enemy's armory is the armory of the PGA. As the enemy is the chief source for our arms, we should use the guerrilla methods of warfare in a creative manner, annihilate the enemy through ambushes and raids by effectively utilizing his weaknesses, and seize the arms thereby enhancing the strength and capacities of the PGA. In order to defeat the counterrevolutionary offensive of the enemy and establish Base Areas, it is essential to improve the armed resistance and might of the masses. Although we seized some arms from the enemy in the past four years, we could not seize sufficient number of rifles of various types in accordance with the requirements of our struggle. This has imposed severe limitations on the fire-power of our PGA. All levels of Party committees should pay utmost attention to this aspect, inspire the PGA and people and concentrate on destruction of the enemy and seizure of arms. All opportunities for the seizure of arms should be examined.

We have not been able to tap the other sources for procuring arms. The method of assembling arms at the state level through our source is not sufficient to arm the masses. The village Party committees, ACs, DCs should take initiative to make country-made weapons locally with the available resources instead of looking to the higher committees. Only then it is possible to arm the militia. We should give primacy to this and organize manufacture of weapons by transforming the local handicraftsmen and

part-timers into red mechanics. Thus the states should become self-sufficient in arms through seizures from enemy forces, purchases and production.

CC and CMC should ensure that various models manufactured by our sources for meeting the growing needs of our war are sent to the battlefield in time. There is also the need to introduce different types of improvised weapons and models in the war in place of the existing ones.

### **Politico-Military Training:**

We planned to develop a central instructors' team in order to strengthen the capabilities of PGA forces in various ways by teaching them military knowledge, fighting skills and abilities, methods of combat and discipline basing on the training developed by the Party. But full-time instructors of DC-level did not come from AP, NT and AOB. Later we reduced the level and decided to include instructors from AC-level. However, we did not succeed in forming the central instructors' team as planned. The instructors' teams in the states also could not yet be developed. There are only individual instructors. We have to select the best trainees in the military camps and allot them for the instructors' teams by keeping in mind the overall interests of the movement.

In December 2001 a central military camp was held for SMCs and sub-zonal commands. The positive aspect of this camp is that CMC conducted the training based on our own experience, knowledge and abilities. After this, military camps were held in all states. In 2003 it was decided to impart political and military training through mobile military schools under the leadership of CMC and SMCs in order to transform the PGA into a powerful force that can achieve the goals set by the Party. This laid the basis for developing the main and secondary forces into a striking force. CMC prepared the notes on the political-military line and on our counter-tactics to defeat enemy's tactics. Decentralised camps were held in all states (DK, AOB, NT, AP,KN, MR, BJ, WB). Later, camps were also conducted at district and area levels. In areas where repression was severe, camps were held in mobile by reducing the number of days of training. 3-7 days camps were held for militia members.

### **Shortcomings:**

Military weaknesses still persist in spite of the formation of CMC, SMCs, Sub-Zonal commands and some district commands. PGA has not acquired the necessary political and military orientation yet. There is need to evolve new tactics and bring them into actual implementation while primarily concentrating on resistance. There is shortcoming in imparting the necessary political education along with military training. Due to the increase in new members and leaders in PGA we could not train all the forces through the camps.

The present phase is a crucial one when revolution and counter-revolution are locked up in a decisive war. At such a juncture, there is an urgent need to improve our military training, arms position and prepare our forces mentally to confront and defeat enemy attacks.

As we prepared the syllabus with anxiety to teach all aspects at once we are unable to acquire a grip on the various aspects. Hence, in future camps, we have to concentrate on some aspects instead of all. If we have to teach more aspects then we must run the camp for more number of days in mobile. Further development of PGA leadership and soldiers and strengthening their grip over the various aspects learnt by them is not taking place as they are not making enough effort during their regular life, both collectively and individually. There are also lapses in arming the PLGA with grenades and grenade launchers, and training it in the efficient use of communication sets and improvised explosive devices. Hence many PGA members are not having confidence in using these and are facing problems when confronted by the enemy forces. Due to shortage of live ammunition target shooting of the trainees is not upto the standard. Instructors should also pay more attention to the backward students and strive to develop them.

CMC and SMCs should generalize the experiences of the people's war in various parts of the country and pass on this knowledge to the entire Party and PGA. They should study the common tactics adopted by the enemy in various states as part of his all-round countrywide offensive, generalize the methods of countering the enemy forces militarily and inflicting damage to the enemy, and thus bring about an overall improvement in our



methods of military training. At the same time, they should concentrate on specialization and improve the training methods to suit the varying conditions in different states by studying the specific tactics and preparations of the enemy, the level of the movement, fighting abilities and the strength of our PGA in the given area or state, and such other features.

There will be some limitations to our military training in the plain and semi-forest areas. We have to give training during night-time. We should have less syllabus and more mobile type of training.

### **Review of TCOCs:**

As the Central and various state governments unleashed an all-round joint attack under the leadership of JOC we took up a TCOC simultaneously in AP, DK, BJ and OS soon after the 9th Congress. In CC-2 meeting in 2002, we assessed the then prevailing condition of our movement in the various states and decided that TCOCs should also be taken up in the various states and even districts according to their needs. Thus we also took up separate TCOCs in various states as well as separate military actions.

In the past four years we have intensified the guerrilla war in AP, DK, BJ, OS and Gondia-BLG. We foiled the conspiracies of the reactionary ruling classes to suppress our movement by stepping up armed resistance heroically and, in some places; we could retain the initiative by carrying out a series of TCOCs. However, we could fulfill only part of the aims through these campaigns. We seized some weapons and succeeded in breaking the initiative of the enemy to an extent by annihilating some enemy forces. In some areas in the guerrilla zones, whenever the enemy forces enter, our main and secondary forces and the people's militia begin harassing them immediately. However, the enemy is still permanently positioned within, and around our guerrilla zones, and around our guerrilla bases and the task of destroying and throwing out these forces still remains a challenge before us. Although we organized some attacks we did not succeed in destroying the enemy forces and seizing arms. We should have the goal of destroying the enemy forces during our attacks even if the number of attacks is less. Our attacks should create good political impact. There are lapses in the selection of the targets, in concrete planning and in taking initiative in

countering the enemy tactics. Serious weakness also exists in enhancing the role of people's militia and coordinating with it.

Our forces do not have the necessary mental preparedness to fight the enemy with initiative and courage during the TCOCs. That is why even though ambushes were successful in many places we did not seize the arms. We also failed to achieve the planned objectives during some raids.

There are serious problems in the preparations such as, conducting reccees and collecting information regarding enemy, arranging explosives and other materials, conducting rehearsals, before taking up campaigns and separate military actions.

In some areas, lack of clarity regarding Party organization and military organization, and coordination between mass work and military work is continuing. As it is the Party that provides leadership to the PGA, they are mutually interrelated and interdependent. All the Party committees should assist the PGA units in solving the problems they face. It has been proved that we can successfully carry out daring and surprising actions such as Geedam, Anakapalli and Chodavaram, and Koraput campaign, if the Party committees mobilise the PGA politically, explain the importance of the campaigns and instill the spirit of self-sacrifice and revolutionary determination. This has been proved in the week-long PGA Anniversary campaigns also. The daring actions on murderous police officers like Umesh Chandra, Gandhi etc., and cruel political leaders and class enemies like Chandrababu Naidu, Madhav Reddy and Erram Naidu in plain areas and cities have created great enthusiasm and courage among our forces and the masses. In some areas of AP, AOB and DK, we were able to successfully combine the attacks on the class enemies and the state forces with famine raids during the TCOCs. This showed the way for the solution of the problem of famine to the masses and boosted their morale.

PGA should implement without fail the Party's policies and methods and pursue class and mass line during campaigns and other military actions such as: actions against enemy soldiers, para-military forces, special forces; killing class enemies and informers; punishing the exploiting ruling classes, revisionist and other political leaders and cadres; destroying the vigilante gangs; punishing the armies of the landlords, and other private armies and

gangsters; punishing covert agents; and so on. Otherwise, the danger of being swept away by pure militaristic viewpoint exists. The actions being undertaken with a sectarian attitude cause grave damage to the Party (In this regard, PB Letter No. 1/2004 should be followed strictly). PGA should implement a comprehensive policy and method in respect of sabotage (destructive) actions. The danger of drifting towards soft targets such as buses, schools and Mandal/Block offices always exists. Instead, we should concentrate on targets that will be of immediate help to the advance of people's war and the people's interests and on targets that cause great damage to the class enemy. Our targets should be the properties of imperialists, CBB, feudal forces, die-hard political leaders and government property such as roads, communications, coal-steel-electricity, information technology and such other infrastructure that primarily serve the ruling classes. Masses should be mobilized in a big way for such actions. Distribution of the property such as foodgrains, clothes etc., to the people should be done wherever possible. Utmost care should be taken not to cause any damage to the people during these actions.

Besides carrying out TCOCs at the Central and state level in accordance with the decisions of the CC and SC/SZCs, the DC/DVCs should also undertake such campaigns at the district/division-level depending on the severity of enemy repression. The period of campaign should be determined basing on the strength and capacity of our PGA forces and resources available. The targets of these campaigns should be concretely worked out depending on our assessment of the position of the enemy and our forces, and our needs in the concerned states. When the targets are clear planning will be simple and concrete. Likewise, it becomes easy to coordinate the main, secondary and base forces. If we have to successfully carry out TCOCs and separate military actions, the nature of our actions should be to make preparations with utmost caution and secrecy and carry out the attack suddenly and swiftly. By taking the attack as principal, we can retain the initiative, planning and control in our hands. Our victories will depend on how effectively and creatively we use guerrilla tactics in accordance with the actual conditions.

## **Review of the work related to guerrilla bases:**

In strategic regions where guerrilla zones are formed with the perspective of developing into base areas we decided to first establish guerrilla bases by building organs of people's democratic political power [RPCs] in strategic pockets where our mass base is strong and the terrain is more favorable, and then extend these organs of political power to the entire guerrilla zone turning it into a Base Area, by destroying the enemy state power thereby achieving a qualitative development in our people's war. In accordance with the call of the 9th congress to build guerrilla bases as focal points in the guerrilla zones, we selected some areas with good mass base and favourable terrain in the three-States/ Special Zones under CRB and in B-J under ERB for developing into GBs. The area of GBs was concretely decided in the CCEM and the concerned SC/SZC. In accordance with the organizational and military strength at that time, and other specific conditions of different areas, we selected some GB areas in DK, AOB, NT, AP, B-J and commenced our work. Decisions were taken to strengthen party ACs, concentrate Platoons/SGSs, build and consolidate LGSSs, RPCs, Party Cells/GPCs, People's militia, cultural organization and other mass organizations, etc.

The concerned SC/SZCs wrote circulars and made comprehensive resolutions and educated all the lower level committees on building the GBs with the perspective of establishing base Areas. In this period study camps were held for the SZCs of DK and AOB in order to acquire a comprehensive ideological-political understanding on GBs based on Mao's writings. However, immediately after the Congress, as we took up the task of conducting TCOC in all the zones of intense armed struggle as the first main task, we could not simultaneously concentrate to the required extent on building the GBs. Besides, our subjective forces were not that strong in many areas at that time and we had to mobilize our limited forces in armed engagements with the enemy forces in a wider area throughout this period.

**DK:** By the time of the first TCOC, the work of building GBs has begun at a preliminary level in most of the GB areas. This is because of the time required for making preparations and lack of plan to coordinate the TCOC with the work of building the GBs in 2001-02. The work of building

and consolidating RPCs, Party Cells/GPCs and people's militia units and mass organizations has begun in several areas by the time of the CC-2 meeting.

The CC-2 meeting reviewed the work and discussed the task of building GBs in detail and chalked out a concrete plan of concentration, political mobilization, destruction – construction, consolidation, military organization, coordination between various tasks, etc., in order to develop the GB areas. A time-bound target was fixed to form organs of political power at the area level and to form GB-level party committees in two areas.

In light of the above review, the DK SZC stepped up its efforts after the state plenum. Party committees and divisional military commands were formed in the areas chosen as GBs. PGA platoons were deployed in the GB areas. Additional LGSs were formed in the GB area, as well as in the contiguous area to provide support to the GB by expanding the area of guerrilla operations. In this period consolidation work and the participation of masses and the PLGA in all fields of PW has developed significantly. The militia participated in a big way in the resistance activities in the TCOCs in the GB area. More than the growth in the number of the militia units, what is more important is the improvement in their fighting capacities and preparedness. They participated in the military activities armed mainly with their traditional arms. In several political, military campaigns, like the two election boycott campaigns, mobilization for *Bhumkal*, support to teachers' strike etc., helped raise the political consciousness of the people. As a result of all these, people have become more conscious of the need to build their own organs of power. A company was also formed in accordance with the decision of CCEM and CC-2 meeting.

The extended meeting of the SZC in May 2004 reviewed the situation in all the GBs and planned time-bound programme and prepared the manifesto of *Viplava Janathana Sarkaa*. In accordance with the plan, guidance and programme given by this meeting, this work has been speeded up in all the selected areas and within one year two ARPCs were formed. Concrete preparations are being completed for some more ARPCs. CRB reviewed the situation and directed the SZC to consolidate the ARPCs, extend and develop them to build district level RPCs as an inseparable

process of building Base Areas. Overall, the situation in DK is quite favorable for developing organs of people's power to higher levels.

**AOB:** In AOB, the SZC took the decision to build the GB and began to implement it immediately after the 9th Congress basing on the understanding arrived at in the Congress. In accordance with this objective various mass organizations and people's militia units were formed in the villages and at the area-level. Some Party cells and RPCs were formed. Revolutionary land reforms were taken up in some villages. In many villages people boycotted elections. Cooperatives, health centres and agricultural development committees were formed. The decision to form the GB committee was taken in end 2003 but could not be done due to lack of leadership cadres. Plans were made to form higher-level RPCs.

When seen as a whole, we find that the concentration of SZC is not in accordance with the needs. Although there was positive effort in developing the GB in the initial period, effort to develop it consistently has come down later on. There is lot of limitations for the leadership cadre (ACMs and DCMs) in the GB. They are not able to make much progress in work due to poor abilities. We have to develop the GB by allotting the necessary leadership forces and both SZC and CC should concentrate to fulfill this task.

**AP:** In AP, there was delay in the selection of the GB areas until 2002. In the SC meeting of 2001, the SC felt that some concrete study and survey of the areas was needed before such a decision was taken, keeping in view the peculiarities of the GB areas of Nallamala, such as scarcity of the population, problem of supplies, sufficient agricultural production, etc.

It was only in July 2002 that some areas were selected for developing into GBs and concrete plans were made. Each GB was allotted a PL but due to the weak subjective forces these PLs had to be engaged even outside the GB areas. As a result, the work of destruction of the enemy forces and the consolidation of the people has not progressed much though, in GB-1 and GB-2, consolidation and development work was taken up at last from the end of 2003 among the *chenchu* adivasis. There will be several limitations in offering long-term resistance to the enemy in the GBs of Nallamala due to the scarcity of the population.

**NT:** By the time of the Congress the movement in NT went into defense. In spite of this, we arrived at the understanding that we can form some GBs in the strategic areas. But with the intensification of enemy repression and severe losses of our subjective forces, destruction or weakening of the revolutionary and democratic mass organizations and reduced mass base on our side, our resistance had weakened and consequently the situation became unfavorable for forming the GBs immediately. Without developing armed resistance and rebuilding local organization and mass mobilization, it is not possible to achieve the destruction of the enemy forces, and without this development, it is not possible to concentrate on the building of GBs in the present conditions prevailing in NT. Hence the work of building GBs did not move ahead in the past four years. Though it will take some more time for our forces to regain sufficient strength and initiative and to build the GBs, it is important that we build RPCs wherever we are able to deal some blows against the enemy forces and consolidate our mass base, Party and the PGA. We have to continuously rouse the masses with the slogan of alternative power which the people had enjoyed for some years before we suffered serious losses and are pushed into a situation of ebb.

**B-J:** CCEM resolved that BJSC should discuss the stage of the movement in BJ and the differences in SC on the question of completion of preparations for guerrilla zone. Later in 2001, final discussion took place in SC, and the SC and ERB arrived at the conclusion that guerrilla zone preparations were completed and that GBs have to be built as part of the guerrilla zone. To achieve this, we selected some areas for building the GBs, allotted PLs and LGSs, and made some organisational changes. But although we had selected three areas for building the GBs and commenced work after the Congress, there was no sufficient preparation and concrete planning and not much progress in completing the social investigation in the GB areas, or in forming new units of the various mass organizations, militia units etc. This was due to spontaneity on the part of the CC and the SC. They did not provide clarity to the lower-level Party committees and drive them in the work of consolidating the GB areas.

To sum up, the CC and the SCs/SZCs have summed up this work from time to time, identified the shortcomings like, spontaneity on the part of the

leadership in linking up other tasks to the central task of building the GBs, insufficient concentration by the CC and SCs, shortcomings in developing guerrilla war and their inexperience which played a role in the delay in the planned work of building GBs. Establishing people's political power at the area level is the vindication of the overall advance of the people's war. But we must always keep in mind that the GBs may go into the hands of the enemy anytime given the vast superiority of the Indian state. Hence we must make greater efforts to destroy the enemy through our PGA and the consolidated strength, armed might and active participation of the people. The Party and the PGA should utilize the ARPCs and the GBs for their strategic tasks most effectively, consolidate these organs of people's political power and the GBs and expand them into the surrounding areas in the guerilla zones. Transformation of guerrilla war into mobile war and PGA into PLA is an essential condition for bringing about a qualitative leap in our people's war by consolidating and expanding the guerilla bases, forming organs of people's power at higher levels and establishing Base Areas. The consolidation and expansion should go on continuously. Only thus we can show to the oppressed people of India at large that the path of their liberation is the path of area wise seizure of power. And it is only in this course that the political power in the area and district level will expand to the entire special zone. When Base Areas are established at the level of the special zone, then the Party and the People's Army can utilize them for the strategic tasks as their Bases in the real sense and qualitatively influence the revolutionary war in India. We can lay the basis for bringing about a change in the revolutionary situation and enhancing tremendously the role of the masses in the people's war and the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. But to achieve this strategic aim, we should courageously and with utmost consistency fulfill the task of building of the Base Areas.

The establishment of Base Areas depends on our effort and successes in: enhancing the active role of the masses in the political sphere, increasing our organized strength, defeating the enemy offensive, improving our striking capacity to destroy the enemy forces and capturing arms, strengthening and expanding the PGA and transforming it into PLA, developing the guerrilla war into mobile war, expanding the areas of guerrilla war, establishing and



consolidating the people's power by destroying the enemy authority, on the successes in advancing the people's war in the adjacent GZ areas, and on developing the people's war by coordinating the war tactics, political tactics and mass movements in the country as a whole. We have to carry out these tasks with conscious effort and utmost determination.

## **Shortcomings to be overcome to transform the PGA in to PLA:**

We have to overcome the following shortcomings in order to successfully carry out tactical counteroffensive actions, strengthen and expand the PGA forces, bring forth new military formations and train them into effective combat forces, and thus intensify the guerrilla war as a whole.

### **1. Arm the masses and involve them in the people's war:**

The active role of the armed masses in the ongoing people's war is not very significant. In some regions it is nominal. Hence we must pay utmost attention to the aspect of arming the masses and involving them in the people's war in increasing number. People's Militia is the very basis for the people's war. Without the existence of a wide network of militia, it is not possible to actively resist the enemy, to harass and engage him continuously, collect intelligence about the movements of the enemy, and punish the local class enemies and police informers, and get recruits into the main and secondary forces of PGA. It is not possible to transform the PGA into PLA without building the base force of people's militia. Hence we must concentrate on building militia units in all our areas of struggle in order to advance our war to the higher stage.

### **2. Adequate preparations and Intelligence gathering:**

Preparations and planning are very crucial for the success of any military action or campaign. Weakness in this aspect is still a serious hurdle for advancing our war. These have to be done with utmost secrecy. There should be concrete work division to complete the preparations efficiently and in the given time. Conducting reccees, gathering information regarding the movements and weaknesses of the enemy forces, and other intelligence reports gathered by the various Party committees and the combat forces

play the most important role in our military actions and campaigns. By making the necessary changes in our preparations from time to time basing on the information gathered we will be able to retain initiative in our hands and make surprise attacks on enemy forces.

### **3. Developing new tactics to counter the enemy:**

Enemy has been continuously changing his techniques in conducting operations against our forces, is constantly changing his formations and staying in fortified stations and camps. He is also using highly sophisticated equipment and technology and is in a position to shift this to wherever he requires. Of late the use of helicopters has also increased.

On the other hand, we are still sticking to old methods and techniques in combating the enemy forces; in conducting our raids and ambushes and in our formations. Hence, though we carried out several raids and ambushes during this period we could not achieve the desired results. Likewise, studying enemy fortifications and collecting the necessary information is very important at the present juncture. We could not achieve success in breaking the fortifications until now. Hence enemy forces are stationed within the guerrilla zones and around the GBs. We have to devise the means to break the fortifications and destroy the enemy.

We are also using old equipment that is often unsuitable to the actual conditions in the field. The difference between the enemy and our forces in this sphere will, no doubt, remain for very long period of time. Despite this fact, we must strive to use the available equipment and technology more efficiently and effectively. If we pay attention to use the improvised equipment and devices we will be able to use them extensively. We have to use code while using communication equipment without fail. Necessary training should be given to our forces in the efficient use of these devices.

### **4. Concentrate on Combat:**

We are more often using the main combat forces for protection duties during camps and meetings. The secondary forces too are engaged in non-combat work for long periods. The base force is weak in many states as mentioned earlier. All these are having a negative impact on advancing the war. The Party committees should ensure that the main forces of PGA

should not be diverted from the principal task of engaging the enemy forces. The base force should continuously harass the enemy forces. Whether the situation is in ebb or flow our forces should engage the enemy in one way or other. In unfavourable conditions too we should try to take up actions on a smaller scale and maintain utmost secrecy of our movements. Without relieving the combat forces from other work it is not possible for us to undertake destruction or harassment of the enemy forces, disruption of his supplies, destroy roads and communications, properties of MNCs, CBB etc., or effectively provide protection to our camps and meetings by stalling the enemy offensive in the surrounding areas. To achieve this with our limited forces we have to reduce camps and meetings and hold them only when very much necessary. We must also conduct meetings while moving. We have to raise the political consciousness, fighting capacity and mental preparedness of our PGA forces and steel them through continuous engagement against the enemy forces.

#### **5. Advance towards higher formations:**

Without Company formation becoming the generalized form of our Main Force, it is not possible to cause serious destruction to the enemy forces or consolidate and defend the GBs, or advance the guerrilla war to the higher stage. Without strengthening the PGA it is not possible to expand the battlefield, or bring a qualitative leap in the war as a whole. Hence we have to undertake recruitment of youth in a big way and hasten the formation of more platoons and Companies, train these forces politically and militarily, and engage them against the enemy forces. It is only in this process that we can transform the PGA into PLA.

**To sum up**, we have achieved some victories in the period after the Congress in the military front by strengthening and expanding the PGA, confronting the enemy and advancing towards the establishment of Base Area in DK. Although we faced a situation of ebb in NT our resistance extended to new areas and new battlefronts opened during this period. Finally after the merger of PW and MCCI our guerrilla war expanded to the entire country. We formed some GBs and laid the basis for more. However, serious weaknesses are still persisting in the military front. Lack of mental preparedness exists in a considerable section of the leadership

and cadre to work in the military front. Comrades working in fronts other than military are not evincing interest or paying attention to study the enemy's tactics and devise counter tactics. Necessary attention is not paid to explore and utilize the available resources for fulfilling the military requirements and arming the people's militia. There is also serious shortcoming in allotting even limited forces for some special needs of war.

### **Enhancing the role of masses in people's war**

The 9th Congress self-critically evaluated our work among the masses in general and the various sections in particular. It discussed the weaknesses in our mass organizations and mass movements, and how to overcome these and involve the vast masses in the ongoing people's war. It had also provided guidelines for the forms of struggle and forms of organization that we have to adopt keeping in view the specific conditions.

Basing on the lessons drawn by the 9th Congress, we made considerable efforts, in the period after the 9th Congress, to overcome the weaknesses in preparing and involving the vast masses in the revolution and to build more effective mass organizations and mass movements. As a result, there has been an overall improvement in our mass work in the various states. Secret, semi-legal and legal mass organizations were formed among the various sections of the people with the principal emphasis on the secret structures at the local level while more open structures were formed at the higher levels under different names.

The general orientation of all these mass organizations was to mobilize the vast masses into broad-based political movements and thus link up the mass movements to the ongoing people's war through various methods. We formed issue-based fronts at the All India, state and local levels by uniting with other struggling forces. Through these broad united fronts we mobilized various democratic organizations and individuals. We also organized various forms of political propaganda.

Our political propaganda began immediately after the Congress with the huge rally in Kolkata hailing the conclusion of the historic Congress. This was followed by the formation of anti-imperialist forum at the All India level in 2001, which brought several anti-imperialist organizations

together. We also joined the international forum of people's struggles initiated by the CPP, TKP/ML and others. This forum took up activities not only in Europe but also in India during this period. In 2001, we also took the initiative, along with the CPN(Maoist) and the MCCI, to form the CCOMPOSA in order to build a people's movement against Indian expansionism. It took up campaigns in solidarity with the ongoing people's wars in Nepal and India and conducted wide propaganda against the massive brutal military onslaught in Nepal and India.

We took up a wide political campaign and mobilized the masses against the US imperialist aggression in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. But although these programmes were taken up actively at the local level in some states such as DK, AP, AOB, etc., the All India programmes were poor shows. We could not take up effective campaign against the Hindu fascist BJP-RSS-VHP-Bajrang Dal-Shiva Sena combine when the Gujarat genocide of Muslims took place.

In the beginning of 2003, when the Asia Social Forum held its Conference in Hyderabad, we mobilized the various organizations and held protest demonstrations exposing the hollowness of its slogan of another world within the present imperialist system and its aim of diverting the masses from the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and for Socialism. Likewise, in the beginning of 2004, we joined forces with hundreds of other democratic and anti-imperialist organizations and individuals against the World Social Forum, exposed it ideologically, politically and programmatically and made extensive propaganda about the real revolutionary alternative before the people oppressed by imperialism worldwide. Our political propaganda created a positive impact on the democratic forces and exposed the social democratic/revisionist and the post-modernist NGO organizations.

In DK, rallies were organized on political issues such as state repression, demand for separate Bastar, iron ore mines in Chargaon and Raoghat, in support of the Iraqi people's just struggle, besides observing anti-imperialist days, July 28, March 8, etc. Bhumkal divas were specially celebrated on February 10 and the importance of *janathana sarkar* was widely taken among the masses. We did not take up the partial demands of the masses

in a big way except struggles for increase in rate of tendu leaf and bamboo and a few other issues.

In AOB, thousands of adivasis were mobilized in rallies at the village, Mandal, Bloc and district level against state repression, POTA, LPG policies of the government, deaths due to disease, US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, WSF, Forest Acts, imperialist culture, tourism, famine, for remunerative prices for agricultural produce, etc. Land occupation struggles and famine raids were also taken up.

In NT, rallies were organized with thousands of people for implementation of 1/70, against the corruption in ITDA in Adilabad, against famine in Nizamabad and Karimnagar, land struggles, struggles against privatization, against POTA, US imperialist war-mongering, and on several issues of the people. Thousands were mobilized in the funeral processions of the martyrs and on Martyrs' Day. In Singareni Collieries, three successful strikes of workers were organized on the demands for the settlement of the Wage Board, jobs for the dependents of the deceased workers, and against work burden. Seminars were organized against LPG policies of the government.

In AP, there were rallies and struggles against the LPG policies, against US imperialist aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq, against fake encounters and trampling of democratic rights of the people, famine, for the ban on liquor, for higher rates for the forest produce for the adivasis in Nallamala region, and on the many issues of the peasantry. Land occupation struggles and struggles against usurers were taken up. Special campaign was taken up against famine and thousands of people were mobilized in over 10 famine raids in Guntur and 25 raids in other districts. Massive rallies were held during Martyrs' week and thousands were mobilized during funeral processions of martyrs.

We had a very rich experience regarding the mass movements in the three zones of AP during this period. The enemy unleashed massive attacks against the mass movements that were suspected to have any link with our Party. The open revolutionary mass organizations such as RWA were first targeted in NT and later in South Telangana and other parts of AP. Even those formed as broad fronts by involving other forces were attacked,

their leaders arrested and harassed. Since the Party was banned, the activists and leaders of the mass organizations were picked up on charges of secretly carrying out the work of the banned Party or having links with it. They were forced to resign from the mass organizations and to report daily to the police stations.

Worse still, the leaders and activists of the mass organizations had to face continuous threats and murderous assaults by the armed vigilante gangs maintained by the State. During this period, civil liberties leaders like Purushotham and Azam Ali were murdered by the state-sponsored goondas. Activists struggling for separate democratic Telangana, such as Belli Lalitha were killed. Leaders of organizations like the Ryotu Seva Samiti in Warangal

who took up many struggles of the peasantry on issues such as remunerative prices for agricultural produce, water for irrigation and power supply for agriculture, against the exploitation by the unscrupulous traders in substandard and spurious seeds, pesticides and fertilizers, were arrested and threatened with dire consequences. The organization became defunct due to the constant harassment of the police. Likewise, several teachers in the districts of NT, ST and AOB were threatened and numerous cases were filed besides the attacks by the state-sponsored armed militias.

In all the three zones of AP, we took up mass struggles on the issue of famine, including famine raids, which had a great impact on the people at large. Several village-level meetings were held in AOB and AP on the famine issue and open rallies too were held with a charter of demands for the drought-affected peasantry. Struggles were taken up on the issues of remunerative prices at several places.

From mid-2003, attempts were made to mobilize the masses against the neo-liberal policies of TDP government in AP, but we could not achieve any result until the beginning of 2004. Overall, at the tactical level, we could succeed to some extent in taking up issue-based struggles jointly with other organizations in the three zones of AP.

We tried to adopt various forms of struggle and forms of organization during this period. There were purely open organizations propagating revolutionary politics, totally secret organizations as well as those working as broad legal democratic organizations or inside existing organizations of

other parties, trade unions, petty-bourgeois organizations, sectional movements, etc. Through all these methods we acquired varied experiences of working among the masses and building mass movements.

**Strategic United front:** During this period we formed the revolutionary united front at the village level mainly in DK, AOB, and parts of NT and AP. In DK, area-level UFs were also formed. All these are in the form of the underground mass organizations and RPCs only. The underground mass organizations of the peasantry and women have been able to mobilize the masses belonging to the various classes belonging to those sections.

## **Weaknesses in our mass work and united front activity:**

### **1. Neglect or a casual attitude towards mass work:**

In spite of our repeated reviews of the weaknesses in mass work and the need to pay more serious attention to the mass organizations and united front activity, the problem of neglect of mass work, non-allocation of the necessary subjective forces to the mass work, or lack of specialization, still persist. Due to non-allotment of forces to the various fronts and lack of specialization on the part of the leadership, the growth has been quite slow and the great potential that exists in some states and areas for launching significant political mass movements, could not be properly exploited.

The chief reason for this neglect is the wrong understanding still existing in our Party that mass work is unimportant and that by advancing the war we can automatically develop mass movements, urban work etc. Our Party had no doubt taken as our guideline the following formulation of comrade Mao regarding the relation between armed struggle and army with mass struggle and mass organization:

*“... War is the main form of struggle and army is the main form of organisation. Other forms such as the mass organisation and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war. Before the outbreak of war, all organisation and struggle are in preparation for war...”*

However, the spirit of this famous quote of Mao is not grasped by our Party committees still. It is an urgent task before us to make serious effort



to prepare the masses for the people's war and mobilize them into mass political movements. And for this specialization should start immediately wherever it has not yet been taken up and able Party organizers should be allotted for this work.

This task has acquired more urgency in the context of the attempts by the reactionary ruling classes to isolate us from the masses by initiating reforms and other measures to wean away the people from the path of revolution.

## **2. Failure in adopting appropriate forms of struggle and organisation:**

In the 9th Congress we recognized the above problem and though this was solved to some extent in the intervening period, it still exists to a considerable degree. The tendency of trying to apply the forms of struggle and forms of organization mechanically is manifested in different forms such as: continuing the same old forms of struggle and organization rigidly or dogmatically even when the conditions had changed i.e., failure to change to new tactics corresponding to the changes in the conditions; second, mechanically copying the forms of struggle and forms of organization prevalent in one state or region in another state or region irrespective of the concrete conditions there.

In spite of these weaknesses, it is also a fact that we were able to adapt to new situations and utilize them to our advantage as seen in AP during the talks period in 2004. Forms of organizations change according to the changing conditions and stage of the struggle. Hence it is very important for the various Party committees and the mass organisation leadership to acquire the skill to creatively apply the tactics to changing conditions and quickly changing from one form to another

The problem of engaging only in secret work and not utilising the available legal opportunities is still seen in the main areas of armed struggle while in other areas we find the persistence of legal style and methods of work. Hence we have to acquire the skill of coordinating legal and illegal work, forming both underground as well as cover organisations in AP, NT, DK, Bihar-Jharkhand, and drive the open mass organisations in other states out of their purely legal style of work.

We gained rich experience in running legal democratic organizations with non-Party forces focusing on various issues in the three zones in AP. The enemy was able to attack some of these organizations due to serious mistakes from our side. Much of the leadership of these organizations was exposed and some became inactive due to our indiscriminate use of these comrades for other clandestine works. Serious technical mistakes are occurring such as: maintaining minutes of the meetings of the fraction committees or the leading comrades of these organizations, writing letters in a language that is easily understood by the enemy, letters to (and from) the leading comrades of these organizations falling into the hands of the police due to our carelessness, exposure of the open comrades to many squad members due to meeting them in our areas, and so on. As some were caught red-handed and the proof of their links with the banned Party was established, they became defensive and inactive.

We have to take lessons from these experiences and avoid the repetition of the mistakes in AP and elsewhere, and evolve proper methods of coordinating the legal and illegal from a long-term perspective of PPW. Any short-cut method would only lead to decimation of the legal democratic movements.

### **3. Non-proletarian trends in the Mass Organisations:**

The non-proletarian trends in the Party and the movement, that were identified in the 9th Congress, were subjectivism, liberalism, spontaneity, economism, sectarianism, bureaucracy and patriarchy. A rectification campaign was taken up throughout the Party and in some states it was taken up to the masses in the villages.

However, in many states, as well as at the central level, we did not undertake the rectification campaign in the fraction committees and the leading comrades of the open mass organizations. Consequently, non-proletarian trends remain quite serious in the mass organizations. Bourgeois individualism, egoism and anarchic trend, are also quite deep along with all the trends pointed out by the 9th Congress. The sectarian attitude is preventing us from expanding the membership of the mass organizations and to build broad-based fronts with non-Party forces. Bureaucracy in the leadership has become a big hurdle for the development of the new cadres

and winning over their confidence. The trend of economism was overcome to some extent.

Sectarianism, bureaucracy and individualism are leading to bitter relations at times between the leading comrades within a mass organization or between the comrades of different mass organizations. This is also leading to the formation of factions within the mass organizations or factional tendencies that hamper development. Liberalism in the leading comrades is preventing the leveling of criticism even when serious mistakes and weaknesses are seen. The trend of patriarchy is also quite deep-rooted among some comrades.

This unhealthy, uncomradely and undemocratic attitude has become a hurdle for the development of the mass organization and building mighty mass movements. Conducting rectification campaign in the mass organizations is an urgent task before the Party. The liberalism on the part of the CC and the State Party leaderships in planning and implementing the rectification campaign is also responsible for the non-fulfillment of this task besides heavy enemy repression.

It is not possible to rectify the deep-rooted non-proletarian trends in the leadership of the mass organizations through education only. Hence, as pointed out in the 9th Congress POR, it is necessary that the members of the mass organisations assert themselves and play an active role in both decision-making and in the execution of the decisions instead of leaving it to a few leaders. It is only through a continuous criticism by the members and the masses at large that the leaders of the mass organisations can overcome their weaknesses and deviations and become fit enough to lead the masses in class struggles. The mass organisation leaders should go deep among the masses, integrate with the basic classes and personally participate in class struggles in order to transform themselves.

#### **4. Problem of building statewide mass movement in AP:**

In the three zones of AP, the mass organizations had undergone ups and downs even during this short period. The enemy's attacks on the mass organizations suspected to be having links with the Party were very brutal and hundreds of activists and members of mass organisations were arrested, tortured, and were forced to tender public resignations from the mass

organizations. Private armed gangs were used to murder and harass the mass organization leaders. Several district and local units were dismantled as a result of this massive suppression campaign.

However, organizations sprang up again in different forms, were destroyed, and once again revived under different banner. Such has been the history of development of the mass organizations in AP. The Party in the three zones in AP had tried to evolve ways and means to build and run the mass organizations every time they were destroyed, and acquired invaluable experiences in building both secret as well as open mass organizations.

The problem of coordination of the Party and the movement in the three zones in AP is quite seriously felt during this period. In spite of making plans from time to time to overcome this shortcoming and achieve better coordination, the problem continues. This obviously has an impact on building statewide mass movement.

There have been some attempts to overcome this problem by forming a sub-committee for guiding the mass organizations in AP in 2002 but this could not function properly after the martyrdom of two DCMs who were actually looking after the mass organizations under the guidance of the sub-committee in 2003. This was finally dissolved after the shortening of the SC in AP in December 2003 by transferring five members due to repression. There is a need to reconstitute the sub-committee of the mass organizations with members from the three zones. There was no member from NTSZC or AOBSZC in the subcommittee constituted earlier and this also created problems of coordination of the mass movement at the state level. As the political conditions and the enemy tactics are similar in the three zones falling in AP, it is essential to specialize, organize and guide the mass movement in the three zones under centralized direction. The CC should directly take the responsibility for this task.

The CC and the SCs have to take up a campaign to rectify these non-proletarian trends, weaknesses and shortcomings in the mass organizations and to orient them for the seizure of political power. They should impart education and training to the Party committees and the cadre working in the mass organizations on how to orient their activity to advance the ongoing

people's war, how to mobilize the masses on their partial demands and, more importantly, on political issues, even under conditions of severe repression, how to coordinate the open and secret work, and how to increase mass resistance against the state attacks. The mass organization activists should be trained militarily and also armed so as to resist the armed attacks of the police, vigilante gangs, and other lumpen elements. They should be prepared for sacrifices without which no real mass political movement is possible especially when confronted by state and state-sponsored repression. White terror will further increase throughout the country and we should prepare our entire Party and mass organizations to adopt various forms of struggle and organization to build a powerful, militant movement of the masses and play an active role in preparing and mobilizing the vast masses in the new democratic revolution.

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# POLITICAL ORGANISATIONAL REPORT OF THE CPI (MAOIST)

After two and quarter years of the formation of the CPI(Maoist), our party and the PLGA have taken the people's war to new heights. This aroused new hopes and aspirations in the vast masses of the people. In this process, several senior leaders and around 700 cadres and fighters sacrificed their valuable lives. We humbly pay homage to our beloved martyrs. When we are going in to the report of this period, let us pledge to fulfill revolutionary dreams and the unfinished task of these great martyrs.

## I. Assessment of the Political Situation

### International situation:

In the two years since the merger of the two Parties and the formation of the CPI(Maoist) the international situation has become even more favourable for the world revolution. Crisis has deepened further in the economic, social and political spheres.

At the time of merger the US imperialism had been aggressively waging a brutal war against the semi-colonial countries, oppressed nations and people of the world in the name of global campaign against terrorism. Utilising the incidents of 9/11 it had whipped up national chauvinism in the US, curbed the fundamental rights of the people in several countries including its own people, waged the most brutal war on the people of Iraq and Afghanistan directly, and on the people of Palestine through its surrogate Israeli Zionist regime. It had targeted every revolutionary party, national liberation organization, and democratic organization along with anti-US Muslim fundamentalist organizations. Particularly in Nepal it had interfered actively to protect the crumbling regime of King Gyanendra.

However, the developments of the last two years had shown that the people's resistance had grown in direct proportion to the US imperialist aggression, oppression, bullying, interference and suppression. Massive protests are taking place all over the world against imperialist wars of aggression, particularly against US war-mongering. **Iraq has become the**

**focal point of the anti-imperialist resistance movement, particularly anti-US resistance movement.** Entire West Asia is seething with anti-imperialist, in particular anti-US hatred and fury. Palestinian masses are waging a fierce struggle against the Israeli Zionist regime compelling it to retreat from its terror tactics of destroying entire villages and civilian dwellings in towns. The fierce resistance by the Hizbollah in Lebanon had taught a fitting lesson to the fascist Israeli aggressors. In Afghanistan, even after five years of occupation, the US imperialists and their NATO allies are unable to contain the resistance. The heroic resistance of the freedom-loving people of Iraq had compelled the US to reconsider their plans of aggression of Iran, Syria, North Korea and other countries. The rout of the Republicans headed by butcher Bush in the Congressional elections in November is the direct fall-out of the heroic Iraqi resistance.

People of Asia, Africa and Latin America had not only intensified their armed struggle against imperialism led by US imperialism but had also demonstrated their anger through various other means. Mass demonstrations are also growing against the imperialist policies of globalization, liberalization and privatization all over the world. The working class in several imperialist countries too is coming out in strikes and other forms of protest against these policies which are leading to the retrenchment of lakhs of workers.

In South Asia, there has arisen a danger of a serious diversion to the people's war in Nepal in the name of 21st century democracy due to their decision to work within the confines of the so-called multiparty competitive democracy. This is a matter of grave concern to Maoists all over the world. The developments in Nepal have, no doubt, come in handy for the reactionary ruling classes of India and the imperialists to denigrate the Maoist ideology, strategy and its ultimate goal of communism. The revisionists and the reactionaries are rejoicing over the present stand taken by the CPN(M) and are calling upon the Indian Maoists to follow suit. The revolutionary people of Nepal, who had undergone tremendous sacrifices in the past ten years of people's war, will certainly overcome the present difficult situation.

In Sri Lanka, the cease-fire between the government and the LTTE of 2002 has broken down by mid-2006 and the war has again erupted between the Tamil national liberation fighters and the Sinhala chauvinist regime led

by Rajapakse. The war is likely to intensify further.

All these developments have intensified the contradictions between the various imperialist powers particularly between the Anglo-American imperialist alliance and the rest of the imperialist powers.

On the other hand the internal contradiction amongst the imperialists is increasing. Of late the contradiction between the EU and the US has increased. In addition, Russia, after recovering from its earlier weaknesses has begun to assert its domination in the globe. Even China has risen as a competitor in the world, particularly in Africa.

In this way looking at the overall situation, the principal contradiction in the world-the contradiction between imperialism and the oppressed nations and people- and all other fundamental contradictions in the world are getting sharper with every passing day. As a result the situation in the world is becoming more and more favourable for revolution, and this has creating favourable situation for the ripening of the subjective forces.

### **Domestic situation:**

The imperialist crisis and the international developments are having an impact directly and indirectly on the domestic situation in our country. To overcome its growing isolation the US imperialists have been trying to rope in India by tightening its grip through signing the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal in July 2005. The UPA government is carrying out policies that would push the country into the octopus-like grip of the US imperialists.

Ever since it assumed power the UPA government has not only continued the so-called model of development of the preceding NDA regime but also opened up the gates of India for massive inflow of capital, goods and technology from the imperialists. It had allowed the MNCs and the big Corporate houses to snatch away the lands, including prime agricultural lands, to set up SEZs, mining, industrial and multi-purpose projects, information technology and software parks, Multiplexes, shopping malls, etc.

Overall, the pro-rich, pro-imperialist LPG policies had further aggravated the economic, social and political crises in the country. Thus in the name of development it had pushed the vast majority of the masses into extreme



poverty, hunger, suicides, destitution, disease and insecurity. On the other hand, it had given even more concessions to the upper ten per cent of the bulging rich facilitating them to amass thousands of crores of rupees at the expense of the poor. Thus the gap between the rich and the poor had never been greater in the history of our country as at present.

As a result, mass protests are gathering momentum against all these imperialist-dictated policies of the Central and state governments. Whichever party is in power in the various states—Congress, BJP, BJD, Samajwadi Party, Left front of the CPI-CPI(M)—the same policies are pursued. The revisionists have become the biggest apologists of these policies of the UPA government despite their occasional whimpering against privatization of the profitable PSUs, FDI in retail sector, retrenchment of workers, and other issues. These social-fascists have shown that they can even surpass the Congress and BJP in wooing the MNCs and big corporate houses where they have the say, as in West Bengal, where lands are sold away for a pittance to the Tatas, Salems, Birlas, Ambanis and others. Buddhadev has turned out to be a more reliable *dalal* to implement the policies of the World Bank.

People everywhere are taking to the streets and waging battles with the state in defence of their *jal, jungle, jameen* and *izzat* and against displacement. The heroic struggle of adivasis in Kalinga Nagar in Orissa against Tata Steel, in North Andhra against the bauxite mining project of Jindal, in Chattisgarh against the mining of iron ore by the Essars, Tatas, and imperialist companies, in Jharkhand against the looting of their mineral wealth by the Tatas, Mittals, and others, in Khammam and other districts of AP against their displacement due to the Polavaram project, people of Singur in West Bengal against the acquisition of land by Tata Motors given by CPI(M) dalal government, struggles against Coca Cola, Pepsi and several other struggles have rocked the country in the past two years.

In this way the question of the displacement of the basic masses has risen as a major issue of the country affecting lakhs from the forests to the cities. Protest against displacement has risen as a wave in all parts of the country. A Forest Bill called the Scheduled Tribes and Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forests Rights) Bill, was introduced with the aim of weaning

away the tribals from the influence of the Maoist movement mainly in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra by supposedly granting ownership rights over land to around one crore forest settlers. The massive displacement of adivasi population from their traditional homelands and snatching away of their traditional rights makes a mockery of the above so-called reform.

Peasant agitations in Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab, Vidarbha, Telangana and other parts of the country have increased in the two years. Dalits, suffering from for thousands of years from caste oppression and repression, have intensified their struggle for self-respect with the hope for emancipation. With the massacre of dalits in Khairlanji and the breaking of the Ambedkar statue in Kanpur this was reflected in the countrywide dalit upsurge.

The struggles of the working class, government employees, students, women, dalits, and backward castes have grown stronger. Struggles against price-rise, for remunerative prices for agricultural produce, for power supply to agriculture etc are becoming militant in many states. Despite the heinous attempts of the ruling classes to divide the people, the unity of the working class, peasantry and other oppressed sections of society is growing stronger due to the adverse effect of the growing crisis.

Nationality struggles are gradually picking up strength after a brief lull. Though the cease-fire between the NSCN and the government is still continuing, the Kashmiri people's struggle, Manipur people's struggle against the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act, the armed attacks by the PLA in Manipur, ULFA in Assam have further escalated in the past two years. With the government refusing to accept the NSCN's proposal for a Federation of India and Nagaland, and Greater Nagaland, the situation in Nagaland has become fragile. Demand for separate statehood is fast materializing into an agitation in Telangana and is showing signs of revival in Vidarbha. The ruling classes are however trying to arrive at an understanding with the leaderships of the nationality movements to water down the struggle through deceptive promises.

All the above-mentioned developments—especially the growing struggles of the peasantry as a result of the increasing agrarian crisis, the

increasing US intervention and the potential for political mobilization of the masses against US imperialism, the growing anti-imperialist movements against increasing imperialist loot and the struggles against the LPG policies—and the unification of our two Parties and the further advance of the people’s war has enthused the people and created a favourable ground for political intervention in the Indian political scenario. Along with this the intensification and sharpening of all the basic contradictions in the country have created a more fertile ground for advancing the revolutionary war in India. This is creating a most fertile ground for the development of the subject forces all over the country. If the opportunities are properly utilized and political mobilization of the masses is taken up with full initiative, it is certain that we can advance the guerrilla war to a higher level and spread the revolutionary movement countrywide.

### **Ruling class response after the merger:**

The brutal state offensive that had been going on against the two erstwhile Parties, especially on the movement in AP, had touched a new level after the merger. The attack intensified in several states in close coordination. It is very much necessary to understand the overall multi-pronged strategy of the enemy, the changes that had occurred in enemy’s tactics in the past two years, and bring drastic changes in our counter-tactics, methods of work, and orient the entire Party to meet the grave challenges before us. Hence let us briefly see the enemy’s response and measures initiated in various spheres to counter the Maoist movement.

The response of the ruling classes to the merger was summed up in the statement of the Prime Minister in November 2004 that Maoists constituted “*an even greater threat to India than militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast.*” National security adviser M K Narayanan howled that the Naxalites have created a compact revolutionary zone from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh while Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee described Naxal insurgency as the gravest threat to internal security.

Within a month after the formation of the CPI(Maoist), the task force on Naxalism was constituted in October 2004 to deal with the Naxal movement more effectively and in a coordinated way. The members of

the task force comprise the nodal officers of the nine States - Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal - and representatives of Intelligence Bureau, CRPF and Sashastra Seema Bal.

The Centre is providing most of the expenditure incurred in curbing Naxalism in these states. In March 2005 the Central government announced that the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana would cover 55 naxal-hit districts in nine states. Under it, an additional special Central assistance of Rs. 15 crore is sanctioned per year per district for a period of three years for developing infrastructure. An Army Core Group was formed to study the Naxal movement and to devise means to tackle it. And in April 2005, for the first time, an army commanders conference had "*analysed the state of extremism in the Naxal corridor from Andhra Pradesh to Bihar to forest areas along the Nepal border*" and is in close touch with the Ministry of Home Affairs. As an initial step, the army has allowed one of its retired brigadiers and a few junior commissioned officers to train the police and paramilitary forces in a counter-insurgency and jungle warfare school in Kanker, Chhattisgarh. In the same month, an apex committee of Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Uttrakhand, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh and which later extended to 13 states, headed by Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil, was formed to deal with the Naxal problem by adopting a multi-pronged strategy.

In its first meeting held in September 2005, the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers decided to adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to effectively combat Naxalism, prepare an Action Plan to combat Naxalism on both security and developmental aspects in a time bound manner; strengthen and upgrade State Police as also the intelligence network; appoint Nodal Officers to deal with Naxal-related issues; BDI, food for work programme and employment guarantee schemes; high priority to effective implementation of land reforms including distribution of surplus land to the landless and the poor in the Naxal-affected areas; and so on. In the April 2006 meeting of the standing committee of chief ministers of 13 states, plans for more coordinated joint operations, unified joint commands, setting up and training Greyhounds type of Special

Forces in all Naxal-affected states, setting up a well-coordinated Intelligence network and intelligence sharing between states, and special training in counterinsurgency warfare, were drawn up. The Prime minister, who chaired the meeting, warned that “*Naxalism is the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.*”

On April 28, 2005, the US imperialists placed CPI (Maoist) and ULFA in the list of Other Selected Terrorist Organisations. A hue and cry has been raised by the Indian ruling classes and the imperialists that the influence of the Maoists is fast expanding, and had “*spread from nine states and 55 districts in 2003 to 15 states and an estimated 220 of the country’s 602 administrative districts*”. It is clear that the spectre of Maoist movement after the merger of the two Maoist Parties has been haunting the ruling classes of our country and the imperialists.

Besides the 2.10 lakh force the CRPF has planned to increase its force to 2.75 lakhs, the deployment of CRPF in the five states had increased from 23 battalions to 37 battalions. Even the director-general’s reserve battalions of the CRPF, which are meant for recreational duty and emergency situations, had to be deployed for counter-insurgency duty. Central assistance is provided for raising IR Battalions in the states to fight the Maoist movement. The Karnataka government had deployed the Special Task Force originally set up to hunt down Veerappan against the Maoists in Malnad region. Police personnel from several states are trained in counterinsurgency warfare by the AP Greyhounds in Hyderabad. A Unified Command comprising central and state law enforcement agencies is formed in some states to tackle the Naxalite movement. *The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School* in Aizawl, Mizoram, had trained the police personnel of the various states and the central para-military forces in order to “*fight the guerrilla like a guerilla*” In March 2005 US military personnel participated in the first joint infantry exercise between the two countries in Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare. Retired police officers are recruited into the anti-Naxal force. Home Guards are recruited from youth in big number.

The Union government has permitted the use of Indian Air Force helicopters purportedly to ferry security forces and to evacuate injured

security personnel during anti-Naxal operations in remote and inaccessible areas but its aim is to launch aerial attacks when needed. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) has regular consultations with the country's top security experts, including Chief of Army Staff Gen J.J. Singh and heads of intelligence services. It is thereby trying to arrive at a coordinated approach in carrying out a multi-pronged strategy to contain the Maoist movement along with the movements in Kashmir and North East. An Empowered Group of Ministers (E-GoM) on Naxalism including the Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission was formed in September 2006 under the leadership of Finance Minister with a view to initiate socio-economic reforms in some areas to wean away the people from the Maoist influence. A special Naxal Desk was also set up in the MHA. Although the Home Ministry's proposal in June 2006 to involve the Army in tackling the Naxal movement had been temporarily shelved due to the reluctance of the Defence Ministry as it finds it difficult to disengage the Army personnel from the North East, Jammu & Kashmir and the long border with Pakistan and China, the Union government is making preparations for deploying the Army in near future. It also decided to establish marine police stations by sanctioning Rs 400 crores for establishing infrastructure. Several states like Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh have placed orders for acquiring Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) from Israel and the local HAL-produced Lakshya.

The most diabolic ploy of the Central and state governments is to pit one section of the people against another by recruiting local youth from the areas of armed struggle into the police and para-military forces; creating a network of salaried SPOs from poor adivasis and other unemployed youth; creating adivasi battalions; compelling the adivasis to accompany the police to loot and burn villages, kill revolutionary activists and sympathisers, indulge in rapes and other atrocities; training and arming illegal private mercenary armed gangs, and so on. Naga and Mizo battalions consisting of tribal jawans of North East are specifically brought to Chattisgarh to pit them against Gond adivasis thereby to break the bond of solidarity between the Maoist revolutionaries and the national liberation fighters of the North East.

The Union government has been projecting its brutal terror campaign cum reform strategy in Andhra as the model to be followed in other states

for the suppression of the Maoist movement. While cruel suppression through military means is the main focus of the ruling classes, they had also unleashed a big psy-war against the Maoists through such means as counseling the parents of the underground cadres, adopting the strong-hold villages of the Maoists and giving financial assistance to the families and adopting the children of the leading cadres, encouraging surrenders through various means, projecting Prachanda's so-called theory of competitive multi-party democracy as the ideal to be pursued by the Maoists in India, besides building an extensive informer network, covert agents, paid SPO network, using private vigilante gangs in Latin American style to threaten, harass and kill anyone who dares to speak out against the police atrocities, etc. In AP, the fascist YSR regime is doubling the strength of the special anti-Naxal Greyhounds force even as it claims that Maoist movement is finished.

Attractive incentives are given to the police forces and the informers to boost up their sagging morale such as insurance cover of Rs. 10 lakhs for 11,000 police personnel posted in Maoist strong-holds in Bastar and Sarguja regions in Chattisgarh, Rs. 2 lakhs to the SPOs, jobs to the kin of those killed in the war with the Maoists, airlifting the injured personnel within hours after attacks by Maoists, full protection to the informers, and so on.

An important immediate reason for unleashing the most brutal war on the revolutionaries by the Indian reactionary ruling classes and their intensified military offensive in Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Orissa, AP, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh is the need to capture these mineral-rich areas and loot the wealth without any hindrance. We have to re-evaluate our work and the revolutionary war led by us in the past two years keeping all the above developments in mind. In order to defeat the enemy offensive and achieve greater advances in people's war, it is necessary to concentrate on all the above aspects along with the military aspect.

## II. An Overview

The merger of the two Parties and the formation of the unified CPI(Maoist) had created a favourable ground for the intensification of the armed agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war and the expansion of the revolutionary movement and guerrilla war to new areas. It has led to a relatively better consolidation of the Party committees, strengthening of the PLGA, provided greater opportunities for building the mass movement in wider areas in a more effective manner and laid the basis for building the revolutionary united front. The centralised planning at the CC, RB and state level had helped in a more systematic advance of the movement and better coordination between the movements in various regions. Some of the centralised Tactical Counter Offensive operations planned by the CMC and executed by the PLGA in the past two years had enthused the masses of the Indian people and created an impact on the Indian political scenario as a whole. Together with these operations by smashing of state power in some areas at the local-level and the strengthening of people's power and defended the people from enemy attack.

In the past two years, around 315 police and para-military personnel had been wiped out in several big and medium and in hundreds of smaller operations of the PLGA across the country and 485 arms, 16,000 ammunition were seized. Hundreds of feudal reactionaries, notorious political leaders, corrupt officials, informers, SPOs, members of private armies like Ranvir Sena and state-sponsored private armed gangs and other counter revolutionary elements had been eliminated. People were mobilised into numerous struggles in all areas at various levels. All these activities had created a positive and deep impact on the oppressed masses of our country who have begun to realise more than ever before that people's war led by our Party is the only alternative before them. Due to this there is significant development in the building up of the UF.

In this period we also suffered serious losses of 700 leadership, cadres, and fighters of PLGA, members of RPCs, people's militia, revolutionary mass organisations and sympathisers of the revolutionary movement. The losses of leadership were very serious in AP and NT while in DK we lost



over 250 of our leaders and activists of various revolutionary mass organisations, members of our RPCs, people's militia units and people associated with our movement. In West Bengal and BJ a significant section of leading cadres were arrested. In BJ, Chattisgarh, Orissa, Karnataka, Maharashtra, 3U and other states several leaders and cadres of our Party, PLGA commanders and fighters, activists of mass organisations either became martyrs or arrested.

Prominent among those who achieved martyrdom during this period were: PBM com KS, eleven state committee members, including three state secretaries—coms Saketh Rajan (Karnataka SCS), Burra Chinnayya alias Madhav(APSCS), Com Mymuddin alias Ravi(3USACS), Ravi Kumar (Sridhar), Samala Venkatesam (Sudarshan), Raghavulu (Obulesu) of APSC; com Gautam of AOBSZC; com Mangtu and Vikas of DKSZC; com Yadanna of NTSZC; and com Bheem (Pran) and Sravan of Chattisgarh SC. We had lost DCMs. Eleven are from NT—coms Ramesh, Babanna, Seenu, Srikanth, Ranjit, Saleem, Giri Ravinder alias Suryam, Jagadeesh, Mallesham, Madhu, Padma; twelve from AP—comrades Raghu, Raju, Ravi, Mohan, Seenu, Ganesh, Rammohan (Naresh), Suresh, Murali, Kranti, Mallikarjun, Prashanti; comrade Manjit from BJ; comrades Ajay, Shyam Bihari, Manas from CG; comrades Raju, Thufan from OS; and comrade Niyam from WB. We lost several AC members and several Party members and fighters of the PLGA, members of revolutionary mass organisations. Totally we lost 628 comrades : 152 in AP, 89 in NT, 264 in DK, 30 in AOB, 53 in BJ, 5 in Maharashtra, 5 in Karnataka, 3 in 3U, 2 in West Bengal, 17 in CG, 8 in OS. A significant number of the martyrs are women comrades who had fought shoulder to shoulder with men and displayed exemplary valour and firmness in the war.

Many of our senior comrades, SCMs, DCMs and other cadres were arrested during this period and some are sentenced to rigorous prison terms by courts. Five CCMs including two PBMs were arrested. Barunda and Tapas were sentenced to five years and life term respectively by the fasttrack court along with one other comrade. In West Bengal, three other SCMs were arrested. In AP one SCM was placed behind bars. In BJ, four SACMs

were arrested and one each in 3U and CG.

In spite of these severe losses of leadership in many states and at the central level, our movement as a whole had advanced in many fronts. At the same time serious weaknesses and shortcomings have persisted in building and strengthening the Party, Army and the United Front.

### **Four Major Tasks:**

Now let us self-critically evaluate our experiences of the past two years, synthesise these to draw valuable lessons in order to take the Indian revolution to a great leap by utilising the excellent opportunities arising from a highly favourable international and domestic situation.

The first CC meeting took up four major tasks for the next two years. These were:

1. The principal task of developing and intensifying the people's war throughout the country, taking up concrete, time-bound plans to transform guerilla zones into base areas, building and strengthening the organs of political power and the Revolutionary United front, orienting all activities including mass movement and mass organisation towards fulfilling the central task, strengthening the Party, PLGA, and United Front and, with the perspective of establishing liberated area, developing the areas step-by-step in this direction. And where struggles are at a low level, they have to be intensified and expanded with the perspective of building guerrilla zones. In order to fulfill this principal task it directed the Party's leading committees in various states to formulate concrete time-bound tasks and provide direct leadership in fulfilling these tasks.

2. The task of completing the merger process at various levels, forming new Party committees and reorganising the existing ones, merging the two guerrilla armies and bringing uniformity in the military formations throughout the PLGA, setting up commissions and commands at various levels, and merging the mass organisations of the two erstwhile Parties.

3. The task of conducting education classes on the party's basic documents, unifying the entire Party on the ideological-political line of the Party, encouraging debate on the documents and holding state and lower-level conferences to further strengthen the party line and achieve higher

unity, and completing the Congress to achieve unity of thought, unity of will and unity of action at all levels in the Party.

4. The task of building and strengthening the party within the working class, building a militant working class movement, building broad-based mass movements on political issues in order to build and strengthen the united front work as the third magic weapon of revolution.

### **III. Party Front**

The CC, PB, CMC, RBs and other central bodies and departments tried to concentrate on the above tasks and took some concrete decisions from time to time in the CC-2 meeting, various meetings of the PB, CMC and RBs to fulfill these tasks in order to advance the war in the country. While carrying out the above tasks, some wrong trends and deviations from the party line had also emerged in the past two years such as the Minority's Right Opportunist Line in Karnataka.

#### **Merger and strengthening of the Party committees at all levels:**

Immediately after the merger we continued our efforts to unite the remaining revolutionary forces, tried to contact and hold discussions with revolutionary organisations and individuals who were associated with the revolutionary movement since long with the aim of bringing them under our Party's fold. A wide political propaganda campaign was taken up throughout the country in the second week of November explaining the significance of the merger. Meetings were held, press statements were issued and wide propaganda was taken up. There was positive response from these forces to the merger and some of them began to associate themselves with our Party.

The task of completing the merger process at all levels throughout the Party was given the first priority in accordance with the decision of the CC. It took almost one year to complete the merger of the units of the two erstwhile Parties at all levels. Our RBs and leading Party committees in the states/special areas/special zones were completely involved in this most important work for several months after the merger of the CCs. State-level plenums/special meetings were held and the Party units of the two

erstwhile Parties were merged and Party committees were reconstituted. In many states SMCs and Secretariats were formed along with some subcommittees and departments. The respective military formations and mass organisation units were merged. The merger had thus provided good scope for the expansion and strengthening of the Party committees, formation of the various departments and expansion of the Party to new areas.

In BJ, where tensions between the two erstwhile parties were serious in the years prior to the merger, the merger process was completed amidst great enthusiasm. Both sides undertook sincere and deep self-criticism and the problems were resolved in a comradesly spirit. BJB SAC was reconstituted after the merger into BJ SAC and MBP area of West Bengal was separated from BJB and brought under WBSC. The areas of Orissa and Chattisgarh, which were under BJSAC, were also separated and brought under the leading committees of the respective states. The Basadhara division under AOBSZC was separated and brought under Orissa SOC. A state committee was formed in Chattisgarh and a SOC in Orissa. A new RB was formed to look after the states of Chattisgarh and Orissa.

The SAC in 3U and committees at lower levels were reconstituted. The prejudices and misunderstandings between comrades of the two erstwhile Parties in UK were quite serious and efforts were made to resolve these through in-depth discussion of the problems based on MLM and conducting criticism, self-criticism in a comradesly spirit.

In Punjab, merger was completed early but the necessary preparations were not made prior to the merger of the two state units. Hence it took more time to resolve the political differences. In Haryana, Delhi, Kerala and Assam committees were reconstituted. In Kerala the committee soon became defunct due to the disruptionist activities of two members of the committee. To resolve this problem a state plenum was held and a new state leading body was elected. In the rest of the states old committees continued.

Overall, our Party committees from Area level up to the state level have become more consolidated in the past two years. The committees were expanded and in some of the DC/DVC/ZCs secretariats were formed.

Several new members were promoted to these committees mainly from local recruits, adivasis and other oppressed classes, yet serious weakness remains. So also there have been weaknesses in the development and promotion of women cadres to the higher committes. In some villages where we have more than one party cell, we also formed village party committees.

### **Problem of Oneness:**

Although the merger process was completed successfully problem of oneness does exist in the Party the reasons for which were identified by the PB in its meeting in April 2006. PB had summed it up thus: *“In the past 18 months since the formation of the unified Party, there has been a positive development of relations between the cadres of the two erstwhile Parties at all levels. Overall, the spirit of unity has pervaded the entire Party up to grassroots level. However, there still exist some problems in achieving oneness due to several historical, conceptual, practice-related, behavioural and other factors.”*

The PB resolution pointed out that a thorough education on the basic documents, concepts, historical development of the movements of the erstwhile parties is necessary and that the utmost need of the hour is to unite our forces like an iron fist to defeat the ever growing all-round enemy offensive. For this, the entire rank and file of the unified Party must place the interests of the Party, the oppressed people of our country and the lofty aim of achieving a new classless society above everything else and stand as exemplary revolutionary models.

### **Conferences at various levels:**

The third major task drawn up by the first CC meeting was to conduct education for the entire Party cadres on the basic documents, hold conferences at various levels and complete the Congress thereby achieving unity of thought, unity of will and unity of action in the entire Party. Accordingly, classes were held on the basic documents of the Party in most of the states. Conferences were held successfully at various levels in all states except five states The conferences in five states could not be held due to the severity of the state offensive, continuous combing operations in our pockets, and losses of state leadership in recent months, problem of

proper coordination within the RBs and some organisational problems which arose in the state party.

In spite of these lapses in holding the conferences in some states, overall we were successful in completing the conference process in the midst of heavy repression, in bringing about a higher unity of thought in the party, and in educating the cadres to firmly grasp the Party line. Political debates took place in a free and frank manner in a democratic atmosphere and several amendments were freely placed by the delegates to enrich the party documents. This had increased the enthusiasm in the party's rank and file. Concrete immediate tasks were drawn up for each state after a thorough review and discussion of the work.

There were also some serious shortcomings in the conference process such as lack of involvement of sufficient number of women delegates, not allotting adequate time for discussions in some instances, or allowing discussions on issues that were brought up suddenly in the conferences without prior circulation among the delegates, and not taking the opinions and amendments of comrades in some of the Party units such as the fraction committees in the mass organizations, some departments, etc.

### **Weaknesses in Party building:**

Although we had expanded our Party committees by promoting several new cadres, these committees are still weak ideologically, politically, and organisationally. These are consolidated to an extent but weaknesses are quite deep. A major weakness of our leading Party committees is in understanding our ideology deeply, grasping the essence of our Party's basic documents, especially Strategy & Tactics, and applying these to the concrete conditions in our areas of work. Hence, due to this ideological-political shortcoming, they are not adequately equipped to provide able leadership in advancing the movement and in resolving the problems that come up in the course of advancing the movement. There is overdependence of the lower committees on the higher committees; it is of utmost importance for the higher committees to adopt correct methods to develop the lower committees to help them independently solve their own problems. Organisationally, our Party committees lack the orientation and, to an extent, abilities to build Party cells and train them up to lead the local Party and the

masses. This weakness is seen even with regard to building and functioning of mass organisation units, militia units, and other organisations in spite of the fact that our Party and movement have a wide influence among the masses. We should make conscious and planned effort to bring them out of their shortcomings and consolidate them as strong and effective political committees that are fit enough to lead the war independently even in the most difficult circumstances.

Our grass-roots Party organisation is weak with insignificant party units at the village level. In some states we formed the Party units at the village level but they are non-functional. We have to activise these units in order to transform these into real leadership of the Party capable of leading the masses at the local level. In many areas our Party activity is still squad-centered. This makes the masses passive supporters and dependent on the squads for taking up struggles and in solving the issues at the village level. We have to mould the Party units into active leadership units at the village level and carry out all our activities through these units. Our squads and higher party committees should only guide them and not take up problems directly as this kills the initiative of the Party units.

As we are building the Party in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society, it is but natural that some non-proletarian trends will be quite strong. Feudal ideology, culture and ideas such as authoritarianism, bureaucracy, empiricism, narrow-mindedness, patriarchy etc are often reflected in our practice. Besides these, there is also the prevalence of bourgeois trends such as: petty-bourgeois individualism, ego, ultra-democratic trend, liberalism, dogmatism, impetuosity, romanticism, vacillation etc. Hence, the role of the leadership and the leading Party committees assumes great significance in educating and training the Party cadres and rectifying these weaknesses. A strong proletarian Party can emerge only through integrating with the oppressed classes, actively participating in class struggle, studying MLM, and through conscious and consistent struggle against these non-proletarian trends.

One of the most important weaknesses in Party building is our poor recruitment from the working class. Although there is some recruitment from the basic classes in the rural areas, weaknesses are serious with

regard to promoting them into leadership committees. It is a foremost task before us to recruit more and more cadre from basic classes, especially from dalits, women, adivasis, landless and poor peasants, and the urban working class, and mould them as proletarian revolutionary leaders in the course of class struggle.

### **Unity talks and our relations with other fraternal parties:**

During this period we held bilateral meetings with CPI(ML)-Naxalbari, RCCI(MLM), Coordinating Committee, CPI(ML)-2nd CC, CPI(ML)-New Line; and a faction of CPI(ML)-JS. CPI(ML)-Naxalbari raised questions regarding Maoism, guerrilla bases etc and are not interested in unity with Parties that are not part of RIM. Hence they did not show interest in unity talks and only proposed joint activities. We asked them to send us the synthesis of their experiences and their concrete opinions on our basic documents. RCCI(MLM) explained that it will send its views on our documents and its opinion regarding the prospects for unity. We continued our bilateral relations with CPI(ML)-JS. As we consider the JS as a Party pursuing a Right Opportunist Line since long, we decided not to go for unity talks with it until it makes a self-critical evaluation of its past line and practice and makes a clean break with the past. In fact, this has been the stand of the erstwhile Parties even prior to the merger. Hence we conveyed our opinion that it should prepare its POR and hand over to us after seeing which we can decide about unity talks. JS comrades assured us that they would send the POR at the earliest but have not given it even after two years. Meanwhile their organisation had suffered severe losses and a few months back their leader was arrested delaying the unity process further.

Overall, during this period some groups joined our Party. There is still scope for unity with other revolutionary organisations and with the revolutionary sections from other organisations. Hence, our Party still has the task of uniting the genuine Maoist forces.

### **Functioning of the CC:**

After the formation of the unified Party only two CC meetings were held. The first meeting was held at the time of the merger and it mainly



concentrated on issues related to the conduct of the merger process throughout the Party, carrying out political propaganda about merger, and changes in organisational structure in some states, etc. It helped in developing mutual understanding among the members of the erstwhile Parties to some extent. The meeting had limitations as some members could not attend it.

The second meeting of the CC was held after a gap of one year but that meeting had to be cut short due to technical problems arising out of enemy repression. It took up only the most important and pressing issues due to the necessity of completing the meeting in the shortest time possible. One more CCM who was released from jail was co-opted into the CC. It reviewed the reasons for the arrests of PBM, CCM and several comrades in West Bengal, assessed the situation following the arrests, and issued directions on how to overcome the serious weaknesses and shortcomings in the Party. It took some more important decisions such as the setting up of the new RB for two states, setting up a study team on production relations in Punjab agriculture, criteria, plan and guidelines for the forthcoming Congress etc, besides some organisational problems. Due to the problems in holding the CC meetings and limitations under which the two CC meetings were held, it is the PB and the RBs which had played a more important role during this period.

The formation of the five RBs covering all the states had helped in collectively understanding the situation in their respective states, guiding the movement and resolving the problems in a better way. While four of the RBs functioned, the newly-formed RB, before its full-fledged meeting, faced problems within a short period due to the arrest of the incharge PBM. Overall, the RBs took decisions on political, organisational and military matters in the areas falling under their leadership jurisdiction in the period between two CC meetings. But weaknesses and shortcomings still exist with regard to developing collective functioning, conducting polemical debates whenever deviations from Party line arise in the Party in the states as well as with other Parties, sending circulars on important issues promptly, and establishing proper mechanism for its coordination and safe functioning. RBs should strive to solve all matters in their areas independently, concentrate on studying the concrete conditions, and take up tactics in accordance with the conditions. They should set up foolproof mechanism

for the smooth running of their bureaus and for coordination with the states even in the midst of severe enemy repression. There is still spontaneity and liberalism in this aspect.

As regards PB functioning, it is relatively better and relatively more PB meetings were held during this period. However, only two meetings were attended by all members. Com Barunda was arrested in May 2005 and one meeting was held without him. The PB meeting in April 2006 was held without two more comrades. Comrade KS (Samsheer Singh Sheri) passed away in end October 2005 and in end-December 2005 Com Vijayda was arrested. Thus the absence of three senior PB members, who were associated with the Party right from the time of Naxalbari, within one year after the merger had a serious impact and the overall functioning of the PB and CC. The PB has to develop the necessary mechanism to strengthen the coordination between the GS and other PBMs, between PBMs and between PB and RBs.

During this period PB took some important decisions related to political-organisational matters, attended the RB meetings and tried to guide the RBs in resolving the problems of the movement in the states under their jurisdiction, tried to guide the subcommittees, issued circulars, brought out two issues of the *People's War/Lal Pataka* magazine, issued calls for political campaigns, and tried to collectively understand the movement in the various states. To understand the movement in other states as well as to assist the incharge PBM, some PBMs at times attended meetings of other RBs and states. This had helped the concerned RBs and SCs in understanding the experiences of other states from the PBMs on the one hand, and the PBMs too had learnt from the experiences of those states on the other. Even the PBMs have limited experiences of the movements which they are leading and hence such interaction is very much essential for developing collective understanding in the PB regarding the movement as a whole. Especially in the backdrop of the merger and the gap in understanding in the Party's leading committees, including the PB, regarding the movements led by the two erstwhile Parties, this had helped in developing an objective understanding of the situation and the state of the movement.

Although PB had tried to give political direction and guidelines to the

entire Party and to resolve organisational problems that had come up in the period between the CC meetings, there are shortcomings in undertaking an in-depth study of the problems facing the Party and the movement as a whole and the concrete conditions in various states. It is necessary to go deeper into these aspects in order to give correct and concrete guidance to the Party committees in various states. There is also lack of concentration on training the entire Party ideologically and politically. Even the magazine had not come in time as planned. Other tasks such as merger task, task of holding conferences had an effect to some extent on the concentration of PB on the problems of the movement in some states. Overall, due to the above-mentioned shortcomings PB could not play its role effectively and could not give the necessary guidance according to the changing conditions

### **To sum up our weaknesses**

The CC is yet to develop as a collective team, CC members have to grasp the problems faced by the Party and the movement as a whole, have to enhance their theoretical and political level, organisational abilities, and study the concrete conditions in order to effectively lead the Party and the people's war in the country. There is also narrow thinking among some CCMs who still consider themselves the representatives of a particular state rather than think as representatives of the entire Party. There is empiricist and dogmatic thinking too that one's own experience is absolute or superior and attempts to impose one's own experience mechanically over others. Hence this provincial and compartmentalized outlook is creating hurdles in taking collective decisions in accordance with the needs of the entire Party. This is reflected most sharply during assessments of the movements in the concerned states/special zones/special areas, transfers of comrades, extension to new areas etc.

There is still a subjective understanding regarding the actual situation and a tendency to present an exaggerated picture of the achievements in the states where the PBMs are incharge and to understate the weaknesses, mistakes and shortcomings. This makes it difficult to get an objective understanding of the movement. Liberalism also exists in implementing the decisions taken by the CC and PB in the concerned RBs and states by the concerned PBMs. There is complacency after some achievements and

laxity towards the enemy and liberalism in strictly adhering to technical principles. We have to come out of these non-proletarian trends and consciously strive to objectively assess the situation, objectively understand the strength and weaknesses of the enemy and ourselves in order to arrive at correct tactics. Thus, subjectivism and liberalism in the PB had a role in the continuation of the weaknesses and shortcomings in the various states and in our failure to check avoidable losses.

### **Functioning of CPB:**

The CPB had under it the work of bringing out the legal magazine and also the publishing of English and Hindi legal magazines. In these two years the English version of the magazine came out regularly during the first year; while in the last year it came out virtually as a bimonthly. The irregularity was primarily due to the lack of articles being written by EB members. Only one issue of the Hindi version could be brought out. This was a serious lacuna as the readership in the Hindi belt is very large after the merger. Meanwhile versions are coming out in two states regularly.

In this period there were three Hindi publications two of which were linked to our movement. The EB of the magazine never functioned on a proper basis.

For any communist party the publishing unit is of much importance to carry the political line of the party and its standpoint as widely as possible. In a country like India the central publishing house can play the role of publishing our stand and view on all international and all-India developments. It is important that the CC gives it more attention.

The functioning of the CPB was severely effected by the arrest of the head of the Bureau after just two meetings. No serious attempts were made to improve the quality of the magazine, its circulation and content. On the whole, though meetings took place, the bureau functioning needs to be improved. The functioning of the EB too needs to be improved much.

### **Report of International Department:**

The department took up tasks at two levels

(A) Coordination with and building greater unity with other genuine

Maoist parties worldwide

(B) Coordinating and building the anti-imperialist international Mass Organizations

Here too the department could not function as a proper department. As far as the international mass organizations are concerned, here too some growth could be seen. The two anti-imperialist fronts could not play much role, though one helped in taking up issues we faced here at the international level to some extent.

Regarding international relations there has been some progress with some Maoist parties and particularly an improvement in relations with RIM constituents in the recently. With the Maoist movements in a weak state the work in this sphere is likely to go slowly but it is important that we play our proletarian internationalist role in this sphere.

**Non-Proletarian Trends:**

Some non-proletarian trends, which prevailed in both the erstwhile Parties prior to the merger, continued into the new Party. The rectification campaigns taken up in various states in the period prior to the merger had some positive impact but subjectivism, spontaneity, liberalism, sectarianism, individualism and bureaucracy are reflected in various forms in the Party committees including the highest bodies of our unified Party. Subjectivism is seen in matters such as assessment of the nature and scale of enemy onslaught and changing our methods and style of work accordingly, study of the enemy's tactics, study of the concrete conditions in the different areas and adopting the forms of struggle and forms of organisation in accordance with those conditions, mechanical implementation of tactics irrespective of the concrete conditions prevailing. As a result we suffered severe losses in West Bengal including two CCMs within nine months after the formation of the unified Party as we did not assess the severity of SOG attack. We suffered serious losses in AP in the last two years due to our subjectivism in assessing the condition of the enemy and ours and in not taking up the correct tactics of retreating and measures for safeguarding our forces in time and evolving appropriate forms of struggle and forms of organisation in accordance with the fast-changing conditions. Several

comrades including a PBM were arrested as we did not change our old methods of functioning even when the enemy had changed his methods and tactics qualitatively. In BJ some comrades were arrested including four SACMs and one CCM. In 3U one CCM was arrested. The heavy losses in North Chattisgarh were also due to the same reason.

Spontaneity is seen in the functioning of the CC and various party committees, in their day-to-day planning, work style and methods, and drifting from one work to another without giving priority to the central task. Lack of proper planning in the CC/PB/RBs and individual CCMs, adhocism in decision-making, and allotting too many works to the committees and individual members is mainly responsible for spontaneity in functioning and lack of focus on the most important tasks. Absence of proper mechanism for the committees is also contributing to the spontaneous work style.

Liberalism is seen in the CC and various party committees in taking timely decisions and firmly implementing the decisions taken, in not changing our thinking and methods of work i.e., not moulding the committees and members to the needs of the situation, not shifting cadres who are prone to enemy attack, casual attitude in assessing the betrayal of the informers and the seriousness of the situation, in conducting rectification of wrong trends in time, in criticising the wrong trends and deviations in the committees and members, in undertaking self-criticism of one's own weaknesses and shortcomings, in maintaining records with utmost secrecy, maintaining proper accounts, reducing expenses and ensuring financial self-sufficiency and so on. Liberalism on the part of the leadership has led to many serious losses during this period.

Beauracracy is clearly seen in committee functioning. It is reflected in: imposing ones opinions on others, not listening to the views of others, not giving attention to cadres, dealing with them as employees or subordinates, blaming them and their work continuously and adopting a negative attitude towards them, etc.

Sectarian is clearly manifested in the sphere of organisation. This takes the following forms: not uniting with those who oppose you; not relying on the rank-and-file of the people but on a handfull who agree with you; taking a negative attitude with those who oppose you; etc This sectarianism disrupts

the collective unity also weakens our relationship with the masses. In this way it separates the leaders from the rank-and-file and the party from the masses. We have had to face the negative results because of this attitude.

Individualism is also reflected in various ways in our organisation. For example. To always begin from self-centred thinking; attempting to impose one's opinion on the committees, and when not possible to get annoyed; to (ding hankna) blow one's own trumpet; to always speak with self-satisfaction and self-praise; to maintain an attitude of hostility and revenge to those who disagree with you; always demanding special benefits for oneself; and also not acting according to any committee and form; imposing discipline on others but putting oneself above any discipline; etc. This tendency is an obstacle to develop the collective initiative in the organisation and developing unity of thought and action in the entire party.

Although PB had tried to give political direction and guidelines to the entire Party and to resolve organisational problems that had come up in the period between the CC meetings, there are shortcomings in undertaking an in-depth study of the problems facing the Party and the movement as a whole and the concrete conditions in various states. It is necessary to go deeper into these aspects in order to give correct and concrete guidance to the Party committees in various states. There is also lack of concentration on training the entire Party ideologically and politically. Even the magazine had not come in time as planned. Other tasks such as merger task, task of holding conferences had an effect to some extent on the concentration of PB on the problems of the movement in some states. Overall, due to the above-mentioned shortcomings PB could not play its role effectively and could not give the necessary guidance according to the changing conditions in some RBs and SCs.

We can only defeat the enemy offensive, preserve our leadership, and advance the movement to the next higher stage if we rectify these weaknesses and wrong trends. A rectification campaign should be taken up throughout the Party to get rid of these trends and the process of rectification should be on a continuous basis as such trends can reemerge in different forms.

## IV. Military Front

After the formation of CPI (Maoist), decision was taken in the first CC(P) and CMC meeting to form commissions and commands at various levels, and to bring uniformity in the formations of the Main, Secondary and Base Forces throughout the PLGA. Accordingly, the process of unification of the PLGA forces had begun and the reorganisation of PLGA formations was completed to a large extent in most of the states. Commissions were formed at the state/special area/special zone and regional (in BJ) levels. Commands were formed at zonal/district/divisional and subzonal levels. The process of forming area commands has begun in some areas. However, it is only in a few areas these played an active role. There is an urgent need to strengthen the commands and make them function effectively.

### **Intensification and expansion of war zones:**

The CMC took up politico-military campaigns such as tactical counter-offensive campaigns (TCOCs), PLGA recruitment campaigns, PLGA Week, etc., as part of the principal task of intensifying and expanding the guerrilla war, transforming the PLGA into PLA, guerrilla war into mobile war, and guerrilla zones into base areas.

As part of achieving the above principal task, we carried out several heroic counteroffensive operations enthusing the Indian masses and sending shock tremors down the spine of the enemy. Some of these actions are historic—Chandauli, Madhubani, Giridih, Jehanabad, Udayagiri, Bania dih, Vinjaram, Padedda, Murkinaar, Kothacheruvu, NMDC, Saranda, Bokaro, etc.

In the past two years our PLGA carried out 130 actions, big and small, annihilated 315 policemen, seized around 485 arms, injured several hundred police personnel. Hundreds of reactionaries, police agents, political leaders, etc were punished.

We succeeded in intensifying the people's war in DK and BJ. The guerrilla war that we are waging for the past 25 years in DK and BJ, especially in the last one year, has advanced. The forces centralised with the platoons and companies, acting as the mobilising centres, are conducting



centralised big actions and the decentralised units are carrying out small and medium-level actions. With the higher mobilising capacity we are able to stop the enemy for hours together, able to do actions with an interval of very few days, deploying the centralised forces in different areas and coordinating them and carrying out big operations and attacks by centralising them. The extensive formation of militia and participating heroically in the resistance actions against the police—all these higher level of experiences that we are getting in DK and BJ are the basis for developing the guerrilla war into mobile war.

We have also expanded guerrilla war to new areas. We achieved some progress in our guerrilla activities in six states. PLGA units were formed in some more states. According to our CC decision, in AP, NT and AOB, we tried to intensify the war but failed as we suffered serious losses in the first two zones in the brutal enemy offensive especially during the enemy's well-coordinated action plan since November 2005 and shortcomings in implementation.

While performing its main role of destroying the enemy forces and seizing arms, our PLGA also played an active role in carrying out strategic tasks such as defending the organs of political power from enemy's fierce attacks, protected the leadership and assisted in conducting study camps, training camps, meetings of Party committees, and other activities of the Party. But for the alertness and heroic resistance of the PLGA our Party could not have carried out its activities successfully. It participated in agricultural production in some areas besides mobilising the masses into production.

While we tried to intensify and expand the guerrilla war during this period, we also faced the acute problem of sustaining the war in the three zones of AP. While the situation was relatively better in AOB in respect of losses suffered by our forces, we can say that our resistance has been overall weak in all three zones. Our one-sided stress on the intensification of the guerrilla war instead of planning to retreat part of the forces while undertaking different kinds of planned actions through small guerrilla units and adopting flexibility in frequently changing the formations of our guerrilla forces according to the changing situation, moulding our forces through

training, education and motivation, and involvement of the leadership directly in all these; failure in expanding the area of armed struggle so as to gain maneuverability for our PLGA forces when faced with a heavy concentration of the special police forces; failure to evolve secret methods of work and tactics for the plain areas and several serious technical mistakes; and, most important of all, our inability to maintain regular organic links with the people in the midst of heavy repression and strengthening our mass base, were the main reasons for the serious losses in AP and NT. Enemy was able to build an extensive network of informers and SPOs in the areas of armed struggle, gather precise information about the movements of our squads while our intelligence-gathering was poor.

There were serious weaknesses in some of the actions such as the Madhuban multiple raid in North Bihar, Dhoula raid in DK, Dumaria raid etc. Politico-military weaknesses were seen even during some successful offensives such as Jehanabad Jailbreak. There is an imperative need to take the lessons from these raids, ambushes, encounters and other counteroffensive operations so as to avoid such mistakes in future and undertake bigger offensives.

Since the last two years we have intensified and expanded guerrilla war countrywide. In the process we have destroyed the enemy power at the local level and established the organs of people's power. Particularly in DK area level power organs (ARPCs) have been built and have been strengthened. Based on this we are moving ahead to build the higher level power organs and the Guerrilla Bases. While defending the new power at the area level we are advancing the guerrilla war and transforming it into mobile war in order to establish the Base Areas.

### **Functioning of the CMC, SMCs, and Commands:**

The CMC concentrated on carrying out the principal task of intensifying and expanding the people's war throughout the country during this period. It paid special attention to the task of forming higher-level military formations and increasing the strength and quality of the PLGA with the aim of elevating the guerrilla war to the stage of mobile war. It took up recruitment drive with the aim of transforming the PLGA into PLA, held some training camps for the PLGA forces and sent guidelines for forming and training the people's

militia units. It made efforts to arm the PLGA and upgrade the weaponry i.e., improve the overall fire-power of the PLGA. It attempted to undertake study on breaking enemy fortifications, smashing MPVs, destroying enemy forces through ambushes, etc but this is insufficient. Besides, we had not seriously studied enemy's LIC strategy being implemented in AP and there was also weakness in formulating appropriate counter-tactics. There is urgent need to concentrate on these important aspects without which it is difficult to advance our war. It strived to evolve military tactics to defeat the enemy's brutal offensive, coordinated and directly led the PLGA in TCOCs and big military operations. It also tried to concentrate on raising the overall politico-military level of the PLGA through military training camps and classes, and by bringing out the military magazine, *Awam-e-Jung*, three issues of which had come out, and other military literature, in two languages. Two MCs were held—one for instructors and the second for both instructors and a few commanders of platoons. Training was also held for PLGA members at various levels. A central instructors' team was set up which imparted training to PLGA forces. The concept of mobile military school has been introduced and also formed in some places with the aim of giving training in accordance with the requirements of the local areas. There is need to concentrate on this aspect of training in accordance with the local conditions and requirements.

Commissions have not yet developed into collective bodies directing all military activities. Specialisation in military affairs by the commissions is inadequate and there is need to concentrate on specialisation in war-related matters, particularly enemy's tactics based on concrete field study. Attempts to study enemy's weaknesses were made but the experiences of PLGA in the various states in countering the enemy militarily have not been summed up comprehensively in order to derive the correct lessons. Such a synthesis of the experiences and transfer of knowledge obtained from the war field in one state to another would be of great help in advancing the war and avoiding a repetition of the mistakes elsewhere. The commissions have to learn the skill of effectively coordinating the three wings of the PLGA. They should be able to maintain the tempo of war and not confined to some actions occasionally. After every TCOC and big military action they should consolidate the gains and plan further. They should train up our

PLGA and the militia to engage the enemy continuously in one way or another.

### **Weaknesses and shortcomings in the military front:**

There are several weaknesses in conducting the war and in the military front as a whole. Firstly, our training is not yet in accordance with the present needs of countering the enemy's tactics. Enemy has fortified all the stations in the guerrilla zones, GB areas and other areas of armed struggle, his movements are secretive and swift, and coordination of his forces is efficient and very much improved when compared to the time prior to the merger. Enemy has been resorting to surprise attacks based on precise information. But our training falls far short of the requirements.

We have to train up our forces on how to break enemy's fortifications, annihilate the enemy in big numbers through opportunity and deliberate ambushes, ensnare the enemy through booby-traps laid through creative methods. We have to practise fire and movement techniques to overpower and take the enemy by surprise. Our commanders should be politically further developed to analyse a difficult situation and take the necessary steps to inflict damage on the enemy by using creative methods. The fighting skills of the PLGA members should be enhanced. We can learn the art of war through war itself. We had derived a lot of experience in conducting the war and it is now our foremost task to synthesise these experiences in the military front accumulated over three decades of armed struggle and evolve appropriate tactics and methods to counter the enemy in accordance with the specific conditions in each area, the strength of our subjective forces and the nature and magnitude of the enemy offensive.

Enemy's offensive has specific characteristics in specific areas. We have to study these and evolve our counteroffensives and tactics accordingly.

Another serious shortcoming that is coming in the way of offering effective resistance and causing serious damage to enemy forces is our weak base force. Without a strong people's militia and consolidated strength and mass participation in the war, it is not possible to strengthen the main and secondary forces and achieve significant victories over the enemy.

The experience of China and Vietnam should be the guide for us. We achieved relatively good results in DK because of our stronger militia units at the village level and the PMS units. We succeeded in forming militia platoons also in DK. Thousands of people have been organised into these militia units. The masses are taking active part in the TCOCs in coordination with the main and secondary forces. They are continuously resisting and harassing the enemy. In states where there is the absence of a wide network of militia units our resistance is facing serious constraints. Moreover, wherever there are militia units we are able to expand the main and secondary forces at a faster pace as in DK but in other places our forces are growing at a snail's pace. It is important to bear in mind that we cannot win the war through the main force alone. People's militia can work wonders in harassing and halting the enemy's advance by creating obstructions at every step.

In modern-day warfare, besides the creativity of the human being, high-technology and modern weapons also play an important role. Although we can never reach the sophistication and modernisation of the enemy, we should not neglect this aspect of continuously modernising our weaponry and fire-power. Our efforts in this regard are inadequate. We haven't even succeeded in equipping all our fighters with the minimum weapons and in many of our military formations there is an acute shortage of arms and ammunition. In DK, where we achieved significant rise in recruitment into PLGA and a large number of militia units, we failed to arm these forces which is showing an adverse impact on carrying out war on an extensive scale. In BJ also the shortage of arms for our PLGA forces is acute. In the three zones of AP, where the enemy offensive is serious, the foremost task is to modernise the weapons and ensure an uninterrupted supply of ammunition. Besides arms, we have to also concentrate on equipping our forces with explosives, grenades, etc. The need of artillery is growing due to the need for breaking enemy fortifications. We have to attend to these problems immediately.

Another problem is the lack of military sense in many Party units, including the highest committees. There is a tendency to think that the military aspect is the duty of the CMC and SMCs and the fighting will be done by the main force of the PLGA. Narrowness of thinking persists in the Party committees when cadres are to be allotted for combat units like

Action Teams, leadership for military formations, military instructors, and for various military works such as intelligence, arms production, storage and transport, and other departments related to the military front. This narrow-mindedness and localised thinking has an adverse impact on our war and in strengthening the military front.

**To sum up our weaknesses**, the first weakness is that our fighting skills are not up to the requirements of the war and hence we have to improve the fighting skills of the PLGA, enhance the analytical abilities of our commissions, commands and commanders, deeply study the enemy movements and tactics and evolve counter tactics to defeat him militarily. Secondly, our PLGA and militia are numerically weak and have not grown in a significant manner in the past two years. Weak militia and grassroots level organisation is the basis for the slow growth or stagnation in growth of the PLGA in many areas. Except in DK, in other states the growth of people's militia is not significant. In BJ, there is vast militia but consolidation is weak. Without a massive growth of the militia units it is not possible to transform the guerrilla war into mobile war. Masses should be roused, their class hatred should be utilised to inflict strong blows on the enemy forces, the latent potentialities and skills of the masses should be brought out in a creative manner, and the war should be transformed into a war between the masses and the state and not just between our PLGA and the enemy forces. In some states the existing PLs were also dismantled due to lack of subjective forces. Thirdly, our fire-power is weak. Most of our forces do not have auto or aemi-auto weapons still. This has an effect on the quality of our resistance. Although our forces are fighting heroically and achieving some successes, we are also undergoing severe losses due to our weak fire-power. We have to upgrade our weaponry if we are to inflict maximum damage to the enemy forces and reduce our losses. Fourthly, our training is not up to the mark. Fifthly, we are still following routine and outdated methods in countering the enemy offensive although enemy had changed his tactics drastically. Hence we are not able to achieve much success in ambushes especially in areas where enemy had taken effective counter measures. Specialised study is necessary to identify the weaknesses and loopholes on the enemy's side. By overcoming all these politico-military weaknesses, we must strengthen the PLGA and intensify

the guerrilla war thereby achieving a breakthrough in the armed agrarian revolutionary war.

## **V. Mass Organisation, Mass Struggle and United Front**

The fourth task drawn up in the first CC meeting i.e., building and strengthening the party within the working class, building a militant and political working class movement, building broad-based mass movements on political issues in order to build and strengthen the united front work as the third magic weapon of revolution has been partially successful. In the past two years we did not achieve much progress in the urban work. There is still problem of correct orientation in urban work. We have to finalise the policy paper on urban work and impart education throughout the Party and give proper orientation to all the Party committees. There is also the need to put in special effort to develop cadres with the abilities to work in the urban areas. All the mass work must be oriented to building solid organisations of the masses, oriented towards strengthening the armed struggle and strategic united front. The basic form of the Strategic United Front will be the united front of new people's power emerging in our GZs and Guerrilla Bases.

### **GBs Review:**

Prior to the merger itself, erstwhile PW took up the task of establishing GBs in the guerrilla zones in our strategic areas of DK and AOB with the perspective of transforming the entire Guerrilla zones into Liberated Areas and there has been some progress in this work by the time of merger. Likewise, before the merger, erstwhile MCCI had its concrete planning for establishing guerrilla base areas in BJ and after the formation of the unified Party the task was taken up in all the three strategic areas. The first CC meeting and the CMC of the unified Party decided to study the concrete conditions in each of the strategic areas, to select some pockets for establishing GBs with the aim of establishing base areas, and begin work in one or two GB areas first through concrete plan and concentration by the leadership. The perspective is to establish Base Area in each strategic area by first developing some GBs, which will act as focal points in the

guerrilla zones, and then to use these to further strengthen our party, people's army and united front and extend our power to the entire guerrilla zone.

Accordingly, in every strategic area GB areas were identified, one or two were selected for immediate concentration, and plans were drawn up to allot Party cadres and guerrilla forces, mobilise the masses politically and consolidate them, destroy the authority of the enemy, and establish people's political power. As a result of this planned work we could establish some GBs and are in the process of establishing a few more in the immediate future. We succeeded in forming RPCs in several villages in the GBs. Particularly in DK, the formation of RPCs not only at the village level but also at area level is a significant achievement and also a new experience in the history of the revolutionary movement in our country. The enemy's repeated offensives on our GB areas in DK and AOB were defeated through the active participation of the people led by our main and secondary forces and base force. In DK, our GBs were further consolidated by increasing our Party units at the village level and even forming gram Party committees, increasing our military formations, strengthening them and taking them to company-level formations, bringing a greater number of people into the militia, politically mobilizing people on different political, military and organizational campaigns and expanding peasant, women and cultural mass organisations on a wide scale and at the level of Division and Special Zone, consolidating, expanding and establishing people's authority in the form of RPCs, and forming GB-level organs of people's political power as well as Party committees. Several RPCs in West Bastar were destroyed in the counter-revolutionary *salwa judum* campaign and these are being reconstituted.

Although, to a significant extent, we could not build the Party within the working class or build a militant working class movement, we achieved some results in building broad-based fronts and made some progress in united front work.. In the mass front, there has been modest activity during the two years since the formation of the unified Party. In accordance with the decision of the CC, we initiated some measures to build united front organisations at two levels—one with a strategic outlook and another being of a tactical nature. Through these two fronts we attempted to politically intervene in the burning issues of the day and succeeded to some extent.



The Party-led front had carried out political calls such as the call for the unconditional release of political prisoners, campaign against salwa judum, against state repression state-sponsored attacks on the revolutionary movement in AP, and observing important Days. At the tactical level, attempts were made to forge a broad front comprising all those who are opposed to imperialist exploitation and loot, imperialist globalisation and the neo-liberal policies pursued by the central and state governments, imperialist occupation of Iraq and the war-mongering acts of the US imperialists, state repression and the various Black Acts, displacement of adivasis and the peasantry from the forest and agricultural lands by huge mining, multi-purpose, infrastructural and other so-called developmental projects, atrocities and attacks on Dalits and Muslims, and other such issues.

While these are the positive aspects in our mass front, shortcomings and weaknesses are also quite serious. Both the central core bodies of the two fronts have internal problems and lack unity of thought and action.

The Sucomo, which was formed for the purpose of coordinating and guiding these bodies and the 5 AIMOs, held five meetings during this period, and strived to guide the mass organisation fractions and the newly formed All India bodies. But one major problem was the involvement of the sucomo members in various works in the states as well as in other activity, which acted as a limitation in giving guidance more regularly. Hence only three of the Sucomo meetings were full-fledged.

One major problem of Sucomo was in its coordination with the states. This has been a long-standing problem in spite of repeated circulars. Unless this is improved there is little possibility to deepen the roots of the AIMOs.

This also effected collective functioning and to arrive at collective understanding to some extent. In spite of the serious technical problems involved in guiding the open mass organisations, and limitations of the members due to other works, it tried to be in close touch with the fraction committees and to guide them. One major lapse of sucomo is that it hasn't been able to give the necessary ideological-political orientation to the leadership and to bring unity of thought by solving the long-standing internal differences within A3 and A4. Overall, the leadership of the mass organisations does not consider itself as real Party leadership in the mass

front and plays the role of job-doer carrying out the decisions sent from above. We have to make serious effort to bring them out of this state of mind and mould them as the Party's leadership in the mass front. Besides we have to rebuild the AIMOs basing not only on mass leaders but political organisers and focus on building the organisation and not merely on propaganda.

Regarding A1 not a single step was taken to reorganise it by Sucomo and decision taken could not be implemented. This sphere has enormous potential and the lack of effort was yet another shortcoming. Regarding A2, though a workshop was taken it served little purpose as the main aim of the workshop was for Sucomo to synthesise the experience to rebuild the student movement. The student movement is an important area of work and needs greater attention. Regarding A5 the main shortcoming was the incorrect assessment of the FCMs, most of whom have withdrawn; yet there has been slow progress here spreading the organisation to a number of states

Another weakness in the building of A4 was the seminar-type approach that was not very effective in consolidating the contacts. Besides, this had not included anti-feudal struggle in our tasks also. A3 lacked the initiative to intervene in the important political event occurring in the country. We should have concentrated on building a mass movement on a political issue by mobilising various sections to build the broadest possible front. This could have brought focus on the issue and the organisation too could have become a rallying point for the revolutionary, progressive and democratic forces.

The weakness in building AIMOs and mass movement at the All India level should be seen in the backdrop of the overall weakness in the Party in the mass front. Although we have considerable mass support and political influence, political mobilisation of the masses as well as mobilisation on the day-to-day issues is still not much significant. There was also shortcoming in coordinating with the nationality movements and implementing proper tactics. Our RBs and SC/SAC/SZCs are not still drawing up concrete plans for political intervention by allotting sufficient able cadres for mass work. There is a serious problem from top to bottom

in the building of a wide and solid mass base. This is also reflected in the building of the AIMOs at the central level. We are not building solid Party leadership in the mass front and involving them in a democratic manner—all of these factors have an adverse impact on building the mass movement.

It is essential to keep in mind the importance of unleashing mass movement, building solid mass organisations with the orientation of forging the united front as the third magic weapon for achieving victory in revolution. Needless to say, without the political mobilisation of the masses there cannot be strong Party, Army and the united Front, for mass movement and mass work are the most important source for recruitment and support for the Party, Army and the UF. The low level of recruitment at present is mainly due to the weakness in building a solid mass base adopting a correct mass line and class line. In many areas it is true that defeating the enemy offensive is an important condition for achieving a breakthrough in the mass front. At the same time without the mobilisation of the masses for war, both directly and indirectly, we cannot defeat the enemy offensive only through our PLGA. Even in areas where our military formations are relatively strong and there exists some flexibility to organise the masses and to build MO units and to make these function on a regular basis, we haven't made serious efforts in this regard. As a result, there exists a big gap between the Party's political influence and organisational consolidation.

In AP, NT and AOB, we have a wide mass base that has come into being due to the long history of numerous anti-feudal struggles and struggles on various people's issues. Lakhs of people participate in meetings and rallies whenever there is slight relaxation in repression. Even in the midst of repression thousands are participating spontaneously in funeral processions and meetings. However, these have not been transformed into militant agitations against the state or organisationally consolidated. We could not bring them organisationally into the party's fold though politically they are with the Party. Hence we failed to involve them actively in war. If this weakness is overcome we can build a powerful mass movement in the three zones of AP.

In BJ, we have a good mass base and support, organisational structures are formed but due to poor follow up we are not able to make the masse

actively involved in the war or in political issues. We have an advantage as our armed formations are relatively strong in BJ, and in thousands of villages KKC units exist. There is relatively more flexibility in the movement of the organisers in some areas as the enemy does not dare to venture due to disadvantages on his side until now. Yet, our work among the masses and initiation of mass struggles is poor. Our MO units are not active and we are not able to make them function on a regular basis. In fact, our main weakness lies in the sphere of consolidation. There is need to consolidate the KKC from the village level to higher levels and to make them function independently by developing them ideologically and politically. We have to also strengthen the mass organisation committees at all levels so that they can take the initiative. We have to deepen and consolidate the anti-feudal struggles in the old areas besides taking up struggles on the day-to-day issues of the masses as well as various political issues.

In 3U, our efforts in building mass movement and mass organisations are far short of the requirements. Especially being an area where big landlords rule the roost, anti-feudal struggles should become the focus and backbone of our movement in North Bihar. Landless and poor peasants can be mobilised in a big way for the occupation of the lands of the landlords, seizure of crops and against various feudal practices. Annihilation of some landlords might enthuse the masses but cannot by itself create a militant mass movement or establish local leadership.

In West Bengal too, we had tried to intervene in some political issues and our influence over the masses has grown. But our mass organisation and mass movement are not in accordance with our political influence. Hence our weakness in building the mass movement and organisational consolidation at the local level has affected our recruitment, overall resistance and in building a strong Party, Army and UF in West Bengal.

In DK, we have a relatively deeper and stable mass base and in most of the villages people are brought into the organisational fold of the party which has helped us in countering the enemy effectively. There is relatively greater mobilisation of the masses both on the day-to-day issues and political issues, increased membership of the MOs and greater organisational consolidation at the village as well as higher levels, and regular functioning

of the MO units. We were able to develop these mass organisations at the level of the special zone. We also achieved some progress in forming joint fronts with the various sections, classes and parties and taking up united struggles. This continuous activity of the masses and their organisational consolidation has provided the basis for continuous recruitment into the Party, Army and the UF. In the past two years MO units had increased and recruitment had almost doubled. It is this systematic work among the masses combined with effective resistance against the enemy offensive that had contributed to this leap in recruitment.

In Karnataka, broad-based struggles and fronts were organised which had a good political impact initially. However, due to the wrong line pursued by a section in the Party calling itself the Minority, the mass struggles were counterposed to the armed struggle and the former were overemphasised at the cost of the latter. This ultimately had a negative impact on the movement in the state as a whole. The refusal of the Minority comrades in Karnataka to associate the state MOs with the All India MOs and their insistence on maintaining an independent existence is also a reflection of their Right Deviation which became crystallised finally into a ROL.

In Maharashtra, where there exists a long history of mass movement and mass organisation, the last two years had not seen much development. There were some successful attempts to form cover organisations among some sections of the people and there has been some progress in UF activity. In Tamil Nadu, where we lost the majority of the cadre and a good part of the leadership following enemy's attack on a military training camp in end 2002, the work picked up gradually and in the past two years MO units were formed and are functioning secretly. The experience of Tamil Nadu in forming and working under the banner of cover organisations, and recruiting cadres from these organisations, even if it is on a smaller scale, is quite useful for the entire Party.

In Haryana, there were good results on account of our mass work and mass movements and there is relative consolidation of the mass organisations. In Punjab and Kerala, there has been some progress in the mass front though it is not very significant. In Assam, the mass activity extended from two districts to six districts in the past two years and some

of the struggles had a good impact on the people.

But overall, our mobilisation of the masses and their consolidation into mass organisations is still weak when compared to our strength and political influence in the country. Without mass mobilisation on their day-to-day and political issues and the building solid mass organisations and basic work among the masses, it is impossible to strengthen the Party, Army and the UF or to intensify the war. All our Party committees have to concentrate on building a strong mass base by taking up their issues and consolidating them into units. Our entire orientation should be to mobilise them into the people's war directly and indirectly.

**Cultural Front:** Some attempts were made to revive the cultural activities in the states. We were successful in building a mass cultural movement in DK and BJ by forming cultural units at the village and area level also. Workshops were held to train up the comrades working in the cultural front. In DK, hundreds of cultural units are presently working in the rural areas. At the All India level the progress has been poor and there is a need to revive the activity with a proper plan. Particularly in the context of growing imperialist cultural offensive, we have to concentrate on developing the cultural front in all states where our Party is present. We have to prepare a perspective on the cultural work and educate the entire Party. We have to ensure that the cultural army also grows along with the people's army.

### **Our work in the women's front:**

Our work in the women's front is still far from satisfactory. Recruitment in many states is poor, selection-gradation-promotion of the women cadres is still not according to a systematic plan and our efforts are inadequate given the immense potential and the necessity of building the women's movement and recruiting cadres and promoting leadership from the women. The trend of patriarchy is acting as a strong deterrent to our efforts in this regard.

The participation of women in the Party, Army and the mass organisations is relatively better in DK, BJ, the three zones of AP, Maharashtra and Karnataka. But in other states, women's participation in

the movement as a whole is poor. Special effort is lacking in many states to recruit, develop and promote women cadres and in taking up women's issues. There exist serious shortcomings in recruiting women into the Party and PLGA and promoting them. Our leading Party committees should concentrate on these aspects and mahila subcommittees should be formed in the states where our organisation is relatively strong. Where this is not possible, at least one SCM should be allotted to specialise on the women's front. Patriarchal trends should be rectified through continuous ideological-political education and encouraging more active participation of women in the movement.

A subcommittee, CMSC, was formed in the first CC meeting at the time of the merger to specialise in the women's front, look into the problems faced by women in the Party, educate the women cadres, and help in building the women's organisations and movement besides guiding the existing front organisation among women. In the past two years a preliminary discussion on the women's perspective paper was completed, amendments were placed but the paper could not be finalised. It took up some fact-finding activities, prepared notes and contributed articles on the women's issues for the magazines, released video presentations, held classes for some women activists, gave organisational guidance, undertook grassroots level study in some areas, and placed suggestions before the CC.

Although CMSC took up some activities it had serious constraints due to its composition where most of the members were involved mainly in other works. Absence of subcommittees in most of the states and lack of information to the CMSC by the concerned CCMs incharge of states was another limitation on the part of CMSC in arriving at a correct assessment of the women's problems. To sum up, while the formation of the subcommittee has been a positive development and has contributed to the development of our work in the women's front, there is an urgent need to strengthen the subcommittee by inducting more full-timers and establishing greater coordination with the subcommittees and women's movements in the states.

## **VI. A Brief Assessment of the Movement in Various States**

In the past two years, we were able to sustain the movement as a whole, intensify the guerrilla war in DK and BJ, and expand to some new areas however limited. But we suffered serious losses in AP and NT and stagnation in AOB. Overall, the movement in AP as a whole had entered temporary setback. When assessing the achievements and failures of the past two years we must keep in mind the background of the most important task of completing the merger process at various levels throughout the Party, especially the tremendous responsibility of BJSAC in this aspect, as well as another priority task of educating the entire Party on the Party's basic documents and completing the process of conferences at various levels and the Congress. Let us look at the overall position of the movement in order to arrive at the correct tactics.

**In AP, (AP, NT, AOB),** we tried to utilise the situation during the period of talks. The mass political campaign during the period of talks until the end of 2004 had created a good political impact and increased our subjective strength in the three zones. But we began to suffer losses soon after the breakdown of talks from the beginning of January 2005. The enemy's plan of multi-pronged offensive, which was going on since 1996, was carried out at a rapid pace with the full assistance of the World Bank and imperialist aid. Combining reforms with repression the enemy had redoubled his planned effort to isolate us by weaning away the masses through various means. He selected one zone after another and concentrated his forces on a massive scale for a certain period of time so as not to give breathing space. His aim is to destroy our leadership in each zone through a well-planned, well-coordinated strategy basing on his vast network of informers and other intelligence networks and by carrying out surprise attacks based on precise information. Besides this, private armed gangs, covert agents are also used on a considerable scale for eliminating the leadership. Fortifications of all stations, even multi-layered in many cases, in all our areas of armed struggle is making it quite difficult to inflict serious losses through raids. Civilians are often used as human shield by the moving enemy forces. Roads and communications are developed to a considerable



extent with the help of the World Bank to suppress our movement. Enemy had developed extremely cruel methods in suppressing our movement. Any arrested comrade, whether it is a CC member or a squad member, is never produced before courts but is eliminated in fake encounters.

We did not adopt the correct tactics to counter the above tactics of the enemy in time. We suffered the heaviest losses in AP part during the period of enemy's Action Plan since November 2005, particularly February 2006. This led to gradual decline of the movement finally resulting in a temporary setback in the state as a whole. The main reasons for the temporary setback are as follows:

Firstly we did not have a correct assessment of the timing and scale of the impending enemy attack during talks. Although we made some preparations militarily during the period of talks, these were not completed by December 2004. When the period of cease-fire was over in December 2004 we thought that the enemy attack may not be serious until another two months i.e., till February 2005. As a result we did not complete our preparations to face the brutal enemy offensive. This was one of the factors that had contributed to losses initially when the enemy began his massive onslaught by the beginning of January itself. But immediately we began to counter the enemy offensive but due to the weaknesses that are persisting since a long period of time we could not offer effective resistance. Second, we did not drive the entire Party to preserve our forces while undertaking planned actions through various means. Third, we did not take up the tactics of retreat in AP part when the situation was clearly unfavourable to us. This shows the lack of deep understanding of PPW and its concrete application. Instead of talking a step back when the enemy was trying to encircle our pockets with the aim of wiping us out, we continued to plan intensification and continuous resistance. Fourth, we had to withdraw our guerrilla squads from the plain areas with increasing repression. We tried to adopt alternative forms of struggle and forms of organisation in the plain areas, achieved some results but these were not sufficient enough in the face of massive enemy repression. Fifth, we did not give serious thought to extend the area of struggle in the earlier period which had a serious effect on the maneuverability of our forces as our areas had shrunk, particularly in AP. Most important of all, our intensification of war did not fetch the

desired results as the active participation of the masses had reduced gradually over the years. Although we have a wide mass support we had failed to bring the masses into our organizational fold. We had been planning time and again regarding the involvement of the masses but the increased enemy repression is making it difficult for us to involve them at a scale corresponding to the enemy attack. Moreover, we did not have proper plan to counter the enemy's multi-pronged strategy i.e., reforms, incentives, psy-war, and various other means besides brutal repression. Overall, lack of consolidated mass base had a serious effect on the scale and quality of our resistance. As a result it became a war between our PLGA and the enemy forces. The CC, PB, CRB and the leadership in charge of the three zones of AP are mainly responsible for the failure in not taking appropriate tactics and preventing the losses. Today we can conclude that the situation in AP as a whole has received temporary setback. It is only by overcoming the above-mentioned shortcomings, building a consolidated mass base, and enhancing the active participation of the masses in the people's war through a systematic plan of work, painstaking effort and creative methods of work in the midst of heavy repression that we can regain initiative in AP. Tactics should be adopted in the three zones of AP in accordance with the specific conditions in each zone.

**In DK**, we achieved a breakthrough in building organs of people's revolutionary power and establishing GBs, actively involving the masses in the war, building militia in large number, and successfully carrying out several tactical counteroffensives. Today our revolutionary war is facing the counter-revolutionary war and coordinated attack by the combined forces of the state administrative machinery, salwa judum, various political parties and police forces on our movement. As the enemy's attempts to create a network of informers had failed, he has hit upon the strategy of destroying entire villages, following a policy of "*kill all, burn all, loot all*" by using the terrorist organisation of salwa judum to attack the people, and to use helicopters to quickly ferry the police forces to interior areas. The chief form of the enemy offensive since June 2005 has been through the so-called salwa judum campaign that is aimed at clearing up entire villages and herding the people into concentration camps in the name of providing relief i.e., a policy of draining out water to kill the fish. Enemy has succeeded

in pitting a section of adivasis against our movement and creating a wedge between Koya and Muria tribes. Thousands of local adivasis were forced to become SPOs and are pitted against our movement. Accompanied by the police and para-military forces, these gangsters enforce the cruelest methods of killing and torturing people in our strong-hold villages and force them to join their counter-revolutionary campaign against us. Carpet security system was formed with police-paramilitary camps in close proximity with the aim of destroying our party, PLGA and other revolutionary forces. Pucca roads are being built, communication network is developed at a rapid pace, and enemy fortifications are strengthened. Local adivasis are subjected to extreme economic distress and tremendous pressure due to the forcible closure of the weekly *haats*. After starting the *salwa judum* campaign, a vast informer network is built along with the system of SPOs. We lost over 250 people in this mopping up operation unleashed by the central and state government of Chattisgarh along with the private armed gangs.

There are shortcomings in controlling the reactionary forces and the enemy forces. We could not assess the situation in time and take prompt actions on the informers and reactionary elements who had fled from the villages and are organising the adivasis against us. Due to our neglect of work in road-side villages we could not exercise control over the *salwa judum* gangs. Initially, we could not assess the depth of the enemy's plan when he began the *salwa judum* campaign. Another major weakness of our movement is our insignificant presence among the various sections of people and weak base in urban areas.

In **BJ** according to the decision of the newly formed CPI (Maoist) the Bihar Jarkhand Bengal Special area committee of the erstwhile MCCI and the Bihar Jharkhand Joint state committee of erstwhile PW were merged to form the BJ SAC. After the formation of the BJ SAC the merger process in lower levels was completed in a period of one and half years. Though there are still some problems in the unification, we can say that the oneness we have achieved in such a short period of time is quite significant. This is an important achievement for BJ SAC because this was the area where the bloodiest conflict, which was identified as a black chapter in the history of the Indian revolution, took place between the two erstwhile parties.

80% of area under the BJ SAC has been identified as guerrilla zone. To implement the planning of the central committee, the BJ SAC selected some places to build guerrilla bases within the guerrilla zone as a transitional process to achieve the immediate aim of building base areas. In order to face the enemy's onslaught several counter offensive programmes have been taken and historical actions like the raids on the Giridih armoury and the Jehanabad jail break operation were also taken up.

In BJ, enemy had intensified his offensive by improving his intelligence mechanism, developing informer network, resorting to large-scale arrests, banning our revolutionary mass organisations, and carrying out combing operations in a big way and in coordination with the neighbouring states. Fortifications of the stations has taken place to some extent. Fake encounters of arrested comrades are increasing and are becoming a general feature. Transporting of police forces in vehicles has drastically reduced and our counter-tactics have to deal with enemy moving on foot. Another important tactics employed by the enemy in BJ is organising private lumpen gangs and attacking our forces in the name of *sendra*. In several villages gram suraksha samitis were formed by the police to counter our movement. Serious efforts are being made by the reactionary classes to pit one section of the people against another. Almost the entire police force is engaged in suppressing us, several battalions of CRPF are deployed and the army too is kept in standby to enter whenever needed. Helipads are kept ready for using helicopters against us. Conducting Long Range Patrolling (LRP), concentrating on our strategic points and strong holds, making drastic changes in the departments of the state machinery and such other measures are initiated as a part of enemy's country-wide strategic plan.

With the planning and active assistance of the state, the degenerate, corrupt and renegade elements had organised themselves into the Third Conference Preparatory Committee (TPC) who are openly acting as agents of the police and are also resorting to physical attacks and murder on us occasionally. In order to overcome this problem we have also prepared a political and military plan basing on class line and mass line and are proceeding in this direction.

Consolidation of our forces, i.e., the mass organisations, militia etc at

the village level is weak. The quality of our leadership in the Party, PLGA and mass organisations has to be developed further through education, training and allotting independent responsibilities. There is also an urgent need for undertaking rectification campaign to get rid of non-proletarian trends in the Party. In the second meeting of BJSAC itself we had identified the strong presence of non-proletarian trends and attitudes. In order to conduct the rectification campaign we had also identified the various alien and degenerate values but could not take up this rectification campaign in a proper way. By overcoming these shortcomings we can certainly intensify as well as spread the war to vast areas in BJ. We had selected areas for developing guerrilla bases with the aim of establishing base areas and even identified them according to priority. In this context, we had also made some organisational changes. If we take up the correct perspective, concrete plan and programme we can achieve success in forming RPCs in the proposed areas speedily. We had also declared the aim of going for higher military formation within the first half of 2007. But due to the engagement in completing the long process of merger of the lower level party organization and organizing classes on basic documents we were unable to give appropriate attention to achieve this task. We also failed to take special drive to develop the organizations to a higher level and intensify in the proposed GB areas. All of these should be considered as the main weaknesses of the BJ SAC area.

We have to keep in mind the immense potentialities in BJ and evolve a systematic plan to utilise these to achieve a qualitative leap in the ongoing people's war.

In **Chattisgarh** after the formation of CPI(Maoist), the merger process in Chattisgarh had been completed. State Organising Committee (SC), Chattisgarh was formed. In the process of completing the organizational tasks, repression campaign by the state has started in a big way. We did many TCOCs against this state repression. Some Raids on police camps, ambushes were successfully conducted. But many actions failed also. Overall, we could not succeed in stopping the enemy's offensive. Meanwhile on behalf of women's organization, centering on March 8<sup>th</sup>, there were small but several programmes were held.

In the enemy's continuous offensive, many comrades became martyrs. Bheem (Pran) and Sravan from SC; Avadesh and Shyam Bihari from Zonal committee, Sagar, Naarayan from sub-zonal committee and several commanders and PLGA comrades became martyrs. CC and SC comrades were arrested. The impact of this state repression was deep on the organisation. As a result, conference could not be held.

To develop the guerrilla warfare there are ample opportunities. We have to plan and give programmes accordingly to explore the potentialities.

**In West Bengal** after merger we took up the task of concentrating on the preparations of Guerrilla zone in BJO and completed it. The state conference held in August 2006 passed a resolution that in spite of some weaknesses BJO has become a guerrilla zone. Mass struggles and mass resistance has grown in the three districts of West Bengal and two bordering districts of Jharkhand in the past two years. In the midst of massive state repression people began to be mobilized into various struggles under the leadership of our Party. As a part of this, *bandh* has become a form of struggle. Of special mention is the mass resistance in November-December against the police atrocities in Belpahari area. In Nadia, Murshidabad, Hooghly and other districts too people are being mobilized into mass struggles in the midst of continuous repression. With the perspective of developing guerrilla zones in the plain areas, on the one hand we have to intensify the armed struggle, while on the other hand, we have to concentrate on extending the areas of armed struggle according to a concrete plan. Our mass organizations participated actively in the struggle against land acquisition from the peasants and giving away to Tata Motors in Singur. West Bengal is stepping ahead in the direction of strengthening the Party-Army through development of mass struggles and mass resistance.

**In Maharashtra** after the formation of CPI(Maoist) new forces are being attracted to the party. Efforts are being made to consolidate and in this process work has developed in new centers. In Uttar Gadchiroli-gondia Division mass struggles, military resistance and recruitment has increased. But weaknesses in developing people's militia, in developing broad mass movements, and strengthening of leadership forces is becoming a hurdle. At the same time the police forces of the three states of Maharashtra,

Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh are jointly conducting an all round offensive against our forces. They are killing people. But mass resistance of the people is also taking place.

In the cities the work is mainly amongst the working class. Apart from this we have managed to make a breakthrough among students. Along with this development there are joint front struggles and activities. In this manner we took up exposure of pro-imperialist policies, exposure of Hindu fascism and caste oppression through united fronts. Attempts are being made to develop work in the cultural front and women's front. There is weakness in building wide mass movements, enhancing militancy and in strengthening the party committees. There is also weakness in integrating the Uttar Gadchiroli- Gondia movement and the movement in the urban areas.

Overcoming the above weaknesses mentioned the main task in the coming period is to intensify the guerilla war and expand it with a Vidarbha Perspective. Along with this we have to develop the working class movement and wide mass struggles and developing party leadership to achieve the above tasks.

**In 3U**, before the merger, the CC of MCCI constituted a SAC in 3 Northern Indian states of UP, Utter bihar and Uttarkhand bordering Nepal. The area was north of the river Ganga. After the merger this committee was reconstituted and zonal, sub-zonal and other committees were also reconstituted. The historical multi-raids of Madhuban on Jun 23, 2005 is an important event under leadership of of the newly formed CPI(Maoist). It generated the consciounsess of spreading people's war in the whole of northern India and terrorised the ruling classes. We lost six of our PLGA comrades, including leadership comrades from zone and sub-zonal level. After that blowing the '*rang mahal*' of the brother of the extreme reactionary central minister Ram Vilas Paswan with dynamite; seizing of Jandaha bank (though it failed) were imporatant political and military actions. All these activities have led to a very favourable situation for developing agrarian revolutionary war in the stranglehold of feudalism of north Bihar.

In continuous encirclement and repression campaign by enemy com

Ravi became martyred and many men and women comrades were arrested and we faced serious organisation losses. Still we were successful in organising zonal/regional committees and SAC through the process of conferences. In spite of the existence of Party members in big number we could not properly take up the task of organisational consolidation. Hence, it has become an immediate task before the Party to strengthen and consolidate our cells, area committees and sub-zonal committees; give organisational form to people's militia forces, educate, train and arm them; increase the number and quality of LGSs, build platoons, develop various types of mass organisations (including KKC) at various levels and develop land struggles and mass struggles on a vast scale on the burning problems of North Bihar such as, flood, famine, water-logging etc. It has also become our immediate task to extend the armed agrarian revolutionary struggle and revolutionary movement on various issues throughout the zone under SAC. We are confronted with the main task of developing agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war to a higher level and, based on strong mass base and concrete work in the selected GB area, achieve our aim. Along with this, achieving financial self-sufficiency is also an important task.

**Haryana** is a small North Indian state with a predominant agrarian society. After the merger some good developments have taken place. At present there is a 35% recruitment from dalits, 21.4% from backward castes and 29% women comrades. Out of total PRs 20% are women. In the leadership also a significant number are from the dalits. More clarity has been achieved regarding forms of struggle and forms of organisation in Haryana and we began to implement these. We also have more clarity today regarding land-class struggle. On some occasions we have gone into armed conflict with the reactionary feudal forces, so we have received the initial experience of armed struggle in the areas of so-called green revolution. Party cadres have become more serious towards underground functioning.

In some comrades the trend of legalism has become a hurdle in the process of this transformation. Another trend which confused many comrades was out-of-form discussion.

Because of change in our tactics the enemy has also become alert. They are building nine battalions of IRB to counter Maoist danger. A special



intelligence has been constituted. In 2005 many were arrested, fake cases were imposed. Today Haryana is passing through a transitional period. Because of above developments, legal openactivities are being replaced with illegal, UG activities. It has put forward new challenges. Some of the comrades who could not adapt themselves according to the new situation, became inactive. This process is still going on. But new recruitment is going on. In the last two years concrete plans has made to develop organisation in 100 villages.

Tasks of 2006 Conference: 1) By bulding more LOS convert the present area into a contiguous area and develop class struggle based on the agrarain programme & 2) more preperation for GZ building in the perspective area.

In **Orissa** after merger the State Organising Committee (SOC) was formed. It was decided to develop two areas as gzs. There has been some progress in this direction. In this period, in the course of struggle, nine comrades have sacrificed their lives, including two zonal committee members. Thus it was not possible to achieve the aims in the time set. Yet, work has expanded in Kalinganagar and a few more towns. Took mass programme against Salwa Judu and arresting of comrades. Also had mass movments on the issue of displacment and other issues.

In **Punjab** the merger process has been completed and the state committee formed. Under the state committee there are .... zonal committees and some area committees are functioning. On the other hand some forces have been sent to the perspective area. Work is going on in the peasantry, agricultural labourers, students, women and working class. Some militant mass struggles are going on in the rural area. Considering the history of Punjab there is a bright possibility of revolutionary movements and armed struggle in Punjab along with the neighbouring states.

In **Assam**, the repressive machinery is highly developed and on constant alert due to the nationality movement led by ULFA and the general sensitive situation in North East. Here it is very important that we work under greatest secrecy from the very beginning and concentrate on strengthening and consolidating the Party organisations, and developing mass resistance struggles centred around various mass issues, along with building people's militia and regular squads. It is also very much necessary to undertake

large-scale political mobilisation of the masses on the issues related to the nationality besides other issues. We have been trying to build mass base and mobilise the masses on issues. We expanded our work from purely tribal masses to non-tribal masses also in the last two years.

**Our Tasks:** consolidate party committees at various levels; integrate with the people and organise them in various forms; take initiative to launch mass movement and strive to forge broad-based UF on the burning issues of people in the state; organise solidarity movement in support of the struggle for self-determination; initiate struggle against state repression; develop forums against communalisation and ethnic strife; build up mass movement on land rights and forest rights; build up organisation within the tea garden workers and oil refineries.

In **Kerala** the first conference of Keralam was completed in August. SOC was elected in the conference. The conference reviewed the problems of the movement and alien class trends in the Party. The conference called for rectification campaign from SOC to the cell level. A serious review had taken place in the first SOC meeting which identified the problems before the Party to advance the movement. It was also decided to conduct ideological-political education in all levels.

At present we have work in 9 districts out of 14 districts in Keralam. We are carrying on work among adivasis, students, youth, working class, Dalits, cultural front etc.

## **Main weaknesses**

As the conference and first SOC correctly reviewed that political education and consolidation is the main problem right from SOC to MOs. Due to the strong influence of the revisionist parties on the masses and the legalist style of work of all ML groups for over three decades, the development of PRs is a serious challenge before the Party. The Party is facing serious shortcoming in developing a leadership team having consistency and initiative.

### **Tasks:**

- 1) Conduct rectification campaign right from the SOC;
- 2) Consolidate SOC, Organizers, ACs up to cell level;

- 3) Build mass movement, conduct militant mass struggle to create favourable political situation, build various types of mass organizations;
- 4) Develop proper method of secret functioning
- 5) Conduct social investigation

**Karnataka:** As per the decision of last Congress of erstwhile PW, we started work in perspective area of Karnataka. After starting work there the right opportunist politics came forward and caused a lot of obstacle to the newly taken tasks and the development of the movement ultimately leading to the desertion by a section of the leadership and some of the cadres supporting the Right opportunist politics.

The movement in the strategic area is still weak. Our mass base is also not very strong. There is serious shortcoming from the SC in concentrating on the area and consolidation. Although masses are organized in some struggles against the landlords and the forest department there is need to develop into a peaceful movement. In urban areas it was already facing the problem of functioning, lack of consolidation, not orienting towards class struggle. Now, with a considerable section is joined with the splitters it has weakened further. Hence, the Party is facing a serious challenge to rebuild the urban movement.

State conference took the task of advancing armed struggle in perspective area towards building guerilla zone with the perspective of building base area. For fulfilling this, conference took the tasks of building party, militia, PLGA, mass organization in Perspective Area. Party, mass organizations, cover organizations, joint fronts in urban areas. It took the tasks of building urban movement complementary to the rural movement.

After the birth of CPI (Maoist) five comrades were martyred including State Secretary.

In TN the movement could not achieve a qualitative breakthrough, fell into stagnation by the time of fifth State Conference held in 2000. After the 9<sup>th</sup> Congress it was decided to carry out rectification campaign and develop the class struggle and armed struggle. But, even as the rectification campaign was in the final phase, the party suffered a huge loss due to the serious mistakes committed in the holding the military training camp in 2002 November.

After the loss, a new tactics was adopted under the guidance of SWRB. It was decided to temporarily withdraw the rural work, and to concentrate in urban areas to develop our subjective forces and restart the rural work. The tactics and efforts to implement them have resulted in the revival. Fresh recruitments and advancement in few fronts have improved our position.

For the past one and half years, the preparatory work to restart the class struggle and armed struggle is progressing in the strategic area. The plan for political, military and organizational preparation is being implemented in the strategic area.

Apart from the wrong trends identified in the 9th Congress of PW, the main reasons for the stagnation and not achieving a break-through were: the lack of collective thinking and collective functioning in SC and not developing into a leading body; the wrong style of work (not giving close guidance, and spontaneity) and of course the low political level throughout the party.

The 6th State Conference held in July 2006, has put forward following tasks in order to achieve a break through in Tamil Nadu:

- developing class struggle and guerilla war with the immediate aim of developing guerilla zone
- to form a political front with party's initiative and to establish it among the people
- to establish our work among working class as identified in urban plan
- to carry out rectification and particularly develop the political and ideological level of the party.

## **VII. Conclusion**

The protracted people's war in our country which began with the outbreak of Naxalbari uprising with armed agrarian revolution as its essence, has proved incontrovertibly the correctness of the Maoist political-military strategy and tactics pursued by our Party over the past three decades. These were further enriched in the course of the armed revolutionary war in this long period.

By implementing the line of protracted people's war we could build several guerrilla zones with the perspective of building base areas. People's army came into existence in the form of PLGA. In some pockets in the countryside we could establish organs of people's revolutionary power. We achieved several tactical victories by confronting the enemy who is several times stronger. This has helped us to take our guerrilla war to the higher phase of mobile war.

In the past two years our unified Party had continued the revolutionary legacy of the two erstwhile parties, implemented the Party line of concentrating on the strategic areas, building red resistance areas, guerrilla zones and establishing GBs with the perspective of establishing base areas. We tried to intensify the ongoing people's war with a firm determination to transform the guerrilla war into mobile war, PLGA into PLA, and guerrilla zones into base areas. We achieved some victories while suffering heavy losses. Although we suffered serious losses there is a great potential to develop the guerrilla war to higher level. We have to derive inspiration from the achievements, take lessons from the failures and draw concrete tasks in accordance with the objective situation and our subjective strength.

Today, in the backdrop of the excellent international and domestic situation, and the positive impact of the victories in our people's war in the past two years along with the long history of the armed agrarian revolutionary war led by us since the outbreak of Naxalbari, there is great potential to achieve a qualitative leap in the revolutionary war. We have to concentrate on the task of mobilising all the forces against imperialism, CBB and feudalism in order to build the four-class alliance by advancing the people's war. We have to concentrate on the recruitment of countless youth from the basic classes and strive to transform the PLGA into PLA. We have to defeat the enemy's continuous offensive, mopping up operations, encirclement-suppression campaigns and various counter-revolutionary campaigns by creatively applying the tactics and carrying out tactical counteroffensive operations against the enemy forces. We must transform the guerrilla zones into base areas in the strategic regions by developing the guerrilla war into mobile war and establishing the organs of people's revolutionary power; we must develop new guerrilla zones and red resistance areas and spread guerrilla war throughout the countryside. Through this

we must create a high tide of revolution. While carrying out the immediate tasks we must show strategic firmness and tactical flexibility. We must strive to transform the unfavourable factors into favourable ones through conscious effort of the leadership. We must develop our tactics by taking the enemy as a real tiger tactically and as a paper tiger strategically. Thus we must strive to build and strengthen the three magic weapons—the Party, army and the revolutionary UF—throughout the country.

Today imperialism is facing unprecedented crisis since the time of the Second World War. All the fundamental contradictions in the world are getting further sharpened. People's movements, national liberation struggles and revolutionary movements are breaking out against the exploitation, oppression and loot by the imperialists and the reactionary ruling classes. Let us utilise this favourable situation to achieve a great leap in the ongoing people's war in the country thereby further advancing the Indian revolution towards the establishment of a new democratic society and to achieve socialism and communism.

## **VIII. Immediate Tasks Before the Party**

### ***The Principal & Central Task before the Party:***

*While strengthening the three weapons of our revolution the principal and central task must be to advance the guerrilla war to a qualitatively higher stage of mobile war and transform the PLGA into PLA in order to establish base areas in the strategic areas. Also intensify the guerrilla war in other guerrilla zones, and develop red resistance areas in the perspective areas and complete the preparations for building guerrilla zones in these and other areas also. To orient the entire party PLGA and masses towards this principle and central task. To achieve this we must formulate the following political, military and UF tasks:*

#### ***Political Tasks:***

- 1) Smash the countrywide multi-pronged fascist armed offensive of the central and state governments led by the Joint Task Force and JOC; concentrate on seriously studying enemy's counter-revolutionary LIC strategy and evolve appropriate*

*tactics and measures to counter it; fight back the counter-revolutionary attack by central and state forces and state-sponsored salwa judum, sendra, cobras, and other private mercenary armed gangs by firmly relying on class line and mass line and effectively mobilising the PLGA forces and the masses.! Carry out tactical counteroffensive campaigns to annihilate the enemy forces bit by bit throughout the guerrilla zones and other zones of armed struggle;*

- 2) *Intensify the guerrilla war in AOB and mobilise all forces to defeat the enemy's cruel offensive and to regain the initiative in war! Consolidate our Party, strengthen the PLGA, Expand our organs of political power; build broad-based mass fronts and increase our overall subjective strength and expand our area of armed struggle to help transform the guerrilla zone into base area;*
- 3) *Concentrate on surviving and reviving the movement in AP and NT. Pay attention to preserve our forces in the ongoing all-round brutal enemy offensive while resisting the enemy in a planned way to the extent possible. Reestablish the relations with the masses and concentrate on political mobilisation and consolidation and increase our subjective forces. Adopt strictly secret methods of organisation throughout the zones;*
- 4) *Accumulate the subjective forces in BJO while carrying out attacks on the class enemies and reactionary classes and developing the guerrilla war to the possible extent;*
- 5) *Develop the agrarian revolutionary war in 3U, North Chattisgarh and Orissa. Concentrate on building a strong mass base, consolidate the organisation while continuing the attacks on the class enemies and the state. Complete preparations for developing guerrilla zones;*
- 6) *Concentrate our forces in the other states and perspective areas, arm them, and intensify the armed agrarian revolutionary struggles and complete the preparations with the aim of*

*building guerrilla zones. Build up strong anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, anti-comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie struggles;*

- 7) Link up the strategic areas between the main zones of guerrilla war as a special strategic task with a time-bond programme;*
- 8) Have a direction to expand the guerrilla war to newer states and areas with proper balance between consolidation and expansion;*
- 9) Develop, deepen and widen the mass base;*
- 10) Impart ideological, political education throughout the entire Party. Intensify the struggle to rectify the non-proletarian trends in the Party at all levels;*
- 11) Step up wide revolutionary political propaganda campaign to counter enemy's vicious propaganda and disinformation campaign.*

#### ***Military Tasks:***

- 1) Study Maoist principles of ppw along with the experiences of other revolutionary and nationality struggles and apply it creatively in the concrete conditions;*
- 2) To develop guerrilla war into mobile warfare and PLGA into PLA in every GZ establish and consolidate commissions and commands;*
- 3) To defeat the enemy offensive develop our forces on a war footing and develop our striking capacity;*
- 4) In order to transform the PLGA into the PLA, we have to establish auxillary departments like intelligence, supply, communication, training, production, etc.;*
- 5) With the aim of forming higher formations in DK and BJ, develop companies on a wide scale as the primary unit of the PLA;*
- 6) Build up militias on a wide scale and arm and train them.*



### ***UF Tasks:***

- 1) *Strengthen the strategic and tactical UFs.*
- 2) *While advancing the peoples war in the main zones develop the UF in the form of the four class alliance and establish and strengthen RPCs from the local to the zone level.*
- 3) *Develop the widest possible UF against displacement and the associated imperialist model of development.*
- 4) *Unite with all forces who oppose the imperialist-dictated policies of globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation pursued by the traitorous ruling class parties in the centre and the state governments.*
- 5) *Coordinate the ppw with the ongoing armed struggles of the various nationalities in Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and other parts of the North East*
- 6) *Build a broad front of minorities, particularly Muslims against Hindu fascism.*
- 7) *Organise dalits against all forms of caste oppression.*
- 8) *Mobilise women on a big scale against all forms of patriarchy and feudal/imperialist oppression.*
- 9) *Mobilise the masses into militant struggles against the fascist repression unleashed by the Indian ruling classes in all fields and wage resolute struggles against all draconian laws.*

### ***Organisational Tasks:***

- 1) *Bolshevisise the Party ideologically, politically and organisationally; build up the unity of thought and action, and with iron discipline act as one voice.*
- 2) *Make the Party committees self-reliant, with initiative and capable to lead successfully the movement in their areas.*
- 3) *Build a strong underground party with a stable nucleus of PRs and an extensive network of part time units. Build a secret apparatus which is impregnable to enemy attacks. Bolshevisise*

*the party by purging it of all alien trends. Concentrate on a recruitment drive to increase the party membership and the PRs to enhance the Party's strength. Give special emphasis on recruiting party cadres from the basic classes and promoting them from the working class, poor and landless peasants and from the special social groups like adivasis, women, Muslims and dalits.*

- 4) *Within the framework of democratic centralism all committees must initiate political and military tactics in a creative and lively way not merely depending on instructions of the higher committees but using their own initiative.*

**Urban Tasks:**

- 1) *To get specialisation in urban work depute our forces and leadership in a planned way with a time-bound programme.*
- 2) *Build up a strong Develop the class struggles in the urban area by concentrating mainly on the working class. Develop the secret network in the urban areas and build a powerful movement of workers; specifically in the core sector.*
- 3) *Build a vast student and youth movement which will act as a big recruiting ground for the party.*
- 4) *Build up a strong urban revolutionary movement oriented towards people's war.*

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