

VOLUME XII NUMBER 2

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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SPECIAL OFFER—

If you become a **Southern Africa** sustainer, we will send you this beautiful book of poetry and photography from South Africa.

Zindzi Mandela is the 16-year old daughter of Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned president of the banned African National Congress of South Africa, and of Winnie Mandela, sentenced to silence as a "nonperson" under South Africa's apartheid laws. Zindzi Mandela is also a poet. Her warm and poignant poems speak powerfully for her, her parents, and all black South Africans.


Peter Magubane, a prize-winning black South African photographer who has spent more than two years inside apartheid's jails, has been documenting life in South Africa's black townships and homelands for more than two decades.

Now they have collaborated on **Black As I Am**, a 120-page, large-format paperback book. Because it is published by a small press in California, however, it is not easy to find.

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Southern Africa has been providing consistent, reliable, comprehensive coverage of political and economic developments in the area each month since 1965. With events changing almost daily, it is vitally important to subscribe to and support **Southern Africa**.


Here's just one reason why. US investment in South Africa has always been controversial. Now its becoming a very hot issue on campuses and in communities all over the country. Jimmy Carter and Andrew Young have taken the public position that US corporations are good for South Africans, white and black alike.



the troubled dream
I see long grey hands
in a black atmosphere
one hand beckons
the other
refuses
the beckoning hand disappears
reappears
with a loud drop the pain
beckoning
beckoning
beckoning
beckoning

the other
refuses
the beckoning hand disappears
reappears
with a cut on the wrist
beckoning
beckoning
beckoning

the other
refuses
the beckoning hand disappears
reappears
beckoning
beckoning



But while Andrew Young argued last year in Johannesburg for "change through the marketplace," the then-U.S. Ambassador to South Africa was cabling home just what Young denied: *that South African blacks wanted the US out.*

Who reported it? **Southern Africa** published the full text of the cable in its April 1978 issue. One activist from Campuses United Against Apartheid at the University of California at Berkeley wrote that the cable would be "very helpful in organizing. We will give it wide circulation on the campus . . . Your magazine helps build the movement."

There's a lot more. These are just some of the special features **Southern Africa** has published in 1977 and 1978:

- *Africa: The French Connection*, by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban.
- *South Africa: Looking for Oil Independence*, and *Prospects for Sanctions*.
- *Britain's Stake in Apartheid*, by Richard Leonard.
- *American Publisher Peddles South Africa*, by Steve Weissman.
- *Carter in Africa—The Shape of Things to Come*, by Edgar Lockwood.
- *Zimbabwe: Expelled Nun Reports People Support Guerrillas*.
- *Destroying World Poverty: President Nyerere Speaks*.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Front cover: Richard Finkelstein

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Special thanks for their assistance to: Mike Martin, Julie Weiman, *Africa News*

Typesetting by Liberation News Service
Cover and layout by The Letter Space

Southern Africa is published monthly, except for July-August, when bi-monthly, by the Southern Africa Committee, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10010

Subscriptions: Individual (domestic and foreign)/\$10.00, Institutional/\$18.00, Airmail Africa, Asia, Europe/\$22.50; South and Central America/\$19.50

Southern Africa is available on microfilm through University Microfilms, Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48206, and is listed in the Alternative Press Index

Distributors: New York, NY: Triangle Exchange, Delhi Distributors, Washington, DC: Liberation Information Distribution Co.; Boston, MA: Carrier Pigeon, Third World Distributors, Chicago: Guild News Agency, Minneapolis, MN: Rainbow Distribution, St Paul, MN: Isis News Distribution.

ISSN 0038-3775

US Government Facilities South African Arms Smuggling Involved in

US government investigators looking into arms smuggling to South Africa by the Space Research Corporation [see *Southern Africa*, January 1979] recently uncovered a major instance of "illegal arms trafficking" by the company. In January 1978, Space Research shipped more than 4,500 155mm cannon shells through the US to Antigua and on to South Africa, according to reports in the Vermont *Rutland Herald*.

The shells were moved by a twelve truck convoy from the firm's Quebec-Vermont border installation to Canaveral, Florida, where they were loaded on two US military cargo vessels, the *Star Trek* and the *Inagun Cloud*.

In addition to breaking the arms embargo the shipments are viewed as illegal because they circumvented required export license procedures. Corporations with current government contracts can get around normal customs procedures with a bill of lading that exempts the holder from duties, customs searches, and other procedures.

In this case, Space Research apparently

arranged to get a bill of lading through contacts at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, a government missile testing site. The firm has no current contract with Aberdeen; the last one was in 1975.

From Florida the shells went to Antigua, where dockers refused to unload the cargo. Apparently, Space Research found some other way to unload the shells prior to shipping them to South Africa. Antiguan workers reported last year that the government was using soldiers to unload Space Research shipments.

Most of these shells, and previous shipments that have made their way to South Africa by way of Space Research, originate in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Shells are produced in a rough form, called forgings, by a US armaments company, Chamberlain Manufacturing, at a government-owned facility that the company leases.

The forgings are then shipped to the Space Research facilities on the Vermont-Quebec border where they are fashioned in-

to special shell casings, which give them a range of at least 40 miles. Most sources agree that the final step, arming the shells, occurs inside South Africa.

Meanwhile, a Vermont grand jury investigation of the case grinds away. The hearings, involving officials from the US Customs Bureau, the State Department, and the Justice Department, are expected to produce public results by the spring. Many observers, though, express skepticism at the investigations. They suggest, as the Aberdeen-Canaveral connection indicates, that there has been upper-level collusion by government officials.

Congressional Africa Posts Chosen

House Democrats have tapped New York Congressman Stephen Solarz to chair the Africa sub-committee of the International Relations Committee. Other Democrats on the House subcommittee will be Diggs (Michigan), Collins (Illinois), Gray (Pennsylvania) and Wolpe (Michigan).

On the Senate side, George McGovern of South Dakota was chosen to head the Committee on Foreign Relations Africa subcommittee. At press time the Senate subcommittee was also expected to include Hayakawa (California), Helms (North Carolina), Muskie (Maine) and Zorinsky (Nebraska). Hayakawa and Helms have been two leading Senate voices in support of the white minority regime in Rhodesia, and are expected to play key roles in this year's efforts to lift sanctions against Rhodesia.

Angolan Refugees Return

According to Angolan government figures, over 51,000 Angolan refugees have returned to the country from Portugal, Burundi, Cape Verde, South Africa, the People's Republic of the Congo, and Zaire. The largest contingent, more than 40,000, came from Zaire.

South Africa Sets Financial Lure

The value of the South African rand, previously pegged to the US dollar at \$1.15, will be allowed to float in response to changing conditions, South Africa's finance minister, Owen Horwood, announced on January 25. Cutting the close link with the dollar is intended to insulate the South African economy from the decline in the value of the dollar and from the political skittishness of US investors—a move recommended by the International Monetary Fund last year.

Horwood also announced new special arrangements making it almost 40% cheaper for direct foreign investment in South Africa. The "security rand," previously used only by investors on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange primarily in order to move money out of the country, and currently valued at about \$0.68, has been renamed the "financial rand," and can be used by companies setting up their own subsidiaries in South Africa.



Finance Minister Horwood—in happy mood.

Another Compromise on Namibia?

Commissioner Martti Ahtisaari stopped in New York only briefly after making a ten-day January trip to South Africa and Namibia to continue negotiations for Namibian independence. He took off again almost immediately, headed for African capitals, having made no public statement about the terms of any agreement reached with Pretoria.

South African press reports, however, indicate that the apartheid regime may have won some significant concessions. The

Pretoria News Africa Service reported from Swakopmund that the number of UN troops to be sent to the territory is expected to be 5,500. This is considerably fewer than the 7,500 figure envisaged by Secretary General Kurt Waldheim's proposed plan for UN participation in the process of Namibian independence.

Presumably Ahtisaari's new mission is to persuade the heads of state in independent Africa and SWAPO to accept the "new deal."

Mobil Fuel for Apartheid

South African Minister of Finance Owen Horwood was obviously in a happy mood when he recently opened a new oil recycling plant, built by Mobil Oil subsidiary Condor Oil in Krugersdorp, South Africa. Horwood had reason to be happy. The plant, built in a record 21 months, will fit in well with the government's policies of energy conservation and protection of the balance of payments, according to Horwood, particularly in light of recent developments in Iran.

Rhodesians Mobilize—for War or Retreat

Regardless of the outcome of the whites-only constitutional referendum, further escalation of the war in Rhodesia is virtually certain. And while the government attempts to beef up its military force, the exodus of white settlers continues to escalate.

Over 90 percent of the countryside is under martial law, with control of a large portion of those areas lost to guerrilla forces. In January, seeking to solve its manpower problems, the government announced that men from the ages of 50 to 59 would be subject to military service. It also, for the first time, called up black conscripts.

Very few blacks appear willing to join Smith's army [see *News Briefs*], and at least 700 young people have been brought before the courts for demonstrating against the call-up.

In addition the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia reports that "the operations of private armies are reaching alarming proportions." Says the Commission December Newsletter:

These armies have been built up by certain members of the transitional government [Muzorewa, Sithole], to justify their claims to guerrilla support, but it could be for other more sinister reasons. Reports coming from areas in which these armies operate are distressing. People are tortured and killed for no reason,

hardly any women have escaped the armies' desires and the food situation will be critical in a short time.

In December, according to government records, 2,937 whites left Rhodesia, while only 166 entered the country. The 2,771 negative balance far exceeds the previous monthly record of 1,834, set in November.

Meanwhile, a number of countries are

making contingency plans for an even larger exodus as the military situation deteriorates. South Africa has reportedly begun setting up refugee reception centers on farms in the northern Transvaal, and Australia is considering a plan to accept as many as 10,000 Rhodesian refugees. □

UPDATE this month was jointly prepared by *Africa News* and *Southern Africa*.



Left Muzorewa, right Sithole, building private armies.

Three Months With the Guerrillas of ZANU

Last August, Justin Nyoka disappeared. Nyoka was a well-known black journalist living in Rhodesia. He had covered the war in Rhodesia for the BBC, *The Observer* in London, and the *Rand Daily Mail* and *The Star* in South Africa.

Before his disappearance, Nyoka had received warnings from the Smith regime in Salisbury that the Patriotic Front laid plans to kill him. In the fall, the Salisbury government unleashed a torrent of propaganda that Nyoka had been kidnapped and assassinated by the Patriotic Front.

But in December Nyoka reappeared, alive and well in Maputo, Mozambique, and revealed that he had traveled for three months as a guest of ZANU throughout the areas of Zimbabwe held by the Patriotic Front. Nyoka's description of life in the liberated zones of Zimbabwe is the best view yet of that little-known aspect of the war in Rhodesia.

In a taped interview in Maputo, Nyoka revealed details of his meeting with members of the ZANU guerrilla group that claims responsibility for the December attack on the oil storage tanks outside Salisbury. Both wings of the Patriotic Front have said they were responsible. That attack destroyed at least 15 percent of Rhodesia's oil supplies. Nyoka says

it was just the initial step in a new, carefully planned ZANU strategy.

"They were talking in terms of 'We are going to hit specific targets. We are going to hit those petrol depots. We are going to hit military installations, electricity installations, in Salisbury,'" Nyoka said. "When I heard [of the attack], I said, 'Here we go. They have started.' And this is just the beginning."

Encirclement, according to Nyoka, is the main element in ZANU's military strategy. "The plan is to encircle the towns and when the whites leave to take control," Nyoka said. "The plan is that this be done on such a large scale that Smith's forces just can't cope."

Many villages and small towns already are in the hands of the guerrillas, Nyoka said. In some areas no whites other than missionaries have been seen for two years. In other cases, he said, the guerrillas feel so at ease that they enter nominally white-held towns with confidence.

Recalling a visit to the village of Enkel-doon, he said, "ZANU is in control of the surrounding area so much that it is possible to actually send people or to go and get cold drinks and you can still drink the soft drinks very cold when you get back." He added, "This happened throughout the

trip."

Schools and Clinics Functioning

In those areas that have been liberated, Nyoka said schools are functioning, in some cases with guerrillas acting as teachers, and health care is provided.

"Every evening there is a clinic for women and babies," he reported. "Then, they have built provincial centers, where you actually have trained men, where they don't only deal with fractures, they deal with the serious wounds including fractures."

Particularly striking, he said, is the level of political awareness among rural people. "They have been mobilized absolutely," he said, adding that most of this has occurred within the past year. In contrast, he said, protests and other indications of opposition to the current regime are still extremely limited in urban areas.

During the three months of his trip, Nyoka traveled over most of the eastern section of Zimbabwe.

All of the area he traveled in was controlled by ZANU, according to Nyoka, a ZANU supporter. He added that there have been "many clashes" between ZANU and ZAPU forces over control of various areas. Maintaining that ZANU has many more men inside Zimbabwe than ZAPU, Nyoka said that it was not unusual to encounter a group of 300 or more guerrillas.


As for foreign missionaries, Nyoka had a completely different story to tell than the one generally reported in the Western press. He said that missionaries have been "pouring aid into the liberated areas." He added, "This is why I say, how can guerrilla forces be accused of killing missionaries indiscriminately when in fact I met missionaries who brought medicines and equipment? And they sat at discussions, they asked questions, they contributed to the discussions."

Nyoka said that while there are some missionaries opposed to the liberation struggle—"I was told that there is an American missionary who goes about armed," he reported—the "rank and file of missionaries" are "absolutely dedicated" to the struggle. □



People's administration discussing tasks in the liberated areas.

South Africa has depended on Iran for at least 91 percent of its oil. Now the tap may be shut off.



South Africa's Natref Refinery, jointly owned by SASOL, the National Iranian Oil Company, and Total, the French oil Company.

Revolution in Iran Threatens Apartheid State

In Teheran and other Iranian cities, news that the Shah had finally fled into exile brought normal traffic to a standstill, as exultant demonstrators surged through the streets chanting, *Shah raft!*" (the Shah is gone). In South Africa, the same news brought the possibility that normal traffic might soon grind to a halt for a very different reason—because the apartheid state may soon have to begin rationing oil.

For the last five years, South Africa has depended on Iran for virtually all of the oil it needed to fuel its economy. Now the tap may be shut off. Even the Shah's hand-picked prime minister has vowed to bring Iran into compliance with an embargo on oil sales to South Africa adhered to by the rest of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

"The events in Iran are supremely important to South Africa," commented Bernard Rivers, co-author of a recent UN study on the possible impact of oil sanctions on the

apartheid economy. "The news coming out of Iran is the worst thing that has happened to South Africa since the Western reaction to Soweto and the death of Steve Biko. And economically it's worse than that."

Oil—The Achilles Heel

Economically, oil has long been recognized as one of South Africa's weakest links. It is one natural resource that South Africa does not possess. And despite the government's efforts to keep the country's oil habit at a minimum, oil remains a resource that a modern, industrial economy simply cannot do without.


As long ago as 1963, both the OAU and the UN General Assembly showed that they had spotted this potential achilles heel. They voted to urge a total embargo on oil sales to South Africa. The US demonstrated its recognition of the situation somewhat differently—by voting to remove the clause calling for oil sanctions from the

UN resolution.

But nobody has focused more attention on the implications of its dependence on foreign oil than the South African government itself. As the managing director of the Industrial Development Corporation has stressed, "Dependence on imported fuel is one of South Africa's most vulnerable points." And major efforts have been devoted to minimizing this weakness.

Since 1965, the government has spent more than \$100 million of its own money scouring the country for oil deposits. And Western companies have chipped in with another \$70 million for prospecting. To no avail. The South African agency Soekor announced in October 1977 that it was giving upon its search for oil on land, although off-shore prospecting would continue. (There have been recent rumors of some strikes.)

But most of the other firms that had taken leases for oil exploration pulled out



Iranian Princess Pahlavi in Johannesburg, March 1978, with South African foreign Minister Pik Botha, laying a wreath on her father's grave.

even earlier, leading one economist to suggest that their initial interest was "dictated not by the expectation of finding oil, but rather by the need to curry favor with the government to obtain marketing concessions."

Other efforts to protect against vulnerability to an oil cut-off have been somewhat more successful. Wherever possible, the government has encouraged use of coal, which is both plentiful and cheap (as a result in large part of the extremely low wages paid to black miners). Consequently, South Africa's "energy mix" includes only 20 percent oil, considerably less than most industrial nations.

Oil From Coal

In the drive to cut that figure even further, the government has already constructed one plant to convert coal to oil. It is now shelling out more than \$2 billion (much of it going to the Los Angeles-based Fluor Corporation) in a crash program to build a second, larger plant by 1982. South Africa has also been diligently stashing away a stockpile of oil in abandoned coal mines for use in just the kind of emergency it may soon be facing.

To judge from the confident proclamations in the South African press, the combined effect of all these measures has insulated the country against anything short of a permanent and complete oil embargo. And the government has done its best to make sure that nobody has much to judge by except carefully managed press reports.

"The government is so aware of the strategic importance of oil to the Republic that it has extended the Official Secrets Act to cover almost anything to do with the oil industry," point out Rivers and Martin Bailey at the beginning of their UN report.

Their own careful analysis of where South Africa has been getting its oil and what it does with it provides ample evidence of why the government has tried to keep the information secret.

By poring over computer lists of the routes taken by the world's oil tankers, Rivers and Bailey verified that South Africa has depended on the sympathies of the Shah for at least 91 percent of its oil. And by studying all available figures and projections on energy use, they were able to demonstrate that virtually every one of the government's protective stratagems contains further proof of its ultimate vulnerability.

No Place To Cut

For example, the success of the campaign to curb dependence on oil can be measured by the fact that oil use is already at "an almost irreducible minimum, unless there is to be a major economic recession." South Africa consumes virtually all of the oil it imports in areas of the economy where no other form of energy will do. Two-thirds is burned in the transport sector—where it could be replaced only by a miraculous technological breakthrough in electrical vehicles or a coal-to-oil conversion capability far beyond even the government's own optimistic predictions.

Rivers and Bailey conclude that the increase in South Africa's oil needs between now and 1981, when the second conversion plant known as SASOL II goes into production, will be considerably greater than the plant's output. As a result, they state, "South Africa will still need to import considerably *more* oil after the completion of SASOL II than at present." In addition, they point out that less than a third of South Africa's vast coal deposits can actually be extracted by existing methods. If that proves to be true, coal production itself could begin to fall short of the country's needs within ten years.

Sifting through all the other relevant variables might yield an absorbing computer print-out. But it would be unlikely to yield any precise conclusions about South Africa's economic future. Especially because South Africa is one place where the

normal rules of capitalist economic logic seem not to apply. A country willing to spend more than \$4 billion on stashing oil in coal mines and to splurge almost \$3 billion on a coal conversion plant clearly has added some major amendments to the law of supply and demand.

Rivers and Bailey are convinced that South Africa's need for oil is not one of the variables in the equation. They are also thoroughly unconvinced by the white supremacist regime's cocky assertion that with rationing it could ride out an embargo for up to five years. If South Africa's oil lifeline were severed completely, they conclude, "the country could probably last for a maximum of two years. . . . During this time, however, there would be enormous economic and social disruption."

That emphatic prediction assumes the imposition of mandatory UN sanctions adhered to by all nations and oil companies. A cut-off by Iran, Rivers hastens to point out, will be "a disaster for them [the apartheid regime]," but a disaster of a different character. "It is very interesting to speculate," Rivers noted, "but the speculation is just that."

Alternate Sources—Rising Costs


Already, speculation has focused on several alternative sources of oil. South African press reports and UN scuttlebutt have identified several OPEC members (most prominently Saudi Arabia) as possible defectors from the embargo. The *Economist* in London points out that "Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have bought increasing quantities of South African goods in recent years," and the Johannesburg *Star* reported at the beginning of January that "the government is believed to have had meetings with Saudi Arabian oil officials."

Still, Rivers emphasizes, "the main thing is that all the members of OPEC have said to the Organization of African Unity that they will not supply oil to South Africa. That leaves three possibilities: that some of these countries are lying; that they will say their oil shouldn't go to South Africa but it will get there anyway through the major oil companies or the 'spot' market; or that South Africa will get oil from non-members of OPEC such as Mexico or the US or Britain."

All of these possibilities would involve considerable political and economic difficulties. As the South African *Financial Mail* commented in December, an oil embargo against South Africa should prove a lot easier to monitor than the notoriously leaky embargo on Rhodesia. "It would be an elementary exercise to monitor oil movements to SA," the *Financial Mail* stated, "whereas landlocked Rhodesia was fed by SA and Mozambique [before independence]."

continued on page 23

Splits in World Church Ranks Over Liberation Support



The Christian church has had a muddled history on the African continent. On the one hand, as nation after nation struggled for independence from colonial rule, the leaders who emerged were often Christian, frequently missionary educated. In the present struggle in southern Africa, Muzorewa, Sithole, Nkomo and Mugabe fall into this category.

At the same time, Ian Smith, John Vorster and Pieter Botha are also members of the Christian church. Their continuation in power demonstrates the profoundly opposing interpretations of the Christian gospel that exist in Africa today. It also demonstrates how the church has often been used as an instrument for maintaining minority rule in Africa.

Christian missionaries such as David Livingstone played a vital role in "opening" the interior of Africa to Western exploitation and rule. While christianizing Africans, Western culture and values were also inculcated. As the late Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya once said, "When the missionaries arrived, the Africans had the land and the missionaries had the Bible. They taught us to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened them, they had the land and we had the Bible."

In South Africa the preservation of minority rule has frequently been justified in religious terms—preserving the land for God. During the Great Trek (1836-38), when they sought to gain control of vast new areas of the country, the heavily outnumbered Afrikaners who faced thousands of Zulus at the Battle of Blood River invoked divine help, promising to "rule the land for God" if victorious.

Whether or not the Trekkers had God on their side, they had other military advantages, including heavy muskets, horses, and

strong wagons. The Africans, under the leadership of Dingaan, were on foot, armed only with light throwing *assegais*. Since then the Afrikaners annually celebrate "Dingaan's Day" on December 16, the day of their victory, with a ritual mixture of racism, nationalism, and religion.

More recently Bishop Desmond Tutu of Lesotho tells how, after South Africa had invaded Angola, then-Prime Minister Vorster called for a national day of prayer to ensure victory against the threat of communism.

Only in recent years has the Christian church begun to deal with its contradictions in Africa. Any changes that have occurred have been in response to voices from oppressed Christian communities, which have challenged the traditional role of the church



Ten years ago the World Council of Churches established a fund to assist peoples struggling for economic, social and political justice. Now a grant made from that fund to the Patriotic Front has raised a storm of protest from both conservatives and some liberals.

Although the January meeting of the WCC Central Committee in Jamaica pledged itself to continuing its liberation support, rightist pressures threaten to curb the World Council's ability to meet the needs of groups struggling to throw off oppression. Truman Dunn describes some of the issues involved in the conflict.

in Africa: its compliance with and lack of action against racism.

Using the World Council of Churches as an international forum, Christians struggling for liberation called upon all Christians to go beyond mere words condemning racism, and to support actively those who were fighting against it.

In 1960, meeting in Johannesburg, the World Council issued a statement against apartheid. As a result, three South African Dutch Reformed Churches withdrew in protest from the WCC. Dr. Beyers Naude, an Afrikaner Dutch Reformed minister, was banned from the Dutch Reformed Church for his denunciation of apartheid.

Fund Created

Mere words of condemnation, however, changed nothing, and so, in 1969, the Central Committee of the WCC (governing body) established the Program to Combat Racism. This program included the creation of a special fund of \$500,000, which was to be used to make grants to "organizations of oppressed racial groups supporting victims of racial injustice whose purposes are not inconsonant with the general purposes of the WCC—to be used in their struggle for economic, social and political justice."

Commenting on the aims of the Program to Combat Racism (PCR), David Gill, a WCC staff member, explained, "It is a concrete action offering moral support to those engaged in the struggle for racial justice. It helps to counter in a small way the churches' long record of participation, actively or by silence, in the violence of the status quo maintained by white establishments throughout the world for centuries.

"The decision is a sign of hope for those who have become increasingly skeptical about the ability of churches to make any real contribution to the building of a more humane world. The action is an indication that the WCC is becoming truly a world body. No longer is the world Christian community controlled by the thinking and programs of the white churches in the affluent nations."

Almost three-quarters of the WCC's income comes from churches in the United States and West Germany. The special fund, however, receives only designated funds from interested persons and organizations; it receives no automatic payments from general WCC funds.

Assistance for Southern Africa

Since 1969 the special fund has distributed \$2.6 million, more than half of it going to southern Africa. "The situation in southern Africa," the Central Committee declared, "is recognized as a priority due to the overt and intensive nature of white racism and the increasing awareness on the part of the oppressed in their struggle for liberation."

From its beginning the PCR has been a



General Secretary Potter with Jamaica's Prime Minister Manley at WCC meeting.

target of criticism, but none as severe as that touched off by the \$85,000 awarded to the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe last August. A member of Rhodesia's government, D. Fawcett Phillips, declared that the World Council should be renamed "Murder Incorporated." John Vorster called the action a decision to support "Communist organizations and terrorists," adding that South African churches that are members of the World Council must withdraw or "action would be taken against them."

But there are signs that the WCC action is actually strengthening South African Council members' resistance to government control. Not one of the nine member-churches in South Africa has yet withdrawn from the WCC, perhaps because many of these churches have large black memberships. Some church leaders have said that the grants have weakened the position of white liberal reformers, but most have welcomed the condemnation of apartheid.



Dr. Beyers Naude, banned from his Dutch Reformed Church for denouncing apartheid.

The opposition to the special fund grants has most frequently centered on the issue of violence, which is the primary criticism of the \$85,000 grant to the Patriotic Front. *Christian Century* magazine, formerly supportive of the PCR, called the WCC "arm-chair guerrillas" and "vicarious doers of violence." The Salvation Army, sensitive about its members who have been killed in Zimbabwe, "suspended" its membership in the WCC in order to study the issue.

The Presbyterian Church in Ireland, headquartered in Belfast, has been the only church to issue an official document critical of the grant. Its statement called for a "thorough reappraisal of the special fund of the Program to Combat Racism and its administration." Continually referring to the civil conflict in Northern Ireland, the document deplored the WCC's imposing a "corporate commitment" to the Patriotic Front.

Likewise, West German criticism has focused on the Christian commitment to end the war and violence. Criticisms from American Christians have also centered on the issue of violence.

Ignoring State Violence

These criticisms reflect the reality that the church has not yet come to terms with the meaning of structural violence, which is most clearly seen in the racist regimes of southern Africa. Traditional Christian debate on violence centered on the simplistic notion that violence was only overt, willful, combat or aggression, such as war. There was no analysis incorporating the violence of state repression. There is still a continuing debate in the WCC over how to understand violence and whether violence on the part of the Patriotic Front is counterviolence to the racist violence of the Smith regime.

Americans critical of the "violent tactics" of the Patriotic Front should be reminded of their own revolutionary armed

struggle to overthrow a repressive colonial regime. Likewise, those in Germany must recall the need to take up arms to free millions from the oppressive violence of the Nazi state.

The Program to Combat Racism of the WCC has itself taken the position that "no support should be given to violence." Thus every grant has been earmarked for humanitarian purposes. Critics question whether the money is not used, instead, for the perpetuation of violence. Both ZANU and ZAPU do have extensive refugee camps in Mozambique and Zambia and welcome the financial assistance, which is miniscule compared with their need.

Church Direction

The real struggle in the international Christian community seems to hinge on the general direction of the church. Under the leadership of its General Secretary, Dr. Phillip Potter, the WCC has attempted to move toward concrete social action. Said Potter of the Program to Combat Racism, "This was a definite departure from World Council practice, for it called on the churches not only to speak but to act." Critics claim that the Council has subordinated theology and the pursuit of church unity to social activism.

This brings the church back full circle to the prior stage in its history when its silence and preoccupation with a "theology of words" were challenged by the oppressed Christian community.

The church struggled again with all these issues last month in the meeting of the Central Committee of the WCC in Kingston, Jamaica. Continuing conservative attack made the Program to Combat Racism the hottest item on the agenda. After heated debate the central committee voted to continue the Program to Combat Racism, but it did so only with the provision that its critics be given a stronger voice in grant approvals. The central committee also endorsed a special \$5 million fund for southern Africa to "serve the needs of all people affected—displaced persons, refugees, victims of the war and oppression," a move more in the tradition of charity than support for liberation.

Through its continuation of the Program to Combat Racism, the WCC has maintained the hope that the Christian church will become an even greater voice in the struggle for liberation in southern Africa. But as indicated by the tremendous controversy that has continually surrounded the program, the church has still not defined its role in the liberation of Africa and other parts of the world.

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The role of CBS was crucial

Sports Boycott Loses to Boxer Knoetze

"the black child alone has enough worries to burden the world and make it crack."

—Zindzi Mandela, *Black As I Am*

Stanley Ndlovu is a "child of Soweto."

Autumn, two years ago, he was 15 and in the streets of Atteridgeville Township near Pretoria. He was a part of the swell of black youth, striking across the country for a new tomorrow.

Detective Constable Kallie Knoetze met Stanley Ndlovu in those streets and shot him through both legs. "When I asked for water I was told to drink my blood," Ndlovu recently told a *New York Times* reporter. "I lay there croaking and writhing in pain but I was told to drink my blood." His right leg was later amputated.

True to the aims of South African justice, Ndlovu, not Knoetze, was brought up on charges. Fortunately, he was acquitted.

Cruelly and ironically, Ndlovu had something very special in common with Knoetze—he also wanted to be "at the top as a boxer." Unlike Ndlovu, Knoetze got his chance to reach boxing's summit after he resigned from the police force following his conviction for "trying to defeat the ends of justice." He had attempted to "persuade" witnesses from testifying against a police colleague.

Knoetze rose rapidly through the ranks of South Africa's segregated boxing system with its black and white champions, separate facilities and all-white boxing commissions, which are regulated by the government to promote the aims of apartheid. For black athletes this means continuing discrimination, inferior facilities and opportunities, while white athletes are underwritten, promoted, and supported to



their best advantage.

"This, to us in the US, is the principal reason why we oppose Knoetze," said Paul Irish of the American Committee on Africa, "not simply because he's an undesirable character, which he is. But because he's a product of a sports system that discriminates systematically against blacks. That's why South Africa was kicked out of the Davis Cup, the Olympics, the International Amateur Boxing Association. The cardinal rule of international sports is that all athletes have the right to participate on an equal footing, and that doesn't happen in South Africa."

Sharp Debate

By the time Kallie Knoetze beat Bill Sharkey in the fourth round of their mid-January heavyweight showdown in Miami, the bout had helped to refocus critical eyes on the status of South African athletes in international sport. Not since the Davis Cup battle of last spring, which drew the largest sports demonstrations in US history



Knoetze, South African "white heavyweight champion," honored at home as sportsman of the year, was condemned in US as apartheid representative.

and resulted in South Africa's suspension from the competition, has there been such sharp debate and action on this question.

Unlike last spring's defeat, this time South Africa's representative scraped by in an unexpected eleventh-hour victory.

Many anti-apartheid, black and human-rights organizations pooled resources in an effort to prevent Knoetze from fighting in the US. Among the activists were Jesse Jackson of PUSH, Richard Lapchick of

the fight to take place. At the same time, vigorous efforts were made to persuade the State Department to refuse Knoetze entry into the US, and later when he arrived, to revoke his visa.

Five days before the fight, the State Department finally revoked the visa on the technical grounds that it should not have been granted because Knoetze had been convicted of obstructing justice in South Africa, a felony in the US.

More Rounds Ahead?

ACCESS, George Houser and Paul Irish of the American Committee on Africa and representatives from the NAACP, church, and local Miami groups.

Representatives of the protesting groups met with Sonny Werblin, president of Madison Square Garden and the co-promoter of the fight, and with Frank Smith, president of CBS Sports, which had invested \$100,000 to cover fight expenses and had sole television rights for the event.

The promoters were urged not to allow

Madison Square Garden immediately withdrew its support for the fight, leaving Chris Dundee as the sole official fight promoter. At a press conference called by the African National Congress, Don King, the well-known black boxing promoter, who had opposed the fight, and Paul Irish of the ACOA commended the State Department's action. Sources at CBS indicated that the fight would be rescheduled for Johannesburg later in the month. It looked like the protesters had won a victory.

Court Ruling

Then, three days before the fight, US District Judge Norman Roettger, a Nixon appointee, granted a temporary injunction against the revocation and took Knoetze "under the protection of the court." Opponents of the fight countered by arguing that Knoetze still required a work permit to fight legally. But Verne Jervis of the Immigration and Naturalization Service disagreed. "The work permit is moot," he said. "We have been enjoined from doing anything to prevent him from fighting."

The State Department informed the press that it would request a hearing within 24 hours, but Mary Ann Youden of the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs could not confirm that Judge Roettger had received the request in time, if in fact at all. Fight opponents made an unsuccessful last-minute attempt to have the Miami Boxing Commissioner revoke Knoetze's license.

When this move failed, demonstrators took to the picket line. More than 150 people actively protested outside the Miami Convention Center, site of the January 12 fight. In a moving display of solidarity, black boxer Walter Lee Walker, scheduled to fight in a preliminary match on the ticket, withdrew in support of the protest and joined the picket line.

Not everyone acted with such integrity. CBS cameras carried the fight across the US. Jesse Jackson and many other protesters believe that, in fact, CBS played a crucial role in keeping the fight alive. "CBS, by televising the fight and putting up \$100,000, is the promoter," Jackson told reporters. "Mr. Chris Dundee only had \$5,000."

One participant in the negotiations with the network before the fight said that CBS was very unsympathetic. This source attributed CBS's stubbornness, in part, to its competition with ABC for leadership in the ratings. Television, the element in the CBS communications conglomerate that earns \$3 billion annually, provides some 60 percent of its corporate revenues. Sports features are particularly important vehicles in winning viewers.

Beyond that, like most other American corporate giants, CBS has not expressed any interest in ending relations with South Africa.

Significantly, after the fight CBS sports commentator Jack Whittaker called the State Department revocation "puzzling" and chastised the government for denying visas to athletes such as Knoetze on "vague sociological norms."

As paymaster, CBS added a peculiar final twist to the story. Sharkey, the loser, received \$10,000, but when reporters inquired about Knoetze's purse, they were told, perhaps for the first time ever in the fight racket, that it was "a personal matter."

Someone from CBS might try explaining that to Stanley Ndlovu. □

The Rhodesian Lobby: Round Two

In a January 3 *Washington Post* story, David Ottaway reported that Rhodesian lobbyists are optimistic about getting the Carter administration to lift sanctions against Rhodesia. Senator Jesse Helms (D.-N.C.) boasts that he already has 42 Senators who are prepared to vote for the lifting of sanctions. And now, as Ottaway points out, the Rhodesian lobbyists believe they "only need to win over a handful of additional Senators to get the Senate to agree to lifting sanctions wholly or partly."

"As for the House, the Rhodesians now feel they could swing a vote in their favor on the sanctions issue without much trouble."

Given the events of the last Congressional session, Ottaway's article comes as no surprise. The Rhodesians and their conservative allies in the US, especially in Congress, have mounted a sustained lobbying effort for sometime now. The current Rhodesian lobbying effort began as soon as the March 3rd internal agreement was signed. In the wake of Ian Smith's visit to the U.S. last October, conservatives on the Hill are now strategizing how to get the new Congress to lift sanctions against Rhodesia.

The Rhodesia agents out to influence Congress have plenty of help from Senators Helms and Hayakawa (R.-Cal.), who have kept the Rhodesian question alive since Smith's trip. During the 95th Congress Helms presented an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Appropriation bill allocating up to \$5 million in aid to "refugees inside Rhodesia" through international organizations. The Senate agreed to this provision with the understanding that the figure of \$5 million represented a ceiling and not the exact amount to be funneled into Rhodesia.

But Helms has been lobbying AID to spend the full amount in Rhodesia. This move may provide the Smith regime with desperately needed foreign currency to continue its war effort against the Zimbabwean people. There is fear that Smith's army

would restrict the areas where international organizations could distribute relief supplies, keeping them out of villages that support the Patriotic Front. Helms's activity is also keeping the Rhodesian issue in the Senate's mind.

Both Helms and Hayakawa have announced their desire to serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. If Helms should find his way to the traditionally liberal Africa sub-committee, any type of legislation Senate liberals may press for, such as the Panama Treaty implementation is likely to be held hostage for Rhodesia's ransom: the lifting of sanctions.

Smith can well argue that he has already gone halfway toward satisfying the conditions Congress has required in the Case-Javits Amendment adopted last August. The amendment required the Rhodesian government to commit itself to participate

in an all-party conference and to install a international observation as a prerequisite international observation, as a prerequisite for ending sanctions. Reports David Ottaway, "Perhaps most important in their eyes, Smith and the three internal leaders met one of the two conditions set down by Congress last summer for eventual US recognition by agreeing to talk to the guerrilla leaders."

The Smith regime will probably try to satisfy the second condition of "free and fair elections" by early spring. Sometime between now and shortly after the April 20 election date there will be an all-out effort to lift Rhodesian sanctions. The only way that this attempt to resume trade with Rhodesia can be stopped is to mobilize and to lobby for the decisive defeat of any legislation lifting sanctions against Rhodesia.

New Southern Africa Working Group Formed in Capital

The Washington Office on Africa and TransAfrica initiated a new Southern Africa Working Group in January. It will coordinate work of Washington, D.C. representatives of national organizations on US government policy toward southern Africa. Thirty-two groups, including church, union and legal-research organizations sent representatives to the first meeting of the group.

The Working Group will meet regularly to develop strategy for work on legislative issues concerning southern Africa. Three issues were initially identified as priorities:

- (1) opposing the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia;
- (2) supporting southern African refugees;

- (3) developing a long-term campaign to stop new investment and bank loans to South Africa.

TransAfrica also urged groups to protest immediately President Carter's invitation to South African Prime Minister Botha to visit the United States in return for cooperation on Namibia and Zimbabwe.

The Washington Office on Africa is sponsored by seven Protestant denominations, the United Auto Workers and the American Committee on Africa. TransAfrica is a black lobby formed last May with the backing of the Congressional Black Caucus and national civil rights leaders.

Another A.I.D. Study Takes Aim at Shaping Southern Africa

The US Agency for International Development (AID) is once again surveying southern Africa. In the wake of the ill-fated African-American Scholars Council study of 1976-77, Congress mandated in 1977 a more thorough attempt, costing \$1 million. On January 8 AID drew together wide-ranging experts for a three-day meeting at the State Department to assess the results of its most recent development studies of nine countries and seven sectors.

Those attending included UN officials, academic experts, development-agency staff from donor countries, and consultants from a variety of firms specializing in development. The ambassadors of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland took an active part in developing the recommendations of working groups.

One handicap faced by the working groups was that the consultants' studies were not available to most participants until the day before the meeting, so few had a chance to read them. Nevertheless, lively, if incomplete, discussion in the working groups led to general approval of the study's recommendations in most cases, with strong dissent and disapproval in a few instances.

It was clear that a major theme of the recommendations was to promote assistance to the "moderate" black-ruled states of southern Africa. Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Malawi were to be the primary recipients of development aid for small industries, mining, non-formal education, extension services for agriculture, and refugees.

Angola was excluded because the US has yet to recognize its government. Mozambique, although invited to participate, had declined to let a large AID mission come to study there. Zimbabwe was omitted because the internal settlement has not yet been recognized and the State Department ruled against dealing with the liberation movements. Namibia is still in limbo. Thus, although AID wanted an "apolitical" study of human needs and resources, political considerations had a great deal to do with who was recommended for aid, for study, for consultation, and for participation.

An announced objective of AID was to lessen the majority-ruled states' dependence on South Africa. One major strategy recommendation of the papers was the pro-

vision of assistance designed to enable the countries to exploit their mineral resources in collaboration with multinational corporations. Many participants felt that it was by no means apparent that such a move would bring benefits other than some foreign exchange flow to the countries concerned.

Thus, unless labor-intensive methods were to be chosen, little impact on the forced migration of labor to the South African mines could be expected. One UN official said that labor-intensive methods meant small mines and that infrastructure could only be justified by very large-scale operations. Some consultants suggested that to induce mining corporations to begin operations, surveying and exploring costs would have to be born by the countries who would have to borrow funds to meet them.

In the area of manufacturing, some participants felt that the paper submitted failed to discuss ways of decreasing dependency on South Africa. They argued that in addition to the small-scale industries recommended, heavy industry involving parastatals as well as private firms with links to the mining sector should have been options. At the same time it was argued that major attention needs to be paid to obtaining the technical skills and access to markets in the West and elsewhere, especially in view of monopolistic practices and the readily apparent trend toward protectionism among industrialized nations.

At several points, participants in the colloquium urged the creation of a "Marshall Plan" for southern Africa—a long-term commitment to the stabilization of commodity prices and foreign-exchange shortfalls. At the same time, it was clear that an agreed regional set of priorities and principles, institutions and coordinating bodies was more in the mind of the donors than in the minds of the countries involved. Most participants warned against regional schemes imposed from above and said that development had to be "country specific" in most cases—transport being the exception everyone mentioned.

Although the colloquium illuminated many issues, the suggested strategy relies on the ability of private enterprise to engage in development that meets the needs of the people of the region. But private enterprise is heavily committed to South Africa's

super-exploitative system, so that inducements for private investment in what one expert called the "elephant countries" would have to be massive. Evolutionary changes by such methods are an unlikely substitute for the liberation struggles. The meetings avoided completely any critical analysis of private enterprise, as against socialist, development strategies.

The colloquium was haunted by the spirit of those who were not there. Several speakers and two working groups deplored the absence of the liberation movements who were fighting wars in Zimbabwe and Namibia—wars that were not being discussed and whose effects would be incalculable on any development plans.

In the case of the refugee working group, the experts said that the refugees should be assisted wherever they might be situated, including Mozambique, a country conspicuous by its absence. The absence of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia meant that the mining development projections for land-locked states were missing a component because mining products are generally exported by railroads and ports in those countries.

AID expects to revise the studies and submit recommendations to Congress before the end of March. Any recommendations that involve large sums of money are going to be in for tough sledding. The conservatives are primed to cut foreign aid. A well-informed source says that this year AID originally requested \$170 million for the Economic Support Fund for southern Africa but has been forced to chop the request to \$100 million before it goes to Congress. What is more, conservative senators such as Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Robert Byrd of Virginia doubly dislike foreign aid for black countries. What could happen is that the right would succeed in diverting considerable aid funds into the hands of bogus "majority rule" countries such as Rhodesia Zimbabwe, as they have already succeeded in doing with refugee money (see Washington Notes).

One former Senate staffer predicted that the new AID study and the results of the colloquium might not result in many practical changes. "When the crunch comes," this source said, "the liberals let the right have some of what they want." □

Economic Woes Bring a Shake-up at the Top



Arlinque Assie

Lopo do Nascimento: prime minister's post eliminated.

The Western press has a tendency to interpret any shake-up in the upper reaches of a socialist government as the result of either foreign policy issues or internal ideological disputes. The tendency to analyze all that goes on in Angola from that point of view is greater because of the splits within MPLA throughout its history, the divisive war in Angola in 1975, and the attempted coup in 1977.

So it is not surprising to see the Western press rely on such an interpretation to explain the decisions of the central committee of MPLA in December to eliminate the post of prime minister—in the process relieving Lopo do Nascimento of his position—and to ask for the resignations of several top advisers, including Carlos Rocha, a longtime MPLA militant who had been in charge of economic planning. (Nascimento retains his position on MPLA's central committee, but Rocha and several other former ministers have been removed completely from positions of authority.)

It appears, though, that these interpreta-

tions are wrong. The economy of Angola has not yet recovered from the disastrous war three and a half years ago. Progress, according to recent statements made by President Agostinho Neto, has been too slow. The bureaucracy has been too sluggish while functionaries have fiercely guarded their privileges. These are the factors that precipitated the drastic central committee decisions in December.

"We've decided that it is necessary," Neto declared after the central committee meeting, "to review our economic plan, and to do it before the end of 1978."

That review has included a hard look at practically every function of the economy—the distribution of basic foodstuffs, agricultural cooperatives and state farms, wide discrepancy in salaries, productivity, and worker participation in the control of the work place.

And it hasn't been just at the central committee meeting that these topics have been raised. For months before at women's organization conferences, union meetings, and youth gatherings, the problems of the economy had been much discussed.

Two problems—commerce within the country and a revision of salary structures—have been particularly pressing. Purchasing power has been threatened seriously by speculation and by the scarcity of many products. Poorer people, especially in the countryside, are unable either to buy or to sell products, while bureaucrats in the cities have managed to maintain a special status inherited from the colonial period.

To begin to right the imbalance, the central committee announced that it was suspending the payments of all special bonuses for bureaucrats. At the same time subsidies are being extended to families of all other workers. And, the central committee has taken a more flexible attitude toward small private merchants who it hopes can help solve some of the country's economic problems, especially the problem



Tempo

President Agostinho Neto: simplifying administration.

of rural commodity distribution.

At the government level, the central committee elevated each of the 17 provincial commissioners to the rank of minister in order to streamline decision-making authority. "With this measure," Neto commented, "we want to simplify the execution of numerous tasks that have been hobbled up till now because of the gap between ministerial representatives and the provincial commissioners."

The central committee was equally concerned with what it referred to as legal problems. "From a juridical point of view," Neto said, "the execution of laws, decrees, and instruction that are promulgated is not under control. This is very important if we are to function in the name of justice and progress."

Thus the central committee has created a sort of executive prosecutor, charged with the task of ferreting out "violations of the rights of citizens and of systems to allow the president to remedy immediately the violations," according to Neto.

U.S. Conditions

Of course, the leaders of the MPLA cannot ignore foreign policy altogether. Two US delegations—the first headed by Richard Moose and Donald McHenry from the State Department and the second led by Senator George McGovern—visited Luanda in late 1978. These visits, coupled with frequent press reports that Angola was turning more and more to the West for economic aid, have led many journalists to speculate whether Angola has begun a “tilt” away from socialism and toward the West.


After McGovern’s visit in December, Neto dispensed with such speculations. “We have learned during 22 years of struggle,” Neto told a huge Luanda crowd, “that at each moment it is necessary to defend the independence of the party in order to contribute to the real independence of the country.”

Neto’s declarations were a strong reply to US conditions for normalizing relations—that Cuba withdraw its troops and that MPLA come to a reconciliation with UNITA—repeated by the State Department representatives while they were in Luanda. “Our people and our party are disposed to cooperate with all countries that want to cooperate with us,” Neto said. “We will have need for foreign technicians for decades. But if the central committee accepted such conditions, we wouldn’t be independent any longer; we would live only thanks to American subsidies.”

Indeed, Cuban officials recently reaffirmed their ties with Angola. “The withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola isn’t negotiable with third parties,” declared Cuba’s vice president Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Rodriguez said Cuba was ready whenever Angola was to pull out its troops; he also revealed that last year the two allies had developed a plan for the withdrawal of Cuban troops. But the plan was aborted after the Western military intervention during the crisis in Zaire’s Shaba province.

As for intensified economic relations with the West, senior Angolan officials have pointed out recently that such contacts are necessary to speed the recovery of Angolan industries, concentrated predominantly in the cities of Luanda, Huambo, Lubango, and Cabinda. If Angola feels the need now to press for closer commercial relations with the West, these officials argue, it is because Angola must attempt to overcome the consequences of the isolation it suffered at the hands of the Western powers during the war.

There is no chance, say MPLA leaders, that the West could lead Angola away from its socialist allies. According to these leaders Angola will accept no conditions for economic cooperation or for the normalization of relations with any Western country. □



ZIMBABWE

Mine-proof vehicle parked in Salisbury street—the war is everywhere.

The Hughes report: Britain backs off

Last month *Southern Africa* reported briefly on a new British diplomatic effort in Rhodesia—or Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, as Prime Minister Smith, in his infinite cunning, has recently renamed the breakaway British colony. That effort was spearheaded by Cledwyn Hughes, an appointee of the Labor government who was to act as a sort of chief negotiator and fact-finder in Rhodesia and neighboring states.

Hughes’s report has since been made public, first being announced by Prime Minister Callaghan in the House of Commons. Its conclusion: The situation in Rhodesia is nowhere near a point where an all-parties conference would be constructive.

Such a conference, bringing together members of Smith’s four-man executive council and the two wings of the Patriotic Front, has been a stated aim of Anglo-American diplomacy since Smith announced his internal settlement last March 3. As a result of the Hughes report, the British PM told the Commons, Britain would reduce its role in the Rhodesian conflict and allow events to take their natural course on the ground.

With the war in an advanced stage, the reaction in Salisbury to this latest British position was quick and sharp. P.K. van der Byl, Smith’s defense and foreign minister, denounced the British posture strongly. Van der Byl stated that the Rhodesian strategy in the future would be to concentrate on building a solid relationship with

Washington—where the minority regime has for some time been working closely with conservative congressmen and other supporters both in and out of government (*Washington Notes*.)

The first step in this new strategy, of course, will be to meet the requirements of the Case-Javits amendment, passed late last summer as a compromise with conservative congressmen who were seeking an immediate end to economic sanctions against the Salisbury government. Case-Javits was conditional: It required that multiracial elections be held before year’s end if sanctions were to be lifted.

Salisbury’s timetable is now a bit off schedule, but the minority government is still moving quickly to a semblance of elections under the terms of the new constitution recently made public. At *Southern Africa*’s press time, Smith was campaigning vigorously in white areas of Rhodesia to win support for a late-January referendum on the constitution. Although Smith faced some opposition on his right, there appeared to be little chance that Rhodesian whites would reject the constitution.

The January 29 referendum is a first step leading to the multiracial elections required by Case-Javits. Those elections are now scheduled for April 20. In the period before them, there is likely to be a pitched effort to win more official support among U.S. officials—a campaign aimed ultimately at winning full diplomatic recognition for Smith’s “transitional” regime.

UN Independence Plan Alive? Maybe.

After four months of South African obstruction, the UN plan for the independence of Namibia is back on track—at least temporarily. In mid-January the Secretary General's Special Representative, Martti Ahtisaari, met with South African officials in Windhoek and Pretoria "to complete consultations" concerning the UN transition team (UNTAG) and to lay the ground work for a cease-fire. This followed a break in official contacts during which South Africa ran its own elections which installed a Democratic Turnhalle Alliance-dominated "constituent assembly" early in December.

Two weeks after the elections, South African Foreign Minister Roloef Botha wrote Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, informing him that "the South African government... has decided to cooperate in the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435," the UN plan for the transition to independence. In an accompanying letter to Waldheim, Botha conveyed a list of reservations from the "assembly" members who are not recognized by the UN but whom Botha referred to as "the duly elected leaders of South West Africa."

Ceasefire Essential

In his reply to Botha's letter, Waldheim began by saying that a ceasefire "is an essential prerequisite to the implementation" of the plan. "Once the cease-fire is in place," Ahtisaari said in January before leaving the UN for South Africa, "then we can proceed from there."

In his letter, Waldheim made no reference to the "reservations" of the "assembly." But the group undoubtedly exists and exerts some force on the situation inside Namibia. When asked before leaving on his trip, whether he would be meeting with any of the new "leaders," Ahtisaari diplomatically replied "Who are those?" Yet he also conceded that he could not prevent the South Africans from including them in the deliberations.

While Foreign Minister Botha made a point of relaying the concerns of the "assembly," South Africa has all along had



Commissioner Martti Ahtisaari (right) with South African Administrator-General Steyn, in Windhoek.

its own reservations. Among these were recurring protests about the size of the UNTAG force which it is proposed will number 7,500 with 5,000 slated as military personnel. South Africa also has problems with the composition of the force, which it says should contain no frontline, Nigerian, or "communist" troops. It is also concerned about the primacy of South African as against UN police and about the relationship between Martti Ahtisaari and the South African administrator-general of Namibia.

With the exception of UN troop size and composition, the substance of the plan had already been agreed to by South Africa, SWAPO, and the UN. The reservations indicated in Botha's letters appeared to serve notice that South Africa would be trying to renegotiate the plan. However, SWAPO has insisted that it will not let that happen. "If one single comma is changed," said SWAPO's UN representative, Theo Ben Gurirab, "the deal is off." Clearly, SWAPO's tenacity in pursuing the Namibian liberation struggle does not suggest that they will let the product of 20 months

of hard negotiations slip away at the point of implementation.

Botha and Waldheim have agreed to the South African proposal that the UN-supervised election for independence would be held by September 30, 1979. Both Waldheim and Ahtisaari have asserted that this means the cease-fire would have to be in force before the end of February for the independence plan to run the full seven months as originally envisioned. During that time South Africa's 25,000 troops will be reduced to 1,500, refugees and exiles will return and all parties will be free to campaign across the territory.

UN Resolute?

Yet questions remain that suggest that peace and independence are perhaps not quite at hand. The UN's ability to adhere to a strong stand will be a critical element. There are important weaknesses in its cohesion, such as those revealed by the evaporation of the sanctions threat after South Africa ran its own illegal elections which installed a Democratic Turnhalle Alliance-dominated "constituent assembly" early in

December.

Some observers have registered concern over Ahtisaari's statement before leaving UN headquarters that the 7,500 UNTAG figure must be viewed as an "upper limit," meaning there may not be 7,500 UN personnel in Namibia at one time. This was viewed as a possible retreat in the face of South African protests.

Ahtisaari also noted that there would be a new voter registration system to replace the discredited system used by the South Africans for December's elections.

"This is a key point," said one African correspondent, noting that this is a basic guarantee of freedom and fairness during the elections. The UN may meet resistance from the South Africans on this point.

"Clearly, the South Africans have agreed [to the plan]," noted another informed observer, "because they believe they can win the UN elections" following on the "victory" of the DTA in December. Vorster's rejection of the UN plan in September was an admission of South Africa's belief in an inevitable SWAPO victory in a free, unmanaged election.

Now, it is argued, things have changed. The DTA has been given a chance to en-

trench itself, so that South Africa can risk having UN-supervised elections. Many observers, however, feel that if it seems that SWAPO can still win in the elections, the South Africans are likely to sabotage the plan again.

"When the UN election does take place," editorialized the *International Herald Tribune* recently, "there will be a 'democratically elected' structure already in place which can wreck any such plan. The South African authorities, in other words, have pulled a fast one: They have agreed to UN-run elections and yet they have found a way to nullify the procedure in advance if they so desire."

Year of Solidarity

In the face of these continuing uncertainties, the General Assembly moved in late December to strengthen its aid to the transitional process. Declaring 1979 as the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia, the General Assembly assigned a \$300,000 budget to promote knowledge about the Namibian liberation struggle world-wide. In addition, Martti Ahtisaari was reaffirmed as Commissioner for Namibia, the chief executive officer of the

Council for Namibia, which the UN regards as "the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until independence."

The General Assembly further strengthened the Council's operations by reinforcing the Nationhood Program. Inaugurated in 1977, the Nationhood Program is an attempt to harness the various talents and capabilities of all UN agencies to aid in the rapid, progressive development of a free Namibia. For example, maritime agencies would help codify new maritime regulations, while UN labor bodies would aid with drawing up labor legislation and the World Health Organization could provide assistance in designing nationwide health care. At this point, most activity is at the point of research and planning with funding provided by the agencies themselves, the Council, or other sources.

"It's a really urgent program," said one source familiar with the intent of the nationhood scheme, "particularly given the experience of the Congo" where a likewise rapacious colonial power left its colony in such a depressed state that it collapsed under the conflicting forces let loose immediately after independence. □

SOUTH AFRICA

Secret Funds Scandal Shakes White Confidence

The National Party of South Africa has avoided being forced from office in the wake of the recent information scandal.

Amid high-level corruption, political retribution, and the rattled confidence of the white minority, Prime Minister Pieter Botha's government accepted the report and recommendations of the Erasmus Commission, headed by Judge Rudolf Erasmus, which had been charged with investigating the scandal. The government's

acceptance of the entire report had the effect of preempting opposition attacks on government members, while retaining support on the right.

Commented *To The Point*, itself a conservative journal:

Politically, the strategy of the opposition in the debate boomeranged badly. [Progressive-Reform leader Colin Eglin's] claim that a scapegoat was being

made of [former Information Minister Connie] Mulder and that the rest of the Cabinet, including especially former prime minister John Vorster, Prime Minister Botha and Finance Minister Owen Horwood, shared the responsibility for the malpractices, coincided precisely with the attitude which had been adopted earlier by Mulder's supporters.

Their defiant stance changed after publication of the Erasmus report, but



Ministers Vorster, Botha, Horwood: whitewashed by Erasmus Commission.

the ironic coincidence of an alliance with the opposition turned their retreat into headlong flight. There was no way they, on the right of the National Party, were going to side with "leftist-liberals" against their own party leadership.

The report and debate thus had the unexpected effect of greatly strengthening the position of the prime minister.

The Erasmus commission concluded that Prime Minister Vorster was responsible for channeling money from a secret Defense Ministry fund to the Information Department. The commission said that this must "be regarded as an irregularity from a technical, constitutional, and audit point-of-view." Prime Minister Botha, who was then Defense Minister, also knew about these illegal and unconstitutional transactions, but he told the investigators he had no knowledge of how the funds were being used. Yet despite such evidence the commission exonerated Vorster, Botha, and Finance Minister Harwood from any responsibility for the malpractices.

Mulder's Fall From Grace

The axe did fall on former Minister of Information Mulder, who at one time was the crown prince of South African politics. Botha asked Mulder to resign his cabinet position. He was also told by a group of 12 parliamentarians, who only weeks before had organized his campaign inside the party

for election to the premiership following Vorster's resignation, that he had become an embarrassment to the National Party and should resign his parliamentary seat. Members of the National Party divisional committee in Randfontein, Mulder's constituency, made a similar request.

Mulder's assistant, former Secretary of Information Eschel Rhoodie, has since fled to Brazil, ostensibly for business purposes. According to the *Washington Post*, the South African government is considering extradition.

The information scandal has posed a major political question for the white minority, focused not only on confidence in the government but also on the accountability of the executive branch to the parliament. The problem of determining the need, the type, and the implementation of state security projects is also in for much debate. But the debate is unlikely to establish new guidelines based on a broad consensus that can solve the problem.

Like many a Western leader before him, Prime Minister Botha has demanded the right to carry out certain clandestine projects in the name of national security. Referring to recent CIA exposures, Botha said, "The West is being paralyzed. The instruments being used to combat subversion are being destroyed."

One device that South Africa has used extensively to combat subversion is "counter-

propaganda." More than \$73 million dollars were used over five years to bolster the government's image inside South Africa and abroad. The facts are well known: money to start and sustain a pro-Nationalist Party newspaper, *The Citizen*; \$11.5 million transferred to conservative American publisher John McGoff to help him buy the *Washington Star*, though the deal never went through; money to film tycoon Andre Pieterse; overtures to publishing houses; junkets for executives and their wives; mysterious cash authorizations for unidentified purposes.

With this slush fund at Connie Mulder's disposal, it was also alleged that Mulder, Rhoodie and General Van den Bergh, former head of the Bureau of State Security—now the Department of State Security—had formed a triumvirate to take over the functioning of the government, with Mulder as premier.

Objectively, there appears to be little, if any, ideological or other significant difference between the Mulder and the Botha factions. Yet the impact of the scandal should not be casually dismissed. The picture of top political leaders salting away money overseas, and the exposure of personal jealousies and private political vendettas has served to shake already dwindling white confidence in the ability of any leaders to preserve white supremacy for another hundred years. []

Letter From Mozambique

The Portugese medical system in Mozambique served the Portugese almost exclusively. Now health is everybody's business, and increasingly everybody's right.

David Sogge, from the American Friends Service Committee, on a five-month assignment to expand AFSC's humanitarian aid to southern African refugees, writes about his October visit to Paul and Andy Epstein, in Beira, Mozambique. This doctor-nurse couple, sponsored by AFSC, are employed by the Ministry of Health and assigned to the Beira Hospital, second largest in Mozambique.

"Today around noon I walked into the emergency room of the Central Hospital of Beira. I was directed to a treatment room, where I found Andy and Paul Epstein, a Mozambican medical assistant, and a Swedish doctor all hovering over a newly admitted patient.

"This fellow has almost no blood," they told me. Paul drew me over to the side of the bed and, as I watched, pulled down the man's lower eyelids. Where the inside of the eyelid should be pink, his were completely white. The man's ribs and facial bones were prominent. He was semi-conscious. But there was no sign of a wound or hemorrhage.

"It's hookworm," Paul said. "This man was brought here from a village far off in the country. He has probably never worn shoes, and the worms just come right in through the soles of the feet. At first the loss of blood to the worms is slight. But after eight months or so, when the infestation is well-advanced, a person can lose about 100 cc's of blood every day. Adults have only about five liters of blood in their bodies (about 5000 cc's), so in a matter of weeks you go into shock from lack of blood."

Now taped to the man's forehead and running into his nose was a plastic tube for

water; into a vein in his arm was a plastic catheter attached to another drip, a provisional measure until blood was brought. I was told that such equipment, which hasn't been available to the hospital's staff, [until a recent AFSC shipment] has made blood transfers, drips, and intravenous feeding immeasurably easier. Before, the staff had to jerry-rig tubing and old needles into peoples' arms, or simply work with large syringes.

Afternoon at a Health Post

The neighborhood of Onhamudima in Beira is not very pretty. Houses are built of stones packed between exposed lattice-works of sticks; there are a few built of iron sheets. The better ones have a pane or two of glass, and iron roofs.

Doors are smudged and weatherbeaten. The predominant color is grey. Rivulets of sewage, sometimes forming into great greenish pools, lie across the dusty paths, which wind narrowly between the houses and shacks. In short, it looks like many other urban neighborhoods in Africa where poor people live.

Yet the people who live here seem to care about their dwelling place. Indeed Inhamudima is said to be the best such neighborhood or "bairro" in this city, Mozambique's second largest. There are a number of broad-leafed trees to provide merciful shade; the trash is swept up into piles; there are small garden plots where tomatoes and cabbages grow, and here and there backyard poultries or piggeries. Where they can, people have set up little enterprises such as a barber shop (a chair, sheet, and a pair of scissors, under a tree) or a one-pot brewery.

But there is no overlooking the poverty,

especially now that much of the city's economic base—the servicing of Rhodesia through transport and tourism—has been cut off with the closure of the Mozambique-Rhodesia border in 1975, an action taken by the newly independent Mozambique to honor the UN sanctions against the illegal, minority-ruled government of Rhodesia.

At mid-afternoon in Inhamudima you will see many places—a low wall, a courtyard—where many adult men sit chatting and watching the traffic pass. There has been no work at the port, or railways, or in ancillary activities, for a couple of years. Little boys, shoeless, wearing greasy shirts many sizes too big for them, push around model cars fashioned of bent wire. There isn't much for them to do out of school. And the women, who, like the men, look years older than they really are, are always carrying something: a baby on the back and a load of water or wood on the head. For them there continues to be plenty to do.

But Mozambicans, after 300 years of colonial servitude, are building out of such conditions in concerted ways. One example was the object of my visit to Inhamudima—the *Posto de Saude*, or health post, built since independence in 1975. I accompanied Andy Epstein to her daily afternoon *consulta*—consultation hours—beginning at 2 pm sharp. Sitting in front of the small green building set in among the grey houses were nearly two dozen women, with infants. In the morning each of them had come to the post to sign up for an afternoon consultation, for which they paid seven *escudos* (about 22 cents) to the post assistant, who records their names on a list limited to 25 people.

Andy introduced me to the post medical

assistant, Jose, who in addition to signing up patients also changes dressings, dispenses medicines, translates from the local language into Portuguese, and ushers patients in and out of the consulting room with a cheerful word. In his work he also teaches, explaining to patients with the aid of an illustrated book (produced especially for Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau by an Italian medical support group) how malarial fevers, diarrhea, schistosomiasis, and other infectious diseases circulate among human beings by way of waste matter, mosquitoes, and other vectors, and how such illnesses can be prevented and treated. Andy tells me such lessons are a hit with patients, most of whom were utterly unaware of the origins of their commonest maladies.

It was a Thursday and therefore the day when pregnant women may come for their monthly check-ups. After recording the person's name and age, Andy asks each for the national health card on which vital statistics, records of inoculations, diseases, and check-ups are listed. Most of the pregnant women have one. After several questions, she checks blood pressure and lymph glands under the jaw, and looks at the inside of the lower eyelid for possible anemia, which frequently occurs. She asks about complaints (indigestion is common) and diet. Unfortunately she cannot weigh the women because the scale is broken and there is no one to repair it. Six women are seen.

The basic thing, says Andy, is to screen for the potentially dangerous cases—women who should be getting closer attention as their pregnancies develop. Most women have come without any prompting. But there is a strong incentive, in that they must show evidence of a monthly check-up or risk not being admitted to the maternity clinic when the time comes to deliver the baby.

The Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) gets the word around about these services and their importance for both mothers' and infants' health. As in many aspects of life in the new Mozambique, health services are linked to political mobilization and the educative work of political organizations.

Next come the regular patients. Most of these are carrying an infant on their hip as they enter. Malaria is common, and many chloroquine tablets were dispensed that day, spread out in groups of two for patients to see and to be told twice when they should be taken. For children, Andy splits the tablets and then groups them appropriately. Because the mothers may forget, or give the children on the spot, but the medical stores have run out.

There are cases of diarrhea, skin rashes, a scraped elbow, an ear infection, hemorrhoids, one simple cold and several urinary tract infections. Andy and Jose dispense



The national vaccination campaign seeks to protect whole population.

medicine from jars on their desk. These drugs are available to all such health posts from the government's central medical stores, but many medical posts, I am told, lack drugs because the medical officers fail to get any for lack of time, transport or interest.

Andy also writes prescriptions to be taken to a government pharmacy, where drugs are dispensed. One private pharmacy in town—and learned to his chagrin that the same drug was about five times cheaper at the government pharmacy.

After an hour, Andy and Jose have seen 18 people. "An easy day so far," Andy tells me, while taking a break. "No emergencies, no special tests needed, no one yet who's really needed to spell out a medical history."

Again patients are ushered in. The other medical assistant has now arrived. His approach to patients is brusque. Twice during the next hour we heard him say something in angry tones to those still waiting their turn. This is another aspect of the colonial legacy Mozambicans are trying to root out: officiousness and disrespect toward com-

mon people. Mozambique even has a national cartoon series whose major theme is the ridicule of the snooty bureaucrat.

Prevention First

During the afternoon, three teenagers come in with cases of chicken pox. A minor epidemic is going around. For more serious diseases the government has, in its first three years, sent waves of inoculation teams across the country to eradicate smallpox, cut back on tuberculosis, and soon, to prevent measles among the high-risk populations. It is still a killer among infants.

Preventive medicine, together with environmental hygiene (mainly clean water) stand far higher in the nation's priorities than do curative services. But even these are to be broadened, mainly at the community level through medical auxiliaries of different kinds. The Portuguese medical system of Mozambique had served the Portuguese, and the better-off Africans in the cities, almost exclusively. Now health is everybody's business, and increasingly everybody's right.

Private medical practice has been officially abolished. This doesn't stop some of those who could afford private treatment under the old system from trying to wheedle it out of the medical staff now. Paul Epstein has been under particular pressure because his training and reputation as a physician was soon known to a wide number of Beira residents who sought him out for privileged treatment. He has coped with this, mainly by insisting that those seeking special attention go to the *bairro* health posts like everybody else. On the afternoon of my visit to his post, three Asian merchants (the only patients to arrive by car) waited their turn in the line to see him.

At the Inhamudima post, numerous patients seemed to have ailments related to diet: anemia, constipation, migraines, severe diarrhea (also related to malaria) and worms. The staple foods, rice and corn meal, are often eaten with little else, although vegetables and fish are available at controlled prices. But perhaps even at those prices *bairro* residents cannot afford them. It is estimated that more than half of a *bairro* family's monthly income (which may be somewhere in the range of \$20 to \$40) goes towards the purchase of one of the staples.

Among the last patients of the day was a woman complaining of a "poison" that someone had put into her, but which no remedy had thus far removed. Such cases of witchcraft can be serious, and the means of overcoming them beyond the scope of conventional Western medicine.

Andy and Paul know of two cases in which previously healthy people came to be convinced that someone wished their deaths. And indeed they wasted away from physiologically obscure reasons, returned to their home villages, and died. Little wonder that FRELIMO poses as the "principal task" on the health front the furnishing people with the "scientific knowledge indispensable for understanding and combating the causes of illness." The party has also pledged to eliminate obscurantist practices while bringing out the good points of traditional medicine.

Satisfying People's Needs

Walking back from the health post through Inhamudima *bairro*, even a superficial look indicated that other improvements have come to the neighborhood besides the health post, and that Mozambique is serious about the guidelines it has set got itself, as expressed in the opening sentence of the party's Economic and Social Directives, General Lines of Orientation: "Satisfaction of the people's fundamental necessities. . . is one of the essential objectives of the Party's politics in the economic and social field."


Pointed out to me were new water standpipes for communal use. The placement of greater numbers of these has reduced for many *bairro* residents the time and drudgery of hauling water. There was also a building containing public showers, a much-used facility unknown before 1975. Plying the main streets adjoining the neighborhood were new city buses. Private

autos are much less numerous than before.

I was also told of not-so-visible changes. Food and household essentials such as soap, salt, kerosene and cooking oil are distributed through a new retail organization of People's Shops. You can see them in the *bairro* and in the high-rent areas in the middle of the cities. I was told that the neighborhood was until 1975 the home of a special class of people making up part of the industry serving Rhodesian tourists—the prostitutes. They are said to be going through rehabilitation in school or through employment.

Very hard to discern during such brief visits are the fundamentals of life in Inhamudima: the residents' change of outlook about themselves and their culture, their altered sense of having some voice, some effect on the life of their community. During my stay in Mozambique I continually heard or read about meetings, consultations, and convocations. It seems to be a country of many committees, and many discussions at all levels. From time to time I saw them taking place.

And in Beira I am left with a particularly resonant image from my last day in the country, when I passed a huge tree in a *bairro*, possibly Inhamudima. Under the generous shade of this tree has assembled a group of several dozen people. The FRELIMO party's red, green, black and yellow flag hung nearby. The group had arranged itself in concentric circles, sitting quietly while one of their number, having risen from her seat in an outer circle, addressed them.



There is still very little equipment, but what there is is now available to all Mozambicans.

June 16th
(a poem for Kwasi)

Brothers and sisters,
I am surprised at my own voice,
I have heard about this soweto. . .
I have heard about his old wounds,
scarred, a racial memory. . .

Heard, yes about his malnutrition,
yes, about his mother's impoverished
breast going dry,
heard yes about his near abortion,
yes I've heard he has no father. . .

Yes, about, I've heard about
this way he studders,
about, about this looking at the
ground, avoiding accusing pure
god-like christian eyes. . .

Heard, yes
I've heard soweto's inaudible,
smiling, flashing-teeth speech,
heard, yes, he is like me. . .
I saw a photo of him dying
in the arms of a friend, young,
bleeding young, dying in the arms
of a friend, soweto.

I'm surprised at my own speech,
surprised at my feet moving,
marching, surprised at my voice
shouting. . .
Angola has won!
South Africa is next. . .
we won Angola
South Africa is next!

I'm surprised at my faith,
listening to
my song,
hearing my march,
hearing my sorrow,
laughing my hope. . .
so. . . we. . . to
I felt soweto
dying that day. . .

Brothers and sisters,
we are here because this is how far
we've come. . .
marching here,
marching past
marching to
marching for
soweto is dying today
in the arms of an old death.

Brothers,
sisters marching again,
against the old sorrows,
walking again, shouting again,
singing again
angola
angola
angola has won
we have won
the chain is broken again
angola
marching again
soweto dying in the young arms

of a friend. . .
a photo
a dying
a cry
a song
a march. . .

Brothers and sisters,
here is where we have come to
marching,
soweto
soweto is young
dying
today in this park
shouting
angola has won

angola has won
young friend
marching. . .

I'm surprised at my own speech
surprised marching again
against an old death.

—Adesanya Alakoye

To Steven Biko

While they keep on trying to
kill you
by trying to disprove that
they killed you,
you give birth to many souls:
You have already been Resurrected.

—Kamal

Zimbabwe

Mozambique, Sahara, Zimbabwe—
take out your map, color it red.
Samora Machel, Polisario, ZANU:
they are fighting, building.
Look—there along the Limpopo—
women with guns.
They are not running for office;
they may win anyway.
You won't read about in the daily paper.

—Ron Richardson

Concerning Hopes

Don't tell me:
I wish I were a baker
in Algeria
To sing with a fighter

Don't tell me:
I wish I were a shepherd
in Yenan
To sing for resurrection

Don't tell me:
I wish I were a waiter
in Havana
To sing the victories
of the oppressed

Don't tell me:
I wish I were a porter
in Aswan
To sing for the rocks

My friend:
The Nile will never flow
into the Volga
Nor will the Congo or the Jordan
flow
into the Euphrates.

Each river has its own spring
Its own course and its own life.

Each land gives birth in due time
And each fighter will see the dawn.

—Mahmud Darweesh

book reviews

The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976, Vol II, by John Marcum, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1978, 473pp. \$30.00

Speaking about the "lessons of Angola" at Harvard University in Washington in 1976, Walter Rodney commented, "There has been no serious analysis of the internal forces operating within Angola. . . We need to enter into a period of very serious self-criticism. We need to understand that what is happening in Zimbabwe, what is happening in the Republic of South Africa and Namibia, may evoke from us a similarly confused reaction if we are not serious about trying to raise the level of our analysis concerning the African continent."

In spite of certain critical limitations, which I will discuss later, John Marcum's *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976*, Volume II (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1978 473pp), is an asset as we examine and analyze Angola and subsequent dynamics on the African continent.

Angolan Revolution: II is well organized and exceedingly well documented. But then what else might one expect from John Marcum. For as far as the academic community is concerned he is clearly unmatched as the main source of information about Angolan nationalism. His first volume, written in 1969, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)*, remains one of the few books available in English which outlines the early years of the modern Angolan nationalist movement.

This second volume must be read very carefully, for the 125 pages of notes at the back provide some of the most useful material in the book. Footnote number 191 on page 439, for example, reads:

Bender, "Kissinger and Angola," p.23. See also *New York Times*, March 10, 1976. One of the most dubious provisions in the July outlay (of the estimated \$31.7 million in CIA funds designated for Angola) was half a million dollars for propaganda activity to build up the images of the FNLA and UNITA. Such a buildup, which could be calculated to increase the political appeal of the two movements within the United States, seemed to do violence to the principle that the CIA should not become a

domestic lobbyist for foreign causes.

Or another point which illustrates the rich depth of information within the footnotes is a discussion about an Angolan trade unionist named Mauricio Luvualu, a UNITA sympathizer, who was approached by the CIA-linked African American Labor Center (AALC) in Luanda in October, 1974. This whole story of the AALC approaching this man, and finally deciding that he wasn't their type of material is fascinating in and of itself.

Marcum's work is not just reflective of his individual scholarship. It also serves to illustrate a general trait of bourgeois scholarship—especially American academic work on southern Africa. That is the desire and ability to accumulate tons of information while avoiding at all costs viewing it within any larger analytical framework. This may have something to do with the fact that such work is rarely widely distributed or used. (This current volume retails for \$30.00, and there is no paperback edition on the horizon.)

Thus, a major criticism which can be proffered is Marcum's apparent inability to place the events in Angola within a global context. Marcum shuns the concepts of "imperialism" and "intervention" like the plague. No connection is established between the statements of US policy-makers such as Brzezinski's oft-repeated "the United States has to play an active world role because if it doesn't there will be chaos," and the same official's preoccupation with wanting to cause Neto trouble



Holden Roberto: paid by the CIA.

because of his Cuban backing. Throughout this book there is an avoidance mechanism at work whereby Marcum never identifies as insidious or purposeful any of the United States activities.

According to Marcum, the US financing of Roberto and Savimbi, the alliance with South Africa, the arming of Zaire to attack MPLA, all are part of an unintended "escalating chain of action." US policymakers realized they were trying to "shape events" but were too late to be able to disengage because "their prestige was on the line." This is the motivation for US involvement put forward by the author.

It is predictable—this form of scholarship—for ultimately it serves to maintain the status quo. John Marcum does not present and discuss facts such as: Kissinger's 1975 secret request to the Israeli government that they send troops to Angola to help the South Africans against the MPLA (see the *Economist*, November 5, 1977); or that a key target of UNITA propaganda was the critical black American community. Marcum also incorrectly accuses the black American organization, the Africa Information Service, of being a supporter of UNITA when in fact it supported MPLA.

Missing from what is otherwise excellent documentation are the texts from the Portuguese General Council for Counter-Subversion set up with CIA assistance in 1967. (Published as *Angola: Secret Government Documents on Counter-Subversion*, IDOC, Rome 1974.) These documents, the propaganda campaign cited above, and the secret maneuverings of the US government constitute part of a consistent pattern of behavior on the part of the United States and its Western allies. US intervention in Angola was not an aberration but part of the structural character of US foreign policy. As President Neto said in a famous 1974 speech at the University of Dar Es Salaam titled, "Who is the Enemy? What is Our Objective?" (included in the Appendix of Volume II):

"In my opinion, the national liberation struggle in Africa cannot be dissociated from the present context in which it is taking place; it cannot be isolated from the world. A worker's strike in England, the imposition of fascism on the Chilean people, or an atomic explosion in the Pacific, are all phenomena of this same life that we are living and in which we are seeking ways to a happy existence for man in this world. This universal fact is, however, rendered particular in Africa through current political, economic and cultural concepts."

But let me not dwell on John Marcum's political viewpoint. Only events and history itself will change that. The note I want to conclude on is that *The Angolan Revolution: Vol II* is critical reading. But read it critically. □

BOOKS RECEIVED

Race and Politics in South Africa

Edited by Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1978)
273 pp.

A collection of essays which discuss some of the more important features of South African society from varying (mostly liberal) perspectives. Many of the essays are recycled pieces from the pre-Soweto period, so the book will serve better as an introduction than as a source of new analysis and information.

Southern African Stands Up

Wilfred Burchett
(New York: Urizen, 1979) 319 pp.

The veteran *Guardian* reporter's interpretation of the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa during the fifties, sixties, seventies and eighties.

South Africa

continued from page 6

As a result, the *Financial Mail* predicted, "If Iran joins the boycotters, SA will have to resort to unorthodox methods of acquisition. This could add as much as 15 percent to the 14.5 percent higher prices sought by OPEC in 1979." Such rising costs would place serious strains on an economy already troubled by inflation, unemployment and a constant need to find foreign exchange.

For South African motorists, higher prices are already a painful fact of life. The price at gasoline pumps took off even before the Shah did, with the government slapping on a stiff new tax to increase its Strategic Oil Fund. The government has also drawn up plans to reduce the hours that gas stations will remain open during the week. And *Business Week* reported at the beginning of January that ration cards had already been printed and readied for distribution.

Taken by itself, a reduction in gasoline consumption will not necessarily diminish South Africa's dependency on foreign oil. That is because refining a barrel of crude oil yields relatively fixed proportions of gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil and other petroleum products. "Diesel is much harder to ration because that would really hurt the economy," Rivers explained. "But if as has happened, consumption of diesel continues to grow, no matter how much they cut gasoline consumption, they will

still need more crude." And they will still need to import it.

A Friend in the Middle-East

The *Financial Mail* may have been leaning toward the optimistic when it warned that "the loss of Iran would not bring SA to its knees immediately, but it would make life difficult and very expensive for many years." Even energy and economic needs other than oil could be seriously affected. In the last few years Iran has become South Africa's main trading partner in the Middle East other than Israel. According to the *Financial Mail*, "SA's main success in the Iranian market has been in the field of building materials. Asbestos, timber, wall tiles, 'thousands of tons' of glass, cement and steel are some examples."

Total exports of South African goods to Iran jumped almost 100 percent between 1973 and 1975 to more than \$50 million a year. And they were still climbing until a few months ago.

Aside from its role as an oil supplier, Iran has also played a prominent part in South African oil refining, as 17.5 percent owner of the Natref refinery in partnership with the South African government, 52.5 percent, and Total, the French oil company. And the German magazine *Der Spiegel* has reported that Iran also has a stake in South Africa's growing nuclear industry. In addition to being paid for some of its oil shipments in uranium, the Shah's regime is also said to have agreed to help finance a uranium enrichment plant in South Africa.

Now, with the Shah taking up residence in Palm Springs, South Africa will probably need to find new buyers for its building supplies and new financing for a uranium enrichment plant designed to produce enough plutonium for "a nuclear bomb the size of the Nagasaki explosion every week."

Hunting the Hawks

From a strictly economic viewpoint, prospects for the apartheid regime look bleak indeed. But South Africa's rulers have long demonstrated an acute understanding of the convertibility of economic, ideological and military power. And in this instance, the downfall of the Shah could enhance Pretoria's strategic value to the cold war warriors in Washington.

In recent years, increased Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean has given rise to "nightmare speculations" in the Pentagon and a spate of articles about "the West's tenuous oil lifeline" in publications such as *Business Week*. It has also spurred Pentagon efforts to build a network of strong points in the region—on the island of Diego Garcia, in Iran, and in South Africa. The "loss of Iran" is a theme South Africa will use to accentuate its own strategic reliability—and there are high-ranking US security strategists who would agree.

The United Nations-imposed mandatory arms sanctions against South Africa may

make direct military links between the US and South Africa diplomatically embarrassing. But Iran has not been squeamish about cooperating with the apartheid government in building a regional alliance. As long ago as July 1972, ships from the Iranian navy visited the South African naval base at Simonstown. And the Imperial Iranian Navy's chief-of-staff stayed behind for two weeks of talks.

Earlier this year the privately-circulated London newsletter *Arms International* reported that plans for a defense pact between South Africa, Iran, Israel and South Korea were moving into their final stages. The newsletter also noted that "some of the Shah's ever-expanding fleet had been refitted at Simonstown."

With the Shah suddenly out of the picture, commented Michael Klare of the Institute for Policy Studies, "there will surely be increased pressure from the Pentagon to find a *modus vivendi* with South Africa."

"Just look at the cover of *Time* magazine," Klare continued. The cover picture showed a lean and hungry Russian bear looming above the Indian Ocean. "They're going to be saying that with the Shah gone there isn't anybody else around with the muscle. It will mean a much greater likelihood of intervention on behalf of the 'internal settlement' in Rhodesia and of closer ties with South Africa. That's the way they'll think."

Klare is not alone in expecting greater reliance by Pentagon planners on their Pretoria connection. As *Business Week* pointed out in an article on the Indian Ocean, "In any kind of crisis, the US would be quickly thrown back on the only full-scale naval base in the region, South Africa's Simonstown. In fact, despite the tension between Washington and Pretoria, the US still maintains an important communications base at Silvermine."

And the South African government will most certainly not be bashful about demanding what it needs most in the particular kind of crisis it now faces—oil. Aside from nervous Indian Ocean watchers in the Pentagon, it can also expect a sympathetic hearing from the major oil companies, whose operations in South Africa represent 14% of total direct foreign investment in the apartheid economy.

As the *Financial Mail* noted gratefully back in 1973, "There can be no greater blessing for South Africa—apart from the fact that Iran is well-disposed—than that the oil business is largely in the hands of international companies with no discernible leanings of excessive patriotism."

Now the disposition of Iran appears to have changed, putting the spotlight squarely on the majors . . . and on the ability of the anti-apartheid movement to mount a challenge to the majors', the *Mail's* and the Pentagon's views as to what constitutes "excessive patriotism." □

CORPORATIONS ATTACK MICHIGAN DIVESTITURE.

. . . The divestment of apartheid-related stocks by Michigan State University has unleashed a battery of threats and taunts from corporate sources and corporate sympathizers. At issue is almost \$9 million worth of stocks in 17 firms doing business in South Africa, including General Motors, Ford Motors, Dow Chemical, and IBM. The Board of Trustees began the process of divestiture in December, after protracted debate on the issue.

Melvin Terril, chairman of the MSU Development Council, which raises funds for the school, reflected a general fundraiser's viewpoint when he said, "I think they [the trustees] are dead wrong in their stance." Terril gloomily predicted dire consequences, saying losses of corporate grants will run "into the millions and millions of dollars."

While all of the corporations affected by the Board's decision have expressed their disagreement with it, thus far only one firm has threatened repercussions—Dow Chemical. In a letter to the school's president, Dow Vice President G.J. Williams said that the firm was "shocked at the position taken by the Board." Williams characterized the trustees' decision as an "ultimatum to withdraw or we will sell our Dow stock. That ultimatum borders on blackmail and is repugnant to us."

Williams later added, "The board's policy is going to make Dow feel less generous towards the university and grants are one of the relationships we're talking about."

Who is blackmailing whom? Earlier in the year, Dow withdrew aid from Central Michigan University after an anti-corporate speech by Jane Fonda on the campus.

"I would think it's an overreaction," said Trustee Raymond Krowlikowski about the Dow statements, adding, "I think corporations operate at too high a level to be retributive toward the university." Krowlikowski chairs the trustees' investment committee which pushed the anti-apartheid policy.

Krowlikowski also discounts criticism that MSU will lose money on their portfolio by pulling out of apartheid-related investments. In some periods in recent years,

continued on page 26

FUNDS RAISED FOR ZIMBABWE

REFUGEES.

. . . A major fund-raising effort mounted recently by a broad coalition of southern Africa activists has yielded more than \$10,000 in contributions for Zimbabwean refugees. Proceeds from last November's "Evening of Solidarity with Zimbabwe and the Wilmington 10," held in New York, were presented to the UN High Commission for Refugees recently.

On hand for the January 23 presentation were Dr. Charles Cobb, head of the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice, Robert Van Lierop, coordinator of the Mozambique Film Project and principal organizer of the solidarity event, and Tirivafi Kangai, chief representative of ZANU-Patriotic Front.

Dr. Cobb presented a check for \$9,657 to John Kelly, Regional Representative of the High Commission, which operates the refugee centers.

Accepting the contribution, Kelly termed it a "superb effort of great benefit." He said refugees were plagued with "appalling conditions," particularly in Mozambique where a lack of resources is compounded by constant Rhodesian bombings and raids. "There are presently more than 100,000 Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique, 90 percent of whom are less than 20 years old," added Kelly.

Van Lierop announced that a "Solidarity Ship" filled with medical and educational supplies is currently being prepared by the Washington, DC-based Southern Africa Support Project, also for Zimbabwean refugees.

New York

Buffalo:

Church Women United Office
1262 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, N.Y. 14209
716-882-4793/683-4888

pick up: 4/9/79; 10/8/79

Rochester:

Salvation Army Men's Service Center
745 W. Avenue
Rochester, N.Y. 14611
716-359-1659

pick up: 4/9/79; 10/8/79

Syracuse

Church Center Building
3049 E. Genesee Street
Syracuse, N.Y. 13224
715-446-3750

pick up: 10/16/78; 4/17/79; 10/15/79

continued on page 26



Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique: tremendous needs.



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Z. A. N. U.

Zimbabwe African National Union

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New York, N.Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 697-7910

Headquarters
Caixa Postal 743
Maputo
Mocambique

Date November 27, 1978

Dept External Affairs

Ref. _____

Dear friends,

We are happy to inform you that the Church World Services in their efforts to support Zimbabwe refugees, have agreed to transport clothes (new and used, all varieties) from the USA east coast to the Port of Beira in Mozambique.

We are sure that this important service will help you to intensify your efforts in raising material support for the people of Zimbabwe. Allow me also to mention that since we have liberated most of the Zimbabwe countryside, it is now our duty and responsibility to provide the peasants in these areas with the necessities of life.

That being the case, the clothes, medicines, educational materials, funds etc. that we are raising will also be used to meet the welfare needs of our people in the liberated areas. Attached please find a list of clothing and medicines pick-up points, which are near your area. We urge you to raise these materials and drop them at one of the areas near your place. They will be shipped from these areas to Zimbabwe refugees and peasants via the Port of Beira in Mozambique.

Once more we would like to thank you for the support you have given in the past and hope that with this new service, you will intensify your efforts.

Sincerely yours,

E. J. Kangai
CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE
FOR THE UNITED STATES AND
HONOLULU, HAWAII
E. J. Kangai : Chief Representative.
Z. A. N. U.

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PAMBILI Ngempi ye NKULULEKO
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Calvary Baptist Church
755 8th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
202-347-8355

pick up: 5/7/79; 11/19/79

Connecticut

South Congregational Church
Main and Buckingham Streets
Hartford, Connecticut 06103
203-249-8627

pick up: 4/30/79; 10/1/79

Maryland

Brown Memorial Presbyterian Church
Charles Street and Woodbrook Lane
Baltimore, Maryland 21212
301-337-7232

pick up: 5/7/79; 11/19/79

Massachusetts

St. James Episcopal Church
1991 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02140
617-547-4070

pick up: 4/23/79; 9/24/79

New Jersey

Council of Churches
of Greater Trenton
1235 Greenwood Avenue
(Methodist Church House)
Trenton, N.J. 08609
609-396-9166

pick up: 5/14/79; 10/22/79

North Carolina

Northgate Presbyterian Church
2504 Roxboro Road
Durham, N.C. 27704
919-477-1001

pick up: 2/19/79; 9/4/79

Pennsylvania

Church Women United
of Greater Philadelphia
1421 Arch Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19102

Virginia

Park Place United
Methodist Church
500 West 35th Street
Norfolk, Va. 23508
622-3363

continued from page 24

the university business office has said that the university would have done better financially by staying outside the market entirely and investing funds in guaranteed public bonds.

Further buttressing the trustees' decision, the Fiduciary Trust Company of New York, consultants to the UN Joint Staff Pensions Fund, recently informed MSU, "It is entirely feasible to develop a sound investment policy, either domestically or internationally, without, in any way, supporting companies who have engaged themselves heavily in South Africa."

Investment experts Scudder, Stevens and Clark recently reported that stocks in corporations doing business in South Africa performed on average "slightly worse" than others during 1977.

MSU trustee Aubrey Radcliffe told questioners he was not surprised by the negative corporate reaction. "I'm pretty sure the board will stand by their decisions," he added.

An impressive assemblage of anti-apartheid student groups who forced the divestiture in the first place are undoubtedly determined to see that it does.

DIVESTITURE SET-BACK: REINVESTMENT. . . Meantime, Hampshire College, one of the first schools to sell South African-linked stock two years ago, has reinvested more than \$25,000 in three corporations operating in South Africa—General Electric, FMC Corp., and Ingersoll Rand.

Opponents of the reinvestment charge that the college's action violated the policy of an Interim Investment Responsibility Committee set up to review future investments. The school's anti-apartheid group plans to challenge the new investments. . . the 1976 victory was only won after a tough battle which included the student occupation of administration offices.

HITTING BANKS. . . On November 11, the City Council of Cotati, California, voted to move all active and inactive bank accounts from Crocker National Bank to a local bank because of Crocker's involvement in lending to South Africa.

CHALLENGING CORPORATIONS. . . The largest coalition of stockholder groups ever assembled has begun a new campaign aimed at influencing the investments of American companies in South Africa. The coalition of 52 church and educational agencies, holding some \$20 million in stock in these firms, has filed shareholder resolutions with 30 companies, according to the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). Two colleges, Oberlin and Bryn Mawr, are participating in this effort.

Resolutions to eight financial institutions concern loans to the South African government. The Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and the Insurance Company of North America have been asked to stop loans to the government; other resolutions call for an end to all South Africa-related loans.

Four companies—3M, Phelps Dodge, Phillips Petroleum and Union Carbide—have been asked to withdraw from South Africa. Other resolutions call on companies not to expand operations, and to discontinue or reduce sales of certain critical commodities, such as oil and computers.

BANK FORUM PLANNED. . . The New York Chapter of the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA) is sponsoring a public forum on "Runaway Banks: The Misuse of Our Money at Home and Abroad." The forum, scheduled for February 24, aims at bringing together activists, trade unionists, students, community workers, bank employees, and others to discuss the ways in which the US banking system channels money away from domestic neighborhoods and toward repressive regimes, particularly South Africa.

Speakers will include Ray Rogers from the J.P. Stevens Boycott campaign of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Ben Magubane of the African National Congress of South Africa, Mike Moffitt from the Institute for Policy Studies, Gail Cincotta, a red-lining activist from the National Training and Information Center, and a congressional representative.

The forum will enable people from many different campaigns in which banks are key to begin to pool information on methods, tactics, and experiences. Through work on red-lining and loans to South Africa, New York COBLSA has already demonstrated the potential for merging these as yet divergent interests.

The forum will be held at Columbia Law School, Room A & B, 118th and Amsterdam Ave., from 10 am to 4 pm. Donation is \$2.

For more information contact: New York COBLSA, 313 78 St. #4R, New York, NY 10024. (212) 865-8972. □

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Letters

Dear Southern Africa:

This letter is just a brief comment on your very excellent article on the U.S. press in the December issue. For some time, I have been alternately depressed and infuriated by the bias evident in American reporting of events in central and southern Africa.

Beyond the examples you cite in your article, the distortion, whether intentional or unintentional, has continued. In reporting in the *Washington Post* recently on the "harassment" of whites in Lusaka, David Ottaway cast his story almost entirely in terms of the victimization of whites. Aside from a very brief quotation of President Kuanda and brief mention that Zambians were upset by the Rhodesian raids, there was no attempt to place the incidents in some kind of perspective. (One thinks of the activities here *vis-a-vis* Americans of Japanese origin in 1944.) My impression was that Ottaway collected his background while having a drink at a white bar.

I tend to disagree with you on one point, however. Early in your article you state: "With notable exceptions, the press continued to reflect not the interests of America in general. . . but rather the interests of America's ruling class, the group to which most members of the press either belong or aspire."

I cannot agree that American attitudes toward Africa rest solely on economic class distinctions as this seems to imply. I am firmly convinced that over and above

the lack of knowledge of the history of colonialism in Africa displayed by many American press representatives and their tendency, like that of the U.S. government, to align themselves with America's economic elite, the American press is catering to racist attitudes deeply engrained in the consciousness of most white Americans. I believe that, for most white Americans, there is a strong qualitative difference between events in which whites are harmed by blacks and events in which blacks are harmed by whites. I believe that it is against this background of primitive racism that white reporters are able to engage in the sort of facile, biased reporting that furthers their own as well as their employers' interests.

Whether or not it is being done intentionally, I believe the American people are *willingly* being prepared by most of the American media for the implementing of

U.S. policies directed against the safety, rights, and dignity of the African peoples.

The question I must put to you because I simply do not know the answer is: What can be done about it? *Southern Africa* is a commendable effort, but I suspect that its audience is small and selective. There is some awareness among student and religious groups, but they are in the minority and, at many levels of American society, largely discredited.

It was not until very late that the American press realized the fallacy of the American position in Vietnam. I am afraid that it also will be too late in Africa.

In any event, I congratulate you for your effort and your article.

Bruce Dunning
Washington, D.C.

Cable Reprints Available

The confidential cable sent by US Ambassador to South Africa, William Bowdler, to the State Department which reveals black hostility to US investment in South Africa and which *Southern Africa* published in April is being made available as a reprint. To obtain one or bulk copies, write to *Southern Africa*, 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 707, New York, NY 10010.





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News briefs



RHODESIA'S NEW MILITARY

induction system, aimed at drawing thousands of blacks into the armed forces, is meeting with a disastrous response from black inductees. Only 300 blacks out of the 1544 called up registered in the first weeks of the draft. The inductions went into effect the first of the year.

Of 1500 white youths drafted at the same time, 434 failed to show, presumably casualties of the rampant white flight that has been soaring to record levels in recent months.

One of the first blacks called up last month anonymously told a South African newspaper that he preferred to fight with the Patriotic Front. He said he did not feel that the internal settlement would end white privilege nor meet black aspirations. "So why should I have to fight for this?" he asked.

The youth, a 17-year-old who lives near-by Lake Victoria, said he had been told he could not finish his studies unless he went into the army. Regretting his decision, he said, "Now that it has come to this, I think I would have preferred to go with the boys in the bush."



SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY

situation is reviewed in detail in a new French journal on strategic studies: *Revue Africaine de Strategie*. The 24-page report notes that the South African defense system has two major priorities: internal security against black liberation forces and external security against possible intervention by other African countries. The key to internal security is the setting up of the homelands, which disperse and contain the black population in pockets where guerrilla warfare, it is hoped, can be prevented.

The external "threat" is faced by an increased technical capacity particularly aimed at increasing self-sufficiency in arms production and developing a nuclear capability. The country now makes under license

armored vehicles, planes, guns, and trainer aircraft.

South Africa's "Achille's heel," like Rhodesia's, is its lack of manpower. Men under arms numbered 65,000 in 1978. Notes the report, the conventional military equilibrium is swinging in favor of black Africa.

The military budget accounts for about 20 percent of the government's budget or \$2.6 billion for 1978-79, up from some \$70 million in 1960.

The largest US investors in South Africa are planning a major increase in direct investment there this year. According to a Commerce Department survey of the 325 largest US investors, this group plans a 20 percent increase in capital expenditures over 1978 investments, or some \$277 million this year as against \$230 million for 1978. More than one-third of the increased investment will be in manufacturing with a large share also slated for mining.

In particular, two giant American mining companies are planning to pour millions into Western Transvaal mining installations. Texasgulf and Utah International have discovered and are now testing huge chrome and platinum deposits on land they have bought in the mineral rich Bushveld area. Texasgulf, which earns \$500 million annually in sales, owns Kidcreek, America's largest lead, zinc, copper and tin mine. Utah International, a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Electric, has sales of about \$1 billion a year with vast interests in uranium, iron ore, copper and coal.

Nineteen-seventy-eight was a record year for Krugerrand international sales. The 6.01 million coins sold—almost twice the 1977 sales—provided South Africa with more than \$1 billion in foreign exchange.

Despite a widespread, grassroots mobilization against Krugerrand sales in the

US last year, more than half of the overseas market was American. West Germany was the second largest buyer.

Krugerrand sales have totaled 22.5 million coins since 1970 or about 700 metric tons of gold, roughly equivalent to South Africa's annual gold production.

West Germany is now challenging the US as South Africa's main trading partner. Figures compiled for the first ten months of trading in 1978 indicate that trade between the two countries soared 50 percent over 1977 figures. The total value of trade stands at some \$2.7 billion at present (South African exports \$1.2 billion, South African imports \$1.5 billion), estimates which are certain to be even higher after final figures for the year are in.

In addition, West German direct investment has increased impressively. Total direct investment stands at some \$2.3 billion, slightly higher than US figures. The number of West German firms with direct ties to South Africa now stands at more than 450.

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
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