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
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
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
# SOUTHERN AFRICA

Volume XIV Number 5  
September/October 1981

## Note to Our Readers

Loyal readers of *Southern Africa* will notice that this issue is later than usual. Unfortunately, higher costs and a shrinkage in the size of the Southern Africa Collective has brought the magazine to the point where we can no longer operate, even at our present bi-monthly schedule, on a wholly volunteer basis. If the collective is to give *Southern Africa* readers the high quality magazine we would like to deliver, a small, paid staff to augment the volunteer efforts is essential. Therefore, this will be the last issue of *Southern Africa* until 1982. In the interval, we will be concentrating on raising the funds to restore *Southern Africa* as a regular, up-to-date information source for supporters of liberation in southern Africa. Readers can help: become a sustainer of *Southern Africa*, give the magazine to a friend this holiday season, or renew your subscription today.

A luta continua,  
The Southern Africa Collective



Front Cover: Destroyed Homes in Cahama. Refugees from the recent invasion.

Credit: ANGOP

Members of the Southern Africa collective who contributed to the production of this issue: Mark Bette, David Brooks, Jim Cason, Jennifer Davis, Mary Feyljinmi, Mike Flesher, Bill Hartung, Richard Knight, Edgar Lockwood, Catharine Macdonald, Andrew Marx, Malik Reeves, Rebecca Reis, Christine Root, Mike Shuster, Stephanie Urdang, Steve Vagh, Jim Vekant.

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# update

## Mozambique Reports Sabotage Attempt

The South African-sponsored Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) organization caused serious damage to vital Mozambican port and transport facilities in and around Beira, the country's second largest city in late October and early November. According to the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM), two bridges spanning the river Pungue 50 kilometers north of Beira were damaged on October 29, while all navigational buoys in the port of Beira were blown up two weeks later.

The attack on the two bridges—one forms part of the main roadway from Beira to the Manica provincial capital of Chimoio, the other carries the railway linking Beira to Zimbabwe—was only partially successful. The Beira-Umtali oil pipeline to Zimbabwe supported by one of the bridges and considered to be the attacker's main target, was not damaged. Further, Mozambican authorities were quoted as saying, "the destruction of buoys will not completely shut down" the Beira port.

A spokesman for the FPLM, Mozambique's national army, linked the attackers to an MNR saboteur group intercepted by FPLM soldiers on October 21. Surprised while laying mines on the Beira-Umtali railroad, six of the MNR guerrillas, including three whites believed to be South African army explosives specialists, were killed. Those who fled left maps and documents pinpointing the Beira-Umtali pipeline and the Beira-Zimbabwe railroad as two of several sabotage targets in Manica province.

The recent MNR activities are particularly serious because the installations attacked are crucial not only for Mozambique's economy but for the economies of neighboring Zimbabwe and the entire 'southern nine'—the nine Black southern African nations participating in regional projects set up at the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

The eventual goal of the SADCC projects is to free these Black states from current dependence on South African transportation

facilities—roads, ports and railways—by developing and upgrading their own. Successful attacks by the MNR could seriously retard such efforts.

The MNR sabotage followed fresh charges by Maputo that South Africa continues to violate Mozambican airspace with helicopters and Hercules transport planes used in parachuting supplies to MNR forces.

The MNR, operating at its highest level in years, was recently described by an ex-South African Security police agent, Gordon Winter, as a special unit of South Africa's armed forces and not as an independent, indigenous force.

## House Vote on Clark Set For early December

In September the US Senate voted to repeal a Congressional ban on US aid to anti-government forces fighting in Angola and according to recent reports from Washington lobbyists, it now looks like the House of Representatives may follow suit in early December.

The ban on covert aid, known as the Clark Amendment, was passed in 1976 following reports to Congress that the US government had been supplying assistance to anti-government rebels both during and before the aborted 1975 South African invasion of Angola. Both the Carter administration and the Reagan administration have been pushing hard for repeal of the amendment, arguing that it impedes US's ability to carry out its foreign policy. The amendment has been retained over the last three years partly because the Congress has been unable to pass a new Foreign Aid Authorization Bill, of which Clark is a part. When Congress is unable to pass a new bill the old legislation is simply continued for the following year.

Advocates of retention of the Clark Amendment argue that repeal of the bill would be another sign that the US is intent on undermining independent Black African states. Randall Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica also points out that "lifting the ban on CIA activity in Angola would identify the United States with the apartheid South African government."

The Senate, however, was not persuaded by these arguments and on September 30, voted 66 to 29 in favor of repeal. The Senate vote came as an amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill and speaking in favor of repeal, Senator Barry Goldwater argued that "we need muscle in the President's office to act like a world power."

Advocates of retention of the prohibition on aid noted that repeal would send a signal to Africa that the US is on the side of apartheid, and that efforts to destabilize Angola would only increase Angolan Dependence on Cuban and Soviet aid.

Faced with a heavy defeat in the Senate, advocates of the Clark amendment have been lobbying hard in the House. TransAfrica lobbyist Salih Abdul Tahim told *Southern Africa* that TransAfrica has been soliciting letters of support from African diplomats in order to convince representatives of the negative effect that repeal would have on US relations with Black African nations.

Lobbyist from both TransAfrica and the Washington Office on Africa, however, note that the Clark amendment faces tough going in the House, especially as a result of the big loss in the Senate. In addition, they point out, the Clark amendment is seen as a "CIA bill" and the current mood in the Congress is in favor of loosening restrictions on the CIA.

Despite these negative indications, the House Foreign Affairs Committee did vote 19 to 5 in favor of retention of the Clark Amendment and Ken Zinn of the Washington Office notes, that strong show of support for the ban on covert aid could help the vote in the House.

With only two weeks left in which to vote on the Foreign Aid legislation some problems still remain. The chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Clement Zablocki, is lobbying very hard for some type of Foreign Aid Bill and is attempting to gain Republican support. These attempts may, according to Washington lobbyists, include some sacrifices such as repeal of Clark in order to gain Republican backing for the full bill.

As of late November it is not clear when the vote on the Foreign Assistance Bill will come up in the House, but observers believe that it is likely to come up in the first two weeks of December. Lobbyist from both TransAfrica and the Washington Office confirm, that an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill advocating repeal of Clark is sure to be introduced and they are preparing a campaign to defeat such an amendment.

"We are urging people to contact TransAfrica or the Washington Office on Africa for information about what they can do in support of the Clark amendment," Salih Abdul Rahim said. Both TransAfrica and the Washington Office have prepared specific lists of congressmen who should be contacted to urge retention of the Clark Amendment.

For further information contact: TransAfrica (202) 547-2550 or The Washington Office on Africa (202) 546-7961.

# Rugby: Springboks Get The Boot

by William I. Robinson

The Springboks, South Africa's national rugby team, have returned home. But their recently completed tour of the US and New Zealand is not likely to be forgotten.

The tour ignited unprecedented anti-apartheid protests in both countries. In New Zealand, where the tour dominated politics for months before the team arrived, tens of thousands of people from all sectors of New Zealand society actively opposed the tour. The subsequent civil unrest, the worst in recent memory, threatened the very foundations of the government of Prime Minister Robert Muldoon.


While the Springboks thrashed out ten games in New Zealand, anti-apartheid groups in the US organized the Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour (SART) coalition. SART launched and built a powerful anti-tour campaign that completely undermined the US tour. The US campaign culminated in one of the largest anti-apartheid actions in years when some 3000 people demonstrated in the pouring rain in Albany, New York on September 22, while the Springboks played their only public US game.

South Africa uses such international sporting events to soften apartheid's image abroad and to enhance South Africa's respectability.

The two "colored" members of the Springboks entourage (there were no Africans) were thrust into the spotlight at every stop the Springboks made. Over and over again they said that apartheid was changing and "progress" was being made "through sport," as evidenced in the "multiracial Springbok team."

What they did not say is that out of the thirty Springbok players, 29 are white. Errol Tobias, the one "colored" player, was only allowed on the team last year as preparations were underway for this tour. Not one of the 200,000 African rugby players in South Africa were chosen for the team. Far from making "progress," sport in South Africa is still thoroughly racist and 99 percent of all sport is segregated. In 1979 the government

*William I. Robinson recently returned from 2 1/2 years in Africa. He is a project associate at the American Committee on Africa, Projects Director of the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society (ACCESS), and a free-lance journalist.*



SART demonstrators marching in Albany.

spent 170 times more for sports facilities and events for each white person than for each Black.

The Springbok's tour of New Zealand was the first major sporting event between South Africa and New Zealand since a New Zealand rugby team tour of South Africa triggered an African boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympics.

As in the US, the anti-tour campaign in New Zealand drew widespread support from churches, unions, students, and many politicians. In May and June, before the team had landed in New Zealand, 50,000 and 75,000 people marched in two separate demonstrations against the tour. When the Springboks arrived in the country a majority of the population was opposed to the tour. And by the time the South Africans left, over 1,200 people had been arrested in what became a continuous series of

protests by tens of thousands of tour opponents.

Among the international repercussions still being felt by the New Zealand government for allowing the tour to go ahead is the country's possible expulsion from the 1982 Commonwealth Games.

The Springbok's tour of the US came as the result of an invitation from the Eastern Rugby Union (ERU) in December 1980. Just before they invited the Springboks the ERU had accepted a \$25,000 "contribution" from Louis Luyt, a well-known white South African multi-millionaire. Luyt had already been publicly exposed during South Africa's notorious "information scandal" as a secret conduit of government funds used for propaganda projects abroad including establishing a "Committee for Fairness in



Sport" to promote South Africa's international sporting links.

But the \$25,000 was not all South Africa paid for the tour. ERU president and tour organizer Tom Selfridge had also accepted a \$50,000 "gift" from the South African Rugby Board (SARB) without informing other union officials. The racially-structured SARB is the official rugby federation in South Africa uniting 22 white rugby clubs and 2 Black clubs. Although technically a private body, one rugby official described it and the South African government as "fairly synonymous."

Selfridge wrote to at least 300 US corporations asking for financial backing for the tour. In one letter to Citibank, Selfridge wrote: "your corporation will benefit from this support in the South African community" and may "either be recognized in the program [as a sponsor] or remain anonymous."

The Reagan Administration itself rolled out the welcoming mat to the South Africans when, on July 13, the State Department granted visas to the Springboks.

The handful of organizations that gave life to SART at a meeting on July 17, included the American Committee on Africa (ACO), the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society (ACCESS), the National Black United Front (NBU), the Communist Workers Party (CWP), and the People's Anti-War Mobilization (PAM). Also involved in the formation of the coalition were the three southern African liberation movements, the African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress, and South West Africa Peoples Organization, who cooperated closely with the coalition throughout the campaign.

#### Coalition Grows Rapidly

From this small start, the coalition grew rapidly into a broad-based group, winning backing from students, churches, and trade unions. At its peak, over 200 local and national Black, civil rights, anti-apartheid, religious, student, sport, and political groups were drawn into the campaign, including such groups as the NAACP, Phelps-Stokes Fund, Clergy and Laity Concerned, and a number of Black and Hispanic caucuses in state and national legislatures. Of particular significance was the unprecedented cooperation achieved among organizations with very diverse agendas and political persuasions, and the involvement of many people from the grassroots community level. Never before had the ANC, the PAC, the NAACP, and the CWP worked together in one coalition.

SART organizers attributed the success of

the coalition to a number of factors, including the fact that the Springboks brought apartheid into America's backyard.

Another factor in the success of the campaign was the large role played by Black community organizations. Black communities identified apartheid and the Springboks very closely with the upsurge of racism and the erosion of civil rights in this country.

"I've been involved in liberation support work for many years and this is the most promising upsurge of anti-apartheid activity I've ever seen," remarked New York State Supreme Court Judge William Booth at the time. Booth, who is the president of the ACO, was elected chairperson of SART.

The anti-tour campaign began with mass telegrams, letters, and phone appeals to the mayors and city councils of the three American cities and the governors for the two states in which the Springboks were scheduled to play. The coalition also applied pressure on the Reagan Administration to cancel the visas, and on the ERU to withdraw the invitation.

SART's first victory came when New York City Mayor Edward Koch was forced to withdraw the permission he had extended for the game to be played in the city's public facilities at Randall's Island. Koch, facing an election fight as mass opposition to the tour grew louder, clearly recognized the depth of community feeling, especially among Black voters.

By August the campaign had begun to gather momentum. Local and regional anti-tour coalitions were established in Chicago and Albany, SART organizers from all three cities met and discussed national coordination of the campaign. When the ERU announced that the cancelled New York City game would be shifted to Rochester, New York, local groups in that city formed a Rochester SART chapter almost overnight and began campaigning against the match. Several days later the ERU was forced to announce the cancellation of the Rochester match because of the intense public pressure in that city. Instead, the union said the match would be played in secret in "an undisclosed Northeastern city."

Through August and early September opposition to the tour grew. Demonstrations and pickets were organized in New York City, Chicago, and Albany. Just back from a visit to South Africa, a group of US congresspeople led by Congressman Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.) urged cancellation of the match, as did prominent political and elected officials, including Los Angeles Mayor Thomas Bradley and Illinois Governor James

Thompson.

Not all rugby fans supported the tour. Some strong opposition emerged in the rank and file of the rugby union. These "rugby dissidents" organized themselves into the Against South Africans Playing (ASAP). "Member clubs [within the ERU] were not consulted in the decision to invite the Springboks and we want to get the word out that this is not what the rugby community wants," said John Logan, the ASAP leader.

#### Non-Stop Protests

When the Springboks finally arrived in the US in mid-September, they were met with non-stop protests as they touched down and departed at Los Angeles, Chicago, Albany, and New York airports. Fearing protests in Chicago and denied permission to play at any public facility in the rest of Illinois by Governor Thompson, the rugby union planned the first game of the US tour for Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, and then for Evansville, Indiana. However, they were forced to cancel both locations when protesters discovered the sites and planned for mass demonstrations.

The Springboks were finally forced to sneak across the state border at dawn on September 19 to play at Racine, Wisconsin. Halfway through the game local residents of the mostly Black neighborhood discovered the players' identity and immediately organized a spontaneous demonstration.

A few days after the match, some 400 outraged residents called a town meeting to protest the match. The residents are now demanding that the local club be barred from ever playing in the city again.

One principal organizer of Chicago SART, Lisa Broehl, summed up the Midwest leg of the campaign: "They came here to play a rugby match and they were met with rejection and resistance everywhere they turned."

Action against the Springbok's US tour culminated in the September 22 rally in Albany, New York, where Mayor Erasmus Corning had announced he would allow the game to be played at a public stadium. Support for the Albany demonstration had been pouring into SART offices from a wide variety of organizations, including an endorsement, on September 16, from the head of the New York State Civil Service Employees Association. Buses were organized to transport demonstrators to Albany for the event, and every day new organizations joined the opponents of the tour.

Several days prior to the Albany match, New York Governor Hugh Carey, responding to growing SART pressure, cancelled the Albany match citing the "threat of a riot"

## SART LEAD

from protesters. The Eastern Rugby Union filed a suit against the governor's action, claiming its first amendment rights of freedom of expression had been violated. On September 21, a federal court judge in Albany issued an injunction upholding the ERU's right to play and this ruling was subsequently supported all the way to a ruling by Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall just hours before the game.

SART was quick to respond to the controversial ruling. "The heart of the issue is not 'free speech' but racial discrimination," charged Booth in New York. "Racism is illegal in the US. It is because of South Africa's constitutionalized racism in sport and society that we want them barred."

The initial cancellation of the Albany match and its uncertain status until just a few hours before the game reduced the size of the demonstration considerably. Nevertheless, the 3000 protesters who braved the pouring rain outnumbered spectators by almost ten to one.

At the same time as the Albany rally was taking place, 300 people demonstrated in front of the White House in Washington to protest the tour and the Reagan administration's complicity in it.

The Springboks were forced to play their final game—originally scheduled for September 26—in complete secrecy on September 25 on a farmer's abandoned polo field in Glenville, New York. ERU president Tom Selfridge admitted lying to the press about the date "for security reasons."

Activists in Albany also believe these ERU's financial dealings might make Selfridge an unregistered agent of a foreign country (South Africa), and are presently pushing for a Congressional investigation.

As the team departed for South Africa, the Springboks' manager described the players as "fed up" with protesters and ready to go home. One South African correspondent called the tour "the most humiliating tour in the history of South African sport," while a Johannesburg-based newspaper described it as "a nightmare."

"As ambassadors of South African racism, the Springboks were recipients of a loud and clear message: most of the American people do not want anything to do with apartheid," one SART spokesperson said.

With its mandate expired and mission accomplished, the SART coalition dissolved when the Springboks departed for South Africa. But the campaign's rippling effects are acting as a catalyst for further anti-apartheid activity. The anti-tour campaign fused together anti-apartheid coalitions in a

number of cities. In Albany, for instance, the Capital District Committee Against Apartheid (the Albany SART chapter), is scheduling a series of further planning meetings to discuss more long term solidarity work with the liberation struggles of South Africa and Namibia. Such activity vindicates the premise by sports anti-apartheid activists that the sports boycott issue is a catalytic means of pulling people into the anti-apartheid movement.

The highly visible campaign considerably raised the level of consciousness about apartheid and US involvement in southern Africa. Regarding the Springboks and their US tour as a symbol of the Reagan Administration's

pro-apartheid southern Africa policy, thousands of people became involved in the anti-tour campaign which signified the first mass-based, grassroots response in this country to the Reagan Administration's southern Africa policy.

Summing up the anti-tour campaign, ACCESS National Chairperson Richard Latchick said, "Our campaign to stop the apartheid rugby tour has been a tremendous success. We chased the Springboks and their US sponsors from city to city, instigating the cancellation of five scheduled matches. The frightened and embarrassed ERU was virtually forced underground. We ran the humiliated Springboks out of this country."

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## Growing Pressure for Land

Zimbabwe's Black farmers are becoming increasingly impatient with the slow pace of land redistribution.

*Land redistribution is the number one thing we must do as a government. Land is the deepest of all grievances.*

Robert Mugabe  
ZANU President  
Maputo 1979

by Rebecca Reiss

Salisbury—The struggle for Zimbabwean independence was fundamentally a struggle for land. Yet now, more than a year after independence, the question of land and who controls it remains the most serious problem facing the Zimbabwean people. It is a problem which Minister of Lands Sidney Sekeramayi has warned could "degenerate into a cancer relentlessly eating away at the foundations of Zimbabwe."

As a recent visitor to Zimbabwe I was able to see how complex this issue is. The country

*Rebecca Reiss is a public health worker in New York City. She has just returned from a five week visit to Zimbabwe where she was completing a study for the National Endowment for the Humanities on traditional healing.*

faces a serious dilemma involving land patterns inherited from the colonial past. Attempts to correct these patterns are severely hampered by the present constitution. One of the most restrictive constitutional clauses is the one that forces the government to compensate white landowners for under-utilized land that the government takes over. Under the former settler regime, several thousand white commercial farmers owned half the land. The remainder, designated the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL's), was composed of barely arable soil where seven million African peasants were left to eke out an inadequate subsistence. In addition, there was chronic under-utilization of up to 60 percent of the white-owned land which was held primarily for speculative purposes, often by absentee landlords.

To make matters worse, the huge amounts paid in compensation for such land now often wind up being remitted to emigrant whites abroad. The resulting hard currency outflow threatens to cause a balance of payment crisis in a country which, in the aftermath of the costly war, is still desperately short of foreign exchange.

The difficulties and constraints involved in land redistribution notwithstanding, both

ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU campaigned with the promise of "land for the people" and understandably it is what the people now expect. During the war the peasant farming sector was virtually ruined.

### Rural Areas Devastated

The "Operation Turkey" policy of the Rhodesian Security Forces (*Southern Africa*, September/October 1980) caused the widespread destruction of rural grain supplies, livestock and crops of villagers accused of helping the guerrillas. This policy of "collective punishment" resulted in the death of nearly one million cattle. Some 250,000 refugees fled to neighboring countries, and another 750,000 were forced into "protected villages" where they were kept under tight curfew and rarely, if ever, allowed to work their fields.

Schools, clinics and entire villages were arbitrarily demolished by the Security Forces. In some provinces the death rate rose as much as 37 percent in the first year after the "protected villages" were set up. Eighty percent of these deaths were from starvation.

In retaliation, infrastructures which symbolized the regime, such as council buildings and telephone lines, were destroyed by the



guerrillas. In some areas the local people resisted the Rhodesian Security Forces by plowing over the dirt roads in the TTLs, thereby making access more difficult for the army as well as symbolizing their support for the liberation forces.

Reconstruction is, therefore, a slow process. Many people have not waited for official assistance in resettlement, but have spontaneously returned to the land to start rebuilding. However, in March 1981, there were still more than 9,000 people remaining in refugee camps and reception centers in Zimbabwe. The 174 former TTLs are presently occupied by 700,000 families, including many of those who were displaced during the war and have returned. This is 2.5 times the estimated number of people that the TTLs can agriculturally support.

According to the Permanent Secretary for Land Resettlement, Robert Mupawosa, 1,400 families have been resettled on 400,000 hectares of land by the ministry since the program began in November 1980. The cost has been approximately \$2,000 to \$3,000 per family.

Of those who have been resettled, most have opted for individual farming plots rather than collective or cooperative farms. Although both ZANU and ZAPU have begun to encourage the idea of cooperatives on a limited scale, in those rural areas I visited, individual farming was by and large the most popular.

One local agricultural adviser in a ZANU-PF office in the Mtoko area said his party was encouraging cooperatives but the people were somewhat hesitant to join them. "Part of [the problem] is that people are afraid, they don't understand what cooperative farming means. We must educate them. During the election campaigns Muzorewa told people Mugabe was a communist and he would take their land away from them." The "protected villages" also serve as a bitter memory of one way in which people were forced to live together and give up their individual plots.

The Ministry of Lands does not consider the lack of enthusiasm for cooperative farming a major problem at this point. "We are delighted that people aren't rushing into collectives and cooperatives," explained Mupawosa. "This gives us the opportunity to educate people in the correct way of organizing co-ops so they can be successful."

#### Slow Progress

Mupawosa, whose program faces a number of difficulties, admitted that "we are not satisfied that things are moving so

slowly." The resettlement program has outlined priority categories of people who need to be resettled. The first are those people who were refugees outside the country, the second are those living in the TTLs who are landless and unemployed, and the third are those with too small a plot to support a family.

"Right now," Mupawosa emphasized, "we have so many people in these three categories that they have priority [over all other groups]. If all of them are settled then we might look at other categories."

One month ago the ministry began requiring applications for inclusion in the resettlement program. Registration began because in previous cases when land was bought, a flood of people would simply arrive and establish themselves. This happened, for instance, in the Nyajena area where people were told not to build permanent housing because some of them would have to move.

The lack of speed in redistributing the land has become an emotionally charged issue. One woman, in the Chilimanzi TTL between Gwelo and Fort Victoria, voiced some of the frustration felt by people in her area: "Mugabe campaigned saying 'Land for the masses.' Now it's hard to wait. You know it wasn't so long ago that our land was taken from us." She went on to explain that in 1969 when the Land Tenure Act was passed, five thousand people were pushed off their more fertile farms and onto the overcrowded Chilimanzi TTL. Three white commercial farmers took over the land, leaving some of it fallow. "We know who took our land and we

know they didn't pay for it. Now we are told we must wait until the government can buy back our stolen land. Some people just don't want to wait anymore." But wait they must. Several bus loads of squatters from this TTL who arrived to reclaim their land were turned away. Short of annulling the independence constitution, however, there is little else the government can do.

#### Squatters a Dilemma

Virtually every other day the newspapers carry articles about squatter incidents in various parts of the country. Mupawosa described it as a "politically explosive issue.... You just need a slight misinterpretation of a political speech or rally and some people think it's a *carte blanche* to move onto land." He said he could not begin to assess the number of squatters in Zimbabwe, but clearly the number is not small. One member of parliament from Manicaland claimed there were 70,000 squatters in his province alone.

An accurate calculation of the number of squatters is hindered by several different definitions of "squatters" and by those whom the government considers "legitimate" squatters. While commercial farmers may claim that people are squatting and want them evicted, Minister of Lands Sekeremayi emphasized that people who moved onto vacant farms during the war, farmworkers who took over farms abandoned by their former employers, and returning refugees who settled on under-utilized farmland because the TTLs were overcrowd-

Farmers with maize to be transported to market.



ed, were all considered "genuine and deserving illegal occupants." The Ministry of Lands has indicated that these people who moved onto land during the war and have farmed it for a number of years will be allowed to remain on those farms until alternative land is available.

Each squatter incident seems to be dealt with individually by the government, according to the circumstances involved. For example, I was told that a number of people began settling in the Umguza National Forest area and the government later turned the land over to the squatters to farm, presumably because it was already state owned property. Nevertheless, frustration can still sometimes be seen. One man accused of squatting on a commercial farm in Manicaland asked ironically: "How can these white farmers call us squatters for taking back the land that is ours? They have been squatting on our land for 99 years."

In addition to the problem of squatters, the government has had to compete with individuals (including some prominent government ministers) who are buying property for their own "self-interest." Both Sekeremayi and Prime Minister Mugabe have encouraged farmers who want to sell to offer their farms to the government first so as not to disrupt the land redistribution program and artificially inflate the price of land. I asked Mupawosa if he thought that individuals would simply stop purchasing land out of the goodness of their hearts, or whether the government was prepared to take action. "Well," he said, "if we end up in a situation where settlers are opting to sell to the private

The experience of living in "protected villages" under white minority rule has made some Black Zimbabweans skeptical of collective farming methods.

sector we will have to come out with some legislation. They will force us to do that. At this time we hope this will not be an issue."

The Zimbabwean government had hoped for international grants to help with the resettlement program. Disappointingly, most land redistribution aid has come in the form of loans. "It seems rather odd for this government to go borrowing to buy its own land," explained Mupawosa, "but we find that many governments are not keen on giving us finances for land acquisition." Countries like the United States have focused on reconstruction aid for the TTLs, suggesting that they are more interested in supporting the old colonial land structures than in contributing to a resettlement program which might significantly transform the existing dual economy.

#### No Shortage of Land

Although the government faces difficulties in financing the resettlement program, according to Mupawosa, land availability is not the critical issue at this juncture. More pressing is provision of an infrastructure to support resettlement. The government cannot simply buy up barren land and settle several hundred families on it without demarcating grazing and arable lands and providing fertilizers, cattle dipping facilities, water supplies and roads. Resources are scarce.

Although Zimbabwe received \$1.45 billion in aid as a result of the March, 1981 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), as always, aid can be a mixed blessing. A number of the donor countries have specified that they expect Zimbabwe to purchase from them the

equipment they are financing. This can be a serious problem. Mupawosa gave one example: "In Britain you can't get small, lightweight D-4 bulldozers because they only produce the much larger D-6's. Can you imagine putting a D-6 on the back of a truck going into the communal areas? It would never work." It took months to negotiate for permission to purchase D-4's from the US instead, and six to eight months longer before they actually arrived in Zimbabwe.

As can be expected, the slow pace of land resettlement has somewhat exacerbated regional tensions. In Matabeleland, for instance, a number of people voiced the concern that the pro-ZAPU province was being discriminated against by the land policy of the predominantly ZANU-led government. One reporter for the Bulawayo *Chronicle* who has written a number of articles on land resettlement told me: "Whether true or not, I don't know, but people feel like Matabeleland is being deliberately neglected by the government." He later conceded that "people in other provinces may feel the same way. When the pace of resettlement is so slow it's understandable that people feel discriminated against."

In every part of Zimbabwe I visited, I found frustrated and impatient people, eager to reclaim their land. They still remember when white settlers seized it from them and memories of the war just fought to reclaim it are fresh and bitter.

But I also found unyielding faith in and support for the Mugabe government among those same people. They are proud of their independence, proud of their sons and daughters who fought in the war, and grateful for the peace it won. The harvest has been good, and slowly, the ruined villages are being rebuilt, clinics are being reopened, and schools established where none existed before. The general conditions of life are improving and if people have complaints about the government, at least it is now their government.

In a small village near Fort Victoria, I asked an elderly woman what she thought of the government after a year of independence. She replied: "These ministers are our sons you know. They left and were educated, and sometimes they forget what it is like in the rural areas. Sometimes they come here with ideas we know won't work out. So we just say 'we'll have to re-educate them so they remember where they came from.'"

In Rhodesia, this woman's confidence in the government would have been unthinkable. I heard it voiced again and again in Zimbabwe.

# Labor Crackdown Backfires


"Between now and December 4," the man warned, "all hell may break loose." This grim prediction about the labor situation in South Africa was not uttered by a union militant. The speaker was "a prominent employer source" quoted in the *Rand Daily Mail* under the even more ominous headline, "Dec. 4: D-Day for the bosses?" His remarks reflected growing nervousness among corporations in the heavily industrialized Eastern Cape as the date on which the Ciskei is due to become an "independent homeland" draws near.

Due to peculiarities of geography and the whims of government officials who draw lines on the map dividing South Africa between white and Black, most of the African workers employed in factories around East London and King Williams Town actually live in the township of Mdantsane, located within the borders of the Ciskei. Under the white government's "separate development scheme," Ciskei's independence will strip all its "citizens" of what few rights they can now claim as citizens of South Africa. The workers of Mdantsane will thus be placed in the curious situation of migrating, daily, from one "country" to another, with no legal rights whatever in South Africa, the land of their birth.

A recent Ciskeian crackdown on union activists, coupled with South African moves to tighten labor legislation, have heightened tensions in the region to the breaking point.

Ciskei Chief Lennox Sebe and his brother, Brigadier Charles Sebe, head of the South African-trained Ciskei Central Intelligence Service, revealed their own nervousness in early September. On September 6, Ciskei police hauled 205 union activists off buses returning from a meeting and detained them under the Riotous Assemblies Act. Evidence of their crime, Charles Sebe asserted, consisted of "singing freedom songs, denouncing the present system of government, upholding a Mandela-type government and waving Black power salutes."

If the arrests were intended to stifle union opposition to Ciskei's scheduled "independence," they didn't work any better than a previous sweep in which 57 union



Faced with growing shortages of skilled labor, corporations are beginning to realize that the demands of Black workers, who constitute 80 percent of the labor force, are going to have to be dealt with.

leaders and organizers were jailed last May. Leaders of five unions representing more than 100,000 Black workers responded to the September arrests with a joint statement vowing to campaign actively against the policy of separate development and Ciskei independence.

## Business Running Scared

South African business leaders were not pleased. The nation's leading business publication, the *Financial Mail*, commented, "The many managements who fear the strengthening of bonds between Black unions have little reason to be grateful to the Ciskei government."

Nor are those many managements happy about the South African government's latest effort to amend existing labor legislation.

Reports that the new laws would tighten restrictions on unregistered unions, ban strike pay for workers engaged in "illegal" work stoppages, and bar contacts between unions and "political organizations" prompted an unprecedented Cape Town meeting attended by leaders and representatives of almost the entire independent trade union movement. At the conclusion of the August summit, delegates from 29 unions representing over 150,000 workers issued a joint statement of defiance, declaring that the "prohibition on financial support for strikers will not be obeyed."

Unions represented at the gathering covered the full spectrum of the independent labor movement—from the militant South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU), which boldly advocates involvement "beyond the shop floor to the squalid condi-



ions we live under in the locations or villages," to the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), whose organizing efforts have been focused around shop-floor issues. SAAWU has flatly rejected official registration under "draconian laws which amount to a genocide against the working class," while FOSATU unions have applied for registration on an interracial basis. But the government's proposed changes in labor law succeeded in bringing all of these unions together more successfully than any number of appeals for labor unity.

"That the meeting occurred at all was remarkable," the *Rand Daily Mail* stated, in its editorial on the August meeting. "Government attempts to allow Black unionism, but to usher Blacks into a controlled, white-created system have not been a success. The more the system has sought to control, the less it has ended up controlling."

And the less corporate executives have liked it. Demonstrating in the streets isn't their style. But if it were, many would be out there chanting, "The workers, divided, can always be defeated!" and brandishing signs proclaiming, "Defend the separation of boss and state!"

#### Unions Winning Recognition

Instead of taking to the streets, a growing number of corporations have shown their disappointment with government policy by taking to the bargaining table. Even after

Manpower Minister Fanie Botha flew to East London and urged employers to "hold out" against SAAWU, three companies—Chloride, Johnson and Johnson, and KSM Milling—turned right around and recognized the union. A few months later, Buffalo Timbers became the first South African-owned company to recognize the union, despite the government's announced intention "to act as a millstone around the neck of SAAWU to prevent the acceleration of the successes" of unregistered unions.

In addition, two garment factories informally recognized SAAWU recently, in the process ousting the conservative, TUCSA-affiliated union led by the government's favorite Black trade unionist, Lucy Mvubelo.

An even greater number of recognition agreements have been won by FOSATU-affiliated unions following a wave of labor unrest in the East Rand area. South Africa's largest industrial group, Barlow Rand Ltd., has gone on record stating that it would deal with any union—registered or unregistered—that proved it represented the work force. "There are signs," the *Rand Daily Mail* reported, "that the very development the Wiehahn Commission sought to avoid—the growth of labor relations outside official control—is beginning."

None of this proves the claim advanced by liberal apologists for US investments in South Africa that the free enterprise marketplace will ultimately erode apartheid. It does prove that corporate managers can count

Blacks already constitute over 80 percent of South Africa's work force. By the end of the century, that figure is expected to top 90 percent. Like it or not, corporations realize they are going to have to deal with the demands of Black workers. Over two hundred strikes that cost industry 175,000 person-days of labor during 1980 got that message across. And it convinced at least the more farsighted among them that they were better off "institutionalizing conflict" by recognizing a union. During a strike, explained Barlow Rand chairman Michael Rosholt, "we had to talk to someone." That view was seconded by a spokesman for South African Chloride, the first firm to recognize SAAWU: "Up to now, recognition of the union has been a stabilizing force in the plant."


#### "Americanizing" Labor Relations

For that to remain true, however, corporate managers also recognize the need to divorce labor relations from politics and economy from ideology, to nourish the perception so familiar in the US that unions negotiate wages but politics happen someplace else.

In that perspective, government intervention that drives unions together and forces them to take up political issues is hardly welcome.

When Black unions mobilized against the proposed labor law revisions, the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) chimed in with a statement that not only rejected the new controls but called for a major overhaul of the existing official system. The government eventually abandoned several of the most controversial and repressive features of its new legislation. When SAAWU suffered a series of arrests and detentions, the FCI issued another statement, calling on authorities to avoid banning and detaining union leaders, to remain neutral in disputes, leaving them to employers and workers, and to move toward a system which would allow direct factory-level bargaining. It also urged employers not to fire worker leaders during strikes.

Their reasoning had nothing to do with morality, as the industrial relations manager of a company that recently signed an agreement with the General Workers Union explained to the *Financial Mail*. "Government's interference in industrial relations must obviously be minimal," Stuart Pennington of Freight Services explained. "Unfortunately the recent spate of detentions has indicated that the regulation of relationships in industry has not been left to the private sector





# Black Labor's New Unity

In mid-August eleven independent Black trade union groupings came together to discuss the South African government's current spate of industrial relations legislation brought together at this meeting were unions that had never before agreed to sit down at the same table. For instance, the Federation of South African Trade Unions sat down with the Motor Assembly and Component Workers Union of South Africa, a union that was formed because workers felt that their FOSATU union was not representing them.

The unions that gathered for the Cape Town meeting come from diverse backgrounds and, in the past, have adopted very different tactics when dealing with the South African government's industrial conciliation machinery. For instance, a major component of the government's new labor legislation is a requirement that unions register with the state-controlled Industrial Councils. Both FOSATU and the Council of Unions of South Africa have applied for registration, the former with the provision that they be allowed to register on a multiracial basis (allowable under the law only with special permission) and the latter simply as an exclusively Black trade union. These two unions argue that registration makes bargaining with employers easier and also gives the union access to other important provisions such as automatic dues deductions from employee paychecks.

The stance of these two moderate trade unions has been actively opposed by the more radical unions such as the South African Allied Workers Union and the General Workers Union. Both SAAWU and GWU refused to register under the government's Industrial Councils because, they say, the

government's registration apparatus leads to government control of their activities. By accepting registration under the Industrial Councils, unions are in effect accepting the government's whole industrial conciliation apparatus which includes regulations about funding sources, legal and illegal strikes, and a whole series of other provisions designed to control independent trade unions.

Despite these differences, the unions agreed on a resolution rejecting the present industrial council system and recommending against registration under the industrial council system.

In another compromise, the unions agreed to send a delegation to Ciskei Chief Minister Sebe following the banings and detentions by the Ciskei bantustan "government." In the past a number of the unions present had refused to meet with Sebe on the grounds that they do not recognize the Ciskei bantustan's government.

The order of the day was unity, and a historic degree of unity was indeed achieved. We have printed below the resolutions adopted by the meeting.

The trade unions present at the meeting all agreed on the following statements and resolutions:

**Resolution—Industrial Council:** The meeting rejected the present Industrial Council system as an acceptable means of collective bargaining. The meeting recommended that unions that are not members of Industrial Councils should not enter any Industrial Council and requested that participating unions refer this back to their respective unions for endorsement. The unions agreed to support each other in the

event of any union resisting participation in the Industrial Council.

**Resolution—Ciskei:** The meeting noted the severe difficulties created for workers by the homeland authorities and in particular by the current situation in the Ciskei, where union members and officials are subjected to severe harassment and constant detentions. The meeting resolved to send a delegation to Chief Minister Sebe to express our strong displeasure at his anti-union stance, and to obtain assurances about the security of workers after so-called Ciskei independence.

**Resolution—Banning and Detentions:** The meeting resolved to continue raising the issue of banning and detention in any way possible. It warned that continuation of this practice could only worsen the already deteriorating industrial relations situation.

**Resolution—Solidarity Action:** To give effect to the resolutions of the meeting, the unions resolved to establish ad hoc solidarity committees in each region. These committees would discuss and initiate solidarity actions arising out of our cooperation.

The meeting ended, after these resolutions were passed, with a resolution to convene again by November.

The unions that attended the meeting were SAAWU; FOSATU; MACWUSA; GAWU; CCAWUS (Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA); BMWU (Black Municipal Workers Union); CUSA (Council of Unions of SA); CTMU (Cape Town Municipal Workers Union); Verbonkings A.G. Group; GAWU (General & Allied Workers Union); and GWUSA (General Workers Union of SA).

to the extent that it might have been. I might add that during the period in which the GWU leaders were detained, our industry experienced an escalation of uncertainty in the area of labor relations... the consequences of which could have been detrimental to the industry."

*Washington Star* reporter Kenneth Walker provided a vivid picture of just how explosive these "detrimental consequences" could be. He described the funeral of a worker killed during a strike. "More than 5,000 men, women and children gathered at the grave, where each joined in angry denunciations of the whites. The graveside service concluded with what was described as a 'freedom song'

thundered, in English, in unison by all in attendance:

'When the white man came, our fathers were turned to boys,  
When the white man came, our mothers were turned to whores.  
When the white man came, they brought hunger and death.  
And we will not be free, until there are no whites left.'

Even without heavy-handed government interference, however, the corporations' chances of insulating Black unions from politics seem remote. "Employers protest that they haven't the power to change South Africa's racial politics," the *Wall Street*

*Journal* reported in April. "Only the government, not employers or the unions, can change apartheid, they argue. But Barlow Rand chairman Michael Rosholt acknowledged that employers 'are dealing with Blacks who have discovered that the trade union movement is an instrument which will also give them the political pressure they have never had before.'"

In the past, notes Zwelakhe Sisulu, head of the Black journalists union, Black labor and community groups rarely worked together effectively. But times have changed. "The entire community has never been as politicized as it is now. And labor-community alliances will grow inevitably." **A.M.□**



## Separate Development: Razing Nyanga Raises Resistance

By Karen Pollens

In October they began filtering back, first by bus, then on foot, then on another bus, and then perhaps they received a ride from a passing stranger. By October 21, over 300 Black "squatters" had made the tenuous journey from the "independent" Transkei bantustan back to the Western Cape from which they had been forcibly ousted last August.

These peoples' trek between Transkei and Cape Town is part of a brutal campaign being waged on the African people of South Africa by the white minority government. The government says that jobless Black South Africans in the Cape Town area can no longer live there, and that instead they must go to their "home," the so-called independent Transkei nation. So, in August, the government shipped 2,000 jobless Blacks off

to the Transkei. But the Transkei bantustan is a country on paper only. It is not recognized by any government except South Africa, has little available land, virtually no industry and, worst of all no jobs. As a result, on arrival in the Transkei the "deported" squatters simply turn around and begin making their way back to the Western Cape, where they have lived all their lives, where their families are, and where there is at least the slim chance of a job.

For Black South Africans the problem is as old as apartheid itself: conservative estimates note that over three million people have been "relocated" in this manner. But for these particular people, trying to return to the Cape Town area, the problem began last July.

It was then that the government stepped up evictions from single men's hostels in the Black township of Nyanga. The single men's hostels are housing for male workers in the Cape Town area. But because these workers are classified as "migrants" they are not allowed to live with their families. So, for a long time, many families have been illegally living in the men's quarters.

When the government stepped up evictions at Nyanga, however, these people—mainly black women and children—were forced to move out. With nowhere to go they settled on barren tracts of land near the township and erected rough shelters out of plastic bags and sticks. Between mid-June and late-August a sort of guerrilla warfare developed between the squatters and the government. The squatters would set up shelters at night (it was mid-winter in South Africa and July was a month of record rainfall), and in the morning the police would move in and tear down the shelters.

As the battle heightened, children were sent to stay in local churches and community support was organized. People bringing pots of hot food and material for shelter could be seen traveling to the camp. Then the police would raid again and tear down the shelters. At one point, the police moved in and razed the bush and scrub trees so they couldn't be used for shelters. In late July the first batch of squatters were "deported" to the Transkei.

Then on August 11, the battle began in earnest. The squatters had succeeded in erect-

*Karen Pollens is a free lance journalist living in New York City and was an editor with Liberation News Service.*

ing about sixty strong shelters and were beginning to consolidate their hold on the camp when the police set fire to the shelters. Road blocks were set up around the camp and policemen barred all those who attempted to bring provisions to the squatters. A five-member US congressional delegation got within one hundred yards of the smoking campsite and was also turned away (see box).

The burning of the campsite, combined with the visit of the congressional delegations spurred on the protesters. Support poured in from organizations around South Africa and across the world. The French Embassy reportedly initiated a move to have the foreign diplomatic corps in South Africa formally protest the handling of the squatter camp situation, but the move was eventually squashed when the US government refused to join the protest.

### 1000 Rounded Up

Finally, on August 19, the police moved in. Almost a thousand people were rounded up and, as the first group was being loaded into vans, they began to sing hymns. Those unlucky enough to be arrested faced a long, grueling ride to the Transkei bantustan over 500 miles away.

The day after the dawn swoop on Nyanga the police sealed off the border with Transkei in the hopes of preventing any of those shipped there from returning to the Cape. But the squatters refused to be sent to the rural areas of the Transkei and instead stayed in local churches while attempting to arrange transport back to the Western Cape. And within a week, the government had stopped over 200 busses loaded with people attempting to go from the Transkei back to the Western Cape.

But the story of the Nyanga squatters is not a new one. Squatters at a camp called Crossroads, near Nyanga, have been battling with the government since 1975. In October, shortly after the Nyanga squatters began filtering back into the Western Cape, another group of squatters near Soweto was deported.

In 1979, a new government commission, the Reikert commission, was established to study what the government terms "influx control." That report found that what was needed was not total exclusion of Blacks from "white areas," but more control on the systems that control labor mobility. The report recommended heavy penalties for employers using "illegal" labor, and stricter enforcement of the pass laws.

In essence, however, the policy in 1981 remains the same as it has always been. Black

## "I Couldn't Believe My Eyes"

*Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, the first Black woman ever elected to the US House of Representatives, recently returned from an eight-day congressional study mission to the African nation. While in South Africa, she personally witnessed the burning of Black houses and children living in a squatter camp at Langa, near Cape Town. When her congressional delegation tried to get within one hundred yards of the burning camp, they were turned away. Here are her detailed words from her camp, by South African radio.*

*Shortly after her return to Washington, Southern African radio with Congresswoman Chisholm about her trip.*

By Peter Langer

"I was not prepared," the congresswoman said, "for the first head-on confrontation with oppression and discrimination in South Africa." "I was there to be a witness and a voter, but the pervasive police brutality and use of military force by the government just shocked me."

After traveling as an "honorary wife" through Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, Durban, and rural areas, back to their state, Chisholm came back "believing the unbelievable about South Africa." "In South Africa," she told Southern African, "every aspect of your life is determined by the color of your skin, and apartheid denies the individual of human rights and human dignity."

"In Langa, I saw Black women and children waiting there in the rain the day after the bulldozers had gone through their

houses, trying to protect themselves with pieces of plastic or old car wraps of tires. Because the government wanted the area white housing, they destroyed the homes of Blacks and destroyed their dignity. They were selected victims."

"By congressional government, we are continuing to see Black communities isolated, segregated, and terrorized by a government that does not care for the Black people who live in conditions of poverty. However, I cannot express my hope for an alternative policy here."

The Congresswoman said she was shocked to discover that Black people are sometimes as long as three months to get their jobs in the city. Then, at the end of the day, they face another three hour commute back home. And if they are not out of the city before sunset, they can be arrested by the police.

"It boggles my mind that South Africa is one of the richest countries in the world. We continue to go on living in the middle and falling deeper and deeper with each year. It is wrong, wrong, wrong any kind of word you choose," she added.

Chisholm said that all of the questions the congressional delegation came away with relate to the South African government's spending money and that the taking of money can't stop backward.

"That continues all across the South African society," she points out, "and government is totally dependent on a white repressive police force."

"There is nothing bad in South Africa that we wanted. And unless the people of Southern Africa is involved in the process of Black dignity, we then will not be getting anything."

*Shirley Chisholm is currently with her first Southern African radio interview, "I Couldn't Believe My Eyes," and seven appearances in Washington.*

people in South Africa should be permitted in "white areas" only when their labor is needed (and their labor is now needed in increasing numbers). The majority of Black South Africans, however, belong in their "ethnic" bantustans (regardless of whether they have ever lived there or not) and eventually most Black South Africans should become residents of the bantustans.

The pressures working against this policy are increasing. The South African economy is suffering from an increasing shortage of skilled labor, and skilled labor almost by definition cannot be migrant labor from nearby bantustans. In addition unemploy-

ment levels in the barren bantustans are making them an increasingly unviable living place for those sent there. But perhaps most significantly, squatters are becoming organized, and resistance to deportations is growing.

A recent study by Afrikaner economist Jan de Lang goes a long way towards explaining why people continue to return to the urban areas. Lang found that people in the Transkei who move to the Western Cape improve their standard of living, on average, by 230 percent. Even if they spend several months in jail, de Lang found that Blacks living outside of the bantustans still earn more than if they were living in the bantustans. □



# Banned Drug Used in South Africa



Women with children in South Africa. The government is attempting to control the growth of the Black population with a drug that has been banned in the United States.

by Pippa Gordon

"There's more and more of them every week," she said.

"Breeding like germs."

"I'm waging a running battle with them about it. Next week I'm rounding up all the women again for injections. No use giving them the pill, they just throw it away or carry it in a bag around their necks for doepa."

So speaks a character in Andre Brink's novel *Rumors of Rain*. Brink, a dissident Afrikaner novelist, writes in his book of the South African government's obsession with oppressing the Black majority. The injections referred to are the hazardous contraceptive shots, Depo-Provera.

Banned in the United States where it was first produced and currently being phased out in Zimbabwe, the contraceptive shot, Depo-Provera, is being widely used in South Africa. Since 1968 South Africa has served as a testing ground for the drug on a target population of predominantly African and "colored" women. Not satisfied with an array of laws severely restricting the freedom of the Black population, the white regime is

*Pippa Gordon was born in South Africa and has lived in the US for the past eleven years. She has been involved in Southern Africa solidarity work with the Africa Resource Center in Oakland, CA and is a family planning professional with the San Francisco Public Health Department.*

also controlling the number of Black babies born.

In a country where malnutrition and infant mortality among Blacks is extremely high, family planning with unsafe drugs is taking a high priority. The South African medical establishment is enthusiastic about Depo: "It is particularly popular as a means of fertility control among patients from lower socioeconomic groups because of its simplicity of administration. The migratory nature of some of the population groups in the Western Cape area of the country is conducive to a preference for longer-acting contraceptives," report four South African medical professionals in a study in the February 1977 issue of the *US Journal of Reproductive Medicine*.

Hence, it is popular among family planning agencies. Besides being easy to use, it lasts a long time—three to six months, depending on dosage, and agencies like the fact that patients have no input in administering it. Dr. Esther Sapire, head of the Family Planning Services at Groote Schuur Hospital, Cape Town, says she favors the drug because of its "reliability" and "convenience" and adds: "In practice, Depo-Provera is more effective than oral contraceptives because of the absence of patient involvement."

Family planning programs have particularly strong political overtones in South

Africa. The government and leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church continually implore whites to increase the size of their families, hoping to reverse the trend of a declining percentage of whites to Blacks. The *South Africa Medical Journal* ran an article in the February 1981 edition entitled, "More White Babies—What Hopes?" and one churchman expressed his fear that "the Afrikaner nation could disappear if the birth rate among whites continues to decrease."

While Dr. Nthato Motlana, leader of the Soweto Committee of Ten, recently told a *Southern Africa* contact that there was a need for family planning programs, he charged that Depo-Provera, an unsafe drug, is being dumped on the Third World. "The example of Thalidomide," he cautioned, "ought to be a warning to us." He went on to ask, "if Depo is so wonderful, how come the country of its origin has banned its usage?"

## Banned in the US

Depo-Provera was banned for use as a contraceptive by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1978. The drug was ruled unsafe because animal studies had linked it with cancer of the uterine lining, breast cancer, and with birth defects. Britain's Committee on the Safety of Medicines has also severely restricted the use of Depo. Most recently, Prime Minister Robert



Mugabe's government in Zimbabwe has decided to phase out the previous regime's widespread use of Depo because it considers the drug "not fully safe."

Prohibited from selling the drug in the United States, UpJohn, the manufacturer, markets it through its subsidiaries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. One such subsidiary is based in South Africa. Despite the raging controversy surrounding the "risks" and "benefits" of this progesterone-based drug, UpJohn South Africa is marketing the drug aggressively. The company's medical director in South Africa, Dr. D.A.M. Zeeman, asserts: "The quality of life is improved [by Depo]. It takes a lot of stress and responsibility off the woman. The risks involved when embarking on a normal pregnancy is 400 times greater than those of contraceptives."

While the most feared risk, the possible carcinogenic effects of the drug, will not be known for many years (carcinogens can take twenty years to manifest themselves) an array of health problems has also been cause for concern. Amenorrhea (the loss of menstrual periods), severe headaches, weight gain, loss of sexual desire, and the more serious effect of the drug's suppression of the immune system, making users more susceptible to other diseases, occur frequently. Dr. Motlana cited cases where patients of his had gone without their menstrual periods for two years after receiving just one shot of Depo. In cases such as these, other estrogen based medications are often prescribed to restart the cycle, exposing the woman to further health risks.

Because of the problems associated with the drug, patients are meant to give "informed consent" before using Depo. Dr. Elin Hammar, chairman of the Family Planning Association of South Africa (a group which is funded by government monies and the International Planned Parenthood Federation), states their policy is: "to explain the different types [of contraceptives] and let women (and their men, who are also welcome) decide for themselves what they feel is best suited for them..."

In practice, however, informed consent is infrequently obtained. Dr. Motlana charges that "not only don't people in family planning try to obtain informed consent, it is often given at the first post-natal visit."

The drug is commonly administered following childbirth when the woman is highly motivated to use contraception and when she is in need of post-natal services. Another

often-stated reason for administering it at this time is because of its "favorable effect on lactation." While Depo might not effect the volume of the mother's milk supply, babies suckled by mothers using the drug could suffer harmful effects. Depo can interfere with properties in the breast milk which in turn may interfere with the production of anti-bodies in the baby. Anti-bodies in normal breast milk protect an infant from diseases such as diarrhea and cholera. Even the proponents of Depo express doubts about its safety for breast-feeding mothers. UpJohn's Zeeman admitted that possible long-term effects on breast-fed infants have not been ruled out.

The long delay in the return to fertility that has been experienced by some women using Depo makes the drug particularly unsatisfactory for women who have not completed their families. A white nurse-midwife in South Africa who favors Depo told *Southern Africa* that "it is given only to women who have completed their families and to those not wanting to be sterilized." While her view expresses desirable practice such caution is not always exercised.

The study in the 1977 issue of the *Journal of Reproductive Medicine* involved 19,875 women in the Western Cape who were given three and six month doses of Depo. The ages of these women ranged from 17 to 49 years, an age range which would include women wishing to have children. "It might also be administered to young Black girls at boarding school," the nurse-midwife admitted. "Some young girls who go to boarding school have their birth control pills confiscated, become sexually involved or are seduced by the teachers, become pregnant and are unable to finish school. In cases such as this it might be warranted to give Depo," she explained and cited such a practice by the district surgeon in Ladysmith, a town in South Africa's Natal Province.

It is not unheard of for Depo to be administered to pregnant women, causing potential birth defects such as heart damage and masculinization of the female baby. Hammar could not rule out such a possibility, but he claimed "the only pregnant women who would get a small dose now would be those who lied to us and hoped that a Depo injection would produce an abortion."

#### Only Contraceptive Offered

The London-based International Contraception, Abortion and Sterilization Cam-

paign (ICASC) has made strong charges about the misuse of Depo in South Africa. In their May 1980 newsletter, their source in South Africa who had interviewed women in the Cape using Depo wrote the following: "For many women it is the only contraceptive offered to them. No follow-up appears to be being done on complaints of side effects. Very few women are aware of the link between the drug and the medical complaints that it brings."

Four case histories from women interviewed are cited: a Black woman aged 26 with four children who is a domestic worker and literate; a white 28-year-old student who is a single mother with one child; a "colored" 27-year-old single woman with two children who works as a bookkeeper; and a 29-year-old "colored" woman with three children who was married and worked as a machinist.

All four of these women had suffered side effects from Depo. In the case of the Black woman, Depo was ineffective in preventing pregnancy. After the birth of her daughter in 1979 she was sterilized. The white woman was offered Depo immediately following the birth of her baby in 1976. She refused the shot. The "colored" woman had Depo following the birth of her second child in 1978. After receiving the shot she did not menstruate, had changes in skin pigmentation, and became irritable and upset.

The case of the fourth woman is reported as follows: "Offered Depo-Provera after birth of third child in 1975. Complained of bloated feeling, enormous weight gain and no menstrual periods. Was told by clinic that she would 'get used to it.' Physical condition deteriorated, experienced severe headaches and continuing weight increase. Clinic told her not to worry and that there was no necessity to see a doctor. Complained of severe abdominal pains at work one morning, hemorrhaged severely and died ten minutes later. The clinic denied any link with Depo-Provera and no investigation was carried out. Cause of death—Unknown."

Clearly many Black women in South Africa are suffering from the consequences of a hazardous drug being administered with the backing of the white minority regime. Programs offering methods of family planning and child spacing are needed by South African women, but the kinds of programs needed are those where the women have access to a choice of methods that they can use safely and with full understanding and consent. □

# The Reagan Disaster

—an interview with Desmond Tutu

*Over the past several years, nobody inside South Africa has been a more vocal, or visible, opponent of the white minority government's racial policies than Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu. As Secretary-General of the South African Council of Churches, Tutu has called for an immediate end to the apartheid system, and endorsed the use of international economic and political pressure to help bring that about.*

*For his trouble, Tutu was detained without trial on one occasion, and has had his passport confiscated twice, most recently after a March visit to the United States.*

*In August, Corbin Seavers, a visiting anti-apartheid activist from Berea College, Kentucky, asked Tutu to comment on current political developments. We have printed below some excerpts from that interview.*

by Corbin Seavers

**The Reagan Administration advocates the necessity to establish closer ties with South Africa in order to prevent Soviet expansionism and to protect vital strategic minerals; what is your response to that position and Reagan's overall foreign policy towards Namibia and South Africa?**

In the view of most of us Blacks in South Africa, the Reagan administration can be said to be nothing short of a disaster. If South Africa is of strategic importance now and has strategic minerals, that strategic importance is not going to change when there is fundamental change and genuine democratic rule in South Africa. Those strategic minerals belong to all the people of South Africa, not just the whites. When change comes we will be able to decide with whom we are going to do business.

Now we Blacks are appalled that the leader of the so-called "free world" is hobnobbing with those whom we consider to be

*Corbin Seavers is student body president at Berea College, Kentucky and was a founding member of Students United Against Apartheid, a local anti-apartheid group. Last summer he traveled in southern Africa and stayed, for part of the summer, with the Tutu family.*

the perpetrators of the most vicious system since Nazism. Now it may be that our people are going to say that if this is the case, if clearly blood is thicker than water, then Blacks are going to decide that there is really not hope of peaceful change in South Africa. And that the only thing left is the armed struggle. Since it is unlikely that the West will supply the insurgents with weapons, they will go to the East. Reagan's policy that is intended to put a halt to "Soviet expansionism" is actually handing the Blacks to the Communist bloc on a silver platter.

It is because of this strange policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa that the Geneva talks on the Namibia settlement were scuttled by South Africa. They were scuttled as soon as they knew that a more sympathetic occupant had entered the White House. While South Africa is quibbling about United Nations "bias"—people are dying. South Africa is scared of free elections in Namibia. They know that SWAPO will win in a free election.

This is why many Blacks are refusing to meet with American representatives. For instance, until the Reagan administration was elected, your diplomatic representatives in this country could attend emotional gatherings like the June 16 commemorations [of the Soweto uprising]. They wouldn't be able to do so now.

If Reagan has made concessions in the sense of being less hostile to South Africa publicly, we don't seem to see what he has got from South Africa in exchange. Nothing! Because if anything has happened, this South African government has become even more conservative than previous governments. The prime minister who promised so much in his rhetoric about reform, is now saying that his policy means white domination. Now that is naked racism and the responsibility for this is to be placed, to a very large extent, at the door of the Reagan administration.

**Does Frank Sinatra's and Cher Bono's visit to BophuthaTswana hold any significance for the anti-apartheid struggle?**

This is an example again of those people who say that whatever they are doing and

politics don't mix. It may be a sportsman who says, "No, I am just a sportsman. I am not interested in politics." In this instance it is musicians or actors who say that what they are doing has no bearing on politics. They know that is not true. They realize when they come here just how much the white South Africans regard their coming as a kind of victory for them. Because in other spheres they are being shunned. There is this boycott and this move to isolate South Africa in order to peacefully persuade the government to negotiate fundamental change.

It has nothing to do with whether they understand politics or not. These people understand politics perfectly well. They are GREEDY! They realize that because South Africa is so hungry to get famous names, Pretoria is prepared to pay more than what these artists would command even in their own countries. And you will note that when Sinatra was here, the government was really boasting.

And therefore one would want to urge that we are looking for peaceful ways—peaceful ways! We are trying to find peaceful ways to persuade this government that it must go to the conference table. And sports, and cultural boycotts are very important in that they may make people realize the error of their ways.

**The P.W. Botha government has made strides towards the development of a Black middle class. Isn't that development, and the desegregation of certain public facilities, a sign of apartheid's gradual erosion?**

Nonsense. Absolute and unmitigated nonsense. What does it do to the life of the people in ghettos who have to travel on inadequate transport, people who receive low salaries, live in matchbox type houses? What does it do for them to remove a few discriminatory signs from park benches, library doors and so forth? That is a cosmetic approach to our problems, tinkering with the system, touching the periphery and leaving the heart of it. Because the heart of it is ultimately political power. And the government has made it clear this is something they are not prepared to negotiate. □

# Ronald Reagan: South Africa's Great White Hope Delivers

Never have so many waited so anxiously and so long for so little. That about sums up the long-awaited unveiling of constitutional "principles" put forward by the United States as a major breakthrough in the deadlocked negotiations over independence for Namibia.

In late October, the five member Western "contact group" embarked on a fresh round of discussions with South Africa, SWAPO, and the front line states in an attempt to revitalize diplomatic efforts for a settlement. The US proposals, said to form the basis of the renewed initiative and carefully kept under wraps for months, were formally presented at a meeting with the South African-backed Namibian internal parties in Windhoek on October 26.


The two part document calls for the formation of a Western style parliamentary democracy, closely modeled on the US constitution and the universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Under the plan, a constituent assembly would "be elected so as to ensure fair representation...to different political groups" in Namibia. This assembly would then draw up a constitution which would become law by a two-thirds vote of the full assembly.

The rest of the US proposals detail the establishment of Namibia with an elected government composed of executive, legislative, and judicial branches, a bill of individual rights (including the right to private property), and an end to racially discriminatory laws.

The most troublesome clause in the proposals appears to be the part which requires "fair representation in the legislature to different political groups representing the people of Namibia, for example, by proportional representation, or by appropriate determination of constituencies, or by a combination of both."

The proposals for "fair representation" appear to be a sop to the South Africans and to the Pretoria-backed internal parties in Namibia. The vagueness of this wording leaves open the possibility of diluting a "one-man, one-vote" electoral system to provide what Pretoria has termed "guarantees for ethnic minorities." The crux of the problem



Destroyed homes in N'giva, Angola. The United States vetoed a United Nations condemnation of the South African invasion.

is that both South Africa and the West fear SWAPO would win most, if not all, of the seats in any government based on genuinely representative elections (a fear only enhanced by a secret 1979 South African poll that found SWAPO could easily win free elections in Namibia).

## No Breakthrough

The obstacle to Namibian independence, however, has never been rooted in constitutional details, but in South African objections to a SWAPO government on its border. In a press statement following the release of the proposals, SWAPO pointed out "that a mere stipulation of a set of principles, which in themselves do not necessarily guarantee racist South Africa's commitment to sign a ceasefire agreement or her unconditional acceptance of a definite deadline for Namibia's independence, does not constitute a breakthrough. Far from it!"

The Western nations proposed a settle-

ment in Namibia along a framework that later became embodied in UN resolution 435. SWAPO accepted resolution 435 in 1978 when it was proposed, but the South Africans have proposed an almost continual stream of objections to this framework and, at each stage when a settlement looms, Pretoria raises new objections.

Yet in the almost four years since 435 was tabled, the South Africans themselves have never raised the question of a constitution as an objection. The constitution only became an issue after Reagan's administration made it one following bitter African criticism of the Western veto of mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

At best, the Western initiative may be able, by gaining agreement on the relatively peripheral issue of constitutional principles, to give enough forward momentum to the negotiations so that if any major party pulled out of the negotiations they would appear to be

*continued on page 27*

## Washington Notes

**Reagan Administration Begins Training South African Coast Guard . . .** Without fanfare, the Reagan administration quietly signed an agreement this summer to train officers of the South African Coast Guard.

The first two South African officers involved in the training program arrived in the United States in August. A State Department spokesman insisted that the Coast Guard is a "civilian" body, and that the training program is being run through the South African Ministry of Transportation, not Defense. But, he conceded, the US interest in the program is strategic, since the South African Coast Guard helps to protect the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope.

The Reagan administration has not revealed the over-all size or scope of the training program.

**Department of Energy Enriches Nuclear Fuel for South Africa . . .** The US Department of Energy (DoE) has enriched 360,000 kilograms of South African "feed" uranium at an Oak Ridge, Tennessee gaseous diffusion plant. The feed uranium, enriched to approximately 2.6 percent uranium 235, ultimately produced 80,000 kilograms of usable ore, and is now in storage awaiting an export license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Under the terms of a 1974 contract between the DoE and the South African Electricity Supply Commission, the US has agreed to enrich the uranium for use in South Africa's Koeberg reactor. But the reactor, which is scheduled to begin operating in December 1982, may never get the enriched uranium because of a 1978 law enacted under the Carter administration. According to the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the US cannot ship enriched uranium to any country that does not have "full scope safeguards" in all of its nuclear facilities.

According to a spokesperson from the State Department, full scope safeguards entail a specific set of procedures regarding the treatment and inspection of nuclear material, procedures which the South Africans do not follow. In addition, according to the State Department, specific regulations regarding

exports to South Africa stipulate that South Africa would have to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to receive uranium. To date South Africa has refused to do so.

The State Department representative ruled out the possibility that an export license for the uranium would be granted, saying, "They do not meet the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and thus cannot be granted an export license."

Nevertheless, according to the trade publication *Nucleonics Week*, South Africa is going ahead with its part of the long-standing \$24 million enrichment contract because "it wants to maintain a reputation as a reliable contract participant." If South Africa isn't given an export license, it will have to pay the Department of Energy to continue to store the enriched uranium in Ohio, or perhaps try to sell it.

Despite the Reagan administration's recent moves to loosen export controls and expand military cooperation with South Africa, the administration seems hesitant to provide South Africa with enriched nuclear fuel. Particularly after the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility, international nuclear cooperation is a very controversial policy issue. This is especially true regarding South Africa, since Pretoria continues to refuse to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus to commit itself not to divert nuclear material to military purposes.

If the Reagan administration does decide to grant South Africa an export license for the enriched uranium, South Africa will still have to fabricate the enriched material into the fuel rods that can be loaded into a com-

mercial reactor. South Africa does not have the capacity to manufacture the rods and will have to convince some other country, probably either the French or the Americans, to fabricate the fuel rods for them.

**Reagan Loosens South African Export Controls . . .** The Reagan administration decided in June to ease Commerce Department export restrictions on the sale of medical equipment and supplies to the South African military or police on a case-by-case basis, even if they are intended for military use. The Commerce Department will also permit sales of such equipment as metal detectors to prevent interference with civil aviation on a case-by-case basis, as part of the new emphasis on combatting international terrorism.

Other export controls on South Africa, including non-medical sales to the military and police, sales of computers to other government agencies, and some aircraft sales, will be up for review before the end of the year. The Congress requires that all "foreign policy export controls" be renewed at the beginning of each calendar year, and the Reagan team will probably use that occasion to further expand US links with the South African government.

**WASHINGTON NOTES** this month was prepared by the Washington Office on Africa, a lobbying group on Africa issues which publishes a newsletter and occasional legislative alerts that can be obtained for an annual contribution of \$5.00. Address correspondence to Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

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## Angola Invasion: South Africa Builds Its Buffer

Cahama medical center, destroyed by South African bombs during the recent invasion.

*"We do not attack civilians, we avoid the MPLA whenever possible, and we are not destroying the infrastructure of southern Angola."*

Maj. Gen. Charles Lloyd, Commander  
South West African Territory Force  
August 10, 1981

It was the single largest South African military operation since World War II. On August 24, three columns of South African and mercenary soldiers, each spearheaded by 32 tanks and dozens of other armored vehicles left their bases in occupied northern Namibia and plunged deep into southern Angola.

But Angola is no stranger to aggression. Gaining its independence in 1975 after a decade of armed struggle against the Portuguese, the victorious MPLA was attacked by combined CIA mercenary and South African army force latter that year. The South Africans drove within miles of the

Angolan capital of Luanda before being repulsed by Cuban troops called in by the Angolan government.

### Six Year War


Since then, southern Angola has been the battlefield for an unconventional war pitting South African army units occupying neighboring northern Namibia, and their anti-government Angolan guerrilla clients, UNITA, against the Namibia liberation movement SWAPO, operations from Angolan territory, and the Angolan army, FAPLA.

Unlike previous South African incursions

*"They have killed Angolan soldiers and villagers—more than 400 by their own count—occupied six towns, bombed villages into the dust, rocketed cattle lorries and refugees. The director of Agostinho Neto hospital, Dr. Felipe Maluba said that ambulances and medical centers had been attacked. I saw the remains of some of Cahama. 'To bomb civilians is an odious act,' he said, 'To bomb a medical post—I can't forgive it.'"*

Peter Davies, London *Guardian*  
war correspondent,  
Luanda, Angola, September 8, 1981

into Angola, however, the later August invasion, codenamed "Operation Protea," directly targeted the well defended and densely populated Angolan towns along the single paved road linking southern Angola with the rest of the country. Predictably, and perhaps intentionally, this resulted in a huge increase in the number of civilian deaths and destruction. And for the first time since the 1975 war South African forces, employing all the tactics of conventional modern warfare—saturation aerial bombing, massed tank assaults, and concentrated artillery barrages—clashed with main force units of the Angolan army, themselves positioned in



strong defensive fortifications and armed with heavy weapons.

The invaders first converged on the Angolan town of Xangongo, situated near the Cunene river bridge on the strategic southern highway. The day before, Western supplied aircraft of the South African Air Force, British Buccaneer bombers, French Mirage jet fighters, and Italian Impalas, had pounded Angolan radar and anti-aircraft missile defenses further north at Cahama and Chibemba, destroying both towns, and leaving 3,000 people homeless.

The advancing South African ground forces encountered fierce resistance from FAPLA units at Xangongo. The battle lasted through the August 24, and the Angolans withdrew only after intense bombardment from US supplied 155mm artillery and South African aircraft. The South Africans had already seized Humbe, north of Xangongo, and the Cunene river bridge cutting Xangongo off from supplies and reinforcements.

After consolidating their hold on Xangongo, the South Africans turned south along the highway for an assault on the provincial capital of N'giva on August 27. Again preceded by intense aerial and artillery bombardment, 6,000 troops spearheaded by an

armored brigade advanced on N'giva while smaller South African units attacked from the south and northwest. FAPLA stood its ground, repelling repeated ground attacks and downing three South African aircraft before exhausting its stores of ammunition and retreating under cover of darkness.

In Luanda, the MPLA government canceled all leaves for military personnel and issued an appeal for Western intercession with South Africa to halt the invasion. South African officials, meanwhile, denied that any large scale military operation was underway in Angola. On August 26, the day before the assault on N'giva, South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha described Angolan and Reuters reports of South African aggression as "grossly exaggerated," a position supported by the US State Department, which officially advised US journalists to view the invasion reports "with caution."

South Africa received further US encouragement when the United States refused to join France and West Germany in condemning the invasion, arguing instead that the attack had to be seen "in the context" of SWAPO guerrilla activity in Namibia and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

Assured of US support, the South Africans, by now 11,000 strong, consolidated

their hold on over 15,000 square miles of Angolan territory, eliminating pockets of Angolan resistance in the towns, and using their air power to attack all road traffic in the region. Most air strikes came along the highway linking the Angolan stronghold of Lubango with the combat zone, including many attacks on fleeing refugees and plainly marked ambulances. In one such incident, South African jets attacked two buses carrying patients to a mission hospital in Chiulo, killing 28 people.

On August 28, the South African Defense Ministry announced the end of its "limited mission" in Angola and the beginning of a withdrawal, a claim hotly disputed by Angola. The next day, South African troops headed north, over the Cunene river in a drive for the devastated town of Cahama.

The attack on Cahama was to be the decisive battle of the invasion. The Angolans took up positions ten miles south of the city, backed by heavy artillery and supplied with ample quantities of ammunition. The fighting raged for days see-sawing back and forth around the battered town. But Cahama's defenders held firm, and the South African drive north was finally halted.

Another strategic town, however, Washington, D.C., fell without a fight. Ronald

Reagan's top Africa advisor, Chester Crocker, issued a major statement of support for South Africa during a speech on US policy in Honolulu on August 29.

Crocker blamed "the Soviet Union and its clients," i.e. the Angolan government, Cuba, and SWAPO, for fomenting regional violence and instability.

Even as he spoke, however, South African troops were operating 100 miles inside Angola, and had been for a week.

Two days later, the United States became the only country to veto a United Nations Security Council condemnation of the South African invasion. The American veto confounded the Western Allies whom, except for the British abstention, voted for the condemnation. The Africa group at the UN was outraged, but Pretoria was delighted.

On September 1, South Africa announced that its troops had killed several Soviet military advisors and civilians during the attack on N'giva, and captured at least one other Soviet citizen. The prisoner, Sergeant-Major Nicolai Pestrotsov, was paraded before Western journalists in an effort to prove South African claims of Soviet involvement in the fighting, on behalf of SWAPO.

But the South African announcement stirred little excitement in Washington or Europe. Most observers expressed no surprise that Soviet military personnel, who are openly training Angolan army troops, had been caught up in the sudden invasion. South Africa can easily find a Russian somewhere... as apparent proof that the Russians are involved," said one diplomat disdainfully.

South Africa suffered another propaganda defeat when their aircraft attacked a party of Western journalists en route to the combat zone in early September. "Pretoria's claim that Western correspondents were attacked by jets because they were accompanied by SWAPO is simply not true," wrote British *Guardian* correspondent Nick Davies. "Our escort was entirely composed of regular Angolan soldiers."

South Africa's claim to target only SWAPO bases was also disputed by Quentin Peel, Africa editor for the London *Financial Times*. "Nor was there any sign of SWAPO... against whose bases the South Africans claim they are acting," wrote Peel. "This whole South African operation seems more to have been aimed more at FAPLA, with its radar sites and anti-aircraft guns than at SWAPO. All the men we met in the road were Portuguese-speaking, none speaking English or Afrikaans as one might expect of Namibians."

*continued on page 27*

## Chronology of Aggression

**July 30**—A mixed force of South African troops and foreign mercenaries invade Angola from bases in northern Namibia. Backed by armored vehicles and aircraft, the invaders establish a base at Mulamba, 25 miles inside Angola and occupy seven towns north and east of the provincial capital of N'giva. South Africa denies invasion.

**August 6**—Angola issues an appeal to Britain, France, and West Germany to press for South Africa's withdrawal. The Angolans announce they may request outside military assistance to repel the aggressors.

**August 10**—The South Africans announce that newly installed Angolan radar and anti-aircraft defenses are hampering air raids into Angola. South African commander General Charles Lloyd predicts, "We will unavoidably have to cross swords" with Angolan army units defending southern Angola. Lloyd denies Angolan reports of an imminent invasion.

**August 19**—South African troops, posing as members of UNITA, clash with Angolan forces near Xangongo. Angolans recover the body of a slain white South African soldier disguised with black paint. South African air strikes escalate.

**August 23**—The South African air force bombs all Angolan air defense installations in southern Angola, establishing control of Angolan airspace.

**August 24**—South Africa launches "Operation Protea" into Angola. Three columns of South African soldiers, spearheaded by 32 tanks and 82 armored vehicles converge on the Angolan army base at Xangongo along the strategic southern highway. Further north, Cahanda and Chibemba are pounded by air. South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan denies an invasion is taking place.

**August 25**—South Africans occupy Xangongo and Carequero after bitter fighting, and take a strategic bridge over the Cunene river. The two day battle marks the first clash between conventional armed forces of the two countries since 1975. Angola cancels all military leaves and orders all troops to report for duty.

**August 26**—Britain, France and West Germany condemn South African invasion. Angolan defenders halt South African advance at Cahama.

**August 27**—Heavy fighting continues along the southern front. The southern Angolan stronghold of N'giva is an oil from regular reinforcements and subjected to industrial bombardment. The United States refuses to condemn the South African aggression. Angola demands action by the United Nations Security Council against South Africa.

**August 28**—South Africa announces the withdrawal of its forces. Angola denies the South African claim, and announces the fall of N'giva.

**August 31**—US vetoes Security Council resolution condemning South African invasion following Crocker's statement. "We will not denounce South Africa if such favor elsewhere."

**September 1**—South Africa announces the capture of a Soviet technician, and the deaths of four others, including two women.

**September 2**—A new South African force invades Angola from Namibia, driving east towards Namibia. Observers speculate that the new invasion is designed to reassemble scattered UNITA bands in the desolate central highlands. Angola puts the total number of South African soldiers in Angola at 11,000.

**September 6**—A British reconnaissance plane with an Angolan army crew is attacked by South African fighters near Cahama. It firing one journalist and two Angolans. The journalists report the South African attack is aimed at Angola, not SWAPO. In South Africa denied. Angola puts the death toll at 700.

**September 12**—The British press reports that resupplied "UNITA" units are moving west to replace withdrawing South African regular forces in southern Angola. It is the development which confirms African fears of a South African created buffer zone along the southern border.

**September 15**—South Africa announces the end of "Operation Protea," and announces the capture of 4,000 tons of war material and the deaths of 1,000 Angolans and Namibians. But the South African Chief of Staff Janabe Geldenhuys admits the invasion failed to destroy SWAPO and predicted continued guerrilla attacks by the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO. M.F.

# Angolan Condemns Invasion, Supports SWAPO

The late August United States veto of a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's invasion of Angola clearly shows that "the US supports South Africa," an official with the Angolan Department of Foreign Affairs told *Southern Africa*. Pedro Mungo, who visited the United States in early October to represent the MPLA/Workers Party at the Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa, went on to explain that "All of the [Western] five condemned the South African invasion, except the US. This shows that the US supports South Africa in its policies against the People's Republic of Angola and also in its occupation of Namibia."

From the Angolan's point of view, the Reagan administration's policy in southern Africa is simply further compounding a long history of bad relations between the two countries. The Reagan administration has successfully pushed for the repeal of the Clark Amendment in the Senate, continues its refusal to recognize the Angolan government and, according to a Portuguese newspaper report quoted in *Africa News*, the US is now backing anti-government guerrillas in Angola's oil-rich Cabinda province (a report which one state department source called "Soviet disinformation"). Reagan administration officials have also repeatedly denounced the presence of Cuban and Soviet personnel in Angola as a "destabilizing" force in southern Africa.

The Angolans see these moves, particularly administration efforts to repeal the Clark Amendment, as gestures of American hostility towards their country. In addition, Mungo noted that while the Cubans and Soviets are in Angola at the request of the people's government, South African troops are illegally occupying Namibia against the expressed wishes of the people of Namibia. Asked specifically about the presence of Cubans in Angola, Mungo said, "they help teach our

children, help build our hospitals, and give doctors for our people. Angola is a sovereign nation. We have Scandinavians, French, Portuguese, and British people here. Are they colonialist?"

## Want Diplomatic Relations

Angolan anger over US policy notwithstanding, Mungo was quick to point out that his country would like more cordial relations with the US, beginning with the establishment of diplomatic relations. Turning to the Reagan administration, Mungo said, "If he [Reagan] has respect for our land, and [for] non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of our country we would like to stabilize relations."

The MPLA representative did charge that South Africa used military equipment manufactured in the US during its recent invasion of Angola and that the US provides support for UNITA. And the Angolans clearly feel bitter about the US refusal to condemn the invasion that, by their own count, left over 160,000 people homeless and 1,000 people dead.

Asked to comment about the invasion, Mungo disputed South African assertions that their troops attacked only SWAPO targets. "In the south of Angola," he said, "the schools are destroyed, hospitals and factories are destroyed, and bridges are destroyed. Is it true that SWAPO is in the schools where children are learning how to write, how to read? Is it true that SWAPO is in the hospitals?"

## Attack Aimed at Angola

According to Mungo, the main reason for the South African invasion "is to force the Angolan people to stop the support which they are giving to SWAPO and the people of Namibia.... We cannot accept this," he said, adding, "we will fight and we will support SWAPO until the genuine independence of the Namibian people is achieved."

At the same time, the Angolans are paying a heavy toll for this support, and Mungo

made no secret of the fact that his country has had to curtail some of its development efforts as a result of the war. While Mungo repeated Angola's position that the steps towards independence for Namibia can only be determined by SWAPO, the Angolans would clearly like to see some type of negotiated solution leading to Namibian independence soon. This was clearly indicated by an early October press report quoting Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge as saying that the current round of US-led negotiations on Namibia was an "important step forward."

## South Africa, West Block Settlement

Diplomatic negotiations for a settlement in Namibia have been stalled since the five Western nations proposed a peaceful solution in United Nations resolution 435 in 1978. In the four years since then, the Western nations have proposed countless revisions and amendments to the original UN plan in attempts to make the settlement more palatable to the South Africans. The Reagan administration has now taken the lead in the contact group and has proposed a series of amendments to 435, including constitutional guarantees for Namibia's white minority in a further effort to pacify the South Africans.

SWAPO, meanwhile, has repeatedly condemned South African and Western delaying tactics, calling for speedy implementation of the existing UN plan. Asked about the negotiations, Mungo first deferred to SWAPO saying, "The front line states, including Angola, support SWAPO and we cannot agree with amendments to resolution 435." Pressed on the US role, however, Mungo did say that "If the US agrees to the implementation of 435, as SWAPO has already agreed, then we also agree to implementation of 435, but without amendment." The Angolan representative refused, however, to comment further on the US role, saying that SWAPO, as the leader of the Namibian people, should carry out the negotiations. J.C. □





Mozambique dances to a new tune.

Stephan Lipson

## Mozambique Changes Its Tune

by Barbara Barnes

Radio Mozambique currently operates three music channels from Maputo. One channel continues, as in the days of Portuguese rule, to play contemporary Western pop music. A second is devoted to Western classical music with a smattering of jazz. The third, however, concentrates on music that was banned by the Portuguese: Mozambican and other African music and political songs from throughout the world.

The change in the programming of Radio Mozambique is indicative of changes in Mozambicans' attitudes toward music, and toward culture generally, in the wake of the FRELIMO victory in 1975. As a music teacher in Mozambique from 1977 to 1979, I

*Barbara Barnes worked in the Ministry of Education and Culture in Mozambique from 1977 to 1979 and is now teaching at Saint Peter's College in Jersey City, New Jersey.*

participated in efforts to develop a national policy and program which would reflect a belief that culture is an essential weapon in the struggle to create a new society.

This belief was expressed by President Samora Machel in a 1978 report to the FRELIMO Central Committee in which he said, "There is no liberation struggle, no revolution, if the struggle against bourgeois domination is not launched also on the cultural front." Machel added that the struggle "has to engage and mobilize all the people in order to be victorious."

At the time of Machel's comments, I was part of a music team at the National Directorate of Culture consisting of nine people: three Mozambicans who had been sent to East Germany by FRELIMO to study music for five years; another Mozambican who had studied in West Germany; two Portuguese music teachers who had stayed on after independence; two North Koreans; and myself.

Our musical knowledge was based on the study of Western musical tradition. We lacked a comprehensive understanding of the musical experience of Mozambique. Even the Mozambicans, who were well trained in Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, and Bartok, were unfamiliar with Mozambican music other than what they had experienced in early life and during the armed struggle. We did not know how to play any traditional Mozambican musical instruments—of which there are many—nor could we sing many Mozambican songs. Under Portuguese colonial rule, virtually all African cultural expression had either been prohibited outright, or denounced as primitive. This legacy of official suppression of Mozambique's musical culture was an early obstacle to our efforts.

### A Distinct Mozambican Identity

Our mandate was to guide the burst of creative energy which had accompanied the armed struggle and independence in a way

which stimulated initiative and creativity within the framework established by FRELIMO. Our training programs in the arts might draw on technical advances in the arts from outside the country, but our goal was to inspire and reflect a distinct Mozambican identity.

Yet not to develop a variation on a Western music conservatory proved difficult. We had a staff trained for that, music available for that, and strangely we found the piano a much easier instrument to obtain than Mozambican instruments. In the mass exodus of the Portuguese settler population, many pianos were left behind, while authentic Mozambican instruments, painstakingly handcrafted by highly skilled artisans, are used in well-established and relatively confined cultural settings. Since independence, these instruments have been in such great demand that even the National Directorate of Culture could not acquire them easily [see box].

Initial discussions in our teaching group centered on the question of the politics of music. Some believed that the most technically advanced and aesthetically developed music came from the West, thus making the West the model to enable Mozambique to advance the quickest. Others, including myself, wanted to give immediate priority to Mozambique's own music heritage, so that students' initial analytic tools and aesthetic awareness would be based on their own music tradition.

The dilemmas and struggles which characterized our work were not very different from the problems of other educational development projects in post-independent Mozambique—how to draw critically on universal technical and scientific principals in a way that has meaning for Mozambique's present needs and future goals.

Hardly had we begun to work through these questions when it was time to begin teaching our first 40 students, all of whom had finished six years of school. Slowly the commitment to learning and teaching Mozambican music grew. Music theory courses in the training program began to use Mozambican songs for the basis of analysis, and choral music increased its repertoire of Mozambican songs. During school vacations students began interviewing Mozambican musicians to find out how their instruments were made and to learn the social context within which these instruments were constructed and used.

A research project to investigate the main varieties of traditional Mozambican music got underway. Recording teams began to

## Timbila Orchestras

Timbila orchestras, whose music is well-known even outside of Mozambique, consist of up to fifteen xylophone-type instruments with several different tunings. Accompanied by dancers and singers, the orchestras play musical works lasting up to an hour. Recently, the timbila has acquired a new musical function—accompanying choral singing in a popular Mozambican song style reminiscent of Christian hymn singing but with words appropriate to the building of the new society.

With few exceptions, only Chopi people, who comprise less than five percent of the Mozambican population, are able to play the timbila, and very few instruments are available outside of either the southern Inhambane province where the Chopi traditionally live, or Maputo, where many have gone to find work.

Prior to independence young boys were apprenticed to timbila players at age eight or nine, and only after years of listening,

imitating, and doing their own improvising were they ready to participate in a full timbila orchestra. Since independence, with women and young girls starting to use the timbila, people from throughout Mozambique wanting to learn timbila, and young boys spending much of their time in school, new methods for understanding and learning to play the timbila are being developed.

The music of the timbila is not written down. Much of it is improvised. Each symphony is performed for a few years, after which it is replaced by new compositions. In contrast to much of Western culture, which emphasizes its own artistic past—often to the neglect of developing contemporary sources of creativity—the Chopi emphasize the process of continually creating new works which, although similar in style to the old, always bring in new twists and elements to reflect new social or political situations.

Barbara Barnes

tape different styles of Mozambican music, and researchers who accompanied the teams questioned musicians about the role their music has played in traditional society, under colonialism, and since independence. Instrument makers were also asked about the construction of traditional instruments. The aim of the project was to understand and popularize music from the various regions of Mozambique and to enable more Mozambican music to be heard on the radio, often with explanations of the social context of the songs.

One thing that helped spur our efforts and those of the students was the popular creativity around us. In Mozambique, Sunday afternoons are typically the time when the community gathers for music-making, singing, dancing and perhaps some commentary on the side. Initially our students didn't participate as a group in these alive and engaging community cultural activities, let alone present models of how development might take place in the various art forms. But as the discrepancy between what was happening in our school and in the society around us became increasingly visible, it served to motivate people for the hard work necessary to develop a new kind of program.

The cooperative spirit of the students was impressive. Students worked together to

learn musical skills, and there was genuine group satisfaction when a student who had difficulty with a particular concept finally mastered it. I recall one instance when a student named Herminio simply could not sing a major scale in tune. We all worked with Herminio and encouraged him to keep trying. When he finally sang in tune, the class cheered. His victory was everyone's victory.

(One might think that such singing should be a requirement for entrance into a program for music teachers, but in Mozambique, where much of the traditional music does not fall within the Western major/minor harmonic framework, most students would have had no opportunity to learn it. Also, students were chosen to represent the diverse cultural traditions within Mozambique, and efforts were made to prevent students from urban areas, where education has been more available, from dominating the program.)

Mozambique is in a race against time—to develop the national strength needed to enable it to give strong support to the progressive forces in southern Africa, while at the same time to provide an alternative model of how a society can develop. Giving attention to culture as a means for creative expression, social enrichment, and ideological growth is very much a part of that alternative. □

# Revolutionary Theater in South Africa

Theater for the Black majority in South Africa is an important part of the people's culture, but it is also much more. Majority theater is a part of the political struggle for liberation.

Robert Mshengu Kavanagh has collected four important plays, produced before the Soweto uprising, that provide a vivid picture of the Black theater movement in South Africa. This collection entitled *South African People's Plays* includes Credo V. Mutwa's *uNosilimela*, Mthuli Shezi's *Shanti*, Gibson Kente's *Too Late*, and the Workshop '71 Theater Company's *Survival*. Kavanagh has also written an excellent introduction to the book and a preface for each play describing the context, meaning, and stage history of each production along with suggestions about how they might be performed.

Editorial royalties on sales of this book go towards refugee aid for the people of southern Africa, and we highly recommended that readers pick-up a copy of this important new book. Below we have re-printed a short excerpt from the editor's introduction.

by Robert Mshengu Kavanagh

*It is generally in culture that the seed of protest, leading to the emergence and development of the liberation movement, is found.* Amilcar Cabral

The South African people's capacity for protest and struggle has been underestimated. The media and many white South African writers export a pitiful image of impotent and passive suffering. Suffering there is and its true dimensions can never be adequately communicated to those who have not experienced it. However, the people's survival is not passive but vigorous. Nowhere is this vigorous capacity to fight back and forge an independent personality more in evidence than in the people's culture, and in its theater. In fact by 1976 theater had become not only an aspect of cultural resistance but also contributed directly to the political struggle.

The theater I am talking about is that of the majority of the South African population. By this I mean all those who are fundamentally oppressed by the ruling minority in South Africa. In effect, this means Black South Africans, without excluding white South Africans entirely. This theater is the mainstream of South African theater. Its sources lie in the theater of early African traditional culture and in particular that of those African peoples who lived or came to settle in the southern portion of the continent, in the area now known as the Republic of South Africa or Azania.

## Theater in the Years Before June 1976

In the six years before the 1976 Soweto uprising, majority theater flourished. It was an urban theater. The traditional cultures had long since ceased to be capable of sustaining or developing artistic forms. This devastation of the traditional culture was part of the same process that had brought the urban culture into existence, a process which had begun in the last century and resulted in a dramatic change in the people's lives. Their society had in the space of a few decades been transformed from the rural and communal civilization of traditional Africa to a system of legalized oppression and exploitation in an industrial economy.

The new townships [constructed by the Nationalist government after its victory in 1948], were further away from town and consisted of mathematically laid out and ethnically organized 'Legolands' of single-story 'matchboxes.' Inadequate or unconcerned police presence, few amenities or entertainments (mostly illegal), freely available liquor, high unemployment, overcrowded houses and schools, poverty and constant indignity and oppression make for a highly volatile and dangerous en-

vironment. Soweto is the largest and best-known of these townships. It has a population of over a million. Soweto and other South African urban townships contain the largest concentration of industrialized proletariat in Africa. It is this proletariat that gave birth to a new, urban, popular tradition of theater.

All the plays in this selection are products of the urban experience, even when traditional themes are attempted. All of them are examples of the new urban, popular theater that the largest proletariat in Africa has given birth to.

## How and Where the Theater was Performed

Majority theater developed in difficult circumstances. It received no assistance from the state. On the contrary, governing policies and regulations impose crippling disadvantages. Moving around in the township or between townships, especially at night, is dangerous and expensive. This affects both performers and audiences. An impossible tangle of inconsistent and arbitrary red tape, attended by the usual corruption, surrounds the booking of halls and the advertising of shows. Touring accommodations and facilities are almost non-existent. Actors and musicians, unless registered with white-managed companies, are officially regarded as 'loafers' and are subject to arrest at any time.

If the content of a play is at all political, actors are constantly harassed, performances forbidden and equipment confiscated. Some plays are banned altogether (Kente's *Too Late* and Workshop '71's *Survival* for example), scripts are subject to censorship, and applications to use facilities are often turned down. Specifically included in the charge sheet of members of the Black Consciousness movement arraigned under the Terrorism Act in 1975 were their theatrical activities. They were charged with conspiring "to make, produce, publish or distribute subversive and anti-white utterances, writings, poems, plays and/or dramas." *Shanti* was hounded out of existence by the security police and in 1976 troops occupying Soweto closed down the hall in which *Survival* was being performed and beat up the staff, including women.

Nevertheless, between 1970 and 1976 majority theater flourished as never before.

Performances in the townships were largely mobile, one-night stand operations. There were some exceptions. *uNosilimela* twice at

Excerpted from: *South African People's Plays*. London: Heinemann (available in North America from Heinemann Educational Books, Inc., 4 Front Street, Exeter N.H. 03833, 1981. 176 pp. \$9.00 pb.

note for requesting books reg. IV-7-82



## Publications Received

Closing Date: 9/15  
Southern Africa & General

Mary BENSON (ed.), *The Sun Will Rise: Statements from the Dock by Southern African Political Prisoners*. Revised & Enlarged Edition. London: International Defense & Aid Fund for Southern Africa (available from IDAF-North American Office, PO Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138), 1981. 80 pp. \$3.00 plus 70¢ p&h.

Lloyd W. BROWN, *Women Writers in Black Africa*. Contributions in Women Studies No. 21. Westport: Greenwood Press (88 Post Rd. West, Westport, CT 06881), 1981. 205pp. \$23.95 hc. Note: This is a monograph on women writers in Africa and not a collection of their work. It includes critical assessments of five major writers, including called South African novelist Bessie Head.

Alfred O. HERO & John BARRATT (eds.), *The American People and South Africa: Publics, Elites and Policymaking Processes*. Lexington: Lexington Books (125 Spring St., Lexington, MA 02173), 1981. 215pp. \$21.95 hc.

Judith HAYER, et al (eds.), *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press (175 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10010), 1981. 375pp. \$37.50 hc.

Richard W. HULL, *Southern Africa: Civilizations in Turmoil*. New York: New York University Press (distributed by Columbia University Press, 562 West 113th St., New York, NY 10025), 1981. 168pp. \$9.00 pb.

Robert Mshengu KAVANAGH (ed.), *South African People's Plays: Plays by Gibson Kente, Credo V. Mutwa, Mthuli Shezi, and Workshop '71*. London: Heinemann (North American orders to Heinemann Educational Books, PO Box 976, Edison, NJ 08817), 1981. 176pp. \$9.00 pb.

Aloysius KGAREBE (ed.), *SADCC-Maputo: The Proceedings of the Second Southern African Development Coordination Conference*, held in Maputo, People's Republic of Mozambique on 27/28 November 1980. London: Southern Africa Coordination Conference Liaison Committee (1 Cambridge Ter., London NW1 4JL, England), 1981. 286pp. £5.00. Note: We know of no North American distributor for this publication.

David OTTOWAY & Marina OTTOWAY, *Afrocommunism*. New York: Africana Publishing (30 Irving Pl., New York, NY 10003), 1981. 237pp. \$12.50 pb. Note: Contains specific chapters on Mozambique & Angola.

PAICV *First Congress: Documents from the Formation of the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV)*. London: Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Center (34 Percy St., London W1P 9FG, England), 1981. 35pp. \$5.00 pb including airmail postage. Note: We know of no North American distributor for this publication.

*The Soviet Union and Southern Africa*. By John BARRATT. Occasional Papers. Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs (Jan Smuts House, PO Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, South Africa), 1981. 19pp. No price listed. Note: We know of no North American distributor for this publication.

*A US Policy for the 80s*. By Chester A. CROCKER. Occasional Papers. Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs (address above), 1981. 20pp. No price listed.

### Mozambique

James H. MITTLEMAN, *Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism: Mozambique and Tanzania*. New York: Academic Press (111 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10003), 1981. 227pp. \$27.50 hc.

### Namibia

DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY, SWAPO OF NAMIBIA, *To Be Born a Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia*. London: Zed Press (available in North America from the Africa Fund, 198 Broadway #402, New York, NY 10038), 1981. 357pp. \$9.95 pb plus \$1.00 p&h.

*Namibia*. Philadelphia: Southern Africa Program, Peace Education Division, American Friends Service Committee (1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102), 1981. 43pp. \$1.50 pb.

*Remember Kassinga and Other Papers on Political Prisoners and Detainees in Namibia*. Fact Paper on Southern Africa No. 9. London: International Defense & Aid Fund for Southern Africa (available from IDAF-North American Office, address above), 1981. 52pp. US price not known.

### South Africa

Mary BENSON, *Nelson Mandela*. London: Panaf Books (243 Regents St., London W1R 6PN, England), 1980. 192 pp. £2.25 pb.

Note: We know of no North American distributor for this publication.

Belinda BOZZOLI, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa, 1890-1933*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul (9 Park St., Boston, MA 02108), 1981. 384pp. \$40.00 hc.

Paddy COLLIGAN, *Soweto Remembered: Conversations with Freedom Fighters*. New York: World View Publishers (46 West 21st St., New York, NY 10010). \$3.25 pb plus 30¢ p&h.

*The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution*. By John S. SAUL & Stephen GELB. Special Issue. *Monthly Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (62 West 14th St., New York, NY 10011), 1981. 156pp. \$3.00 single issue, \$15.00 annual subscription.

Beryl A. GERBER & Stanton P. NEWMAN, *Soweto's Children: The Development of Attitudes*. New York: Academic Press (address above), 1980. 215pp. No price listed hc.

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Peter LAMBLEY, *The Psychology of Apartheid*. Athens: University of Georgia Press (Terrell Hall, Athens, GA 30602), 1981. 291pp. \$16.50 hc.

Ken LUCKHARDT & Brenda WALKER, *Working for Freedom: Black Trade Union Development in South Africa Throughout the 1970s*. Geneva: Program to Combat Racism, World Council of Churches (available from Publicity Department, WCC, PO Box 66, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland), 1981. 118pp. \$7.95 pb. Note: We know of no North American distributor for this publication.

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Ref 10-12-82

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*South Africa, Morality and Action: Quaker Efforts in a Difficult Environment.* By Hendrik W. VAN DER MERWE. Studies in Quakerism No. 7. Chicago: Progressive Publishers (401 East 32nd St. #1002, Chicago, IL 60616), 1981. 64pp. \$3.00 pb.

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*Special Issue on International Sanctions Against South Africa. Objective: Justice, Vol. XIII No. 1* (available from UN Publications, Rm. A-3315, UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017), 1981. 48pp. \$1.50 single issue.

Pamela TODD & David FORDHAM (eds.), *Private Tucker's Boer War Diary: The Transvaal War of 1899, 1900, 1901 & 1902 with the Natal Field Forces*, North Pomfret: Hamish Hamilton (North Pomfret, VT 05053), 1980. 192pp., 111. \$27.00 hc.

*The White Sheep of the Family.* By James BARBER. Occasional Papers. Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs (address above), 1981. 19pp. No price listed. Note: First published in the London Times Higher Education Supplement January 2, 1981.

**Zimbabwe**

Paul F. BERLINER, *The Soul of Mbira: Music and Traditions of the Shona People of Zimbabwe*. Berkeley: University of California Press (2223 Fulton St., Berkeley, CA 94720), 1978 (1981 pb). 332pp. \$6.95 pb.

Miles HUDSON, *Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*. London: Hamish Hamilton (address above), 1981. 252pp. \$25.00 hc.

Mudereri KADHANI & Musaemura ZIMUNYA (eds.), *And Now the Poets Speak: Poems Inspired by the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. Gwelo: Mambo Press (PO Box 719, Gwelo, Zimbabwe), 1981. 178pp. \$13.20 plus p&h. Note: We know of no North American distributor for this publication.

Charles MUNGOSHI, *Some Kinds of Wounds and Other Short Stories*. Gwelo: Mambo Press (address above), 1979pp. No price listed pb. Note: We know of no North American distributor for this publication.

*Robert Mugabe on Aspects of Zimbabwean*

*Foreign and Domestic Policies.* Occasional Papers. Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs (address above), 1981. 13pp. No price listed pb. Note: This is a complete transcript of an interview given by the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe on January 28, 1981, to Jonathan Kapotein, Africa Editor for *Business Week*. Lengthy excerpts from this interview appeared in the *BW* issue of February 16, 1981.


David SMITH & Colin SIMPSON, *Mugabe*. Salisbury: Pioneer Head (PO Box 2374, Salisbury, Zimbabwe), 1981. Z\$3.50 pb plus p&h. Note: We know of no North American

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*Zimbabwe Women in Chimurenga: A Personal Synoptic Account of the Experiences of Some of the Women of Zimbabwe During the Liberation War for the Freedom of Zimbabwe.* Interviews by Lindiwe Mimi TSELE. London: Black Women's Center (available from Azania Solidarity, 1 Park House, London E9 7TB, England), 1981. 64pp. £1.00 plus p&h. Note: We know of no North American distributor for this publication.

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude later review.)

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## Students Meet, Plan Spring Protest

Students from across the country are planning two weeks of anti-apartheid actions in late March, 1982. The plan for a "two week period of national anti-apartheid action" between March 21 and April 4, 1982 was the major result of a student anti-apartheid conference held in New York City in early October. The conference, organized by the American Committee on Africa, brought together students from fifty campuses in twenty states across the US and was endorsed by the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, the South West Africa Peoples Organization, the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress also participated in the two day event.

Conference workshops offered students and other activists an opportunity for in-depth discussions about US foreign policy and the potential for linking anti-apartheid struggles to other progressive struggles in the US.

By far the most well attended workshops, however, were those devoted to specific strategies for student organizing work and to frank discussions of past experiences. In one workshop, student activists from Berea College in Kentucky and Western Michigan

University summarized their work and led a discussion on the pros and cons of divestment, material support work, and other solidarity activities.

Another key focus of the conference was linking struggles in southern Africa to struggles in the United States. Again and again speakers stressed the importance of dealing with campus racism as an integral component of anti-apartheid work. Conference participants also stressed the need, when focusing on divestment, to promote alternative investments that would benefit local communities.

At the final plenary, participants endorsed a proposal noting the need to link anti-apartheid struggles with community struggles and the importance of cultural activities in community work. Also endorsed was a proposal recognizing the "fundamental principle of anti-apartheid work as solidarity with the people of southern Africa" and a proposal to help defend nine demonstrators arrested in Albany during the recent South African rugby tour.

The spring action, according to ACOA student coordinator Joshua Nessen, will focus on four themes: support for liberation

movements in southern Africa; calls for the withdrawal of US corporations in South Africa and an end to all academic, cultural, and sporting ties with that country; opposition to the Reagan administration's growing alliance with the apartheid regime; and a call for building links between southern African issues and opposition to racism in the US.

To prepare for the two-week action, regional meetings are being held around the US to bring activists together. A California meeting was held in early November, activists gathered in late November for a New England regional caucus and New York City area activists are scheduled to meet in early December.

For a full report on the conference, send \$3 to:

Student Coordinator  
ACOA  
198 Broadway  
New York, NY 10038

A National Student Anti-Apartheid Newsletter is also available from the same address for \$5 per year.



# One Thousand Gather in New York

Nearly one thousand people representing nearly 200 different organizations from twenty-four states converged on New York October 9 for the three-day Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa. The conference was aimed at strengthening the anti-apartheid and African liberation solidarity movement in the United States. The international anti-apartheid movement was also represented, with delegations from Grenada, France, Canada, and West Germany among others, as well as high level delegations from the African National Congress of South Africa, and the South-West Africa Peoples' Organization of Namibia.

Unity, and more coordinated national action by existing solidarity groups was a central theme of the conference. SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, in a personal message relayed to conference delegates by SWAPO representative Peter Mueshahange, at the opening plenary session on Friday, called on the assembly to put aside "personal interest, political and ideological differences and focus on the central struggle, the struggle for liberation in southern Africa."

Although both ANC President Oliver Tambo, and SWAPO President Sam Nujoma were unavoidably forced to cancel their slated appearances, the importance attached to the conference by the liberation movements and the front line states was underscored by the presence of ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo, SWAPO Foreign Secretary Peter Mueshahange, and that of Pedro Mungo, a member of the MPLA/Workers Party of Angola who is attached to the Department of Information.

Following the Friday opening plenary, the conference broke into commissions to examine collaboration between the US and South Africa in political, economic, military, sports, and cultural spheres.

On Saturday morning, delegates gathered for a plenary devoted to the role of organized labor in opposing the "unholy alliance" between Washington and Pretoria. Labor was heavily represented at the conference, with seventy-two delegations in attendance along with a number of prominent labor leaders such as Frederick O'Neil, president of the Associated Actors and Artists of America, and Cleveland Robinson, secretary-treasurer

of the United Automobile Workers District 65.

Saturday afternoon was devoted to workshops covering every aspect of US/South Africa collaboration. Throughout the day, delegates critically examined a host of issues, from the need to support the struggle of women in Namibia and South Africa to the role of church and community groups in mobilizing grassroots opposition to apartheid. From these workshops emerged the conference's resolutions—21 pages of them—and a program for action to implement them.

## Sanctions Focus

The Conference concluded on Sunday by endorsing the resolutions and sanctioning the creation of a continuations committee to put the plan of action in motion. By the end of the final plenary, the two principal planks of the conference program were in place: a demand for a comprehensive economic, political, military and cultural boycott of the South African regime, and a commitment to build support and recognition for SWAPO in Namibia and the ANC in South Africa as the sole authentic representative of their peoples.

Asked what specifically would be the tasks of the continuations committee in its first few months, conference coordinator Bloice said, "the question of building support for sanctions on the governmental level and popularizing the notion of sanctions, I think that is going to be the key."

"The key thing is how we enforce sanctions in lieu of governmental action. I thought one of the most significant resolutions that came out of this conference," said Bloice, "was the call for a labor conference; it is not just a call for a new way of enforcing sanctions. If truck drivers stopped carrying South African goods and longshoremen stopped unloading them, we will have reached a new level."

As the conference delegates went home, however, a number of key questions remained. The final conference plenum passed a mass of resolutions, and there is a pressing need to identify priorities and key areas of activity for the immediate future.

While conference organizers singled out sanctions as a key focus for the anti-apartheid movement over the coming months, ways of mobilizing grassroots support for what some participants felt was an

abstract and far removed goal remain unclear. A number of college delegates who are active in the campus divestment movement expressed concern at the apparent emphasis on sanctions at the international level, where student actions have little influence.

## Sole Recognition For ANC

Conference resolutions recognizing the African National Congress of South Africa as the "sole and authentic representatives of the struggling peoples of South Africa," also posed some problems. A number of prominent community organizations did not participate fully in the conference because organizers excluded the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. How the conference will support above ground, and therefore not openly ANC-affiliated, opposition inside South Africa was also left undefined.


One of the strengths of the conference was the high level of participation by individuals and organizations that have not been actively involved in anti-apartheid work in the past. Unlike some previous conferences, a glance at the sea of delegates revealed a predominantly Black and Third World audience, many of whom were new to the southern Africa support movement. An important focus of the future work will be building links between these people and the existing anti-apartheid movement while simultaneously avoiding duplication of already existing efforts.

On the whole the conference was termed by most participants as a great success. Rarely do nearly a thousand people gather for three days to discuss the issue of apartheid. The level of participation by a wide variety of groups was also singled out as a telling sign of the significance of this event.

"The conference on all accounts was very successful," said ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo in summarizing the event. "Representatives of many political parties, many social organizations, many trade union movements and religious groups were represented at this conference. We think that the discussions that went on set a very firm basis for launching a very strong support movement for the struggles of the people of South Africa and Namibia."

M.F. & J.C.D.

# News Briefs

 THE US-BASED SOUTH AFRICAN Military Refugees Aid Fund (SAMRAF) has reported that on the night of August 14 their Brooklyn offices were ransacked and that hundreds of files and other records have been handed over to the South African government.

The break-in was carried out by Clifton Westraad, a South African exile and war resister who had been seeking assistance from SAMRAF since January 1980, and had worked briefly in SAMRAF's New York and San Francisco offices. He disappeared on the night of the break in and immediately returned to South Africa. He admitted his role in the break-in in a series of interviews with the South African press.

The alleged contents of the stolen files made headlines inside the country. Drawing on information purported to have been in the stolen files, and from Westraad himself, the war resisters group was portrayed as financially bankrupt, racked with dissension, and as maintaining extensive "communist links." Westraad told reporters that life in New York was "ten times worse than any part of [military] basic training," particularly in the "bowels of Brooklyn," and advised would-be draft evaders to steer clear of the US-based organization.

More serious, in SAMRAF's view, is the government's attempt to use the break-in to drive a wedge between SAMRAF and other anti-apartheid forces, particularly the South African liberation movements. Sensational

"exposes" of SAMRAF's supposed criticism of the ANC were denounced as government propaganda by SAMRAF representative Mike Morgan. "These allegations of mistrust and not supporting the liberation movements fly in the face of what we believe in and practice," Morgan said. "These lies have to be put in the context of the apartheid government's military 'Total Strategy.' They want to crush military resistance. Their campaign to discredit us is designed to disrupt our network of support and portray us as an unreliable base for war resisters in exile."

SAMRAF believes that Westraad was offered a deal by South African security agents in the US. The deal allowed him to return to South Africa and gain exemption from military service in exchange for the war resister's files. Two counts of desertion and numerous other charges logged against Westraad by the government were also presumably dismissed.

According to an official statement released by the exile group, the items taken included the petty cash box, "a considerable sum of money" owed SAMRAF by Westraad, and the organization's "entire US and international mailing lists." But, the statement reports, "no files relating to contacts inside South Africa were kept at the office and those files remain safe."

Despite this serious setback to their efforts, SAMRAF has pledged to continue its draft resistance work. Their official statement concludes that:

"Very few white South Africans support resistance to apartheid upon first arriving in exile. Because we believe in peoples' capacity to change, we try to encourage and involve war resisters in work beyond their initial asylum application. This means ongoing risks, but it also means we have to take maximum measures with regard to security."

Conservative "think-tanks" in the US reportedly received large sums of money from the South African government in the late seventies as part of the minority regime's attempt to promote favorable studies of apartheid. These funds, part of the between \$70 and \$130 million that Pretoria spent in its now infamous information scandal that brought on the resignation of Prime Minister John Vorster, were funneled through third parties to a number of organizations and individuals in the US in an attempt to influence

US policy towards South Africa.

The Virginia-based *Richmond News Leader* has obtained a partially censored copy of the Information Department's budget for the 1978-1979 budget year that reveals details of funds sent to the American African Affairs Association, the Advanced International Studies Institute, and Americans Concerned About South Africa. The documents also reveal that funds may have been funneled to a number of other organizations but use code names or vague references in identifying these additional recipients.

The original details of South Africa's influence buying scheme were revealed by a South African government commission in 1978, after US and South African newspaper reports revealed a South Africa Information Department program specifically set up to secretly promote favorable studies of and reports on South African government policies. At that time the commission revealed that Michigan publisher John McGoff received \$10 million for an unsuccessful effort to buy the now-defunct *Washington Star* (money McGoff later used to purchase the *Sacramento Union* and a California-based cable TV network).

The new Information Department budget documents reveal that the American African Affairs Association received \$13,000, and, Americans Concerned About South Africa received \$65,000 in secret payments. According to a spokesperson for Americans Concerned About South Africa, they did, in fact, receive an anonymous grant for \$65,000 which they later funneled to the Advanced International Studies Institute. All three organizations have published reports advocating closer ties between the US and South Africa. Spokesmen for all three organizations denied knowledge of any funding from South Africa and details of the deals are difficult to uncover because all of the money was funded through third parties. The budget documents also confirm, however, many other secret payments originally revealed by former Information

## CORRECTION

The "At A Glance" section of our July/August 1981 issue incorrectly stated that military spending in South Africa rose by 40 percent. Military spending for the 1981/1982 budget year rose by over 30 percent to a total of \$2564 million from last years spending of \$1966 million.



Secretary Eschel Rhoodie in an interview taped in 1979. In that same interview Rhoodie also said that South Africa provided funding to help defeat two US senators who were unfriendly towards South Africa. Rhoodie claimed that South Africa gave \$250,000 to opponents of Iowa Senator Dick Clark and \$120,000 to help defeat California Senator John Tunney. Although the new budget documents do not confirm these payments, they do substantiate many of Rhoodie's other claims and thus add credibility to his allegations.

The new budget documents, even when combined with the 1978 commission report, do not provide a complete picture of South Africa's influence buying scheme. The 1978 commission did reveal, however, that over half of the secret projects are being allowed to continue.



#### MOZAMBIQUE PRESIDENT

Samora Machel, in a September visit to the northern province of Cabo Delgado, ordered the release of over 700 people held in re-education centers since independence. In visits to two re-education centers, the president spoke with hundreds of detainees and, according to

the Mozambique Information Agency, "was so shocked that he ordered the establishment of a 'commission on legality and the state.'" Machel also ordered the arrest of the director of a re-education center in Ruarua after criticizing disorganization at that center.

"Traitors can be transformed into useful citizens," and that, he said, is the primary tasks of the re-education centers. "In other parts of the world where a revolution triumphed," he told the detainees, "you would have been shot without question." But what interests Mozambique, he said, is eliminating the causes that created these criminals.

The president praised the work at a re-education center at Chaimite, where over 600 people were released. The released detainees were told that they will have to remain in northern Mozambique and work on building a new textile factory at Chipembe and on a 162,000 hectare agricultural project at N'guri.

While praising the work at Chaimite, the president also singled out the re-education center at Ruarua for disorganization, lack of agricultural projects, and negligence. "The center had become a center for producing idlers," Machel said.

"In Ruarua were men who fought for our liberation and who had been punished after independence. It turned my stomach," the president said. "Soldiers sent to a re-

education camp because they were six hours late, or because they were absent for four days. We found old soldiers who had only committed a tiny offence, but who had been in re-education for six years side by side with secret police agents whose mission had been to assassinate FRELIMO leaders."

"We found the man who stole two potatoes, the man who got into a fight, the worker who missed four days at work, alongside real criminals." In ordering the changes at Ruarua, Machel noted that the constitution and the laws of Mozambique should be upheld and that re-education must have clear criteria, with fixed sentences and corrective procedures to suit the type of offense, not arbitrary imprisonment.

The shake-up in northern Mozambique is part of a larger campaign by Mozambican officials to weed out corrupt government officials. As part of this campaign the Deputy Minister of the Interior has held a number of mass meetings in residential areas to hear complaints and opinions about the workings of government.

At one mass meeting in a residential area of Maputo, five policemen were put on display after residents of the area denounced them for stealing from prisoners and a number of other crimes. The policemen will go on trial before a people's tribunal to be held in their residential area. □

## THE IRONY OF APARTHEID

The Struggle for National Independence of Afrikaner Calvinism Against British Imperialism  
by Irving Hexham

*The Irony of Apartheid* is an enlightening study of the complex relationship between religion and society. Based upon original research using Afrikaans, Dutch and English sources, it focuses on South Africa during the years 1902-1916 and studies apartheid in terms of the mythology which inspires Afrikaner Nationalism. Apartheid is shown to have developed as a result of British Imperialism, nineteenth century Dutch neo-Calvinism and the social experience of the religious community within Afrikaner society. The mythology itself and the social conditions out of which it was born are examined in detail and the theory which enabled the mythology to become a political ideology is discussed in terms of this background. The myth of apartheid is shown to have influenced both the Second Language Movement, which created Afrikaans as a written language, and the Christian-National Education which later became part of the myth itself. Dr. Hexham thoroughly explores the relationship between the group that created the myth, the Doppers, and the political movement of General Hertzog that created the National Party in 1914.

### SOME COMMENTS ON DR. HEXHAM'S WORK ON SOUTH AFRICA:

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