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SOUTHERN AFRICA

July/August 1980

SASOL Explodes!

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**Angola
Under
Fire**



SOUTHERN AFRICA

Volume XII Number 6
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Front Cover: SASOL tanks ablaze. Smoke from the blasts rose over two miles into the air.

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update

Botswana President Critically Ill

Sir Seretse Khama, who was elected president in 1965 and led his nation to independence from Britain the next year, is suffering from an incurable illness and deteriorating rapidly, according to government reports. Khama arrived in London for a routine check-up on June 21, but was hospitalized and flown home early in July. A diabetic, the Botswana leader had a heart pacemaker installed four years ago, and is also suffering from liver complications.

Quett Masire, Botswana's vice president and minister of finance and development planning, has now assumed the role of acting president and will probably be chosen by parliament to assume the presidency if Khama dies. Government policies are expected to remain unchanged.

New Money for Mozambique

A new currency named the *Metical*, after a pre-colonial unit of exchange, has been substituted for the Portuguese escudo in Mozambique. Although Mozambique had, after independence, brought its monetary system under control of the national bank, the notes in use continued to be those printed before independence in 1975.

The exchange of old notes and coins for new was carried out over a three day period beginning on June 16, the twentieth anniversary of the massacre of Mueda, when Portuguese colonial forces killed more than six hundred persons in that northern Mozambican village. The exchange operation was a closely held secret until a national announcement on Sunday June 15, at 10:00 pm, and bank employees and other government workers stayed at their posts straight through from their Sunday briefing on the procedure to the close of the exchanges on Wednesday.

The new money was introduced to the people as a national and patriotic symbol, but also as a measure which signified the ability of the state—and the bank of Mozambique in particular—to assume real control over the country's economy.

It was also a blow at opponents of the new government who still hold large amounts of the colonial currency in South Africa or Portugal, currency which was used, along with counterfeit money, to finance spies and saboteurs sent back inside the country.

Great efforts were made to ensure that Mozambicans who had hoarded honestly earned money, buried in backyards out of mistrust of the banking system, were not injured.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's newly independent government has been confronted with its most serious challenge since coming to power. In Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's words, an "open rebellion" is taking place in western Zimbabwe. The rebels, who according to government estimates number about 300, are comprised of disaffected renegades from the guerrilla armies, and other malcontents who reject the authority of Zimbabwe's coalition government. They have been responsible for numerous instances of murder, destruction of property, and robberies in the Tjototjo area between Victoria Falls and Bulawayo.

The government has responded firmly to the threat, employing joint army units comprised of forces from both ZANU-PF's ZANLA, and Patriotic Front-ZAPU's ZIPRA forces.

Zimbabwe's coalition government also continued to struggle against other major problems. New Black ministers have been slowly taking over the functions performed by the all-white civil service scarcely six months before. Yet problems are arising in some government offices where entrenched civil servants have been reluctant to promote Africans into their once-exclusive positions of power. The new government, however, has begun to speed up the process of Africanization in the civil service and the once slow, and in some cases obstructionist white civil service is being replaced by people more in tune with the new government. Perhaps the best indicator of the relative success of the new government is the planned release of a new budget, which will take place, on schedule, in late July.

Meanwhile, the government's efforts to combine the two guerrilla armies with elements of the Rhodesian Security Forces have, predictably, hit some snags.

Upwards of 35,000 armed guerrillas remain in their pre-election assembly points, and an early attempt to integrate 1200 ZANLA, ZIPRA, and Rhodesian Security Force soldiers resulted in the detention of

several hundred troops for insubordination. The effort to combine three mutually suspicious armies is virtually unprecedented in military history, and such problems are unavoidable. Nevertheless, the British instructors and white Rhodesian officers make no secret of their preference for the conventionally trained ZIPRA troops, raising fears that an effort to play the guerrillas off against each other may be underway. Another difficulty faced by the new government in creating a national army is the sheer numbers of guerrillas involved. Current plans call for a combined military of no more than 15,000, which means that about 20,000 soldiers will be forced onto a job market badly shrunk by the ravages of war, and already flooded by thousands of job-seekers.

Government planners envision resettling the former soldiers in agricultural and reconstruction projects. But the demobilization plan, code named "Operation Seed" (Soldiers Employed in Economic Development), has so far found few takers, and inducing the rest to surrender their arms in the current unsettled political atmosphere remains a pressing challenge for the new government.

Regional Transport Links Advance

A summit meeting of Zaire, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique reached agreement in late June on a pact designed to increase use of Mozambican ports by the other three countries. The summit brought together the presidents and transport ministers of the four countries in Lubumbashi, Zaire, and a follow up meeting was set for July 10 in Maputo, Mozambique.

The Maputo meeting will also include six other states—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Tanzania—which also attended the April summit in Lusaka on economic cooperation in southern Africa. Zaire did not attend the Lusaka gathering, but has been brought into the discussion since it may use Mozambique's ports for exports from the copper producing Shaba province. At present, those exports go through Zambia and Zimbabwe to South African ports. □

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Telling It Like It Isn't: US Press Coverage of Zimbabwe

by Michael Beaubien

More than six hundred correspondents from two dozen countries (including correspondents from socialist countries granted entry for the first time) gathered in Salisbury for the recent election, in which Robert Mugabe became the first prime minister of an independent Zimbabwe. But Americans who had hoped that the ending of the tough censorship imposed by the Smith regime would result in an improvement in US media coverage were quickly disappointed. Reporting on the tense political situation prior to the election was marked by the long familiar preoccupation with the status of whites, the same biased language, political outlook and reliance on Rhodesian officials for interpretation of events (see *Southern Africa*, January, 1980).

Official Sources

Unbalanced reporting is an old problem in US media coverage of southern Africa. A study on coverage of Zimbabwe in major US newspapers, conducted by Howard University Professor Beverly Hawk, produced the startling statistic that in the three years from 1975 to 1978, quotes from white civilians outnumbered those from Black civilians by a ratio of two to one; Rhodesian officials were quoted almost four times as frequently as liberation movement leaders.

Hawk found that government versions of stories were given space and credence, while statements by liberation movement leaders were ignored or granted only some cursory, often skeptical, lines buried in the middle of an article. This preoccupation with official views and white reactions and interests dominated US reports from Zimbabwe throughout the election period.

Thus, although ZANU-PF and Patriotic Front (ZAPU), as ZANU and ZAPU were then known, complaints of serious intimidation and interference with campaigning by Rhodesian official and Muzorewa forces were confirmed by several international observers, including a US group, the major media preferred to rely on "official sources" for their views. John Burns' story of March 1 for the *New York Times* relied on a British official's interpretation of alleged voting fraud. On February 25, Peter Kent of NBC reported allegations of wide-

spread intimidation by Mugabe forces. His only informants were Peter Gordon, a British election supervisor, and Bishop Muzorewa.

Robin Wright of CBS reported uncritically on February 28 that, "Because of mounting violence, the British Governor, Lord Soames recently introduced laws that empower him to ban candidates, parties, and even voting in any district seriously disrupted by intimidation. There have been numerous grenade attacks on churches and political offices. Several candidates for Parliament have been abducted, injured or assassinated. And there have been more than 800 convictions for fighting among political opponents within the past two months." Wright included no interviews with either ZANU-PF or Patriotic Front (ZAPU) members, nor did she think it worth reporting the strong evidence that much of the violence emanated from Muzorewa's auxiliaries, and that at least one church bombing was the proven work of Selous Scouts acting as provocateurs.

The MacNeil/Lehrer Report of February 28 utilized film footage supplied by the BBC and commentary from two of the network's reporters. The sole guest for that evening's program was the British ambassador to the United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson.

Few reporters raised any questions about the way in which Lord Soames, in charge of the election proceeding, was collecting his information about violations and intimidation. Yet Michael Shuster, in Salisbury for *Southern Africa*, reported that "Most of the information that is reported about the continued fighting comes from the Rhodesians themselves. There is in fact no means of independently ascertaining the truth. Those members of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force assigned to security force bases have no way of knowing if the Rhodesian version of reported incidents is correct." (*Southern Africa*, March 1980)

The Silent Majority

According to Professor Hawk, "Many correspondents seemed to share this idea that reporting disparity of white civilian opinion constituted balanced coverage... very few felt the resulting coverage was inadequate."

It is not surprising then, that with this

combination of racism, reliance on Rhodesian and British spokespersons, and hostility, particularly to the ZANU forces, no one in the major US press corps came anywhere close to predicting Mugabe's landslide victory despite consistent ZANU-PF confidence in the outcome. Predictions all focused around possible combinations of seats won by Muzorewa and Nkomo forces, and the press people never bothered to check their forecasts with the voters who mattered—the African majority.

Even after the dramatic election result was announced, a momentous event in the African community, reporters went in search of white opinion for interpretation and explanation.

On March 3, David Brinkley of NBC began the Zimbabwe story: "In Rhodesia's election, it appears the Marxist candidate, Robert Mugabe, has won a landslide victory and will become Prime Minister. What this means for the country and for the white minority causes some nervousness and uncertainty among the whites. And some pessimism." Then came Peter Davis' report from Salisbury which detailed the feelings of Rhodesian whites.

John Burns, in his March 6 report for the *New York Times*, fared no better, his only allusion to Black opinion appeared in the following form: "Along Rhodes Avenue in the city center, a middle-aged Black mailman rode happily along on his bicycle, taking both hands off the handlebars to flap his elbows like a rooster, crowing like a cock [ZANU-PF symbol, editor] as he passed sidewalks packed with whites." The remainder of the article was devoted to Mugabe's election victory speech.

When Gregory Jaynes of the *New York Times* made his first attempt to solicit Black opinion, it was about the weather. On February 29, he wrote: "'The rain is an assistance,' said Andrew Muchabaiwa, who voted here today. 'Rain is a good sign to the African. The rain will give us a good poll.'" Yet, further along in this article Gregory Jaynes gave an indication of the problems he faced in soliciting Black opinion. He wrote, "The voters will not talk. An occasional bellicose drunk will shout something unintelligible, but for the most part the people in the lines outside the polling stations nod shyly when approached by questioners, even official Commonwealth election

Mugabe: The Christ of Rhodesia Vote Near,
He's Diffident, Scholarly but the Devil!
Free Election Is Impossible
Social
Of Balls and Bullets and Nightmare
Emerges as King
Zimbabwe: Born Free

THE NEW YORK TIMES TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26

Britain's Man on the Brink of the Rhodestian Whites
 Many Rhodesian Whites
 For the Whites
 Rhodesia Is Enjoying Him

Newspaper coverage concentrated almost exclusively on the plight of whites and little attempt was made to elicit Black opinions.

observers." Gregory Jaynes' comment would seem to suggest that one way to overcome the Africans' natural hesitance to talk freely with Europeans would involve a greater use of African stringers or the employment of more Afro-Americans as correspondents in southern Africa. Earl Caldwell of the New York Daily News produced some of the finest reporting of any American journalist in Zimbabwe. (See his March 1 column for description of life in the free trustland with ZANU-PF).

Yet even accepting that there was some reluctance to talk to reporters, it seems clear that any serious effort could and did produce a response, especially from educated Africans in the urban centers.

Thus, on March 5, Caryle Murphy of the Washington Post interviewed several Zimbabweans in Salisbury providing the only reportage of Black feelings, concerns and expectations in the major media. Murphy spoke with Reeds Masango, a student in the Black town of Highfield, who told her, "Now we are getting the country in the right way." Providing some indication of Black expectations, Lillian Murombedzi told Murphy, "We want our salaries increased, better accommodation and better education." Reeds Masango also provided the reporter with an insight into Bishop Muzorewa's downfall. "When he got into power he did nothing for the people," said Masango. "He intensified the

military call-up instead of increasing our wages."

In addition to the reluctance of most American correspondents to seek out Black opinion, most journalists seem to have made very little effort to get out of Salisbury. As a result American readers were never introduced to any members of either ZANU-PF or Patriotic Front (ZAPU), other than the leaders who were candidates for prime minister. There were no stories profiling the candidates for parliament. These included a number of Black women and a wide variety of people who had played many roles in the freedom struggles.

American readers were similarly never informed about the status of the thousands of refugees caused by the seven-year war. No American correspondents from the major media felt compelled to visit the refugee camps in Mozambique or Zambia, or report on conditions at any of the major border crossings.

Biased Language

American journalists have in the past been notorious for their biased language in characterizing members of the Patriotic Front. Throughout the war, members of the Patriotic Front were always labeled by American journalists as "terrorists" in an effort to discredit them. During the election period, American correspondents continued to rely upon emotionally-charged

and politically-biased terms. By the time of the Lancaster House accords, members of the Patriotic Front had evolved from "terrorists" to "guerrillas," but never freedom fighters. Ironically, members of the major media never reported on the language used by African and white Rhodesian soldiers, which referred to liberation fighters as "gooks." Perhaps this omission was due to concern about any parallels Americans might draw to Vietnam . . . some observers believe the term was imported along with US mercenaries.

The use of biased and emotive language was particularly evident in characterizations of Robert Mugabe, general-secretary of ZANU-PF. For Jay Ross of the Washington Post, he was the "guerrilla leader Mugabe (2/28)." Robin Wright of CBS found Mugabe to be "a hardline Marxist (2/18)." Peter Kent of NBC described members of ZANU-PF as "those who favor the Marxist policies of guerrilla leader Robert Mugabe (2/29)," while Jay Ross of the Washington Post saw them simply as members of "Mugabe's Marxist-oriented party (2/29)."

Such language appeals to knee-jerk anti-communism, relying on stereotypes, and avoiding any reference to background which might generate a less hostile response.

By contrast, other Black leaders were depicted in much cooler language, with references to Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, and Nkomo, the veteran Black Nationalist.

Robert Mugabe

Interestingly, the characterizations of Mugabe underwent some transformation immediately following his electoral victory. For Peter Jennings at ABC, Mugabe became the "Nationalist guerrilla leader (3/4)." Mark Coogan informed his audience that "despite Mugabe's label of Marxist, African observers don't expect a communist state."

In a profile of Mugabe, Gregory Jaynes of the New York Times wrote, "Most white Rhodesians despise him . . . Whites see Mr. Mugabe as a murderer and a communist. His base has been socialist Mozambique and his expressed ideology is linked to the views of Marx and Lenin . . . Mr. Mugabe also sought to dispel concerns about him by presenting himself as a cultured, well-dressed political figure. There has been no suggestion of guerrilla connections. His well-tailored suits, mainly tan, have been set off by expensive shirts and shoes . . . His talk reflects the five degrees he earned, three of them during eleven years as a detainee of the former white-minority government (3/5)."

Jay Ross added a comment on Mugabe's religious outlook for readers of the Washington Post. He wrote: "For a man

seen as the devil incarnate by most white Rhodesians and even some Blacks, Robert Mugabe hardly seems to fit the image With his trace of a goatee, horned-rim glasses and natty suits often from London's stylish West End, he hardly looks like a man who spent ten years in Rhodesian prisons Although he makes no bones about his Marxist leanings, he has toned down that image in the last year, talking more about socialist principles in the manner of a European social democrat Mugabe is somewhat an anomaly since he was raised a devout Catholic and is now an avowed Marxist even though there is much evidence that he still practices his religion At one time, Mugabe called his political-economic philosophy by the ill-defined name Christian Socialism."

But not everyone was prepared to accept the view of Mugabe as a "Christian Socialist." On March 3, Robin Wright of CBS cautioned, "Although Mugabe has toned down his Marxist rhetoric since he returned to Rhodesia last month, Comrade President, as he refers to himself, is certain to mean major changes for Rhodesia and perhaps for all of southern Africa."

Ask No Questions

In general, American correspondents demonstrated their preference for Muzorewa by restricting their scrutiny of his campaign. To his credit, Gregory Jaynes of the *New York Times* did report that "Money in great quantities distinguishes Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa's campaign for the leadership of this country (2/21)."

On February 25, Jaynes reported: "Blocked by Rhodesia's High Court from raffling off six new Peugeot automobiles to supporters, the bishop nonetheless concluded a four-day rally on the outskirts of Salisbury by supplying voters with bottles of syrupy orange drinks and leaden loaves of bread." What, no fishes?

Certain peculiarities in Muzorewa's campaign didn't altogether escape the attention of the writers for the *Washington Post*. On February 26, Jay Ross observed, "Muzorewa's virtually unlimited financial backing, apparently from South Africa, has given him a distinct advantage in the campaign. He has the use of four helicopters and a prop-jet plane, all of which create an image of power with his African constituency."

No one, however, bothered to tell American readers that Mugabe and Nkomo had no aircraft at their disposal or that the Rhodesians had even confiscated some of their vehicles.

When pressed by Jaynes as to the source of his funding, Muzorewa stated, "We have said it does not matter where we get our funds, as long as it is not from communists." But that was the extent of any in-



Robert Mugabe. The Western press left their readers almost totally un-

investigative reporting that took place in Zimbabwe during the election.

Soames: High Praise

If the press was hostile to Mugabe, and cautious with Muzorewa, it tended to be very generous to the major British actors in the electoral drama. On June 24, John Burns suggested that Lord Carrington was "a credible candidate for a Nobel Peace Prize," adding that "the governor's [Lord Soames] accomplishments have been considerable." On June 26, Burns reported that the governor was "enjoying himself." Soames is quoted as having said, "Of course I'm having a splendid time. I can't imagine anything for a politician that would be more fascinating, can you?" The governor went on to compare his performance to a magician. "It's all done with mirrors," he said. "I have an endless supply of rabbits. Didn't you know?"

A *New York Times* editorial on March 5 stated, ". . . praise is due the interim British Governor, Lord Soames, whose exemplary bluffmanship kept all the candidates off guard so that none could cohesively cry 'Foul!'"

Yet there was another, more serious view of the Soames role. American readers were given only a glimmer of this perspective in one op-ed column in the *New York Times* of February 24. In a detailed criticism of the British role in overseeing the transition to majority rule, Randall Robinson, director of TransAfrica (a Black American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean) wrote, "Lord Soames, the British Governor in Rhodesia, has favored the whites and their

conservative candidate, Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, while penalizing the Patriotic Front, particularly the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)."

Among the criticisms of Lord Soames's maneuvers cited by Robinson:


- Permitting the Rhodesian Security Forces to return to full operational footing
- Deployment of over 25,000 armed "auxiliaries" loyal to Abel Muzorewa
- Allowing an estimated six thousand South African troops to remain in Rhodesia
- Failure to pursue investigations of terrorism and assassination attempts directed against the Patriotic Front
- Promulgation of a decree giving Soames the power to disenfranchise voters and prevent elections in certain districts
- Banning of ranking ZANU officials and election candidates
- Permitting the Rhodesian Army and Air Force to engage in political activities on behalf of Bishop Muzorewa, and
- Obstruction of the return of an estimated 200,000 refugees from outside the country.

Charges of British manipulation were so widespread that the Organization of African Unity called for a special meeting of the UN Security Council, and at a meeting in February a resolution was passed 14-0 which called on Britain to stop violating the London Agreement. Yet very little of this was deemed worthy of attention by American correspondents in Rhodesia.

American observers somewhat more open to the liberation movement's view-

Continued on page 21

Angola Under Fire



Eight battalions of the South African Defense Forces entered Angola during June, according to Elísio de Figueiredo, Angolan representative to the UN.

by Michael Schuster

Angola is at war again. Throughout June and early July several thousand South African troops were occupying significant areas of southern Angola. At the same time, a series of right-wing moves in Washington gave notice that Angola might soon have to deal with covert US intervention on a major scale. To some extent this double onslaught appeared to have been provoked by Angola's continuing support for SWAPO, which has been making important military gains in its liberation struggle against South African troops in Namibia. Apart from hitting SWAPO and punishing Angola, the attacks, particularly in the US, revealed profound hostility toward Angolan attempts to reconstruct society on an independent socialist base.

Ever since South Africa's retreat from Angola in April 1976, after the failure of its massive attempt to destroy the new MPLA government by force of arms, there has been constant skirmishing between South African forces operating out of northern Namibia and the Angolan army. Earlier this year, Pretoria intensified its armed actions on Angolan territory, and since late May, South African forces have been fighting almost continuously in southern Angola.

According to the Angolan ministry of defense, on May 21, a column of South African troops, backed by helicopters, armored cars, and heavy artillery, attacked Savate, a small town in the extreme

southeastern province of Cuando-Cubango, about 36 miles north of the Namibian border. Angolan government sources said that more than 200 Angolans were killed in fifteen hours of fighting there.

That attack has not been acknowledged by the South African defense ministry. Instead the South African press reported claims by UNITA, the anti-MPLA guerrilla movement supported by Pretoria, that its forces had seized the "strategic and important" town of Savate.

It is unlikely that UNITA forces were responsible for capturing Savate, but it is probably true that some UNITA forces accompanied the South Africans into Angolan territory. South Africa has been training, sheltering and supplying Savimbi's forces for several years, seeing in them a useful tool to be used against Angola and SWAPO.

On July 2, however General Jannie Geldenhuys, commander of the South African forces in Namibia, finally admitted that after a ground and air attack on targets inside Angola on June 10, his forces remained inside Angola to carry out what he termed "mopping up" operations against so-called SWAPO bases. The South Africans have claimed that all their attacks were directed against SWAPO targets, and they now say they have virtually wiped out SWAPO's military structure in southern Angola, killed 360 guerrillas and captured 150 tons of equipment, in exchange for the loss of seventeen South African lives. These

are the worst attacks against SWAPO positions since the raid on Cassinga in May 1978, which left more than 600 Namibian refugees and Angolan civilians dead.

It is still difficult to determine the exact details of the current series of strikes, as the South Africans have been cautious about releasing information, but it is possible to piece together a general picture, which indicates at least two waves of attacks after the May 21 incident. The first appears to have occurred on June 7 (the date mentioned in Angolan dispatches) or June 10, the date referred to by South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha when he announced the raid on June 13.

Then on June 23, according to the Angolan defense ministry, as many as 3,000 South African troops moved across the border into Cunene province and occupied several small towns. More than 300 civilians were said to have been killed. It took South Africa four days to admit that it had been involved in another military operation inside Angola, and even then it denied Angolan allegations about the scale of the operation. South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha wrote to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim on June 27 that "a small combat team" had entered Angola to take further action against SWAPO.

This is War

Angola presented a different picture of the invasion to the UN Security Council. "I cannot adequately convey the full dimen-

sions of the national tragedy that we face," Angola's UN Ambassador Elisio de Figueiredo told the council, "as the racist minority regime in Pretoria uses our territory as its battlefield and our people as its sport."

Figueiredo said that the South Africans had sent a motorized infantry brigade into Angolan territory. It was backed by armored cars and heavy artillery, he said. "These are not merely war preparations. This is war."

On June 27, the Security Council passed, by a vote of 12-0, a resolution condemning the South African attack and threatening to consider economic sanctions against Pretoria if South Africa continued such actions. The United States, Great Britain, and France abstained in the voting.

Clearly frustrated by the inability of the council to come up with stronger action Figueiredo said: "If the council does not act beyond the adoption of yet another resolution, if the council does not effectively implement these resolutions, then southern Africa will be the match that will ignite the world."

Why Now

Why did South Africa step up its activities against Angola so drastically during May and June? Some part of the answer to that question lies in the tangle of diplomatic activity surrounding the future of the southwest African territory of Namibia. The answer is further complicated by the activities of UNITA and by recent moves in the US Congress to set the stage for renewed CIA covert actions against Angola.

South Africa has for several years been playing for time in its negotiations with the United Nations over the future independence of that country. At each stage new "difficulties" have been found to postpone the moment for the transfer of power to Namibians. In mid-May, in its latest response to the United Nations proposals, South Africa attempted to introduce an entirely new element into the negotiations—suggesting that UNITA ought to be recognized as a party to the settlement discussions.

Pretoria included in its reply to the UN a letter from Jonas Savimbi, the head of UNITA. Savimbi in effect demanded to be included in the plans for a settlement in Namibia, which would accord him an important diplomatic position in his fight against the Luanda government. He threatened implicitly to disrupt the UN peacekeeping effort if Waldheim refused to accord him equal status with the Angolan government.

Since that time, "news" of UNITA's activities has been regularly featured in the South African press, culminating in the claim that UNITA was responsible for the attack in Cuando-Cubango in late May.

The South African press also gave full play to UNITA claims in mid-June that its forces had shot down an Angolan transport plane in southwestern Angola, killing, according to the South African account, almost thirty, including 22 East German soldiers on board.

SA Under Pressure

There is no doubt that the war in the area has stepped up, but the war is in northern Namibia waged by SWAPO, and not UNITA's activities in southern Angola. Accounts in the Namibian and South African press indicate that SWAPO has intensified its activities, forcing Pretoria to commit sizable extra forces to Namibia.

At the same time, the apartheid regime is facing stronger internal resistance to its rule than at any time since the Soweto uprising in 1976. With greater demands for police control at home, it is becoming harder to wage an effective war in Namibia.

South Africa needs a surrogate in its struggle against SWAPO, and UNITA provides a ready-made supply of cannon fodder. The more convincingly South Africa can portray UNITA as a military force to be reckoned with, the longer Pretoria can delay its acceptance of the UN plan for Namibian independence.

There also appears to be no solid evidence that UNITA is anywhere near as strong as South Africa would like the world to believe. But there is a move afoot in the US Congress, that, if successful, would make it easier to supply UNITA with arms and inevitably increase its threat to the government in Luanda.

A CIA Return

On June 17—in the middle of South Africa's attacks on Angola—the Senate passed an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act of 1980 that would lift the Clark amendment. The Clark amendment was passed by Congress in 1976 after the US threatened to become involved in the Angolan war. It prohibited any covert US military or paramilitary activity inside Angola unless the Congress should specifically authorize it.

The new amendment would effectively give the green light to CIA action that was stopped four years ago. It stipulates that no US aid may be given to any group for paramilitary or military operations in Angola "unless and until the president determines that such assistance should be furnished in the national security interests of the United States." If the president makes such a determination, the amendment requires him to report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the House Foreign Affairs Committee the details of the operations. But the president's report to those committees can be delivered in secret, whereas the Clark

amendment provided for public disclosure of any proposed operations against Angola, making covert operations impossible.

The intelligence community in Washington has been frustrated by the Clark amendment ever since it was passed, but that frustration reached a peak in the months following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. As the Carter administration appears to seek a renewal of the Cold War, CIA sources indicate growing Agency interest in covert operations in Afghanistan, Jamaica, and Angola. Repeal of the Clark amendment is crucial to any renewed US operations against the government in Luanda.

The move to repeal the Clark amendment was initiated by Senator Helms (R.—N.C.), who first proposed that the amendment be repealed outright. The present language of the new amendment was a "compromise" between Helms and liberals in the Senate, and was co-sponsored by Helms, Jacob Javits (R.—N.Y.), and Paul Tsongas (D.—M.A.). But the compromise does not effectively restrict future covert operations.

Helms has been a friend of Pretoria and white interests in southern Africa for a long time. His current move has no doubt won the blessings of circles inside South Africa as well as inside the Washington intelligence community. In addition, Helms is close to Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. Reagan has already gone on record in favor of supplying arms to UNITA.

"Frankly, I would provide [UNITA forces] with weapons," Reagan told the *Wall Street Journal* in May. "I don't see anything wrong with someone who wants to free themselves from the rule of an outside power, which is Cubans and East Germans. I don't see why we shouldn't provide them with the weapons to do it."

Thus perhaps the most important effect of the destruction of the Clark amendment is that it will identify US interests with those of the South African government. South Africa has been hoping for such a move from Washington since Jimmy Carter took office. In a time of increased tension and crisis inside South Africa, this would be a signal to Pretoria that Washington is still an ally.

By early July, the measure to repeal the Clark amendment had only passed the Senate. A conference committee of House and Senate members was expected to take up the matter some time in July.

If the new amendment becomes law, it will open the door to increased deliveries of arms and technical equipment to UNITA in the very area in Angola where South Africa has been hammering away over the past six weeks. Angola's enemies in Washington and Pretoria will be delighted. And it will be a way that Pretoria can wage its war against SWAPO—and against Angola—with renewed vigor. M.S.□



SASOL Blast Rocks South Africa

For many whites in South Africa, Sunday is a time to relax, a time for church, for a family outing, and then early to bed. Sunday, June 1 was no exception, and by midnight most people had settled in for the cold winter night. But for some, this was still a time for work, as it was for Robert, a young security guard at the NATREF oil refinery at Sasolburg near Johannesburg.

Midnight found Robert on his bicycle, patrolling along the plant where he discovered a neat hole cut in the security fence. Investigating, he was confronted by a figure dressed in black, who produced a gun, fired, and then fled. Wounded, Robert managed to sound the alarm on his radio, but he was too late. The intruders had already finished their work.

At SASOL 1, South Africa's billion dollar oil-from-coal conversion plant, four kilometers south of NATREF, investigators had also discovered a hole in the security fence just as a gigantic explosion ripped through the plant, sending a wall of flames thousands of feet into the sky. Minutes later, the fuel storage tanks at NATREF exploded, bathing the stricken plant in light as bright as midday. Said one awed observer, "It was like watching a nuclear bomb going off in the movies. I almost passed out."

At the same time, raiders attacked the mammoth SASOL II plant in Secunda, 150 miles to the northeast, exploding bombs near the processing unit, but causing only minor damage.

At Sasolburg, the twin infernos raged through the night, only finally being

brought under control Monday evening. Oily black smoke from the blasts rose thousands of feet into the sky, drifting forty miles into Johannesburg. Quite literally a war cloud had gathered over the white city.

In all three attacks the raiders escaped, despite the intensive search launched by police and local para-military "commando" units. Twelve hours later two bombs were discovered at the recruiting offices of Fluor Corporation, the giant US construction firm responsible for building South Africa's strategic SASOL projects. Those bombs, discovered by schoolboys, were disarmed only minutes before their timed detonation. South Africa had entered a new era.

White Confidence Shaken

In London, the African National Congress (ANC) confirmed what everyone already assumed, that it was their guerillas who had destroyed the tanks. But it was not just the storage tanks that lay in smoking ruin, but also white complacency. As one Black journalist put it: "A shaft of doubt had been fired into the very heart of the white laager."

Central to this complacency was the innate belief held by most whites that their African opponents were simply incapable of penetrating South Africa's powerful defenses and brutally efficient internal security network. By this racist reasoning, Blacks were simply too incompetent to pose a real threat to white lives and property, let alone SASOL, the symbol of South


Africa's self-reliance and industrial might. Some whites even have a name for this smug and comforting racial assumption; the "Kaffir factor".

But recent events in Africa have been chipping away at white arrogance; it has been undermined by Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe, riots in the Cape, industrial unrest, and the Silverton and Booyens attacks. Now Sasolburg has shattered it. While the physical damage caused by the raids is staggering enough—over \$7million—the damage to white confidence, though incalculable, is probably even more severe.

The liberal *Rand Daily Mail* solemnly concluded that "this country is now in a state of revolutionary war," and urged the government to negotiate with "the true leaders of the population." The government, however, saw the problem differently. Police Minister Louis Le Grange blamed the attacks on Joe Slovo, a white South African Communist Party member based in Maputo, Mozambique, and on the Soviet Ambassador to Zambia. He reiterated the threat that neighboring countries harboring ANC guerrillas would face military retaliation by the South African army, an apparent reference to Mozambique. Mozambique has consistently denied charges that it permits ANC forces to operate from its soil, and fears that it will be made the scapegoat for South Africa's internal unrest.

In contrast, the SASOL attacks are certain to boost Black opposition to the

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Leaks in the Laager

It must be hard to be a general in South Africa these days. True, the South African brass has a \$2.5 billion budget this year, and friends in the United States and Europe are happy to help them around the UN arms embargo—for a price. But there's a somber side as well. SWAPO guerrillas have pinned down 50,000 troops in Namibia, Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe has moved the front line to South Africa's long northern border, and the ANC has just penetrated two of the most heavily guarded installations in South Africa. Not a reassuring picture.

And now, to make things worse, the South Africans must contend with an apparent security leak at their military headquarters in Pretoria. Thousands of names and home addresses of South African conscripts on a classified computer list have been sent to SAMRAF, the South African Military Refugees Aid Fund, in New York. SAMRAF in turn passed the list on to the publishers of *Omkeer*, an underground anti-apartheid soldiers' pamphlet that encourages young whites to resist induction or desert the South African military.

The lists made it possible for the publishers of *Omkeer* to send thousands of copies to soldiers' homes during Christmas leave last December. And while many hundreds have been turned over to military authorities, additional hundreds have not.

South African military spokesmen at first denied as "nonsensical propaganda" charges by SAMRAF founder Don Morton that the lists had come from within the army itself. But as the story slowly reached

the South African press, high-level military representatives conceded that the labels used in the *Omkeer* mailing were identical to those used by the army. Military sources confirm that all such lists are restricted to military headquarters in Pretoria. Officials promise "a full investigation."

Possession of the list represents a major breakthrough for *Omkeer*, and for other anti-government publications as well. Two previous issues of *Omkeer* have been distributed within South Africa, but only on a very limited scale, from friend to trusted friend. With the computer lists, it has now become possible to reach thousands of young white South Africans through the mails. Anti-apartheid literature can now be delivered, ironically enough, by the South African state.

Service Increasingly Dangerous

And, more and more soldiers are likely to take an interest in such literature. Military service has become an increasingly onerous—and dangerous—obligation for South Africa's white youth. In 1978, the length of active service was doubled to two years, including a ten-month stint of combat duty in Namibia against tough SWAPO guerrillas. The Namibia tour is now followed by eight years in the reserves. In a land where the prime minister has declared a "total strategy" of militarization in defense of white privilege, and where conscientious objection on any grounds is illegal, *Omkeer* is considered a real threat.

Just how seriously the regime views *Omkeer* became apparent early this year

when dozens of threatening telephone calls from irate South Africans began to flood SAMRAF's Brooklyn offices, many at two or three in the morning. They came from soldiers who said they had received a copy of *Omkeer* but the calls were mostly from Durban and the Cape, areas not targeted by the first mailing.

With the calls pouring in unabated, SAMRAF was forced to vacate its headquarters. Meanwhile, friends in South Africa and the US tried to find out what was causing all the trouble. After some delay, a copy of *Omkeer* was located in South Africa and sent to the US. But upon inspection, the pamphlet, despite its title and appearance, was not *Omkeer* at all. It was a bogus issue, apparently created and distributed by South African intelligence agents in the U.S.

Placed side by side, the two *Omkeers* look identical. The cover, illustrations, layout, and articles are the same. And like the original the fake *Omkeer* was mailed from the US, but there the similarity ends. In place of the carefully argued case against service in the South African army, the counterfeiters substituted absurdly rhetorical language and wild statistics in an obvious effort to alienate readers and discredit the war resisters movement.

In the section on alternative service, for instance, the original reads: "Finally there is the option to go into the heart of the beast i.e. to join up and disrupt and resist the apartheid military machine from within, by whatever means possible." The bogus copy says: "Finally there is the option to go

into the heart of the beast i.e. to join the army. By resisting all military discipline, even turning against your loved ones you will successfully further the cause of communism. It is not too much to sacrifice the lives of your girlfriend, parents, or wife for the noble cause of communism. However it should be realized that the South African government has a well-organized intelligence system, BOSS, and exposure of your treason might mean capital punishment."

An article in the original by SWAPO's UN representative Theo Ben-Gurirab defines the central issue in South Africa as "the struggle for power between the black majority, on the one hand, and fascist junta, under the leadership of the all-white Nationalist Party, on the other." The bogus *Omkeer* states, "The primary contradiction at the present time in South Africa is the struggle between Communism and Capitalism." Ben-Gurirab's references to "the racist, white-minority-dominated . . . South Africa" becomes "the anti-communist South Africa" in the government's rewritten version.

Despite its crudeness, the fake *Omkeer* provides a useful view of the way South Africa has chosen to present itself to its white constituency and to public opinion in the West. Throughout the bogus publication, the authors have deleted all reference to apartheid, racism, and majority rule, substituting the catchwords communism, Marxism, and terrorism.

"The bogus copy attempts to re-define the struggle in South Africa," said one of *Omkeer*'s clandestine editors in New York. "Where we call on white soldiers to resist and reject apartheid as a system internal to South Africa, the bogus edition consistently poses the reason for the war as a thing foreign and external to South Africa. The writers of the bogus *Omkeer* consistently deleted mention of the apartheid system, preferring to characterize our movement as opposing the South African states' anti-communism, rather than as a resistance movement against the apartheid military state. Again and again the terms, liberation movement, Black majority, and national movement are replaced with the words Marxist or communist movements, giving support to the authors' contention that the primary contradiction is between the communists and the capitalists."

No doubt, South Africa's propagandists can sell this political fable to cold-warriors in the West and in white South Africa. But it is just as clear that Blacks aren't buying. Prime Minister Botha's "reform" proposals have been flatly rejected by their intended beneficiaries, and increased ANC guerilla activity has been matched by internal unrest. The message is clear: Blacks want an end to white minority rule, and no counterfeiter can fake that. M.F. □

Unity Grows, Protests Continue

"One thing is certain," Black South African journalist Percy Qoboza predicted as the fourth anniversary of the June 16, 1976 Soweto uprising neared. "The day when this nation celebrates June 16th as an official commemoration day is inevitable."

Until that day arrives, however, June 16 will just as inevitably be the occasion for an annual measurement of the growing strength of black resistance to white supremacist rule. Apartheid's rulers clearly see it that way. They did their utmost this year to prevent any strong show of Black defiance, banning all political meetings, arresting more than 1,000 people in the week before the anniversary, barring foreign reporters from black townships, and finally opening fire on angry crowds that gathered in spite of the ban.

The repressive tactics backfired. Townships and factories exploded in an upheaval characterized by the *New York Times* as "by far the worst since the anti-Government uprising in black, Indian and mixed-race areas that began four years ago this week." By the time the tear gas and gunsmoke cleared, more than 40 people were dead and hundreds more wounded by

police bullets and savage baton charges.

The protests indicated that four years of government crackdowns on Black organizations and more than year of aggressively publicized "reforms" have hardened rather than eroded Black resistance. As the generally conservative London *Times* observed in an editorial marking the Soweto anniversary, "the whole programme [of government reform and repression in response to Soweto] merely serves to reveal the bankruptcy of South African political thought. The four years since Soweto have been thrown away."

Corporate Concern

That indictment of Prime Minister P.W. Botha's "total strategy" was echoed in corporate boardrooms where the *Financial Times* reported "growing concern, especially among foreign investors, about the resurgence of unrest." Multinational corporations had lobbied strenuously for a relaxation in apartheid regulations that contribute to an acute shortage of skilled labor. Now some of them seem to be having second thoughts. The *Financial Times* report notes concern "that the liberalization



Workers in South Africa voting at a union meeting. Increasingly, workers are saying no to low wages, and poor working conditions.



Working on the assembly line. In June, workers at major international automotive factories rejected employer wage offers and walked off the job.

wanted by the business community—if only to overcome such economic bottle necks as the skilled labor shortage—will only arouse ever higher expectations.”

And the corporations have good reason to be alarmed. Many of them became prime targets in a wave of strikes that crested with a one-day walkout by 80 percent of the black workforce in the Cape Town region on June 16.

Workers at a number of major industrial plants, including Ford, General Motors and Volkswagen recently stayed out on strike until they won a twenty percent wage boost. Even as those strikes came to an end, police had to use tear gas, clubs and dogs in a street battle with workers dismissed by a Goodyear Tire factory eight days after they walked off the job. On July 1, one Black was reported killed during another clash between police and striking Goodyear workers. And on the same day the American Committee on Africa reported that Goodyear was just one of several major American corporations designated as industrial “key points” under South African law and ordered to assist the government in putting down the wave of strikes and demonstrations. (See *Southern Africa*, May 1978, for the text of a secret General Motors memo detailing plans for collaborating with the South African government “in the event of civil unrest.”)

Taken by themselves, the strikes would have constituted a major “event of civil

unrest.” But they did not happen by themselves. They capped months of growing labor unrest, student demonstrations and boycotts, and stepped up guerrilla actions, including the daring June 1 attack on two coal-to-oil refineries (see article in this issue). And they came amid clear signs of what the *Financial Times* predicted “would be most likely to invite a drastic government clampdown”—“firm evidence of collaboration across ethnic lines, or a student hand in industrial unrest.”

“Colored” activists emphasized that this new-found solidarity meant a firm identification with the overall Black struggle against apartheid. “We’ve always been a natural ‘middle-class,’” noted Allan Boesak, chaplain at the “colored” University of the Western Cape. “But the government hasn’t taken advantage of this and as a result black consciousness came here.” A mixed-race school teacher put it more bluntly. “We are black and our future is with the black majority,” the teacher told *Africa News*.

Core Hardens

Some press reports made much of the fact that “colored” students and workers were the shock troops in this year’s protests, while Soweto and other Black townships remained relatively quiet. But other accounts interpreted this as a sign of toughening rather than willing Black militancy.

“There are a growing number of young blacks who believe that the only answer is for them to finish their education as quickly as possible and leave the country for military training,” one former Soweto school teacher remarked. “They are not in favor of peaceful protests like the current school boycott. They see that as simply providing cannon fodder for the police.”

Even some of those still engaged in peaceful protest, including Bishop Desmond Tutu, secretary-general of the South African Council of Churches, now speak openly and sympathetically of the possibility of armed struggle. “I do not rule out giving personal support to an armed black rebellion,” Tutu stated. And he warned that it might be more imminent than many people think. “We have always had crises, but I think we are now reaching a crunch point,” said the Bishop, who had his passport confiscated early March and was arrested in late May. Tutu even suggested how he expects the “crunch point” to be resolved, predicting that imprisoned African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela will be Prime Minister of South Africa within five to ten years.

That prediction may prove overly optimistic. But the recent protests marked significant progress toward what Mandela himself defined as the essential requirement for victory in a post-Soweto statement only recently smuggled off South Africa’s maximum security prison at Robben Island. “The first condition for victory is black unity,” Mandela wrote. “Every effort to divide the blacks, to woo and pit one black group against another, must be vigorously repulsed. Our people—African, Indian, Coloured and democratic whites must be united into a single massive and solid wall of resistance, of united mass action.”

When that day dawns, it will also bring the day that Percy Qoboza predicted with such certainty “will happen in the life span of the present generation.” The day when June 16 will become an official commemoration day in a free South Africa, not a banned demonstration prohibited at gunpoint, to honor those who died during that Soweto rebellion and those like Phindi Mavuso who will bear its scars for the rest of their lives. Phindi Mavuso was only fifteen in 1976 when a police bullet shattered one of her legs. The leg had to be amputated. But when interviewed on the eve of this year’s fourth anniversary of the Soweto rebellion, Mavuso looked back more in pride than in anger.

“The approach of June 16 which marked the beginning of the uprising has since 1976 made me feel proud because I regard my injury as one of those casualties that go along with the struggle,” she said. “I find it better to die young while fighting for justice and the truth than to live longer without doing anything to fight for liberation.” A.M.

New Constitutional Moves

Soon after coming to office, South African Prime Minister Piet Botha challenged national and international opinion with a seemingly new approach to the future of South Africa. Botha's 1979 watchwords, "adapt or die" captured the imaginations of those who wanted to believe that meaningful change could issue forth from the executive headquarters of apartheid. Today, Botha's "total strategy," code name for his new approach, is under attack from many directions, as far apart as the violent streets of Cape Town and the inner sanctums of his own ruling brethren in the National Party. Despite this, Botha continues advancing new initiatives. His latest efforts are reflected in the constitutional changes proposed by the hand-picked Schibusch Commission Botha appointed to deal with this issue.

Among its major proposals the commission calls for parliament to be enlarged by twenty appointed seats, and the Senate to be disbanded and replaced by a president-appointed council of whites, "coloreds," Indians and Chinese. This 60-seat State President's Council would, for the first time in South African history, bring non-whites into the government—albeit, only as servants, chosen by Botha with limited powers to advise "on any matter" short of legislation, the exclusive province of whites.

Africans will have no representation on the new council. According to the legislation drawn up to implement this Schibusch proposal they will sit on a separate committee, subordinate to the President's Council and thus be as far away from the white Parliament as is structurally possible without being outside the government. The President's Council will consult with the African council "at its discretion."

Some measure of the distance that divides the Nationalist government from social reality was evidenced when the justification for African exclusion was given by the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Hennie Smit. Africans were "less developed," said Smit, and had "slower thought processes," and were "slower in assimilating constitutional processes."

Almost all Black South Africans have rejected the proposals—African leaders being joined by representatives of other Black (Asian and "colored") communities in condemnation of the farce. Only a few bantustan ministers and government-



P.W. Botha

sanctioned community council representatives have indicated their willingness to accept the new councils.

Planning Ahead

Botha appears to hope that these new bodies will function as a "mini national constitutional convention," to work on replacing the universally criticized present structure of government by a future system of "confederal" independent African bantustans through which the majority of Black South Africans would exercise their so-called political rights. In this way, the "total strategy" would seek to divide power, not to share it, in ways that would build buffers around entrenched white rule.

Any belief in change emanating from a possible convention is becoming increasingly discredited among Blacks, Dr. Nthato Motlana of the Soweto committee of 10 recently told a convocation of elite students at Stellenbosch University, the Afrikaaner "Harvard" of South Africa. Even if real change could come through constitutional reforms, he said, whites presently are not disposed to make the kinds of concessions that would allow for such change, because they still retain the power to enforce their political will.

Yet it seems clear that the more sophisticated white interest groups, particularly at the corporate and university level recognize that some change is unavoidable, and in fact urgently needed.

Thus at Stellenbosch University the "heirs apparent" to apartheid leadership recently brought together a range of political viewpoints—from white supremacist to Black nationalist—to talk about the future. This diverse public forum overwhelmingly rejected the status quo and, with a few right-wing exceptions, also rejected a future based on partition into "confederal" states, calling instead for common citizenship and negotiations between all representative political leaders. Whites, it was argued, would have to give up their monopoly of state power.

A month earlier Stellenbosch students had shocked public opinion by challenging Botha with tough questions, laughter, and boos when he attempted to defend his "total strategy"—an occurrence totally unthinkable a few years ago.

Where Next?

Many Botha supporters inside and outside government suggest that he plans to go beyond the confederal plans toward real, fundamental change. While nothing in the prime minister's statements supports this view (in fact he has often contradicted it) they suggest he raises these designs to fend off too rapid mobilization of the country's right-wing against him. Others, including many Black leaders, see in his designs a new rewording of traditional Verwoerdian apartheid ideology.

It is not clear where Botha's planning will take him, but his moves suggest that he believes that he cannot stand fast on the status quo.

The collapse of the white buffer zone states of Angola, Mozambique and, most recently, Zimbabwe, has sent South African handwriting analysts scurrying to the walls to read the political forecasts. The startlingly successful ANC guerrilla strikes against major oil installations strengthen the fear that South Africa may share a similar fate. Increasingly, pressures from Africa and the West over Namibia also cloud the future. And, despite recent attempts to crush SWAPO militarily, Pretoria must face the likelihood that the war in Namibia will continue to drain South Africa's national will and resources. Finally, popular revolts of Soweto '76 and Cape Town '80 have proved again that conditions cannot remain unchanged for much longer.

Yet change also entails a threat from
over

right-wing forces inside and outside the ruling National party. A recent election in a National Party stronghold saw the National Party's majority cut from 92 percent a year ago to 69 percent, to the advantage of the ultra-conservatives who are calling Botha everything but a traitor to apartheid. They are repulsed by the idea of granting any concessions to Blacks, fearful that this might eventually lead to the "unthinkable"—majority rule. They stand poised to challenge Botha's rule should he make a too obvious mistake.

But Botha appears to have some weapons of his own designed to deal with his erstwhile allies who are now proving so recalcitrant. "Total strategy" is not a plan for strengthening liberal democracy in South Africa. In fact it is based on a growing centralization of real power in the hands of a powerful executive which will brook no challenge from white or black dissenters.

The recent Steyn Commission investigation into press reporting on defense and police matters described the struggle between the "South African [government's] initiative" and others calling for majority rule as "fierce, merciless, all-embracing, continuous and escalating." "Total strategy" will mean an all-out struggle on many fronts to re-fashion apartheid's present and future to the continuing advantage of the ruling white minority.

A Weakness in Practice

Yet the result thus far has been the application of a range of tactics in contradictory ways which seem to subvert the intended strategic goals. For example, some of the most obsolete and abhorrent so-called petty apartheid social and economic legislation is being scrapped and there are much-trumpeted concessions to parts of the black labor force. Yet Transport Minister Christ Heunis has said that apartheid signs are needed on the railways to avoid "friction" and currently thousands of mixed-race citizens face eviction from white areas, though Botha has said people must stop treating them as "lepers."

A key element in the new policy is the desire to create an internal Black "buffer zone" in the form of an urban elite with a raised socio-economic status. Towards this end, large increases have been announced for proposed spending on adult education, secondary and advanced technical education for Blacks in the white areas. But given the backlog and the gap between the races, this will likely generate a very small elite which may in turn inflame mass disapproval. And even among the elite, the radicalizing power of rising yet unfulfilled political expectations may unleash unsettling forces in apartheid's midst.

The Schlebusch proposals envision the

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Hunting Oil

South Africa is a vast storehouse of mineral riches, including gold, diamonds, uranium and coal. But, the Republic has no known oil of its own, and that makes it vulnerable to outside threats of an embargo. To escape this vulnerability the apartheid state is developing a vast oil-from-coal industry. At the same time, the country's largest corporation, Anglo-American, is deeply involved in adding foreign oil interests to its \$15 billion minerals empire.

In late March, a sudden shift in the fortunes of the Hunt brothers—the US corporate giants notorious for their silver market speculations—gave Anglo access to important prospecting rights in the Canadian Beaufort Sea, through Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals Corporation of New York—a company in which it holds a controlling interest.

The Hunts had been buying and selling silver speculatively for years, pushing the price up and making huge paper fortunes. But in early 1980 when the price plunged, the Hunts found themselves unable to pay for the silver they were pledged to buy at the old high price. One of their largest contracts was with Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals Corporation, and involved an agreement to buy 19 million ounces of silver at an average \$35 an ounce, with \$700 million due March 31. On April 1 Engelhard announced that the Hunts had not been able to meet this payment, and had instead, as part of a settlement, transferred to the company a 20 percent undivided interest in each of the blocks of permits that they held for oil exploration in the Beaufort Sea. The concessions cover a total of some 3.5 to 3.7 million acres, and their value has been variously estimated at between \$300 and \$700 million.

"The Beaufort Sea has the potential of being the largest single oil-producing area outside of Saudi-Arabia," said Milton F. Rosenthal, chairman and chief executive officer of Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals. Engelhard, through its principle subsidiary Philipp Brothers, is already one of the world's major commodity trading companies, and Anglo-American controls a 29 percent interest in Engelhard via a Ber-

muda based holding company—Minorco.

Attempts were made to block the transfer by alerting both government members and concerned groups in Canada to the South African connection involved in this deal. Several Canadian groups, including representatives of the indigenous populations and trade unions, have already been campaigning against foreign control of Canadian resources. The Beaufort Sea deal may provide a basis for an alliance opposing the transfer of Canadian oil interests to a South African company.

Early reports indicated that the transfer might have to be submitted for approval to the Foreign Investment Review Agency—a Canadian government watchdog agency. But in late May, FIRA decided that Engelhard would not be subject to its formalities.

As a result of expanding South African investment, however, there does appear to be a potential for future actions challenging South African oil interests in Canada. There have been press reports that Engelhard may consider exchanging the Beaufort Sea exploration rights for already producing properties elsewhere in Canada. Such an exchange would put Engelhard in direct control of crude oil.

Prospecting in the Beaufort Sea has only begun recently, but there have already been several finds and an official for Dome Petroleum, which is testing in the area, said in mid-June that oil shipments might begin in 1985 and could reach 1 million barrels a day in 1990.

Other Investments

The oil for silver deal is only the most prominent example of a consistent trend as Anglo reaches out as an energy company.

The corporation has already acquired considerable international holdings in oil exploration and producing companies, primarily through Minorco, but often through several intermediary holding companies. In this fashion Anglo controls 62 percent of Canadian Merrill Ltd., a company involved in oil and gas exploration, development and production in Canada and the US. It has an eighty percent interest in Francana Oil and Gas Ltd, a Canadian based oil exploration and development company also active in the US and Canada. Francana in turn controls Trend International and Trend Exploration—companies with interests in the US, Canada, Indonesia, Paraguay, the Philippines and the UK. J.D.□

Write the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa for a detailed report on the Engelhard/Hunt deal. Silver into Black Gold: Canada and Oil Sanctions on South Africa. TCLSAC, 427 Bloor Street West, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

ANC Releases Mandela Statement

In mid-June, just before the fourth anniversary of the Soweto uprisings, the African National Congress of South Africa released the following statement by imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela. Written in the aftermath of the Soweto uprisings, the statement took over two years to be smuggled out of South Africa and reach ANC headquarters in Lusaka Zambia.

ANC President Oliver Tambo introduced the statement by saying: "We believe the message remains fresh and valid and should be presented to our people. The ANC urges you to respond to this call and make 1980 a year of united mass struggle."

We have reprinted the statement in full below.

Racist Rule by the Gun

The gun has played an important part in our history. The resistance of the black man to white colonial intrusion was crushed by the gun. Our struggle to liberate ourselves from white domination is held in check by force of arms. From conquest to the present, the story is the same. Successive white regimes have repeatedly massacred unarmed defenceless blacks. And wherever and whenever they have pulled out their guns, the ferocity of their fire has been trained on the African people. Apartheid is the embodiment of the racialism, repression and inhumanity of all previous white supremacist regimes. To see the real face of apartheid, we must look beneath the veil of constitutional formulas, deceptive phrases and playing with words. The rattle of gunfire and the rumbling of Hippo armoured vehicles since June 1976, have once again torn aside the veil. Spread across the face of our country, in black townships, the racist army and police have been pouring a hail of bullets, killing and maiming hundreds of black men, women and children.

The toll of the dead and injured already surpasses that of all past massacres carried out by this regime. Apartheid is the rule of the gun and the hangman. The Hippo, the rifle and the gallows are its true symbols. These remain the easiest resort, the ever ready solution of the race-man rulers of South Africa.

Vague Promises, Greater Repression

In the midst of the present crisis, while our people count the dead and nurse the injured, they ask themselves: What lies ahead? From our rulers, we can expect nothing. They are the ones who give orders to the soldier crouching over his rifle, theirs is the spirit that moves the finger that caresses the trigger. Vague promises, tinkering with the machinery of apartheid, constitution juggling, massive arrests and detentions, side by side with renewed overtures aimed at weakening and forestalling the unity of us black and dividing the forces of change—these are the fixed paths along which they will move. For they are neither capable nor willing to heed the verdict of the masses of our people.

The Verdict of June 16

The verdict is loud and clear: Apartheid has failed. Our people remain unequivocal in its rejection. The young and the old, parent and child, all reject it. At the forefront of the 1976/1977 wave of unrest, were our students and youth. They come from the universities, high schools and even primary schools. They are a generation whose whole education has been under the diabolical design of the racists to poison the minds and brainwash our children into docile subjects of apartheid rule. But after more than 20 years of Bantu Education, the circle is closed and nothing demonstrates the utter bankruptcy of apartheid as the revolt of our youth. The evils, the cruelty and the inhumanity of apartheid have been there from its inception. And blacks, Africans, Coloured and Indians have opposed it all along the line. What is now unmistakable, what the current wave of unrest has sharply highlighted is this: That despite all the window dressing and smooth talk, apartheid has become intolerable. This awareness reaches over and beyond

the particulars of our enslavement. The measure of this truth is the recognition by our people that under apartheid, our lives, individually and collectively, count for nothing.

Unite!

We face an enemy that is deep-rooted, an enemy entrenched and determined not to yield. Our march to freedom is long and difficult. But both within and beyond our borders the prospects of victory grow bright. The first condition for victory is black unity. Every effort to divide the blacks, to woo and pit one black group against another, must be vigorously repulsed. Our people—African, Indian, Coloured and democratic whites must be united into a single massive and solid wall of resistance, of united mass action. Our struggle is growing sharper. This is not the time for the luxury of division and disunity. At all levels and every walk of life, we must close the ranks.

Within the ranks of the people, differences must be submerged to the achievement of a single goal—the complete overthrow of apartheid and race domination.

Victory is Certain!

The revulsion of the world against apartheid is growing and the frontiers of white supremacy are shrinking. Mozambique and Angola are free and the war of liberation gathers force in Namibia and Zimbabwe. The soil of our country is destined to be the scene of the fiercest fight and the sharpest battles to rid our continent of the last vestiges of white minority rule. The world is on our side. The OAU, the United Nations and the Anti-Apartheid movement continue to put pressure on the racist rulers of our country. Every effort to isolate South Africa adds strength to our struggle. At all levels of our struggle, within and outside the country, much has been achieved and much remains to be done. But victory is certain!

We Salute All of You!

We who are confined within the grey walls of the Pretoria regime's prisons reach out to our people. With you we count those who have perished by means of the gun and the hangman's rope. We salute all of you—the living, the injured and the dead, for you have dared to rise up against the tyrant's might. Even as we bow at their graves we remember this: The dead live on as martyrs in our hearts and minds, a reproach to our disunity and the host of shortcomings that accompany the oppressed, a spur to our efforts to close ranks, and a reminder that the freedom of our people is yet to be won. We face the future with confidence. For the guns that serve apartheid cannot render it unconquerable. Those who live by the gun shall perish by the gun.


Unite Mobilise Fight On!

Between the anvil of united action and the hammer of armed struggle we shall crush apartheid and white minority racist rule.

AMANDLA NGAWETHU!

MATLA KE A RONA!

Zimbabwe's Economy: Despite Immediate Problems, A Bright Future Lies Ahead



by Patrick Lawrence

Gold mines at Eiffle Flats, Zimbabwe. Rich in mineral deposits, the new Zimbabwe has, potentially, one of the healthiest economies in Black Africa.

When he took office on April 18, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, inherited by common consent what is potentially one of the healthiest economies in Black Africa—even though it has been damaged severely by five years of intensive war between nationalist guerrillas and the white minority of what was formerly the British colony of Rhodesia. There is little question among economists, bankers, analysts, and business executives that the economy of Zimbabwe is about to reverse a five-year decline in its overall growth and post a gain of three to five percent in its gross domestic product for 1980 (about Z\$2.6 billion, 1979); growth rates for 1981 and beyond are expected to be even higher.

Patrick Lawrence is a long time southern Africa liberation supporter and was formerly a member of the Southern Africa collective.

Those are impressive figures for a non-oil-producing third world nation, especially when considered in the current climate of worldwide recession, when growth in the healthiest industrialized countries will be minimal and when Britain and the US will post negative growth rates of two to three percent.

Prime Minister Mugabe also inherited some difficult problems, however. Nearly all of these can be viewed in terms of his government's need to balance its short-term tactical moves, as dictated by the requirements of day-to-day administration, against its longer term objectives. Having taken command of the economic and administrative structure of the colonial government virtually intact, Mugabe and his economic planners must make drastic shifts in economic priorities in coming years if the economy is to serve the majority of

Zimbabweans as it never has before. This process started, almost literally, on April 18.

At the same time, there are urgent tasks that must be undertaken, for the time being, under existing conditions—procurement and distribution of sufficient amounts of grain, for instance, job creation programs, meeting wage demands, and regaining and maintaining relatively high levels of foreign investment and exports.

Mugabe's economic strategy appears thus far to be designed to balance these often-conflicting pressures to the best advantage of the country's majority. "It's a tightrope," says Ann Seidman, a development economist at Clark University, of the Mugabe government's economic position. "There are no easy answers for anybody."

The Mugabe government's most immediate difficulties stem largely from the

war. Although the country's wealth of resources is cause for optimism in the middle and long term, the new administration is immediately faced with what one analyst has called "a severe economic situation" whose main characteristics now are "dislocation and hunger."

Even prior to the end of the war earlier this year, the unemployment level in Zimbabwe was worsening, as industries were forced to curtail production for lack of skilled personnel and agricultural areas were more widely affected by the war. Now, however, there are also thousands of refugees returning from camps in neighboring countries, demobilized soldiers, and the hundreds of thousands of people released from the former government's "protected villages"—virtual prisons in which it was impossible to conduct even subsistence agriculture.

Zimbabwe's economic potential lies largely in its advantageous balance between manufacturing, mining and farming. Because agriculture was not sacrificed as industrial sectors grew, the country can be expected to eventually regain and keep its position as a net food exporter—becoming a kind of regional breadbasket to help fuel development in neighboring countries.

Now, however, Zimbabwe is a net importer of grains, especially wheat and maize, which are staples of the local diet. Although current figures show a trickle of exports to established markets, the government now imports 10,000 metric tons of wheat monthly, at Z\$135 (US\$ 202.5) per ton.* Domestically, the government announced late last month that minimum producer prices for maize would be raised by 41 percent, to Z\$120 (US\$180) a metric ton. The move will bring the producer price next planting season near to twice what consumers will pay for maize—the obvious implication being that the government's plans include large farm subsidies (up to Z\$45 million or US \$67.5 million, by some estimates) in its new budget, due to be published in late July.

Such a subsidy is expected to increase domestic food production output considerably, and this, in turn, will reduce or even eliminate Zimbabwe's current dependence on imports. It is also expected to prop flagging morale among white farmers, who still control most of Zimbabwe's productive farming areas.

The decision on maize subsidies illustrates perfectly the tension between near-term necessities and longer-term planning. As part of its crucial land-reform program, the government has already purchased more than 300,000 acres of vacant farm land for the resettlement of refugees, former soldiers and dislocated subsistence farmers. But for now, this program must

* Z\$1 = approx. \$1.50

1 metric ton = 2,205 pounds

co-exist with another priority: easing fears among white farmers who control farm output—which in turn is responsible for about a third of Zimbabwe's foreign exchange earnings. Once Mugabe took office, Professor Seidman said, "The question quickly became, 'How do you get this economy going as rapidly as possible.'"

Workers' Demands

The same principle applies to the wage situation. Late in May the government increased minimum wages by up to fifty percent—increases that still fell far short of expectations among restive workers. The overriding concerns in government, however, were to avoid inflationary wage rises, and to assuage fears of economic disruption among local employers, real or potential aid donors and foreign investors. As it was, the move resulted in about 5,000 layoffs before it went into effect in July, after which time layoffs as a result of the law would be illegal.

Many Western business executives and government officials believe that the Mugabe government's "moderation" in economic policy stems largely from lessons learned in Mozambique—the principal one being, these sources believe, that socialist economies do not work.

Professor Seidman and others believe that there were lessons learned during the years ZANU had its headquarters in Maputo and its main guerrilla camps in western Mozambique. But they believe the Mugabe government saw the necessity to construct socialism on a solid economic foundation which requires encouraging skilled Europeans to stay in the country long enough to train replacements. Seidman also pointed out that neither Angola nor Mozambique were anxious to nationalize industry as quickly and extensively as they did. These moves were taken at the pace they were only out of necessity.

The South African Connection

Apart from the long-term restructuring of the economy into collective modes of production, first in agriculture and then eventually in industry, the other serious economic problem facing the new government is South Africa. The two countries' economic and financial links stretch back to Rhodesia's founding as a white settlement under the control of the British South Africa Company in 1890. From such beginnings, the Rhodesian economy developed largely as an outgrowth of the South African economy. The results today are striking: the country's industrial financing, transport, supply and distribution systems are all strongly oriented toward South Africa; South Africa purchases, for instance; 70 percent of Zimbabwe's manufactured goods, and the role of South African bank capital in Zimbabwe's industrial

development has been, Professor Seidman said, "a very powerful element."

The Multinationals

The South African link also brings with it the problem of multinational involvement. The Zimbabwe economy is unusual for its proportion of multinational enterprise in virtually all sectors. In many instances, Zimbabwe operations have been conducted from regional headquarters in South Africa. In the case of the US, for instance, eighty percent of its manufacturing capacity in Africa is located in South Africa, and many of these companies had branch operations or sales and distribution offices in Salisbury prior to the imposition of sanctions. Many of these are likely to restart operations.

Whether multinational involvement proves desirable or not in the long term is a question that will remain for some time. Most informed analysts, taking into account the new government's political and social priorities as well as its short-term requirements, believe that some multinationals will be able to work within the framework that will be constructed gradually by the government. Multinationals reinvesting in domestic industries that contribute to the development of the internal economy are likely to be allowed to continue operating even once the process of selective nationalization gets under way.

In opening Zimbabwe's first international trade fair in Bulawayo early in May, Mugabe said, "It is my government's intention to persuade potential investors to consider the needs of this country first and foremost. We welcome investment, but it must be Zimbabwe-oriented. In other words, the majority shareholding must remain inside the country and profits reinvested here."

That speech sent minor tremors through board rooms from New York to London to Frankfurt to Tokyo. The strategy behind the prime minister's remarks is clear, but Mugabe felt called upon to emphasize the word "persuade" in clarifying remarks the next day.

The South African link is likely to prove even less tractable. Apart from the job of disengaging from long-standing links with the apartheid state in virtually every sector, there is the complementary problem of developing new links with Black neighbors where none had previously existed.

Meetings on this subject have been held regularly for the past year, and Mugabe has taken an active role in them. Although building the infrastructure and implementing new trade links and economic ties will be a lengthy process, two early indications of what this will look like lie in the reopening of an oil pipeline from Beira to Zimbabwe, which will not be completed for

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Self-Help in the War Against Disease

During the Zimbabwe election campaign, ZANU-PF emphasized the urgent need for improving health services, and promised to "offer a free national health service, deliver primary health care to the whole nation—the whole people—regardless of race."

Shortly after independence, Warren Day visited Zimbabwe and took a look at the first efforts to realize this pledge.

by Warren Day

A white baby born in Salisbury in 1978 had a fifty percent chance of passing the ripe old age of 65. An African baby born on the same day and in the same city had very different prospects. In fact, this infant had a fifty percent chance of living beyond five years. If born in the rural areas he or she could expect an even bleaker future. Here the infant mortality rate was estimated as high as 22 percent, with isolated districts reporting rates up to thirty percent. That white child, on the other hand, was the beneficiary of a very different set of statistics: an infant mortality rate of 1.7 percent—among the lowest in the world.

The grossly inadequate health services provided for the African population by the settler regime was further diminished by the war, resulting in major increases in malaria, schistosomiasis, and other endemic debilitating diseases. Treatment became increasingly impossible as 193 rural clinics and 45 rural hospitals, caught in the crossfire of the liberation struggle, were forced to close.

The new government now faces a formidable task as its attempts to build a new, healthy nation, and to break away from a system which provided excessive privileges for the white population. Zimbabwe has inherited a pattern of common diseases parallel to that found in most underdeveloped countries: malnutrition, airborne diseases (measles, pneumonia, tuberculosis), faecally-transmitted and water-borne diseases (gastro-enteritis, typhoid, cholera), water-washed diseases (leprosy, trachoma, scabies) and vector-borne diseases (malaria, plague, schistosomiasis or bilharzia).

Warren Day, a long-time liberation supporter, just completed two years as senior lecturer in the Division of Community Medicine, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. While there, he visited Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, exploring links between ideology and environmental health.



Health care in the refugee camps. Zimbabwe's new health care officials can draw on experience gained during the war to help guide future policy decisions.

Malnutrition

Malnutrition heads this fearsome list. Not only is it a major cause of disease and death, but it is also an associated cause of many of the other diseases. Not only poverty, but deliberate policy of the Smith regime played a key role in increasing malnutrition. As the war ended, for instance, the Rhodesian security forces mounted "Operation Turkey" which included the destruction of crops, livestock, huts, cattle dips and personal property—an anti-guerrilla scorched earth campaign in the rural areas.

During the war, the Patriotic Front had already outlined some basic health problems and drawn up detailed solutions. ZANU and ZAPU strategists, meeting in Tanzania in 1978, adopted a plan which drew heavily from various models of primary health care established in other third world countries, most particularly in neighboring Mozambique and Tanzania. These policies had been initiated in the bush in Mozambique and in the Patriotic Front controlled areas in Zimbabwe itself.

Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, the new Minister of Health, served as overall commander of the ZANU medical corps and was, as well, ZANU secretary for health during the war. As he begins to implement new health policy, he can draw on his first hand experience.

When I interviewed him in Zimbabwe he spoke of the importance of health to the population. "It is important that you ex-

tract the same commitment for health as you have for the struggle," he said. "A healthy guerrilla is able to engage the enemy, win battles, and finally the war. A guerrilla is both a fighter and a health agent who educates the masses," by the example of his own good hygienic practices.

The same principle has been extended to the continual struggle to rebuild the society. Among the urgent needs Ushewokunze outlined are:

- the extension of public health education in the villages;
- revitalization of school-based mobile services in the rural areas;
- the reduction of infant malnutrition through community services;
- control of endemic diseases such as malaria through environmental measures;
- and the rehabilitation of the war-disabled both mentally and physically.

All this requires the building up of an extensive infrastructure of highly trained medical personnel. The shortage is critical, due both to emigration and to death. Three years ago, one-third of the doctors treated white patients only, providing a doctor to population ratio of one per 1000. The remaining doctors—about 500—served more than 6½ million Africans, an utterly impossible task, with a ratio of one doctor per 13,000 people.

In Victoria Province, for instance, only four of the original 26 doctors were practicing medicine at the time of the ceasefire.

One of these was Dr. Simon Marorodze, who impressively manages to undertake his demanding duties as deputy health minister for the new government with his medical practice in Fort Victoria.

Health Education Vital

But while skilled technicians are vital, countries such as Mozambique are demonstrating that a highly effective health care system is not solely dependent upon them. The people themselves can modify their environment to curtail disease and to promote their own health. For this they need encouragement and health education that can better be provided from the communities themselves.

For instance, while it is necessary to treat children suffering from urinary schistosomiasis in a concentrated program—and there are villages in which every single child is infected—unless the causes for the disease are routed, the children will simply be reinfected. The most important intervention against this debilitating disease in the long run is not an injection, but a grass-roots effort to break the transmission cycle through water management, vector snail control and changing habits of water usage. This can best be encouraged by village health workers and not by highly trained doctors.

Functioning in their home village and where they are engaged in agricultural production, or other vocational pursuits, such health workers become the most important force in the primary health care program.

And so plans are underway to train several thousand such health workers, who will be able to handle minor health problems, assist midwives, teach about safe drinking water, give immunizations and family planning advice, in addition to providing basic curative care for common illnesses.

One good example of how this can be put into practice is the new government's efforts to ensure that cholera—absent from Zimbabwe since 1976—does not creep back.

The threat of its introduction by returning refugees was used as a scare tactic by the British to prohibit their entry before elections. Even if it has been reintroduced by unknown carriers who return from cholera-endemic areas of Mozambique, Tanzania or Zambia, it need no longer pose a threat. Any danger of cholera could be handled through early detection by the people and the health workers.

Once a case is reported to the health worker, he or she would administer the critical life-preserving oral rehydration fluid to keep the victim alive until body defenses could take over. If the case becomes more serious, the health worker would refer the patient to a rural hospital

for more intensive treatment under the guidance of a doctor.

Back in the village, the worker would assist the people in initiating environmental control measures, focusing upon safe drinking water (boiling), proper excreta disposal (latrines), and personal hygiene. These measures clearly do not only effect the curtailment of cholera, but will be undertaken to ensure the overall health of the population.

Medical Facilities Reorganized

Plans are also underway to reorganize medical facilities in the urban areas for the benefit of all the people of Zimbabwe. Andrew Fleming Hospital is one such highly-sophisticated medical facility that originally catered only to whites. In an attempt to demonstrate that the regime was changing, its doors were opened to all races shortly before the end of the war. Except for the teaching wing, however, costs were prohibitive to most Africans, who continued to attend the overcrowded Harare Hospital. Even though some of Harare's personnel were excellent, they were so overworked and the facilities so inadequate that there was little they could do to provide adequate health care for the patients.

The stark difference between the two hospitals can be seen from examples given by Dr. Ushewokunze. At Andrew Fleming the nurse-patient ratio was four times that of Harare. "Disposable" syringes were not disposed of at Andrew Fleming, but sent over to Harare where they were sterilized and re-used. As soon as is economically feasible the new government will open all medical services to all people, regardless of race and economic status.

Another exciting development is Chitungwize Poly Centre, just twenty kilometers south of Salisbury. Forerunner

of a proposed new hospital unit being designed to serve the estimated 350,000 people living in the Seke, St. Mary's and Chitungwiza townships, this health center is already operating as an urban prototype of the future nation-wide primary health care system. Most popular is the maternity and child health program under the direction of an experienced administrative nurse, whose experience lies not only in curative and preventive measures, but also in grass-roots organizing of the people. She was long involved with ZANU in the liberation struggle.

The most urgent need in order to put these programs into effective practice is funding. The Ministry of Health issued an appeal for emergency assistance totalling \$14.5 million. The United States had promised, during the Lancaster House summit, to fund heavily the reconstruction of Zimbabwe, but such promises were made as part of US attempts to ensure a moderate government in the country. The initial US response to the emergency appeal has been an immediate grant of \$2 million for health rehabilitation. While this response initiated a proposed total US assistance package of \$30 million, added to British, Dutch and German pledges it falls far short of the \$1 billion fund proposed by Western powers in 1978. Aware of the dangers of aid dependency, however, the new government insists the "aid is to be channelled to long-term programs which will continue, not temporary appendages which create ex-troverted demand not in line with (Zimbabwe's) total plan."

The difficulties that need to be overcome in the quest for a healthy nation are vast. But the process has begun and begun by a government who, for the first time in Zimbabwe's history, has the real needs and aspirations of the people at heart. □



Health center staff at Chitungwiza Poly Center talking with ZANU cadre.

Namibia: Oil Exploration Begins

Oil. It is one critical commodity that South Africa does not possess. There are no known deposits of oil inside South Africa, nor is there oil, most South Africans thought, in Namibia, where the war between South Africa and the guerrilla fighters of SWAPO has been intensifying for more than a decade.

Now that all might change. For the first time major oil exploration will soon be getting under way in Namibia. That announcement came in mid-June, right in the middle of South Africa's month-long attack on SWAPO encampments in southern Angola.

A company called Etosha Petroleum has held a concession for oil and gas exploration on 120,000 square miles of northern Namibia since 1959. The concession extends right up to the Angolan border and covers much of the region that the South Africans have considered the "operational area"—the war zone. Etosha is now in the process of trying to raise the necessary funds to finance the drilling. The company has contracted with Allen and Co., a New York investment banking firm, to finance the project.

No oil or gas in commercial quantities has been found yet in Namibia, but a survey carried out in 1976 by J.D. Moody, a petroleum consultant, concluded that "there is a modest chance of finding oil" in northern Namibia.

Could the news that drilling will begin soon in Namibia have affected South Africa's decision to go on the offensive against SWAPO? Maybe. South Africa has no oil of its own. Although it has embarked upon a multi-billion dollar project to turn its considerable coal deposits into oil and gas, the spectacular guerrilla attacks in June on two SASOL plants have demonstrated that the plan is vulnerable. South Africa would like nothing better than to find oil in Namibia, but if exploratory drilling is to take place in the "operational area," SWAPO's activities must be curtailed.

There are, of course, other reasons for the attacks. Pretoria is still involved—albeit sluggishly—in negotiations with the United Nations over the future of the territory. At least nominally those talks, now in their fourth year, are not yet dead. There is always a slim chance that Pretoria will eventually settle with the UN—if it thinks SWAPO is weak enough, if it gets the best deal it can at the negotiating table, and if it believes it has strengthened the position of its favorite in Namibia, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance.

In fact Pretoria has been hard at work recently in all three areas. South African officials said in early July that the attacks inside Angola wiped out SWAPO's entire external military structure. "It's my opinion," General Jannie Geldenhuys, commander of the South African forces in Namibia, told reporters at a press conference in northern Namibia, "that they [SWAPO] did suffer a very severe blow. It will take time for them to reorganize. This operation could contribute to a long-term tendency of easing the military conflict."

There is no telling yet whether Geldenhuys' assessment is at all accurate, but it certainly reflects Pretoria's ultimate aim: to make it impossible for SWAPO to operate effectively out of southern Angola.

During South Africa's intervention in Angola, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim gave his response to Pretoria's most recent diplomatic move. In May Pretoria stated it would accept the incorporation into the UN independence plan of the concept of a demilitarized zone along the Angola-Namibia border. But Pretoria's acceptance was conditional. Among the demands: the elimination of SWAPO bases inside Namibia during the period that the UN-supervised elections would be held, and a claim to twenty South African bases inside the DMZ.

Waldheim, reflecting the general attitude at the UN, was compromising on both points. In a letter in late June, Waldheim told the South African foreign minister that if South Africa accepted the DMZ proposal, the question of SWAPO bases inside Namibia "would no longer arise." And he added, despite the view of SWAPO and the front line African states that twenty South African bases inside the DMZ would be "unnecessarily large . . . in the interest of obtaining a final settlement to the Namibian question, the front lines states and SWAPO would agree to this total.

It appears that there is no longer any obstacle in the way of South African approval of the UN plan. But things have appeared that way many times before, and the South Africans have always come up with something new upon which to base their disapproval.

As the negotiations continue, so do the clashes inside Namibia. According to the *Rand Daily Mail*, in an article before the recent invasion of Angola, the month of May was the bloodiest so far this year and reports of sabotage are on the increase. The road between Ondangua and

Oshakati—probably the road most heavily traveled by the military—has been blown up. Land mines have begun appearing in Kaokaland, an area where SWAPO had not previously been active militarily. Mines are now also appearing well outside the proposed DMZ, and the Rucana Falls hydroelectric power station has been unable to supply electricity since SWAPO attacks first put the station out of service in April.

Reports of "contacts"—clashes between SWAPO forces and the South African Defense Forces (SADF)—have also increased. In late May, the SADF reported their largest battle with SWAPO forces inside Namibia in over two years. And, in the first half of 1980, clashes between SWAPO and the SADF have killed 64 South African soldiers, twice the number of troops killed in all of 1979, even according to Defense Force figures. These figures were, of course, later surpassed by the South African incursion into Angola. But the point remains, the intensity of the war in Namibia, and the costs to South Africa, is increasing.


The battle against South Africa's occupation of Namibia has not, however, been limited to the military front. Student strikes, which began in the Cape Town area in April, have now spread to Namibia. Reports in Windhoek newspapers indicate that students from at least two schools boycotted midterm exams in early June. Earlier reports indicated that students had also been boycotting classes.

The South Africans, it now appears, have also not been limiting their actions to the strictly military front. In early June, the Windhoek *Observer* reported the existence of a right-wing death squad that has targeted approximately fifty prominent businessmen, pastors and church leaders for assassination. Further credibility is added to the "death list," which consists primarily of opponents of South Africa's occupation of Namibia, by the recent assassinations of two people named on the list and reports that a bomb was recently found in the office of another businessman on the list.

In the mean time, South Africa has also inched its colonial-supported internal political structure closer to independence.

South African Administrator-General in Namibia, Gerrit Viljoen, announced in mid-June that he was forming Namibia's first governing "cabinet." Known as the minister's council, it will have sweeping

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Credit: Barry Pinsky

Mozambique: Attacking Urban Problems

by Barry Pinsky

Earlier this year, when Mozambique launched a broad ideological offensive against the last remnants of colonial bureaucracy and corruption, Samora Machel chose Beira, the nation's second largest city, as the site from which to fire his opening salvos.

Speaking before an enormous gathering, Machel talked about the ways in which Beira synthesized all of the worst aspects of Portuguese colonialism.

The city had grown around the port which was developed to profit from the transit trade with Rhodesia and Malawi. In the last years of the war it was dominated by the Portuguese capitalist Jorge Jardim, and by the Catholic Church. At independence Beira was a center of violent racism and repression.

Like chameleons, aspiring "petty Portuguese" Mozambicans who, in Machel's words, had adopted the colonial values of "racism, tribalism, corruption, regionalism, and banditry," were quick to camouflage themselves and infiltrate positions of responsibility in the new government, party and economic structures.

Barry Pinsky, a member of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, returned to Canada in August 1979 after working with the National Housing Directorate in Mozambique for almost two years. An architect/planner, he worked on the first pilot project to improve living conditions in the shanty-town areas of the capital, Maputo.

Colonial values had also found expression in the physical form of the city. Beira had a modern urban core area of office towers, hotels, and apartment blocks as well as expansive areas of single-family villas reserved for foreign settlers.

This "cement city" was surrounded by shanty-town settlements where 80 percent of urban dwellers lived. Conditions in Beira, which is situated at a very low altitude, were particularly unhealthy. Many families were subject to periodic flooding or bulldozed out of their homes at the whim of speculators and government bureaucrats.

At independence, most of these areas lacked basic water, sanitation, or community services. There were very few schools, most of which were only built in the early 1970's. What newly paved roads there were had been built mostly to serve improved police surveillance.

These grim conditions were duplicated in all of Mozambique's urban centers and have been especially exacerbated by widespread unemployment. After independence, unemployment intensified due to the large numbers of people arriving from the rural areas. This migration resulted from earlier dislocations during the war, the collapse of the Portuguese controlled commercial network in the countryside, and the greatly reduced numbers of Mozambicans working in South Africa's mines.

FRELIMO's decision to impose trade sanctions against Rhodesia also contributed to the unemployment rate in the cities. Under the Portuguese, Mozambique had

Women at a newly built bairro well. Clean water is a key element in Frelimo's drive to improve living conditions.

become a major conduit for Rhodesia's "sanction-busting" operation. Thousands of Mozambicans who were employed on the railroads and docks, moving goods to and from rebel Rhodesia, lost their jobs when that traffic ceased. Additional thousands fled the depredations of Rhodesian military incursion into the Mozambican countryside, seeking the relative safety of the cities.


As a major step towards attacking and eventually eradicating these urban sores, the first national meeting on cities and neighborhoods, held early in 1979, analysed the situation in the twelve major cities and towns, and developed a program to begin to resolve the extensive political, economic, social and financial problems facing them.

Hulene Province Selected

After the conference, Hulene, a *bairro* or district of Maputo, was selected for an important experiment in community mobilization.

Hulene's history was one of particular deprivation. Created in 1971 by a Portuguese land speculator, this *bairro* houses some 36,000 people, mostly impoverished workers who had been shuffled from place to place to make way for various colonialist-inspired projects. Their lives, marked by gross insecurity, made them easy prey for the authority of the landlords, the chiefs, "witch doctors" and reactionary churches in the area.

over



Credit: Barry Pinsky

Socialism under construction. Improved roads and housing are transforming Mozambique's ramshackle bairros.

The majority of Hulene's population greeted FRELIMO and the new government with suspicion. The *grupos dinamizadores*, or neighborhood committees, which were organized after independence to actively support and implement FRELIMO policies throughout the country, were largely weak and ineffective in Hulene. The mass organizations of youth and women fared no better.

FRELIMO decided that the best way to win the support of the people of Hulene, would be to demonstrate the party's genuine engagement in improving living conditions, by working with the residents to help them solve their own problems.

Following a series of meetings and intensive discussions in the *bairro*, party members living there were selected to be responsible for commissions of residents. Each worked on a specific neighborhood problem and reported to a coordinating commission.

Just four months later there were very visible signs of change. A host of new community facilities began to appear, including: a consumer cooperative with 800 member families; a small animals production cooperative and a clothes making cooperative run by the Organization of Mozambican women; a refurbished market and health clinic; new public telephones and bus shelters; a public address system for local announcements, and a *grupo dinamizadores* office.

A festival celebrating these events was held in the new cultural center—housed in a former church building which had been taken over a few weeks earlier by 2000 community people after it was discovered that the pastor had been secretly sending money

to church headquarters in South Africa.

There are still many problems confronting Hulene. Most families still live in tin shacks and the water supply is dreadfully inadequate. People now, however, sense the presence of FRELIMO and more importantly, they have begun to gain confidence in themselves and in their own neighborhood organizations.

"Green Zones" Created

Hulene is one example of how FRELIMO's efforts to involve people in meeting their own needs have had a practical impact on the lives of Mozambicans. These efforts are being applied in all urban centers. For instance, Mozambique is now creating "green zones" in and around urban areas.

Unemployed city residents will be encouraged to settle in these new zones and will be assisted in developing collective food production. Such moves help make the cities more self-sufficient and reduce the divisions between town and country. Recreation areas and natural reserves are also part of the green zone plan.

The new city assemblies, first elected in 1978, were also directed to help resolve problems in the distribution of goods and the provision of public transportation; to encourage adult literacy training and the formation of school-community committees; to legalize the occupancy of land by shanty-town dwellers; and to assist in constructing road, water and other municipal services. The promotion of preventative health care, education, culture, sports and the control of rental housing are all part of the assemblies' responsibilities.

The decision to involve the city

assemblies in all facets of urban life reflects an important re-commitment to the political values of local participation and mobilization developed in the rural areas during the struggle against the Portuguese.

The colonial municipal chamber system, which only served the "cement city" and the speculators, has been dismantled. City assemblies are starting to work with neighborhood dynamizing groups to create an environment in which infiltrators and saboteurs will not find a home.

Still, many obstacles remain to solving Mozambique's vast urban problems, exacerbated by severe shortages of equipment, materials and technical personnel. If the communal villages, rural industrialization, health and education programs fall far short of their goals, solving urban problems will become a Sisyphus-like task as the flow of rural migrants to the cities continue, and urban problems intensify.

With the independence of Zimbabwe, one considerable obstacle is being decreased, as many experienced cadres are released from war and refugee camp duties for national reconstruction duties and the port of Beira can resume activity.

Concluding his remarks in Beira, President Machel thanked the people of that city for their sacrifices during the war and looked toward the future: "We have won the war in Zimbabwe. Now let us create conditions so that we can live better than we have lived . . . liberate ourselves from our complexes and from those elements that divide us, and identify ourselves as Mozambicans . . . Let us say with pride, 'we are from the province of Sofala, we are from the city of Beira, a clean and wonderful city—ours to take care of!'" □

Press

Continued from page 4

point, who were in Zimbabwe to monitor the election, got a cool reception from the media. In one passing reference John Burns reported, "Mr. Mugabe's criticisms have received some backing from international observer groups here to monitor the election, including a coalition of private American bodies with an interest in Africa that issued a statement today endorsing the guerrilla leader's complaints."

Dan Rather of CBS provided the only television coverage about the activities of the American observers. On March 3, he stated, "American observers who monitored the Rhodesian elections reported today that government Security Forces intimidated many voters, but, on the whole, they said, the election went much better than might have been expected and overall, did reflect the will of the people."

No Change For the Better

Traditionally, southern Africa is not news in the US. But the reporting on the Zimbabwe election shows that even when there is considerable coverage, its quality is poor. American reporters demonstrate a preoccupation with the status of whites, a preference for interviews with white government officials and strong political biases. In Zimbabwe, these problems led journalists to ignore two of the most explosive aspects of the story—the presence of South African troops, and American mercenaries in the Rhodesian Army.

The continuing failure of the US media to present accurate and balanced reporting on southern Africa suggests the need for a return to what Herbert Matthews, one of America's foremost foreign correspondents, once called "partisan reporting." This was the method employed by the *New York Times* to cover the Spanish Civil War during the 1930's.

In the case of Zimbabwe, the media should have stationed correspondents in Mozambique and Zambia as well as Salisbury during the war. They should have been correspondents who enjoyed the confidence of the Patriotic Front leadership, and correspondents to whom Africans would talk. For if there is one prominent lesson to be learned from this study, it is that the failure to explore the experiences, feelings, and hopes of Black Zimbabweans led inevitably to a failure to anticipate the electoral victory of the Patriotic Front. □

Sasol

Continued from page 7

regime, already of a size and duration unprecedented since the Soweto uprising in 1976. Many Blacks attribute the upsurge of guerrilla activity in South Africa to the thousands of young Blacks who left the

country to avoid the post-Soweto repression, and are now returning as heavily armed guerrillas, using underground networks unknown to government informers. Said one Black journalist of the former students, "The class of '76 are today graduates in the political arena of war and liberation." As the government represses this latest round of unrest, more thousands are expected to swell ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) military ranks.

Security Shakeup

The ANC's ability to penetrate SASOL's expensive and elaborate security system provoked a thorough overhaul of South Africa's industrial security system. The Minister of Minerals and Energy Affairs Fredrick de Klerk underscored the scope of the security problem: "It is clear that we are faced with a sophisticated attack, which is evidenced by the fact that there were three separate attacks on three separate installations almost simultaneously." During an acrimonious debate in parliament, de Klerk denied charges of lax security at Sasolburg, and revealed that security measures at the sensitive energy installations had already cost the state over \$14 million, and that an additional \$5 million security expansion was partly completed.

The Botha regime, by its own admission, was in possession of information that the ANC had targeted the SASOL plants. At Terrorism Act trials before the SASOL raids, the government presented evidence that Craig Williamson, the South African agent who successfully infiltrated the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) regularly reported on ANC efforts to research and sabotage the SASOL projects. The court testimony helped fuel parliamentary charges of lax security at the plants.

In light of the uproar caused by the attacks, the South Africans have now promised to deploy the army around potential sabotage targets. The problem is that industrial South Africa presents hundreds of potential targets, including dams, bridges, factories, railways, and telephone stations. It seems doubtful that the army, already severely stretched in Namibia and Angola, will be able to assume such a massive internal security role without a disruptive call-up of white reservists. The white economy is already experiencing a critical shortage of skilled workers, and an expanded draft would pose serious economic and political problems for Prime Minister Botha.

One way out of this dilemma was offered by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, head of the KwaZulu bantustan. Buthelezi responded to news of the attack with the observation that "It is a pity that the people of this province are not armed. They should form vigilante groups and when they see people interfering with buildings, they should shoot to kill." Despite the offer, the regime seems to prefer tax incentives to private

businesses and improved training as methods to tighten industrial security.

Interviewed after the daring SASOL raids, ANC president Oliver Tambo acknowledged that his organization was responsible for the attacks, and went on to describe their significance. "We attacked these installations because of their strategic positioning in the South African economy. We have proposed sanctions and a foreign trade embargo as the alternative to the escalation of armed conflict in South Africa."

"This attack therefore," Tambo continued, "is in the pursuit of the aims of peace. It encourages the possibility of a peaceful settlement which can only come with the demolition of the structures of apartheid domination." M.F. □

Constitution

Continued from page 12

President's Council as a means to broaden the base of white support among non-whites. Yet the paltriness of the power granted has meant that no major non-white leadership has dared to endorse the plan. Recent widespread strikes and demonstrations indicate that most Blacks regard the maneuver as totally irrelevant to their lives and needs.

The plan also calls for twenty new legislators to be chosen on the basis of party representation, giving Botha power to hand-pick 17. Such intrusions on the power of the white electorate threaten to alienate Botha from sections of his white popular support. Significantly, Botha has been turning increasingly to the military. A contender for one of the appointed seats in Parliament is chief of the defense force, General Magnus Malan.

Indeed, Botha's largely military inner circle of advisors have recently been moved into secret Cabinet committees to which Botha has granted decision-making power greater than those exercised by the Cabinet—once the supreme executive body.

All this is part of a pattern—the development of the garrison state. Defense spending has risen 46 percent over last year and a core of the country's leading business leaders have been brought directly into defense planning. The new Defense Advisory Board comprises thirteen chief executives drawn from South Africa's largest financial and industrial interests, both English and Afrikaans. The group includes the deputy chairman of Anglo-American, the chairmen of Standard Bank, Anglo-Vaal and Hulett's, and the president of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

Thus, adapting in Botha's eyes means centralizing power, tightening control, blurring the distinctions between military and civilian government, and combining executive and legislative functions. M.S.R. □

Zimbabwe's Economy

Continued from page 15

some time, and the trial runs of exports through Maputo that started in May. Zimbabwe has been wholly dependent on South Africa for its oil supply, as is now well known, and almost as dependent on the apartheid state for its export routes.

The long term goal of Zimbabwe and its neighbors is to encourage regional development through mutual cooperation among themselves, thus eliminating the dependence that inevitably came with development through ties with South Africa. But Professor Seidman points out that South Africa's economic influence historically stretches northward through Angola and parts of Zaire—suggesting that this project, too, will be a lengthy one.

Zimbabwe's economic problems have been further compounded by the failure of Western countries to deliver on promises of economic aid. Total Western aid to Zimbabwe currently stands at about \$300 million, a far cry from the billion dollar economic package first floated by Henry Kissinger during the 1976 Geneva talks, and resurrected by the West during the Lancaster House negotiations. Britain tops the list of donors with a three year commitment in excess of \$176 million. After extensive negotiations with Zimbabwean officials, Britain has also agreed to write off some \$52 million in debt incurred by the colonial government of Rhodesia before the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. An additional \$77.5 million in outstanding loans has been rescheduled.

In contrast, the other major Western powers, the US and West Germany, have each contributed only about \$30 million over the next three years. In early July, Lord Carrington, British foreign secretary, and principle architect of the Lancaster House agreement, pronounced himself "very disappointed" with Western aid offers. A team of Zimbabwean ministers were touring European capitals at that time, in search of additional aid money.

For the immediate future, however, Zimbabwe's economic prospects are fairly bright, although even the short term is not free of problems. The makeshift manufacturing sector that grew up as a result of sanctions is now showing signs of expansion, although it will require large amounts of capital-goods imports before getting fully under way. The budget, currently \$1.2 billion and suspected to grow significantly this year, is no longer burdened with large military spending bills, which, at \$1.3 million daily, took up forty percent of last year's budget. But, as spending on the military decreases, spending on education, health and other social programs will rise. A deficit of \$1 billion or more would not surprise most economists and inflation is

expected to rise from eleven percent last year, to between twelve and fifteen percent in 1980.

Exports, led by gold, tobacco, and ferroalloys are expected to grow to up to Z\$1.2 billion (US\$1.5 billion), from Z\$700 million (US\$1050 million) last year—a growth rate between thirty and forty percent. Imports are projected at Z\$900 million (US\$1350 million) or more, a rise of fifty percent.

Zimbabwe will continue to import all of its considerable oil needs—it bought Z\$13 million worth in January alone, making oil and oil products by far the leading imports. Although they will no longer be paying a sanctions-busting premium for their energy imports, oil bills will grow significantly along with the economy. A New York banker estimates that Zimbabwe's energy needs will double in the next five years, but apart from oil, the country is self-sufficient in energy, with large coal deposits, a newly financed hydro thermal project getting underway, and a surplus of electric power from the Kamba dam.

Just as it inherited a fairly well developed manufacturing sector, the new government also took on an active local capital market. A government current accounts deficit in the balance of payments of \$550 million for the year ending June 30 was financed largely through this market, and the new Zimbabwe will also be entering the international bond markets. Credit among the private banks, however, may be slower in coming than the new administration would like, since they are hanging back for the moment until the economic situation is clearer. But, like the multinationals, the banks appear poised to enter in the near future. For now, such private financing will be crucial to the country's economic well-being. □

Namibia Oil

Continued from page 18

powers and will be empowered to administer any affairs that are now overseen by Viljoen, except primarily in the area of military affairs.

Dirk Mudge, the chairman of the DTA, was appointed head of the council. Less than a month after Mudge was appointed, he and three other colleagues from the minister's council were off to Europe to try and establish their authenticity with Western political, business, and press leaders. The delegation met with, among others, officials of the French ministry of foreign affairs, the German secretary of state, and a junior official in the British foreign ministry.

Pretoria denies that it is carrying out a policy of "creeping UDI" in Namibia, but Mudge's council will, in effect, become the government of Namibia. Viljoen will retain veto powers over the council's decisions.

M.S.□

action news notes

DUTCH PARLIAMENT VOTES OIL BOYCOTT OF SOUTH AFRICA . . . The Dutch government narrowly avoided a major crisis that could have precipitated national elections when parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of a unilateral oil boycott of South Africa, in mid-June.

The move comes as a response to legislation introduced earlier this year which called on Holland to pressure the European Common Market to put the boycott into effect.

NATIONAL BLACK AGENDA CALLS FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA . . . More than 1000 Black leaders meeting in Richmond, Virginia, recently adopted a strong platform opposing all forms of economic support for South Africa as part of the National Black Agenda for the 1980's. This is the first time a national Black organization has called for full trade sanctions against South Africa.

The statement, adopted on March 1, calls on the US to sever all economic, diplomatic, political and cultural relations with South Africa and to support a UN resolution for comprehensive economic sanctions against that country. It also calls on Black American organizations to give material and conceptual support to those African liberation groups committed to the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. Finally, the report calls on the Congressional Black Caucus to introduce legislation which would prevent our national government from providing funding to American corporations doing business in South Africa.

STUDENT MILITANCY INCREASING

. . . Actions aimed at pressuring universities to divest stock in companies that do business with South Africa were widespread this spring. Ranging from educational programs to demonstrations, sit-ins, and rallies, the divestment campaign was often linked with anti-nuclear and anti-draft issues, as well as other campus struggles. Those groups that have taken a broad political approach have tended to be most successful.

Campuses on which divestment activities took place this spring include Princeton, Dartmouth, Western Michigan, the University of Tennessee, Indiana Central, Rutgers, Harvard, Berea College, Georgetown,

Ithaca, Cornell, the University of Minnesota, Williams College, Wesleyan, Kansas University, Tufts and Brandeis.

Dumisani Kumalo, an exiled Black South African journalist who has been coordinating the national bank campaign for the past year, made a speaking tour during the spring which included many of the above-mentioned campuses, as well as other schools, community groups, state legislatures, and unions.

ANTI-APARTHEID CONFERENCES HELD IN US, CANADA, AND EUROPE . . .

Conferences at Columbia and Western Michigan Universities in early April explored ways of linking anti-apartheid work to struggles against racism, the nuclear industry, the draft, and sexism.

Activists at both conferences stressed the importance of linking anti-apartheid struggles with concrete work in local communities, especially issues such as racism and the draft. Participants also targeted legislative divestment campaigns as a special area of emphasis in the coming year. Finally, the two conferences developed concrete proposals for increasing communication between local support groups and providing for an exchange of tactics and ideas.

In Sweden, on May 23 to 26, an international seminar of youth and students, sponsored by the International Student Movement of the UN and the UN Center Against Apartheid, attracted over 100 participants. Groups from every continent, including both eastern and western Europe, sent representatives. Members of the youth wings of the ANC and SWAPO, as well as delegations from Zimbabwe and Angola, also attended.

Pointing to the need for cooperation and coordination between activist groups working in different countries, participants agreed to initiate measures to ensure greater cooperation and exchange of ideas on actions, tactics, and strategies.

For more information contact: Josh Nessen, Student Coordinator, ACOA, 198 Broadway, New York, NY 10038.

Finally, a very successful conference on Women Under Apartheid was held in Montreal on May 9 to 11. Sponsored by the Ligue des Femmes du Quebec, participants came from the UN, the Organization of African Unity, southern African liberation movements, countries in Latin America the Caribbean and the US, and many religious and anti-apartheid organizations.

Resolutions adopted at the seminar called for oil and economic sanctions against South Africa, support for divestment campaigns, more efforts to disseminate information about women in southern Africa, the release of political prisoners, and support for the liberation movements. In addition, August 9 was declared a day of special



credit: Stan Sierakowski

Commemorating the Soweto uprisings: June 16th was marked four years later by anti-apartheid actions in many parts of the world. In New York, hundreds of protesters converged on Wall Street for a lively mid-day demonstration, to denounce U.S. financial ties with South Africa

solidarity with the women of southern Africa.

SWAPO/SAMRAF PLAN TOUR . . . SWAPO, the South West African People's Organization, and SAMRAF, the South African Military Resistance Aid Fund will embark on a joint three month tour of the United States in September. Representatives of the two groups will appear in most major east coast cities in September, Canada and the mid-west in October, and the west coast in November, and return to New York via the southeast in early December.

The purpose of the tour is to increase understanding and support for SWAPO's struggle against South Africa's occupying army. SAMRAF, which works closely with SWAPO in building support for anti-war sentiment inside South Africa, has organized the tour in hopes of establishing ongoing grassroots groups throughout the country to raise political and material support for the struggle in Namibia.

For information contact: SAMRAF, 29--7th Avenue, Brooklyn, NY, 11217. (212) 638-0417.

BRIEFLY . . . In Hartford, Connecticut, a resolution was passed on March 4, by Local 1716 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) urging the Hartford City Pen-

sion Commission to divest the union's share of the \$93 million now heavily invested in US corporations doing business in South Africa. The union represents almost 700 city employees.

In Chicago, a coalition of religious and community activist groups held an interfaith vigil on July 1 to demand that charges be dropped against religious leaders scheduled to face trial that day in South Africa. About ninety people gathered in front of the South African Consulate and representatives later attempted to present a petition calling for the dismissal of the charges against the South African religious leaders facing trial.

Responding to the demonstration, the consul general said the demonstrators were "sanctimonious clerics whose actions are dictated not by religious belief, impulses or motives but by political activists here and abroad, many of whom despise religion."

The protesters vowed to return within the next week to continue the vigil and attempt again to present the petition.

Appeal to Activists: We are trying to improve the Action News and Notes section of the magazine. Please send your reports, assessments, newsclips, and especially graphics to: Action News and Notes, c/o Anne Crane and Jennifer Link, 91 Jamaica St., Apt. 2, Boston, MA 02130.

news briefs



SOUTH AFRICA'S WHITE minority rulers may be shakier than we think. At age 75, Helen Joseph, a resolute and determined opponent of the white racist regime has just received her fourth banning order.

The two year banning order, a particularly debilitating form of house arrest, prohibits Joseph from attending political meetings, or student gatherings. Banning orders are used against persons considered to pose a threat to "the public order."

Helen Joseph, who has in the past been the target of vandals and gunmen, played a key role in mobilizing women against apartheid and the pass laws in the 1950's and early 60's. In 1977, she was sentenced to four months imprisonment for refusing to testify against Winnie Mandela, a leader of the banned African National Congress, and wife of Nelson Mandela, now imprisoned for life in South Africa's notorious political prison, Robben Island. Joseph remains a defiant symbol of the struggle for freedom and justice in South Africa and throughout the world.

The OAU boycott on trade with South Africa notwithstanding, a number of Black African states are importing grain from the Republic this year. Kenya alone will import about 80,000 tons of yellow maize.

Drought and economic problems, and cancelled grain shipments have combined to force at least five other African countries to do business with South Africa. Zambia purchased 250,000 tons of maize and some wheat. Mozambique is importing about 150,000 tons of maize and may buy wheat later. Zimbabwe is expecting about 35,000 tons of maize by rail and Zaire, Malawi and Mauritius have bought lesser amounts.

Trade with African countries is becoming an increasingly important part of South African foreign policy. Pretoria's planners see trade with Black Africa as a desirable way to enhance Africa's dependence on the Republic, and thus provide a measure of assurance against those countries ever effectively enforcing sanctions.

South African manufacturers are also pressing to expand their market and the

government has introduced new inducements for trade with apartheid. These include generous credit agreements and favorable deals on foreign exchange.

Although exports to Black Africa were reduced from 13.5 percent of South Africa's total exports in 1974 to 8 percent in 1979, total trade with Black Africa is expected to increase to 10 percent this year. Despite this increase, and continued government efforts to expand the Republic's foreign markets in Black Africa, the US remains South Africa's largest bilateral trading partner.

"Urgent message. South African State, most probably Craig Williamson, has put out a fake SANA bulletin." With these words the Southern African News Agency, based in Gaborone, Botswana, announced what appears to be the latest fallout from the infiltration of the Geneva-based International University Exchange Fund by South African Security Police Agent Craig Williamson (see *Southern Africa*, March 1980). In a letter dated June 23, IUEF director Massim Soumare quotes the contents of a telex received by IUEF from SANA. The "bulletin calls itself SANA bulletin, May 1980, no. 13 and is full of slander and fabrication." SANA then goes on to ask IUEF to "inform all parties on SANA/IUEF mailing list that the bulletin is a fake."

The very content of this SANA issue caused some activists to question its authenticity even before IUEF released the SANA denial. At one point in the issue the text reads: "IUEF also used SANA to gather information about liberation movements, to spread false information and to cause splits, confusion and division in the ranks of the oppressed." The issue then goes on to assert that although SANA knew that they were being used for such purposes, they "decided to co-operate" because they believed they could use the IUEF money to build up SANA. It is highly unlikely that any organization would deliberately issue false and divisive statements in an attempt to build up their own organization. It is even less likely that if an organization did issue such statements, they would admit as much in public!

Craig Williamson's infiltration of IUEF has also caused aftershocks in places much closer to the heart of apartheid.

Renfrew Christie, a South African who had recently returned to the Republic after completing his studies at Oxford University in England, was sentenced to ten years in prison for trying to send information about South Africa's top secret nuclear research program to the ANC. The evidence that the South African attorney general presented in

court included details of specific letters that Christie sent to IUEF director Lars-Gunnar Eriksson. Letters which could only have been obtained by a person who had access to top-secret IUEF files—a person such as Williamson.



MOZAMBIQUE'S ECONOMIC prospects continue to brighten in the wake of the peace settlement in Zimbabwe. Their second largest

city, Beira, will handle an estimated 500,000 tons of freight traffic to and from Zimbabwe this year alone.

Beira, hard-hit when Mozambique complied with economic sanctions were imposed on the white minority regime in 1976, is the closest sea outlet to Salisbury and Lusaka, and boasts a port whose "turn-around" time for ships—that is, time to unload and load—is already among the fastest in East Africa. A modern "roll-on, roll-off" freight handling facility was completed last year, and another is under construction. Increased cold-storage and a container freight handling capacity are also nearing completion.

But serious transport bottlenecks threaten to hamper port operations. The biggest problems are on the railway between Beira and Umtali, Zimbabwe, where severe shortages of freight cars and steam engines often cause delays. Mozambique's recent purchase of diesel engines for the Maputo and Nacala lines will free more steam engines for use in Beira, but the engines are old, and mechanics are in short supply. Equipment shortages currently restrict rail traffic to only 660 tons per day, but ongoing discussions with the European

Correction


In the "Newsbriefs" section of our June 1980 issue, we reported incorrectly that US publisher John McGoff had attempted to purchase the *Washington Post*, partly with money furnished by the South African government. The newspaper McGoff attempted to purchase was not the *Washington Post* but the *Washington Star*.

The review of three films by Peter Davis that appeared in the June 1980 issue, implied that the films were produced under the auspices of Unifilm. This is not the case. The three films were produced by Peter Davis and distributors are listed at the end of the review.

Economic Community may soon bring desperately needed aid for improvements.

Mozambique is also working to expand its coal production and export activities in response to growing world demand for the fuel. In March, the rail line from Beira to the Moatize coal mine in Tete province was re-opened and about 500,000 tons of coal will be exported to Japan and East Germany this year. Another coal export terminal is scheduled to begin construction shortly at Matola port near Maputo. Upon completion, the terminal will handle five million tons of coal exports every year.

Expansion of coal mining at Moatize also marks a milestone for Mozambique's efforts at self-reliance. For the first time, hydro-electric power from the massive Caborra-Bassa dam project is being used to power the mine and the provincial town of Tete nearby. Mozambique expects to realize considerable benefit from the shift, due to increased production at the mine, savings on diesel fuel to power the mines' generators, and improved working conditions for the miners and residents of the province. Caborra-Bassa was built by the Portuguese and intended exclusively to power South Africa's industrial development. Only since independence in 1975 has there been any effort to harness the immense power plant to meet Mozambican needs.

 **DANISH SHIPS HAVE BEEN** carrying machine guns, ammunition, rockets and other weaponry to South Africa for years despite the mandatory UN arms embargo, according to former crew members interviewed by the Danish newspaper *Politiken*.

Vessels registered under the Trigon shipping partnership loaded the arms for South Africa, sometimes labeled as machine parts, in the ports of Rotterdam, Lisbon, and Constanza, Romania. Two former crew members of the Trigon ship, the Sarah Poulsen, recounted one instance in which the arms were loaded in the English channel from an American ship which had had its name painted over.

The crew members alleged that the principal members of the arms smuggling ring which arranged the shipments were a purchasing agent based at the South African embassy in Paris and a West German weapons merchant.

The shipments are reported to involve millions of dollars in profits and bribes for arms merchants, shipping company agents, and port officials. On each trip to South Africa, a ship loaded with illegal cargo can earn the equivalent of \$2,500 a day, compared to an average of \$800 to \$900 with legal cargo, according to *Politiken*. Crew

members also received bonuses of between \$300 and \$500 each from South African agents when the ships docked in the Republic.

Two former crew members of the Alice Trigon jumped ship in Belgium last year, complaining of the dangers involved in disguising the ship while at sea. The ship had just put in at Antwerp after a Lisbon-to-South Africa run, when word was sent down that it was to repeat the voyage.



THE PRELIMINARY US Democratic Party platform on American foreign policy in Africa will remain consistent with the Carter administration's policy over the last four years. The platform, released in early June, does contain, however, some small alterations with regard to economic sanctions against South Africa.

Supporters of Senator Edward Kennedy originally proposed that the platform call for "full economic sanctions until that government abandons its undemocratic apartheid system." Carter supporters, however, managed to have the key word, "legal," inserted into the final draft. The meaning of the wording "legal economic sanctions" remains unclear, but it is sure to provide a basis for future efforts to avert economic sanctions against the Republic.

On Namibia the Committee pledged "active support" for self-determination. And on Zimbabwe, the platform will include a statement which calls for aid as part of a "coherent multi-donor development plan for all the cooperating nations of the southern Africa region."

"A fundamental re-evaluation" of US policy towards South Africa would be ordered if Ronald Regan was elected, said Joseph Churba, national security advisor to the Republican presidential candidate.

Churba, on a recent trip to South Africa, went on to call for an end to the arms embargo, and for an American military presence at the Simonstown naval base in South Africa.

He suggested that South Africa would become America's "fighting ally," even at the risk of losing Nigerian oil.

The Reagan adviser also asserted that the US should supply South Africa with American helicopter gunships. When questioned about the possible use of US equipment against South Africa's Black majority, he declared himself "not at all afraid that they might be used against the Black population."

In the US a spokesperson for Ronald

Reagan immediately denied that Churba was speaking for the Reagan campaign. The spokesperson, Joe Holmes, went on to say, "we don't subscribe to his thinking on lifting the embargo on supplying arms," and to deny that Reagan subscribed to a US naval presence at Simonstown.

Nevertheless Reagan's policy on southern Africa has been vague and his advisors rarely say more than policy questions are still being discussed.

Yet, on other occasions, Reagan has publicly expressed his support for South Africa's Prime Minister Piet Botha, and he also backs aid for Jonas Savimbi, the leader of Unita, the South African backed, anti-MPLA forces in Angola.



IN GREAT BRITAIN, A EUROPEAN Economic Community voluntary report has revealed that 20,000 employees of British firms in South Africa were receiving wages below the minimum recommended by the EEC code, and over 2,000 were paid below the so-called poverty datum line—a gauge of income which provides only for immediate needs and includes no provisions for health care, education and other essentials.

One firm, International Distillers, reported payments of between \$120 and \$175 to 161 of its Black workers for a 195 hour working month, excluding fringe benefits. Tarmac, another British firm, was reported to be paying between \$220 and \$240 for a 278 hour month (close to seventy hours per week!).

The British Department of Trade also reports that only nine of the 202 British firms with operations in South Africa have trade unions representing Black workers. The Durban-based Federation of South African Trade Unions asserts that in only one case, that of Smith and Nephew in Durban, has a British firm recognized a legitimate trade union.

There is no evidence to suggest that American firms in South Africa treat their workers any better than their British counterparts do. In addition to reports that Ford-South Africa's wage and working conditions do not meet even the minimal standards set by the Sullivan principles, Colgate-Parilmolive recently denied a petition, signed by 200 of the 300 Black workers at its Johannesburg plant, that asked the company to recognize their union, the Chemical Workers International Union.

In their letter rejecting the petition, Colgate management stated its policy was to "resist the establishment of trade unions throughout the world." □

Supplement:

WOMEN . . . STRUGGLING ON TWO FRONTS

Southern Africa has produced an attractive twenty page special supplement on women.


This expansion of the section on women in the April/May 1980 issue of the magazine includes articles on women in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, an interview with ANC militant, Mavis Nhlapo, photographs, poetry, and resources on women.

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