


A F R I C A N - E U R O P E A N
I N S T I T U T E

Account from Angola

UNITA as described by ex-participants
and foreign visitors



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UNITA as described by ex-participants and foreign visitors

William Minter, Ph.D.

LUCIO LARA

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Civilian population disappearing goods for UNITA. Photo: Arnold Karskens (III)

The author

The author is a writer on southern Africa. His most recent books are *King Solomon's Mines Revisited* (1986) and *Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier* (1988). He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Wisconsin (Madison) and is fluent in Portuguese. He is currently associated with the African Studies Program, Georgetown University, as a visiting researcher. He is also a contributing editor for Africa News Service and an associate director of the Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund.

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
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Photo front cover


Civilian population transporting goods for UNITA. *Photo Arnold Karskens / HH*

Angola

- +—+— Main railways
- - - - International boundaries
- Internal boundaries



Only those towns mentioned in the text are shown



Notes from a working visit to Angola

The AWEPEAA delegation that in September 1989 paid a working visit to Angola, at the invitation of the Speaker of Parliament, was given an extremely interesting opportunity by their hosts to fulfill their mission. Also on behalf of my colleagues, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Sr Lucio Lara and his staff.

I would like to present the following reflections.

The Angolan authorities and the various institutions and persons whom we met, showed a heart felt desire for peace.

Restoration of peace is an absolute condition for the reconstruction and development of this country. AWEPEAA sincerely hopes that peace will be given a genuine chance as soon as possible, and is prepared, if that were desirable, to actively cooperate in this field.

Parliamentary institutions at national and provincial level are becoming real policy instruments. All opportunities were used to arrange encounters between our delegation and Angolan parliamentarians.

A clear evolution in economic policy is apparent. A change is being made from an orthodox approach to a more flexible, pragmatic and less centralised policy. Good examples underlining this policy shift are the new laws concerning foreign investment, a mixed economy and private property.

The Angolan authorities wish to have a good cooperation with Europe. I propose that we, parliamentarians, urge our colleagues and our governments to seize this opportunity in a constructive way.

In the interest of the SADCC states and Europe this cooperation is of the utmost importance for the future.

Luc Dhoore, Vice-President AWEPEAA

From: Report of AWEPEAA mission to Angola, Sept. 1989.

Cost of destabilization to Angola

Angola

The war against the Angolan people and economy has been devastating. South African forces intervened openly and massively, alongside its proxy force — UNITA — that was also supplied by the US.

Sabotage of key transport routes, such as the Benguela railway, and rural terrorism have disrupted government services, displaced over 1.5 million people, and made refugees of 500,000 more. With its large number of limbless people (40,000) Angola has the highest proportion in the world. The war was directly or indirectly responsible for nearly 500,000 deaths in 1980–88. Up to 75 per cent of small town and rural water systems have been destroyed or damaged, depriving perhaps 1.5 million people of good water. Between 15 and 25 per cent of primary health and education units have been destroyed, affecting more than 2 million people.

Defence spending has cost Angola at least \$8.5 billion over the 1980–88 period. Following a fall in oil prices, the defence bill rose to well over 40 per cent of government spending, crippling the budget and devastating import availability for all other sectors.

The export loss on global trade for 1980–88 was roughly \$3.5 billion, while the loss of potential regional exports cost another \$250 million. Angola also lost between \$600 million and \$750 million in transit traffic revenue over 1980–88.

Rural terrorism resulted in cases of starvation, and a grain equivalent overall food deficit of about 750,000 tonnes in 1988. The implied loss of rural production amounted to \$1 billion for 1980–88.

Some data on human and material costs for Angola

War-related loss of life

Children	330,000
All deaths	500,000

Material costs

Loss of GDP, 1988 (90% of actual GDP)	4.5 billion\$
Loss of GDP, 80–88 (in 1988 prices)	30 billion\$

Source: *South African destabilization — the economic cost of Frontline resistance to apartheid.* United Nations, Oct.1989.

Abstract

This report, based on recent interviews with ex-participants in UNITA and a compilation of other first-hand reports from visitors to UNITA areas, describes the operations of this insurgent group inside Angola, and analyzes the data on its cooperation with South Africa and alleged human rights abuses.

During a six-week research trip to Angola in September and October 1989, the author carried out the interviews individually, out of hearing and sight of officials. Eleven interviewees had deserted from UNITA, while five had been captured. Only one, a recent captive, was currently imprisoned. Of the 16 interviews, ten were in Huambo, four in Luanda and two in Lubango.

The interviews averaged over an hour. All but one were in Portuguese. The respondents clearly distinguished their own direct observations, what they had heard from other UNITA combatants, and questions that they lacked information to answer.

The average age of the respondents at the time of the interviews was 30, and the average level of education between 3 and 4 years. Fourteen came from Umbundu-speaking families, one was of Ganguela origin and one of Cuanhama origin.

As a supplement to and check on the interviews the author also collected as many first-hand accounts as possible by foreign journalists and hostages who had spent time with UNITA. In using these reports, in Portuguese, English, French and German, the author sought clearly to distinguish between first-hand observation and what the visitors were told by UNITA leaders.

Several previously unpublished observations emerged from this evidence, which also provided data to evaluate disputed issues. Among the results:

(1) UNITA recruits, judging both from the interviewees' own experiences and their observations about others, fell into two generations. A wave of voluntary recruits joined the organization in 1974-1976, during the period from the Portuguese coup until the expulsion of South African troops. This group, probably the majority among UNITA's officer corps, was in large part motivated by ethno-regional loyalty to UNITA.

By 1979-1980, however, the majority of UNITA soldiers were recruited by force, either by conscription in areas controlled by UNITA or by abduction of youth during attacks on government areas.

(2) In addition to the overt South African troop interventions cited in news reports, the interviewees described a consistent pattern of South African involvement in logistics and training. After P.W. Botha became South Africa's prime minister in late 1978, this connection took a quantitative and qualitative leap, with the founding of the UNITA headquarters at Jamba and establishment of a mechanized logistics system over the Namibian border. From that time, UNITA troop training was consistently carried out by mixed teams of South African and Angolan officers.

(3) Particularly in the 1980s, UNITA adopted forcible measures toward the civilian population, including abducting villagers, targeting agricultural production and transport in government areas, and taking foreign workers as hostages. UNITA also made political appeals to the rural population, however, and made an effort to provide health and educational services, with some success at least in the Jamba headquarters area.

- (4) The interviews provided first-hand data confirming at least some of the killings of rivals and suspected "witches" alleged in reports by UNITA exiles and Amnesty International. These included the killings of UNITA leaders Jorge Sangumba and Valdemar Chindondo in 1982, and the public burning at Jamba in 1983 of a number of people accused of witchcraft.

Extrato

Este relatório, baseado em entrevistas recentes com ex-participantes da UNITA e na compilação de outros relatórios de observação directa de visitantes a zonas de UNITA, descreve as operações do grupo insurgente dentro de Angola, e analisa os dados sobre a sua cooperação com a África do Sul e abusos alegados de direitos humanos.

Durante uma viagem de pesquisa de seis semanas em Angola em setembro e outubro de 1989, o autor levou a cabo entrevistas individuais, fora da audiência e da vista de oficiais. Onze entrevistados tinham desertado da UNITA e cinco foram capturados. Havia apenas um cativo recente que estava actualmente encarcerado. Dos 16 entrevistados, dez estavam em Huambo, quatro em Luanda e dois em Lubango.

Cada entrevista durou uma média de mais de uma hora. Todas menos uma foram realizadas em português. Os entrevistados distinguiam com clareza entre as suas observações directas, o que tinham ouvido de outros combatentes da UNITA, e as questões sobre as quais não tinham informação adequada para responder.

A idade média dos entrevistados no momento da entrevista era de 30 anos, e o nível médio de educação entre 3 e 4 anos. Catorze vinham de famílias de língua umbundu, um era de origem ganguela, e um de origem cuanhama.

Para suplementar e verificar as entrevistas o autor colecionou o maior número possível de relatos de observação directa de jornalistas estrangeiros e reféns que passaram tempo com a UNITA. Ao utilizar estes relatórios, em português, inglês, francês, e alemão, o autor procurou distinguir com clareza entre observação directa e informação que os visitantes receberam dos líderes da UNITA.

Desta evidência surgiram várias observações que não foram anteriormente publicadas, e também dados para avaliar assuntos em disputa. Os resultados incluem os seguintes:

(1) Recrutados da UNITA, julgando tanto das experiências próprias dos entrevistados como das suas observações sobre os outros, podem ser divididos em duas gerações. Um grupo de recrutados voluntários se juntaram à organização em 1974-1976, durante o período do golpe em Portugal até a expulsão das tropas sulafricanas. Este grupo, provavelmente a maioria entre o corpo de oficiais de UNITA, foi principalmente motivado por lealdade étnica e regional à UNITA.

Porém desde 1979-80 a maioria dos soldados da UNITA foram recrutados por força, ou pela conscrição em zonas controladas pela UNITA, ou pelo seqüestro de jovens durante os ataques nas zonas governamentais.

(2) Além das intervenções abertas de tropas sulafricanas citadas em reportagens, os entrevistados descreveram a consistência do envolvimento sulafricano em logística e treinamento. Depois de P.W. Botha se tornar Primeiro Ministro da África do Sul no final de 1978, esta ligação aumentou quantitativa e qualitativamente, com a criação da sede da UNITA em Jamba e o estabelecimento dum sistema de logística mecanizada através da fronteira namibiana. Desde essa altura, o treinamento das tropas de UNITA foi consistentemente levado a cabo por equipas mistas de oficiais sulafricanos e angolanos.

(3) Especialmente na década de oitenta, a UNITA adoptou métodos de força contra a população civil, como o seqüestro de aldees, e ações militares contra a produção agrícola e o

transporte nas zonas governamentais, e a captura de trabalhadores estrangeiros como reféns. Porém, a UNITA também fez apelos políticos à população rural, e emvidou esforços para fornecer serviços de saúde e educação, com algum sucesso, pelo menos na zona da sede em Jamba.

- (4) As entrevistas forneceram dados de primeira mão confirmando pelo menos alguns assassinatos de rivais e 'bruxas' alegados por exilados de UNITA e pela Amnistia Internacional. Estes incluíram os assassinatos dos líderes Jorge Sangumba e Valdemar Chindondo em 1982, e a incineração pública em Jamba em 1983 de várias pessoas acusadas de bruxaria.

Autor

O autor é escritor especializado em assuntos da África Austral. Os seus livros mais recentes são *King Solomon's Mines Revisited* (1986) e *Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier* (1988). É doutorado em sociologia pela Universidade de Wisconsin (Madison) e fala português fluentemente. Actualmente está associado ao African Studies Program, Universidade de Georgetown, como pesquisador visitante. Também é editor contribuinte do Africa News Service e director associado do Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund.

A pesquisa para este relatório foi subsidiada pela Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), com fundos adicionais da Ford Foundation e da Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (NOVIB).

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The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as described by ex-participants and foreign visitors

Research report submitted to:

The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA)

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African Studies Program
Georgetown University

Washington, DC
March, 1990



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 March, 1990

Red Cross Centre for civilians injured by landmines. Photo Ragnar Hansen

Introduction

There are probably few guerrilla movements in the world, let alone in Africa, which have received more favourable publicity in the Western world than the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and its leader Jonas Savimbi. Even before the Angolan decolonization conflict of 1974-1976, the *Washington Post* had published a four-part special series of articles by Leon Dash (December 23-26, 1973), and Fritz Sitte had presented Savimbi to German-speaking readers in a 300-page book (Sitte, 1972). French audiences had read and seen reports from journalist Dominique de Roux's 1973 visit with UNITA. The *Washington Post* later dedicated two seven-part series to UNITA, one by Dash in 1977, and another by editor Richard Harwood in 1981.

In the 1980s, Savimbi was by far the most photogenic and accessible of the Reagan-doctrine 'freedom fighters,' and the flow of reports from his Jamba headquarters was prodigious. By 1987 as many as one hundred journalists at a time could be taken to a press conference in Jamba (*Diário Popular*, Lisbon, November 14, 1987). A widely distributed biography by Fred Bridgland (1986) called Savimbi the "key to Africa," and French writers Yves Loiseau and Pierre-Guillaume de Roux (1987) published a book consisting of almost 250 pages of an extended interview with Savimbi.

Nevertheless, the amount of serious research and solid information about the movement is still limited. In early 1989 Bridgland published reports of internal human rights abuses which he had apparently

missed in earlier contacts with UNITA. A journalist reporting for the conservative *National Review* on three months travelling with UNITA charged that his hosts were "compulsive liars." And State Department officials, despite extensive U.S. contact with UNITA, professed to have inadequate information to confirm or deny the reports of abuses.

In fact, there is little independent data available to evaluate UNITA's operations in the Angolan countryside, or its internal functioning. The fact that the war has devastated much of the country is uncontested. And no one denies the existence of extensive South African military involvement throughout the 1980s at least, nor U.S. military aid since 1986. But the significance of this external support, as compared with UNITA's internal sources of strength, is widely disputed.

As part of a larger research project on insurgency in post-colonial Angola and Mozambique, funded by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), the Ford Foundation and the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (NOVIB), the author undertook a research trip to Angola in September and October 1989, with the objective of interviewing ex-participants in UNITA. As a supplement to and check on the information provided by these informants, the author also used several other interviews by independent journalists and human rights groups, and collected as many reports as possible by foreigners who had visited UNITA zones of control, whether as journalists or as hostages.

Although the amount of serious research and solid information about UNITA is limited, there are probably few guerrilla movements in the world, let alone in Africa, which have received more favourable publicity in the Western world.

Methodology

Anyone researching this topic faces numerous obstacles to finding the truth: contradictory reports, charges of disinformation and the small number of independent witnesses, even as compared with Mozambique or other cases of warfare in remote rural areas. Few researchers or journalists have travelled extensively in government-controlled areas of Angola. Of those who have travelled with UNITA, few are fluent in Portuguese, and even fewer have managed to deviate from the highly-programmed tours provided by UNITA guides.

In this context each researcher, or reader of a report, is inevitably dependent on their own judgements about credibility of different sources. In this report the author has tried to give primary weight to first-hand accounts, in the interviews with ex-participants and in written reports by foreigners who have visited UNITA areas. Second-hand statements, particularly those by UNITA representatives or Angolan government officials, are not used as sources concerning factual issues at dispute among the parties. (When referring to their own attitudes such statements are considered primary sources.) The greatest credibility applies to points confirmed by several distinct sources independently.

Insofar as possible, and while respecting the anonymity of interviews, the author has sought to identify sources of information in this report, so that readers can make their own judgements.

The interviewees included both amnestied ex-participants who had deserted UNITA and combatants who had been captured in battle. All, except for one combatant who

had been captured recently and a deserter who had just presented himself, were free at the time of the interview. (The other prisoners of war interviewed had completed prison terms and been released.) The author obtained approval for the interviews from top levels of the MPLA Workers Party and the Angolan government, along with explicit instructions to local officials that the author be allowed to interview the individuals privately. As far as the author is aware, this is the first systematic set of interviews to be carried out privately inside Angola, either in government- or UNITA-controlled areas.

Local officials aided in locating the interviewees, in accordance with criteria supplied by the author: those who had spent more time as UNITA soldiers, commanders if possible, able to converse in Portuguese. In a number of cases, the author asked for specific individuals by name, previously identified from the Angolan press or other sources. Some of these were able to be located and interviewed; others were geographically inaccessible, and one was in the hospital.

Each interview was carried out individually, out of hearing and sight of officials. All of the interviews were in Portuguese, except for one with a Cuanhama-Portuguese translator from the local radio station. Although a few interviewees spoke ungrammatical Portuguese, and required repetition of some questions, all were understandable.

The author started each interview by explaining that he was not working for the Angolan or any other government, that he was a North American writer trying to understand the war in Angola in order to explain it to people overseas, and that the names and raw notes from the interviews would not be made public.

The author did not ask general questions about political attitudes

In this analysis the author sought to gain a broad understanding of the pattern of UNITA operations over the years, rather than seeking simply the most recent details.

or human rights issues, in the belief that these would produce stereotypical and unreliable responses. Instead, he stressed his interest in the interviewee's personal experience, eliciting as detailed a biographical account as possible. Particular topics were explored with follow-up questions only when they came up in the course of the biography. The author did not use loaded language in referring to the government or to UNITA. He also made clear that he was not inquiring about their personal guilt or innocence, and that he would ask questions about what they heard and saw, not what they did. Most importantly, he explained that he understood that situations of war always led to much 'confusão,' in which it was difficult for anyone to know for sure just what had happened or why.

This statement, using the colloquial word 'confusão,' meaning in English something like 'a royal mess,' invariably produced affirmative responses. In the subsequent course of the interview, almost all spoke freely and fluently. Some were eager to tell their stories in great detail, but even the more taciturn — generally those with less education — gave substantive chronological accounts. One first asked several questions about how the material would be used, implying that either UNITA or the government might take revenge, but spoke freely after accepting the reassurance that his name would not be used. Most seemed to appreciate the opportunity to talk about their personal experiences.

As the author requested, the interviewees distinguished among their own direct observations, what they had heard from other UNITA combatants, and questions that they lacked information to answer. Their willingness to answer questions with "No," "I don't know," or "I heard about that, but didn't see it myself," gave some confidence that

the information they provided was genuine.

Interviews were carried out in the capital Luanda, in Huambo in the central plateau, and in Lubango in the south. This allowed access to informants with experience in the major zones of UNITA activity, from the central plateau to the south and east, but the northern zone adjacent to Zaire was not represented. Although some interviewees had spent time in the eastern province of Moxico, a more extensive set of interviews from the east was not possible, due to security and transport problems in arranging a visit to Luena.

The largest number of interviews, ten, was obtained in Huambo, the heart of UNITA's traditional ethnic base. Two interviews were carried out in Lubango, and four in Luanda.

The average length of the interviews was over an hour, with several running over two hours. The author did not use a tape recorder, but took extensive notes.

The total number of interviews was 16, fewer than hoped for but still the largest body of systematic interview data on the topic to date. In preparing this report, the author also made use of other primary sources to supplement and check the Angolan interview data. These include a 1988 interview he conducted in Mozambique with an Angolan who had served in South Africa's special forces, scattered interviews by Angolan and foreign journalists with UNITA or ex-UNITA soldiers, data from interviews with Angolan refugees in Zaire and Zambia cited in a 1989 report by Africa Watch, and interviews with UNITA dissidents in exile cited in press reports in 1988 and 1989. Most important in quantitative terms were the eyewitness accounts of foreign journalists and hostages who have spent time in

As far as the author is aware, this is the first systematic set of interviews to be carried out privately inside Angola, either in government- or UNITA-controlled areas.

UNITA control zones.

These latter eyewitness accounts have their own problems of credibility. Hostage accounts may be challenged on the basis of the so-called 'Stockholm syndrome,' in which captives acquire a psychological dependence on their captives. And most journalists' accounts include not only their own observations, but abundant portions of material given to them in interviews with Savimbi or his lieutenants. The researcher can, however, apply credibility criteria to this material similar to those used with the interviews. Greater credibility should be given to observations directly seen or heard by journalists, particularly those fluent in Portuguese or who spent substantial time with UNITA, over reports from a whirlwind tour and press conference in Jamba. Observations vouched for independently by several witnesses likewise gain in credibility.

In evaluating the different sources, the author also benefitted from discussions on this topic in 1988 and 1989 with many Angolans and others knowledgeable about Angola in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Portugal, Sweden, England, Cuba and the United States.

In this analysis the author sought to gain a broad understanding of the pattern of UNITA operations over the years, rather than seeking simply the most recent details. Current intelligence can only be evaluated in a responsible way on the basis of the background pattern over a number of years, particularly in the case of a war in which covert operations and disinformation play an important role.

There are many questions left unanswered by the author's research. Future researchers, with the benefit of hindsight, the fading of the passions of war, or access to documents from covert operations, will hopefully be able to answer some of

these. In this report the author has sought to distinguish clearly between conclusions of which he is confident and hypotheses which require future verification. A more extensive comparison of these results with those from Mozambique, and analysis of the insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique, is planned for a future publication.

Interviewees and other primary sources

The 16 interviewees were all male, with an average age of 30 at the time of the interview. The youngest was 16 and the oldest was 45 years old. Fourteen grew up in the central plateau section of Angola (two in Bié province, eight in Huambo province, and four in the northern fringe of Huíla province). The other two grew up in Huíla and Cunene provinces.

The primary home language for thirteen interviewees was Umbundu,* although two of these said their families also spoke Portuguese at home. Another said his mother spoke Umbundu,

but that he only knew how to speak Portuguese until after joining UNITA in the bush. The remaining two spoke Ganguela and Cuanhama respectively.

Eleven said their families were peasants, one that his father was a cattleherder, and one that his father owned a large farm. Two said their fathers were skilled workers, and one had not known his father, but had grown up with an uncle who was a shopkeeper.

(* Note: For simplicity the term Umbundu is used throughout this report, instead of following the Bantu grammatical variations. The term Ovimbundu is frequently used in other sources for the same group.)

Among the interviewees the earliest participation in UNITA dated to early 1974, and the latest entered in mid-1989. Five said they had joined voluntarily, the rest described being forcibly recruited.

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Methodology

Anyone researching this topic faces numerous obstacles to finding the truth: contradictory reports, charges of disinformation and the small number of independent witnesses, even as compared with Mozambique or other cases of warfare in remote rural areas. Few researchers or journalists have travelled extensively in government-controlled areas of Angola. Of those who have travelled with UNITA, few are fluent in Portuguese, and even fewer have managed to deviate from the highly-programmed tours provided by UNITA guides.

In this context each researcher, or reader of a report, is inevitably dependent on their own judgements about credibility of different sources. In this report the author has tried to give primary weight to first-hand accounts, in the interviews with ex-participants and in written reports by foreigners who have visited UNITA areas. Second-hand statements, particularly those by UNITA representatives or Angolan government officials, are not used as sources concerning factual issues at dispute among the parties. (When referring to their own attitudes such statements are considered primary sources.) The greatest credibility applies to points confirmed by several distinct sources independently.

Insofar as possible, and while respecting the anonymity of interviews, the author has sought to identify sources of information in this report, so that readers can make their own judgements.

The interviewees included both amnestied ex-participants who had deserted UNITA and combatants who had been captured in battle. All, except for one combatant who

had been captured recently and a deserter who had just presented himself, were free at the time of the interview. (The other prisoners of war interviewed had completed prison terms and been released.) The author obtained approval for the interviews from top levels of the MPLA Workers Party and the Angolan government, along with explicit instructions to local officials that the author be allowed to interview the individuals privately. As far as the author is aware, this is the first systematic set of interviews to be carried out privately inside Angola, either in government- or UNITA-controlled areas.

Local officials aided in locating the interviewees, in accordance with criteria supplied by the author: those who had spent more time as UNITA soldiers, commanders if possible, able to converse in Portuguese. In a number of cases, the author asked for specific individuals by name, previously identified from the Angolan press or other sources. Some of these were able to be located and interviewed; others were geographically inaccessible, and one was in the hospital.

Each interview was carried out individually, out of hearing and sight of officials. All of the interviews were in Portuguese, except for one with a Cuanhama-Portuguese translator from the local radio station. Although a few interviewees spoke ungrammatical Portuguese, and required repetition of some questions, all were understandable.

The author started each interview by explaining that he was not working for the Angolan or any other government, that he was a North American writer trying to understand the war in Angola in order to explain it to people overseas, and that the names and raw notes from the interviews would not be made public.

The author did not ask general questions about political attitudes

In this analysis the author sought to gain a broad understanding of the pattern of UNITA operations over the years, rather than seeking simply the most recent details.

or human rights issues, in the belief that these would produce stereotypical and unreliable responses. Instead, he stressed his interest in the interviewee's personal experience, eliciting as detailed a biographical account as possible. Particular topics were explored with follow-up questions only when they came up in the course of the biography. The author did not use loaded language in referring to the government or to UNITA. He also made clear that he was not inquiring about their personal guilt or innocence, and that he would ask questions about what they heard and saw, not what they did. Most importantly, he explained that he understood that situations of war always led to much 'confusão,' in which it was difficult for anyone to know for sure just what had happened or why.

This statement, using the colloquial word 'confusão,' meaning in English something like 'a royal mess,' invariably produced affirmative responses. In the subsequent course of the interview, almost all spoke freely and fluently. Some were eager to tell their stories in great detail, but even the more taciturn — generally those with less education — gave substantive chronological accounts. One first asked several questions about how the material would be used, implying that either UNITA or the government might take revenge, but spoke freely after accepting the reassurance that his name would not be used. Most seemed to appreciate the opportunity to talk about their personal experiences.

As the author requested, the interviewees distinguished among their own direct observations, what they had heard from other UNITA combatants, and questions that they lacked information to answer. Their willingness to answer questions with "No," "I don't know," or "I heard about that, but didn't see it myself," gave some confidence that

the information they provided was genuine.

Interviews were carried out in the capital Luanda, in Huambo in the central plateau, and in Lubango in the south. This allowed access to informants with experience in the major zones of UNITA activity, from the central plateau to the south and east, but the northern zone adjacent to Zaire was not represented. Although some interviewees had spent time in the eastern province of Moxico, a more extensive set of interviews from the east was not possible, due to security and transport problems in arranging a visit to Luena.

The largest number of interviews, ten, was obtained in Huambo, the heart of UNITA's traditional ethnic base. Two interviews were carried out in Lubango, and four in Luanda.

The average length of the interviews was over an hour, with several running over two hours. The author did not use a tape recorder, but took extensive notes.

The total number of interviews was 16, fewer than hoped for but still the largest body of systematic interview data on the topic to date. In preparing this report, the author also made use of other primary sources to supplement and check the Angolan interview data. These include a 1988 interview he conducted in Mozambique with an Angolan who had served in South Africa's special forces, scattered interviews by Angolan and foreign journalists with UNITA or ex-UNITA soldiers, data from interviews with Angolan refugees in Zaire and Zambia cited in a 1989 report by Africa Watch, and interviews with UNITA dissidents in exile cited in press reports in 1988 and 1989. Most important in quantitative terms were the eyewitness accounts of foreign journalists and hostages who have spent time in

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UNITA control zones.

These latter eyewitness accounts have their own problems of credibility. Hostage accounts may be challenged on the basis of the so-called 'Stockholm syndrome,' in which captives acquire a psychological dependence on their captives. And most journalists' accounts include not only their own observations, but abundant portions of material given to them in interviews with Savimbi or his lieutenants. The researcher can, however, apply credibility criteria to this material similar to those used with the interviews. Greater credibility should be given to observations directly seen or heard by journalists, particularly those fluent in Portuguese or who spent substantial time with UNITA, over reports from a whirlwind tour and press conference in Jamba. Observations vouched for independently by several witnesses likewise gain in credibility.

In evaluating the different sources, the author also benefitted from discussions on this topic in 1988 and 1989 with many Angolans and others knowledgeable about Angola in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Portugal, Sweden, England, Cuba and the United States.

In this analysis the author sought to gain a broad understanding of the pattern of UNITA operations over the years, rather than seeking simply the most recent details. Current intelligence can only be evaluated in a responsible way on the basis of the background pattern over a number of years, particularly in the case of a war in which covert operations and disinformation play an important role.

There are many questions left unanswered by the author's research. Future researchers, with the benefit of hindsight, the fading of the passions of war, or access to documents from covert operations, will hopefully be able to answer some of

these. In this report the author has sought to distinguish clearly between conclusions of which he is confident and hypotheses which require future verification. A more extensive comparison of these results with those from Mozambique, and analysis of the insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique, is planned for a future publication.

Interviewees and other primary sources

The 16 interviewees were all male, with an average age of 30 at the time of the interview. The youngest was 16 and the oldest was 45 years old. Fourteen grew up in the central plateau section of Angola (two in Bié province, eight in Huambo province, and four in the northern fringe of Huíla province). The other two grew up in Huíla and Cunene provinces.

The primary home language for thirteen interviewees was Umbundu,* although two of these said their families also spoke Portuguese at home. Another said his mother spoke Umbundu,

but that he only knew how to speak Portuguese until after joining UNITA in the bush. The remaining two spoke Ganguela and Cuanhama respectively.

Eleven said their families were peasants, one that his father was a cattleherder, and one that his father owned a large farm. Two said their fathers were skilled workers, and one had not known his father, but had grown up with an uncle who was a shopkeeper.

(* Note: For simplicity the term Umbundu is used throughout this report, instead of following the Bantu grammatical variations. The term Ovimbundu is frequently used in other sources for the same group.)

Among the interviewees the earliest participation in UNITA dated to early 1974, and the latest entered in mid-1989. Five said they had joined voluntarily, the rest described being forcibly recruited.

Forced Recruitment

Evidence of forced recruitment appeared in both the personal cases of the remaining eleven interviewees and in the descriptions of recruitment procedures in later years given by the voluntary recruits. In each case, after reaching the point in the life story when the interviewee described his own entrance into UNITA, the author asked, "And others? Did it happen the same way as with you, or was it different?"

Of these eleven, nine described being forcibly abducted by soldiers, using such words as *ataque* (attack) or *raptado* (abducted or kidnapped) in describing the circumstances. The other two did not explicitly refer to open violence, but said they were *levados* (taken) along with others in their school or village. One of them used the term *rusga* (draft raid, or pressganging).

The stories varied somewhat in locale and circumstance. Only two were from the 1974-1976 period, one who could be described as a draftee, the other as abducted. The first said that UNITA soldiers arrived at his school in Huambo province in May 1975, and took 79 students — all those of military age. They were told it was their duty, he said. The other, a hospital nurse, who said he did not support any of the political groups at the time, was abducted at night from his mother's home in Bié province.

Dash (1977, pp. 42-43) describes another incident told him by a UNITA officer, who said he and other friends had been invited to a party in Kuito (Bié province) in April 1975. They were loaded into trucks and taken to join the UNITA army.

The interviewees with direct knowledge of this period said such incidents were the exception rather than the rule at that time. They did not have a precise common estimate

of when the shift to forced recruitment became significant, several saying that it began in 1977-1978, while another said it was not very significant until 1982. They all agreed it was widespread in the 1980s.

The interviewees did not include any who entered UNITA in the 1977-1981 period. This may reflect slower growth in UNITA ranks during these years or simply the fact that it was not possible for the author to specify year of recruitment in seeking interviewees. In any case, all of the interviewees who entered UNITA during the 1980s (ranging from June 1982 through June 1989) said they had been recruited by force.

One, the only one of Ganguela origin, said that between 1975 and 1982 some men from his village in Huíla province left voluntarily to join the MPLA, while others left to join UNITA. In 1982, when he was 28 years old, UNITA carried out a recruitment raid (*rusga*) in the area and took him along with ten other villagers and others from neighbouring villages. In referring to other recruits, he volunteered a distinction among three

categories: *voluntários* (volunteers), those taken in *rusgas* (drafted) and *raptados* (abducted). His impression was that there were "a lot" (*muitos*) of each kind among his fellow soldiers in UNITA.

Another, a Cuanhama from Cunene province, said his whole village had been captured by UNITA in mid-1983 and taken first to Namibia and then in trucks to a UNITA base in the Jamba area. He said that from Cunene province at least everyone he knew had been forcibly recruited, but that he didn't know about people from other provinces.

Of the remaining seven recruited during this period, four were abducted from rural areas of Huambo province, three from the northern

The second generation, those recruited during the subsequent phase of guerrilla war against the Angolan government, were principally recruited by force, the majority being abducted by UNITA from government-controlled areas.

area of Huíla province adjoining Huambo. Five were taken in attacks on villages or schools, two in road ambushes. All were taken in large groups on foot to UNITA bases in the bush, after which the youth of military age were sent to the Jamba area for training. One, who was 33 at the time, was captured and lost his family in a UNITA attack in October 1982. He was not sent to Jamba, but was kept in a company-level base as an agricultural worker producing food for the soldiers until the base was captured by government forces in 1987.

These interviewees had different observations on the proportion of forced or voluntary recruits among their fellow soldiers. Several said they were afraid to ask, and that they didn't discuss the subject except with close friends. Others did make partial observations, however. One said all those from his village at least were abducted. Another said that those abducted like himself were few in comparison with "those they took from the population they already controlled." Two others also made the distinction between those abducted in combat and those from *rusgas* in areas controlled by UNITA.

With the exception of Dash in 1976-1977, journalists who have travelled with UNITA appear not to have spoken with rank-and-file UNITA soldiers about their recruitment. Angolan press interviews with ex-UNITA soldiers also rarely give such details. Several refugees in Zaire interviewed by James Brooke of *The New York Times* (February 10, 1987) said they had fled Angola to avoid being drafted by either side, but he gave no further details.

An Africa Watch report (1989), based on interviews with Angolan refugees in Zambia and Zaire, said that many described forced recruitment by UNITA during attacks on government zones. The report in-

cluded details on two cases: one man, in a government prison for belonging to an outlawed religious sect, was taken by UNITA along with other prisoners in a 1984 attack in Benguela province, and was subsequently inducted along with other forced recruits into the UNITA army. Another older man told of his family being captured by UNITA in Moxico in 1984. He was released after several years, but four of his sons and his younger brother were forced into the UNITA army.

The Namibian (October, 1988; cited by Angolan Press Agency) interviewed an Angolan named Jonas Kemanya, a deserter from the Koevoet counterinsurgency force in Namibia, who said he was kidnapped with other villagers by UNITA in 1983 near Mongua, in Cunene province, and then handed over to Koevoet as a recruit. Conchiglia (1987) reports interviews with three ex-UNITA soldiers who relate being abducted in the period since 1982.

The evidence available is insufficient to estimate reliably the proportion of recruits falling into the categories of voluntary recruitment, draft or abduction. The distribution among the interviewees obviously cannot be used for this purpose, since the group is not a random sample. But one can reasonably conclude that forced recruitment of both the draft and abduction categories grew in importance in the 1980s.

One of the better educated among the interviewees said that in general the UNITA officers and other cadres were volunteers, but that among the ordinary soldiers volunteers were rare after 1980. None, however, gave a clear estimate of the ratio between those conscripted in UNITA areas and those abducted from government zones. One might hypothesize that those from UNITA's own zones would be less

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likely to speak Portuguese, and that the draftee experience is therefore probably underrepresented among the interviewees themselves.

In the case of Renamo (Minter, 1989), some critics have suggested that reports of forced recruitment may be in part a product of interview bias, with respondents presenting this version in order to exculpate themselves or to conform to a theory they believe the government or the interviewer might prefer. The same question applies here, and deserves at least brief comment.

Despite his precautions taken to elicit accurate testimony and to present a non-judgemental open-ended stance in the interview towards different responses, the author agrees that one or another individual might be lying for such reasons. He regards it as highly implausible, however, that such bias could be responsible for the patterns observed.

The idea that individuals talk of forced recruitment in order to exculpate themselves, first of all, does not explain the fact that they talk also of the forced recruitment of others, and that they can describe the process in nuanced terms. Secondly, if forced recruitment were not a common phenomenon, how could they expect their own story to be believed? And why would some interviewees (particularly the Angolans recruited in 1974-1976) talk without hesitation of their own voluntary enlistment in UNITA, going on to describe the forced recruitment of others, in some cases implicating themselves as responsible officers?

The alternate hypothesis of bias — that interviewees say they were recruited forcibly in order to confirm a government theory — falls apart because in fact there is no consistent or preferred theory on the government side, either in Angola or in Mozambique. Government accusations of banditry and tribalism

imply voluntary motives, while mention of forced recruitment in government media is only sporadic. In both countries, recently stressed amnesty programs promise forgiveness for enemy soldiers, implying a more tolerant attitude. But these programs make no distinctions in terms of motivation. The crucial distinction made with respect to ex-enemy soldiers is whether the person deserts, i.e., gives himself up voluntarily, or is captured in battle. There would be ample reason for trying to deceive officials on this ground, but little benefit from deception concerning their original recruitment.

The differences among the interviewees' responses also correspond to what is known about the history of conflict in the two countries. In the Mozambican decolonization process there was no significant organizational challenge to Frelimo, and Renamo's origin with the white Rhodesian security forces is well documented. The tripartite split in Angola in 1974-1976 is also well known in its general outlines. It thus makes sense that a significant number of Angolans talk of voluntary recruitment during this period.

It is less well known, but documented by UNITA as well as other sources, that in 1977 UNITA made a conscious policy decision to expand its military from a guerrilla army to one that included semi-regular and regular forces (Dash, p. 100). Savimbi termed this the "theory of large numbers" (Savimbi, 1979, pp. 8-9; 1986, pp. 13-14). The massive expansion in scale of UNITA military operations came with escalation of the South African involvement in 1979-1980. The expansion in scale would require more troops, and the timing fits with the shift to forced recruitment as described by the interviewees. As one explained, when local commanders could not meet their quotas for recruits, a order

In 1977 UNITA made a conscious policy decision to expand its military from a guerrilla army to one that included semi-regular and regular forces. The expansion of UNITA operations came with escalation of the South African involvement in 1979-1980.

“from higher up” was issued to begin abductions in government-controlled areas.

It is beyond the scope of this report to analyze in more theoretical terms the meaning of forced recruitment, but a few brief comments are in order. A form of forced recruitment, in the sense of military conscription, is common to the governments of Angola and Mozambique as well, and indeed to most modern armies. Both governments also acknowledge complaints about draft raids on youth not having their documents in order.

One distinction is that military conscription in the case of governments is enacted into law, and is acknowledged and defended as legitimate despite abuses that may occur in practice. One’s judgement about its legitimacy obviously depends on one’s judgement on the legitimacy of the government in question.

For a guerrilla or insurgent movement, however, it is often assumed that its recruits are volunteers impelled by outrage at government policies or other strong social forces. For the outside world at least, UNITA takes advantage of such beliefs.

Whatever the general validity of such a theory for other cases, it does not appear to apply to most of the Renamo recruits in Mozambique. In Angola, it seems to apply primarily to the recruits of the 1974-1976 generation, and more particularly to the officer corps which comes primarily from this generation.

The existence of this officer corps, a nucleus of educated young men primarily from the Umbundu central plateau, is probably a key factor in UNITA’s practical operations and its capacity to project itself as a viable and legitimate movement.

Training and control

As with recruitment, the military training the interviewees reported fell into two generations: 1974-1975 for one group, and from 1981 for the other. The intermediate generation was not represented among the interviewees, but a few reported some information on fellow soldiers trained during that period.

Three were initially trained at UNITA camps in Moxico province, before the fighting began in 1975. Their instructors were a mixture: a few veterans from UNITA’s pre-1974 guerrillas, but principally recruits who had been soldiers in the Portuguese colonial army. Two of the interviewees, one a veteran of the Portuguese army, quickly became instructors themselves.

Other sources, such as Bridgland and former CIA officer John Stockwell, refer to the presence of South African, American and French advisors inside Angola in the second half of 1975 and early 1976. None of the interviewees, however, said they had personal knowledge of the involvement of these advisors in military training.

Those thirteen interviewees who underwent military training from 1981 through 1987, including several involved in courses other than basic training, all referred to camps situated in the Jamba area (not, however, in Jamba itself). One was trained in logistics at Licua, several in camps at unspecified locations near Jamba. After 1983, judging by the interviewees’ experiences, the principal training camps were located near the Zambian and Namibian borders, in the most remote southeastern triangle of Angolan territory.

Military training during these years followed a standard pattern of

UNITA’s military instruction was carried out by joint teams of South African and Angolan officers, in the Jamba area. UNITA officers also were sent for courses in Morocco and Namibia.

three months of basic training, after which the recruits were qualified as 'semi-regular' troops. Some recruits took specialized courses of six months, they said, while others received only minimal guerrilla training.

There were two notable differences from the pattern of Renamo training in Mozambique. In the Renamo case, some troops were trained directly by South African instructors in Mozambique or in South Africa, but by the early 1980s most were trained by Renamo instructors at bases located within each province. The UNITA system was more centralized, with recruits being taken to the Jamba area. And, with only one exception, those trained during this period reported that the instruction was carried out by joint teams of South African and Angolan officers. Most often two or three of each would be responsible for training one company, with the Angolans doubling as instructors and as translators for the South Africans. Those training in special fields such as artillery might have double the number of instructors, divided almost evenly between South Africans and Angolans.

None of the interviewees had received military training outside of Angola, but several said that officers they knew personally had been sent for courses in Morocco and in Namibia. The training in Namibia consisted of specialized courses for commandos or subjects such as mining and explosives, they said. One also said he had served from 1983-1985 in Battalion 517, most of whom had been trained earlier at Dodge City, a South African military base near Rundu just inside Namibia.

Other sources confirm this general picture of UNITA training. One interviewed by Conchiglia (1989, p. 46) said he was part of UNITA's first semi-regular infantry battalion, which began three

months of training in Dodge City in December 1979. The instructors were South Africans, who relied on Portuguese and Angolans to translate into Portuguese and Umbundu. Another was trained at Dodge City in 1980 (Conchiglia, 1985, pp. 58-59). Yet another told a Portuguese journalist (*Diário de Lisboa*, June 29, 1985) that UNITA had sent him to a course for commandos at Buffalo Base in Namibia. And Rufino Satumbo told an Angolan tribunal he had been trained in laying mines at a base in Namibia, apparently in 1979 or 1980 (Minter, 1988, p. 111).

Savimbi has at times categorically denied using South African instructors (e.g. *Le Matin*, July 2, 1983), citing instead Moroccans and Zairians. But the interviewees leave no doubt that the vast majority of UNITA troops received their training from South African instructors. According to other sources, the training in Morocco amounted to 500 or more officers by 1981 (Harwood, July 22, 1981). Loiseau and de Roux cited Savimbi as referring to training by French instructors in Zaire before 1978 (p. 259), but none of the interviewees had direct knowledge of this.

Like Renamo, UNITA often executed attempted deserters, and made it difficult for recruits to desert by moving them weeks or months of walking time from their home areas.

The interviewees had only fragmentary information about more recent training by Americans. One said he had seen three American officers in Jamba in June 1986, and heard they were there for training in the use of Stinger missiles. Another, who lived in Jamba from 1981 to 1984, said three Americans were stationed there, but that they had little direct contact with Angolans and appeared to be involved primarily with sending radio messages.

UNITA clearly differs from Renamo in that the interviewees reported no pattern of forced recruitment of young children for military training. With the exception of one, who said he had been involved in

the military training of “children” (*crianças*) in 1986, all the interviewees said that recruits were not sent to military training until they were adults — minimum ages mentioned ranged from 17 to 19. Two had themselves attended school after joining UNITA before being sent for military training.

Like Renamo, however, UNITA often executed attempted deserters, and made it difficult for recruits to desert by moving them weeks or months of walking time from their home areas.

One said that four people abducted with him, including his primary school teacher, had tried to flee shortly after being captured. They had been recaptured by UNITA and executed. Others said they had witnessed executions of attempted deserters on several occasions, and several said this was one of the themes of the graduation speech Savimbi gave each group of recruits when they finished their training.

Those among the interviewees who did desert all said it was virtually impossible to do so from the Jamba area, remote as it was from cities or other populated areas of the country. The danger, they said, was not only the risk of being recaptured, but also of dying of starvation or from attacks by wild animals.

A final deterrent to desertion mentioned was the fear of punishment, including execution, by the government. According to the interviewees, UNITA tells recruits that the government executes former UNITA soldiers whether deserters or prisoners. Several described their surprise at finding alive acquaintances that they had been told by UNITA were killed by the government.

It is impossible to tell from the evidence available to the author to what extent such fears might have some base in reality. By 1989, after a widely publicized amnesty and

the release of numerous prisoners, the government program for dealing with both prisoners of war and deserters seemed relatively well organized, and aimed at reintegrating the ex-UNITA soldiers into society. The personal experience of several interviewees, both prisoners and deserters, shows that this program was also functioning earlier in the 1980s. The dominant thrust of government policy, involving programs to reunite such people with their families and to find jobs (successful in at least some cases), was clearly to attract deserters rather than to exact vengeance.

Angolan press accounts in earlier years, as well as other sources, report the death penalty applied by military tribunals to UNITA prisoners. Amnesty International has also reported allegations of extra-judicial executions. And regardless of official policy, it is clear that in the early years of the conflict, particularly in 1976-1978, there was much indiscriminate retaliation in some locations on both sides.

One of the interviewees, who was in rural Huambo province at that time, refers to it as a time of *confusão*, and said he might have stayed home instead of rejoining UNITA if he had not feared being killed by government troops. He said both UNITA and government troops were killing suspected supporters of the other side in his area, and that someone might be fingered to one side or the other because of local or personal conflicts having nothing to do with one's political beliefs.

Motives differed among the eleven interviewees who had deserted. Those who said they were forcibly recruited tended to describe their desertion as taking the first opportunity they saw, often in the confusion of battle. Those who had joined UNITA voluntarily spoke of being tired and wanting to

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get on with their lives, that the war had gone on too long. One also said he feared being killed by his superior officer who was jealous of his military skills.

Logistics and trade

In contrast to Mozambique, where South Africa has always sought to maintain deniability for its military support for Renamo, the scale of military operations in Angola and the wish to gain publicity for UNITA through visits by foreign journalists have made it impractical to maintain a consistent policy of deniability. The strategy of UNITA and its backers has instead been to maintain secrecy on the details and minimize the significance of such support.

For example, Savimbi has at times denied that South Africa provided aid, saying that UNITA paid for all supplies with trade goods or funds raised elsewhere (e.g., *Paris-Match*, March 8, 1988). He has denied receiving South African support at a particular time, later conceding in effect that he had been lying (e.g., *Washington Post*, July 30, 1986; *Le Point*, September 22, 1986). He has portrayed the period before 1980 as one in which the South Africans were providing no aid at all (Bridgland; Loiseau and de Roux). And the presence of South African troops in UNITA zones of control or combat has only rarely been acknowledged publicly, either by UNITA or South Africa.

No observer of the Angolan conflict doubts the existence of massive and sustained South African military support for UNITA, at least from 1980 through 1988. Determining how significant this dependence has been is crucial to evaluating the current situation after withdrawal of

South African troops from Angola and Namibia. Unfortunately published information provides little basis for making such a judgement. Parties with more information, such as South African and U.S. military and intelligence services which have been directly involved with UNITA logistics, do not of course allow public scrutiny of their judgements or data.

Information from the interviewees and from journalists who have travelled with UNITA, given its fragmentary character, is not sufficient to make a confident judgement on this issue. But it does provide a somewhat clearer picture of how the system worked.

Dash and Rodrigues, who visited with UNITA in the 1976-1977 period, report that arms they saw appeared to be from stocks from the conflict in 1975-1976. They made no reference to new supplies from South Africa. The seven interviewees present during this period also said that supplies were scarce then. Several dated the beginning of regular supplies to the end of 1978, but said no one was allowed to talk about where the supplies originated.

According to Savimbi (Loiseau and de Roux, p. 226), South Africa made the decision to provide UNITA with aid in 1980, when it established a regular system by which UNITA would submit requests three months in advance. Before 1980, Savimbi said, South Africa only allowed transit facilities through Namibia for aid from other sources, such as France, Zaire, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Bridgland and De Marenches, the former French intelligence chief (1987, p. 165), also refer to a Chinese shipment in 1978, reportedly at the encouragement of U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The general contrast between the pre-1980 and later periods is un-

By 1989, the government program for dealing with both prisoners of war and deserters seemed relatively well organized, and aimed at reintegrating the ex-UNITA soldiers into society.

doubtedly accurate, but the picture of no supplies in 1976-1977 and a purely passive South African role until 1980 is almost certainly exaggerated. There were few journalists in a position to check such deliveries. Dash, for example, entered and left Angola via Zambia. Sitte, however, who entered Angola with UNITA guerrillas from Zambia in August 1976 and left via Namibia at the end of the year, reported that his party was in radio communication with South African authorities concerning his exit. He also said they met columns of porters carrying huge quantities of Kalashnikovs and ammunition boxes in the opposite direction (Sitte, 1977, p. 156, 161). Some of the weapons, he said, were newly manufactured.

The shift to regular and large-scale South African supplies seems to have come in late 1978 or early 1979, judging from the comments of the interviewees and several other sources. One of the interviewees said he was part of the transfer of UNITA's central base from its location on the southern edge of the central plateau southeast to Jamba, near the Namibian border. He arrived at Jamba in April 1979. Jamba was about six hours from the border by truck, he said, and the move was not only to flee government attacks on the earlier location, but to establish a secure supply base.

This dating coincides with other indications. The BBC monitoring service first picked up UNITA radio broadcasts in January 1979. There were reports of South African shelling of towns on the border in April and May that year, as the border south of Jamba was brought under UNITA control. By the middle of 1980, when Sitte visited again, UNITA's logistics operations in the area were already using a fleet of 50 trucks (Sitte, 1981, p. 71). Three impeccably-uniformed battalions were on parade at UNITA head-

quarters, a striking contrast to Sitte's previous visit three years earlier.

The general picture of Jamba and the UNITA-controlled area in southern Cuando Cubango province is familiar from numerous newspaper reports, and does not warrant extensive repetition here. Several summary points are worth mentioning, however.

First of all, the Jamba area was accessible by land from South African-controlled northern Namibia. Although journalists in the 1980s were invariably flown to an airstrip near Jamba, most supplies came in overland. According to the interviewees, both South African and UNITA personnel regularly moved back and forth across the border. One interviewee, who was in Savimbi's personal entourage in the early 1980s, said Savimbi often spent the weekends at a base assigned to UNITA in Namibia. This accessibility by land was a crucial factor in reducing the cost of supplying military operations, and meant that in practical terms southern Cuando Cubango was an extension of Namibia. South Africa's official designation of northern Namibia and southern Angola as one "Operational Zone" was more than a figure of speech.

Secondly, this base area was previously very sparsely populated. In colonial times most of southern Cuando Cubango was a set of game parks, roughly the size of the U.S. state of South Carolina and only slightly smaller than Portugal. The population of Jamba itself was estimated by several interviewees at roughly 8,000 to 10,000 in the mid-1980s. The wider UNITA control zone had ten times that number. The population was composed principally of people brought there by UNITA from other parts of the country.

UNITA expanded this area in the early 1980s by picking off isolated government outposts in eastern An-

UNITA has had massive and sustained South African military support, at least from 1980 through 1988. Determining how significant this dependence has been is crucial to evaluating the current situation after withdrawal of S.A. troops from Angola and Namibia.

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The interviewees generally agreed that in contested areas UNITA's food came from two sources: taxed contributions from civilians under UNITA control and raids on villages under government control. The Jamba area, they agreed, was a relatively privileged area, with food and other goods arriving from Namibia and being distributed free to people living under UNITA authority.

Judging by visitors' reports, a significant portion of the population in the Jamba area was loyal — even fanatically so — to UNITA and to Savimbi. While some visitors privately described this allegiance as cult-like, larger numbers were impressed or even inspired by the organization and communal spirit they saw. They tended to assume that those they talked with were representative of UNITA's presence elsewhere in the country.

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After the establishment of Jamba, however, the level of organization improved. There was a clear disparity between the Jamba area and the contested military regions, but there was a sustained effort to provide at least rudimentary health and education services for civilians in all military regions. This was in addition to the military medical services.

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In the educational sphere, the evidence also failed to provide solid numerical estimates, but did confirm the existence of a sustained effort to provide some services. Both interviewees and foreign journalists witnessed to the existence of schools in the Jamba area, including the secondary school known as the Instituto Polivalente, which had about 600 students when one interviewee attended it in the mid-1980s. Outside the Jamba area the reports contained more contradictions, some saying there were very few schools in the areas they knew, some saying there was a school in each community controlled by UNITA. Several said that as far as they knew the only secondary school was in Jamba. The curriculum was in Portuguese.

Statistics given by UNITA officials (e.g., Savimbi, 1986a; De Oliveira, 1988; Honey, 1988) and in a report from the UNITA Secretariat for Education and Culture claimed over 200,000 students in UNITA schools, over 2,000 of them secondary students (5th grade and up). The figures given showed dramatic shifts from year to year. In 1986, for example, Savimbi said UNITA had 6,951 primary schools; a table in UNITA's own education report said there were 976 primary schools in 1987, and 3,139 in 1988. The number of primary teachers went from 7,127 in 1986 (Savimbi, 1986, p. 19) to 3,003 in 1987 and 8,611 in 1988 according to the education report. The data provided by the interviewees makes the largest of these

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With the exception of the Cuanhama interviewee, who implied Cuanhama were not treated equally, the others denied that there was any discrimination between Angolans of different ethnic origins within UNITA. The idea that UNITA aimed at separatist goals for Umbundu or

for southerners, occasionally voiced by outside observers but not by Angolans, was not supported by any of the interviewees. In practice, however, participation in UNITA seems to have remained overwhelmingly Umbundu, with a secondary contribution from the sparsely populated northeast and southeast, and, for some time, from Cuanhama as well (see comments on the death of Cuanhama leader Vakulukuta in the next section).

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In general, the military problem confronting the government is a defensive counterinsurgency task. In addition to guarding strategic economic targets and population centers, the government has tried to cut off supply routes for guerrilla forces and to eliminate these forces. Civilians living under UNITA control are vulnerable in such operations, but are apparently not principal targets.

However, Savimbi himself has described UNITA's strategy as one of bringing the Angolan economy to its knees (e.g., Rodrigues, *Expresso*, April 6, 1977), alluding to the controversial policies of attacking food supplies as well as other civilian targets. Two aspects of this strategy, on which there is evidence available, are the mining of fields and the taking of foreign hostages.

Refugees quoted in the Africa Watch report described the UNITA policy of depriving government-controlled towns of food supplies, and relief agencies working inside Angola have referred to the mining of fields by UNITA in government-controlled areas.

Most of the interviewees said they had little information about mining which, they claimed, was carried out by specialized units. One who had had command responsibility, however, said mines were used mainly to cut road communications. They were used also in fields that belonged to the government, he said, but he was unclear whether this was limited to state farms or to farms of villagers who supported the government. He

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UNITA's practice of taking foreign hostages was aimed both at paralyzing government economic development plans and at attracting international attention. On repeated occasions, Savimbi warned that foreigners in Angola were at risk (e.g., Savimbi, 1986b, pp. 48, 132), and hostages released by UNITA were required to pledge that they would not return to Angola until the war was over. At times hostages taken during attacks were told that they were taken so that the government would not kill them and blame it on UNITA, an explanation the hostages understandably received with skepticism (e.g., Horvath, pp. 15-16).

Some hostages were taken in the course of road ambushes or other minor military actions. Two young Baptist missionaries from Brazil, for example, were travelling with a mission ambulance in Huíla province, and were taken captive after surviving a UNITA rocket attack on the vehicle (Horvath, pp. 1-3). Four Portuguese teachers were captured in an attack on the town of Sumbe in 1984 (*O Jornal*, September 21, 1984). Three Swedish aid workers on a rural electrification project were captured in September 1987; one of them died several days later.

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One extraordinary effect of UNITA's hostage-taking was the relatively favourable publicity it received in a decade when the media was highly sensitized to threats of international terrorism. While the basic reason for such coverage was undoubtedly media bias towards a 'pro-western' group, UNITA skillfully exploited this advantage. Only a few of the hostages were from major powers such as the United States or Great Britain; instead the victims were Portuguese, Filipinos, Brazilians, Czechs or Swedes. The captives were not abused beyond the wounds they sometimes received in the initial attacks, and the experience of being forced to march hundreds of miles through the bush to Jamba. Most hostages were eventually released through the Red Cross or other private channels, even when governments refused UNITA's demand for negotiations. And each release was an opportunity to invite journalists to Jamba for a ceremony and press conference by Savimbi, with the hostages presented to the press in a context controlled by UNITA.

Savimbi's leadership and human rights issues

It is impossible to discuss UNITA without addressing the major role played by its leader Jonas Savimbi. Both his admirers and his critics agree that Savimbi's personality has dominated and stamped the character of the organization. "Savimbi is the chief," UNITA officer Jaka Jamba told Dash in 1977, "If he were killed, I don't know what would happen to UNITA" (Dash, 1977, p. 113). Among the central issues in the peace negotiations of 1989 and 1990 were precisely the position of Savimbi, and the credibility of his commitment to an agreement should one be reached.

Both news coverage and public debate on Angola have focused on the multiple contradictions in Savimbi's ideological stances and external alliances. According to Dash, "Savimbi is an enigma, a man on whom many labels can stick — brilliant, charismatic, affable, unyielding, forgiving, temporizing, Machiavellian, opportunistic, lying, nationalistic, Marxist, Maoist, pro-Western and socialist" (Dash, 1977, p. 113). This report is not the place to try to analyze this enigma in depth, but it is appropriate to draw out a few themes from the public record before adding the data emerging from the interviews and other recent first-hand accounts.

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against the Portuguese" (Bender, 1981, p. 59). He had introduced himself at the U.S. Embassy in Switzerland as the "future president of Angola," and denounced the MPLA, accusing its leaders of being mulattos disliked by most Angolans.

Whether voiced as black against mulatto, southerner against northerner, Umbundu against Kimbundu, rural against city-dweller, or 'genuine Angolan' against deracinated residents of the capital city Luanda, this hostility to other Angolans has been a central theme of Savimbi's rhetoric. In his eyes, and those of his followers, this is what justified any political strategy or outside alliance.

These included the well-known military cooperation with South Africa from 1975 to the present, and the less widely known covert military alliance with the Portuguese colonial administration prior to independence (see Minter, 1988, for documentation on the 1971-1974 period; also a 1969 letter from Savimbi to the Portuguese authorities in Angola cited by Conchiglia, 1989, pp. 15-16). The stances taken towards UNITA by those outside Angola have largely reflected attitudes towards these external alliances (or, conversely, attitudes towards the Angolan government's military reliance on Cuba and the Soviet Union). There is no evidence, however, that these topics have ever been the subject of discussion within UNITA.

Another thread has been Savimbi's capacity to maintain a cohesive group of second-rank leadership around him, without any publicly visible dissent or challenge to his authority. This second rank of leaders has included Savimbi's contemporaries such as Nzau Puna and Tony Fernandes, as well as others from the 1974-1976 generation, such as Tito Chingunji and Jeremias Chitunda. This cohesion has helped ensure that until recently only the

official version of UNITA was communicated to the outside world.

Even in the period of Portuguese colonialism, Savimbi demonstrated an extraordinary skill in presenting different images to different audiences. In the early 1970s he presented a 'black-power' image to visiting black nationalists from the United States and an 'anti-revisionist' Maoist image to white radicals. In the African context he portrayed UNITA as the purely independent guerrilla movement, surviving alone in the bush with no outside aid. Visiting journalists had no hint that he had arranged a covert military alliance with the Portuguese authorities, and was arguing in secret correspondence that he was the only one who could preserve the Portuguese heritage in Angola.

In the 1980s, Savimbi and his aides received visitors in the Jamba area with consummate public relations skills. Although his studies in Switzerland had produced a *licence* (roughly equivalent to a U.S. master's degree), few journalists could resist the easy opening paragraph profiling the bearded and charismatic guerrilla leader with

a beret, an ivory-handled pistol and a Ph.D. Savimbi's interviews invariably produced quotable material, and showed awareness of the national and political context of the interviewer. And the image was sustained by the number of talented young aides who could also converse convincingly with journalists in English or French.

Even if many journalists had doubts about the validity of the images, few such doubts surfaced in print. The *National Review's* Sikorski concluded after three months with UNITA in 1989 that "UNITA officers, including top leaders, are compulsive liars.... the full list of UNITA Potemkin villagers would be too long to quote." But such skepticism was an exception among

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published reports from Jamba.

None of the interviewees were members of UNITA's inner leadership group, but a few did spend significant time in the Jamba headquarters and had the opportunity to observe Savimbi and his colleagues. Their observations provide confirmation for some of the allegations by Angolan exiles which appeared in the press and in Amnesty International reports in 1988 and 1989.

The first hint of specific charges against Savimbi came in May 1988, when three students in Portugal, dissident members of UNITA's youth league, spoke to the Portuguese press. Expressing their continued confidence in the movement as a whole, they denounced Savimbi for lack of democracy within UNITA, and cited the disappearance or punishment of several rivals to Savimbi. One of the three, Ermelindo Jamba Kanjungu, a 22-year-old who said he had grown up in the bush with UNITA (1975-1986), said he had been an eyewitness to several incidents of abuses (*Africa*, May 11, 1988; *Expresso*, May 7, 1988).

Kanjungu said that three UNITA leaders (Tony Fernandes, Samuel Chiwale, and Colonel Kanjungu) were accused of being "reactionaries" and severely beaten in a public session of UNITA's Fifth Congress in 1982, which he attended. The students also said that Dr. Jorge Sangumba, formerly UNITA's foreign secretary, was decreed a reactionary and "disappeared" after 1981. One of them told *Expresso* (April 30, 1988) that Savimbi had also had other leaders killed, including Brigadier Xandovava, Colonel Vakulukuta, and Valdemar Chindondo, UNITA chief of staff from 1975 to 1979.

Kanjungu also said he witnessed, on September 7, 1983, the incineration of a number of people at Jamba, accused of being witches and ex-

ecuted in a public ceremony directed by Savimbi. Among those killed, he said, were six members of the Kalitangue family, Aurora Katalaio (the widow of Colonel Mateus Katalaio) and her two children.

The charges attracted little international attention until March 1989, when, convinced by several other UNITA dissidents in exile, Savimbi biographer Fred Bridgland repeated similar allegations in a television program (*The World This Week*, March 11, 1989) and in an article in the *Sunday Telegraph* (March 12, 1989). Sousa Jamba and Dinho Chingunji, who spoke on the record to Bridgland, were both relatives of prominent UNITA leaders. Neither Jamba nor Chingunji claimed to be an eyewitness to specific incidents, but said their information was based on conversations with many others who were. They also said, as had the students in Portugal, that they still opposed the Angolan government and supported the ideals of UNITA, but had finally decided to speak out against Savimbi.

Dinho Chingunji, a member of UNITA's most prominent family apart from Savimbi himself, grew up in a refugee camp in Zambia, and, according to UNITA spokespersons, spent only a short time in Angola before taking up a scholarship in Britain. He told Bridgland that he ascribed the death in 1974 of his father Samuel, UNITA's first chief of staff and a celebrated hero of the movement, to Savimbi. He said family members also believed that three other brothers had been killed by UNITA instead of dying natural deaths as UNITA claimed.

Such rumours, although they at the least indicate suspicion between Savimbi and the Chingunji family, could easily be retrospective explanations of genuine natural deaths. Chingunji added, however, that when his grandfather Jonatão

The first specific charges against Savimbi came in May 1988, when three UNITA members cited the disappearance or punishment of several rivals to Savimbi. Amnesty International's 1989 annual report confirms such allegations.

expressed his suspicions to Savimbi in 1979, he and his wife Violeta were beaten to death for witchcraft, within hearing range of one of their daughters. And, Chingunji said, his aunt Chica had been accused of witchcraft in 1983 and subsequently killed.

Chingunji and Bridgland also alleged that Dinho's uncle Tito Chingunji, formerly UNITA foreign secretary, was being held in Jamba and had been tortured. Tito Chingunji subsequently appeared in UNITA's Congress in September, but was listed as number 43 in the party hierarchy in contrast with his previous number 3 ranking (*Expresso*, October 7, 1989).

Sousa Jamba, younger brother of UNITA Education Secretary Jaka Jamba, told Bridgland, and himself repeated in articles in *The Spectator* (March 18, 1989) and *Expresso* (May 6, 1989) that he had talked with numerous eyewitnesses to the September 1983 public burning of witches in Jamba, attended by "hundreds." He said that his nieces and nephews were part of the crowd that witnessed the bonfire and that the identification of the witches was carried out by a healer (*curandeiro*) named Mariano whom he had known in Huambo in 1973. Jamba was inconsistent about the number of victims, however, saying 15 in his *Spectator* article, 13 or 14 in his interview with Bridgland, and 18 in his article in *Expresso*.

Bridgland, adding that he had other independent sources, said he was "pretty certain in my own mind that what they are saying is at least 80 to 90% correct," while cautioning that "some facts are always a little imprecise in Africa." (*The World This Week*, March 11, 1989).

No visitors to Jamba have published any data confirming or disconfirming these allegations, although Sikorski of the *National Re-*

view said that a CIA officer was withdrawn from Jamba after he confronted Savimbi on the subject (Sikorski, p. 37). Amnesty International, which requires confirmation from several independent sources before publishing details of an allegation, told Bridgland that three reliable sources had provided evidence that Jonatão and Violeta Chingunji were clubbed with rifle butts, kicked and then run over by a truck. In the Amnesty International annual report for 1989, two specific witchburning incidents were reported: three women in March 1982, and at least 12 people in September 1983, including the Kalitangue family.

Of the interviewees, five said they knew about the killing of rivals to Savimbi. One was a direct eyewitness, while the others were present in Jamba at the time and talked with others who were eyewitnesses. Three said they knew of incidents of witchburning, two referring to events in Jamba in 1983, another to an incident in 1980 in UNITA's military region 50, in the Benguela/Huambo area.

Two said they were in Jamba when a Colonel Sabino Lumumba was killed, allegedly for indiscipline. The decision to eliminate him was taken at the Fifth Congress in July 1982, one said, but he was actually killed while trying to flee the following month. The cases most frequently mentioned, however, by four interviewees who attended the Fifth Congress, as well as by another who was not in Jamba at the time but had afterwards heard about the incidents, were those of Sangumba, Chindondo, Chiwale and Fernandes.

Sangumba and Chindondo were executed in 1982, beaten to death in public around the time of the congress, the interviewees said. One said he witnessed the killings. Several others referred specifically

Of the interviewees, five said they knew about the killing of rivals to Savimbi. One was a direct eyewitness, while the others were present in Jamba at the time and talked with others who were eyewitnesses.

to Savimbi's announcement in the congress of the deaths, in which he accused Sangumba and Chindondo of wanting to betray him. Chiwale and Fernandes were both under suspicion at the same time, the interviewees said, and were demoted and beaten in public. They survived the beatings, however, and later returned to leadership positions.

Three referred to the Cuanhama leader Vakulukuta, but none had much detail. One interviewee, of Cuanhama origin, said there was a conflict in 1984, in Cunene province. The Umbundus were killing the Cuanhamas, he said, and Vakulukuta fled to Namibia after this. Vakulukuta died later, he added, but said he was not in Cunene at this period and did not know any details. Another said Savimbi had accused Vakulukuta of wanting to form a separate tribal movement, that the South Africans captured him in Namibia and handed him over to UNITA, where he was severely beaten. Yet another said he saw Vakulukuta in hospital in Licua in 1986, but didn't know what was wrong with him or how long he survived.

With respect to the question of witchburning, one interviewee said he had heard of but not witnessed this type of event in Jamba. He said he had seen a woman burned as a witch, but this was by the order of the regional commander, in 1980 in the Benguela/Huambo area. She was accused of being a government infiltrator and of using magic to make UNITA lose battles.

Another said he was present in Jamba in 1983 when people were burned as witches, and along with others was required to gather wood for the fires. Savimbi, he recalled, summoned the people together and read the condemnation. According to this interviewee, there was a total of 27 people killed on two separate occasions within a month of each

other. He cited Katalaio's widow and a Chingunji daughter as individuals he remembered being burned to death. He said that as far as he knew 1983 was the only time something like that happened in Jamba.

A third said he did not witness the event, but arrived in Jamba in October 1983 to find the community "traumatized" by it. He also said he was only aware of two witchburning incidents shortly before his arrival, did not know details about the number involved. There were no incidents he knew of after that.

He added the observation that there had been cases of witchburning in 1976-1977 initiated by local commanders, explaining that in some cases it was used for personal revenge on women. But this shocked the people, and Savimbi gave orders to stop it, he said. The only time he heard of such a punishment being authorized after that was in Jamba in 1983.

The existence of witchcraft trials and punishment in rural Angolan society, in times of intense social tension, is not disputed. Dash, for example, describes a case presented to UNITA guerrillas

by villagers in Bié province (Dash, 1977, pp. 79-81). In this case, the guerrilla leader ordered two accused women to be released. There is also some evidence that UNITA made efforts to moderate the practice. Fernandes, for example, visited a village which his UNITA guides told him was set up in 1984 for people accused of witchcraft, who could not stay in their own villages. The settlement, with 69 women and 14 men when he visited in 1988, was just to the north of Mavinga.

Nevertheless, the interviewees' statements add weight to previous allegations to indicate that at least in 1983 Savimbi himself made use of witchcraft beliefs to victimize selected individuals in Jamba. Ini-

The issue of Savimbi's personal responsibility for human rights abuses, and his apparent unwillingness to tolerate political rivals, is not only a human rights issue but a political one.

tially, UNITA responded to the allegations by exiles with charges that they were involved in a disinformation campaign orchestrated by the Angolan government. The Angolan media have certainly taken advantage of the alleged incidents to berate Savimbi, sometimes giving the impression that witchburning was a habitual practice on his part.

It seems unlikely, however, that the core of the story could have been planted. Both the exiles and Bridgland are still strongly hostile to the Angolan government; it is implausible that they would be party to any such campaign. The references both by exiles and by the interviewees are to specific incidents in 1983, not generalized denunciations. The discrepancy in numbers given by different sources is understandable given an event allegedly attended by several thousand people; a planted story would be more likely to have consistent numbers. In short, the author agrees with Bridgland that some of the details may not be precise, but that some such incident, directed by Savimbi, actually took place.

The issue of Savimbi's personal responsibility for human rights abuses, and his apparent unwillingness to tolerate political rivals, is not only a human rights issue but a political one. It has been central to Angolan government fears in the delicate peace negotiations which began in 1989 and are continuing this year. In Luanda Savimbi is seen as most unlikely to keep any agreement if he saw political advantage in breaking it. If his personality cult and dominance over UNITA's second-level leadership remains intact, as well as his support from U.S. government and private right-wing groups, many doubt that he would stop at any measures to achieve his goal of unquestioned dominance.

The interviewees did agree on the existence of a war weariness among UNITA's rank and file, which corresponds to the general impression that Angolans on both sides are eager for the war to end.

The interviewees, most of whom had left UNITA before the beginning of the Zaire-mediated talks in 1989, had no privileged information about UNITA's plans for the future. Although their comments might well reflect their position as ex-participants, they did agree on the existence of a war weariness among UNITA's rank and file, which corresponds to the general impression that Angolans on both sides are eager for the war to end.

Two interviewees added additional reflections. One stressed that the central problem (*maka*) was Savimbi's undiminished desire to be president. But he added that there would also be difficulty in integrating UNITA's officer corps, especially the 45 generals who were both more numerous and less well educated than the equivalent rank in the Angolan army.

Another, who was captured two months after the abortive cease-fire in June 1989, described the troops' delight at hearing the truce announced on the radio. Three days later, he said, a brigadier named Bunga arrived from UNITA headquarters to say that UNITA could not accept the government's interpretation of the agreement. They were therefore ordered to begin offensive operations again immediately. Whether they were tired or not didn't matter, the brigadier said, they had to continue.

Diplomats and aid workers with whom the author talked in Luanda in September and October 1989 agreed that after several days of calm following the June cease-fire announcement, there was evidence of a coordinated step-up of UNITA attacks around the country.

Appendix one: Interviewees

Interviewed in Luanda, September, 1989

□ 37 years old, born in Bié province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished six years of school. Drafted into Portuguese army in January 1974. Joined UNITA in August 1974. Participated in fighting in Lobito, retreated with UNITA to Cuando Cubango province. In bush until called to Jamba in 1981, where he accompanied Savimbi to coordinate musical programs. Transferred to Huambo province as medical administrator in 1985. Fled to government-controlled town in 1987.

□ 43 years old, born in Huíla province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished four years of school. Construction worker in Cunene province 1972-1973. Left to join UNITA in 1973. In combat in Huíla, retreated to Namibia, sent by UNITA to Huambo province and then to Benguela province, 1976-1981. Captured by government troops in 1981, released after nine months, now working as a mechanic.

Interviewed in Huambo, September, 1989

□ 33 years old, born in Huambo province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished four years of school before joining UNITA, one more in UNITA school. Joined UNITA in 1975, fled into bush in Moxico, responsible for base logistics 1980-1983. Further training in Jamba in 1984. Was in battle at Cuito Cuanavale, deserting to government troops in August 1987.

□ 29 years old, born in Huambo province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished four years of school. Taken by UNITA with other

students in 1975; spent four years as aide carrying baggage for UNITA political leaders in Huambo province. Accompanied leader to Jamba for UNITA congress in 1982. Received military training in 1985, deserted at Cuito Cuanavale battle in July 1987.

□ 34 years old, born in Huambo province. Family spoke both Umbundu and Portuguese at home. Finished three years of school. Joined UNITA in 1974 while working at port in Luanda. Served as UNITA driver in 1975. Went home in 1976, but left again to join UNITA in fear of government reprisals. Became officer, 1977-1982 in Kuanza Sul province. Later advanced training in Jamba, stationed in Bié, Moxico, Huíla. Fled to government-controlled zone in 1988 because he feared a rival commander was plotting to have him killed.

□ 16 years old, born in Huíla province. Family Umbundu-speaking. One year of school. Abducted from school in 1988, but succeeded in escaping after one month.

□ 21 years old, born in Huíla province. Family spoke both Umbundu and Portuguese at home. Finished four years of school before entering UNITA, two more at UNITA's Instituto Polivalente in Jamba area. Abducted in a UNITA ambush on a bus in 1982; attended UNITA school 1983-1984. Military training in 1985, on Cuito Cuanavale front in 1985 and 1986, deserted in late 1986.

□ 20 years old, born in Huíla province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished three years of school before entering UNITA, one more since he was captured by government troops. Abducted from village in 1983, trained in UNITA camps, captured by government troops in 1985, released after six months prison term.

□ 40 years old, born in Huambo province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished two years

of school. Family killed by UNITA in attack on his village in 1982, he was taken to UNITA base. Worked as agricultural labourer for UNITA until 1987, when government troops captured the base.

□ 23 years old, born in Huambo province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished three years of school. Abducted with family by UNITA in late 1984; sent to UNITA training camp. Captured by government troops in Moxico in late 1985. Spent approximately one year in prison.

□ 24 years old, born in Huambo province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished one year of school. Was in government village militia when abducted in 1985; sick in UNITA hospital in Jamba in 1986, then sent for military training. Deserted in Cangumbe area in late 1988.

□ 18 years old, born in Huambo province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished part of first year of school. Abducted with his family and whole village in July 1987. Father and mother sent to work in fields for UNITA, he sent to training camp Tigre near Zambian border. Sent to Lunda Norte; escaped and presented himself to government troops after one day in bush.

Interviewed in Lubango, October, 1989

□ 35 years old, born in Huíla province. Family Ganguela-speaking. Finished one year of school. Taken with other youth by UNITA soldiers in June 1982. Four years as guerrilla, with little training; sent to training camp in 1986. Company stationed on Cuito Cuanavale front, then in Cunene province. Captured by government troops, August 1989.

□ 45 years old, born in Cunene province. Family Cuanhama-speaking. Did not attend school. Abducted by UNITA with whole village in 1983, taken in trucks first to Namibia and then to Jamba area. After training sent to

Malanje province; wounded, reassigned to guard duty at Mavinga. Allowed to visit Cunene, he fled to a government-controlled town in September 1989.

Interviewed in Luanda, October, 1989

□ 30 years old, born in Huambo province. Mother Umbundu-speaking, but only spoke Portuguese in uncle's house where he grew up. Finished six years of school. Fled from Huambo with relatives who supported UNITA in February 1976. From 1977-1980 was gravedigger at UNITA clinic in Bié province; sent to Jamba for military training in 1981. Stationed in Kuanza Sul and in Malanje. Fled to Zambia while an instructor in UNITA training camp in 1986.

□ 35 years old, born in Bié province. Family Umbundu-speaking. Finished eight years of school, including two years nurses' training. Worked in hospital in Lubango. Abducted by UNITA in 1976 while visiting family in Bié, put to work by UNITA as nurse. In Jamba at founding in 1979; in Benguela/Huambo area 1980-1985. Escaped in 1985, imprisoned by government, released in 1988.

Appendix two: Excerpts from interviews with ex-UNITA soldiers by Augusta Conchiglia

***AfriqueAsie*, December 21, 1985, interview with Januário Kossuma, from Bié, captured by Angolan forces on August 23, 1985, near Mavinga**

"I joined UNITA at the time of a meeting, in September 1974. In the bush in Moxico, I received basic military training. I stayed in that region during the South African military invasion in 1975, but I had to leave in June of the following year when FAPLA [government troops] mounted an invasion, following the South African retreat in March 1976. Then I hid with a UNITA group in the bush in Bié. We had few arms and we didn't do much, only a few attacks against civilian convoys. We fed ourselves with the reserves from villages in the region.

In September 1979, UNITA sent us an emissary from Cuando Cubango: everyone should gather near the border with Namibia, at Jamba. When we arrived in December, we were sent right away to a camp in Namibia: Dodge City. Three months of infantry training. The instructors were whites from the South African army. Portuguese and Angolans translated into Portuguese and Umbundu. We continued the training inside Angola at Cuangar, a border post of Cuando Cubango with Namibia. We formed the first semi-regular battalion of UNITA: 350 men.

We then went into action. The objective was to take over centers and posts in the south and east of Cuando Cubango where there were no Angolan armed forces. Thus we took Calai, then Luengue. We also encircled Rivungo, on the Zambian border, and we took Lupire, to the east of Cuito-Cuanavale, and Mavinga. But with the arrival of FAPLA reinforcements things became difficult, we were pushed out of Cangombe, to

the north of Lupire. We were pulled back to Jamba, taking with us youth that we had taken to train in our bases....

In 1982, I took at Tigre camp near Jamba a course as an infantry lieutenant. There were South African instructors, but not the same ones. Three months later we formed an elite brigade composed of three battalions of special forces, 170 men each....

In June 1983 we destroyed a bridge over the Kuango river between Lunda Sul and Malange. Resupplies were parachuted to us. These were the 'vertical operations:' after radio contact with Jamba, we lit fires in a clearing, the airplanes came at night and dropped us boxes of ammunition, arms, uniforms, food and medicines. It was agreed that we had the right to four aircraft each quarter....

In 1984, I took further training at the Tigre and Palanca camps, near the border with Namibia. Fifteen South Africans trained us. Six months afterwards we formed a battalion equipped with artillery and anti-aircraft weapons."

***AfriqueAsie*, February 1987, interview with José Eduardo**

José Eduardo only spent ten months with UNITA. When he was abducted, December 20 1985, he was with two friends in a car on the way to visit relatives near Quibala. They fell into a UNITA ambush, were imprisoned and the car was burned.

"The first night, we slept by the Queve river, guarded by the UNITA men. Then, we marched a lot, always through the bush to avoid the FAPLA patrols. Three months later, we reached the Kissonde base, which was probably in Cuando Cubango province. Then we found ve-

hicles which took us to the Jamba recruitment center. Down there I took a three-month training course. They taught us how to use 81mm mortars.

Then they took us, in all-terrain vehicles, to Moxico, near the Luengue-Bungo river. We found there 327 Battalion. After an ambush against FAPLA, they responded violently and we had many wounded. I also was wounded.

But I had already made my decision: as soon as possible I would turn myself in. When the camp moved, I made an excuse to go off to the side, and then I hid until they left without me.... I walked for five days, feeding myself on cassava and fruit. I arrived near Luena at night. I waited until dawn and then I came up to a group of FAPLA and told them I wanted to turn myself in."

How did you feed yourselves?

"In Jamba, the food came from abroad. In eastern Moxico also, the bulk of the supplies came by truck. From time to time, one went to collect cassava in the fields of the region. The people had fled."

***AfriqueAsie*, February 1987, interview with Francisco Franco**

Francisco Franco was from Luau, the last station on the Benguela Railway. He was captured by UNITA in 1982.

"I was going to buy dried fish at Kavungo, when they took me on the way. They weren't many, but they were well armed. We stopped at the Portorico base, somewhere in Moxico. Then we went down to Kuando base, near the Zambian border, from which vehicles took us to Mavinga.

At the recruitment center, they sent me to school. I did the fourth year of primary school. The course was in Portuguese. But the majority of those there spoke Umbundu. They told me that before they didn't send recruits to school, but that it was better for certain military specialities. In 1984, they sent me to the military camp: infantry training. I learned to use mortars and how to place

mines. The instructor was South African. He didn't have a rank, he was dressed in campaign uniform and he spoke his language to an Angolan who translated for us.

In 1985, they sent us to a supply base near Mavinga. The FAPLA were advancing towards the UNITA positions and they needed reinforcements. We had to place antitank and antipersonnel mines. But in October we had to retreat to the Lombe river. The battles were very fierce. Behind us, there was the South African Buffalo battalion, ready to intervene. There were a lot of dead on the UNITA side. In the Vilaverde Mavinga base, I saw about 300 wounded. I don't know how many were killed. In our area, only two companies of 130 men with 81mm mortars remained operational. Then the South Africans intervened and we had a respite.

We stayed in the area until October 1986. Then they sent us to the railway, near Munhango, which UNITA had lost. It was there that I was captured.... I don't regret it. I didn't choose to go to war at all, much less over there."

What are your plans for the future?

"To go back to Luau and begin farming."

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Notes: (1) * indicates that source contains first-hand material from interviews or visits.

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