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Vol. IX No. 8


September 1976

PAIGC-1956-1976

20th Anniversary, from Liberation Movement
to Victory to Government



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Rhodesia Attacks Escalate**



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OUR COLLECTIVE

SOUTHERN AFRICA is published monthly, except for a double issue July-August, by the Southern Africa Committee, 244 West 27th Street, Fifth floor, New York, N.Y. 10001.

All subscriptions run from January to December. Those readers subscribing later in the year will be sent back issues to January, or after June, readers may opt for the 7 month subscription. Subscription rates are \$6.00 per year for individuals; 7 month subscription from June is \$4.00; institutions are \$18.00 per year. Cost per copy is 75¢, \$1.00 for the double issue. Airmail postage (in addition to the subscription rate) is: Caribbean, Central America—\$9.50; Africa, Asia—\$14.50; Europe, South America—\$12.50. Gift subscriptions available for prisoners. If unable to send \$6.00 please write to us for other arrangements.

SOUTHERN AFRICA is available on microfilm through University Microfilm, Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106

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RETURN TO GUINEA-BISSAU

by Stephanie Urdang



Pupils at the intermediate school in Quebo, an ex-Portuguese enclave in a liberated zone, perform a skit on the Council of Races which Spínola formed during his government. "Spínola" is to the right with glasses. Through these cultural and theatrical activities which are developed in each school, the history and culture of Guinea-Bissau are learnt and emphasized.

"Rebuilding Guinea-Bissau is like work in the rice-fields. Some of the rivers are salty. Everybody must build a wall around his portion of the rice field to keep out the salt water. If just one person does not build his wall or builds it badly, it will let in the water for the whole community."

— Bwetna N'Dubi, Balante
Peasant woman, member of a
regional council.

"Next time we will meet in Bissau", Guineans told me when I left the liberated zones in June 1974. I had just spent eight weeks with PAIGC and the first negotiations with Portugal after the April coup were underway. Despite this voiced optimism, the mood was one of caution. It was still too early to presume that arms were not again to be picked up to fight the colonialists, and behind our smiles and warm farewells lurked a question mark. Maybe. And if so, how long would that take? But a few months later the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, one year old after its self-proclaimed independence in September 1973, became the newest member of the United Nations. Far sooner any of us at that time could have hoped or dreamed.

Just under two years later the Transport Aereos Guinea-Bissau (TAGB) plane in which I was travelling from Dakar landed at Bissalanca Airport, just outside of Bissau. I stepped down out of the ex-Portuguese troop transport plane and could not contain my joy and emotion. After years of following and supporting the armed struggle

against Portuguese colonialism, after seeing that armed struggle and the reconstruction in the liberated zones at first hand, after feeling the great excitement of victory, I was finally in Bissau.

For the next eight weeks I was made to feel welcome and at home in this country. From that first afternoon when comrades exerted extensive efforts to find me a place to stay, I was shown a hospitality that I have never before experienced. The fact that I had been with them in the liberated zones—witnessing the difficulties and harshness of life—seemed to mean a lot and gave an added dimension to the way I received. It meant a lot to me. I travelled now through most parts of the country visiting the old liberated areas, passing at times through places I had been during the war—then on foot, now by landrover or Peugeot—speaking to people, visiting villages and towns, attending mass meetings, visiting schools, hospitals, people's stores. All the while listening, looking, learning and trying to understand what it means to rebuild a country after centuries of colonialism, after decades of economic destruction, after years of devastating war.

The first thing that I had to understand was that Guinea-Bissau inherited from the Portuguese *nothing*. "*Nada, nada, nada*," they would say in creole, always using the word repetitively for emphasis. It was hard to come from many years in the United States and from South Africa before that, a country that is in comparison very highly developed, and appreciate what it means to have nothing. "Portuguese" Guinea was totally neglected by the Portuguese, for it was virtually owned by one



The priority for the development of the country is agriculture and tremendous emphasis is placed on the rural areas. Pupils from the Kwame Nkrumah Secondary School in Bissau go out into the

countryside each week to work on the land. On the right is the director of the school.

Portuguese company Companhia Uniao Fabril (CUF) who had no interest in providing any services for the people of Guinea-Bissau. When the Portuguese army and administration departed at independence they made sure they took with them everything that could be moved. What could not be removed was, for the most part, simply destroyed. Such as the equipment at the military hospital which had served the Portuguese army during the war. Or the radio station.

When the Portuguese left, the new PAIGC government inherited an unworkable economy, of one of the most undeveloped and poor countries of Africa. In order for the Portuguese administration to compete with the successes of the liberated zones, prices for basic commodities were artificially low and many salaries artificially high. Whereas in the liberated zones sufficient rice was grown to feed the population—even to export, as had been done one year—in the Portuguese areas virtually every grain of rice had to be imported. And so the Portuguese sold the rice for 7 escudos, although they were importing it at 15 escudos. All Guinea-Bissau's gold sat in Portugal and to this day has not been returned. The country had and still has virtually no foreign currency. With independence came the massive relocation of the population, as refugees returned from Senegal and the Republic of Guinea (Conakry), as peasants who had fled to the towns to avoid the bombing returned to their villages and as the people in the liberated zones, who had moved their villages into the forests, returned to their own land. Their priority was to re-establish their homes, so long denied them, and agricultural production suffered a great set back. The government had to import nearly all its food, including 30,000 tons of rice. It was not possible to sell the rice for less than have been paid for it, so the price increased, causing added hardships. This past year the situation improved and rice imports were reduced to 10,000 tons.

My visit coincided with the coming of the rains and the

planting of rice, peanuts, manioc and other produce. Everywhere peasants could be seen working in the fields from early morning to late afternoon. As I drove through the countryside, comrades I was with would enthusiastically point to land under cultivation for the first time. "The people are working hard this year", they would say with pleasure and satisfaction. The rains had come on time and were evenly spread throughout the country. It looks as if a major obstacle—the shortage of food—will be overcome.

This is no small matter as agriculture is the basis of the economy of Guinea-Bissau, with over 95 per cent of the population being peasants. Rivers zig-zag their way across the country in abundance and with the heavy rainfall in the rainy season as well as the rich soil, Guinea-Bissau is in a fairly unique situation in Africa to be potentially totally self-sufficient for their food. Not only self-sufficient, but the export of agricultural products will form the major part of its foreign trade. (There is a large deposit of Bauxite, greater than that of the Republic of Guinea and this will be mined in the future).

Throughout the country there are experimental farms working on improving the agricultural output. Plans are being developed for large-scale projects, some of which have already begun. A sugar-refinery and cane fields financed by Dutch and British firms, will produce 60,000 tons of sugar by 1980. It will employ 2,500 people and a town is being planned for the workers with housing, schools, medical services, cinemas etc. In Bolama I saw the foundations being laid for a large juice canning factory, financed by Holland, which will process fruit grown in different parts of the country as well as develop plantations for fruit in Bolama itself—mangos, pineapples, cashew fruit, oranges, grapefruit. Agronomists from the People's Republic of China were in the country when I was there, completing a study for rice production along the banks of the broad Jeba river, which will yield large quantities of rice, to be harvested twice a year. A few

state-owned co-operatives are being developed, and more are projected. I visited a coconut co-operative outside of Bolama which was worked by members of FARP—the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, the national army. They combined their daily work with learning to read and write. Every three months the 80 soldiers were rotated. The co-operative had previously been a plantation owned by Gouveia—which along with Companhia Uniao Fabril (CUF) totally monopolized the economy of Guinea Bissau. When Gouveia was nationalized, the plantation was developed into a co-operative. It will eventually be run 60 non-FARP workers, but now with the lack of money this is impossible. Meanwhile soldiers work the land, as they do in other areas throughout the country. "Soldiers need to understand the importance of agriculture and production to our country," the Secretary-General of FARP told me. "They must help the people with production."

Improving the conditions of life

"Keep always in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone's head. They are fighting . . . for material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children. National liberation, war on colonialism, building of peace and progress—independence—all that will remain meaningless for the people unless it brings a real improvement in conditions of life. It is pointless to liberate a region if its populations then remain without essential goods."

—Amilcar Cabral
Quoted in Basil Davidson,
The Liberation of Guiné.

These words never meant more to me than when I was travelling through the countryside, or being taken on a "tour" of the *bairros* (districts) of Bissau. People did have


enough to eat. I saw no signs of hunger and the children generally looked healthy. The exceptions to this appeared to be in the old Portuguese areas, rather than in the former liberated zones.


Having enough to eat is no small feat, but beyond that much has yet to be done to improve the "material benefits" of the people. The problems confronting the Government as it begins to establish people's stores, hospitals, schools and other services for the people are immense. First there is the basic problem of lack of funds. But what is the use of a people's store if goods cannot be transported because there are no roads? (I saw signs of road building and repair everywhere I went.) What is the use of a school building if there is no paper, no chalk, no teachers? There were many more schools, hospitals, people's stores than under the colonialists but certainly not enough yet for the whole country and this will no doubt take a few years to achieve. At one meeting of the population I attended in the south, the newly elected president of a village council or base committee as they are now called, stood up towards the end and said that the people of his village had asked him to bring to the attention of the *responsables* that they had no people's store and this caused much hardship. They had been promised one a year before, but it had not materialized. Now the rainy season was beginning and it would soon be impossible to get goods and because of the bad roads they would be isolated. The Party *responsable* for the region responded and spoke about the need for patience, emphasizing that they could only go step by step. But that in the future these services and more would be available for the people.

I was driven through the *bairros* of Bissau by the assistant Mayor. He spared me nothing. We drove over "roads" that were gauged deep with ruts and almost impassable. In a month or so they would be rivers. The housing varied from small neat, tile-roof houses, dotted here and there, to more commonly shacks of one description or another—either badly weathered mud huts or brick

One of the many people's stores being built throughout the country. This store is in Campeane, a village that has been rebuilt since independence, as the peasants transferred their village to the

forest at the beginning of the war to lessen the possibility of attack by the Portuguese army.





Each numbered doorway of this house in Bissau represents the home of a family and is without running water or electricity. Under the corrugated iron roof the heat of the day is intensified. The planned new housing will have tile roofs and houses that can be renovated will have their iron roofs replaced.

houses patched together with beaten out metal drum or crates used to ship war materiel. Electricity was scarce and running water generally non-existent. Round the communal taps women and children gathered to collect water. Overcrowding was in evidence everywhere. I was shown a section of one *bairro* where houses were neatly lined up along the street, complete with electricity and running water. They had been built when Spínola was Governor, for supporters of the Portuguese regime by political prisoners who worked from early morning to dusk, without stop under the blinding sun. At lunch time a large container of rice was brought to the work site and the prisoners had to line up and walk past the container and, without breaking their pace, grab a handful of rice. That was their food for the day. One woman political prisoner who was working with her baby on her back, discovered that the child had died from sunstroke. She was not allowed to stop work and continued till the end of the day, her dead baby still tied to her back. Many of those who were imprisoned at that time still carry the scars of the whippings they were given regularly.

The small brick houses with tiled roofs are the models for all the future housing in the area. Extensive plans are presently being developed to build housing, provide sanitation and electricity to build the roads, to rebuild the markets and eradicate the present unhygienic conditions. Already interim measures are being taken and I was shown small one or two roomed constructions with refrigeration that are being built for the sale of fish and meat. The government plans to begin the reconstruction of the *bairros* within the coming year, but it will clearly take years to complete.

Bissau is not the central focus of the country even if it is the capital. Emphasis is placed on developing the economy in the countryside and not developing the town of Bissau, although it is the center of the administration and government. "What for?", I was told by one commissioner. "We have seen how capitals have been developed in other parts of Africa to the detriment of the people. Where just kilometres outside of the towns people have never seen a car or hardly know that the government has become 'independent'. We must be able to learn from other people's mistakes".



A meeting of the population continues despite a heavy downpour. People had come from miles around to attend the meeting where the members of five village councils, recently elected by the population, were presented. Some of these are standing to the left and right of the landrover where the political responsables and the president of the sector sheltered while speaking to the people.

The country has been divided into eight regions, each with its President. The regions are then divided into sectors, sections and finally the villages. There are party and state responsables working throughout these divisions, as well as party and state committees elected by the people at all levels. In addition there are People's Justice tribunals, and committees for JAAC (Juventude Africano Amílcar Cabral, the Youth Organization) and the women's organization.

While I was on a visit to the interior I was present at a meeting of the population to present the five members of six village councils that had been elected shortly before. (In keeping with PAIGC policy during the war, all the committees had at least two women members.) If these elections had taken place at the time of independence in the former Portuguese areas, those in authority would have been automatically elected. Before truly representative elections could take place, the people had to understand what the independence of Guinea-Bissau really meant and what participation of the people was all about. Much political education and discussions had to take place in order to explain this to people imbued with a mentality imposed by Portuguese colonialism.

A meeting of the People's National Assembly had been held in Bissau shortly before my arrival and it demonstrated the high level of mass participation in the government of the country. The problems that were brought by the deputies, the level of the discussion, the demands made, the criticisms voiced, the decisions voted for, all evidenced the deep understanding and concern and the political awareness of the deputies, mostly peasants elected by the people.

"It's all there", one Party militant said to me. "The people know and understand their problems better than the members of the government. They must be listened to carefully. Their political consciousness is very high as a result of the armed struggle and the politicising of PAIGC. They must lead us."

At the Assembly, many laws were discussed in detail, and passed such as a new law about marriage and the family and one about divorce. Other regulations were introduced as a result of discussions, for example one reflecting the concern about alcoholism, a carry over from



Teodora Gomes addresses a meeting of the population in Pitche a small town that was in the Portuguese-controlled area during the war. She is a member of the 10-member Women's Commission which heads the Women's Organization. She is the representative

of the Commission to the Region of Gabu, where she was visiting to speak to women and continue the process of politicizing women, a fundamental goal of the Commission.

life under colonialism. Deputies called for and voted for a ban on the commercial production and sale of palm wine. In future, families may collect it for their own personal use but beyond that it is forbidden.

And so, step by step, the development of Guinea-Bissau goes forward. I saw how the government is trying to develop a country that would benefit all its people, and one in which the people themselves would participate fully—a continuation of what was prevalent in the old liberated zones. The direction is clear and the goals revolutionary and socialist, though Marxist or socialist terminology are used sparingly, in keeping with Amilcar Cabral's ideology. "It is a question of semantics and not ideology", a member of the central committee said to me.

Step by step. It's a slow process, as so much needs to be done at times the problems seem overwhelming. "We are trying to do the impossible," the same comrade said to me quietly. He stopped and looked beyond me contem-

platively. "Somehow, somehow we are achieving the impossible."

Stephanie Urdang is a member of the Southern Africa collective. She has just recently returned from a two-month visit to Guinea-Bissau. In future issues she will cover in more detail different aspects of the national reconstruction being undertaken by PAIGC and the government.

* Footnote: The term Commissioners and not Minister is used. They feel that "Minister" denotes a sense of authority and decision-making, which does not reflect the collective way in which the Commissariats are run.

Photos by Stephanie Urdang

South Africa

politics

BLACK UPRISINGS CONTINUE IN THE FACE OF REPRESSION

The uprisings which started in Soweto on June 16th when high school students demonstrating against the use of Afrikaans in schools were brutally killed by police bullets, have not stopped. (see Southern Africa August issue). They have continued to erupt all around the country. During the first week the uprisings spread to all of the Black townships that surround Johannesburg including Alexandria, Daveyton, Tokosa, Natalspruit, Vosloorys, Katelong, Tembisa and Kagiso. Students at the University of the North at Twifloop and at the University of Zululand near Embangeni set fire to Administration buildings and organized marches on their campuses. Both black universities were closed down by armed police and a number of students were arrested.

Despite Prime Minister Vorster's statement that new measures would be taken "without regard to persons" and despite the massive killings by police in Soweto, Alexandria and elsewhere, there were big militant demonstrations outside Pretoria in the black townships of Mamelodi, Garankuwa, Mabopane and Atteridgeville. Students at Mamelodi High School hung up a banner which read "Soweto we are one." Bantu Administration Board offices were destroyed and beer halls and bottle stores were burnt down, depriving the board of its largest single source of money—outlets for its multi-million dollar brewery. Still later, ten days after Soweto, more incidents expressing Blacks' anger and frustration occurred in Langa near Capetown, Jouberton and Klerksdorp.

The South African Government has resorted to a brutal series of killings, arrests and detentions under the Terror-



The students of Soweto: continuing the demonstrations.

ism Act and the new State Security legislation. At the same time it has tried to preserve its "liberal" image for the rest of the world by backing down on its compulsory use of Afrikaans in the schools. Mr. Botha the Minister of "Bantu Education" has not totally reversed the Government's former position, but has said that the government will agree to authorize school principals to apply for *permission* to teach in English to the Secretary of Bantu Administration. However a little over a week later the Government closed down all schools in black townships indefinitely and the Minister of Justice, Mr. Kruger, announced a ban on all political gatherings.

There is little information available about the wave of arrests and detentions. An official statement gave a total of 1298 arrested, but made no mention of how many people had been detained. (Under the new State Security law the government can hold suspects up to a year without trial.) There have been arrests connected with the uprisings at all three black Universities. Dozens of young people from Soweto are being held at John Vorster Square and according to a local reporter who saw some of them in cells some detainees appeared to be no older than eight. The police announced that 33 of the young people held *were* under 18 but refused to give details of the charges against them. Thomas Manthatha, an executive of the Black Peoples Convention was arrested on June 30th as was Victor Gallinga, an official of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Southern Africa. Jairus Kgokong, a member of SASO and resident of Soweto was arrested on July 16. The government has used the events of the last weeks, not to come to terms with the Blacks, but to intensify repression. Time is running out for them and even moderate Black leaders are making demands which are totally contrary to apartheid policies. Abolition of the pass system, abolition of the Group Areas Act and acceptance of urban blacks as citizens of South Africa were some of the demands presented to the Government by moderate blacks from the townships in the form of a memorandum which said that if demands were not met, South Africa

would drift into a confrontation "of such dimensions that the current unrest will be like a Sunday school picnic by comparison."

Despite repressive measures, e.g. the government ban of a mass burial of the students and teachers killed in Soweto, and police occupation of more than 20 black townships, resistance continues. Hundreds of people in Soweto, though not allowed a mass burial, gathered with clenched fists to sing black anthems at the funeral of a 13 year old boy, one of the first children to be killed. His funeral was a symbolic commemoration of all who had been murdered. On July 18, students at Fort Hare, a black university on the border of the Ciskei held a meeting on the uprisings and bombed the main campus buildings with gasoline bombs. Police were called in and the University was closed.

Most recently there have been confrontations in the coal mining center of Witbank. There, on July 20th, thousands of black youth came out of the townships and attacked people living in the surrounding areas, and cars driven by whites. Students attacked Government buildings and vehicles. Riot police armed with automatic rifles were called in under orders to suppress any uprisings with all necessary force.

If the Government had expected there to be no problems with the opening of schools outside the Johannesburg area, they were very much mistaken. In Mhluzi, another township in the Witbank area students from six schools marched together shouting anti-government slogans and stoning Government vehicles. Only one black was reported killed which is no doubt a conservative figure. The police later sealed off several townships after summoning reinforcements. All schools were closed indefinitely and students were warned not to gather, not even for sports.

Not since Sharpeville has there been such upheaval in South Africa. But this time there is a notable difference: Angola is free, Mozambique is free and the struggles in Zimbabwe and Namibia are intensifying. It is now a



South African police seizing a demonstrator in Guguleta outside Capetown. The demonstrations spread to the Cape area in mid-August.



A policeman arresting an Alexandra resident (one of the Johannesburg townships) who had been shot in the leg.

Government buildings burning in Soweto.





A Soweto mother, mourning her child, who was shot in the riots. One of her grandchildren is with her.

matter of time but it is also a matter of lives. Blacks in South Africa are standing up to government repression with courage and a faith in the future. The biggest high school at Orlando in Soweto has a spray painted message on the wall—"Victory is certain—Orlando MPLA" (*Sunday Times*, London, June 26; *The Guardian*, (London), June 22, 25, 23, July 3, 7; *New York Times*, July 2, 3, 11, 7, 16, 4, 19, 17, 21; *The Star*, July 3, June 19; *The Guardian* (New York) June 30; *The Observer*, July 11; *Southern Africa*, June issue)

SOUTH AFRICA—INDEPENDENT AFRICA STATES

The derailing of the Apartheid regime's detente strategy in Africa has caused the regime to use more subtle means to co-opt African Governments into being supporters of the status-quo in southern Africa. Economic linkages are being more heavily emphasized in order to push African leaders into the position of being allies of the apartheid regime. A new propaganda agency, the "Southern African Freedom Foundation," was formed in June 1976. Its trustees include most of the prominent South African businessmen, such as Mr. Raymond Ackerman, Mr. Aaron Beare, Dr. Jan Hupkes, and Mr. Gerry Muller. The Foundation's chief executive officer is Mr. F. R. Metrowich from the African Institute, a pro-apartheid propaganda agency masquerading as an "academic" institution. According to Mr. Metrowich, the group's objective is the promotion of "freedom and democracy in Africa, particularly Southern Africa" through the "dissemination of information on issues affecting African countries," through having experts from African states visit South

Africa, and through their own visits to African states. Meanwhile the British corporation, Lonhro, with investments in Zimbabwe and South Africa threatened by the liberation struggle, is using its control of the *Standard* of Nairobi, Kenya, to promote the acceptance of the "Bantustan" concept. For example, a typical *Standard* editorial states that "South Africa is daily becoming stronger, while in most ways, the rest of Africa is becoming weaker. . . . There is no realistic way they [the liberation movements] can beat South Africa. . . . The affairs of [African] governments are badly mismanaged and many countries face bankruptcy and economic stagnation." (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 19, 1976)

THERON COMMISSION: MIRAGE OF REFORM

The South African regime is behaving like a typical colonial regime faced with the growing resistance of its colonial "wards." Just as the resistance of the oppressed majority is becoming more unified and stronger, the Apartheid regime—the colonial rulers of South Africa—published a report which purports to create "reforms," but is really a strategic maneuver to detach one section of the oppressed Black majority from the liberation struggle. Thus, the very week African students rioted against the "Bantu Education System," the Theron Commission issued its report on the social, economic, and political position of the Coloured community, and the Government issues its White paper on the report's recommendations.

The 20 member Commission, headed by Professor Erika Theron of the Sociology department of Stellenbosch University, met for three years. In a 600 page report, the Commission recommended 178 "reforms." A summary of the recommendations is as follows:

1. A body of experts "should investigate the eventual political re-integration of the Coloured people."
2. "Provision should be made for a satisfactory formula of direct Coloured representation and say in the various levels of government and decisionmaking."
3. "The existing Westminster-based government system will have to be changed to conform to the distinctive demands of the South African plural population."
4. Since "job reservation between Coloured and Whites no longer fulfills any appreciable function . . . the Government [should] endeavor through information and guidance and by its own example to remove all forms of administrative and traditional job reservation in respect of the Coloureds."
5. "In those parts of the country which are demarcated as Coloured and White labour areas, and as Coloured preference areas, an equal effort should be made to ensure that every White and every Coloured worker is fully employed."
6. "Coloured residential areas should be systematically developed as communities so that rising buying power would increasingly flow to Coloured entrepreneurs."
7. "The principle of racially mixed companies [should] be extended with non-Coloured shareholders initially holding over 50 percent of the shares."
8. "Coloured businessmen should be encouraged to become members of White business and employers' organizations."
9. The Coloured Development Corporation should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Development Corporation.
10. The Industrial Conciliation Act should be amended to

allow the establishment of "mixed trade unions between Whites and Coloured . . . without any limitation on Coloured membership of a trade union executive."

11. "The Western Cape should be mainly the labour area of the Whites and Coloureds."
12. Coloureds should "be allowed to buy or rent agricultural land anywhere in the country without a permit."
13. The Mixed Marriage Act and Immorality Act should be repealed.
14. Coloured students should be allowed to attend *private* White elementary and secondary schools.
15. All the White universities should be opened to Coloured students, and White students should be allowed to attend the University of the Western Cape (Coloured).

(*Guardian*, London, June 19, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, June 26, 1976)

None of these recommendations are aimed at fundamentally altering the position of the Coloured community within the South African system. Their objective is to separate the Coloureds from the Africans. By throwing the Colored community a few crumbs, it is hoped that they will falsely think that their position can change under the Apartheid regime. The recommendations are the response of the "verligte" (enlightened) section within the Afrikaner community to the Black Consciousness movement of the 1970s. In other words, these politicians are attempting to make the Coloured community identify psychologically with the fortunes of White South Africa, so that they can become cannon fodder against the liberation movement.

This is the reason for the total support of these recommendations by the Progressive Reform Party and the United Party. Mr. Enthoven (M.P., Progressive Reform Party) stated that there should be "a new constitution representing all groups, with *safeguards for minority groups*." (Italics added) In other words, the method of White control should change but the objective would remain the same. All English language newspapers endorsed the recommendations. The President of the faculty council of the University of Cape Town, Dr. J. P. Duminy

viewed it as a method to restore "academic freedom." The Archbishop of Cape Town, Most Rev. Bill Burnett, stated that "the implementation of the commission's recommendations would create a whole new atmosphere in relationships between the races in South Africa." (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 26, July 10, 1976) The objective of this segment of the White community is to modify some of the grossest, overt aspects of the system without changing its basic nature. The economic and political oppression of the Black majority would continue, but the tactics would become more subtle.

Responding to the Commission, the National Party issued a White Paper on June 18 which stated that it will study the possibility of implementing many, but not all of the recommendations. It immediately rejected the possibility of giving Coloureds *direct* representation in the *existing* Parliamentary system and the repeal of the Immorality and Mixed Marriage Acts. The National Party is considering reorganizing the constitutional structure. One possibility being discussed is the expansion of the powers of the State President who would then be chosen under a system in which Indians, and Coloureds, along with Whites, would participate. This would lead in the view of Mr. Piet Marais (MP, National Party) to the "situation . . . where the 'non-Black groups' could talk with each other on a consultative basis over matters of common concern." Another possibility involves the creation of a Third House, or a reform of the Senate, which would have both White and Coloured members. Because of the Government's response, the *Friend* wrote that "the Government has given notice that it is likely, once again, to ignore the writing on the wall. . . . Admittedly they [the unacceptable recommendations] make up only three of a total of 178 recommendations submitted by the Commission. But only a fool would not appreciate that these three are among the most relevant to the whole Coloured tragedy." (*Star*, Johannesburg, July 2, 1976; *Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, June 25, 1976)

COLOURED AND INDIAN POLITICS



Sonny Leon, a leader of the (Coloured) Labor Party, favors Black solidarity.



The South African Indian Council (SAIC) has proposed that the first meeting of the Inter-Cabinet Consultative Council of Coloured and Indians take place during the Parliamentary recess. This proposal was emphatically re-

jected by the (Coloured) Labor Party which opposes the Council concept. Explaining his Party's position, Mr. Sonny Leon stated that "the Labour Party, which has the mandate of the Coloured People, rejected the Council on the basis that it was 'racialistic' in excluding African representation. We are not calling for an exclusive Coloured representative on the Cabinet. If an African, Asian, or White turns out to be the better man standing for election, then we will elect him." He criticized the SAIC's policy of "going along" with the Cabinet Council, and advocated, instead, that the Indian management committees call for the immediate dissolution of the SAIC on the grounds that it was rejected by the Indian people: "I [Mr. Leon] appeal to these SAIC members with a conscience to quit this sterile body in the name of Black solidarity" (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 12, July 10, 1976)

Despite this conflict with the Indian Council leaders, there have been talks between the Labor Party and the SAIC over a possible merger of the Indian Council and the Coloured Representative Council. Mr. Gopee Munsook, the Cape member of the SAIC executive stated that he favored the merger because "we have been living and trading together, intermarrying and attending the same schools. So I don't see why we can't merge the councils till we got parliamentary representation." The Labour Party Chief Whip, Mr. Lofty Adams remarked that "we find ourselves in similar situations, since we both have ethnic councils. . . . We should get together to hammer out a pattern of uniformity. Once we have sorted ourselves out, the African not amenable to the homeland concept should in their own right be allowed to do the same and then the two bodies should get together." (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 5, 1976)

Meanwhile the SAIC executive asked Prime Minister Vorster to give the Indian community direct representation on town boards and local councils in Natal. Vorster gave a "non-committal" reply. A member of the Natal Executive Council, in charge of local government, Mr. Derrick Watterson expressed total opposition to any "mixed" local councils pointing out that the Indians could not be given participation while it was denied to the Coloureds and Africans. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 12, 1976)

RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION

On March 18 a member of the African National Congress underground, Mr. Joseph Mdluli, was arrested in SA. He died 24 hours later from the tortures inflicted during his detention by BOSS members. The Mdluli family home was raided on March 19. Initially the Apartheid regime claimed that Mr. Mdluli had "committed suicide." But when his widow was allowed two days later to see the body of her deceased husband, she said that there were obvious grave physical injuries all over the body. The Mdluli family appointed a pathologist to attend the post mortem examination. However, he was prohibited from releasing his findings. Two lawyers, hired by the family, began investigating the case and served the Minister of Justice and the Commissioner of Police with demands for damages of \$39,200. Mr. T. L. Skwiya, a barrister, was deprived of his passport. Mr. Mlungife Mxenge, a solicitor, was detained under the Terrorism Act from mid-March until mid-July—a total of 103 days—and was declared a banned person upon his release. However, a general public outcry has forced the Apartheid regime to investigate the causes of Mr. Mdluli's death and four

security police officers were charged with "culpable homicide." (*Guardian*, London, June 12, 1976; *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, July 13, 1976)

Mr. Mdluli was arrested in connection with a BOSS investigation of an "underground railroad" for black South Africans to leave South Africa for military training. At least 50 other persons have been arrested—including Mr. Mdluli's brother and two ANC members, Mr. Cleopas Ndlovu and Mr. Joseph Ntuli who were kidnapped from Swaziland—and held incommunicado under the Terrorism Act. The Swazi Government accused the South African regime of "flagrant violation of its territorial sovereignty." The South African Foreign Minister and Minister of Police replied that the matter was being investigated. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 5, 1976; *Guardian*, London, June 11, 1976)

During early 1976 the ANC underground distributed throughout South Africa two leaflets and the latest issue of its underground newspaper—*Amandla-Matla* (Power). (*Sechaba*, no. 3, 1976) The following are excerpts from these publications:

"There is panic in the ranks of the Whites; in a timid way some have condemned the invasion of Angola by racist SA. They feel that such adventures will hasten the doom of White Domination. But we must not close our eyes to a growing number of Whites who genuinely support the freedom struggle. . . . The ANC correctly defines the enemy as White Domination and its imperialist backers and hence every revolutionary, Black or White, ought to take in the struggle to overthrow White Domination. . . . The correctness of such a revolutionary approach of unifying all progressive forces has been vindicated in Mozambique, Angola, etc. The liberation movements in these former Portuguese colonies consistently defined their enemy as Portuguese Colonialism, NOT the White Portuguese people. As a result many White Angolan and Mozambican patriots of Portuguese origin fought side by side with MPLA and FRELIMO militants."

"We . . . must draw a serious lesson from the disruptive role played by the so-called 'pro-West' or 'anti-communist' splinter organisations like the FNLA, UNITA, PAC, or COREMO, which sow chaos and disunity among the people. . . . Because these so-called 'liberation movements' are anti-communist, they get full support of the oppressors themselves. . . . These organisations . . . merely serve as agents of imperialism for a new form of colonialism, neo-colonialism. . . . The liberation struggle . . . [is] between all those who are pro-oppressor, 'pro-West' and pro-imperialism versus all those who are anti-oppressor or pro-liberation, nonaligned and anti-imperialist."

"The offer of phony independence to the Bantustan traitors . . . is a hopeless attempt to divert the people from the path of revolutionary armed struggle. . . . The Bantustans are so designed as to foster a narrow local nationalism based on tribes which surrenders the people's birthright to the whole country. . . . The Bantustans are geared to create a collaborationist class of Black capitalists who are prepared to sell their Black brothers to the White rulers for a few crumbs. That would set the stage for . . . neo-colonialism—where the African masses will be oppressed by Whites, but indirectly through Pretoria bootlickers in the Bantustans. The main aim of this neo-colonial oppression is . . . to counter . . . the revolutionary aspirations for real and complete freedom, cherished by the people."

Meanwhile the Minister of Justice, Mr. Kruger, told

students at the University of Port Elizabeth that the danger facing the regime was ten times greater than World War II. He hinted that it might become necessary to use executive action and by-pass the courts as was done during W.W. II when people were arrested and interned under emergency regulations. "Our [the Apartheid regime's] security is maintained . . . by four security laws—the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Internal Security Act, the Terrorism Act, and the Public Safety Act." (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 12, 1976)

The latest victim of the Internal Security Act is Ms. Fatima Meer who was banned for five years in July. A prominent sociologist from the University of Natal and a member of the Indian community, Ms. Meer had been active in the South African Liberal Party during the 1950s and 1960s. Recently she has been a leader of the Black Consciousness movement. As a banned person nothing she writes or says can now be quoted inside South Africa. (*W.B.A.I.* radio, New York, July 23, 1976)

In the meantime, the African students have continued to revolt against the Bantu Education system. Thousands of students in Witbank demonstrated violently. When the Government attempted to reopen the schools in Soweto on July 23, hundreds of students threw rocks at the few students willing to attend classes. Outside of Durban, stones were thrown at schools in the African townships. The library at the Amanzimtoti Zulu Training Institute was firebombed. (*W.B.A.I.* radio, New York, July 21, 26, 1976.)

foreign relations

SOUTH AFRICAN PROPAGANDA IN THE US INCREASES

During the last year, South Africa's propaganda efforts in the United States have increased substantially. Equally

as important, they have changed in strategy; the Department of Information has now hired a black American to defend its racist regime.

This newest foreign agent for South Africa is Andrew Hatcher, International Vice President of Sydney S. Baron & Co., and a former associate press secretary to President Kennedy (*New York Times*, July 2). Hatcher claims to be working on the full range of accounts with the firm [whose other foreign contacts are with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Electronics Industries Associated of Japan]. But Hatcher joined the company in May, at the same time as the South African contract was signed. Furthermore, his propaganda for South Africa has been very visible. In early June, Hatcher appeared on the nationally-televised Today show with George Houser, Director of the American Committee on Africa, and addressed a Harlem meeting of 100 blacks opposing South Africa's Progressive-Reform Member of Parliament Helen Suzman a white South African, neither of whom were forewarned that included on the panel was a black American defending South Africa. Houser likened Hatcher to a "Jew hired by the Nazi's," to which Hatcher replied that he wanted to, "save" black South Africans "from the George Housers of the world." Hatcher is obviously a very valuable asset to the South African Government, and the South Africans are paying him for it; Sidney S. Baron & Co. reported to the Justice Department that their annual contract with the South African Department of Information will bring him \$365,000.

The Sydney Baron contract represents a leap in South Africa's propaganda spending in the US. In the last year, South Africa spent about \$1 million in the US for purely political purposes—excluding all the expenses of its embassy and its three consulates (whose information staffs have just doubled), and various contracts for film distribution and tourism promotion which are not purely political.

Andrew Hatcher of the U.S. firm of Sydney S. Baron & Co., public relations consultants, shown with Helen Suzman, the opposition M.P.



The Baron contract therefore represents an increase of about one-third. It also shows a trend toward contracting out a greater percentage of public relations work to American consultants as opposed to handling it from official South African Information Offices in New York and California.

In 1974, a South African contract with the Washington law firm of Collier, Shannon, Rill and Edwards to do lobbying in Congress and with the Administration was a significant increase in its use of foreign agents. (See *South Africa*, July-August, 1974.) That contract, which costs \$51,765 over the last year, now looks small by comparison to the Baron deal. The South African Department of Information has also demonstrated a sensitivity to US political developments. In 1974, with a Republican in the White House, the contract went to a conservative Republican law firm, but Baron's firm appears to be more closely tied to the Democratic Party. The President of Sydney Baron contributed \$1000 to the Birch Bayh campaign last year, and the Chairman of the Board gave \$1000 to Jimmy Carter this March.

The South African government has recently initiated several other new public relations ventures. In August, the Department of Information contracted with Image Industries, Inc. of New Jersey to produce 50,000 multi-media packets on South Africa for junior and senior high school teachers for the price of \$90,000. South Africa also pays Albert Berstein \$15,000 a year for two days a week of consulting work with the South African representative to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

The law firm of Casey, Lane and Mittendorf also appears to be working for the South African Government, although it is registered as an agent for the South African Sugar Association. In previous years, the firm lobbied for retention of the US sugar quota for South Africa, always claiming that the Sugar Association has no relationship to the Government. But their foreign agent six-month report for the period ending in June, 1975 stated that they "gave attention to the attempt by the United Mine Workers and Attorney General of Alabama to prohibit the importation of South African coal . . .—a topic obviously unrelated to the interests of the Sugar Association. The same report also states that they have been exchanging correspondence with the Justice Department "in connection with the propriety and/or necessity of filing supplemental information" on the foreign agent activities.

Simultaneous with the surge in South Africa's propaganda activity, the Justice Department decided to allow them to do more of their work in secret. This spring, the South African Information Service, which had been registered as a foreign agent, was granted consular status under which it will no longer have to make any public report of its activities or finances. The Justice Department approved the change, over some protest from the Department of State's Africa Bureau.

The apartheid regime rationalized the defeat of its detente strategy by claiming that few African countries actually supported the resolutions passed and that South Africa continues to be in "dialogue" with "moderate black countries." (S.A.B.C., Johannesburg, June 29, 1976) On the other hand, the OAU conference was a victory for the South African liberation movement. Mr. J. Makatini, a member of the African National Congress delegation to the OAU meeting, stated that "the key phrase for us was that the conference recognized the 'legitimacy of armed struggle in South Africa for the

seizure of power by the people and . . . that it was no longer just the question of ending apartheid, but of the national liberation of South Africa by armed struggle. . . . The other point of great satisfaction for us was that the OAU member states are committed not to recognize the Transkei, when South Africa bestows its phony independence on October 26. There was unanimous agreement that any violation of this commitment would be regarded as a betrayal not only of the people of South Africa, but of the entire African continent. . . . They [the Bantustans] are glorified strategic hamlets intended as a barrier to the southward thrust of our liberation struggle. They will be 'Transkei' ect-nationals and we will be 'foreign invaders,' and the racists hope we will be locked in a fratricidal conflict. For this reason we hail . . . the recent OAU decisions which reaffirm the sacred principle of national integrity for South Africa." (*Guardian New York*, July 14, 1976)

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES

The South Africa regime was elated that, despite the uprising and massacre of Soweto, the Vorster-Kissinger conference took place as scheduled. *Die Vaderland* wrote that "the importance of the talks will probably not only derive from the contents of the agenda, but also from the fact that South Africa and the US can now for the first time negotiate at a high level after years of diplomatic rebuffs from Washington. Mr. Vorster's decision to proceed with the talks in exceptionally difficult circumstances, once again proves his determination to find a solution to Southern Africa's problems by means of contact and dialogue." The *Star* commented that "the Bavarian Summit will provide the basis for further, potentially constructive contacts among South Africa, the United States of America, the most important Western nations, and Africa's more moderate leaders." While *Die Transvaler* noted that "the measure of success that Mr. Vorster achieved in his talks with the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, is largely the fruit of the Premier's tireless zeal to accomplish peace in Southern Africa instead of an awful race war". The *Rand Daily Mail* stated that "pressures arising from the Southern Africa crisis helped force the meeting, and no doubt helped force the decisions too. . . . What impelled Dr. Kissinger to meet Mr. Vorster—and risk the opprobrium that comes from supping with the apartheid devil—was America's concern to keep Russian communism out of Southern Africa and so defend her strategic and economic interests. . . . Mr. Vorster seems prepared to speed majority Black rule in Rhodesia and South West Africa in an effort to buy time for separate development at home." (*Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, July 2, 1976)

Responding to the Vorster-Kissinger Summit, Mr. Sony Leon, backed by the executive of the (Coloured) Labour Party and two members of the South African Indian Council, sent a cable to the US Ambassador to South Africa, asking that he should arrange a summit meeting between Kissinger and the Black "leaders." He asked that the summit meeting take place anywhere in the world. If the US Government agreed to the conference, then Mr. Leon would invite people such as Chief Buthelezi to represent Black South Africans at the conference. Explaining the request, Mr. David Curry, deputy leader of the Labour Party, stated that they "rejected Apartheid and resented the American Government's move to consult only a White Government leader." (*Star*, Johannesburg, July 10, 1976)

Vorster also conferred with West German Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Schmidt who informed him that West Germany "opposed" South Africa's racial policies. At the same time the European Economic Community decided to increase its political pressure upon South Africa to "force" South Africa to grant independence to Namibia "as soon as possible," to use its influence to "hasten" majority rule in Zimbabwe, and to "phase out" apartheid. However the EEC ruled out the possibility of enforcing an economic boycott of South Africa because "South Africa is a vital supplier of scarce raw materials, such as chrome and manganese. . . . During the next ten years it will become the world's second largest producer." Meanwhile NATO issued a new policy that any links between South Africa and a member of NATO must be the sole responsibility of the country in question, and that NATO itself will not authorize such a linkage. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 26, 1976; *Guardian*, London, June 15, 28, 1976) Thus Western European governments forced by the events in Soweto of June 1976 are being more vocal in their opposition to the apartheid regime but are not willing to actually end their profitable economic relationship with that system.

During June the apartheid regime sent its puppets from the Transkei "Bantustan Government" traveling around the West in order to gain official Western recognition and endorsement of South Africa's "independence" scheme. Mr. George Matanzima, the Transkei "Justice Minister" first visited Canada, and in the company of the South African Ambassador to Canada lobbied for Canadian support. However the official Canadian position is that "Canada shares the international community's skepticism and deep concern that this is a continuation of the racial policies of apartheid which Canada opposes without any reservations. We would need a great deal of convincing evidence that the black population of this supposed independent territory is going to receive its due rights before we make any move at all on this question." "Minister" Matanzima received a similar rebuff by the EEC. At the Consultative Assembly of the EEC-Iome Convention (African, Caribbean Pacific countries), a resolution was passed which opposed any de facto recognition of the Transkei. The EEC Commissioners then ruled that they were only prepared to meet Matanzima as a member of the South African delegation which would not discuss the Transkei. (*Globe and Mail* Toronto, June 19, 1976; *sita*, Anti-Apartheid News, London, July-Aug., 1976)

defense

U.K. ARMS EMBARGO—A HOLE BIG ENOUGH FOR TANKS

Like the United States, Britain officially maintains an arms embargo against South Africa. And like the US Government, the British Government has been less than vigilant in insuring its enforcement, and more than generous in allowing the sale to South Africa of materials that clearly have military value but can be officially designated as destined for "non-military use."

In the last six months, several serious breaches in the British arms embargo have been brought to the attention of Parliament by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and by anti-apartheid MPs in the Labor Party.

One case involving the sale of over \$1.8 million in Centurion Tank parts has been brought to court, and the

company concerned, Technical Support & Services, a subsidiary of Aviation Jersey, has been fined \$2,880. In all, the Jersey Island-based company admitted to 16 charges of contravening export control regulations between August and December 1975: eight involving false description of goods for export and eight concerned with exporting prohibited military equipment.

Earlier, in January 1974, Aviation Jersey had begun overhauling Meteor engines—the engines used to power South Africa's 200 Centurion tanks—returning them to Grosvenor Industrial Engines Co. in Johannesburg with spare parts. Then, in May, Jordan, having purchased British Centurions, sold 41 of them to South Africa in a breach of the UK embargo.

Four months later, when the Jordanian transaction was exposed, Prime Minister Harold Wilson, on behalf of an embarrassed Government, "had words" with King Hussein. But Aviation Jersey's exports continued and indeed increased dramatically from August, 1975.

In an inquiry conducted earlier this year, Sir Philip Allen, a member of the Security Commission, discovered that most of the engines and spares had been supplied directly to the Jersey company by the British Ministry of Defense. John Chalmers, the company's managing director has insisted that Aviation Jersey has been made a "scapegoat" and that sales to South Africa have always had the "blessing" of the Ministry of Defense.



A British-made Saracen tank during a counter-insurgency exercise in the Northern Transvaal.

The involvement of a former Ministry of Defense official who is now a senior executive of Aviation Jersey has raised anew the issue of the embargo-busting role of ex-Defense Ministry officials, a large number of whom have found their way into companies manufacturing arms in Britain. Other touchy issues raised have included the use of Jersey's sovereignty over international trade as a loophole for evading the arms embargo, and the serious loopholes contained in the relevant UK Customs and Excise Order itself.

By the end of April this year, at least four other major

breaches of the arms embargo had been brought to public attention.

1) A contract between British Marconi, and the South African Defense Department involving almost \$14.5 million worth of "communications" equipment destined for use against guerilla fighters in Namibia. This contract had an Exports Credit Guarantee from the Department of Trade—thus, official approval.

2) A second Marconi contract for \$12.6 million to "refurbish and update the South African air defence system."

3) The sale, via France, of 250 rocket motors manufactured by Martin Baker Ltd. and destined for use in the pilot ejector systems of South Africa's Mirage F1 jet fighters.

4) The sale by Hasler (Great Britain) to Hasler (South Africa) of a 64-line message-switching unit worth between \$410,000 and \$900,000. The unit, under construction for completion in 1977, could be fitted into South Africa's "Advokaat" long-range military surveillance system at Silvermine; or it could be destined for Rhodesia.

The disclosure of these breaches has been the result of extensive work by Britain's Anti-Apartheid Movement. By early August, it is not known whether the other companies will be taken to court, as was the Jersey-based firm. What is clear, however, is that the British Government, and the Ministry of Defense in particular, have been caught with their loopholes showing and are being challenged to mend them or suffer further from indecent exposure. (The *Sunday Times*, London, March 28; The *Guardian*, London, April 2, 15, 17, 20, 27; The *Observer*, London, April 4, 18, 25; *Evening Standard*, London, June 18, 1976.)

NATO SHIELD TO BE DROPPED

Norway, supported by Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands, has forced a NATO decision which will prevent member countries from using the organization as a shield against political fall-out from defense links with South Africa. Under the new agreement, each country's ties with South Africa must be the responsibility of that country alone. Thus, the British Government's contributions to South Africa's "Advokaat" military communications system, heretofore justified on the grounds of NATO authorization, can no longer be justified on these grounds.

The decision, following the May meeting in Oslo of NATO Foreign Ministers, was made in response to the expressed concern of Norway that NATO was taking an "unsatisfactory" political stance on white regimes in southern Africa. A blatant example of this stance has been the absorption of South Africa into the NATO communications system with access to NATO's defense equipment coding system.

NATO members are now reportedly in agreement that in view of growing tensions in southern Africa, African "moderates" must be encouraged and links with the white regimes officially disavowed. (*Guardian*, London, June 15 & 18, 1976)

SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY CELEBRATES BICENTENAL IN NEW YORK

On July 4 and during the following week, the South African anti-submarine frigate *President Kruger* lay in the Hudson River receiving over 3,000 tourists. It was the first time a South African naval vessel has ever visited the US.

The US invitation to South Africa to attend the international naval review was a belated one, coming more than six months after 90 other countries had received

theirs. But South Africa has learned to ignore such slights, and was happy to participate, chalking up another "first" in US-South Africa relations.

Now, when will Vorster and Kissinger meet again? (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 22, July 10, 1976)

S.A. DEFENSE OFFICIAL VISITED US FIRMS IN 1974

In May of this year, the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain disclosed, with relevant documentary evidence, that Dr. L.L. van Zyl, a South African defense official, had visited two important British defense establishments (the former Royal Radar Establishment, and the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment) and a number of British, European and American arms firms during a trip taken in October 1974. Mr. Abdul Minty, Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, called on the British Foreign Secretary to launch a full Parliamentary inquiry into the matter that would determine the nature and extent of collaboration between British arms firms and defense establishments and South Africa.

Dr. van Zyl also made visits to American-owned firms. On October 11, 1974, he went to Heidelberg, Germany, to talk with Eltro Engineering, a partly American-owned company that produces laser range-finders, homing devices and military electronic equipment. On October 23, he was in New York, talking with the International Signal Corporation, and Barnes Engineering of Stamford, Connecticut. The International Signal Corporation is not listed in the US Industrial Register, but Barnes manufactures detectors to measure infra-red radiation, and devices to detect object at night and in outer space. (*Observer*, London, May 9, 1976)

Note: for information on South Africa's recent attacks on Zambia and Angola, see Namibia and UN sections.

THE US HAS AN ARMS EMBARGO?

Readers may have noted that the planes used in the successful Israeli rescue of hostages held at Uganda's Entebbe airport were American C-130's ... just like the six that Lockheed has sold this year to Safair Freighters of South Africa. (See *Southern Africa*, April, 1976)

economics

ECONOMIC RIPPLES AFTER UPRISINGS

What will the Soweto, university and township uprisings and killings do to the South African economy? Although it is too early to tell (and the South African papers aren't talking that much), it appears that the stiff regulations controlling the export of capital, which were instituted after more than \$200 million was pulled out following the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, have in the short term done their job. According to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange President, the controls whereby profits must be held in "securities rands" and only exported at a lesser value prevented a repeat of the panic in 1960. But the killings did affect price indices with a drop in the industrial and gold prices, although there were no drastic plunges.

Theories abound for the relative stability of the economy—relative in the sense that South Africa is beset by continuing double digit inflation, massive and growing unemployment (absorbed by Blacks to date), and a persistent unfavorable balance of payments position.

Some business people think that multinational corporations and banking institutions are simply more adjusted to the fact of unrest in countries where they have business; others believe that the South African Government's tough handling of the riots gave confidence to the business world. Whatever the reason South Africa cannot afford to scare away its foreign backers. Minister of Finance Horwood flew to England in early July, a visit which was interpreted as an attempt to "allay . . . fears after the Soweto riots." (*Star*, Johannesburg, July 10, 1976) The expanding dependence on foreign capitalization means that South African politicians will have to smooth over the lack of confidence which may grow as problem upon problem appear for South Africa. The country's failed intervention in Angola, its continuing headaches in Namibia, the ultimate defeat of South Africa's interests in Rhodesia added to internal unrest means that South Africa will have to work harder to curry foreign favor. Yet with high profit returns and continuing cheaper labor the international firms and investors are far from ready to abandon their long time ally.

EX-IM BANK REJECTS SASOL PROJECT

The US Export-Import Bank rejected on June 17 a request from the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (SASOL) for \$450 million worth of guarantees for goods and services for the construction of a coal gasification plant in the Eastern Transvaal by Fluor Corporation of Los Angeles. Ex-Im had made an earlier decision to approve \$225 million in loan guarantees, but Congressional pressure plus the Soweto killings apparently changed the policy. Although the Bank has traditionally refused direct financing of projects in South Africa, it was believed that in such an important energy area as the transformation of coal to gas, a process of much interest to the United States, large loan guarantees would be forthcoming. Fluor will continue with its SASOL contract and the financing will come from other sources, but the Ex-Im negative response was a blow to South Africa and its allies in the US. (*Africa News*, Durham, July 5, 1976; *Guardian*, UK, June 30, 1976)

GOLD PRICE—FOREVER DOWNWARD?

"With this new confidence I believe it is only a matter of time before the gold price resumes its upward trend," commented a confident South African Minister of Finance after the first International Monetary Fund sale of 780,000 ounces of gold in early June did not adversely affect the price of gold. But by July 21 the price fell to \$107.75 per ounce, dropping 12 percent in 5 days. Although by July 24 it was back up to \$111/ounce, the downward spiral seems never ending. For each \$10 drop in the price of gold South Africa's balance of payments deficit increases by \$200 million, and it is suspected that another devaluation of the Rand may be forthcoming. Rising mining costs, drops in production, and lower prices spell continuing problems for the South African economy, yet mining-house analysts remain optimistic that central banks will begin buying again and prices will rise. Their confidence contrasts drastically with the London economist quoted in the *New York Times* of July 21: "If you take the gold out of South Africa . . . you've got one of the worst economies in the world." Although the statement is extreme given South Africa's vast mineral and industrial base, it does show how large the gold problem looms for South Africa. (*Die Volksblad*, June 3, 1976; *Comment and Opinion*, SA Dept. of Information, June

11, 1976; *New York Times*, July 21, 25, 1976; *Wall Street Journal*, June 15, 1976)



A migrant worker going to the Transkei to briefly join his family.

BANTUSTAN SWEAT SHOPS

The future of the "homelands" is clear. A French electronics firm will pioneer a system to make the Bantustans "the workshop of industry of Europe." Components will be flown to the Venda "homeland" and assembled by cheap labor for sale in Europe. The project presages a role for the Bantustans as adjuncts of a European-based economy by providing a pool of manual labor which is cheaper than either hand labor in Europe or mechanization. (*South African Digest*, May 14, 1976)

JOB RESERVATION CONFLICT

White and coloured union members in the iron, steel, and engineering industries feel betrayed by their employers because with the relaxation of job reservation their jobs have not been well protected nor have they been retrained as had been promised. Now the industrial employers' association, Seifsa, wants to further dissolve categories of work reserved for Whites or Coloureds and open up a potential 40,000 new jobs to Africans. Negotiations between Seifsa and the unions (Confederation of Metal and Building Unions—CMBU) have been unsuccessful. Meanwhile the African Metal and Allied Workers Union has advocated the total abolition of all job reservation (the employers are willing to keep one category at the top reserved) and new wage scales which would give greater wage increases for lower job category holders thus reducing the differentiations between skilled and unskilled wages. CMBU wage demands on the other hand call for across the board increases which would maintain the differential. (*Financial Mail*, May 14, 1976)

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD

Despite the fact that the call for an end to economic links with South Africa was issued at the OAU Summit Meeting which was held in *Mauritius*, it will be difficult for this country to implement it. South African tourists, food stuffs, and industrial goods flow into this island country, while Mauritius sells tea to South Africa. For

for South African industrial and export links in Africa include *Reunion*, a neighboring island of Mauritius, the *Ivory Coast*, *Malawi*, *Central African Republic*, and *Zaire*. (*Star*, Johannesburg, July 10, 1976)

Diamond Distributors of the USA and Cominco of Canada will help finance the exploration of diamonds in the northwestern Cape by a South African company, Trans Hex-Beleggings.

Iran and other Middle Eastern countries have become the new buyers for South African fruit. Sales to Iran rose from 5,000 cartons in 1973 to 2.2 million in 1975. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 26, 1976)

The Australian Council of Trade Unions instituted a month-long ban during July on the handling of all goods coming from or going to South Africa via air, sea, or land. Australia exports \$115 million worth of goods, mainly auto components, to South Africa, while South Africa sends \$50.6 million worth (including strategic ferrous alloys used for steel production) to Australia. South Africa fears that although the ban will not last it may encourage Australian importers to look for new supply sources. Some Australian companies, including transporters like Quantas, are not even to fly mail to South Africa but may in fact have secured ways of undermining the

union ban. (*Guardian*, UK, July 2, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, July 3, 1976)

An Israeli electronics firm, Tadiran, will invest \$1.95 million in South Africa in a new dry battery plant and, together with a South African firm, in a lighting factory. (*South African Digest*, May 14, 1976)

CHROME BUSINESS IMPROVES

The reserves of South African chrome are estimated to be increasing to some 66 per cent of the "world's proven reserves" according to a researcher for the Institute for the Study of Conflict in London. This, together with the fact that there is a new technique to utilize low grade South chromite in producing steel, will magnify South Africa's role as a source of chrome.

The London economist, Peter Janke, also thinks that South Africa will surpass Canada as a source of aluminum and will grow as a manganese producer also, although in this area it will have to compete with new Pacific Ocean deep sea exploitation. Janke warned, however, at a seminar in Swaziland that new technologies will ultimately replace the need for some of these minerals. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 5, July 12, 1976)

Namibia

TRIALS, DETENTIONS, ARRESTS

A South African supreme court justice sitting in Windhoek, capital of occupied Namibia, on June 25 granted an application for a special entry to be made on the record of the recent Swakopmund terrorism trial which resulted in the conviction of four members of the South West Africa People's Organization charged under the South African regime's Terrorism Act.

Mr. Aaron Mushimba and Mr. Hendrik Shikongo had been sentenced to death by Justice J. J. Strydom, the first imposition of the ultimate penalty in the nine-year history of the Act. Ms. Rauna Nambinga was given a seven-year prison term and Ms. Anna Nghihondjwa five years. The five-month-long trial was described by an observer from the International Commission of Jurists as "one in which the prosecution evidence was selective and incomplete" and, since most witnesses had been detained for long periods by the security police, "their detention, the torture and the fear of torture must render the probative value of their evidence suspect."

Justice M. J. Hart allowed the application brought by the firm of Lorentz and Bone, defense attorneys, after it was disclosed that copies of vital defense documents had been leaked to the security police during the course of the trial. The firm had forced a partner to resign and had fired an employee. During the course of the two-week hearing, the State Prosecutor testified he had no personal knowledge of the leaked information, although he was known to have spent a great deal of time in the company of the security police lieutenant investigating the case and to whom the documents were handed over. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, June 28, 1976)

The result of the decision means that the case with appended note of irregularity will be considered by South Africa's highest court, the Appellate Division. It makes it likely that the two men will have their death sentences reduced to life or a specific number of years. There is an

outside possibility that a new trial for all the four SWAPO members might be ordered.

Another Terrorism Act trial moved a step further on June 25 when six men appeared in a Windhoek magistrate's court and were remanded for a summary supreme court trial set to begin on August 30 in the southern Namibian town of Keetmanshoop. They are: Messrs Zach-

Aaron Mushimba, SWAPO National Organizer. His case is being reviewed because of illegal actions by the South African government during the trial and the death penalty may be reversed.



ariah Nashandi, Risto Nakanyala, Marius Isak, Karel Nampala, Solomon Mbango and Gabriel Willem. Mr. Filemon Nduvu Nangola is also charged but still in hospital recovering from wounds received in an April 19 shoot-out with South African Police.

The state withdrew charges against three others: Ms. Ragel Shifotola, Mr. Albanus Heinrich and Mr. Johannes Amutenya. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, June 25, 1976)

Ms. Shifotola told the story of her detention and treatment at the hands of the security police. The mother of three children, whose husband is in political exile in Zambia, was arrested on Sunday, April 18, and detained for 12 days. She was beaten, knocked to the floor and verbally abused. Water was poured down the side of a blindfold and she was given electric shocks behind her ears until she lost consciousness.

Ms. Shifotola made her allegations in the presence of the Rev. Edward Morrow, vicar general of the Anglican Church in Namibia; the Right Rev. Dr. Lucas de Vries, head of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia; and Pastor Gerson Max. She demonstrated how she was trussed up in a crouching position, her bound hands alongside her knees. A long stick was inserted over the elbows and under the knees, which allowed her tormentors to spin her around and around until her elbows were bleeding and she was completely disorientated. A striking—and painful—photograph illustrates this treatment.


Three SWAPO members were arrested on July 20 in the Rehboth enclave south of Windhoek. White plain-clothes policemen picked up Mr. Othniel Kaakunga, secretary for internal affairs, and two supporters after a public meeting to discuss national unity and support for SWAPO and charged them with not having permits to be in Rehboth. Kaakunga was detained for several months last year. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, July 21, 1976)

THE WAR

August 26, 1966, marked SWAPO's initiation of armed warfare for the liberation of Namibia from South African rule. As the tenth Anniversary approached, clashes between South African troops and SWAPO forces intensified.

Throughout the latter part of June, 1976, a large force of guerrillas infiltrated through the border bantustan of Owambo and penetrated almost to Tsumeb, site of the American-controlled base metals mining complex. A wave of near-panic spread amongst the White minority in Namibia (no doubt partly influenced by the ongoing demonstrations and shootings in the Black ghettos surrounding Johannesburg and Pretoria following upon Soweto) and special military units were rushed up. The South African Defense Force headquarters attempted to censor press reports of the call-up and officials made express efforts to calm their constituents. A new South African major general was put in charge of all operations in Namibia (the top officer in the South African army is a lieutenant general; ("South West Africa" is Pretoria's prime war theatre).

South African Minister of Police Jimmy Kruger flew to Namibia and in mid-July declared that "White South West Africa"—the land lying below the border bantustans—was cleared of "terrorists." Mr. A. H. du Plessis, leader of the White delegation at the Turnhalle talks told a National Party meeting that the country would have "to live with terrorism." On July 20, Defense Force headquarters in Windhoek claimed occupation troops and police had killed 57 "SWAPO insurgents" in a seven-week period.



(*Windhoek Advertiser*, June 23, 24, 28, 29; July 1, 5, 14, 15, 20, 1976)

The region where the long, thin finger of Namibian territory known as the Caprivi Strip and the Republic of Zambia face each other across the Zambesi River has become a focal point of conflict. South Africa and Zambia have exchanged a series of accusations of incursions, over-flights and cross fire, culminating in a Zambian call for a Security Council meeting at the United Nations on the subject of South African aggressive moves. Sialola village was bombed and invaded, resulting in the killing of 24 people and the serious wounding of at least 45 more. A SWAPO guerrilla camp stands at that site. Angola's border with Zambia and with the Strip lies a few miles to the west, and President Agostinho Neto accused South African troops of crossing "once again" into Angola to burn three villages. South Africa denied all accusations, (*London Times*, July 13, 1976; *London Observer*, July 18, 1976; *New York Times*, July 20, 1976; *Washington Post*, July 12, 1976)

Owambo Chief Minister Cornelius Ndjoba declared that security forces had been instructed to shoot to kill if necessary in the one kilometre no-man's land strip along the Namibia-Angola border. The zone has been largely evacuated in Owambo and will be extended to the Ruacana Falls, site of the Cunene hydro-electric dam. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, July 8, 1976)

TURNHALLE

The "Constitutional Conference"

The South African-sponsored Turnhalle conference is in recess, with a constitutional committee pausing after three weeks of work on June 23. A press blackout has been instituted and little hard news has yet appeared in the press. The *Windhoek Advertiser* speculates that consti-

tutional principles have been agreed on and will be presented when Turnhalle reconvenes on August 3. The Windhoek newspaper also says there is a contentious issue due to the lack of representation in the "ethnically-based" talks for three classes of White-English-speaking, Germans and Jews. The matter of representation of political parties, notably SWAPO, the parties in the Namibian National Convention (the major element there being SWAPO) and a gathering of smaller parties and tribal entities grouped in the Namibia National Council has not been settled. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, June 24, 1976).

Turnhalle's star figure, Chief Clemens Kapuuo (wearing two hats as chief of one branch of the Hereros and president of a Herero party called NUDO), has meanwhile returned to Windhoek from his fifth trip to Britain and the USA. Those promoting his future introduced him into some activities of the American bicentennial and he was hailed at at least one function as the "future Prime Minister of South West Africa." Further promotion of Turnhalle is the preparation of a booklet drawn up by two South African government officials, to be distributed domestically and overseas.

On the Larger Scene

August 31 looms nearer and nearer. That was the deadline established last January by the United Nations Security Council for South Africa to accept the principle that the world body can enter Namibia to supervise and control national elections for a constituent assembly

leading to independence for the international territory. The deadline accounts in part for the accelerated combat inside Namibia and on its borders. It is a matter of concern to the Americans and British and others with heavy investments not only in Namibia but South Africa as well. The issue was discussed at the Kissinger/Vorster talks in West Germany in June. Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster denied that the American Secretary of State had pressed him for a timetable for "granting independence" to the UN territory, but there are other indications to the contrary. The *London Times*, for instance, says "South Africa is being pressed by the West to show that South-West Africa is moving rapidly towards independence as a multi-racial state. It is believed that an undertaking to achieve this within 18 months was the only concession Mr. Vorster made in his talks with Dr. Kissinger." (*Windhoek Advertiser*, June 28, 1976; *London Times*, July 13, 1976)

Emanating from American diplomatic sources are recurrent suggestions that the Turnhalle talks will be moved either to Lusaka, the Zambian capital (how that accords with the present South African/Zambian contretemps is anybody's guess), or to London. Obviously this "suggestion" doesn't originate from Mr. Vorster. Its assiduous promotion can only come from our very own Henry Kissinger. Since a further imminent meeting between the South African prime minister and the US Secretary is bruited about (even in Washington!!), the pressure cooker is indeed close to popping.

Zimbabwe

THE MILITARY SITUATION

Liberation fighters have expanded the geographical area of their operations inside Zimbabwe. In June, guerrilla activity took place in both the northwest and south-east of the country, and by July violence had hit the Rhodesian capital, Salisbury, itself.

On June 8, two aircraft were blown up in the northwest region, near Lake Kariba on the Zambian border. This was the first attack in the northwest since the recent intensification of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle earlier this year. Freedom fighters have also sabotaged the vital rail link between Rhodesia and Botswana. A goods train detonated an explosive device on June 4 near Plumtree, just inside the border with Botswana. In June guerrilla attacks southeast of Bulawayo forced the Smith regime to begin using armed convoys between the South African border at Beit Bridge and Bulawayo. Convoys are already in operation between Fort Victoria and Beit Bridge. (*Tanzania Daily News*, June 6, June 9, July 10, 1976)

On July 20 a nightclub and restaurant in Salisbury were hit by hand grenades. (*New York Times*, July 21, 1976) This is the first incident of its kind to take place in the Rhodesian capital in the recent fighting.

Also in early June, Chief Mabika, one of the ten chiefs appointed by the Smith government to sit in the Rhodesian Senate, was reportedly abducted from his home east of Fort Victoria by guerrilla forces. Mabika has long opposed the Zimbabwe liberation struggle and is a staunch supporter of the Smith regime. (*Guardian*, London, June 9, 1976)

In June the Rhodesian government extended the country's state of emergency for another year. Originally imposed in November, 1965, when the Smith government

illegally declared independence, it has been in existence ever since. Minister of Justice, Law and Order, Hilary Squires, cited four reasons why the state of emergency had to continue: the intensification of the guerrilla war; the "active hostility" of one neighbor (Mozambique) and similar threats by another (Zambia); the fighting between factions of the nationalist movement; and the extension of UN sanctions. (*Guardian*, London, June 25, 1976)

Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of the illegal Rhodesian regime, warned Zambia's President Kaunda, on June 15 that he would face "serious consequences" if he allowed Zimbabwe nationalist forces to operate from his country. The warning, which included a threat to engage in "hot pursuit" across the border into Zambia, came after a recent guerrilla incursion into Rhodesia launched from Zambia. Zambia responded that if attacked by Smith's forces, it would "fight back to the last man to protect its hard won independence." (Radio Lusaka, June 16, 1976)

On June 26 Smith forces attacked the road transportation center of Mapai, 60 miles inside Mozambique. Three FRELIMO soldiers and 16 civilians were killed. Mozambican officials assess this attack as one aimed at hurting the economy of the area rather than an effort to destroy facilities used by the Zimbabwe nationalist forces. The intent, the Mozambicans believe, was to raise the cost to Mozambique of supporting the Zimbabwe liberation struggle. (*Guardian*, London, July 2 1976). The air attack concentrated on a large transport company, taken over by the State and run by a workers committee after the owner fled several months ago. Buses, trucks, land rovers, and garages were all destroyed. They were part of a network of the Mozambican transportation system, not part of the



Rhodesian troops in Salisbury: more and more of them are mercenaries.

support system for the Zimbabwe liberation fighters operating out of Mozambique.

RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT ACTS TO BOLSTER ITS MILITARY FORCES

A potentially dangerous threat to the Smith government's ability to wage a continuing war against Zimbabwe nationalists lies in the growing numbers of young white professionals leaving Rhodesia. Despite heavy restrictions on the export of currency and intense propaganda by the Smith Regime on the importance of fighting against the outside 'Communist' agitators, 820 more whites left Rhodesia in April than emigrated to it. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 5, 1976) This loss is by far the largest drop in the white population since UDI. (*Guardian*, London, May 29, 1976) All together 2,280 white citizens left Rhodesia in the first six months of 1976. (*New York Times*, July 25, 1976)

To compensate the Smith government has increased its efforts to recruit white foreigners to fight in the Rhodesian army. While denying it is hiring mercenaries, the

illegal government claims that it is seeking immigrants to come and live in the country and join the Rhodesian army with the same pay and privileges as other white Rhodesians. Press persons close to the fighting report seeing North Americans who fought in Vietnam, Portuguese colonial soldiers who fought in Mozambique and Angola, Britons, South Africans, Germans, and Greeks—all recent arrivals to Rhodesia. (*New York Times*, July 25, 1976) The Rhodesian attack on Mapai, Mozambique, is said to have been engineered and undertaken by ex-Portuguese colonial fighters.

In the United States a group called American Aid for Rhodesia has started to recruit soldiers and to raise money for the Smith regime. Mike Gonzalez, a former army infantryman, told UPI that his group is operating in San Antonio, El Paso, Houston, Phoenix, and other cities in southwestern United States. "It's a paramilitary organization . . . but it's not composed of mercenaries," Gonzalez reported. "We would fight only as a last resort." (*Los Angeles Times*, May 23, 1976) Adverse publicity on the recent use of mercenaries in Angola as well as legislation which forbids the recruitment of mercenaries in many Western countries, including the United States, has led the Smith regime and its collaborators to develop new language to explain their efforts to recruit and pay foreigners to fight against the Zimbabwe liberation struggle.

The Smith regime has also taken steps to increase the number of Rhodesians fighting on the war fronts without hindering the functioning of the government apparatus or economic enterprises. The South African government has been asked not to give work permits or residency to Rhodesians who have not completed their military service.

On June 26, it was reported that 450 South Africans had volunteered to fill in at industrial and government posts for Rhodesians called for military service. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 12, 19, 26, 1976)

RACE REFORM PROPOSALS MEET OPPOSITION

On June 14 a Commission of Special Inquiry on Racial Discrimination issued a report advocating changes in Rhodesian racial laws. The recommendations covered many areas of life; however, the most important and

Rhodesian soldiers in an anti-guerilla operation—they're after Mozambique's economic lifelines as well.



controversial ones centered on voting and land reform.

The Commission recommended a return to a nonracial common voters roll for Parliamentary elections. Under the present system there are separate voters rolls for Africans and white Rhodesians with Africans voting for 16 Black members and white Rhodesians for 50. However the Commission did not deal with the controversial question of what qualifications would be necessary for being put on the roll.

In terms of land reform, the report advocated that urban, commercial and industrial land be made available to all races and that "suitably qualified blacks" be allowed to farm lands in areas that are now reserved for whites only. The present land tenure policy gives the 280,000 whites half of the country and the country's six million Blacks the other half. The Commission also stated that residential land of Europeans should remain exclusively white. (*Guardian*, London, June 15, 1976)

The report called for an end to racial discrimination in hotels, bars, and restaurants after a two year transition period. However class and behavior could still be used to determine whether an individual should be served. The Commission opposed multiracial schools and advocated that parents' permission be obtained before children engage in inter-racial sports activities. At the adult level the Commission recommended there be no barriers to multi-racial sports. (Radio Salisbury, June 15, 1976)

While moderates in the Rhodesian Parliament applauded the Commission report, opposition came from many quarters. Hard liners in Smith's Rhodesian Front Party argued against both the common voters roll and the opening up of white farm areas to "qualified" Africans. (*Guardian*, London, July 3, 1976) "We cannot accept these changes, they will undermine the white man's position and future in the country," argued a Rhodesian Front MP. (*Guardian*, London, June 17, 1976) Smith himself called the report "balanced and reasonable" and said his government would attempt to implement several of the proposals. There is considerable doubt as to whether Smith would actually move to implement substantial items in the report. Giving lip service support to many of the recommendations is probably more of a public relations gesture aimed at winning support from Western powers who are demanding some progress in breaking down racial barriers in Rhodesia.

Both factions of the ANC criticized the report. Reverend Max Chigwida, speaking for the Muzorewa group, said the report left the major issue, the question of power in Rhodesia, untouched. "Oppressed Zimbabweans will not be deceived either by the recommendations of the commission or by any promises to implement all or some of the recommendations."

Josiah Chinamano of the Nkomo faction was less critical in his reaction to the report, saying that Africans had been demanding much of the Commission's recommendations for years. He added, however, "publication of the report is one thing: implementation is yet another. We wait to see what the government will do. The report is not enough and more drastic changes can be brought about only by majority rule." (*Guardian*, London, June 16, 1976)

US-BRITISH PLAN FOR RHODESIA

The U.S. and British governments are developing a plan to win the support of whites in Rhodesia in an effort to pave the way for a quick settlement leading to majority rule. Western interests fear a protracted struggle by the

liberation forces in Zimbabwe will bring to power a political leadership similar to FRELIMO in Mozambique. The *New York Times*, of July 19 writes that diplomats fear "escalating war will produce a radical Marxist black leadership. . . ." Such a leadership would not be likely to look toward Western capital as the means for developing an independent Zimbabwe.

The U.S.-British proposal contains a plan to finance the purchase of land from white farmers who could then lease back the land if they chose to remain. A second proposal would guarantee a floor price for land thereby assuring that a farmer could sell his land if and when he chose to do so. Other proposals are being drawn up to assist white businessmen, to guarantee pensions for civil servants, and to provide ways for Rhodesian whites to settle in Europe and the United States. (*New York Times*, July 19, 1976)

This general plan for dealing with the white settler population of Rhodesia is similar to the one developed by Great Britain for Kenya at the time of its independence in 1963. In Kenya the settler class was bought out in order to make possible the granting of independence to moderate Africans who in turn agreed not to tamper with British or other foreign economic interests. Today Kenya is a leading example of capitalist development in Africa.

CLASHES SAID TO CONTINUE WITHIN ZIMBABWE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Bishop Abel Muzorewa, head of the external faction of the ANC (Joshua Nkomo leads the internal wing) told the OAU conference held at the end of June in Port Louis, Mauritius, that fighting is going on in the guerrilla training camps in Tanzania and Mozambique, and as many as 50 people have already died in these clashes. He also accused Presidents Machel of Mozambique and Nyerere of Tanzania of creating the "Third Force", a group of former ZANU and ZAPU militants led by elements of both organizations. Muzorewa urged the OAU to support the "established Rhodesian nationalist leadership." (*Guardian*, London, June 29, 1976)

The OAU Liberation Committee meeting in Dar es Salaam in early June had approved a resolution calling on rival factions of the nationalist movement to unite and to intensify the struggle against the Smith regime. At the same time, the Committee praised the efforts of the Presidents of Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, and Zambia for their efforts in trying to bring together the divided leadership of the ANC. (*Guardian*, London, June 7, 1976) At the meeting there had also been some consideration to openly condemning the established leadership of the ANC for their failure to achieve unity, but no resolution to this effect was included in their final report.

On July 6, Nigeria gave \$250,000 to the Mozambican government for support of the Zimbabwe liberation fighters in Mozambique, the so called "Third Force". The Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier Joseph Garba said at the time he was sorry he could not give the money to the ANC but that they seemed to be fighting more among themselves than against Ian Smith. (Maputo Radio, July 6, 1976)

A LUTA CONTINUA

Mozambique

MOZAMBIQUE COUNTER-ATTACKS RHODESIAN OFFENSIVE

Rhodesia launched an air and ground attack on June 26 at 5 a.m. on Mapai, a village in Mozambique about 55 miles from the border, in Gaza province. The attacks were carried out with the collaboration of a plantation owner and a former proprietor of the Nagala transport monopoly, which has its headquarters in Mapai. The former owner of the company is currently a fugitive in Rhodesia. The aim of this new attack was the destruction of the transport company which has recently been nationalized. Only a small unit of the Mozambique's People's Liberation Forces was stationed there.

During the struggle, 16 civilians and three members of the FPLM died. Seven civilians and nine members of the FPLM were wounded. Every building in the village center was bombed, burned, and raked with machine gun fire including the transport company buses, garages and canteen and club used by local residents.

At 7:00 a.m., The town of Malvernia, which is adjacent to Mapai, was attacked with artillery fire and infantry. Another attack was launched against Malvernia at 12:30 p.m. on June 28.

The July 1, *Guardian* (Britain) reported that officials in Mozambique believe that the Rhodesian attacks were aimed at crippling the economy of the region. The two towns hit by the Rhodesians are of vital economic importance to the Gaza province.


Malvernia is the western terminal of a railway that runs from Maputo to the Rhodesian border. The line is a vital supply route for the region. Mapai is the center of road transport for the region.

Many men in the Gaza region are employed as miners in South Africa and one of the transport company's main functions was to transport mine workers to the town of Pafuri, on the South African border. Most families in the province are dependent on the work in the South African mines for their livelihood.

An important Rhodesian base, Vila Salazar was completely destroyed by Mozambican troops in response to the above attacks. Rhodesian casualties are unknown.

The raiders on the Mozambican villages were mostly black and they were heard to have been speaking English, Portuguese and several Mozambican and non-Mozambican dialects. The July 3 *Guardian* (London) reported that after the end of the struggle for independence, many black people serving in the Portuguese army fled to Rhodesia. It is believed that the army of attackers was comprised primarily of this group of people. They obtained entrance into Mozambique by posing as a Frelimo convoy—with Frelimo uniforms and the Frelimo flag waving gaily in the breeze as the vehicles in which they rode headed toward their destination. It was reported that they were often waved at and cheered on by villagers who had been celebrating the Mozambican independence anniversary.

The attackers spent the night camped near Mapai and at dawn, struck in co-ordination with the aircraft. All communications links between Mapai and the rest of the



Students at Maputo University staged a rally recently denouncing the racist Smith government in Rhodesia. Smith is pictured as an insect being caught by the continent of Africa.

world were cut, hence allowing the raiders to drive back to Rhodesia undetected, still posing as Frelimo activists.

Since the beginning of the year, President Machel had been threatening to counter attack into Rhodesia. In February, he told the central committee of Frelimo: "We will respond to an attack with attack. . . . This means that we will not stop in Salisbury. We will stop at the far border of Zimbabwe." (*The Guardian*, London, July 1, 1976)

A people's militia is being organized throughout Chicalacuala district in Gaza province. The mobilization is being carried out for defense purposes by members of the People's Forces and the Mozambican police force.

The Johannesburg *Star* (July 10, 1976) reported on a rally attended by approximately 100,000 people, addressed by President Machel at Maputo airport. President Machel en route to Tanzania, to attend the 21st anniversary of TANU (Tanzanian African National Union) as the ruling party.

At the rally he stated, "We want the support of Africa because now we are in a position to advance to crush Ian Smith. . . . We appeal to the Mozambique People's Liberation Forces to get ready from this very moment to march on Zimbabwe. . . ."

President Machel appears to be keeping his word: to work towards building a Mozambican socialist party—a party strong enough to lead the masses in the building of a new socialist country while helping to bring socialism to other countries as well.

AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION SIGNED WITH CAPE VERDE

A 46 member Mozambican delegation led by President Samora Machel visited the Republic of Cape Verde on June 9 and 10, 1976. During the visit, an agreement of

cooperation and friendship was signed jointly by the Mozambican President and Aristides Pereira, the Cape Verdean President.

Article one provides for economic, financial, technical, scientific, cultural, diplomatic and communications cooperation. These areas of mutual aid will be outlined in special, separate, agreements. The agreements will be drawn up at a later date in Maputo.

Article two outlines plans for trading, development, monetary and financial relations.

Article three provides for cultural and educational exchange.

Article four provides for plans in setting up diplomatic missions in the respective countries.

Article five requests frequent consultations in reference to the establishment of the foreign policies of Mozambique and Cape Verde.

Lastly, article six puts the agreement into effect immediately. Should Cape Verde or Mozambique request a change, a 90 day notice is required. (untitled source)

NEWS IN BRIEF

The Johannesburg *Star* reported on the release of all 200 Portuguese prisoners who had been detained in Mozambique. The immediate release came after President Machel toured the country, visiting prisons in particular. Most have gone back to Portugal, by way of South Africa. (June 19, 1976)

A communique issued by the Minister of the Interior announced that 14 people connected with the police force have been detained in re-education centers for behavior "incompatible with Frelimo policy." (Maputo Home Service, June 13, 1976) One case in point was that of an attempted subversion plot by an individual within the police force who was found to be a former PIDE agent.

Angola

INSIDE THE PRA

The PRA continues to nationalize selected enterprises including the country's radio, TV and newspapers, such as *Jornal de Angola* and *Diario de Luanda*. It was also announced that an Angolan national oil company called "Sonangol" will be formed which will be totally responsible for the country's oil affairs. (*Africa AFP*, May 25; May 28, 1976)

Early in June the PRA nationalized 36 agricultural firms, including a coffee company which was said to cover most of the province of Kuanza Sul. A mass mobilization of people in the northern provinces early in June was scheduled to harvest coffee on plantations abandoned by Portuguese owners. Secretary of Agriculture, Carlos Fernandes, reported a severe labor shortage in coffee-growing areas due to the war-time exodus of workers to their home villages. (*Africa AFP*, June 1, 1976)

The first grass roots popular elections were held in Luanda June 27, a first step toward Angolan popular democracy. The residents of Luanda's 20 'bairros' (neighborhoods) voted for neighborhood committees representatives which will be responsible for consumer cooperatives, medical services, local schools and other necessities of daily living. (*Sunday Times of Zambia*, June 27, 1976)

In the field of education, Antonio Jacinto Minister of Education announced that the Ministry is in the process of re-writing school textbooks, changing programs and

developing a philosophy of education distinct from the limited colonial education provided by the Portuguese. "We've had to start almost from zero", said Jacinto. One of the new textbooks begins, "Angola is the name of our dear land. It is located in Africa and produces much wealth such as coffee, sugar, cotton, diamonds and oil. We are therefore proud to be Angolans". The objective is to make Angola the center of our world and then Africa, Jacinto pointed out; before books taught it used to be Portugal, then Europe, Asia, America and finally Africa. At the same time the MPLA is introducing a new concept of education, which aims to end the colonial practice of separating the educated elite from the working class. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 19, 1976)

ANGOLA MERCENARY TRIAL AFTERMATH


Following praise regarding the fairness of the Luanda trial of 13 British and American mercenaries, the court handed down death sentences against four of the mercenaries. Five Americans and seven Britons were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 16 to 30 years by the Angolan People's Revolutionary Tribunal. (*Tanzania Daily News*, June 26, 1976; *New York Times*, June 29, 1976)

On July 9 President Agostinho Neto delivered a radio speech to the Angolan people in which he reviewed the history of the phenomenon of mercenaries in Africa and in Angola and declared that the "justice which we apply in Angola is not only on behalf of our martyred people, but also for the benefit of the fraternal peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe and all peoples of the world against which imperialism is already preparing new mercenary aggression". With that the President of Angola confirmed the death sentences passed on the three Britons, Georgiu, Baker, and McKenzie and on the American Vietnam vet, Daniel Gearhart. (Radio Luanda, July 10, 1976) A few days later the executions were carried out by firing squad and Radio Luanda editorialized that the trial and executions were in defense of the whole of Africa which has been beset with mercenary attacks in Katanga, Biafra and Sudan. The editorial went on to say that it is imperative that the mercenary phenomenon be banished from the African continent and the world in general. (Radio Luanda, July 12, 1976)

It is clear that the action taken by Angola against the mercenaries was one of international solidarity with clear implications for the future of mercenary activity in Africa. Mercenary recruiting for Rhodesia (which came to light during the Luanda trial) might become a little more difficult.

In passing sentence the presiding judge, Comrade Teixeira da Silva, referred to the evidence of the collusion by the U.S. and England in the ending of mercenaries to Angola. International organizations denounced by the Tribunal as criminal aggressors against the Angolan people were the CIA and the SAS or "Wild Geese Club", a mercenary recruiting organization in South Africa. (Radio Luanda, June 29, 1976)

Official reaction in the U.S. was, not surprisingly, one of condemnation of the executions. The State Department condemned the death sentence against Gearhart as "unwarranted by the facts as we understand them", while they denied the allegation that the department condoned the dispatch of mercenaries to Angola. The State Department was joined by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger who condemned the executions as an attack against the U.S. government, thus implying that Gearhart



Angolans demonstrating against the mercenaries.

was in fact fighting for the U.S. government. (*New York Times* June 29, 1976; *Washington Post*, June 30, 1976) Before this outcry the U.S. had threatened that the execution of Gearhart would jeopardize the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Angola, but those who are familiar with the U.S. posture on the recognition of Angola prior to the time of the trial know that the U.S. had no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRA or supporting its application for U.N. membership. [see August issue of *Southern Africa* and this issue]

Meanwhile the two U.S. lawyers from the National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL) who attended this trial are charging that the Ford administration breached U.S. neutrality laws by permitting mercenary recruiting here. Lennox Hinds, national director of the NCBL and Hope Stevens, co-chair, went on to say that "we see Angola as merely the tip of the iceberg with Namibia and Rhodesia as areas that are really going to be dangerous". (*Washington Post* June 29, 1976) Hinds and Stephens contend that evidence given at the trial shows that the FBI knew of the violations of the law and the State Department knew or ought to have known of the violations of the law. They want to pursue the U.S. mercenary recruiter, David Bufkin, of Security Advisers Service, and find out from where he received the money for recruiting. In an interview in late May Bufkin said he was unworried about being prosecuted in the U.S. because the "individuals fronting the money happened to be a department in our government". (*Washington Post*, June 29, 1976)

A group of seven South African prisoners of war are also to be put on trial according to the Angolan Director of Information, Luis de Almeida. A campaign from Pretoria has already been launched to attempt to stop the trial and obtain the release of the captured soldiers. A South African editorial claims that the only real crime of the sentenced mercenaries is that "they fought on the losing side and were unfortunate enough to be captured" (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 29, 1976)


ANTI-PRA FORCES STILL ACTIVE

Angolan Prime Minister, Lopo do Nascimento, said in an interview with Radio Mozambique that troops opposed to the Angolan government were regrouping in the north

on both sides of the Angola-Zaire border. (*Guardian* London, July 2, 1976) It was not clear whether these were remnants of the defeated FNLA or some new forces. The U.S. Press has also been reporting the continued presence of UNITA guerrillas in the southern part of Angola, although no official reference has been made by the PRA to UNITA troops in the south. The *New York Times* 1976 reported a news release brought out of Angola especially for western consumption by a courier coming from Cangumbe UNITA "headquarters", in Central Angola. Dated June 1976, the report listed a series of ambushes, attacks on towns and railroad derailments undertaken by UNITA bands. According to another report, UNITA soldiers are moving in groups of 100 and 200 and the fighting is reported to be taking place around Huambo and Silva Porto. (*Christian Scientist Monitor* July 9, 1976) Support for the UNITA fighters may be South African or it may be the U. S. which is anxious to tie up Cuban and MPLA troops in the south thus creating more problems for the base of the MPLA government in the north. (*Guardian*, London, July 10, 1976)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

U.S. VEToes ANGOLAN APPLICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS



William Scranton, United States representative to the United Nations. The U.S. vetoed Angola's application for United Nations membership.

In an anticipated move, the U.S. vetoed Angola's application for U.N. membership claiming that Angola is not truly independent while Cuban troops are still in the country. The U.S. veto was the only vote against Angola of the 15 member Security Council, with the exception of China which abstained from voting, as it has on a number of occasions. The gesture at the U.N. increases the isolation of the U.S. from the 112 countries which have recognized the People's Republic of Angola.

PRA representative, Elisio de Figueiredo, spoke to the U.N. Security Council saying that the presence of Cuban troops is strictly an internal affair and that "Angola is an independent and sovereign state and will not tolerate the U.S. or any other country dictating its domestic and foreign policies". (*Tanzania Daily News* Dar Es Salaam, June 25, 1976) The U.S. had wanted to postpone the U.N. vote until after the Republican Convention in

August, and China sided with the U.S. in objecting to this "early" consideration of Angolan U.N. membership.

OUA SUPPORT OF PRA

The Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers which met in Mauritius from June 24-29 adopted a series of resolutions regarding the PRA which include the following points 1) a denunciation of the continued campaign of defamation against the PRA 2) condemnation of the practice of the recruiting of mercenaries, most recently to de-stabilize the Angolan régime 3) to recommend OAU members who have not done so to stop all aid to anti-PRA forces, and thereby aid the liberation struggle in the whole of southern Africa 4) to reaffirm the right of the PRA to adopt the political system which suits it and to establish relations of cooperation with any country it may choose 5) to ask all OAU member states to aid the PRA in any way possible to stop South African aggression in Angola. (Radio Luanda, July 6, 1976)

CUBA-ANGOLA RELATIONS

For some months a state visit by Fidel Castro has been expected in Angola; now it appears President Agostinho Neto will visit Cuba as a guest of honor in its 26th of July for celebrations in Havana. [Editors' Note: This latter visit took place and will be reported on in the September issue.]

Top sports officials of Cuba and Angola signed a joint communique on June 16 expressing plans for socialist cooperation in the training of cadres and exchange of athletes. (*Granma*, Havana, June 27, 1976)

At the first Latin American Congress of Journalists, resolutions were passed congratulating Agostinho Neto and the MPLA for the victory achieved in Angola and the Congress called for a campaign in the Latin American press to counter the false reports and distortions put out by the North American press in defense of U.S. policies. (*Granma*, Havana, June 20, 1976)

In Northern Angola the workers of the Martines do Caxito sugar mill requested that the sample of the first sugar produced in the mill be sent to Fidel Castro in recognition of the Cuban people's solidarity with Angola. President Neto agreed that this is an appropriate moment as the Cuban comrades had shown special interest in Angola's sugar production. (Radio Havana, July 13, 1976) Cuban soldiers who had previously fought with the FAPLA troops of the MPLA are now participating in the first sugar harvest of the PRA. (Radio Havana, June 30, 1976)

According to Luis de Almeida, PRA Director of Information, Cuban aid to Angola will continue as long as the two governments desire. Best estimates are that 5-6000 Cubans will remain in Angola to aid with technical and economic development.

Meanwhile the U.S. State Department is continuing its international "dirty tricks", the latest of which was a report that part of the Cuban force in Angola would be withdrawn to the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). The Congolese Foreign Ministry denied the U.S. intelligence report saying that it was designed to "create tensions between the peoples of Central Africa and ruin the climate of co-existence". The U.S. report said that 3000 Cubans would be used to train the Congolese army which might exert pressure on other central African countries. Having "lost" Angola, the U.S. is employing the old tactic of the "red menace" to frighten non-aligned African countries into the American fold.

RELATIONS IMPROVING WITH ZAIRE AND PORTUGAL

For the first time since Zaire recognized the PRA, President Neto met with Zairean President Mobutu. Their discussions concerned security along their common frontier and measures needed to strengthen control of the border. The two parties recognized the need to open a liaison office in each country, particularly important after the re-opening of the Benguela Railroad. (Radio Kinshasa, June 30, 1976)

An MPLA source in Lisbon has reportedly told officials in Portugal that favorable conditions existed for a speedy normalization of relations between Portugal and Angola. Semi-official contacts between the two countries and other bilateral initiatives are believed to have contributed to the creation of such conditions. (Radio Lisbon, June 2, 1976)

Guinea-Bissau

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In a sweep along the Casamance frontier area, Senegalese authorities arrested 150-200 people who were charged with carrying out armed actions against the Republic of Guinea Bissau. Some of these held were members of the counter-revolutionary organization known as FLING (Front for the National Liberation of Guinea). Several years earlier FLING members were implicated in the assassination of PAIGC Secretary General Amilcar Cabral as well as the infamous attacks on neighboring Conakry. While some of the FLING rebels were simply removed from the border area, others were turned over to the Bissau authorities. It is thought that this action by Senegal will help to improve relations between Bissau and Dakar. (*West Africa*, Lagos, Apr. 5, 1976)

Secretary General of the PAIGC, Aristides Pereira, recently announced that a vote on the merger of the Republic of Guinea Bissau with the Republic of Cape Verde may be expected in the near future. Currently relations between the two nations are articulated in many ways and the vote would formalize this alliance. (*New York Times*, July 18, 1976) A recent issue of the government newspaper noted "we are not tribes, we are not races, we are one country" with reference to the proposed unification of the two nations under the joint leadership of the PAIGC. (*No Pintcha*-Bissau, July 8, 1976)

THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE

The first anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Cape Verde was held throughout the Cape Verde archipelago. During the celebrations the two dominant themes were unity with the Republic of Guinea Bissau, and a broad call for increasing effort in economic development. Attending the festivities was a seven-person delegation of top officials from Guinea Bissau. These include Umara Diallo, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; Vasco Cabral, from the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning; Jose Araujo, Minister without Portfolio, and Major Constantino Teixeira, from the Office of National Security. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, July 7, 1976)

Although a formal vote and additional details still are to come, a number of strong points of unity are already well established. Beyond the common political party in both republics there is direct air service, bilateral development meetings, harmony in foreign policy, plans for a

away. According to the *Star* it is for this reason that Salim A. Salim, Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization and U.N. Ambassador from Tanzania, has said that his Committee would not call on Botswana to close its borders with Rhodesia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 5, 1976)

South Africa could come to Rhodesia's aid by threat-

ening to close its own border with Botswana if Khama closed the border—a move which would cripple the Botswanan economy overnight. But as the South Africans are well aware, the white Rhodesian regime's days are numbered, and the longer it lasts the more likely it is that the new government replacing it will be actively hostile to white rule in South Africa itself.

at the United Nations

SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION

The Security Council met from July 27 to 30 to discuss a charge by Zambia against South Africa's repeated acts of aggression, which culminated in an attack on the village of Sialola on July 11. Zambia had requested an urgent meeting of the Council, charging that South African troops under air cover had attacked and shelled Sialola, about 20 miles inside Zambian territory, killing 24 people and seriously injuring 45. Zambia said that this was only the most recent in a series of South African acts of aggression against Zambia, which totalled 13 since the beginning of the year.

In his speech before the Council, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia, Siteke G. Mwale, explained that the immediate target of South Africa's attack was a SWAPO transit camp. Mwale told the Council that the attack should be strongly condemned on two grounds: first, it was perpetrated in blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia, a direct contravention of international law and the United Nations charter; second, since the attack was directed at a SWAPO camp and since South African occupation of Namibia was totally illegal, it was cruel and completely without justification for the South African regime to attack Namibians fighting to liberate their country.

Mr. Mwale explained that South Africa, in collaboration with the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia, had deployed air and infantry commando forces along the Caprivi strip and Kasungula border with Zambia. The commandos had often crossed the border with Zambia and planted anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines which took a heavy toll in human life and property.

In addition, he charged, Zambia had irrefutable evidence that South Africa had been interfering in Zambia's internal affairs for a long time. The Vorster regime had trained, financed and armed certain dissident elements in Zambia such as William Chipango, who was recently sentenced to death for treason, and Bratson Mushala. South Africa's activities, he said, were designed to change Zambia's policy with regard to the liberation of southern Africa and to put an end to Zambia's support for SWAPO and the other liberation movements.

Mwale urged the Council to take action along the following lines: to isolate totally the white racist regimes of Southern Africa, demand South African respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia and other "front line states", declare that South Africa should relinquish forthwith its illegal hold on Namibia, and express its unqualified support of SWAPO and the other southern African liberation movements.

The representative of South Africa came before the Council to claim his Government's ignorance of the attack and to blame the "instability" in southern Africa on the activities of the liberation movements. In keeping with

their attempts at "detente" - a policy which has worn rather thin after the aggression in Angola and the Soweto massacre - he offered that all the countries of southern Africa "come together to examine the underlying issues, not simply discuss the symptoms of dispute, and to lay the foundations of permanent harmony in the area." South Africa also engaged in a diversionary tactic by seemingly acceding to a proposal by Liberia that the Council send a fact-finding mission to Namibia to investigate Zambia's charges of aggression. The proposal, however, and South Africa's offers were roundly condemned by the other African speakers, who rightly saw in them a maneuver to legitimise South Africa's control over Namibia.

In the end, the Council adopted a resolution which met most of Zambia's demands. The resolution, sponsored by Benin, Guyana, Libya, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and Tanzania, strongly condemns the armed attack of South Africa against Zambia; demands that South Africa respect Zambia's sovereignty; demands that South Africa cease using Namibia as a base for launching armed attacks against Zambia and other "front line" states for their support of the liberation struggle; declares that the liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe and the elimination of apartheid in South Africa are necessary for the attainment of justice and lasting peace in the region; and declares that in the event of further attacks on Zambia, the Security Council will consider "the adoption of effective measures in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the UN charter."

The vote on the resolution was 14 in favor to one abstention—the United States. According to its representative at the UN, William Scranton, the US felt that the text was "too categorical in the light of evidence so far made available." Whether Kissinger's much touted statement on southern Africa will ever be followed by concrete policy changes was, of course, very much on the mind of the Africa delegates in the Council debate and was the object of bitter remarks by many speakers. (United Nations press releases SC/3780-3, *New York Times*, July 30, 31, 1976)

This whole question of sanctions, which is one of the few effective weapons that African countries could use against South Africa, highlights at the same time African economic weakness and dependence on the Western world, and the divisions between the Western-oriented African countries and the more progressive African nations. The result has been that the OAU has always been unable to obtain a commitment from its members to take effective action against South Africa, or against those Western interests which support the apartheid regime, but on which they themselves are dependent for financial aid and investment. As Western observers at the Summit pointed out, imposing sanctions on South Africa would mean for several African countries imposing sanctions on themselves. The disappointing resolution on sanctions was

accompanied by another weak resolution on airline connections. While acknowledging the fact that airlines flying to and from South Africa have pool arrangements with South African Airways which in fact enable the South Africans to use the African airspace and facilities although they are barred from them, the Summit postponed action once again. It merely referred the question to a conference of "experts" which should report to the next session of the Council of Ministers.

Finally, the resolution on sports links with South Africa was also rather weak, again reflecting fundamental divisions between the pro-Western and the progressive camps. Incensed at New Zealand's decision to send a rugby team to play in South Africa immediately after the Soweto massacre, several African countries had called for a total boycott of the Olympics if New Zealand was allowed to participate. Eventually, the resolution adopted appealed to all member states to reconsider their participation if New Zealand was not barred by the Olympics Committee. (Despite the mild wording of the resolution, however, most African countries did quit the Olympics, with the exception of Tunisia, Senegal, and Ivory Coast).

The meeting also took a number of decisions on Angola, which show that the conflicts which had wrecked the last OAU Summit have been overcome and that the People's Republic now enjoys a wide consensus within the Organization. One resolution denounced the continued acts of hostility against Angola and condemned the recruitment and training of mercenaries attempting to overthrow the Angolan Government. The OAU called on member states to place at the disposal of the PRA all political, diplomatic, financial, material and military resources to enable it to face external aggression, particularly from South Africa. The resolution reaffirmed the right of the PRA to have the political regime of its choice and to establish relations of cooperation with all countries of its choice and to solicit all assistance in exercise of its sovereignty (an obvious reference to the Cubans).

In another resolution on Angola, the Summit condemned the U.S. veto of Angola's membership in the United Nations as being contrary to the Charter and a challenge to the OAU. It called on the OAU, the Non-Aligned Conference, and all states members of the UN to support Angola's admission to the next session of the UN Law of the Sea Conference as a full member.

The continued presence of mercenaries operating against the PRA and the reported recruitment of mercenaries by the Rhodesian army led the Summit to adopt a resolution condemning mercenaries as agents of the enemies of Africa, who are determined to obstruct the struggle against colonialism and racial domination. The Summit congratulated Angola for its presentation of a Draft Convention on Mercenaries, which would be submitted to states members of the OAU for study and comments, with a view to adoption by the next Council of Ministers meeting in February, 1977.

Constant frustration in the United Nations because of the Western Powers' abuse of the veto power (such as on Angola's membership, on sanctions against South Africa, etc.) led to a debate in the Summit on the possibility of revision of the UN charter. Sekou Toure of Guinea argued that the Security Council was an anachronistic body having a racist bias, given that Africa is not represented as a permanent member with the power of veto. He called for constitutional changes that would give the OAU such a power. Eventually, the Summit adopted a more cautiously worded resolution, affirming that the misuse of the veto

power is a violation of the Charter and of UN resolutions on self-determination and decolonization, but simply asking member states of the UN to seek effective alternatives to the right of veto enjoyed by the permanent members, so that the will of the international community would not be thwarted. (OAU documents CM/Ctee A/Draft Res. 1, 2, 4, 9, 14, 20, 25; *Africa News*, July 5, 1976; *Observer*, London, July 4, 1976; *Guardian*, London, July 7, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, weekly edition, June 26, July 10, 1976; *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, July 4, 1976.)

OAU ADOPTS UNIFIED STAND ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

The OAU Summit concluded its work on July 7 with a number of strong resolutions on Southern Africa, despite deep internal rifts on a variety of issues which had led observers to describe the meeting as a trial of African solidarity comparable to the crisis over Angola earlier this year.

The meeting was beset by controversies even before it started, when the decision to convene the session in Mauritius was challenged because of the island's close links, especially economic, with South Africa. Another dispute related to the fact that Mauritius is one of the few Commonwealth countries which has retained the English Queen as titular head of State. Since the OAU Chairmanship falls by tradition to the head of State of the host country, Idi Amin had threatened to press the issue in a bid for a second term as OAU Chairman. Both questions, however, were resolved before the beginning of the session and Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of Mauritius, was elected Chairman.

The Summit itself was rocked by regional controversies, some of which have occupied the OAU practically since its inception, but have seemed to come to a head in recent months because of a number of developments. Mauritania and Morocco at one point threatened to withdraw from the OAU in their confrontation with Algeria—and the liberation movement Polisario (supported by Algeria)—over the question of the Western Sahara, which became independent from Spain last year. The Ethiopia-Somali border dispute flared up again with the impending independence of the territory of Djibouti. The Israeli raid at Entebbe airport led to bitter accusations by Uganda against Kenya of collusion with Israel. Sudan, which was threatened by a coup against the Nimeiry regime during the Summit, accused Libya of having sponsored the attempt.

Despite these growing conflicts, which undermine African solidarity and open the way to imperialist maneuvers (such as the recent United States decision to supply arms to Kenya and Zaire), the OAU Summit was able to adopt a unified stand on Southern Africa. Nevertheless, the need to maintain unity on this question led to some watering down of essential provisions in a few resolutions. While the final text of the resolutions is not yet available, the preliminary drafts (as adopted by the Political Committee of the Conference of Ministers) show the outlines of future OAU strategy on Southern Africa.

The Soweto massacre and reports of growing nuclear collaboration with South Africa by the United States, France, West Germany and other Powers dominated the debate on South Africa. To this must be added the new aggressive posture adopted by the South African regime against independent Africa, as shown by the aggression in Angola and the recent invasion of a Zambian town under pretext of attacking a SWAPO camp, as well as the

recently adopted Defence Amendment Bill by which South Africa arrogates itself the right to strike anywhere in Africa to defend its borders. The result has been a change in African attitudes away from the negotiating posture adopted with the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, which assigned priority to the solution of the Rhodesian and Namibian question, to a concern with the immediate need to tackle the question of South African liberation itself.

In one of its most strongly worded resolutions, the OAU Summit affirmed that the only effective guarantees for the African people of South Africa against the repetition of massacres is the launching of the armed struggle for the seizure of power by the people. The Summit resolved to extend maximum political, economic and military assistance to the movements to enable them to execute the armed struggle. It also appealed to all friendly countries, especially the Non-Aligned Conference and the Arab League, to increase their support to the liberation movements. At the same time, the OAU declared that an act of aggression against any independent African state by South Africa is an act of aggression against the whole of Africa, thereby assuring the "front line" states (Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana) of African help in case of attack.

Repeating its previous stand against the "bantustans" in uncompromising terms, the OAU went a step further than in the past by making it mandatory for its Members not to accord recognition to the Transkei when it supposedly becomes "independent" on October 26. The OAU declared that violation of this collective commitment by any member state would be seen as a betrayal of not only the fighting people of South Africa but the entire continent. The resolution committed the OAU through the African group at the United Nations and African diplomatic representatives throughout the world to wage a concerted campaign to dissuade U.N. member

states from recognizing the fraudulent independence of the "bantustans." The fact that the OAU reached unanimity on the question was reportedly a shock for the Chief Matanzima, the dictatorial ruler of the Transkei, who had hoped to achieve recognition from some of the more Western-oriented states in Africa, such as the Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic. South African observers noted that Western countries which might have been considering recognition would now have to take the OAU stand into account in their diplomatic calculations. The resolution, which is strengthened by the similar approach taken by the United Nations in opposition to the "bantustans," has thus shattered South Africa's maneuvers to make apartheid acceptable to the international community.

Other provisions adopted by the OAU strongly condemned nuclear collaboration with South Africa, called it a hostile act against all of Africa, and called on France to rescind its decision to sell nuclear reactors to South Africa, and on the other Western countries, Japan and Israel, to terminate all nuclear collaboration with South Africa. The Summit also recommended that the OAU member states take strong measures against transnational corporations collaborating with South Africa in the nuclear and military fields. However, no action against other transnationals (which would be sensitive to African pressure in view of the fact that they invest both in South Africa and in independent Africa) was decided upon. Similarly, the question of economic sanctions against South Africa was not dealt with in any detail, except by denouncing all cooperation with South Africa by OAU member states, by appealing to all countries to implement sanctions, and by requesting the oil-producing countries to establish an effective embargo against South Africa.

U.S. and Southern Africa_____

KISSINGER AND VORSTER MEET

Only one week after the uprisings in Soweto broke out, Secretary Kissinger met Prime Minister Vorster in Germany on June 23-24. The meeting came as no surprise; Kissinger had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a report on his April trip to Africa that the US planned to start "serious conversations" with South Africa on the "evolution of southern Africa."

It was widely believed in Washington that the main topic of the high-level talks would be what Vorster would be prepared to do to accomplish a "moderate" solution in Rhodesia and to set a timetable for independence in Namibia. As Kissinger told the House International Relations Committee, "The question I want to explore is whether South Africa is prepared to separate its own future from Rhodesia and Namibia." Kissinger told reporters, who asked if the "riots" would force him to call off the talks, that the talks would go on because South Africa is an essential element to any solution in southern Africa. Because of the recent uprisings in South Africa, the Congressional Black Caucus and others demanded that majority rule in South Africa be made the main agenda item for the talks, but it is likely that the crisis-management attitude of Secretary Kissinger kept the focus on Rhodesia and Namibia.

Both Kissinger and Vorster were virtually silent about the results of the two-day meeting. Kissinger had stressed to the press that the talks were merely "exploratory" and that no conclusions would be reached. The report on the talks in the government-owned mouthpiece *South African Digest* of July 2 was characteristic of the vagueness of official comments: "A significant aspect of the talks was that they did not come to an impasse." Another report said that the only agreement was for the two leaders to meet again, and the July 20 *Washington Post* quoted the *Rand Daily Mail* speculating that a second session of talks would begin within the next five or six weeks. This story suggests that the venue might be Iran, although the Iranian Ambassador in Washington rejected this possibility.

Speculation in the press on the contents of the talks, centering on Rhodesia, began in late July. The most important article so far is a July 20 *New York Times* report from London by Bernard Weinraub. The focus is on possible guarantees to white Rhodesians in the event of majority rule, consistent with Kissinger's emphasis in his April 25 Lusaka speech on majority rule with minority rights. (See also Zimbabwe section) The proposals which are being considered include compensation for property to whites who want to leave, establishment of a bank to

joint shipping company, and long standing cultural ties.

In view of deficiencies in material and administrative resources, the short run policy for development is to concentrate on productive investment rather than quickly consume the scarce resources on social welfare which

would then have to be cut back. The overall strategy is to put the nation on a secure economic footing before moving in other sectors. There is no room for utopianism in the pragmatic plans for Cape Verdian development.

Neighbors

BOTSWANA STRUGGLES FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

A decade of relative isolation is coming to an end for Botswana as the advance of the liberation movements in Southern Africa compels its leaders to take sides against the remaining white dominated states.


Since Mozambique closed its borders with Rhodesia, pressure on President Seretse Khama has intensified to cut the railway link between Rhodesia and South Africa which runs through his country. But the problems resulting from closure would be even more severe for Botswana than those suffered by the Mozambicans. The railway line and all its rolling stock are owned by the Rhodesians, who also provide all the personnel. Closing the border and the rail link would cut off Botswana's lifeline: coal and oil supplies would be exhausted within ten days; the millions of dollars in foreign exchange received from Rhodesia for the use of the line, and income from copper and beef exports would disappear (*Manchester Guardian*, April 18, 1976)

In an effort to mitigate the difficulties which closure would cause, President Khama has taken several steps. His visit to India in April reportedly resulted in a promise of Indian rolling stock and personnel to run the railways and train managerial and maintenance staff. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 25, 1976) Two oil storage depots are being built outside the capital of Gaborone which will allow for a four-month reserve. (*Manchester Guardian*, April 18, 1976) Also, construction is continuing on the 700 mile all-weather road to Kazangula, the town on the Zambezi ferry link to Zambia, and Botswana's only section of border with a black-ruled nation.

This road, financed by a \$70 million loan from the United States, Sweden, West Germany, and the World Bank, will provide an alternative export and import route for Zaire and Zambia as well, which currently ship goods through the officially closed border between Zambia and Rhodesia to South Africa or via Botswana and on to South Africa. The South Africans are quite interested in the road since they believe, probably correctly, that it will increase their trade with Zaire and Zambia, reinforcing the economic dependence of those countries upon South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 5, 1976)

Botswana, which is currently a virtual economic dependent of South Africa, is now struggling to loosen its ties. In August its currency will cease to be the South African Rand and will become the "Pula", which means rain. The word is also used as the ceremonial greeting, an indication of the importance of rain and water in general for this semi-arid country. (*Manchester Guardian*, April 18, 1976)

Khama is also making an effort to attract foreign investment to counterbalance the heavy South African investment which now prevails. The country has rich deposits of diamonds and other minerals and "is on all the investors' maps," according to a United Nations develop-



BOTSWANA
Roads: projected and completed
Railroads

ment official. At present, nearly half of the wage-earning population of this nation of less than 700,000 people works in the South African mines. (*Washington Post*, June 30, 1976)

At the same time, Khama's continuing need for South African aid and approval is evidenced in his call for a summit meeting between African leaders from inside and outside South Africa with Prime Minister John Vorster. He said that political prisoners should be released for the talks so that they can all together discuss ways by which "South Africa can change the present system that is objectionable to non-Whites." (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 26, 1976)

Roger Hawkins, Minister of Transport and Power, shrugged off the potential effect on Rhodesia if Botswana sealed the border, asserting that the remaining rail link directly to Beitbridge on the South African border could handle the traffic. The South Africans, however, are less sanguine. "The effect on Rhodesia would be drastic," predicted the *Star* of June 5; the already overloaded rail line from Beitbridge to the south would have great difficulty handling the increased traffic. Even if it could accommodate all the Rhodesian goods, the Zambian and Zairean goods which use that route would be turned

buy land from whites at a guaranteed floor price, and guaranteeing pension benefits of Rhodesian civil servants. The US, with Great Britain, would probably finance such proposals, and the expense could be considerable. The *New York Times* has already given such a plan its editorial blessing, saying every effort should be made to associate black African governments with such a plan. In fact, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaefele was dispatched to Africa after the talks to report to various African leaders. Several African leaders, including President Nyerere of Tanzania, have suggested compensating white Rhodesians who want to leave, but none have publicly countenanced making guarantees to whites who would want to stay, particularly when rights for the majority have not been established.

DEMOCRATS ADOPT AFRICA PLATFORM

Besides selecting Jimmy Carter as its nominee for President, the Democratic Party agreed at its July convention on a party platform, which includes a section on Africa. The platform drafting committee, whose members ranged from anti-war activists to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, accepted most of the recommendations of the Democratic Foreign Affairs Task Force's "Study Group on Africa." The Study Group was headed by Goler T. Butcher, an attorney and former aide to Rep. Charles Diggs, and Wayne Fredericks, Lyndon Johnson's top man on Africa in the 1960's.

Essentially the African section is a restatement of liberal Democratic viewpoints on Africa, first put forward in the Kennedy-Johnson era and regularly espoused by Democratic critics of Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger ever since. However, events over the past two years have forced even Kissinger to accept, belatedly, many of the positions advocated by liberal Democrats, especially in public pronouncements such as his April speech in Lusaka, Zambia. The result is that many Democrats are no longer critics but supporters of Kissinger; Carter himself said on June 23 that "I personally agree with the recent posture taken by Secretary Kissinger as relates to Africa." (*New York Times*, June 24, 1976)

Nonetheless, the platform does propose several steps which would amount to a substantial change in US policy. Declaring that "eight years of indifference, accompanied by increasing cooperation with racist regimes, have left our influence and prestige in Africa at an historical low," the platform calls for:

- an Africa-centered policy, and not a corollary of US Soviet policy which produced the Angola fiasco
- increased economic aid, especially to the Sahel
- unequivocal support for majority rule in southern Africa
- non-recognition of Bantustan "independence" in South Africa
- strengthening of the arms embargo against South Africa
- withdrawal of tax credits for businesses operating in Namibia and paying taxes to South Africa
- enforcement of Rhodesian sanctions and repeal of the Byrd Amendment
- normalization of relations with Angola
- increased participation of black Americans in formulation of African policy.

The items dealing with Bantustans, the arms embargo, Angola, and black Americans are additions to the party's

1972 platform. On the other hand, the 1972 document called for "sharply reduced" military aid, which is not mentioned this year. Ironically, the point has less significance in 1972 than it would have now, when the US is initiating a much-expanded program of military sales and aid to Africa, beginning with Kenya, Zaire, and Ethiopia.

Nor does the platform deal with the crucial question of stemming growing American financial participation, including new investment, in the South African economy, which is largely dependent on such outside contributions for its future growth. This is not surprising, perhaps, given the predisposition of the Africa Study Group. A crucial section of their submission says that Administration "policy blunders" are "imperilling vital US interests on the following critical issues: a) Preserving US access to *Raw Materials and Energy*; b) Protecting *US Trade and Markets*; c) Protecting Long Term *US Investment* interests in Africa; d) Protecting *US Strategic Interests* Respecting Africa."

It is no secret that these interests, deemed "vital" by the Democrats have clashed with national revolutionary movements in many parts of the world. They may well do so again in southern Africa.

FIGHT AGAINST NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA BECOMES MORE INTENSE

Liberation movement spokesmen, fourteen members of the Black Caucus and a number of anti-apartheid groups have filed legal papers with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to try to put a stop to US exports of highly enriched uranium to South Africa.

On January 22, 1974 and again on October 2, 1974 the NRC had licensed export of 12,529.25 grams of uranium with an enrichment of approximately 93%. Again on January 6, 1975 20,759.65 grams were licensed for export. The current application by the exporter, US Nuclear, Inc. is for 25,713.50 grams of the same degree of enrichment, called the weapons grade because it is sufficiently enriched to be used for an atom bomb. All of these applications have in the past have been routinely approved as a part of the US Atoms for Peace plan in which the US hoped to unburden itself of the onus of its own nuclear stockpile by selling enriched uranium for scientific and medical and other peaceful purposes under what are alleged to be appropriate safeguards.

The petitioners in the proceedings filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, however, claim that the NRC should not have granted the licenses in the past and should not do so now without a specific finding that the proposed export is not "inimical to the common defense and security," a finding which, the petitioners argue, the Commission simply cannot make in regard to South Africa.

Not only has South Africa not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it has indicated a desire to "maximize its nuclear options, including those that are militarily related." Because of its advanced nuclear technology, including the ability to enrich uranium for itself, South Africa has the capability of building nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the petitioners contend that some of South Africa's nuclear facilities, such as the Valindaba enrichment plant and the Pelindaba research reactor, are not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which are themselves deficient. Because of rising black tension and anger over Apartheid, South Africa could withdraw into itself and divert uranium to make weapons.

Given the fact that licenses have already been granted in the past on an almost routine basis, the petitioners face an uphill battle even to be allowed an open hearing on the issues. But it is clear that Congressional sentiment is moving in the direction of openly questioning the wisdom of nuclear exports and of the viability of safeguards. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, however, has been given virtually dictatorial powers, which even the President cannot touch. Its decision is final.

Appearing for the petitioners is Goler Butcher, former counsel for the Diggs Committee on Africa of the House of Representatives, Michael Peay and William Ware of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law are co-counsel. Black Caucus support of the petition was almost unanimous. Only Barbara Jordan, Yvonne Brathwaite Burke and Harold Ford have failed to join in so far. Organizations which have joined the suit include the American Committee on Africa, Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, SWAPO and the Washington Office on Africa. Individuals include Thami Mhlambiso of ANC (South Africa), and Theo-Ben Gurirab of SWAPO, and Elizabeth Landis, a leading expert on Namibian legal questions.

Meanwhile, South Africa has been forced through public pressure to shift the contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant from a US-Dutch-Swiss consortium led by General Electric to the French Framatome Company. Supporters of the legal campaign point to this as evidence of the growing power of political opposition to dealings with South Africa which feed the possibility of nuclear holocaust to defend apartheid.

CONGRESSIONAL TRIPS TO SOUTHERN AFRICA FOCUS ON RHODESIA

An articulate young member of the House Committee on International Relations has returned from an Africa trip convinced that the Kissinger plan for a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe just won't work. Brooklyn Democrat Stephen J. Solarz talked directly with Robert Mugabe, secretary general of ZANU and Edgar Tekeru, a member of the ZANU central committee, on July 7th at Quelimane, a coastal city some 200 miles northeast of Beira, in Mozambique. He told reporters in Johannesburg

and the audience of the Today show in the United States that the guerillas would reject anything short of immediate and unconditional transfer of power to the black majority. The guerillas ruled out any advance guarantees of compensation to whites for land and property, an issue which Kissinger has stressed in hopes of securing a future for Whites and stemming a white flight. Mugabe said that Zimbabwe's land was "God-given" and that it had been worked by Africans, who could place counter-claims for exploitation.

Solarz also talked with Whites and ruled out their acceptance of any such terms. From the evidence he has gathered, he has concluded that Kissinger's policy of seeking a negotiated solution to the Zimbabwe conflict is "based on illusion" and has called for US humanitarian and medical aid to the liberation forces. Solarz' views are interesting not only because he has broken with the general view expressed by liberals supporting Kissinger's efforts, but because he has been a sophisticated advocate of Israel, a nation with few friends left in black Africa especially since Prime Minister Vorster's visit to Israel in April to forge an economic and perhaps military alliance.

The so-called "Third Force" of the Zimbabwe nationalist movement will get a chance to tell its case to an even more important Congressional spokesman of liberalism on Africa when Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visits Mozambique this November. Clark hopes to visit the guerrilla camps themselves and talk to the guerrilla leaders of the ZILA directly as well as to Mugabe. One factor which is likely to influence Clark's perception of the Zimbabwe situation is his close relationship with the African American Institute, which has recently signed a contract to administer some \$4 million in training funds, which will probably be appropriated shortly, on behalf of the Nkomo faction of the African National Council. But Clark is determined to hear from all parties among the Zimbabwe nationalist groups.

In addition to his stay in Mozambique, Clark plans to spend time in Zambia, South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania and may also try to get to Somalia and Ethiopia.

u.s. action news and notes

MOBIL: FUELING RACISM IN RHODESIA

For eight years, Mobil Oil and other oil giants have been supplying Rhodesia with its oil needs, despite UN sanctions. The Center for Social Action of the 1.8 million member Protestant United Church of Christ, (UCC) revealed the process and secret documents from inside the Mobil organization at a press conference in June. Center director Rev. Harold K. Schulz explained that the documents were obtained by mail from a group in South Africa called Okhela, which describes itself as made up of "white patriots" who clandestinely support the African National Congress.

The oil came from Mobil's South African refinery and was shipped by Freight Services, Ltd, owned by Harry Oppenheimer's Anglo-American empire. A Freight Services representative contacted by the *New York Times* responded to questions with the comment: "we do not disclose the identities or details of the business activities" of the companies we ship for.

Genta, a secret corporation established by the Rhodesian government, acts as the importer of the oil, which it

then distributes to the refining companies in Rhodesia, including Mobil. An elaborate "paper chase" of billing to six bogus corporations was established in order to make it appear that Mobil in South Africa was not making any sales to Rhodesia, and thus violating U.S. sanctions laws. The second purpose of the billing was to confound any person pursuing an investigation of the sales.

Mobil's initial response to the Center for Social Action disclosures was to issue a statement "denying charges that it has contravened US restrictions on trade with Rhodesia." The response stated that Mobil headquarters "have gone to considerable effort to make sure that all our affiliates . . . have been informed of the requirements of US law". Mobil may be perfectly correct in its denial however, since there are large loopholes in the law so that it does not necessarily stop Mobil's South African affiliate from trading with Rhodesia, but only prohibits knowledge and complicity in the scheme by U.S. officers of the

company. Nevertheless, as the UCC report charges, "With three U.S. citizens who are or have been both directors of Mobil (South Africa) and very senior executives within Mobil (USA), it is difficult to see how Mobil (USA) could be said not to know of the sanctions-breaking activities of its subsidiary." The *Times* report also cites the existence of a Mobil executive who "is said to have authenticated the broad outlines of the company's secret activity in southern Africa" and presumably confirmed the knowledge of U.S. officials.

The charges are now under investigation by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. Further, following testimony by Rev. Schulz before the UN Security Council sanctions committee, the US Government is being asked to respond to the allegations within two months. Hearings on the matter may be held in the fall by Senator Dick Clark's Subcommittee on Africa and Congressman Donald Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations. And Representative Charles Diggs has telegraphed the White House calling for "immediate amendment of the sanctions regulations to cover US owned or controlled subsidiaries wherever located."

With the Zimbabwe liberation armies poised for a takeover, it may be difficult to arouse interest in sanctions enforcement now, yet the Center's report concludes: "Today a tiny white population of Rhodesia hangs onto power with a tenacity few could have foreseen. But no amount of determination by them could have kept their economy and military machine operating if they had not received a steady flow of oil supplies." The report is available from the Office of Church & Society UCC, 297 Park Avenue South, New York NY 10010 for \$1.00.

EXPOSE SOUTH AFRICA LINKS IN U.S.

The American Committee on Africa released a three page memorandum describing the contract between the U.S. public relations firm of Sydney S. Baron & Co. and the South African government's Department of Information. News of the contract became known when Andrew Hatcher, a black vice president of Baron, (and formerly assistant press secretary for President Kennedy) debated George Houser, ACOA's white executive director on NBC-TV's "Today" show. The Baron organization receives \$1,000 a day, all year round or \$365,000 annually.

The contract, filed with the Justice Department under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, details the responsibility of the company to South Africa.

The Consultant will "make every effort to encourage the American business and financial community to become acquainted with the economic opportunity offered by the Republic of South Africa. . . ." Will "promote exchanges of visits between the U.S. and the Republic of South Africa. . . ."

"Assist the Department of Information in the preparation and distribution of press releases, publication, analyses, reports, films and other communication vehicles. . . ."

"Counsel the Department of Information concerning tourism programs. . . ."

"Undertake such public opinion surveys in the United States as the Department of Information deem necessary to determine American attitudes and opinions concerning the Republic of South Africa."

"Furnish the Department of Information with analyses and interpretations of political and sociological developments in the United States affecting the Republic of South Africa when so requested. . . ."

ACOA's memo also details a contract between a black cosmetics firm based in Meridian, Ms. to market hair straighteners and skin lighteners through a South African pharmacy chain, Andrew Harding Pty Ltd. The memo describes the history of the contract, based on information from local Mississippi activists.

In 1974 Dr. Carlton Turner, Associate Director of the University of Mississippi Research Institute for Pharmaceutical Sciences went to a conference on Alcohol and Drug dependence in South Africa.

While there he met a white businessman, Andrew Harding who runs a chain of pharmacies in South Africa. Out of their discussions came the introduction of Harding to Charles Young, president of E.F. Young Co., an invitation from the Mississippi University Research Institute of Pharmaceutical Sciences to Harding and some fellow businessmen to visit the U.S., and a five year contract signed between Young and Harding.

Under this contract E.F. Young, which is headquartered in Meridian, Mississippi, will supply a wide range of its special "black" cosmetics skin lighteners and hair straighteners to the Harding Co., which will market them in South Africa. The contract, obviously seen as a triumph by the South Africans was signed in front of Governor Finch of Mississippi, in a partying atmosphere which included the presentation of South African gifts to the Governor.

In a hard-hitting statement Henry J. Kirksey, an independent black politician running for the Senate against incumbent John Stennis, attacked the contract and said "The native people of South Africa and Rhodesia don't need any cosmetics. They need help to get the European apartheid thieves off their backs." (Memo 8/2/76)

OPPOSE MERCENARY ACTIVITY IN TEXAS

The Texas Black Caucus, Texas State Representatives Joe Bernal and G.J. Sutton, San Antonio City Councilman Claude Black and Texas NAACP leader Lillian Sutton Taylor are among those who have endorsed a campaign to stop mercenary recruitment to Rhodesia in the Southwest. The Caucus adopted a resolution calling for strict enforcement of U.S. laws against mercenary recruitment and calling on the Democratic convention to oppose mercenaries and all other forms of U.S. aid to the white minority regime.

Mario Salas, who chairs the 30 person Committee Against Mercenary Recruitment and U.S. Intervention in Foreign Countries in San Antonio, explained that his group is seeking names for a petition with the following goals: discouraging tourism in Rhodesia, boycotting Rhodesian goods, and end to bank loans and freedom for all political prisoners in southern Africa.

The Committee arose in response to a report carried in the San Antonio *Light* about a certain Mike Gonzalez, acting on behalf of an unnamed El Paso man, recruiting persons to a group called "American Aid for Rhodesia" (AAR). The drive is aimed at persons with military backgrounds, but Gonzalez claimed "We will not be taking any arms or ammunition". A local attorney confirmed that Gonzalez contacted him about setting up a tax-deductible conduit for funds for the Smith regime. Gonzalez claimed that AAR was recruiting in El Paso, Phoenix, Los Angeles and Houston and had 400 prospects. Gonzalez is apparently one other of the many individuals actively recruiting for the Rhodesian army. (*San Antonio Light News*, 5/23; 6/13/76) The Committee Against the Mercenaries can be contacted at P.O. Box 893, San Antonio, Texas 78293

update

SOUTH AFRICA CLAMPS DOWN ON MILITANTS

The South African government is moving on two fronts to quash continuing resistance by blacks to its apartheid policies: it is cracking down hard on what it regards as militant troublemakers and at the same time it is making concessions to mollify the bitterness of Africans.

Following weeks of intermittent protest in black townships around the country, police arrested scores of African leaders in August, among them Winnie Mandela, Steve Biko and many prominent members of the South African Council of Churches. Charges against the detainees were not made public, but it is thought that most are being held under the tough new Internal Security Act.

In the midst of the police swoop, however, South African authorities moved to liberalize urban leasehold regulations, so that urban Africans can now own their homes without taking out homeland citizenship.

SWAPO ROLE SOUGHT IN NAMIBIA TALKS

Diplomatic sources in New York and Washington say there are indications that a quiet campaign is in effect to "destabilize" SWAPO, the Namibian independence movement. Sources say the action-backed principally by Britain and the U.S.—is designed to promote a moderate faction within the movement that will accept a negotiated settlement with South Africa, the controlling foreign power since World War One.

Sources say that the internal pressure within SWAPO could well force the leadership to accept a settlement that falls short of its long-term demands. SWAPO has demanded that all South African forces must be withdrawn, all political prisoners released, and Namibian exiles allowed to return before it could agree to talks on the territory's future.

South African-sponsored constitutional talks in the Namibian capital of Windhoek continued through the month of August, however, with delegates from the country's ethnic groups discussing structures for a future government.

RHODESIA ESCALATES EASTERN BORDER WAR

The Mozambican government claimed last month that Rhodesian forces attacked a refugee camp near the village of Nhamias and killed over 600 men, women and children.

A Rhodesian military communique issued earlier had described the incursion as an attack on Zimbabwe nationalist guerrillas at their base camp. The Salisbury statement, said that 300 guerrillas had been killed—an occasion for celebration among the government's white constituency, some of who felt the offensive was long overdue.

South African whites reacted differently to news of the Rhodesian action—the latest and largest in a series of "hot pursuit" border crossings. Both Afrikaans and English-language newspapers criticized Rhodesia and cautioned that further attacks on Mozambique might draw outside powers into the conflict.

MPLA SAYS BENGUELA TRAFFIC TO RESUME

The Angolan government says it is working as fast as it can to reopen the Benguela railway to normal traffic. The line was closed due to damage done during the recent war,

and continuing skirmishes have stalled repair work.

Both Zambia and Zaire rely on the Benguela Railroad to get substantial quantities of copper to port at Lobito, on the Angolan coast.

PENTAGON CONSIDERS TRANSKEI NAVAL BASE

A recent issue of the U.S. Army's *Military Review* proposes that the U.S. establish a naval base in the Transkei—one of South Africa's black "homelands," which is slated to get independence in October. Writing in the *Review*, Major Wesley Groesbeck of the Army Intelligence Staff says the U.S. arms embargo against South Africa will probably continue in spite of the Defense Department's desire to end it, but he suggests a way around the diplomatic embarrassment of direct ties with South Africa's white government.

Groesbeck argues that the Transkei—whose independence will be contested widely—will welcome a U.S. naval presence. He also points out the U.S. is losing access to other ports on Africa's coastlines and that the Transkei's ports are close to the strategically vital Cape sea lanes.

The article carries a reminder that it doesn't reflect official U.S. thinking, but experts who monitor defense activities say it is a "trial balloon" for the Pentagon. Military strategists are worried about what they see as increased Soviet influence in Angola and Mozambique, the flanks of southern Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA WARNED ON ZAMBIA ATTACKS

The United Nations Security Council last month warned South Africa against further attacks on Zambian border outposts in their campaign to root out SWAPO guerrillas. The Council heard a presentation from Zambian Foreign Minister Siseko Mwaile, in which he charged South African troops with violating Zambian territory fourteen times since January—incidents that South Africa denies altogether.

Mwaile said he was pleased with the Security Council resolution, which he described as "very very strong."

"They have told South Africa never to use Namibia as a base for attacking Zambia and Front-Line states," said Mwaile, "and they also repeated that South Africa is in Namibia illegally."

MUZOREWA SUPPORTERS CHARGED WITH BOMBINGS

Eight members of the faction of the Zimbabwe African National Council led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa have been charged with responsibility for two bomb blasts that took place in Salisbury in July. The eight men face death sentences under Rhodesia's Law and Order Maintenance Act, and all pleaded guilty at the start of their trial in Salisbury.

RHODESIA RESTRICTS FOREIGN JOURNALISTS

The white regime in Rhodesia has issued new regulations applying to foreign journalists, who will now be required to obtain special residence permits before entering the country. The new measures are evidence that the government is feeling increasing pressure from Zimbabwe nationalist guerrillas.

The Mozambique Film Project Announces the Premiere of O POVO ORGANIZADO

O POVO ORGANIZADO (THE PEOPLE ORGANIZED) IS PRODUCED BY ROBERT VAN LIEROP AND TAKES UP WHERE 'A LUTA CONTINUA' LEAVES OFF. THIS 16MM COLOR FILM WAS SHOT THROUGHOUT MOZAMBIQUE IN LATE 1975.

O POVO ORGANIZADO SHOWS MOZAMBIQUE AS COLONIALISM LEFT IT AND AS IT IS TODAY - AS IT STRUGGLES TO CREATE A DYNAMIC NEW SOCIETY.

ALL OF THE MONEY RAISED AT THIS PREMIERE WILL BE DONATED TO MOZAMBIQUE'S MINISTRY OF HEALTH FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A HEALTH CENTER AND A MATERNITY CLINIC IN A RURAL AREA. OUR GOAL IS \$40,000 NATIONWIDE.

THE NEW YORK PREMIERE WILL ALSO FEATURE 'A LUTA CONTINUA' AND TWO MAJOR JAZZ PERFORMERS. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MOZAMBIKAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE THE GUEST SPEAKER.

IT IS A NIGHT NOT TO BE MISSED.

September 25, 1976 — **8:00 p.m.**
Hunter College Assembly Hall - 68th & Lexington
Tickets: \$5, \$10 & \$25

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