

# UMSEBENZI

VOICE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Volume 8 No 2

JULY 1992

'It's just the Sixth Kaffir War' - See Page 3



# FW'S war on the people...

# Forward to the General Strike!

## The ANC/SACP/COSATU Programme of Mass Action

### ■ AIMS OF OUR MASS ACTION

- When we return to the negotiating table, it should be to discuss the transfer of power to the people through a democratically-elected Constituent Assembly.
- But mass struggle should not end there. Struggle is the overall process through which the people determine their own future.
- Our programme of mass action must include the widest possible pro-democracy front.

### ■ CAMPAIGN DIARY

#### 1. AGITATION PERIOD

Up to the first half of July we have focussed on broad mobilisation. As part of this, the SACP leadership has addressed over 100 rallies in all major cities and in numerous rural towns from Marble Hall to Mossel Bay.

#### 2. FROM JULY 15 - HEIGHTENED MASS ACTIVITY

From July 15 up to the General Strike there will be hundreds of local and regional initiatives. Each region will spearhead the occupation of government buildings. Other actions will include:

- marches, including sectoral marches of pensioners, children, etc. on specific demands;
- work-place go-slows;
- actions directed at those involved in violence.

Among key points of focus in this period should be

- Bantustans - we must demand restoration of citizenship and reincorporation.
- Violence - dates and events to be decided locally. We need to build a broad coalition, at all levels, against government murder and corruption.

- SABC - towards the end of July we will launch the campaign for the democratisation of the SABC. This campaign will run beyond the General Strike.

#### 3. THE GENERAL STRIKE

- The General Strike will begin on August 3.
- Its duration and the exact form of actions to be taken on different days are under discussion. These will be announced soon.

The General Strike will include:

- a stayaway on a fixed day (or days) which will be used to hold township rallies and other township-based mobilising activities;
- city and town-centre occupations and other actions on other clearly designated days. Hundreds of thousands of strikers will move into the city centres.

#### 4. BEYOND THE GENERAL STRIKE

Other mass action is being planned.



## JUNE 20 1992: THE BUTCHER OF BOIPATONG FINDS OUT TH

# De Klerk's five-card trick

**D**e Klerk blundered terribly at Boipatong. But it took him some days to realise just how badly he had blundered. Why?

The answer is that De Klerk has been getting away with numerous Boipatongs. Since February 2 1990 he has been negotiating and at the same time waging low intensity warfare against our people. This strategy has worked well for De Klerk.

De Klerk has successfully projected himself as a peacemaker and a moderate to the international community and to many people in our country. At the same time the violence has been portrayed as "black on black" violence, as "tribalism", as "political rivalry" between the ANC and Inkatha.

But this time De Klerk had

**You can have a scorched earth policy in southern Angola, Ovambo or Mozambique. It is a different matter in the PWV**

become too arrogant. He badly overplayed his hand.

### FW's strategy to counter mass action

During his recent trip to Japan De Klerk bragged to journalists that he had a plan to deal with the ANC-led alliance campaign of mass action. He bragged that he was going to get tough.

All of this meant that the world was waiting to see what the regime would do in the days following the June 16 launch of our campaign.

Would there be a state of emergency? Would the ANC

and SACP be banned again?

The answer was the Boipatong massacre. But the brutal arrogance of this answer was just too much to stomach, even for a world that has got used to seeing massacres on TV screens. The sheer scale of the Boipatong massacre, and the clear involvement of the security forces, was just too much.

But the National Party regime has got used to getting away with atrocities. After all, the SADF regularly wiped out villages in southern Angola. Last year when 27 people were butchered in the Swanieville squatter camp just two days after De Klerk's last visit to Ulundi, Inkatha was blamed and there were widespread allegations of SAP collusion.

But the world quickly forgot. To this day nobody has been prosecuted for the Swanieville massacre.

And so De Klerk had every hope of pursuing his counter-strategy to our peaceful mass action campaign. His strategy continued in motion as if it hadn't lost its clothes. Captain Craig Kotze, the chief SAP press liaison officer, had obviously been told in the weeks before

## Is it a coincidence?

In 1991 the ANC set a May 4 ultimatum to the regime: end the violence or we suspend talks about talks.

■ May 10 1991, De Klerk travels to Ulundi to consult with Buthelezi about the ANC ultimatum.

2 days later...

■ On May 12 1991, twenty seven people killed by IFP hostel dwellers in an attack on Swanieville squatter camp. Widespread allegations of SAP collusion and assistance.

In 1992 June 16, ANC-alliance launches mass action campaign.

■ June 16, for only the second time in many years, FW De Klerk travels to Ulundi to consult with Buthelezi on the ANC stand. One day later...

■ On June 17, the Boipatong massacre... ★

# AT HE CAN'T ALWAYS GET AWAY WITH MURDER...

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
■ THE CARD  
Gatsha Buthelezi



**THE TRICK**  
Unite anti-democratic forces

**JUNE 16**  
De Klerk goes to Ulundi

■ THE CARDS  
Special forces and hostel dwellers



**THE TRICK**  
Unleash violence on people, hiding state involvement (card 2) behind 'black on black violence' (card 3)

**JUNE 17**  
Boipatong massacre

■ THE CARD  
SABC News



**THE TRICK**  
Blame the ANC

**JUNE 18**  
Captain Craig Kotze: 'Boipatong was caused by the ANC's mass action'

■ THE CARD  
De Klerk the Joker



**THE TRICK**  
Present FW as 'the Peacemaker'

**JUNE 20**  
De Klerk goes to Boipatong

that it was essential to lay blame for violence on the ANC. And so on June 18, Kotze dutifully told a disbelieving world that the Boipatong massacre "was caused by the ANC's mass action campaign".

**One step behind the news**

That had been part of the plan, to unleash violence and then blame our campaign. But Kotze played that trick too soon after Boipatong, too obviously. And so it has been in the weeks since the Boipatong massacre. The regime's propaganda machine has been churning out its interpretation of events, according to its pre-arranged plan. But, ridiculously, its statements have always been one step behind the news.

When it was clear that KwaMadala hostel dwellers had been involved in the massacre, the SAP was blaming the ANC. When it began to look as though Koevoet was directly involved, the SAP suddenly had a burst of activity, and agreed that the hostel-dwellers were involved after all - "but there was absolutely no evidence of any security force involvement whatsoever."

One day it will finally and conclusively be shown that Boipatong was part of an overall low intensity war sanctioned at the very highest level. When that happens, you can be sure Captain Kotze will be admit-

ting that there was "some security force involvement" after all, but they were "rogue elements acting without any higher authority".

And when Captain Kotze makes this claim, we will remind him that he said "It is a lie that President FW De Klerk has lost control of the security forces."

In being one step behind in this way, the regime's propagandists have unintentionally revealed that they are indeed acting in terms of a co-ordinated national strategy.

**FW goes to Boipatong**

An even more arrogant miscalculation was De Klerk's visit to Boipatong on June 20. Once more, he was being half too clever, he was revealing his strategy too blatantly.

On June 18 the National Party announced the launch of its election campaign into the black areas. It intended to present itself as a force for peace and moderation standing "above the terrible spiral of black on black violence".

And so the arrogant De Klerk travelled to Boipatong on June 20 with this intended message. He really expected the people of Boipatong to forget that he De Klerk had been consorting with Buthelezi on the very eve of the massacre.

De Klerk was so stunned by the reception he got at Boipatong

that he momentarily forgot that he is supposed to be presenting himself as a super-democrat. On the afternoon of June 20 he muttered threats about a state of emergency. If you catch him out, FW starts to become become PW.

De Klerk blundered at Boipatong. Part of the reason has been sheer arrogance on his part. But there are other reasons.

**FW de Klerk, the Joker**

The kind of strategy De Klerk is using has worked best in situations like Nicaragua where US Special Forces together with local puppet forces like the Contras wage low intensity war against the people.

At the same time BUT SEPARATELY a "moderate" politician like Violeta Chamorro is cultivated as an alternative to the national liberation forces.

Here in South Africa, De

Klerk is trying to be a Special Forces high commander and Violeta Chamorro at the same time.

But the people of Boipatong are perfectly capable of seeing behind apartheid president De Klerk's crocodile tears, the cold eyes of the chief commander of the SAP.

**Bush war killing machines**

There is another reason for De Klerk's blunder. To conduct the low intensity warfare, FW relies on highly professional killing machines like Koevoet and Battalion 32.

But it is one thing to massacre civilians in the remote bush of northern Namibia and southern Angola. It is a bit different doing it in the industrial heartland of South Africa.

Of course, a massacre in a township or a squatter camp is still not a massacre in a suburb.

But Boipatong is less than an hour away from the largest contingent of international press people on the African continent. It is in the heartland of the most industrialised part of our country.

Unleashing a killing machine into this kind of situation is much more transparent than in a remote bush war.

A massacre in Boipatong also impacts directly on the economy of our country.

The captains of industry in South Africa never expressed any public misgivings about the dirty war in Angola or Namibia. But it is another thing when their own work-force is destabilised here at home.

This sets up contradictions within the ruling bloc itself.

You can have a scorched earth policy in southern Angola, Ovambo or Mozambique.

It is a different matter in the PWV. ★

## Kriel must go!

Minister of "Law and Order" Hernus Kriel is one of the key figures in De Klerk's Low Intensity War against our people.

The death of over 6000 people in political violence since 1990 leaves him cold.

A month or two ago he was overheard by several people in the corridors of CODESA joking about the terrible violence in the townships: "Dit is maar net die Sesde Kafferoorlog" ("It's just the Sixth Kaffir War"). ★



## How to defeat Low Intensity Warfare

- Build **DEMOCRATIC** organisations, in which differences are debated openly and in a comradely fashion — Low Intensity Warfare exploits factionalism, whispers and gossip inside the liberation movement.
- Build **UNIFIED** organisations — LIW seeks to split leadership from its base.
- Build a **BROAD DEMOCRATIC COALITION** against murder and corruption — LIW aims to build its own "moderate" coalition.
- Build a **DISCIPLINED SELF-DEFENCE** ability — LIW wants communities to feel hopeless.
- Spread **INFORMATION** about LIW — LIW

depends on disinformation and confusion.

- **EXPOSE LIW** - we must welcome the media, we must call for international monitoring.
- *We must be the champions of PEACE and DISCIPLINE* - every act of indiscipline, every piece of ultra-militant rhetoric, every act of coercion against the people, every short-cut is a space for LIW to exploit.

**REMEMBER —**

LIW has worked quite well for the imperialists in places like Nicaragua and the Philippines. It has also had a devastating effect in remote rural areas of

Mozambique and Angola —

**BUT HERE IN SOUTH AFRICA —**

- LIW is being used in the industrial heartland of our country, in the full glare of the world's TV cameras. This makes it a much more clumsy and risky weapon for De Klerk. It also disrupts FW's own economy, we must make him pay.
- LIW depends on building a credible "pro-Western" alternative to the liberation movement. FW was hoping to be that alternative. Let us make sure that the people of our country and world never forget the blood of Boipatong. **LIW CAN BE DEFEATED!**

## Hostels: I

**T**here should be no doubt at this stage about the pattern of the violence on the Witwatersrand. There is one recurring feature in all the killing and that is the presence of Inkatha— and more particularly, of its Youth Brigade.

Around the middle of 1991, there were positive developments in progress around the hostels in most areas of the Transvaal. The hostility which had been festering between hostel dwellers and the residents of

# SDUs: Let us learn from our mistakes

**N**umerous self defence units (SDUs) have been established in our country since the December 1990 ANC Consultative Conference resolution in this regard. There can be no question that the formation of these units has contributed to saving many, many lives in a situation of escalating violence.

The formation of SDUs has also meant there has been space for building democratic organisations. The very existence of the ANC in Richmond, Natal, to take just one example, has depended upon the capacity of the people to defend themselves.

An inspiring feature in the formation of the SDUs has also been the great popular creativity we have seen.

Many SDUs have demonstrated the potential our people have to organise themselves, to acquire skills and weaponry.

Our people have been moving away from the old habit of passively waiting for material from MK.

MK does not and will not have the capacity to defend our people against all the violence coming from the system.

## SACP general-secretary CHRIS HANI writes about lessons to be learnt on the growth of Self-Defence Units

These, then, are some of the positive and inspiring features of the SDUs. These positive features once more underline the absolute correctness of our resolution calling for their formation.

But, generally speaking, it is now time to revisit this whole area of SDUs honestly and self-critically. We must admit that their record has been uneven.

### Weakness

• In the first place, there has often been a clear weakness on the side of the political organisations themselves. The first step in setting up an SDU is strengthening our political and community organisations. Individuals cannot just set themselves up as an SDU. Community control is central to SDUs. SDUs must serve the interests of the community, and they must derive

their authority from such community based organisations.

### Absence of political control

• As a result of this first weakness, there has often been a glaring absence of political control and a clear line of command. Where this is the case SDUs have sometimes been hijacked by criminal elements. These elements have then used the space created by the SDU to organise all sorts of rackets. I have heard of examples where some SDUs have tried to exact a special tax on township business-people with some implied consumer boycott if they don't comply. Political organisations must curb any such tendency immediately.

### Kangaroo courts

• We have also seen an alarming revival of kangaroo courts and kangaroo justice and even

the horrifying method of necklacing. It is extremely important to note that the entire national liberation movement has taken a very, very strong stand against the barbaric method of necklacing.

### Obstructing police

• Some elements have used SDUs to obstruct the police when the police have been engaged in justifiable crime prevention activities. SDUs must never be seen to be sheltering criminals. Criminals who prey on our communities can never be seen as modern-day Robin Hoods.

### Weapons aren't for settling differences

• The weapons in the hands of SDUs must never be used to settle political differences, or to get rid of a leadership by threats. Even if the leadership in question has become extremely unpopular, the only way to settle political differences is through debate, and through the proper democratic channels.

### Political short cuts

• Another great danger is the

use of SDUs as the cutting edge for political work - for example, comrades sometimes want to take a political short-cut. "Let's attack the hostel", they say, instead of addressing the whole question of the hostel politically. We must avoid at all cost tendencies to elevate military and offensive action over political and defensive operations.

### Infiltration of SDUs

• The enemy is generally worried by our movement's strategy to encourage the setting up of SDUs. Consequently the police and Military Intelligence have intensified their strategies to smash SDUs. Already we know of some SDUs that are heavily infiltrated. In some cases elements of the system have actually taken over SDUs.

They then use them to carry out operations to discredit the national liberation movement. Wrong targets have deliberately been selected, attacks have been carried out that are not understood or even denounced by the community.

The infiltration of SDUs has also led to a situation where rivalry has been stoked between

# Dwelling units or military bases?

the surrounding townships since 1976 - when hostel dwellers were used as police auxiliaries against township youth - were in the process of being resolved. The hostels were gradually becoming integrated into the broader community.

At this point a campaign of militancy conducted from within the ranks of the IFP's Youth Brigade worked to turn hostels on the Reef into little more than military barracks. With the formation of the

Inkatha Freedom Party in July 1990, Youth Brigade leaders moved from hostel to hostel playing on tribal tensions, persuading Zulu-speaking inmates their lives were under threat from the ANC and the 'Xhosas'. At the same time large numbers of IFP impis were moved into the Transvaal from Natal, providing a fighting core to be deployed in the hostel-centred violence which followed. The broad strategy was, cynically, to extend the sphere of influence of

KwaZulu Chief Minister Buthelezi into the Transvaal, and make him a political force more to be reckoned with than his miniscule degree of democratic support would indicate.

Two things happened around the time of the IFP takeover of hostels: one, non-IFP supporting hostel dwellers were either killed or forced out of the hostels, making way for impis from Natal. Many hostel refugees then moved into squatter camps surrounding the hostels - which

became the focus of much of the war of destabilisation.

Two, with the hostels consolidated as IFP strongholds, a cycle of violence was initiated from within the hostels which continues to this day. This violence has apparently been geared toward destabilisation and sowing terror in random ways among the township population at large.

In every case, it is areas where there are IFP-controlled hostels that the violence has been

prevalent. Areas around hostels like Sebokeng's KwaMazisa and most of the hostels in and around Pretoria - where the IFP never succeeded in getting a foothold - have remained relatively untouched by the township killings.

Equally suggestive is the fact that it was only after impis forcibly took over Madala hostel in Alexandra in March 1991 that this area became, in a matter of months, one of the worst flashpoints in the country. ★

# Learn takes

SDUs, taking advantage of poor co-ordination between different SDUs. This has happened in the Vaal, for instance.

## Lessons

From all of these negative problems certain clear lessons emerge:

- selection of people for SDUs, especially for the leadership of SDUs, must be carried out with extreme care. Only people with a clear track-record of service to their communities should be selected.

Care must be taken to avoid those whose main track-record is militant rhetoric. Make sure that people incorporated into SDUs are not lumpen elements - people who are highly adventurous, often very brave, but who are open to manipulation by the system.

- SDUs should never be cut off from the leadership of community organisations. The leadership of these organisations must demand reports from the SDUs on their activities and there must be a regular check on material used.

- Community and political organisations must be seen to be

punishing people who act contrary to the aims and objectives of the democratic movement and of the SDUs themselves.

- It is very important that the political and community organisations look into the welfare of members of SDUs. They often get picked up by the system, they and their families need legal and other assistance, otherwise demoralisation will set in.

I raise all of these criticisms not in order to undermine SDUs. On the contrary, it is crystal clear that our people desperately need to be able to defend their homes, their young children, their aged parents, their own lives.

Our struggle needs well-organised SDUs made up of our best revolutionary fighters.

We need SDUs that are ever sensitive to the needs of our people. ★



# How to wage war without it looking like you

**T**he massacre at Boipatong has underlined what many have been arguing. De Klerk is using a deliberate strategy of "low intensity war" against our people.

But what is "low intensity war"?

"Low intensity war" (LIW) is the latest in a series of imperialist strategies to counter national liberation struggles. It was developed as a strategy after the United States suffered a humiliating defeat in Vietnam in the 1970s.

The defeat of the most powerful army in the world by a national liberation movement in a poor third world country led US strategists to review their approach to counter-insurgency. This led to the strategy which they call Low Intensity Conflict or Low Intensity War.

## What's 'low' about LIW?

The first thing to remember about LIW is that it is an imperialist term - it is "low" cost for THEM. But for the third world communities against which it is directed it is HIGH cost. It is, as

one former commander of US Special Operations in El Salvador described it, "total war at the grassroots level."

LIW draws upon many earlier counter-insurgency and colonial and neo-colonial strategies - divide-and-rule, winning "hearts and minds", dirty tricks operations, assassinations and death squads. But LIW place much more stress on using proxy (puppet) forces than earlier strategies.

## Rule 1: 'Let Asians fight Asians'

In using puppet forces it prefers to use those of the same nationality as the people it is fighting.

This is the first way in which the cost is "low" for the imperialists.

Anticipating LIW strategy, United States secretary of state John Foster Dulles in the 1950s said the best way to maintain American power in the Pacific was "to let Asians fight Asians."

Does that sound familiar?

The apartheid regime has followed this principle systematically over the past decade. It

## Rule 1: 'Let Asians fight Asians'

## Rule 2: Destabilisation

## Rule 3: Disinformation

## Rule 4: Build a 'moderate', 'reformist' alternative

has used all kinds of proxy forces - Renamo, Unita, the Lesotho Liberation Army, Askaris, IFP/KZP, kitskonstabels, etc. This often means less financial cost. But most importantly the political cost is lower:

- There are far fewer deaths of white conscripts, and,
- Above all, responsibility is disguised. Violence is presented as "black on black" violence, as "inter-ethnic tribal violence", or even as "factional" violence between hawks and doves, communists and nationalists, within the national liberation movement itself.

But LIW usually also involves the use of some Special Forces drawn from the imperialist army (or in our case the SADF and SAP). These special forces are used for training, di-

recting and supplying the puppet forces. The Special Forces are also used for highly specialised tasks like assassination, infiltration and intelligence gathering.

## Rule 2: Destabilisation

The main objective of LIW is not military victory, but destabilisation. Once a country or a community has been thoroughly destabilised, the long-suffering, war-weary people will vote for a pro-Western, "moderate" government.

Destabilisation in our situation involves two major features:

- general destabilisation and demoralisation of communities through random violence (train murders and massacres like Boipatong) and
- well targetted assassination. In

Vietnam the United States imperialist discovered that often the best targets for assassination were the second and third layer leadership - the critical connection between the national and head-office leadership of democratic organisations and their regional and grass-roots support.

The assassination of national leaders (which can never be ruled out) is, nonetheless, a high risk operation.

Unless it can be "blamed" on factionalism within our movement it would have incalculable international and national repercussions. But the elimination of second and third layer leadership on the ground is less risky, and possibly much more damaging to our organisations.

## Rule 3: Disinformation

As US colonel Oliver North recently put it: "There is great deceit and deception practised in the conduct of covert operations. They are at essence a lie."

The NP Sunday newspaper *Rapport* outlined the De Klerk

# The soldiers who do the dirty work: The Spec

**T**here is no real telling just how long or how numerous are the tentacles of the covert structures of the South African security forces. Under the influence of total onslaught theory, and under the rule of PW Botha's Security Council, secret and semi-secret organs of state power proliferated at such a rate and with such deviousness that it is doubtful that even the top securocrats are fully in control of the whole Secret Forces apparatus.

Millions in secret funding and much hardware were made available during the 1970s and 1980s for informal repression.

## Loose groupings

In many instances there appears to have been just a general brief to attack and

destabilise the political opponents of the state.

Many of these loose groupings are connected to paramilitary organisations like commercial security firms (e.g. Springbok Patrols) and far right wing organisations, remain on the loose today.

These 'special forces' continue to be a factor in the covert strategies of the regime.

## SAP covert forces

SAP-connected outfits like the Vlakplaas-based Askari and Security Police squads continue to be operational despite government claims that they have become non-political investigative units, involved in such exercises as dealing with stock theft.

More recently, another 'stock theft unit', the notorious SAP 'support' unit,

## Secret and semi-secret organs of state power proliferated at such a rate that it is doubtful that even the top securocrats are fully in control of the whole Secret Forces apparatus

Koevoet, made up mainly of Ovambos recruited during the Namibian war, has resurfaced - as South African citizens. There is widespread belief that Koevoet is involved in the ongoing hostel violence.

After 42 Koevoet members were discovered hiding out at Goldfields' Greenside Colliery near Witbank, the Goldstone Commission heard evidence that the unit was involved in

the Boipatong massacre of June 17.

It is believed that members of the unit could also have been involved in numerous train massacres and in repression in Phola Park, where attackers were heard to speak foreign languages.

## SADF Special Forces

SADF Special Forces deployed for covert military operations

as they exist today are as follows:

- 32 Battalion, created in 1976 and made up 1600 to 1800 largely of Portuguese-speaking mercenary soldiers. The battalion is based at Pomfrets in the Northern Cape.

It was formerly involved in conventional operations in Angola. More recently, it has been deployed as a 'peacekeeping' force in Natal and in Reef townships.

An example of 32 Battalion's peacekeeping style was on view recently when members went on the rampage in Thokoza, killing, maiming and looting at random.

In the face of public outrage and recommendations by the Goldstone Commission that it be disbanded, the government has made no moves whatever in this direction.

# What is Low Intensity

# 're doing the fighting...

regime's approach in similar words: "Say one thing, but do the other. Keep simultaneously, a whole lot of options open in struggle. But above all, never allow the people to realise what you are really doing."

As part of the LIW disinformation operation the SADF runs what it calls COMOPS. Major Nico Basson, himself a participant in these activities, has revealed that a massive COMOPS operation was run in Namibia during the first elections there.

The aim was to discredit Swapo, and build up the credibility of DTA.

At present, here in South Africa, one of the main aims of the disinformation campaign is to portray the huge wave of LIW violence as "black on black".

#### Rule 4: Build a 'moderate', 'reformist' alternative

The objective of LIW is the political defeat of a national liberation movement. This requires that some "moderate" alternative is manufactured.

After a series of defeats in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the US has since managed very successfully to snatch victory from national liberation movements, combining LIW and the creation of a "moderate" political bloc. Two notable examples, among many others, are the Philippines (Cory Aquino) and Nicaragua (Violeta Chamorro).

Sometimes, however, where a credible alternative is not to be found outside of the liberation movement, LIW is used to transform the liberation movement from within.

The aim is to try, through massive destabilisation, to turn the liberation movement into a reformist, pro-imperialist party.

#### But is De Klerk really using LIW?

Hundreds of facts can be quoted to underline what township dwellers throughout South Africa know from their own daily experience. Since February 2 1990 over 6000 people have been killed in political violence.

No fewer than 49 massacres

have occurred in the Reef and southern Transvaal in the past two years costing the lives of 1250 people - an average of 25 per atrocity.

We could go on and on. But the last word belongs to SAP press liaison officer, Captain Craig Kotze. Reacting to allegations that Boipatong showed that FW De Klerk had lost control of his security forces, Captain Kotze said that it was "an absolute lie."

Exactly. ★



## Special Force killing machines

• Five separate reconnaissance regiments totalling about 7 000 highly and unconventionally trained and dangerous SADF soldiers, whose overall headquarters is at Spieskop outside Pretoria. While they have apparently not been deployed in recent covert operations inside South Africa, they have yet to be demobilised.

• 1 Recce: Based in Natal, 1 Recce is made up of 1000 to 1200 soldiers at present. Involved in recce training, the unit has also been involved in raids in Maputo, Maseru and Gaborone, as well as Angolan operations, and in the training of MNR rebels.

• 2 Recce is the largest of the recce regiments, with an overall reserve strength of between 2 000 and 3 000 members. The special function of this recce group is to provide Citizen

Force manpower to Special Forces. In the event of a massive clampdown over mass action, it is likely that 2 Recce will be among the first units to be fully mobilised.

• 3 Recce was formed to accommodate former members of the Rhodesian Special Forces, and was later fused with the CCB.

• 4 Recce, made up of some 300 to 400 personnel is based at Langebaan, and is specially equipped for seaborne operations. It was believed to have been integrally involved in sabotage operations in Angolan harbours.

• 5 Recce, between 500 and 600 strong, is, like 32 Battalion, made up largely of Portuguese speakers, but this time recruited from Mozambique. It is made up of intelligence as well as operational commandos. Extensively deployed in

support of Renamo bandits in Mozambique, it is the only recce regiment alleged to have been deployed recently inside the country, in a commuter train attack in Benrose, Johannesburg.

• Added to these officially extant special forces regiments, there is also the former CCB.

When the former 'Section 6' (the internal arm of the special forces) was disbanded in July 1990, many of its members were reincorporated into other special forces outfits.

#### Military Intelligence

Finally (though not properly a 'special forces' outfit) there is the SADF's Department of Military Intelligence, a giant apparatus in itself and integrally involved in repression against political opponents of the state. ★

# Intensity Warfare?

# Dan Tloome: Patriot and communist

**D**an Tloome the SACP's immediate past chairperson died in Johannesburg on June 12 after a long illness. Known to all his comrades as "Oom" (Uncle) Dan, he was born in Bloemfontein in 1919.

After attending school in Bloemfontein, Uncle Dan studied at the Modderpoort Anglican Teachers' Training Institute where he graduated as a teacher.

Towards the end of the 1920s the family moved to Johannesburg and Uncle Dan followed some time later. In Johannesburg he gave up teaching and became an organiser in the Milling Workers' Union, of which he was later elected secretary.

## Trade Unions

With the outbreak of the Second World War, African workers flocked into industry and a new wave of militancy swept through the trade union movement. In November 1941 a meeting of trade union delegates from all over the Transvaal was held in Johannesburg. This meeting launched the Council of Non-European Trade Unions



(CNETU).

CNETU was the direct forerunner of SACTU and COSATU. Among the first officials of CNETU was Dan Tloome, who was elected vice-president.

## ANC

Dan Tloome also became very active in the ANC in the course of the 1940s. He was a founder member of the ANC Youth League (launched in 1944). He was elected chairperson of the Orlando branch of the ANC in 1945.

He was later to become full-time secretary/bookkeeper of the national ANC. At the 1949 ANC conference, 'Uncle Dan' Tloome was one of the new militants elected to the national executive committee.

## Communist Party

It was also during the early 1940s that Dan Tloome became an active member of the Communist Party. He was elected to the Johannesburg District Committee of the Party and later to the Central Committee. Together with JB Marks, he played a big

part in building up the Mineworkers' Union and in organising the great strike of 1946 in which nearly 100 000 miners went on strike.

Uncle Dan played a prominent part in the organisation of the historic Defiance Campaign of 1952.

Together with other leaders and militants he was tried and convicted under the Suppression of Communism Act for his part in leading the campaign.

Uncle Dan's outstanding role on all fronts of struggle made him a prime target for the wave of apartheid repression then sweeping the country.

He was barred from attending gatherings, and he was ordered to resign from all organisations to which he belonged.

Undeterred by the harassment, he became editor of the journal *Liberation*, which included among its contributors Ruth First, Duma Nokwe, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu.

## Exile

The apartheid regime's vindictiveness against Uncle Dan continued. In 1963 he was placed under house arrest.

In that year the underground SACP took the decision to send Uncle Dan out of the country to promote the work of the movement abroad.

Through the exile years, Dan Tloome remained a staunch revolutionary. He served as a central committee member of the SACP, and as an executive member of the ANC and SACTU. During the 1970s he was appointed Deputy Secretary General of the ANC. In 1986 he was elected SACP chairperson.

After the unbanning of the ANC and SACP Dan Tloome finally returned to South Africa in 1991. It is one of the sadnesses of our struggle that by the time of his return Uncle Dan was in poor health.

The new generation of young revolutionaries were never able to see Dan Tloome in his prime, one of the giants of our struggle, one of those who played a critical role in the years when our movement truly discovered its vocation and its mass and working class base.

Dan Tloome, pioneer trade unionist, militant patriot and communist - HAMBAKAHLE, OOM DAN!



■ The mystery of the death of one of the SACP's most dedicated young cadres has not yet been solved. Cde Fani Johannes Jiba, 36, died on June 3 after being shot by a security guard at a taxi rank in Butterworth in the Transkei. At the time, he was chairperson of the Party's Transkei region.

■ The famous MK short bursts of the AK47 were the cream on top of full military honours for Cde Jiba - whose MK name was Mdidiyela Mbambo - at his funeral in East London on June 21 (see photo above).

■ Police, who had been observing the funeral from a distance, advanced on mourners to try to find out where the fire came from - but in true guerilla fashion, the weapon was concealed.

## Flying the flag all over South Africa

Since May Day the SACP's leadership has been involved in a countrywide campaign to meet the people.

In the two months to the beginning of July SACP general secretary cde Chris Hanu, in particular, has been on the road. He has been to more than a hundred meetings in this period. In some cases he has been to as many as five meetings in a day.

One of the biggest gatherings took place in Kimberley, where militant comrades from the Chris Hanu Park squatter camp crammed into the local stadium to hear a delegation from head office.

Cde Chris has since been to Bloemfontein and Welkom in the Orange Free State; Pietersburg, Phalaborwa and Steelpoort in the Northern Transvaal. In the Border region he has covered East London and environs; Cathcart, Dordrecht, Indwe, Barkly East, Seymour, Balfour, Adelaide and Fort Beaufort. He has covered the PWV region and the Western Cape.

Thousands of people countrywide have attended SACP meetings in this period to confirm the Party belief that socialism is the future. ★