


# southern africa



VOLUME VIII No. 1

January 1975



In memory of

AMILCAR

1975 CABRAL

assassinated

January 20,

1973

**Inside: The Cape Verde Islands - Colonialism on the Wane**

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# Overview

## A CRAB DOES NOT BEGET A BIRD.

—Ethiopian Proverb

About ten weeks ago the collective that produces Southern Africa decided that we should try to present our readers with an 'overview' of events every month. It looked like a good idea—but subsequent events moved so swiftly, sometimes in apparently contradictory directions, that Monday's overview was outdated by the time it reached the printer on Wednesday afternoon—and so the idea seemed to die before it was properly born.

Allowing this to happen was irresponsible. In a period when the incredible occurs daily and the impossible seems only a headline away, when Vorster is warmly welcomed in African capitals, when President Kaunda refers to the South African Premier's utterances as "the voice of reason", when the South Africans talk about pulling their troops out of Rhodesia, and Smith encourages his old enemies Sithole and Nkomo to leave their prisons and go talk with men such as President Nyerere and Samora Machel, in such times it is more important than ever to preserve a clear perspective, based on an analysis of the real interests concerned rather than on wishful thinking.

In the dust whipped up by the whirlwind of shifting positions commentators have tended to lose sight of some basic realities. There are two kinds of "change" occurring in Southern Africa. There is the process of revolution, the long painful struggle to destroy an old oppression and build a new society—this is the process so painfully fought for by a militant, disciplined organisation such as FRELIMO. Then there is the process of counter, or perhaps anti-revolution—the deliberate attempt to maintain, by any means necessary, an old order of power and privilege, in as intact a form as possible. There should be no doubt in anybody's mind that South Africa's white leaders are totally committed to the second process.

Taking this one step further South Africa's critical relationship with the major capitalist powers and the role of these allies in the current drama also needs careful scrutiny. Commentators have generally agreed that the "price" exacted by the United States, France and Britain for the triple veto at the United Nations which preserved South Africa's membership was a more "flexible" South African policy, to be evidenced it seems, by a swift retreat

on Rhodesia and some openness on Namibia. The question to be asked however is what does this represent? A new commitment to democracy and the end of exploitation—or a more sophisticated strategy to save a very valuable asset?

Writing in *The Observer* (London) in mid-December, Stanly Uys, a shrewd South African journalist pointed out that Smith is being brought to the negotiating table not only by South African pressure but by what he termed "the solid foundations that were laid for the peace offensive: the consensus that was reached between Mr. Vorster, President Kaunda, Sir Seretse Khama, of Botswana, President Nyerere and Mr. Samora Machel, Frelimo's president, that southern Africa needed peace and stability.

"Implicit in this consensus," he said, "was acceptance by the African leaders that Rhodesia was the first priority, Namibia the second, and South Africa's race policies the final priority. A peace offensive would not have been possible on any other basis.

"The African leaders," he concluded, "will deal with the question of apartheid when they come to it; meanwhile, they have other priorities."

If that is indeed the perspective of the men now negotiating with the South Africans there are some questions that must be seriously examined. Vorster's priority is to preserve white hegemony, the Western powers seek to maintain their strategic and economic interests in the area. If these can be maintained at the price of some concessions, the concessions may be made. But the Chile experience should warn us that ultimately the concessions made will not be very great. Some indication of American thinking is given by recent news of the proposed replacement of Donald Easum, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and a relative "liberal" on Africa by an old anti-communist "trouble-shooter", the man who was United States Ambassador to Chile at the time of the right-wing U.S.-backed coup against Allende.

As another old Ashanti proverb tells us:

"Rain beats a leopard's skin, but it does not wash out the spots."

DID YOU RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TO  
SOUTHERN AFRICA?

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feature

# The Cape Verde Islands: Colonialism on the wane

by Richard Lobban

## Introduction


For centuries the Cape Verde Islands have been a colonial possession of Portugal. Following the coup d'etat in Lisbon on April 25, 1974 a deeply rooted nationalist spirit has emerged on the Islands with demonstrations for unification with the mainland Republic of Guinea Bissau. The ties between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau developed throughout the era of slavery and continued up to the present. The Islanders carry a rich overlay of African culture and values in their language, Creole (also spoken widely in Guinea-Bissau), in the unique *mornas* of Cape Verdean music, and in many other aspects of Cape Verdean life. Under the leadership of the PAIGC the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea Bissau will again be linked. Since the readers of *Southern Africa* are familiar with the current happenings in the Islands in the regular column on Guinea Bissau, this article has been prepared to give some of the historical background necessary to understand contemporary realities.

## Basic Geography

Sailing west of Dakar some 350 miles into the Atlantic Ocean one finds the Cape Verde archipelago (estimated 1970 population; 270,000) consisting of ten major islands and five minor islets. The northern, or windward cluster is comprised of Santo Antao, Sao Vicente, Santa Luzia, Sao Nicolau, Sal, and Boavista. The southern, leeward islands include Maio, Sao Tiago, Fogo, and Brava. While the leeward islands are fewer in number and smaller in territory they hold about twice the population of the windward islands.

Each island varies considerably in terrain and natural resources. Sal is long and flat but sparsely populated with concentrations around the international airport or the saltworks. Sao Vicente offers a major port at Mindelo for bunkering ocean freighters. Fogo, a volcanic island which rises thousands of feet above the sea, is heavily populated on the coastal ring. Sao Tiago is the most heavily populated having well over 90,000 people living on its hilly, deep-cut slopes and in the islands' capital city of Praia. Sao Tiago has some regular sources of water, but on Santo Antao, Sao Nicolau, and Brava, sources are small and unreliable. Naturally the greatest population concentration is centered on the islands with water, which, through the centuries, has been a chief determining factor in agricultural and demographic growth. The lack of water is immensely aggravated by the fact that most of the forest cover was removed during the slave plantation period and that the islands lie along the same 16° latitude with the vast Sahara desert. Cycles of drought and famine have blotted the islands' history. Since 1900 alone, some 135,000 people have died during some twenty-one years of desiccation. In short, the profound effects of the great continental African drought are extended to the islands.

THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS



## An Historical Outline

In 1441 with the kidnapping of a dozen men, in North Africa, slavery began. By 1448 more than one thousand people of African origin had met the same fate and were shipped to Portugal. It was in this period that the sailing ships of Henry the Navigator inched their way along Africa's west coast and reached the point of modern Dakar. Sometime between 1456 and 1462 the first Europeans reached the Islands. Most reports indicate that the islands were uninhabited, but this is not absolutely certain. By the end of the 1460's African slaves had been brought to the islands of Sao Tiago and Fogo. In 1469 Fernao Gomes was granted a crown monopoly of the trade along the Guinea coast with his base of operation in the Cape Verde Islands.

The Islands themselves were divided into two *donatorios* or semi-autonomous commercial and military administrations under the authorization of Portugal's King Alfonso. The trade in slaves, Cape Verdean handicrafts, salt, and a popular textile dye (urzella) brought an atmosphere of prosperity. With the exploration and early settlement complete, the Portuguese crown assumed direct control of the Islands in 1475 as the slave trade was being launched on a global scale. Notables such as Columbus, Vasco da Gama, and Magellan were reported to have stopped at the Islands as a jumping off point for their epic voyages towards the end of the 15th century.

As the tempo of slavery increased the Islands of Boavista, Maio, Sao Nicolau, and Santo Antao began to be utilized in the development of a plantation economy. Peoples from Guinea such as the Balante, Pepel, Feloupe, Jalof and Mandingo were captured on the mainland and brought to the Islands to harvest cotton, rice, sugar cane



Pro-PÁIGC Demonstration in Cape Verde Islands

and maize. Once local needs were met, slaves were increasingly stored (especially on Sao Tiago) for shipment to the New World and marginally to Europe.

A population census taken in 1582 reported more than 11,700 slaves on Sao Tiago, 2,000 slaves on Fogo, 400 free Africans, and 1,608 Europeans and mestizos. The Europeans were Iberian settlers, miscellaneous criminals, and Jewish exiles from Spain and Morocco. Today's population is reported to be about 70% mestizo and 28% African; only 2% are apparently European. The White population was concentrated in Brava (perhaps 7% of that Island's population) and in the towns of Sao Tiago and Sao Vincente.

Even in the early decades of the 1500's Portugal's influence began to be rivaled by Spain with the imposition of an import tax on West Indian slaves in 1513. In order to strengthen its weakening monopoly of the slave trade Portugal revoked the slave commerce rights of Cape Verdeans. By 1540 King Dom Joao III of Portugal had declared himself to be "Lord of Guinea" with the original traces of local autonomy fading from the past. The first Captain-General of the Cape Verde Islands was appointed in 1550 to oversee the administration of the Islands and the Guinea mainland. This administrative pattern persisted until 1879.

In 1580 the Portuguese royal dynasty came to an end with the imposition of Spanish rule under King Felipe. During Spanish rule (1580-1640), slavery was diverted solely to Atlantic crossings and the plantation economy began a decline from which it never fully recovered.

With the renaissance of the Portuguese royal dynasty in 1640 under King Dom Joao IV an effort was made to restore the Islands' administration. At the end of his rule in 1656 he personally appointed a Crown Revenue Officer to collect taxes and regulate trade. In the 1660's a slaving

company known as *Cachen Rios e Commercio da Guinea* which granted it exclusive slave rights on the Guinea coast. This company had its headquarters on the Islands but was primarily concerned with supplying slaves to the New World plantations and the gold mines of South America. In 1676 this company was replaced by the *Companhia do Cachen e Cabo Verde* which simply continued the slave transport to the Spanish West Indies. For example, a 1696 contract with the Spanish government agreed to provide "ten thousand tons of slaves" for a proscribed period.

In the mid-18th century (1757-1777) still another firm, *Companhia do Grao Para e Maranhao*, was created by the Portuguese King, Dom Jose, who granted exclusive slave trading and navigational rights to the Guinea coast and the Cape Verde Islands. This company was not even owned by Cape Verdeans, but by Brazilians.

The intense monopolization of Cape Verdean trade by foreigners coupled with the penetration of cheap manufactured goods from Europe sent the Cape Verdean economy into a perpetual depression. The famous *pagnes* textiles produced on the Islands could no longer compete although they had been known as early as 1550 as an Island product used in the barter for slaves. Vineyards, sugar, spirits, and cotton were neglected and by the end of the 1700's economic autonomy was almost totally suppressed. The only units of land which could have been economically cultivated were still in the hands of the Portuguese nobility which traded and divided them with no understanding of local conditions.

One small benefit of the centuries of neglect and isolation appeared with some Cape Verdeans of mestizo origin rising in the administration of the islands. In Maio and Boavista, for example, the highest local official was not a European Portuguese. At least by the 1700's, if not



PAIGC Leader, Silvano da Luz (third from right), a Cape Verdean, Arrives at Sal Airport

before, Cape Verdeans were also involved as middlemen in the slave trade and later as functionaries in the formal colonial administrations in Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola. One Cape Verdean, Honorio Baneto, was even the Governor-General of Guinea. However, the access to economic roles in slavery began to wane when Britain abolished the slave trade in 1807, to be followed by Portugal in 1815. Illicit slavery continued to feed the Southern United States and the Caribbean until 1869 but rapidly developing European capitalism had little tolerance for a rival economy based on slaves who could not be taxed as in a colonialist system.

Mestizo land ownership increased throughout the mid-1800's so that in 1886 there was little worthwhile open land accessible to former slaves. Indeed, land was either further divided in sales to earn a token financial return, or the large landowners just consolidated and expanded their already extensive holdings. This pattern of large holdings in private hands and small inefficient peasant farms continues down to the present. The arable land in the Islands is barely 2% of the total area and one third of this is usually left fallow since mechanization and fertilizers are rarely used. Worse yet, two thirds of the farms are not cultivated by the owners and thousands of peasant farmers rely on the debt-ridden share-cropping system. The impoverished soil and the backward patterns of land use and distribution have prevented the Cape Verde Islands from reaching self-sufficiency in agricultural production.

#### Contemporary Perspectives

The results of this miserable colonial inheritance can be vividly seen in the balance of trade statistics from 1967 to 1972. During this period exports averaged \$1,570,000, while imports cost an average of \$16,230,000. In 1972 alone exports were \$48 million and imports were a staggering \$657 million. This horrific economic situation is compounded by rising inflation and an annual population increase of 3.1%. In addition the Portuguese military budget nearly doubled during the few years between 1967 to 1971. It was also during this same period of increased need that all agricultural production (except coffee) fell

below previous levels. Despite these intractable financial woes Portugal monopolized commerce by a 1953 law requiring all shipping to and from the Islands to be carried on Portuguese ships. Even some of the larger islands only see ships for mail and commerce three times a month and up to 1971 regular air service only existed between Sal, Fogo, Maio, and Sao Tiago. The massive monopoly of trade can also be seen in the fact that 76% of Cape Verde's imports were from Portugal and its colonies. The principle cash crops of sugar cane, bananas, peanuts, coffee, and citrus fruits simply did not produce enough revenue to afford the imported manufactured goods and necessary food imports. It has even become difficult to grow sufficient quantities of the three main subsistence crops, corn, beans, and cassava. The drought continues to be severe. Portugal made no effort during its rule, to alleviate the results of the drought or to arrest the famine.

These bleak economic realities were not being met with increased production (many day laborers making only 85¢ per day in 1972) so Portugal stressed an emigration policy to settle "surplus" Cape Verdeans in Angola and Mozambique and expand the contract labor system which brought thousands of Cape Verdeans to menial work in Western Europe and the Northeastern United States. Labor contracts brought in some currency and the migrants often sent regular remittances back to their relatives on the Islands. Still the impoverishment continued and food imports rose (more than 300% between 1966 and 1970). Portugal was forced to make up the gross budgetary deficits. Some efforts were made to develop fishing and tourism but neither industry has been able to counter the lopsided budget.

Both historical and contemporary realities show that Portugal's interest in the Islands has never been altruistic. It has held on because of the psychological and strategic significance of the Islands. While the Islands are formally excluded from NATO's operational jurisdiction they can easily serve as submarine and transport bases in the event of global war and the Islands' airfields have very recently been expanded to accommodate the largest of aircraft.

The close relationship between the governments of the United States and Portugal frequently led to financial and

military agreements in which considerable sums of money and arms helped Portugal afford to keep the Cape Verde Islands. During the decade of wars of national liberation, Portugal and her ally South Africa used the Islands to refuel and repair their naval and air forces. The Islands have also gained in importance with the closure of the Suez Canal forcing huge oil tankers to pass in the vicinity. Lastly, there are several Afro-European and Afro-Brazilian communication links which have their nexus on the Islands. It is interesting to note that while these several factors make the Islands important to outsiders they really create few new employment horizons for the Islanders.

### **The PAIGC and the Cape Verde Islands**

Part III of the PAIGC 9-point program states:

1. "After the winning of national independence in Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, unity of the peoples of these countries [will be formed from] a strong and progressive African nation, on the basis of suitably consulted popular will.

2. "The form of unity between these two people to be established by their legitimate and freely elected representatives.

3. "Equal rights and duties, solid unity and fraternal collaboration between Guineans and Cape Verdeans; prohibition of all attempts to divide these two peoples."

During the armed struggle in Guinea (1963-1974) the PAIGC was preoccupied with military and national activities in the liberated zones, but did not neglect deep organizational activities in the Islands. By the late 1960's and early 1970's Portugal's fascist rulers were facing serious internal contradictions with constant erosion of

their military, political, and economic viability. On April 25, 1974 the fascist state was overthrown and a new junta of progressive-minded junior officers came to power. While the form of the collapse was unpredictable, any serious observer of Luso-African affairs could have seen that Portugal was on a dead-end course.

In the wake of the events in Lisbon, Guinea Bissau is now a fully sovereign nation; Mozambique will be free in mid-1975; and intense negotiation is underway in Angola. Now is the time for the implementation of Part III of the PAIGC program. By the late spring and early summer PAIGC militants were actively organizing in the Islands with the full knowledge of the new Portuguese rulers. The situation has become complicated by the sudden emergence of two anti-PAIGC parties. The UDC (Democratic Union of Capeverde) and the UPCV (Popular Union of Cape Verde) both seem to favor independence from Portugal but are opposed to unification with Guinea. In a series of demonstrations the PAIGC has shown itself to be the only movement with a wide, popular base. If independence comes by referendum or by executive fiat (as in Guinea), there is little question that the PAIGC will triumph.

Nonetheless, some observers have expressed concern about the growing delay in reaching a final decision in this matter. It is known that the United States is formly opposed to the unification of the two lands and is presumed to be seeking any means to impede the process. The PAIGC position might be summarized in the old African expression "even twins are not born at the same time." Both cultures were born in the womb of Africa; their links will not easily be lost or broken. ■

# South Africa

## POLITICS

### WHITE POLITICS

#### **Government commission backs university apartheid**

The report of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission of inquiry into South Africa's white universities has been submitted to Parliament. Stressing the link between the university and the society it served, the report recommended continuation of exclusively white universities in the country and warned against the anti-government activities going in the English-language white universities. There was also an implication that Government aid to such universities may be cut off if such activities continue.

Justice J. van Wyk de Vries, chairman of the Commission explained his views over a radio interview in which he accused NUSAS (National Union of South African Students, a predominantly white English-speaking student union opposed to apartheid) of setting about to create a revolution.

One member of the Commission Professor G.R. Bozzoli, vice-chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand, disagreed with the conclusions contained in the report. Criticism also came from the *Star* and NUSAS, who viewed the report as an attempt to make universities conform to Government policy. The *Star* also challenged Mr. de Vries to prove his allegations against NUSAS in court.

Commenting on the stress the Commission put on the universities' role in society, Mr. Charles Nupen, a prominent NUSAS leader said that their role in society is not merely to serve the status quo. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 9, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Oct. 31, 1974)

### FORMER NUSAS PRESIDENT NOW IN AUSTRALIA

Mr. Neville Curtis, former President of the National Union of South African Students, NUSAS, who was under banning orders and due to come up for trial on charges of breaking them, escaped on the Italian liner 'Marconi' in September. He used a borrowed American passport which he posted back to its owner before the ship arrived at Perth, Western Australia, his own passport having been confiscated in 1971 by the South African Government when he returned from a trip to the United States. Curtis, who arrived in Melbourne on Sept. 25, was granted a temporary travel document by immigration officials and is applying for an Australian passport.

About one week after his arrival in Australia, Curtis was employed by the Education Unit of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, a non-governmental organization which is planning an anti-apartheid campaign culminating on December 10, U.N. Human Rights day, to coincide with similar action in Britain, Holland and the



**NEVILLE CURTIS**

U.S. The campaign will aim at the removal of the Australian Government Trade Commissions in Cape Town and Johannesburg and try to break the link between the Australian Government airline, Qantas, and South African Airways. Boycotts of South African goods will also be initiated. (*Herald*, Melbourne, Sept. 25, 1974; *Age*, Melbourne Oct. 5 1974)

### **BLACK POLITICS**

#### **Aftermath of 'FRELIMO' rallies**

As a result of the crackdown initiated after the pro-FRELIMO rallies at the end of September (see Southern Africa Nov. 1974), there were at the time of writing 27 people in detention under the Terrorism Act, 18 of them arrested in Durban. At least 20 more people were arrested in the Durban area but have been released on bail and charged under the Riotous Assembly Act. Most of those detained were office bearers of SASO, BPC and BAWU. 8 more leaders of these organisations, including a banned person, have reportedly fled to Botswana.

No formal charges have been laid against the prisoners still being held and they can be held incommunicado as long as the Minister deems necessary. A mammoth trial is expected soon as a sequel to these arrests. 3 Indian lawyers have been appointed to represent the 18 detainees who are from Durban. An application was filed in the Pretoria Supreme Court asking the Court to restrain the security police from assaulting the detainees, most of whom have been transferred to Pretoria. Several weeks after the arrests only one detainee had been allowed to see a lawyer.

Black organisations like SASO and BPC which have sprung up in the past few years, have been a source of constant irritation to the Government. Various attempts have been made to limit the activities of these organisations and only last year 8 top leaders were banned. The pro-FRELIMO rallies have provided a convenient excuse to move against the leadership of these bodies. Neither the white-owned press or the opposition parties in Parliament have made any serious attempts to break down the wall of silence surrounding these detentions. A liberal organisation from Johannesburg, 'Programme for Social Change', has therefore issued a detailed 28 page report on these events and has made it available to those interested. For further information write to Africa News, P.O. Box 3851, Durham, N.C. 27702. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 26, Nov. 2, 11, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Nov. 11, 1974)

#### **Bantustan Leaders reject 'Independence'**

Following widespread speculation about possible

Government policy changes, Prime Minister John Vorster clarified his intentions when he recently spoke of 'surprising' changes in South Africa. He said that he wanted time not to change South Africa but to change South Africa's position in the world. He vowed that majority rule would never come to South Africa and that the only way development could proceed was through the 'Homelands Policy'.

Vorster's statement, however, received a sharp rebuff from the leaders of the Bantustans. At a recent gathering, eight of the nine leaders decided to reject the possibility of seeking autonomy for their respective areas. They issued a statement saying that Blacks and Whites had a joint future in South Africa and should share in the mineral wealth. Since the Bantustans have only 13 per cent of South Africa's land area, and are largely devoid of minerals such as gold, iron, diamonds and coal, the leaders felt that they would be forfeiting their rights to these riches by demanding independence. As the leader of Gazankulu, Prof. Hudson Ntsanwisi put it, asking for self rule would be like "asking our people to sell their birthrights".



**Children Carry Water in Zululand: Typical Bantustan Poverty**

Tim Smith

The leaders did leave open the possibility of opting for independence if their demands for more land area and greater economic development were met. However, the Government has rejected all such requests in the past and is unlikely to change its policy in the near future.

The Government's Bantustan policy had been set up in the hope that demands by Blacks for participation in running the country could be more manageably diverted into demands for more autonomy for Africans in the Bantustans. The latest move by the leaders indicates that this policy is meeting with resistance from even the most conservative African elements.



The only dissenting leader was Chief Matanzima of the Transkei who is slated to ask for autonomy in the near future. (*Africa News*, Nov. 21, 1974; *Washington Post*, Nov. 17, 1974; *Voice of America*, Nov. 18)

### Coloureds and Indians

Observers expecting a basic shift in the Government's policy towards the Coloureds at the recent reopening of the Coloured Council were disappointed. The Prime Minister in his opening address promised the Coloured people more of the same that they have been getting for the past 25 years under Nationalist rule. The Coloured Council is to be maintained and elections to the Council will be held next year as scheduled. A new body called the Coloured Consultative Council is soon to be constituted. It will consist of an equal number of members from the executive of the Coloured council and the cabinet. Its function will be to advise the Prime Minister on issues pertaining to the Coloured community. As a further measure the Coloureds will also be given representation on a number of apartheid implementing bodies such as the Group Areas Board and the Race Classification Board.

The last session of the Council was suspended by the Government after it had passed an unprecedented motion of no-confidence in itself and the policy of separate development. Various attempts were made to resolve the impasse created by this move and meetings were arranged between Mr. Vorster and the leaders of the parties in the Council. Nothing however came of these meetings and the leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Sonny Leon, whose party holds the majority of the elected seats in the Council, decided to withdraw from these talks. Without his participation the talks collapsed.

Both Sonny Leon and the deputy leader of the Labour Party boycotted the opening of this current session. Nevertheless, when the regular sessions resumed both of them returned and another motion of no-confidence was introduced. The resolution missed gaining a majority by a

margin of one vote when the Chairman cast the two votes to which he was entitled. Hence the hollow political games of the Coloured Councillors seem likely to continue at least until the next elections.

(*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 9, 1974; *Comment and Opinion*, Oct. 18, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, Nov. 2, 1974)

### ECONOMICS

#### BLACK LABOR IN SOUTH AFRICA: DEATH, STRIKES, PANIC AND NEW MILITANCY

At least seven miners killed in accident at Impala platinum mine, Bafokeng. (*New York Times*, Nov. 12, 1974)

Four hundred workers strike Transkei construction project with demand for 50 per cent. wage rise. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1974)

Five hundred hospital workers strike hospital in dispute over back pay. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 1974)

The entire work force of 260 employees in the paint shop department at Prospecton's giant Motor Assemblies dismissed in wage dispute. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 1974)

Eighty-nine of 314 Randburg municipal workers who refused to report to work convicted of breaking contracts, sentenced to \$28 fines and returned to their reserves. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 9, 1974)


The Ministry of Labor reports that in first six months of 1974 there were 54 strikes involving 75,000 African workers. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Oct. 1974)

These events illustrate that labor unrest is wide spread among black workers. It is however in the gold mining industry that matters are most serious. In October, in two separate incidents, police resorted to use riot control tactics and dogs to quiet the situation. Malawian and Lesotho miners were involved in a six hour fight at the ERPM mine. Afterwards, 1600 Malawians refused to go underground and demanded they be sent home.

Ten days later two black miners were found dead at



"I am calling on you to deal with this situation."



"How could such a tragedy happen?"

the Hartebeestfontein mine in the Western Transvaal. The deaths were the result of a riot involving 500 miners that was broken up by tear gas and police dogs. Although one of the dead miners was shot, the police deny opening fire. As a result of the riot and deaths, more than 6000 miners went on strike.

In the past year, 52 black miners have died at ten South African gold mines. Some mine managers call the trouble, "mindless tribal or factional fighting," but others see it as a symptom of the deep unrest among the black labor force. (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 24, 1974)

Unrest among black miners is a major concern to South Africa. Less than a quarter of the 400,000 miners are South Africans. Thus when 1600 Malawians demand to be sent home, South Africa has to worry about the 100,000 Malawians who work in SA. Further, South Africa is worried that the new government in Mozambique may eventually cut the supply of 160,000 Mozambican miners who work in the gold fields.

One answer to the problem is to recruit more South African miners, and the mining industry has set a goal of 50,000 additional black miners a year. To interest South Africans, the mines are being forced to raise wages. The minimum wage will now be about \$57 a month plus free food and accommodation. This is three times what the minimum wage was before May of last year. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 26, Nov. 2, 1974; *Times*, London, Oct. 26, 1974)

#### BANTUSTAN DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

Much publicity is going to accompany the growing development of South Africa's reserves, and there is development. For example, the first silk industry is being established in Gazankulu, the Tsonga Reserve, as a joint venture of the Gazankulu Government and the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC). A several million dollar industry is expected to develop with an initial annual income from the project of \$150,000. One thousand mulberry bushes were imported from Japan to begin the industry. (*Africa Update*, Sept-Oct. 1974)

In the Transkei, the Italian textile conglomerate Zegna has signed a contract to build a \$3.75 million spinning and weaving mill. The plant is expected to employ about 500 workers. It is the first major foreign investment under a four-year old program that offers lavish incentives for industrial development in the reserves. (*Business Week*, Nov. 16, 1974)

In Bophuthatswana, the BIC and private enterprise have invested more than \$42 million in Babelegi. Already 57 industries and 65 factories have been established. Babelegi is the largest Bantustan decentralization project. (*South African Digest*, Oct. 18, 1974)

Of special significance is the selection of Dimbaza as a "growth point" in the Ciskei. Dimbaza has become synonymous with the worst aspects of apartheid—removing people to a place that had no sanitation, no water, inadequate housing, no jobs. Many people died at Dimbaza, and for once the deaths were not unnoticed because the township became the subject of a film, "Last Grave at Dimbaza." Clearly the development of Dimbaza as a showcase of economic growth is for public relations reasons. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 19, 1974)

The significance of these and other projects needs to be analyzed so as not to be exaggerated. What all this activity represents in the total SA economy was spelled out by Dr. J. Adendorff, managing director of the BIC. "It has been estimated . . . that if a growth rate of 5 per cent can be

maintained over the next 25 years, South Africa will have a total gross domestic product of nearly \$70,000 million at the end of the century. By the year 2000, South Africa will thus have developed into a major economic power comparable with the major Western European powers of today.

"Assuming that Bantu incomes will grow at an annual rate of 7.5 per cent as against 5 per cent for the population as a whole, it has been estimated that the total income of Bantus will be some \$23,800 million, or 35 per cent of the total national income at the turn of the century." (*South African Digest*, Oct. 18, 1974)

At present, Africans make up about 80 per cent of SA's population, and the percentage is going to increase. Thus, if predictions are correct, more than 80 per cent of the population will be receiving only 35 per cent of the total national income at the turn of the century, or after 25 more years of development. The Whites, who are less than 20 per cent of the population will still control 65 per cent of the income.

#### INEXHAUSTIBLE WEALTH IN SOUTH AFRICA

In December, *Southern Africa* reported the discovery of new minerals in the North-Western Cape and southern Namibia. The new discoveries are merely a small part of South Africa's incredible mineral wealth.

South Africa's total mineral earnings, including gold, increased from about \$2,200 million in 1970 to about \$4,000 million in 1973. This year's earnings are expected to top \$5,600 million and by the year 2000, total earnings should exceed \$9,800 million.

Gold and diamonds are what spring to mind when South African minerals are mentioned. Gold is still the foundation of the economy, and South Africa produces about two thirds of the capitalist world's total. Diamond production peaked in 1970 at 8.1 million carats. Expected production is 7 million carats by 1985 and 5 million by the year 2000. South Africa is the world's principal producer of gem diamonds.

In addition to gold and diamonds, South Africa is estimated to have the world's largest deposits of manganese and two-thirds of the world's chrome reserves. The Transvaal probably possesses nearly half the world's fluorspar reserves while the country as a whole has some of the largest deposits of antimony, asbestos, vermiculite, and high grade iron ore. There are almost limitless deposits of titaniferous magnetite (which contains the world's largest source of vanadium). In addition there are enormous reserves of non-metallic minerals like limestone, phosphates for fertilizers, clay and granite.

As if this were not enough, South Africa has enough coal for the foreseeable future, and probably enough copper. The world's largest reserves of platinum are in South Africa, with nickel an important by-product.

South Africa may be short of lead and zinc, but the new fields in the North-Western Cape could solve this shortage. Zinc, copper, lead, nickel, cobalt, as well as exotic minerals like tungsten, tin, and tantalium have been found in the Cape.

Finally, South Africa possesses one quarter of the capitalist world's known reserves of uranium, the power source of the future. (*South Africa Digest*, Oct. 18, 1974)

#### EQUAL WAGES: SOUTH AFRICAN STYLE

For the first time White, Black, Coloured and Indian information officers with the Department of Information will be paid equal wages for equal work. The catch is that



the equal wages will apply only while these workers are on overseas duty. All information officers revert to the domestic pay scale on return to South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 19, 1974)

### JAPANESE POLICY CONTRADICTIONARY

Criticism of Japanese-South African trade by African nations has resulted in the termination of loans to the SA Government by the London-based Japan International Bank. The bank made its decision to terminate the loans after the Japanese Government requested private business to limit contact with South Africa, a request that was the direct result of African criticism.

Japan International Bank is wholly owned by Mitsubishi Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Fuji Bank, Tokai Bank, and Daiva, Yamaichi and Nikko securities companies. It has supplied loans totalling more than \$24 million to the South African Government and private interests since its founding in 1970. (*Africa Report*, New York, Sept-Oct., 1974)

Although the Japanese Government has a policy of prohibiting investment in South Africa, critics say that there is a growing network of Japanese industrial involvement in South Africa, and that the action of the Japan International Bank does not represent a general trend. According to Ms. Yoko Kitazawa in testimony before the UN General Assembly's Committee on Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, Japanese involvement does not take the form of direct capital investment in wholly owned subsidiaries, but of joint ventures with South African capital, using Japanese blueprints, technical expertise, and sometimes Japanese equipment.

Ms. Kitazawa pointed out that many of the joint Japanese-South African ventures were in the border areas of Bantustans and thus were a direct aid to the South African Government's policy of "separate development," a policy which is designed to siphon off any African development of power into harmless expressions in containable forms. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 9, 1974)

### LOCKHEED TO SELL PLANES TO SOUTH AFRICA

At the beginning of October, the Department of Commerce licensed the sale of six Lockheed L 100 Hercules transport planes to SAF Air, a South African commercial airline. SAF Air first requested permission to purchase three L 100's, and then doubled its request in

light of the tremendous world-wide demand for the planes. SAF Air has already purchased four L 100's, one in 1970 and three more at the end of 1971.

SAF Air's purchase request came before the "Gray Areas Committee" of representatives from the State, Commerce, and Defense Departments in August for a determination of whether the sales were permissible under the US arms embargo against South Africa. According to the *Johannesburg Star* Washington correspondent, Ken Owen, the Gray Areas Committee approved the sale of the first L 100 to SAF Air in 1970, and then passed on the 1971 sale without further consideration. According to the State Department South Africa desk officer, the conditions agreed to by SAF Air for the 1970 and 1971 purchases were: 1) that the planes must be used to transport predominantly civilian goods, 2) that they must not be flown by anyone on active duty with the South African Air Force, 3) that they must not be used for Rhodesian trade, and 4) that they may not be transferred to another owner without the approval of the Department of Commerce. Reports on the use of the previously sold planes, which have not been made public, caused the Committee to place additional conditions on the licensing of the 1974 sale, including a prohibition against keeping the planes at military bases and against repairs being made by military personnel. SAF Air agreed to these additional conditions at the end of September, and the license was immediately granted. Because of Lockheed's backorders for L 100's, the deliveries to SAF Air will probably not be made until 1976.

The sales represent the implementation of the accelerated Nixon policy of closer political, economic and military links with South Africa.

### SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

#### South African Reactions to UN Actions

There was general agreement in the South African English and Afrikaner circles regarding the recent action against South Africa in the UN. Soon after the US, Great Britain, and France cast their vetoes in the Security Council to prevent the passage of the draft resolution to expel South Africa from the UN, Prime Minister Vorster thanked these three powers for acting in South Africa's favor, and asked the world community to give South Africa six months to institute "changes." However, even Mr. Vorster admitted that the "changes" which "will occur" will be limited, in that there might be "Black majority rule" in the "Bantustans," but White rule will remain forever in the rest of the country. *Die Burger* stated that "the threefold Western veto in the Security Council against the expulsion of South Africa from the UN. . . shows that the United States, Britain, and France are maintaining their fundamental understanding of vital Western interests." Additionally, the *Star* commented that "the triple Western veto which saved South Africa's membership was a vote for constructive change versus the politics of confrontation." (*WBAI*, New York, Nov. 6, 1974; *Comment and Opinion: A Weekly Survey of the South African Press and Radio*, Nov. 8, 1974) In other words, the growing political and military alliance between South Africa and the Western powers is a reflection of their common interest in maintaining the status-quo in southern Africa.

Although the South African regime commended the

Western powers' defense of its UN seat, the tone of the regime's remarks concerning the UN in general changed after the UN General Assembly suspended South Africa's right to participate in the current session. Prime Minister Vorster called the General Assembly's action "illegal," and Foreign Minister Muller announced that South Africa will withhold its annual contribution to the UN. However, the South African regime's complaints of "illegality" is just an example of its hypocrisy, since no regime which denies citizenship rights to 83 per cent of its population can be considered as legal and legitimate. Ms. Helen Suzman (Progressive Party, M.P.), who claims to be a critic of Government policy, joined the South African Government in its condemnation of the UN action. Speaking at Barnard College (New York City), she stated that the action "may well prove counterproductive" because "to take steps which could lead to a withdrawal from the United Nations may well accomplish less in the long run than insuring that South Africa stays in the United Nations, accountable to it and under constant pressure to change." According to Ms. Suzman "change" in South Africa will be the result of economic development. (*New York Times*, Nov. 9, 14, 20, 1974 (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 16, 1974)

Economic development has not undermined the underlying nature of the South African system. Even though some Blacks have been advanced to more highly skilled jobs—and most often without any increases in pay—in recent years, the white workers in turn have been promoted to supervisory positions, with sizeable pay increases. Therefore, the basic relationship of white domination over the Black remains, and it is irrelevant where the dividing line is drawn. Additionally, the method of political change advocated by the South African Progressive Party is restricted voting rights for Blacks based upon educational and property qualifications (similar to the literacy tests used in US southern and many northern states to prevent black Americans from voting) and by this method it would take generations for Blacks in South Africa to obtain equal political rights.

#### South African-Zambian Relations

At the end of September, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller announced in South Africa's House of Assembly that South Africa was continuing with its outward movement policy. He stated that from July 31, 1973 to July 31, 1974 members of the South African Government had met with 24 Heads, or Ministers of African states, contacts were made at the "official level" with 12 African states, and visits to South Africa were made by 144 officials of African states. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 21, 1974)

It seems that one of the African states with which South Africa has been conducting secret diplomacy is Zambia. For the past two months Zambian diplomats, who had the equivalent of cabinet level positions, have been visiting South Africa and holding discussions with the White Government. There is speculation that these meetings might be paving the way for a meeting between Vorster and Kaunda. (*Toronto Globe and Mail*, Nov. 25, 1974)

One of the first public indications of this South African-Zambian dialogue was President Kaunda's October 26th speech in which he stated that Prime Minister Vorster's latest policy statement was "the voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting." (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 28, 29, 1974) Some

observers have expressed concern that President Kaunda appears to be 'softening' his stance on South Africa. South Africa is intensifying its international public relations campaign in an attempt to create an image of flexibility and change. There are in fact no indications at all of basic alterations in internal policies. In this context dialogue with South Africa is seen as helping the white minority regime maintain its power over the black majority.

#### South African-Rhodesian Relations

The South African regime is finding its support of the Smith regime of Rhodesia an increasing threat to its own security interests. The *Sunday Express* recently stated that "Rhodesia is a stumbling block in South Africa's campaign to achieve a *detente* with Black Africa... South Africa's interests undoubtedly stand to suffer if Rhodesia continues to fail to respond to the rapidly changing situation in Southern Africa... We cannot afford to continue propping up a Rhodesia which is not moving toward a *detente* of its own with Black Africa. They must either get cracking or stand alone. This would not be interfering in their domestic affairs: it would simply be giving first consideration to our own." In agreement the *Hoofstad* remarked that "for South Africa it is of greatest importance that an active attempt should be made [by the Smith regime] to come to a settlement with Britain... As its [Rhodesia's] immediate neighbour, South Africa is intimately concerned... Rhodesia must be honest with her Blacks and active attempts must be taken to satisfy their political aspirations... Negotiations with them [the African National Council of Bishop Muzorewa] must take place. But there are also ZAPU and ZANU... with them, too, negotiations must take place in order to avoid violence at all costs and in order to reach a peaceful settlement more quickly." (*Comment and Opinion: A Weekly Survey of the South African Press and Radio*, Nov. 8, 1974) The South African regime, with the developing threat to its own internal security, might soon be re-evaluating its support of the Smith regime.



Ian Smith, Rhodesian Prime Minister: An Albatross Around Vorster's Neck

## US VISITS BY SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS ABORTED


Visits by two South African Government officials to Washington, which could have given them significant political contacts, have recently been aborted, apparently because US officials felt that public dialogue with South Africa at the present time was potentially explosive.

The first trip was to have been by Mr. Piet Koornhof, South African Minister of Mines, Immigration, Sport and Recreation. Koornhof was invited by liberal Republican Congressman John Dellenback to come to the United States to attend a Nov. 5 prayer breakfast of US Congressional leaders and African leaders. Representative Dellenback, has since been narrowly defeated in his re-election bid, has visited Africa several times, and believes in communicating with Christian African leaders of all political persuasions. His contacts in the last two years have included both Minister Koornhof and South African Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Kwazulu. The prayer breakfast was to have been in honor of Liberian President Tolbert. It therefore appears that Dellenback intended the breakfast to be a forum for dialogue not only between South Africa and the United States, but also between South Africa and black Africa. When the story of this breakfast became publically known, the White House decided that it was too potentially embarrassing, especially in the wake of the coalescence of African opinion on South Africa at the United Nations.

It is still likely that Minister Koornhof will be coming to Washington in a few months, this time under the aegis of the State Department's Leadership Exchange program. The State Department claims that it brings a few Nationalist South African leaders to the US under this program to offset the larger number of opposition visitors. In late November, Koornhof passed through New York and Miami on his way to attend the presidential inauguration in Nicaragua. Apparently the State Department had no prior knowledge of this brief trip. At this writing, it was not yet known whom Koornhof met with in these cities or whether he will visit the United States again on his return from Latin America.

The second visitor from South Africa was to have been Admiral James Johnson, the Chief of the South African Navy. On October 8, conservative Republican Congressman Louis Wyman invited Admiral Johnson to make a private trip to the US. As a member of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, Congressman Wyman has provided South Africa with useful military contacts in the past. It was Wyman who arranged the meeting at the Pentagon for Minister of Information Cornelius Mulder in January. It could therefore be anticipated that Wyman would have tried to arrange a meeting for Admiral Johnson with his American counterpart and other military bureaucrats. While the decision on whether to grant Admiral Johnson a visa was still being debated in the State Department, Under Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum faced stiff questioning about the visit while he traveled in Africa. Easum explained in Lusaka that any South African military official could be granted a visa only if he came on a purely private basis and agreed to make no contacts with US military officials. South African Admiral Biermann, however, had agreed to these same criteria in May and then violated them by meeting with two high-level Pentagon officials. American Church groups, Africa-oriented groups, and liberal Congressional Representatives loudly protested the Johnson visit, seeing it in the wider context of tighter links between US and SA military systems.

On November 13, Admiral Johnson's Johannesburg office announced that he had cancelled his US trip because of other commitments. Although the Defense Force denied that public protest played any part in the cancellation, it is known that they were sensitive about the trip, since they refused for several days to grant permission to the *Johannesburg Star* to publish a story on the visit. A spokesman for the South African Navy refused to comment on whether Admiral Johnson's trip would be rescheduled. (*Johannesburg Star*, Nov. 9, Nov. 16, 1974)



## DEFENSE

### APARTHEID REGIME GIRDS FOR WAR ... WITH INCREASING HELP FROM FRIENDS

The last nine months of 1974 were a traumatic period for white South Africans. In that period, South Africa lost the protective buffer of archaic Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola. If it once harbored hopes for the long-term survival of a white minority Rhodesian regime and the corresponding hope that Zimbabwe would remain simply the name of an ancient African empire rather than a reality born of successful liberation struggle, such hopes have dimmed. During the same period, it became apparent that no South African strategy short of full-scale military occupation will keep Namibia safe for apartheid, and that this price is higher than South Africa can now afford.

On the face of it then, prospects for the continuing survival of white supremacy in South Africa don't look good. Yet appearances can be deceiving and the face of a situation is not necessarily the heart of it. Two crucial questions must be asked: First, to what lengths will white South Africans go to defend the status quo in South Africa? Second, who will come to their assistance in the event of serious internal or external challenges to that status quo? Neither of these questions can be answered definitively at this point; but it is important to be aware of the emerging situation.

#### Internal Signals

South Africa now seems prepared to consider sacrificing both Rhodesia and Namibia to the "wolves" (from the white South African standpoint) of world anti-apartheid opinion. However comforting it might be to interpret this as a sign of weakness on the part of Vorster's regime, there is a danger in doing so. South Africa's willingness to extricate itself from situations that are both difficult and damaging can also be interpreted as evidence of shrewd bargaining and unexpected flexibility within the apartheid regime. By scolding Ian Smith for not seriously negotiating with Zimbabwe's African majority (the irony of a plea like this from a white South



South African Troops in Camouflage Uniforms

African must be overwhelming for Smith) and by making conciliatory noises regarding Namibia, Vorster can argue that UN attacks against South Africa based on these issues are unjustified. At the same time, Vorster can consolidate military forces within South Africa's borders and avoid the growing problem of the over-extension of limited men and money.

While South Africa's UN representative, Botha, and Vorster himself talked disingenuously of "change," an end to discrimination, a six month "period of grace" after which the world would see great differences in South Africa, and a new era of solidarity with the rest of Africa, the South African Government introduced a new defense budget that is about 50 per cent higher than last year's and calls for increasing the defense expenditure by about \$288 million. The new defense budget represents 18.5 per cent of the entire South African budget, and 3.8 per cent of GNP. It is "twice that of the . . . Bantu Administration Department (BAD) and four times the education vote." (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Oct., 1974) Within the next few years, the defense budget is expected to reach more than \$1.5 billion. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 17, 1974; *Rand Daily Mail*, July 31, 1974)

In August, the apartheid government responded with incredible speed and harshness to a South African Council of Churches resolution calling on member churches to consider whether or not Christ's call to identify with the oppressed might necessitate conscientious objection as a means of opposing apartheid. A new defense bill introduced within days of the resolution calls for a fine of \$15,000 or up to 10 years imprisonment for any person who refuses national military service or urges, directly or indirectly, conscientious objection. This type of "over-kill" on the part of the government typified what can be seen in the South African press almost daily now—that is,

a growing "war psychosis" in the Republic. With increasing numbers of military and policemen being deployed to protect South Africa's vulnerable borders, women and black policemen are being called upon to play a greater part in internal law enforcement. Capable of mobilizing an estimated 350,000 persons in the event that complete mobilization should prove necessary, the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Malan has called on every man and woman "to think seriously of doing voluntary service in the defence forces. . . ." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 12, 1974) Black Bantustan leaders have also been asked to set up defense forces in their homelands, and a "counter-insurgency" military training area has been reopened in Northern Zululand by the Natal Command. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 1974)

In September, South African Defence Minister, Pieter Botha, announced that South Africa will soon begin building its own tanks. In recent years, South Africa has built up a modern munitions industry, and military combat vehicles, including armored personnel carriers, are already being manufactured in South Africa. In addition, South Africa manufactures its own anti-aircraft missiles, and with French assistance, has developed the anti-aircraft missile system Cactus. (*Dagens Nyheter*, Sweden, Aug. 20, 1974; *Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Sept. 19, 1974. For related internal military developments, see *Southern Africa*, Sept., 1974)

According to a recent Africa Bureau Fact Sheet (No. 39, Oct., 1974) South Africa is now "technologically and financially capable of making a nuclear bomb. . ." Using its Canberra bombers, its British-supplied Buccaneers, and French-supplied Mirages, it could "extend a nuclear umbrella to cover the whole of East Africa, Mozambique, Rhodesia, most of Zaire, Angola and Namibia, as well as reaching far out into the Indian and Atlantic Oceans." South Africa has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

#### Jordanian Arms Sale

In a move that embarrassed the British Government and the 20-nation Arab League, angered the OAU, and further damaged the already tarnished reputation of King Hussein and his government, Jordan has sold about \$17.5 million worth of arms, originally purchased from Britain, to South Africa. Included in the deal (that has apparently been in the works since 1973) and already delivered in South Africa by the time the *Guardian* (London) revealed the secret sale on July 11, 1974, were a complete British-built Tigercat missile system and 41 British-made Centurian tanks. Thirty-one Hawker Hunter fighter jets, destined for Rhodesia along with the missile system, were supposed to be delivered; but a telephone call from an angry Egyptian President Sadat to Hussein reportedly prevented their shipment, and the shipment of an additional 350 Centurians. (*Africa*, London, No. 39, Nov., 1974)

#### West Germans Assist South Africa and Portugal

Jordan is not alone in having been caught out in violation of the UN arms embargo against South Africa. According to a document from the German Africa Society released to African journalists and foreign embassies and dealing primarily with extensive West German sales of military equipment to Portugal for use in the colonial wars, West German soldiers are presently in South Africa in connection with the building of a military equipment factory. The document reveals that West Germany has agreed to finance a NATO "emergency base" in South Africa. (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Oct. 14, 1974)

## Anchors Away

If it is clear that South Africa can buy or make the weapons it needs to defend its racist regime, it is now equally clear that the apartheid government has won a very important battle for the politico-strategic minds of those who control the deployment of the military forces of the US, Britain and France. Mounting evidence points to the fact that the South African Government has been able to sell itself as a crucial Cape bastion, poised against the "threat" to the "Free World" allegedly posed by the presence of Soviet vessels in the Indian Ocean. According to the *Washington Post* (Oct. 21, 1974), top Pentagon strategists are now convinced that Russian naval forces in the Indian Ocean (latest Pentagon estimate, 35 ships) are "a menace to the West's oil jugular," and that the US Navy needs access to South Africa's Simonstown base "to protect the vital sea lanes around the Cape." Despite numerous official denials that the US cooperates with South Africa or has any intention of doing so (a recent one came from Assistant Sec. of State for Africa, Donald Easum during his five week tour of Africa), direct military agreements with the South African Government are clearly in the offing in the near future . . . if they don't already exist. US military interest in the Cape sea route, in South African overflights rights for the air force, and in ship repair facilities is well-documented in the recently exposed and now widely circulated National Security Council 'secret' Memorandum of 1970. More recent information points to a "secret" White House decision, reached in response to "developments" in Angola and Mozambique, to negotiate the sale of additional helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft to South Africa. (*Journal of Commerce*, New York, Sept. 18, 1974) Further help in the air is to be supplied by Boeing, which has sold South African Airways three special-performance B747 SP jets for about \$85 million. The importance of these particular jets, due for delivery in early 1976, is that they can reach London from Johannesburg without any stopovers in Africa. Given South Africa's inability to count on friendly relations with any other African country, the *Star* (Johannesburg, Oct. 26, 1974) regards the purchase of the special Boeings as "timely."

According to sources in both Britain and South Africa, US Defense Department pressure was instrumental in Britain's decision to engage in joint naval maneuvers with the South African navy in October—a decision which contradicted stated Labor Government policy, caused a furor in the Party, the British press and generated strong reaction from the Anti-Apartheid Movement. (*Africa News*, Oct. 21, 1974) The fate of the 19 year old Simonstown Agreement between Britain and South Africa is now uncertain, with Britain's Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, forced to counter a "politically embarrassing" situation with a pledge to review all British policy toward South Africa. (*Africa News*, Oct. 31, 1974)

A French flotilla of warships also visited Cape Town in October, and two further naval visits from the French are expected in the near future. For its part, a South African naval frigate traveled to the Canary Islands for an "operational visit" in September. (*Washington Post*, Sept. 22, 1974) In July, 1974, the South African Minister of Defense revealed plans to re-convert Salisbury Island in Durban Bay into a "fully operational naval base (as it was during the war)." (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Sept., 1974)

South African whites believe, and apparently with good reason, that NATO is placing a high priority on the maintenance of the Simonstown Agreement and on a "continued American naval presence at the Cape." According to the *Star* (Johannesburg, Oct. 26, 1974) if Britain ultimately decides to go against NATO opinion, Simonstown "would quickly be filled by an American fleet." To NATO concern over Russian fleets in the Indian Ocean has been added fear (actively capitalized on by South Africa) of the "Moscow leaning of the FRELIMO provisional government" in Mozambique. Under the present charter, NATO itself would be "powerless to intervene," but the US, Britain and France could.


Closer to home, NATO spokesmen are busy trying to cover up a controversy caused by America's own Dr. Kissinger, who "both publicly and privately, has warned NATO countries of the dangers of sharing top secret information with . . . an unreliable member of the Alliance," namely Portugal. Because of "American concern about Communist participation in the Portuguese Government," a top-level meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, a group which has included Portugal, was postponed. (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 31, 1974) In the meantime, Kissinger, who thinks the US Embassy has underestimated Communist power in Portugal, has sent CIA agents and State Department "experts" to appraise the situation. (*International Herald Tribune*, Oct. 28, 1974, see US and Southern Africa section)

South Africa has successfully manipulated, and will, it would seem, continue to successfully manipulate US defense strategists whose thinking remains, as always, mired in domino theories and power vacuums. As long ago as November, 1968, the US National Security Council published as their *Washington Report* an article which contained the following guidelines for a US role at the Cape: "The emergence of South Africa as crucial in the struggle between the West and the Soviet Union requires a newly founded structure of politico-military powers in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, to complement NATO, so as to complete a system of Western defense. . . . A US-South Africa Alliance should be the 'hub' of a complementary political agreement between the West and South Africa. Opposition to an alliance with South Africa because of her racial policies is irrelevant to the strategic situation. In the strife for world supremacy now in progress politico-strategic interests are primary. . . . There is no evidence that the South African policy of separate development diminishes its military strength, while there certainly can be a presumption that revolutionary changes would." ("South Africa: A Bastion for an Oceanic Association")

It goes without saying that the apartheid government will promptly label any attempt, whether internal or external, to challenge white supremacy a "communist threat." As the Western powers become more blatant in their support for the status quo in South Africa, the USSR may indeed find it necessary to increase its political influence in Black Africa. The stage may then be set for a wider conflict which the US claims to want to avoid. ■

# Namibia

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Windhoek's White Section—A New Future

## SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL?

In the wake of Portugal's phasing out in Africa, the thwarted (by a three-power veto) effort to expel South Africa from the United Nations and South Africa's subsequent suspension from the UN General Assembly, talk, albeit with scant hard evidence, of change in southern Africa mounts. South African Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster declared that there will be substantial movement within six to 12 months time and there are persistent stories of diplomatic contacts between the Pretoria regime and African governments. A report in Windhoek's *Die Suidwes Afrikaner* is a case in point.

The United Party Afrikaans-language newspaper, quoting "very good authority from New York", says a plan for South Africa to withdraw from Namibia is already in a "most advanced stage." The plan was extracted from South Africa by Britain, France and the United States in exchange for their vetoes at the Security Council on October 30. The paper says "it is expected that South Africa and SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) will begin to negotiate about Namibia, possibly at the Hague, and it is likely that both President Kaunda of Zambia and Mr. Vorster will go to The Hague." It is surmised that the withdrawal will start with the pull-out of South African military in northern Namibia.

Interrelated developments connected with the Namibia story are talk of the withdrawal of South African support of the Rhodesian regime, the gradual doing-away of gross forms of apartheid in South Africa and an Organization of African Unity decision to decrease African liberation pressure on South Africa.

## INSIDE NAMIBIA

A statement, signed by Mr. Axel Jackson Johannes, SWAPO secretary and issued in Windhoek, called for a constitutional conference "to which all, including the Whites, should be invited. This proposed conference should, however, be based on the principle of one man, one vote." (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, Nov. 15, 1974) The English-language newspaper quoted the statement as declaring: "The White population, commercial and all industrial companies and property owners should have no fear that a Black government will be a threat to their future, as long as we remove all apartheid laws and live as brothers and sisters. White and Black are in need of each other in a free Namibia."

The statement was firm that there be only one nation. The *Advertiser* says, "It called upon the South African Government, as a condition to the proposed constitutional talks, to release all Namibian political detainees, to give an assurance on the freedom of speech and the holding of public meetings, freedom of movement, to abolish pass laws forthwith so that the constitutional talks could take place in a climate of peace, friendship and happiness."

The all-white, all-National Party legislative assembly in Windhoek voted to call a national conference in Namibia on the country's future. Dirk Mudge, speaker of the assembly, said all ethnic groups would choose their own delegates. "We do not want a repetition of what happened in Angola and Mozambique." (*Times*, London, Nov. 22, 1974)

The United Party in Namibia is expected to break away from the South African UP (which it joined only a few years ago) in a move "regarded as essential to give the

RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPTION NOW





SWAPO President Sam Nujoma

party there the flexibility to cope with changes which many believe will lead SWA to independence from the Republic in a year or two." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 15, 1974)

#### AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The Johannesburg *Star* on November 1, 1974, printed a South African Press Association dispatch from New York saying that United Nations Commissioner for Namibia Sean MacBride predicts a UN administration in Namibia within ten months. The commissioner "believes South Africa will wish to hand over South West Africa before the next General Assembly session in September 1975." The story quotes MacBride saying that "a United Nations administration in Namibia would be very short-lived"—only while elections were being organized.

The United States representative on the UN Fourth Committee, Ms. Barbara White, who holds ambassadorial rank, urged South Africa to act regarding Namibian independence. (US Mission to the UN press release, November 7, 1974) "We ask that South Africa provide the United Nations, the legally recognized authority for Namibia, with an unequivocal statement of its plans for permitting the people of Namibia to exercise their right of self-determination. This statement should include an indication of the period within which positive changes can be expected. And we want the United Nations to play its rightful role in this process." (See "At the United Nations" section.)

#### "OWAMBO" ELECTION

SWAPO members will not run as candidates in the January, 1975, elections in the "Ovambo homeland" according to SWAPO official Skinny Hilundwa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 1974) He is quoted as saying SWAPO would not conduct a boycott as it did during the last election in August, 1973. "Under the quasi-emergency regulations in force in Ovambo we would risk arrest if we advocated a boycott. We will leave it to the people to decide for themselves." Mr. Hilundwa said the elections were rejected principally because they were taking place in a Bantustan. SWAPO stands for a unified Namibia.

Chief Minister Filemon Elifas said that Namibians who

had fled their country (now well over 2,000) were welcome to return and take part in the election. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 26, 1974) However, he warned "his people" not to allow people with "other ideas" to mislead them.

#### OCCUPATION AS USUAL

That the South African usurper continues to use its accustomed methods of control is sharply focused by two events. Clive Cowley writes in the Johannesburg *Star* (November 9, 1974) of the South African administration's decision to alter drastically Namibia's 108-year-old Augustineum Training Institute in Windhoek. Pretoria has decreed that at the end of 1975 Augustineum will be transferred from the Department of Bantu Education to the Department of Coloured Relations and Reheboth Affairs. Blacks would be forced to leave the school to go to new institutions based on old tribal lines.

Founded in 1866 by the Lutheran Rhenish Mission, Augustineum has brought together Black and Brown people—and Whites as teachers—to achieve academic, commercial and trade learning and to live and work with one another. The Evangelical Lutheran Church and the African Teachers Association are protesting strongly this action from Pretoria.

In a similar attempt to cripple an all-Namibia independence, South Africa has forced the closing of St. Mary's Hospital and threatens the closing of St. Mary's High School, both located at the Anglican Mission at Odibo in northern Namibia. The state had subsidized basic medical costs at the hospital with the church bearing the rest. Harassment, such as refusal of permits for doctors and administrators, and for Namibian nurses' training, has gone on for years.


The high school is private and not in any way supported by the state. Withdrawal of its registration would make it impossible for it to continue. The Odibo Mission has long been a target of the South Africans. The high school teaches in the medium of English, refusing to employ Afrikaans. Students, teachers and nurses have been heavily involved in resistance to foreign rule and many have been arrested. Four nurses were among those Namibians subjected to public floggings last year at the behest of the South African administrators, operating through paid chiefs and their councils.

The Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa's publication has the full background on the closing of the hospitals and school with statements by Bishop Colin Winter, exiled from Namibia in London, and Suffragan Bishop Richard Wood who recently travelled in the US. For info, write ECSA, 14 W. 11th St., New York 10011.



Government Detention Center in Ovamboland

# Zimbabwe



## GUERRILLA STRENGTH GROWS

N.G. Mukono, External Affairs Secretary for ZANU, told the UN Committee for Trust and Dependent Territories that ZANU has effective control of nearly half of Zimbabwe. Between May and August of this year, ZANU has killed 109 enemy troops, destroyed five enemy camps, 17 enemy trucks, shot down three aircraft and damaged another five aircraft. He said that Rhodesians are exploiting Africans now more than ever and that unless they surrender power, ZANU will continue to intensify the war for national liberation. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 18, 1974)

The other liberation movement in Zimbabwe, ZAPU, claims that 49 Rhodesian and South African soldiers were killed during September and October in the Wankie and Urungwe districts and near Kariba, where the Rhodesian

Light Infantry was over-run at Kanyambizi Camp. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 19, 1974)

The increased intensity of the war can be measured by developments within Rhodesia. Ten thousand white police reservists are being recruited to patrol their own neighborhoods, a police spokesman said. The patrols are aimed at preventing urban guerrilla action. The nucleus of the group will be those who took to their beats during the "emergencies" of the 1960's. Bulawayo and Salisbury will receive 80 per cent of the new force. (*Washington Post*, Oct. 27, 1974)

Students will be doing their national service directly upon completing school, according to a new call-up system. White women may join the struggle too, as the president of the Rhodesian chapter of the National Organization of Women has suggested. She said that if the Ministry of Defense cannot use them in a fighting role, they could cook and drive vehicles. (*Rhodesia Herald*, Salisbury, Oct. 5, 1974)

The Rhodesian Government announced that five more "rebels" were killed in the northeast, bringing the total to 454 since "Operation Hurricane" began nearly two years ago. Forty one security forces have reportedly lost their lives. Rhodesian Front chairman, de Frost, says Africans "are becoming more vociferous by the day" as they see the situation change in Mozambique. He said the policy of provincialization (creating South African-type reserves for permanent African rural settlement) has become essential and will be functional within the next few years. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 9, 1974; *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, Sept. 20, 1974)

In South Africa, the Minister of Police announced that bonuses were augmented for police serving in Rhodesia. He also said that South Africa was establishing a border duty corps of volunteers for Rhodesia. He stated that "the combating of terrorism in Rhodesia necessitates the use of weapons of war and is to an increasing extent becoming a sort of conventional warfare." Sir de Villiers Graaff, leader of the opposition United Party in South Africa said, "Now most people must be realizing that real war ... has overthrown some of the other bastions of Southern Africa and we know that a new decisive phase in this real war is upon us." (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 28, 1974)

## SETTLEMENT TALK AGAIN

President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa have made statements concerning the desirability of settling the Rhodesian question. President Kaunda offered to freeze the guerrilla war along its present battlelines if Mr. Smith would come to the conference table. Commenting on these developments, Noel Mukono, ZANU Foreign Minister, said, "President Kaunda will not stop armed struggle for something which is empty." (*Africa News*, Durham, N.C., Nov. 4, 1974)

Mr. Mukono also called on the UN to transfer British responsibility for Zimbabwe to the Organization of African Unity. Zambian Foreign Minister, Vernon Mwaanga, called on Britain to convene a constitutional conference to work out the transfer of power to majority rule. And in a BBC interview, the ZAPU representative said, "Immediate and unqualified majority rule is not a



ZAPU President Joshua Nkomo



ZANU President Ndabeningi Sithole

record of the past nine years since UDI shows that Mr. Smith is a man who chronically resorts to this kind of Delphic utterance when he finds himself in a tight spot politically." (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 28, 30, Nov. 12, 1974; *Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 26, Nov. 2, 9, 1974; *Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 18, 1974)

negotiable principle." If Rhodesia's Whites accept that, the violence would end. The *Guardian* indicates that politicians in South Africa are expecting assurances from President Kaunda that he can effect a promise of non-aggression towards South Africa by guerrillas if South Africa withdraws her support of the Rhodesian government. This is perplexing because President Kaunda is speaking of the Zimbabwean guerrillas' activities in Zimbabwe.

Sources in Salisbury say Smith may not reply to President Kaunda's statement. The African National Council responded favorably to the South African suggestion which promised to help seek peace and secure a political settlement among influential parties in Rhodesia. The ANC Secretary General, Gordon Chavanduka said the ANC would agree to more talks with Smith if they lead to a constitutional conference. He insisted that Britain should attend, a suggestion rejected by the Smith regime.

The US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Donald Easum, suggested in a press conference in Lusaka that South Africa withdraw its para-military forces from Rhodesia and put pressure on Rhodesia to settle with the Africans. He said that the US could hardly continue to support South Africa in the UN if South Africa failed to do this.

The Wilson Government has re-affirmed its determination not to accept any Rhodesian settlement which is not supported by the African people. It also believes that Smith must be present at any conference to assure a meaningful and lasting settlement. Reports say Britain may be planning an all-Africa approach to the question by inviting Commonwealth countries in Africa to make proposals that would be acceptable to all of Africa. Mr. Smith would then be invited to the conference table to consider these.

Smith himself continues to issue cloudy statements to his public that he is negotiating with another African group which promises a settlement acceptable to Rhodesia. The *Guardian* of November 12, says, "The

#### ZAPU OFFICIAL KIDNAPPED IN BOTSWANA

At 9 p.m. on October 13, 1974 two Whites and one African, armed with pistols, kidnapped a ZAPU official named Ethan Dube from a house in Francistown. Dube, who worked at ZAPU headquarters in Lusaka and was on a visit to Botswana, was taken by car to the border and then by foot across the dry river bed into Rhodesia. Dube resisted and blood stains were found in the house where he was staying. Botswana has protested the act and demanded the immediate return of Dube. It is thought that the kidnapping was linked with the recent step-up in ZAPU activity in western Rhodesia. In March of this year another Zimbabwean, teacher Joel Mthimukulu of Francistown, was also abducted; he has not been heard from since. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 16, 1974, *The Guardian*, London, Oct. 19, 1974; *Africa*, November 1974)

George Silundika, National Secretary of ZAPU, addressed the UN Committee on Trust and Dependent Territories and condemned the Smith regime for its act of international terrorism. (*Botswana Daily News*, Francistown, Oct. 1, 8, 1974)

#### RHODESIAN-ZAMBIAN BORDER CLASHES

A helicopter with South African markings started a brush fire on the Zambian side of the Zambesi River about a half mile south of the Kazangula border post, where Rhodesia, Zambia, and Botswana meet. Villagers were frightened as the helicopter returned towards Zambia's immigration post, and Zambian border guards fired into the air to divert it. This incident came only a day after a similar one in which Rhodesian soldiers poured machine gun fire into the Zambian post and damaged two boats moored on the Zambian side. Firing continued for over an hour. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 8, 9, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Oct. 8, 1974) ■

# portugal and africa

## angola


### ANGOLA STILL FRAUGHT WITH PROBLEMS

Political machinations and intrigues, false starts and setbacks for unity among the three liberation movements, divisions within MPLA and maneuvering between neighboring African countries and the liberation forces continue to stall independence efforts in Angola. While the political situation among the various forces is often confusing and unclear, certain patterns are beginning to emerge that are not entirely encouraging for a truly independent Angola in the immediate future.


It is now clear that the Spinola-Mobutu talks in the Cape Verde Islands reported in last month's *Southern Africa* were also secretly attended by Holden Roberto and a delegation from Chipenda's faction of the MPLA. The secret talks centered on the approval of Spinola's plan for a provisional government in Angola that would include the three liberation movements but exclude Agostinho Neto from any participation in the government. Spinola's plan was for a 12 man provisional government including two representatives from each of the liberation movements and six members from 'tribal' chiefs and various white minority groups. (*Sunday Times*, London, October 20, 1974). According to reports circulating in Luanda, the list of names for the provisional government included Fernando Falcao (head of FUA, an Angola Settler Party), Holden Roberto, Jonas Savimbi and Daniel Chipenda. (*Diário de Lisboa*, Lisbon, Oct. 12, 1974)

Mobutu emerges as a key figure in the international machinations to exclude Neto from a major leadership role in Angola. Mobutu offered the Chipenda and de Andrade factions of MPLA a base in Kinshasa and Chipenda has moved from his former base in Lusaka to Kinshasa with 700 of his followers. Four days after the Spinola-Mobutu meeting in Sal in the Cape Verde Islands, Roberto declared in an interview that Chipenda and de Andrade had agreed to an alliance with FNLA. (*Daily World*, New York, Nov. 12, 1974) It was expected that if Spinola's plan had been implemented UNITA would have been brought into the alliance. For Spinola, the Angolan plan was his one chance to apply principles from his book, *Portugal and the Future*.


At this point it is assumed that any united front to emerge from the three liberation movements would not include Neto in any leadership role. Holden Roberto and the FNLA have emerged as a more powerful force than expected. Mobutu is clearly aiding his brother-in-law, Holden Roberto, and he has used the three-way split in MPLA to strengthen FNLA's position. Mobutu has a strong dislike for the left-wing politics of Dr. Neto and prefers the ideological orientation of Chipenda who was MPLA's military commander in Angola's eastern district until 18 months ago when he was suspended from the party's executive. Mobutu's public political posture and Chipenda's are apparently alike in that both agree that



FNLA's Holden Roberto



Agostinho Neto



Joaquim Pinto de Andrade



UNITA's Jonas Savimbi

foreign" ideologies have no place in Africa and the state system should spring naturally from African communal life. (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 19, 1974) It is no secret that Mobutu has received \$376 million in loans and nearly \$50 million in direct military aid from the US since 1962. (*Sunday Times*, London, Oct. 20, 1974) Apparently there is no objection to *this* intervention from a 'foreign' ideology. It has also been rumored that a secret alliance masterminded by the CIA and Mobutu is forming which includes FNLA, UNITA and white Angolan groups. Such an alliance would be sure to have strong ties with Zaire. (*To the Point International*, Nov. 2, 1974)

The attempts to isolate Neto are increasing. On November 9, in Kinshasa, leaders of the FNLA and Chipenda's faction of MPLA threatened a resumption of hostilities with Portugal if it recognized Neto's faction of MPLA which had entered Luanda November 8. (*New York Times*, Nov. 10, 1974) Chipenda has stated to Angolan journalists in Brazzaville that he does not recognize the "election" of Neto as President of MPLA (at the Brazzaville summit conference in September, 1974). The election, he charged, was engineered by four East and Central African heads of state and not by MPLA militants. (*O Século*, Lisbon, Oct. 15, 1974) It is clear now that other liberation movement leaders want Neto out of the picture at all costs and that President Mobutu is prepared to aid this move.

#### RENEWED VIOLENCE IN LUANDA

For the third time since April 25, major violence has broken out in Luanda. Again, the African slums, where more than 300,000 impoverished Africans live, were the center of the worst violence. An estimated 100 persons were left dead and scores were injured. (*New York Times*, Nov. 17, 1974) Reports from Luanda indicate that the killing was not a result of racial tensions, but rather a response to political tensions between the three African liberation movements.

The violence erupted a few days after the arrival in Luanda of a delegation representing Neto's faction of MPLA, and apparently after the turbulent arrival of a UNITA delegation. (*Guardian*, London, Nov. 12, 1974;

*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 12, 1974) Reports in the western press claim that the clashes between two factions of MPLA were responsible for the violence, but nothing has been confirmed concerning the genesis of the outbreak of fighting. (*New York Times*, Nov. 17, 1974; *Washington Post*, Nov. 17, 1974) The cities, once considered the stronghold of MPLA, are clearly having this traditional dominance challenged by FNLA and UNITA.


Gulf Oil evacuated more than 100 of its American staff and dependents to South Africa following the violence. (*Washington Post*, Nov. 16, 1974)

In the aftermath of the disturbances Portugal has decided to put aside the plan for the provisional government and substitute this with the establishment of a guerrilla commission that would advise Portugal and the present colonial administration in Angola. (*New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1974)

The lack of any substantive unity among the liberation groups plus three episodes of severe violence in Luanda have halted progress towards any feasible solution for Angolan independence soon.

#### CABINDA-FLEC UPRISING THWARTED

FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda), launched a major attack on the streets of Cabinda town in the first week of November. Hand



grenades were thrown, shots were fired and several people were injured during the attack. (*Daily News*, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 2, 1974; Nov. 6, 1974) MPLA joined forces with Portuguese troops to neutralize the uprising and together they regained control of the installations captured by FLEC. Observers report that the FLEC rebellion accomplished its purpose and established the fledgling secessionist group as a force to be reckoned with in Angolan politics. (*Africa News*, Durham, Nov. 7, 1974)

The future of the enclave of Cabinda could well rest with President M'obutu of Zaire. The BBC correspondent in Tanzania reports that diplomatic and government officials in Dar es Salaam believe that M'obutu has made a secret deal with Holden Roberto to obtain Cabinda. Were Roberto to emerge as the leader of an independent Angola, he would reward his long-time backer in Zaire with the prize of Cabinda. Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel of FRELIMO are reportedly worried over such deals and are meeting with the President of Botswana and the Prime Minister of Lesotho to discuss the Angolan situation. (*Africa News* Durham, Nov. 14, 1974)

*After months of worrying, top Portuguese officials think they've devised a way to give independence to Angola, their largest African colony—and still keep oil-rich Cabinda, a territory administered from Angola but actually a separate enclave 40 miles away. If the Portuguese abandon Cabinda—which generates \$500 million a year in oil revenues, they fear it will be seized by a free Angola or by its other neighbors, Zaire or the Congo Brazzaville. The Lisbon plan would set up Cabinda as an autonomous state, with Portugal furnishing military protection—and sharing the oil money.*

(*Newsweek*, Aug. 12, 1974)

*Gulf Oil is staging open meetings with its 20,000 dealers around the country to let them air complaints and to help improve communications. As one Gulf district marketing manager understates it: 'Our public image is rather lousy.'*

(*Business Week*, June 29, 1974)


# mozambique

## BUILDING A NEW NATION: DEMILITARIZATION

"The time has passed for the necessity of guns. All of us have to work in national reconstruction." (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 3, 1974) This statement was made by a FRELIMO spokesman in reference to Mozambique's demilitarization program. Portuguese High Commissioner to Mozambique, Rear Admiral Victor Crespo announced that by November 17 Mozambican civilians must give up all guns of 7.65 caliber or more. Those not doing so will face one to six months imprisonment. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 1974) This move is in line with measures introduced in September to collect illegal weapons when a combined patrol of FRELIMO and Portuguese soldiers seized two submachine guns, two automatic pistols, and munitions from Whites in Lourenco Marques. (*Allgemeine Zeitung*, Frankfurt, Sept. 9, 1974)

More than 12,000 Portuguese troops have already returned to Portugal leaving behind a token force. Some attempts have been made to regroup some of these soldiers into a mercenary force designed to operate against FRELIMO. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 4, 1974)

Demilitarization activities are also evident around the Cabora Bassa dam project in the Tete region of Mozambique. Some fencing has been removed and hundreds of land mines are being dug out by Portuguese and FRELIMO soldiers. Following preliminary tests the



New Situation for Cabora Bassa


dam may become operable by early December enabling it to produce power to export to South Africa and for Mozambican consumption. (*Times*, London, Oct. 7, 1974) Rumors are circulating that the financing of the dam has been interrupted and members of the Zamco Building Consortium have threatened to withdraw their credit backing. (*Times*, London, Nov. 1, 1974) Other sources have speculated that South African Prime Minister Vorster may postpone economic negotiations with FRELIMO until full independence next year when economic realities may be more clear. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1974)

## AFRICAN SOLIDARITY

Several formal pledges of solidarity have come from Mozambique's African neighbors. A Central African summit conference was held in Dar es Salaam which was attended by representatives from Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and Mozambique. The meeting discussed plans for closer cooperation between these countries in order to aid Mozambique at this critical period. Specific decisions were not disclosed. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 3, 1974)

Zacarias Kupela of Tanzania called on all African nations to assist Mozambique in reconstruction. Prime Minister Rashidi of Rwanda responded pledging full solidarity. As one result of these talks, East African Airways and the Mozambican Airline (DETA), began exchanging weekly flights in November. (*Sunday News*, Dar es Salaam, Sept. 22, 1974; *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 3, 1974)

Black South Africans have also given their support to the Mozambican peoples' victory and look to FRELIMO for encouragement and support in their struggle. Slogans on buildings in South Africa read, "FRELIMO shall free us." Two FRELIMO support rallies in South Africa were broken up by security police who carried out interrogations, and raids. At least twelve Africans were arrested for 'riotous assembly' and an undisclosed number are being held under the notorious preventive detention law. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct., 23, 1974)



**Central African Leaders Mobutu, Nyerere, Machel and Kaunda**

Members of the South African National Union of Students are visiting members of the Mozambique Student Association in order to strengthen relations between the two organizations. (AFP, Paris, Sept., 1974)

### **THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES: AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE**

Since the formation of the transitional government more than 150 people have perished in Mozambique's cities as a result of violent clashes initiated by Whites. (Times, London, Oct. 28, 1974) The ugly confrontation of October 21-22 between off-duty Portuguese commandos and FRELIMO soldiers left a wreckage of burned shops, cars and homes along blood-stained streets. FRELIMO's Prime Minister Chissano has implied that those soldiers responsible were linked with the former Portuguese security police, the DGS. All of these anti-FRELIMO elements have been sent to Portugal. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 23, 1974)

In addition FRELIMO has attributed this uprising to "agitators, criminals, and rumor mongers." The transitional government has now issued three decrees to prevent further outbreaks of violence. The first decree seeks to end "the spreading of false rumors" which have been "inciting people to violence" and "preventing the decolonization process." The second decree establishes penalties of two to eight years for the above crimes. The third decree gives the right to suspend *habeus corpus* during a national emergency. At the end of September and in early November more than 1,200 people were arrested for security checks. Many have already been released. (Washington Post, Oct. 28, 1974; Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 1974)

### **MERCENARIES AND DISSIDENTS**


There are persistent reports of attempts to recruit Africans and Europeans to serve as mercenaries to oppose the Mozambican government. The leading capitalist, Jorge Jardim, has frequently been seen traveling between South Africa and Malawi where he is reported to be organizing African troops. Meanwhile, anti-FRELIMO leader Joanna Simiao has been placed under arrest in Beira with the

suspicion that she is linked with Jorge Jardim's recruitment schemes. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 10, 1974; Anti-Apartheid News, London, Nov. 1974)

A Zurich businessman, Hans Linglinger, infamous for his illegal immigration activities, is reportedly paying wealthy Portuguese to recruit at least 500 Swedish mercenaries to fight for the purported "restoration of White rule" in Mozambique. (Aftonbladet, Sweden, Oct. 18, 1974; Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 24, 1974)

In the beginning of September, two Americans were reported recruiting single young Africans from the suburbs of Lourenco Marques "to work for the new government." However word circulated that they were being sent to Swaziland for guerrilla training in opposition to FRELIMO.

People pretending to represent FRELIMO have sought to entice Africans to loot and assault Europeans and



**Jorge Jardim**



**FRELIMO school in liberated area.**  
Under the new government, the education system will be expanded.

generally discredit the new government. There was also a bomb scare in the South African consulate in Lourenco Marques. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 19, 1974)

### FRELIMO ON THE MOVE

With trains again on the move and calm restored to the capital city, FRELIMO continues to consolidate its firm hold on the developing nation. Its non-racial policy has endorsed a spirit of hard work and revolutionary spirit to develop the country. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Oct. 28, 1974)

Africans are now posted as Governor and Mayor of Lourenco Marques state and city as well as a host of lower administrative appointments. A twenty-eight year old woman was appointed as junior minister in the transitional government; she is Grace Simlime, Secretary of State for Education and Culture. Other recent appoint-

Reports from South Africa indicate that exiled DGS agents are observing Mozambican mineworkers and thousands of refugees from the recent episodes of violence. Evidentially the DGS and South African intelligence services are still closely allied. The border between South Africa and Mozambique is now tightly watched despite a period of granting 30-day visas to those fleeing for safety. At least some 20,000 dissidents have been received in South Africa with "open arms" and appear to be living under "conspicuously better facilities than South Africa provides for its African people in their wretched resettlement camps." (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 19, 1974)

ments include Professor Jorge Tembe, Under Secretary for Agriculture, and Professor Salomao Manguambe, Secretary of State for Finance. Two Portuguese, Luis Felipe Salgado Motos and Jose Luis Cabaco will serve, respectively, as Economic Coordinator and Secretary of Labor. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 2, 1974, *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 18, 1974)

A major task of building the new society is the liberation of Mozambican women. FRELIMO has begun to put an end to prostitution by sending numbers of streetwalkers to special "rehabilitation" camps throughout the nation. The purpose is to give the women a sense of consciousness so they can learn to live new lives in line with the society which is being created. (*Africa News*, Nov. 11, 1974)

The education system of the liberated areas will be expanded and former patterns changed. Formerly 83.5 per cent of the enrollment of Mozambican universities was European. Many Portuguese professors have left their posts at the University of Lourenco Marques to return to Portugal. (*AFP*, Paris, Oct. 8, 1974)

In the rural areas FRELIMO intends to keep some 250 aldeamentos intact and establish 150 additional "communal" farms. The government argues that it was not the buildings of the Portuguese "concentration camp system" that were oppressive but the system of colonialism. A rural resettlement program intends to provide employment for 1,200 unemployed in the Inhambane region. Rural areas in the Beira region have been hit with devastating floods which have wiped out crops; here FRELIMO is supplying aid and encouraging self-sacrifice. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 25, 1974)



# republic of guinea-bissau

## THE NATION MOVES FORWARD

Early on the morning of October 15, 1974 the last of the Portuguese troops left the shore of Guinea-Bissau for Portugal. Brigadier General Carlos Fabiao will be the last Portuguese ever to rule in this new West African nation. Now, Juvencio Gomes is the mayor of Bissau and the PAIGC executive secretariat is functioning. On October 21, 1974, PAIGC President Luis Cabral, and brother of the assassinated Amilcar Cabral, came to Bissau with PAIGC Secretary-General Aristides Pereira, Francisco Mendes, President of the Council of Ministers, and Joao (Nino) Vieira, President of the National Assembly and Armed Forces Minister. They were greeted with wild cheering by crowds of supporters and it was an emotion-filled moment when President Cabral found himself at a loss for words, before addressing the people. The enthusiastic crowd halted for a respectful minute of silence to Amilcar Cabral founder and leader of PAIGC who had been treacherously assassinated on January 20, 1973. (*Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 21, 1974*)

The departure of the Portuguese troops was completed somewhat earlier than had been expected. The transition to full PAIGC control has been relatively easy. Independence day celebrations were held on September 24, 1974 at Boe in the forested area in the southwest of the low-lying country. Manuel dos Santos, the Republic's Minister of Tourism and Information has indicated that, for the time being, Bissau will remain the seat of government. (*Marches Tropicaux, Paris, Oct. 25, 1974*) Portuguese Ambassador Sacoutino will soon assume his post in the capital and some medical, technical, and educational brigades have already arrived as part of the close ties established between the new Portuguese government and Guinea-Bissau. (*Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, Sept. 26, 1974*)

In the capital most Europeans have stayed on since demonstrating confidence in the PAIGC. Their numbers are not huge, perhaps 3,000 Portuguese and Lebanese, but they will help to insure stability. About 700 of these people were employed as shopkeepers. Most of the small number who did leave did so because their business was dependent on military sales and trade with soldiers. (*Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 22, 1974*)

The economy of Guinea has long suffered from serious underdevelopment in most sectors except agriculture. With the war at an end, peanut and rice cultivation should be able to accelerate sufficiently to regain self-sufficiency and then become a source of foreign exchange. Forest and palm products will also see production increases. The Companhia Uniao Fabril (CUF), the Portuguese trading company dominated all the commerce in Guinea, including the processing and export of agricultural items and the import of manufactured goods. To date, the PAIGC has not indicated what relationship it will have with the CUF or with Exxon, which had long been prospecting for oil in the coastal areas under contract to Portugal. Foreign interests are also involved in developing the extensive bauxite reserves in Guinea. Presumably these concerns will come under the control of the state sector of the economy. With a strong nationalist spirit and

immeasurable dedication and hard work for the people of Guinea will be able to put economic meaning behind their hard-fought independence.

Just prior to independence a minor shuffle in the PAIGC government was announced from Gabu, with the addition of new Ministerial appointments. The new positions are: Commissioner of National Security and Public Order, Constantino Teixeira; Commissioner for Communications and Transport, Otto Schact; Commissioner for Agricultural Planning and Natural Resources, Carlos Correia. Jose Araujo is now Commissioner of State without portfolio. (*AFP, Paris, Sept. 10, 1974*)



PAIGC Leaders (from left)  
Aristides Pereira, Luis Cabral, Francisco Mendes

## INSIDE THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

Since the turbulent events of September 21-25, 1974 (See *Southern Africa, December*), calm has again been restored to the Islands. Indeed, a new spirit of detente has been reached between the PAIGC and the Portuguese government as negotiations have been resumed.

PAIGC Major Pedro Pires, chief negotiator at the London and Algiers meetings with the Portuguese, has said that the people of Cape Verde must decide for themselves "without any interference from the Portuguese authorities or any other foreign power." (*Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Aug. 29, 1974*) The conclusion of the Algiers meeting suggested that a referendum would be held. The PAIGC position was to hold such elections with the goal of forming a national assembly of Cape Verdeans to join with a parallel organization in Guinea to create a supreme parliament and adopt an overall constitution.

In the first weeks of September, Portuguese President Spinoza (since resigned) reiterated the goal of having a referendum and sent his Overseas Minister, Dr. Almeida Santos to the city of Praia on Sao Tiago to meet with delegates of the PAIGC, the UDC (Democratic Union of Capeverde), and the UPICV (Popular Union of the Cape Verde Islands). Dr. Santos stated he wanted to have the referendum as quickly as possible. (*O Seculo, Lisbon, Sept. 17, 1974*)

In early October, the PAIGC Secretary-General, Aristides Pereira indicated that the current phase of the liberation struggle for the Cape Verde Islands was progressing well. He said "there is a period of calm and


people and the ideas of our party." (*Revolution Africaine*, Algiers, Oct. 4, 1974) Even more recently the PAIGC leadership has demanded "immediate independence" saying that the colonial administration on the Islands could no longer function effectively. (*La Suisse*, Switz., Oct. 27, 1974)

In short, the situation remains unclear at this point but the time for a final resolution of the problem is now facing the Lisbon leaders with the greatest urgency.

### SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

In early September massive demonstrations swept the islands of Sao Tome and Principe nestled in the Bight of Biafra off the coasts of Nigeria and Cameroon. Subsequently a threat of a general strike called by the MLSTP (Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe) forced the Portuguese to the negotiation table. In the most recent reports the Portuguese have determined that a referendum is not necessary and will soon proceed with full decolonization towards independence under the MLSTP. (*Guardian*, New York, Oct. 30, 1974)

These two large islands and several smaller islets are not considered as strategic as the Cape Verde archipelago which have a more prominent location on Atlantic shipping lanes. The climate of the two islands is excellent for plantation production of coffee, cocoa, copra, and numerous tropical fruits which figure importantly in export trade.



Premier Vasco Gonsalves

the open—and this they did, when on May Day 1974, in Portugal, one of the largest popular rallies in the world occurred!

5) A provisional government representing the three opinions mentioned above and one more, Popular Democratic Party (PPD), a group of capitalists that once participated in the fascist assembly of Salazar and Caetano, was formed. This coalition is entrusted with governing the country until popular elections, scheduled for March 1975, decide what socio-politico-economic system Portugal will have.

Democratically constituted by the main political parties, this government is presided over by Gen. Francisco Da Costa Gomes, the man dismissed from the position of joint chief by Caetano two months before the coup. The premier is Vasco Gonsalves, a Colonel from the Armed Forces Movement (M.F.A.), the group of young officers that overthrew dictator Caetano. Gen. Gomes succeeded Gen. Spínola, who resigned on Sept. 30, 1974. Spínola had been chosen president of the National Salvation Junta by the M.F.A. because of his prestige inside the armed forces. He had served as joint chief of staff Gomes and both were fired the same day—for the same reason—criticising Caetano's colonial policies.

These men were highly respected by the military, but very conservative. The M.F.A. sought to legitimize the toppling of the old order by naming them top leaders of the Junta. Spínola resigned with three other conservative members of this body because of pressure from the progressive M.F.A. . . "He was too slow" putting their program into practice, they reported.

### Colonial Situation

Africa played an important role in the downfall of the fascist system. For about five hundred years the Portuguese colonialists plundered parts of Africa. More to the point: Salazar and Caetano brutally repressed nationalistic and democratic feelings in their colonies.

# portugal

## EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE COUP

In the months since the coup of April 25, many events have taken place in Portugal.

Shortly after the overthrow of the fascist Caetano regime several pillars of that hated system were destroyed: the fascist secret police, PIDE; the Portuguese legion, a fascist organization comparable to Mussolini's black shirts; the Portuguese Youth, similar to Hitler's brown shirts; and the fascist party, A.N.A., originally Salazar's National Union (Uniao Nacional) that Caetano changed to National Popular Action (Accao Nacional Popular). Some leaders of these fascist groups were arrested and jailed by the armed forces.

For close to 50 years these organizations had terrorized the people and ruthlessly repressed the most basic liberties. For half a century they ruled Portugal by the use of sheer brute force.

With the toppling of the fascist regime and the dismantling of its institutions, fundamental democratic freedoms were reinstated and political prisoners freed.

1) The fifty year-old press censorship was abolished, freedom of press, speech and assembly was restored.

2) One day after the coup, on April 26, thousands of political prisoners were released in Portugal and its colonies. Some of these people had spent as many as 22 years in the political dungeons of the dictators Salazar and Caetano.

3) Exiled political leaders, revolutionary intellectuals and other anti-fascists were welcomed back into the country by thousands of people.

4) The Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP/CDE), Communist and Socialist parties, after decades of persecution and oppression, were finally free to come into


Even more to the point: in the past fifteen years the Portuguese capitalists were forced to deploy close to two hundred thousand troops and commit their entire armed forces (supported by N.A.T.O.) to suppress the Liberation Movements in Guinea-Bissau, now an independent nation in Angola and Mozambique. Inevitably these class wars turned the "slaves against the masters"—the young officers and soldiers—those that had to do the fighting—against the generals.

Among other things, the colonial wars accelerated the revolutionary process against the ruling class. According

to the logic of these events, it would be natural for the officer movement that engineered the coup of April 25 to stop these repressive class wars and turn those countries over to the people living there. And this they have been doing!

The April coup and its decolonization program have opened up new frontiers for Portugal. Starting with Algeria, relations with Africa, the Middle East and Asia were re-established. Beginning with the Soviet Union cultural and commercial ties were initiated with the Socialist countries, some for the first time in fifty years!

# neighbors



## LESOTHO TRENDS

In its November 1974 issue, *Africa* suggests that Lesotho is consciously lessening its dependence upon South Africa. Prime Minister Jonathan has been seeking closer ties with Nyerere and Kaunda, sending large delegations to OAU and non-aligned meetings and taking some positions against South African encroachments in his country. On the economic front, Lesotho is attracting increasing investment, partly because the investors wish to reap the benefits of the Southern African market without incurring the opprobrium of dealing with South Africa. Tourism is becoming an important industry, with construction of a second Holiday Inn and a Hilton under way. Iran has provided 100 buses to help establish a bus service for the whole country. Canadians are doing a feasibility study for a possible international airport at Maseru, which would allow direct flights with the exterior. The investments are being coordinated under the umbrella of the Lesotho National Development Corporation, run by a German, Heinrich Bechtel, who did a similar job in Sierra Leone.

## POSSIBLE MALAWIAN SHIFT

In the wake of an air crash which killed more than 70 Malawian workers returning from labor contract service in the South African mines, Malawi shows some evidence of rethinking its previous policy of open links with South

Africa in the light of the new situation in Mozambique. The crashed flight was run by Wenela (WNLA), the South African labor recruitment organization; subsequently, workers have returned home and recruitment of Malawians for the South African and Rhodesian mines has been ended. Malawi has also established closer relations with Zambia over the past year and the two countries are considering linking the Malawian railway network to the TAZARA line, thereby giving Zambia another outlet to the sea. South African police boats, however, apparently still patrol Lake Malawi. (*Africa Report*, Sept-Oct 1974; *Africa*, October 1974)

## CRASH IN ZAMBIA

Three white South African employees of the Bantu Investment Corporation, flying a light South African aircraft, crashed 200 miles within Zambia in Western Province. F.J. Lotter was killed but P.J.M. Louw and D.G. Steyn, the pilot, were rescued with injuries. Steyn praised the hospitality of the Zambian people and said that he ran out of fuel and lost his way while flying from Windhoek to Katimo Mulilo in the Caprivi Strip. The *Daily Mail of Zambia* said that a fourth man was believed to have been aboard and to have disappeared, and that one of the men had set fire to documents after the crash. The survivors were being kept in Lusaka pending an investigation. (*Sunday News*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 13, 1974)



Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda

In a speech Kaunda offered to freeze the guerrilla war along its present battle lines if the Rhodesian settlers would come to the conference table. The speech was praised in South Africa for its conciliatory nature by Prime Minister Vorster, Foreign Minister Muller, Opposition Leader de Villiers Graaf and others. According to South African Government sources, South Africa would be prepared to withdraw its police units (8,000 men) from Rhodesia if Zambia agreed to 'freeze the activities of guerrillas' attacking Rhodesia from Zambia. The sources said that the rationale for the presence of the police units had always been a threat to South Africa, and not merely to defend Rhodesia. (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 28, 29, 1974; *Times*, London, Oct. 30, 1974)

In an interview with *Africa* (November 1974), Zambian Foreign Minister Vernon Mwaanga spoke of his country's approach to the Southern African situation. He called on Britain to assert its authority in Rhodesia, to repudiate the constitutional conference which Ian Smith has called and to preside over a new constitutional conference which would include Sithole and Nkomo, with Smith as only a participant, and to push South Africa to withdraw its 8,000 member police force from Rhodesia. He indicated that Zambia will propose new and more comprehensive sanctions against the Smith regime if it refuses a

negotiated settlement, and has explored such measures with FRELIMO and Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares. Mwaanga stressed that the search for a negotiated settlement in no way mitigated Zambia's support for the liberation struggle.

#### COPPER AGREEMENT

Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia, four leading producers of copper who form CIPEC (Comité Intergouvernemental des Pays Exportateurs du Cuivre), have agreed to cut exports by 10 per cent in an effort to stabilize the world price, which dropped 50 per cent last year because of a glut on the market. Zambia also announced that it will take full control of its copper industry, terminating the management and sales contract with AMAX. Zambia is offering \$32m. for Amax's holdings while the company is demanding \$38m. The matter is to be settled by international arbitration. (*Africa News*, Durham, Nov. 7, 25, 1974)


#### KHAMA GOVERNMENT RETURNED TO POWER

In elections held in late October, the Botswana Democratic Party increased its domination of Parliament to 27 out of 31 seats. Only 1/3 of the voters turned out. The size of the BDP majority seemed to represent approval for a number of accomplishments and plans: the exploitation of mineral deposits, the paving of a number of roads, the announcement of plans for a new currency and the assumption of administration of the segment of the Rhodesian Railroad that runs through Botswana. (*Africa News*, Durham, Oct. 31, 1974)

#### EVENTS AROUND THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF ZAMBIAN INDEPENDENCE

The late October celebrations of Zambia's independence anniversary have been the occasion for a number of meetings and statements about the Southern African situation. Leaders from Tanzania, Mozambique (Machel), Botswana, and Namibia (Sam Nujoma) have been meeting with Kaunda and other Zambian leaders. Sean Macbride, the UN Commissioner for Namibia, attended the celebrations and hinted at a more militant UN policy on Namibia in a talk on Zambian television. The industrialist Harry Oppenheimer and Sir Richard Luyt, chancellor of the University of Cape Town and former Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia right after Kaunda's release from jail, also attended and had conversations with Kaunda. In a number of public ceremonies, Samora Machel was frequently seated at the right hand of Kaunda. (*The Guardian*, London, Oct. 25, 28, 1974)

# UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA



## KISSINGER SEEN HARDENING ON PORTUGAL

Washington this fall has been alive with reports of Kissinger's anxiety over the presence and activity of Communists in the new Portuguese Government. Miguel Acoca, a *Washington Post* reporter stationed in Lisbon, has reported in a series of articles (October 27, November 19, November 23) that Kissinger is reluctant to deal affirmatively with the Portuguese Government, that he is holding up aid to Portugal, "dragging his feet" on Azores negotiations, and requesting that the Portuguese not have access to strategic defense data of NATO. The Secretary of State is described as fearing that Portugal may be the first in a southern European progression toward Communist governments: Portugal, then Spain, then Italy, then Greece. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting which had been scheduled for November 7 and which would have been the first NPG meeting which Portugal would have attended as a member, was postponed at the request of the US. (Later the Portuguese withdrew from membership in the NPG.) According to Acoca's sources, Kissinger personally dispatched Deputy Director of the CIA, Vernon Walters, to Portugal to evaluate the situation first hand, to assess the degree of Communist activity and the likely direction Portugal would go.

One indicator of Kissinger's attitude toward Portugal is his dismissal of Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott on November 16 and his appointment of Frank Carlucci as Scott's replacement. Scott had been Ambassador to

Portugal only since December 23 of last year, so his dismissal is surprising. As there were no advance rumors about the dismissal at the State Department prior to its announcement in the press, State Department Desk Officers relating primarily to Portugal think the decision to fire Scott was made by the Secretary of State personally and reflects his dissatisfaction and/or disagreement with Ambassador Scott. Kissinger and Scott are said to disagree about the significance of Communist activity in Portugal. As described by Acoca in the November 19 *Washington Post* Scott's views are: "that despite the appointment of a Communist as minister without portfolio, the presence of Marxists among the military leadership, and leftist control of the news media, there is little chance of a Communist takeover there." Further, "He believes that the Communists are not favored by the present electoral law, and thinks they are unlikely to win control of the Constituent Assembly next March. . . (he) has recommended that the United States do nothing to capsize the provisional government and create hostile reactions among the Portuguese."

Scott's views are congruent with the State Department position as reflected by the Portugal Desk Officer, William Kelley. Kelley predicts that in the March elections the Communists will win at most only 15-20 per cent of the seats in Portugal's Constituent Assembly and will play a very minor role in the new government of Portugal which follows from the Assembly's deliberations. Judging by the similarity of views between Scott and Kelley it seems

Kissinger and the State Department "experts" on Portugal are in disagreement.

Carlucci brings a surprising diplomatic background to his new position as ambassador to a country moving toward decolonization in Africa. Of his four previous assignments as a career foreign service officer, Carlucci spent three terms in Africa: 1957-60 as Economic Officer in South Africa, 1960-62 as Political Officer in Congo-Leopoldville (now Zaire) (where he was beaten up during the anti-white reaction following Congo's independence from Belgium), and 1964-65 as Counsel in Zanzibar. At the beginning of 1965, the Tanzanian government asked that Carlucci leave, charging him with subversive activities. Press stories at the time suggested that the action might have been a symbolic expression of Tanzanian dissatisfaction with US policy on the Congo. Carlucci's last foreign assignment was Brazil, where he stayed until 1969 before moving to other departments in Washington.

On November 27, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported Carlucci's nomination. Congressman Michael Harrington testified, expressing his concern about press reports of recent US intervention (including CIA) in Portugal, and the lack of information about these apparent policy changes available to Congress. Harrington said that "with memories of [the CIA's] recent record in Chile... I give credence to the largely circumstantial evidence which has been assembled in the Portuguese case." He hoped that the Senate Committee would hold off confirmation of Carlucci until Congress was consulted about recent US policy shifts. Carlucci asked to respond to Harrington's statement, saying "To my knowledge there is no such intervention [by the CIA]. When pressed to explain further he said, "It means that I know, and that there is none." The Committee approved Carlucci's nomination in spite of Harrington's request, and sent it on to the full Senate for final action.

The Portuguese Armed Forces Movement has been dismayed by the US attitude toward their government, as evidenced by the snagged negotiations over the Azores base agreement. Since the treaty expired in February, negotiations over renewed US use of the base have been in progress. However, on November 14, Acting Portuguese Defense Minister Vitor Alves indicated that the US probably will not receive full rights to the Lajes base, and that the final treaty will probably confine US use of the Azores to NATO purposes only. Since the Azores was used by the US as a stop-off point in the resupply of Israel, the Arabs would like to see US access to the base cut off. According to several reports, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have offered Portugal oil and economic aid in return for Portugal's denying the US continued use of the base.

Portugal is also concerned about US foot-dragging on the question of economic aid. President Francisco Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Mario Soares both explored aid possibilities with Kissinger this fall in Washington, and both went home empty-handed. In contrast, the Soviets offered Portugal petroleum in exchange for various Portuguese exports.

US relations with the new government in Portugal are quite uncertain. The developing US policy toward Portugal appears strikingly reminiscent of US political

intervention and aid cut-offs to Chile, and the Portuguese are understandably concerned.

## **MORE LIBERAL CONGRESS EXPECTED IN JANUARY**

The new 1975 Congress will probably be more liberal on certain issues. The major change in the gain of 44 Democrats in the House of Representatives. The impact of this gain on southern Africa can be evaluated in part by the kinds of Republicans the Democrats will be replacing. The right-wing Republican Steering Committee, which provided a forum for Deputy Minister of Information Eschel Rhoodie to meet with sympathetic members of Congress, lost 35 of its 70 members, including its president and three of the four vice presidents. By contrast, the liberal Republican Wednesday Group lost only one member, John Dellenback, who had a strong personal interest in Africa, favoring a "dialogue" position.

Although the erosion of the conservative Republican power base in the House will weaken the pro-apartheid forces, it is equally important to consider the election fate of their leadership. On the one hand, several of the conservatives who actively support white southern Africa will remain in Washington, and some have gained additional power. California Representative Bob Wilson, who hosted a meeting for Rhoodie in October, retained his seat and will move up to be ranking Republican member of the House Armed Services Committee. Representative Edward Derwinski, who took an active role against the Rhodesian sanctions bill this year, will probably retain his seat as ranking Republican member on the Africa Subcommittee. On the other hand, several conservatives who support South Africa were defeated in November. In one of the surprise upsets of the election, Louis Wyman lost his bid for the Senate seat from New Hampshire by only ten votes. Wyman had provided contacts for South African military officials at the Pentagon, so South Africa's lobbyists will be sorry to see him go. Also, H.R. Gross will no longer be on the Foreign Affairs Committee to obstruct progressive bills on southern Africa, and Louisiana Representative John Rarick will not be in Congress to add his open racism to floor debates.

Most of the Representatives who have taken leadership against white rule in southern Africa will still be in Congress in 1975. The only loss in the House Africa Subcommittee was John Culver, who will be in the Senate next year. Among the incoming Democrats, there may be others who will be supportive of this position, for example, Harold Ford, a black representative from Memphis, Tennessee, defeated conservative Dan Kuykendall. Ford will be the seventeenth member of the Congressional Black Caucus. The strength of the southern Africa leadership in the 94th Congress is hard to measure, since no joint strategy for action has yet been decided on.

The election brought fewer changes to the Senate than to the House. The most important change for those watching southern Africa policy is the change in the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee. John Sparkman of Alabama, a consistent supporter of white-ruled Africa, will replace moderate William Fulbright. While Sparkman, at 74, is not expected to be a strong chairman, South African Foreign Minister Hildgard Muller did stop by to nurture his support in October.

Committee assignments to the House and Senate Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees will be decided by party caucuses in December. (*Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 1974)

## UNDER SECRETARY EASUM VISITS SOUTHERN AFRICA

Donald Easum, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, made a five-week trip to southern Africa in October and November of 1974. A major purpose of the trip, apart from general familiarization, appears to have been assessing the changes within southern Africa in light of the Portuguese coup and the attempt to expel South Africa from the United Nations.

Easum stressed in his meeting with African leaders that the US expects to see South Africa end its support of Rhodesia, end its occupation of Namibia, and make substantial changes in its internal policy of apartheid. He defended the US veto on the basis of South Africa's promises on these issues.

Easum appears to have been urging black leaders to normalize relations with South Africa and give her a

change to fulfill her promises of reform. According to David Ottoway of the *Washington Post*, "it appears that the US may play an important role in forthcoming diplomatic maneuvers between South Africa and black African nations." This policy of encouraging detente between the black and white states of the area seems consistent with the view of US interests recently exposed in the 1969 National Security Study Memorandum on southern Africa. In this document, the goal of US policy is seen as "balancing" US economic and strategic interests in southern Africa with its political and economic interests in black Africa. If detente is accomplished, the political price for continued, or expanded, US involvement in white-ruled Africa would decrease.

Easum was also interested in assessing the current situation in the former Portuguese colonies. He met in Mozambique with FRELIMO president Samora Machel. Easum also hoped to meet with representatives of the three liberation movements in Angola.

Easum's other stops to speak with top government leaders were Zaire, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa. (*Johannesburg Star*, Nov. 19, 1974; *Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 1974).

# at the u.n.



## SOUTH AFRICA SUSPENDED FROM CURRENT SESSION

On November 12, the General Assembly took an important vote in its continuing campaign against the racist regime of South Africa. The vast majority of the Assembly members were angry at the veto by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in the Security Council on October 30 to block the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. By a majority of 91 to 22, with 19 abstentions, the Assembly decided to uphold a ruling by its President which denied the South African delegation the right to participate in the current session of the Assembly. The ruling, which followed an earlier decision by the Assembly to reject the credentials of the South African delegation, had been requested by several African and other Third World countries. By its vote, the Assembly struck down a challenge to the ruling made by John Scali, the United States permanent representative, on the ground that "under the Charter the Assembly may not deprive a Member of any of the rights of membership." In his ruling, the President of the Assembly declared that the decision affected only South Africa's participation in the current session, leaving open the question of the status of South Africa in the United Nations, which requires a recommendation by the Security Council. Pointing out that the Assembly had rejected the credentials of the South African delegation for the past four years, he stated that "one may legitimately infer that the General Assembly would in the same way reject the credentials of any other delegation authorized by the Government of the Republic of South Africa to represent it, which is tantamount to saying in

explicit terms that the General Assembly refuses to allow the delegation of South Africa to participate in its work."

It had been widely expected that, since an Algerian was President of the General Assembly this year, there would be a ruling against South Africa. Other Presidents since the first credentials challenge against South Africa was brought in 1970 had interpreted the negative vote to mean no more than a "solemn warning" to the South African regime which, however, did not affect the right of its delegation to speak and vote in the Assembly. The South African delegation had tried to avoid bringing the issue to a head at this session by not asking to take the floor and adopting a low profile in the Assembly and its committees.

The apartheid regime responded angrily to the ouster of its delegation from the General Assembly. Prime Minister Vorster immediately recalled the South African ambassador and the other members of the delegation from New York for "urgent consultations." He also froze payment of the one million dollars that South Africa annually contributes to United Nations programs. Mr. Vorster denounced the Assembly vote as an evasion of the United Nations charter, and declared that South Africa would decide its next move "in its own time." While Mr. Vorster has, in the past, made clear that he would pull South Africa out of the United Nations if the republic's "self-respect" was threatened, recent events show that his regime still attaches considerable importance to continued membership in the world body. Following the triple veto in the Security Council in October, Mr. Vorster publicly thanked the United States, the United Kingdom and France for keeping South Africa in the United Nations,

and said that he wished to reiterate that South Africa would remain a member of the United Nations as long as it was in her interest "and at the moment, it is in our interest to be a member." (United Nations document A/PV.2281; *Africa News*, November 18, 1974; *Los Angeles Times*, November 14, 1974; *New York Times*, November 6, 1974).

The Security Council remains seized of the question of South Africa, since it was unable to adopt a resolution because of the veto. A draft resolution tabled in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on November 26, and which will probably be adopted at this session, requests the Security Council "urgently to resume consideration of the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa with a view to taking action under Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure the complete cessation by all States of the Supply of any arms, ammunition, military vehicles, spare parts thereof, and any other military equipment whatsoever to South Africa, as well as any military co-operation with South Africa."

Another draft resolution tabled in the Special Political Committee on the same day calls for the total exclusion of South Africa from participation in all international organizations and conferences under the auspices of the United Nations "so long as it continues to practice apartheid, and fails to abide by United Nations resolutions concerning Namibia and Southern Rhodesia." In the past few years, South Africa has been excluded from a number of meetings and conferences organized by United Nations specialized agencies, and the liberation movements have been admitted as participants. (United Nations documents A/SPC/L.311; A/SPC/L.314; A/9804).

#### MORE UN ACTION ON NAMIBIA PLANNED

On November 1, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (on Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories) took up the question of Namibia. Before the Committee was the annual report of the Council for Namibia, which contains several important recommendations for adoption by the Assembly at this session. The Council recommended that the Assembly recognize the national liberation movement of Namibia—the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)—as "the authentic representative of the Namibian people," and give it its support and financial assistance. The Council for Namibia has also requested the General Assembly to invite the Security Council to consider taking effective measures, in accordance with the relevant chapters of the United Nations Charter, to put an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. A third recommendation made by the Council for Namibia is that the Assembly approve the establishment in Lusaka, Zambia, of a "Namibia Institute," under the aegis of the Council, to prepare Namibians for the administration of their country after liberation from South African rule.

During its debate, the Fourth Committee heard statements by Peter Mueshahange, SWAPO's Secretary for International Relations, and John Ya Otto, SWAPO's Secretary-General. The SWAPO delegation, which has observer status in the Fourth Committee, included several Namibians who recently fled the country to escape South African repression. They told the Committee that South Africa is waging a terror campaign against SWAPO and its supporters, and that about 3,000 Namibians had recently fled the country. (UN documents A/9624 and Add.1; A/C.4/SR.2103). (see section on Namibia)

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# action news and notes



#### ECONOMIC ACTION GROUPS IN THE SOUTH COALESCE ON SOUTH AFRICA COAL ISSUE

The Southern Conference Educational Fund, an organization which has a long history of involvement in civil rights and economic issues throughout the rural and urban South, has now initiated several programs to educate and encourage action on the importation of South African "slave coal" into the United States. SCEF plans to itinerate ZANU rep. Tapson Mawere throughout the middle and deep South, and to have a "southwide" conference on the issue. SCEF is encouraging a number of groups including the African Liberation Support Committee, Black Workers Congress, Youth Organization of Black Unity, and many others with offices in the South to

join in planning a conference called for January. A planning meeting was held in Birmingham, Alabama in late November. For more information contact Ina Grupper, SCEF, 3201 West Broadway, Louisville, KY 40211. (For information on the coal issue see *Southern Africa*, June-July, October, December, 1974)

#### GULF OIL PROTESTED AT YALE

The Chairman of the Board of Gulf Oil Corporation, B.R. Dorsey, spoke before the Yale Business Forum on November 21st. His visit was protested by the Yale Black Law Students Union and the Yale Caucus for Radical Politics which sponsored a forum several days before the Dorsey speech at which Gulf's role in Angola was discussed by Paul Irish of the American Committee of



Africa. The Yale protesters leaflet focussed on Gulf and the energy crisis and Gulf's negative role and manipulative politics in Angola.

### **CHURCH GROUPS HOLD HEARINGS ON THE ROLE OF IBM IN SOUTH AFRICA**

The National Council of Churches sponsored two days of public hearings, November 20 and 21, on the role of IBM in South Africa. Representatives from more than a dozen Protestant denominations and Roman Catholic orders heard a wide variety of speakers talk about IBM's South African involvement. The hearings were established to help churches, most of which were IBM stockholders, decide what actions were appropriate in the upcoming year re IBM. In addition, the hearings served the purpose of building a substantial record of testimony on the way IBM specifically, and foreign companies generally, strengthen white minority rule in South Africa.

Two IBM Vice Presidents attended the hearings and their Director of External Relations stayed for the entire two days.

Mr. W.E. Burdick, Vice President of Personnel, spoke on behalf of IBM and answered questions.

Explaining IBM's presence in South Africa, Mr. Burdick said: "First: IBM is perfectly willing to do business where the United States Government lets us. We don't make US foreign policy. As you know, the State Department's position is that US companies should remain in South Africa, and it is encouraging businesses there to improve pay scales and working conditions.

"Second: IBM is in South Africa because it makes good business sense. IBM-South Africa is profitable, and has a potential for future growth.

"Third: IBM has found that it can provide dignified employment for all its South African employees.

"We provide opportunities for employment without regard to race, creed, or color, and we provide equal pay for equal work."

After explaining IBM's positive employment program, including "a minimum entry wage for blacks and whites alike of \$223," Mr. Burdick stated:

"These facts show that IBM-South Africa is assisting its country's blacks, and make it difficult to listen seriously to the rhetoric of those who believe IBM's withdrawal would somehow help the blacks of South Africa."

Mr. Burdick later stated:

"Another set of IBM activities which has concerned various church groups is the sale of computers to South African Government. There are some who would like IBM to decline to sell to a specific government customer.

"IBM has strictly observed the United States arms embargo and has not sold or shipped any military equipment to South Africa. IBM has sold to South Africa only standard commercial data processing products. We believe we are observing both the United Nations arms embargo and the US Government's policy."

Numerous other speakers analyzed IBM's South Africa investment from other perspectives, including, Prof. Ben Magubane, a member of the African National Congress; Mr. Valderrana, representing the UN Special Committee on Apartheid; Ms. Golar Butcher, a lawyer formerly on Congressman Diggs' Staff; Charles Powers, a professor of ethics at Yale; Norm Faramelli who spoke on the potential misuses of computers; economists Jennifer Davis and Barbara Rogers; Amb. Mustaffa Sam, representing the OAU; Betsy Landis from the office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia; Bill Cotter of the African American

Institute; and Harry Johnson of Polaroid Corporation. Questions and discussion followed each presentation.

Harry Johnson of Polaroid provided a surprising counter to IBM when he testified that Polaroid refused to do business with the South African Government. IBM had argued that it could not monitor the use of its computers in South Africa and would sell to anyone as long as the US arms embargo was not violated. A number of church panelists picked up on the difference and opposed IBM.

IBM is also providing computers for the "Book of Life", an extension of the pass book system.

Two IBM ads were inserted in the record; one arguing for the right of privacy, the other explaining how a computer could help catch a criminal. Both ads indicated the dilemma for IBM operating in South Africa. Criminals in South Africa can be defined as anyone trying to bring about social change, and the right of privacy is totally ignored for black people.

On the issue of the arms embargo, numerous panel members noted that IBM equipment was being used by the police and military for a number of functions and that this clearly undercut the spirit of the United Nations arms embargo.

Panelists also recognized that IBM was clearly reluctant to talk about any question broader than their employment practices. For instance, one-third of IBM's sales are to the South African Government. Yet, this was an area about which IBM refused to reveal any details.

One panelist commented, "Foreign investment strengthens the ability of the white minority to govern and therefore, is de facto to the detriment of the black population that seeks majority rule."

This was the first time that church groups had held open hearings on a Southern Africa issue. If it did nothing else it involved a wide variety of national church people in a serious look at IBM's role in South Africa and their responsibility as investors. By early January, they should announce what actions will come from this process.

T.S.

### **POLITICAL/EDUCATIONAL ACTION LIBERATION MOVEMENT SPEAKERS APPEAR THROUGHOUT COUNTRY**

Political Affairs Officer of the African National Congress, South Africa, Duma Nokwe, attended the United Nations Security Council debate on South Africa, and then spent several weeks touring the United States.



Duma Nokwe

He spoke in Chicago and also to a crowd of 450 at San Francisco's Glide Memorial Methodist Church. That meeting was sponsored by the Bay Area Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation. Other speakers were Angela Davis, SWAPO rep Paul Smith, author Maya Angelou, and others. Nokwe talked about the importance of the suspension of South Africa from the General Assembly, and praised the action of the United Mine Workers in boycotting South African coal. (*Daily World*, New York, Nov. 20, 1974)

Sharfudine Khan, FRELIMO representative, has spoken on a number of occasions recently in Iowa, Chicago, New York, and Austin, Texas.

### HELEN SUZMAN CONFRONTED IN NEW YORK

Demonstrators from Barnard College and Columbia University challenged the politics of Progressive Party MP from South Africa, Helen Suzman, when she made a number of appearances on campus in mid-November. Groups involved arranged a debate between ZANU spokesman, Tapson Mawere, and Ms. Suzman. The organizations, including the Revolutionary Student Brigade, Baranrd Organization of Soul Sisters, and the Barnard Women's Collective, criticized Suzman's "go slow" policy for change in South Africa and her role as a spokeswoman for the deceptive appearance of positive change within the apartheid system. (*Columbia Daily Spectator*, New York, Nov. 20, 1974) Apparently Ms. Suzman was heard saying that she received more verbal barbs and protest speaking in New York than at the University of Pretoria, an Afrikaans University in South Africa.



Photo by Pat Wada

A protestor confronts Helen Suzman

### WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN ATHLETES ATTACKED

The Black League of Afro-American Culture at Allegheny County Community College in Pittsburgh has issued a statement protesting the recruitment of two white South African track men for competition on behalf of the college at national athletic events. The League published a statement which said, in part:

"Through it's support of white South African athletes, the college is condoning the racist apartheid government

of South Africa, thereby, perpetuating a system of slavery detrimental to all Black, poor, and oppressed peoples.

"The very existence of white South African athletes at a community college is an act of non-support to oppressed Black, coloured, and Indian South Africans. We realize that such action is a direct contradiction to the human rights and values of all oppressed peoples.

"Make no mistake about the position we have taken. We have no quarrel with Robin Holland and Bruce Smith, other than that they have allowed themselves to become pawns in this institution's attempt to elevate it's oppressive policies toward Black, poor, and minority students." (*Daily World*, New York, Nov. 14, 1974)



### PETITION DRIVE TO EXPEL SA FROM THE UN CONTINUES

The National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation is trying to collect one million signers of a petition to totally expel South Africa from the United Nations. The National Black Liberation Commission of the Communist Party USA has issued a call to support this petition. The Commission has also analyzed the linkages between South African apartheid and Zionism. (*Daily World*, New York, Nov. 20, 1974)

### CONGRESS OF AFRIKAN PEOPLE HOLD RECEPTION

This year the Congress of Afrikan People held its annual reception at the Renaissance Ballroom in Harlem, a change from last year's venue at the Park Avenue Waldorf Astoria. Attended by 650 persons the reception featured speeches by Chairman A. Baraka and Somalia's Representative to the United Nations. Also included on the program were UNITA rep, S. Lukata and ZANU spokesman, D. M'Gabe. The evening's participants heard speeches on Cambodia, Puerto Rico, and Palestine as well as music and entertainment.

### CFM RAISING MONEY FOR CAMERA EQUIPMENT

The Committee for a Free Mozambique has established a FRELIMO Photographic Equipment Project to raise \$1500 for cameras and darkroom equipment which FRELIMO has requested for use by its Department of Information. "This equipment will help enable FRELIMO to continue to carry the message of the revolution and news of national development to all parts of Mozambique," according to the CFM leaflet. Send your contribution to CFM, 616 W. 116th St., Dept. SA, New York, NY 10027.

# UPDATE

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## ZIMBABWE

After more than a decade of divisions, Zimbabwe's liberation movements worked out a unity agreement in Lusaka, Zambia, in mid-December. Agreeing to unite into one organization—the African National Congress—were the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). The pact was signed by Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa, A.N.C. president, and leaders of the three other movements—all of whom designated themselves as "former presidents": Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU, Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo of ZAPU, and James Dambaza Chikerema of FROLIZI.

Their agreement promised a cease-fire in the eight-year old guerrilla war as soon as a date for a Constitutional Conference is set, and called upon black and white residents to maintain calm and to unite behind the demand for independence with majority rule.

## Ian Smith Agrees to Talks

On Wednesday, December 11—three days after the Lusaka unity agreement was reached—Ian Smith, leader of the white minority regime, announced a deal involving release of political prisoners and a cease-fire in the guerrilla war. Speaking on national radio and television, Smith said the agreement might be the first step towards a settlement, but warned that complex negotiations lie ahead.

A week later, in an interview with the BBC, Smith denied the inevitability of black rule in Rhodesia. "We have majority rule already," he said, arguing that his Rhodesian Front party had won the majority of Parliamentary seats in the last election.

African nationalists, too, have reasserted their commitment to majority rule, very soon if not immediately. Bishop Muzorewa made several statements affirming that goal but was careful to avoid direct conflict with Smith, apparently to keep the negotiation door open.

## ANGOLA

Dr. Agostinho Neto, president of the MPLA and Jonas Savimbi, president of Unita, held discussions on December 18 and agreed to cooperate in forming a Provisional Government for Angola. They agreed to stop all hostilities between their two groups and work together to unite with the third major party, the FNLA, in preparation for talks with the Portuguese authorities. An FNLA official indicated his group's willingness to join with the other two.

A major stumbling block remaining is the status of the MPLA splinter group, led by Daniel Chipenda. In early December, the MPLA Political Bureau in Luanda announced the expulsion of Chipenda and his supporters from the party. Chipenda responded by declaring all Neto's actions as MPLA leader illegal. Savimbi recognizes Neto as the MPLA leader, but Holden Roberto of FNLA has said he wants to include Chipenda's group in any

unity pact. Chipenda is based in Kinshasa and is believed to have the backing of Zaire President Mobutu. FNLA is also backed by Mobutu.

## MOZAMBIQUE

The Mozambique Provisional Government announced the arrests of several dozen residents in late-December, following a series of bomb explosions in the capital, Lourenco Marques.

## MALAWI MINERS LEAVE SOUTH AFRICA

The South African Chamber of Mines announced in December that over half the 90,000 Malawians employed in South African mines have quit their jobs and returned home. The outflow is continuing at a rate of about 1600 per week. The departures began following an April air crash in which a group of Malawi miners died on route home. Various disagreements with management and violent clashes with other miners in recent months have also influenced many men to return home.

Workers from Mozambique and Lesotho have filled some of the vacancies, but the miners are suffering a labor shortage, which is affecting production.

## CAPE VERDE

The Portuguese government has announced that the Cape Verde Islands will be given independence next July 5th. Elections for a provisional assembly will take place on June 30.

## U.S. CONTINUES SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS

Another attempt to repeal the "Byrd Amendment" died a quiet death in Congress, crowded out of a busy end-of-session agenda and harmed by a general anti-United Nations sentiment. American businesses can continue to legally import strategic minerals from white-ruled Rhodesia, since the House of Representatives never voted on the repeal measure, which passed the Senate earlier this year. Supporters of repeal felt they did not have the votes to win, and the item was removed from the House agenda on the day before Congress adjourned. The measure will now have to pass both houses in the next session if US compliance with U.N. sanctions is to be restored.

## KISSINGER TO REPLACE AFRICA OFFICIAL

After only 10 months in office, Donald Easum is being removed from the post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Secretary Kissinger, who earlier this year promised to pay more attention to Africa, apparently wanted to install a man with views more similar to his own. Although not officially confirmed at the time of this writing, highly-placed State Department officials say Easum's replacement will be Nathaniel Davis, a career foreign service officer who was American ambassador to Chile during the 1973 coup ousting President Allende. ■



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