

SOUTH - WEST AFRICA

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SOUTH West Africa is governed under the mandate given to the Government of the Union of South Africa by the League of Nations immediately after the First World War.

The aim of this was to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the indigenous people until such time that they would be able to govern themselves as free people in a free country. The South African Government agreed to carry out these objectives accordingly.

During the formation of the United Nations the fascist Government of South Africa refused to transfer her Mandated Territory under the United Nations Trusteeship system.

In 1946 the fascist regime of South Africa under General Smuts, the Prime Minister, claimed that a referendum designed to test South West African opinion on this question had produced a majority in favour of incorporation with South Africa. But the evidence produced before the Fourth Trusteeship Committee by the Reverend Michael Scott on behalf of the Africans stated very clearly that the African people had not been consulted, and the idea of incorporation failed.

In 1950, the status of South West Africa was placed before the International Court of Justice, where the unanimous decision was reached that the South African regime was not competent to modify the International Mandate of South West Africa without the consent of the United Nations. In the same year, the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (UNO) appointed a temporary Committee on

South West Africa to confer with the South African Government and to examine reports and petitions.

In defiance of the decision of the Court and the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the South African Government totally refused to recognise the Committee on South West Africa. She further ignored with contempt the order to submit reports and petitions, as stated by the General Assembly's resolutions.

On the 4th November 1960, the Governments of Liberia and Ethiopia filed applications with the International Court of Justice against the unjust law of the Verwoerd regime, for violating Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. They stated that the Verwoerd regime with its Headquarters in Pretoria had not promoted to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the African people of our country; and also that the South African Government had not only failed to adopt measures necessary and appropriate for the implementation of Article 22 of the Covenant, but had taken positive action preventing their carrying out.

The white Settler Regime under the leadership of diehard Verwoerd arbitrary adopted a policy of APARTHEID according to which people are classified on the basis of race, colour and tribal origin. It furthermore introduced the system of pass laws, which is the greatest method of oppression, persecution and exploitation of African labour in our country, and control the freedom of movement of our peoples in their own country.

The African people were deprived of their land and removed from their original places by force, to the so-called African Reserves, and they cannot leave the area without a permit from the South African Government, thus officially forming a cor-

pulsory and forced labour pool from where the Africans are recruited to go and work in mines, farms and elsewhere for the benefit of the white man, at starvation wages, and subjected to inhuman treatment.

The people are sent to jail if they have no money to pay the fine for failing to carry their pass. In other words, South Africa is still violating the Mandate Agreement which states in Article 3 that "The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited and that no forced labour is permitted" in the territory.

Furthermore the Pretoria Regime agreed that no military bases would be established in South West Africa. Defying all the laws of the International Organisation and violating the Mandate Treaty, the Settler Regime of South Africa has established military bases in the country. The military base at Walvis Bay alone has more than a hundred and fifty officers and about four to five thousand men. In addition to this, there are already other bases at Caprivi Strip on the border of South West Africa and Northern Rhodesia, a secret air strip at Swakopmund, the Windoek training camp and the Ondangua Air Strip for emergency service. New police stations and jails have also been built recently.

VIOLENCE OUR LAST WEAPON

Ever since the formation of the South West Africa Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) under the leadership of Comrade Nujoma, its followers have persistently and consistently striven to bring an essential change in our political life by demanding independence, improvement in the living conditions, the development of our national economy, the abolishing of all unjust laws, and the forming of a democratic government where all people of our country are represented. Failing this violence is the last weapon.

The people of South West Africa are determined to fight for their freedom and to end exploitation of their lives. It must be made clear that the peoples' forces cannot be stopped by anti-tanks, anti-aircraft or rockets. We shall fight to the last man until we achieve our goal.

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For comparison, South Africa's imports of crude in 1962 were 12,107

2. REFINED PRODUCTS

Mexico	11,230
UNITED STATES	59,511
DUTCH ANTILLES	263,203
Trinidad	89,824
Venezuela	291,364
FRANCE	55,400
W. Germany	30,966
ITALY	62,170
NETHERLANDS	88,166
UNITED KINGDOM	72,316
ADEN	24,571
BAHREIN	76,480
Iran	82,559
Kuwait	33,452
Saudi Arabia	62,507
Indonesia	36,378
Malaya & Singapore	29,535
Sino-Soviet bloc	94,900

For comparison South Africa's imports of refined products in 1962 were 21,814

The countries listed in capital letters have been selected by going through the voting list of the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations General Assembly which has on recent occasion voted on the subject of oil sanctions.

The occasion was a somewhat obscure one: in a lengthy resolution on South-West Africa which the Committee was preparing for the Assembly, a clause urged all states to "Refrain from the supply in any manner or form of any petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa."

The United States delegate proposed that this clause should be deleted, and had the support of 21 other countries—Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

The delegates of 67 countries voted for the retention of the clause, and the resolutions containing the clause was adopted by the General Assembly in a plenary session on 13 November 1963.

There may be 22 good reasons to explain why 22 states which voted against the clause can be expected to

support an oil embargo.

Indeed, the Iranian delegate said that he voted against the resolution because 10 per cent of Iran's petroleum exports went to South Africa and Iran was not prepared to stop these sales so long as South Africa was certain to get the petrol from another source.

He added: "To find a practical and realistic solution, this problem must be dealt with not on the level of one country but on a global scale which would make it an effective and real embargo." Collective measures, he said, would willingly be accepted by Iran. He also said that he thought that the organisation of an embargo might be worked out by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

The Venezuelan delegate said that his country agreed with Iran. When the vote was taken he abstained.

There may be other exceptions like Iran. Denmark expressed sympathy with the resolution, adding that she thought it was not in the jurisdiction of the General Assembly.

But it is reasonable to suppose that the majority of the 22 countries which voted against sanctions on that occasion have still to be converted.

The countries that voted against the delegation and may therefore be assumed to be in favour of an oil boycott are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussia S.S.R., Cambodia, Camerouns, C.A.R., Ceylon, Chad, Colombia, Congo (Braz), Congo (Eliz), Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Ruanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.A.R., Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Abstentions were: Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cyprus, Ecuador, Guatemala, Laos,

Lebanon, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad, Tobago, Venezuela.

They include the parent countries of all the world's major oil companies. U.S. companies control 58 per cent of world oil production and British and British-Dutch companies control 16.3 per cent. The U.S.S.R. bloc produces 16.4 per cent of the world's oil, leaving 9.3 per cent shared between the control of France (about 2.5 per cent), Western Germany, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, Argentine, Austria, Japan and some even smaller producers, including Portugal. The 22 also include most of the world's largest oil consumers, all of which export some surplus products.

The large oil-consuming countries, especially the United States and those in Western Europe, are the ones we need to worry about, and no party with a prospect of power in any of these countries, let alone a government, has yet made an oil embargo against South Africa part of its policy.

Unless it is backed by a blockade, an embargo could be rendered ineffective if one Western Government decided not to break it, not even to encourage companies to break it, but merely to allow some trifling inefficiencies of administration occasionally hamper the free movement of the embargo inspectors sent by the United Nations, are regularly, but always accidentally, to fail to stop sales of oil to independent businessmen, for whose subsequent use of the oil the government really could not be held responsible.

Britain appears to have practiced similar duplicity over the U.N. military operation in the Congo without suffering for it.

Thus it can be seen that an oil embargo requires the active co-operation of the powerful countries of the West, and probably their military support. Such co-operation will never be obtained by exhortation, but only by convincing the governments concerned that supporting an embargo is in their own national interest.

One way to attempt this would be to apply concerted pressure on oil companies. If the many oil producing and oil consuming countries

which favour economic sanctions threatened simultaneously to levy some form of charge against any company known to apply South Africa, the big oil companies would stand to lose more by continuing to supply South Africa than by withdrawing from her market.

On the other hand, if the big companies gave up the South African market, smaller companies would be able to supply South Africa without penalty. The present suppliers of South Africa, Shell and B.P. Mobil, Caltex and to a lesser extent Esso and Total, would not wish to lose the South African market to minor competitors, and might therefore be expected to ask their governments—the U.S., Britain, Holland and France—to try to stop the sanctioning countries from carrying out their threats.

If the sanctioning countries made it clear that they could be stopped only by an undertaking of the governments concerned to support wide economic sanctions against South Africa, the countries which support a boycott might be getting somewhere.

Such pressure would work in this way only if it coincided in timing with the conversion of the U.S. government to sanctions. If the U.S. government were strongly opposed to sanctioning at a time when a large body of producers and consumers was making threats against the oil companies, it could advise the oil companies concerned to stop supplying South Africa and could encourage some of the large U.S. companies which have no present interests outside the U.S. to fill the gap.

The other ways of attempting to put pressure on the Western governments, including flirting with Communism, trade union pressure, and diplomatic pressure while all worth examining, do not belong properly in a paper on oil sanctions.

Once the persuasion of the Western powers is accomplished the problem of organising the embargo will have to be faced.

A blockade by ships of war off the South African coast looks like the simplest answer. If the United States and Britain are persuaded to support an embargo, why should

they not lend ships to enforce it? The answer may be that this could involve them in threatening to sink ships of third parties with whom they have no quarrel.

Possibly, if an embargo can be organised without recourse to blockade, the Western powers will be more easily brought to agree with it. In this case, mere diplomatic undertakings will not be enough: countries cannot be recalled upon to punish their own citizens who are found to be breaking the embargo.

International inspection and sanctions will be needed and these may be based on an oil-rationing scheme, under which no country is allowed more oil than her previous year's consumption plus a reasonable allowance for growth.

A vast team of U.N. inspectors will have to be appointed, performing to some extent the function of Lloyds agents—that is, reporting on movements of ships, as well as advising on individual application for authority to make bulk purchases of oil, and seeing that the rationing scheme is obeyed.

All oil-exporting ports will need surveillance. More important than the inspectorate, however, will be the sanctions machinery. If a U.N. inspector reports to the government of a country that a purchaser of oil who lacks the U.N. rationing authorisation is being supplied, and the government takes no action, what follows? Clearly the correct answer is that the country accused shall be given an immediate hearing to inquire whether it supplied South Africa, and, if it is found guilty and is an oil-importing country, it should have its ration reduced.

If it is an oil-exporting country its sales will be curtailed. On the other hand, if it is found that the sales to South Africa were made by an international oil company without the consent of any government, the company will have to face some similar form of sanction. The tribunals looking into such cases will have to be ready to sit at very short notice and reach findings quickly.

If this system worked, South Africa could be supplied by a producing country only in the event of an unlikely coincidence—that the

supplying country produced just enough oil to satisfy her own needs and South Africa's without having to import or export oil, or in any other way to be dependent on international oil companies.

To prevent oil from being sold to South Africa through independent businessmen, nations and international oil companies would bear the responsibility of selling only to holders of a U.N. rationing permit.

To attempt to catch the fly-by-night speculator would involve an impossibly large international police operation. For oil companies or countries which sold oil to an unauthorised person to be effectively sanctioned, companies and countries with the power to effect oil sanctions would have to place this power, for the period of the embargo, in the hands of the U.N. sanctions authority.

BOYCOTT

SOUTH

AFRICAN

GOODS