

VOLUME XI NUMBER 8

SOUTHERN AFRICA

\$1


NOVEMBER 1978

Library

DEC 1 - 1978

Serial

**Busting Arms and
Oil Sanctions**
Western Lifeline for white rule



GUNS FOR HIRE

US Mercs in Rhodesia

Tanzania 8shs.

Mozambique 35 esc.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

VOLUME XI NUMBER 8
NOVEMBER 1978

ISSN 0038-3775

Our Collective:

Barbara Barnes	Carol Benglesdorf
Wes Cohen	Paddy Colligan
Jennifer Davis	Michael Davis
Charlie Ebel	Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban
Peggy Halsey	Janet Hooper
Craig Howard	Paul Irish
Allen Isaacman	Bill Johnston
Marci Kerr	Richard Knight
Patrick Lawrence	Richard Lobban
Edgar Lockwood	Andy Marx
Bill Minter	Ruth Minter
Malik Reaves	Susan Rogers
Christine Root	Karen Rothmyer
Witney Schneidman	Mike Shuster
Janet Siskind	Jinni Stroman
John Stroman	Stephanie Urdang
Roberta Washington	Jim Weikart
	Sybil Wong

Southern Africa is published monthly, except for July-August, when bi-monthly, by the Southern Africa Committee, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10010.

Subscriptions: Individual (domestic and foreign)/\$10.00; Institutional/\$18.00; Air-mail: Africa, Asia, Europe/\$22.50; South and Central America/\$19.50.

Southern Africa is available on microfilm through University Microfilm, Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Mich. 68206, and is listed in the Alternative Press Index.

Distributors: Delhi Distributors, c/o NRS Books, 1181 Amsterdam Ave., New York, NY 10027; Carrier Pigeon, 88 Fisher Avenue, Boston, MA 02120; Third World Distributors, 100 Worcester St., Boston, MA 02118; Liberation Information Distribution Co., 1622 New Jersey Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20001; Guild News Agency, 1118 W. Armitage Ave., Chicago, IL 60614

Cover: Rhodesian Army Unit reinforced by mercenaries

Contents

US AND WESTERN ALLIES' SUPPORT FOR WHITE MINORITY REGIMES UNABATED

3 THE US — STILL ARMING APARTHEID

SPECIAL REPORTS:

- 7 In Zimbabwe 1000 American Mercenaries Fight Against African Liberation
- 10 Open Oilgates to Rhodesia— Exposure causes British Scandal
- 23 Arms Embargo Regulations: Weak on Paper, Weaker in Practice
- 24 Gun Running to South Africa



14 INTERVIEW

Impression of a Movement Ready to Run the Government: Interview with George Houser, American Committee on Africa

13 NAMIBIA

Unchecked by West, South Africa Plans for Control

14 ZIMBABWE

Salisbury Struggles to Survive 16
The Casualties Mount 18

19 ZAMBIA

Kaunda Opens Border to Rhodesia 19

21 SOUTH AFRICA

New Leader— Same Policy 21

23 US

Arms Embargo Regulations: Weak on Paper, Weaker in Practice 23

Gun Running to South Africa 24

Smith Parties in New York 25

27 ANGOLA

Seeking Some Peace to Grow In

29 BOOK REVIEW

Basil Davidson, *Let Freedom Come*

30 ACTION NEWS AND NOTES



The US—Still Arming Apartheid

There have been no licenses issued for the sale of military equipment to South Africa in violation of US laws and regulations implementing the [1963] embargo.

—President Carter, 1977

If you are going to tell a lie, tell a big one.

—Joseph Goebbels,
Nazi propagandist

by Joshua Nessen

Since the 1963 “voluntary” UN arms embargo, the United States has clandestinely supplied at least \$465 million in military equipment to South Africa. Most of it has been delivered since 1970, and there is probably more we still know nothing about.

Evidence of this arms flow, first revealed in testimony by Sean Gervasi before a Congressional Subcommittee in July 1977, has since been confirmed and expanded by other authorities.

Last spring, witnesses from the US, Britain, France, Sweden and West Germany told a special meeting of the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid how the Western powers had collaborated in arming South Africa in the last 15 years. It is now equipped with long-range strike capability and the capacity to deal with internal uprisings and guerrilla activities, and has become the strongest military power in Africa.

Countries such as France dealt openly in an arms trade with South

Africa. Officially, the US adhered to its arms embargo. But a variety of loopholes have allowed a stream of helicopters, fighter planes and personnel carriers to leak into South Africa’s secret arsenal.

Sean Gervasi told the UN meeting that the actual size of the South African army had been seriously and probably deliberately underestimated by Western sources. Valuable evidence of the truth of this allegation, and of the extent of the flow of American equipment and technology and training is contained in a new book, *US Military Involvement in Southern Africa*, published by South End Press of Boston.

The extensive material, by many authors, provided in this book makes it crystal clear that contrary to official pronouncements the US government has played a crucial role in providing South Africa with its awesome military capability. The Carter Administration is no exception, despite its “support” of the November 1977 mandatory UN embargo. Recent sales of civilian aircraft to South Africa and continued nuclear cooperation demonstrate the duplicity of current US foreign policy, and its de facto support of apartheid.

The Extent of Support

When the arms embargo began,

South Africa had a relatively small military establishment. Annual military expenditure was less than \$200 million. The Air Force had few modern aircraft and only a few helicopters. The Army had a collection of old British and American tanks and armored cars and some British artillery. It had relatively few armored personnel carriers.

Today the situation is completely different. South Africa now has an awesome military capability, spending, according to a recent US Senate report, more than \$1 billion a year on defense imports alone. The Air Force possesses more than 600 combat aircraft, including US equipment such as 40 Lockheed F104G fighter-bombers and 50 North American F-51D Cavalier counter-insurgency strike aircraft. It also has more than 200 helicopters including at least 25 Augusta-Bell 205-A Iroquois helicopters sold in the 1970s. There are well over one thousand aircraft in service with the South African Air Force.

The Army possesses more than 500 tanks, including at least 100 US Patton tanks, delivered in 1971. The Army possesses several hundred armored cars and nearly 1,000 armored personnel carriers, some being very recent American models. The Army also has a large number of self-propelled guns, an important element

Joshua Nessen has been active in the campaign on US campuses against US corporate support for South Africa and is a member of the Northeast Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa.

in South Africa's armored forces.

According to Gervasi, almost all the front-line armor of the regular army has been imported from Western countries in the last ten years. Much important US-linked equipment, including armored personnel carriers and heavy guns, has gone to South Africa in the 1970s. The list includes: several hundred M-13 A1 armored personnel carriers, delivery beginning in 1973 and still continuing; 300 Commando V-150 armored personnel carriers, delivered after 1971; 50 M-109 155 mm self-propelled guns, whose delivery began in 1972/73.

Michael Klare and Eric Prokosh have provided evidence that "aircraft of US origin delivered to the SAAF after the embargo was imposed include sixteen L-100 transports, seven Swearingen *Merlin-IV* medium transports, and at least twenty-two Cessna Model-185 *Skywagons*. US-designed and US-powered aircraft delivered during this period include nineteen Piaggio P-166S patrol planes, forty AM-3C *Bosbok* utility craft, and twenty C-4M *Kudu* liaison planes."

US corporations do not sell directly to South Africa, but allow foreign manufacturers to produce American weapons under license. Thus the M-113 A1 personnel carriers are made in Italy by Oto-Melara, under license from the US-based FMC Corporation, and the Commando carriers are made in Portugal, by Bravia, under license from Detroit-based Cadillac-Gage.

Some of the equipment flowing to South Africa appears to consist of re-conditioned, slightly "out-of-date" models. But although all the equipment may not be entirely new, it is far more modern equipment than is usually found in Africa. It is also far heavier, and there is a lot of it. All the front line states combined could not hope to match South Africa's firepower on the ground, according to Gervasi.

Impact on Liberation Struggles

This build-up has had an impact throughout southern Africa. Extensive research by Michael Klare and Eric Prokosh has shown that arms shipments to South Africa directly aided the Rhodesian Government. In the 1960s, for instance, 20 "Aermacchi-Lockheed" transport planes were sold to the South African Air Force. The planes, produced in Italy, were made by Aeronautica Macchi

under license from Lockheed (US), and are designed for operation out of unimproved airstrips. These planes were later transferred to the Rhodesian Air Force where they are now known as the Trojan and used to support anti-guerrilla forces. Other examples of such forces are provided in *US Military Involvement in Southern Africa*.

The implications of US-South African military cooperation were particularly significant in Angola. In October 1975, approximately 5,000 South African troops invaded Southern Angola. This invasion followed a major increase in US aid to UNITA and the Zairean-based FNLA, which had launched a major offensive in the North against the MPLA. South African Prime Minister Vorster later indicated that his government had undertaken this action after consulting with the US, with its blessings and promises of aid. Certainly the South African invasion force was amply equipped with US weaponry and Lockheed "civilian" transport planes were used to carry its troops.

US Foreign Policy and South Africa

These military linkages have been an important component of overall US postwar policy towards South Africa. The major characteristic of this policy has been its consistent and escalating support of South Africa, in the face of increased opposition to apartheid.

A vital reason for protecting white minority rule has been the growing stake of US corporations in South Africa, as well as its immense mineral wealth. Just as important has been South Africa's role as a sub-imperialist power in active opposition to regional liberation movements. South Africa has long acted as the major base for US corporate penetration of Southern Africa and as the military "gendarme," protecting white interests in the region.

Beyond its regional role South Africa has also become important in US and NATO strategic planning for the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean, especially since Vietnam. This planning has been designed not so much to counter the Soviets, as to combat Third World revolutionary movements which represent the greatest threat to Western capitalism in the Southern Hemisphere.

1963-1970: Behind the Smokescreen

US military support of apartheid

has a history going back to before the Sharpeville era. In the early Sixties the US blocked UN mandatory arms sanctions and supplied equipment and military patents to South Africa. However, in 1963 the Western powers agreed to a "voluntary" arms embargo. In keeping with this public stand, an Executive Order was issued in Washington prohibiting the sale of US military equipment to South Africa. Behind this official smoke-screen, the embargo has been quietly and effectively ignored.

Covert deliveries included aircraft, helicopters, self-propelled guns and armored cars. There were several ways this arsenal found its way through the embargo:



First of all there was a huge *legal loophole*. The Government Executive Order did not cover the sale of "civilian" equipment or support systems. Some "civilian" planes were sold directly by US corporations to the South African Air Force with Commerce Department approval, while others went to "private" citizens who were themselves members of the Air Commandoes, a paramilitary extension of the Air Force. The most popular of such planes were small, executive-style craft produced by Cessna Corporation which are ideal for counter-guerrilla surveillance due to their maneuverability and low fuel consumption, and are openly used by South Africa for this purpose.

In the case of acknowledged military equipment, a more indirect route was found. What developed was a triangular trade in which a European-based company (or subsidiary) producing US weapons under license would sell directly or through a dealer to South Africa. In theory, the Office of Munitions Control of the State Department has to license all military sales. The OMC apparently does not control sales when production takes place under license.

The US Government also built South African military capacity through NATO. One example was the NATO FN rifle which was manufactured under license by the South African Defense Department and equipped the entire South African army and police. The granting of this license required US approval within NATO.

South African Regional Power

The effect of this aid was to make possible South Africa's interlinked economic and military expansion. By



Atlas Corporation's Bosbok (top) and Kudu (bottom) powered by US engines, are ideal for counter-insurgency reconnaissance.

1967 South Africa had investments in neighboring countries of \$975 million, and trade in Africa was up to \$384 million. These economic links gave South Africa control over regional resources and were backed by its military might.


From 1960 to 1970 military spending increased fivefold and mutual defense pacts were made with the other white-settler regimes. South Africa shared training facilities with Rhodesia, and with the outbreak of guerrilla fighting dispatched 500 security forces followed by 2700 troops and armored carriers of US make. When FRELIMO began to make headway in Mozambique, South Africa also sent two battalions of soldiers to aid the Portuguese.

1970-1976: Era of Crisis

Patterns established in the 1960's were extended in the Seventies as the region moved into a period of profound crisis, marked by industrial unrest, the fall of the Portuguese colonies, and finally the Soweto rebellion. This situation increased the importance of US economic, diplomatic, and military support. At the same time, rapidly growing US investment—\$1.6 billion by 1976—and US defeats in Vietnam heightened the strategic importance of South Africa in US policy.

South Africa's importance in US strategic planning was underlined by a series of meetings between top Pentagon personnel and key South African officials throughout 1973 and 1974. Among the VIPs who came to Washington were the South African Navy Chief and Dr. Mulder, the minister of information, who met with Vice Admiral Peet, the top US official concerned with the Indian Ocean. In conjunction with high-level conferences, NATO contingency plans were formulated for "crises" in the Southern Region, and joint British and South African naval maneuvers took place in 1973.

During these years the actual provision of arms for South Africa underscored its increased strategic importance. There were first of all expanded sales of "civilian" planes such as the Swearingen Merlin IV, which could hold 15-20 paratroopers and has been used for reconnaissance in Namibia and southern Angola. According to Prokosh and Klare, although the US-made plane is not configured specifically for military use, it is included in the air force inventories of several countries, including Chile and Argen-



South African Defense Force Panhards in use in Namibia

tina. Seven Merlins were delivered to the SAAF in 1975-76 and assigned to the 21st Transport Squadron.

In addition, the State Department authorized the sale of "non-military" helicopters which had been used in Vietnam.

Besides such legal "civilian" sales there was also a growth in the illegal triangular trade of overtly military material. An important example of such sales to South Africa was that of the Lockheed Starfighters. During the 60s these combat planes were made under license in Germany. In 1973 the Luftwaffe decided to retire some of its older Starfighters, and a dealer at Memingen purchased 44 of them for transfer to South Africa. Again, the sale of these aircraft should have been under the direct control of the State Department which must license all US weapons systems for transfer, but somehow the planes became part of the South African arsenal.

As pressures built up on the Pretoria regime, following its defeat in Angola, and with growing internal resistance, the Ford administration actually moved to give more support. In February 1978, US Deputy Ambassador Donald McHenry, describing the problems of diplomatic cooperation with South Africa at the time, admitted:

"We were put in the very difficult

position of being relatively quiet on the situation in Soweto where 600 kids were being killed while we were speaking with South Africa on Rhodesia and Namibia. And it's very difficult to follow that kind of approach. *We were making changes in our arms embargo, being more lenient with South Africa, while 600 children were being killed in Soweto.*" (Emphasis added.)

Carter: Era of Escalating Hypocrisy

By the time Carter came to office, South Africa had a military capability rivaling that of such "middle" powers as Iran, Brazil, Egypt and Japan. The years of the "voluntary" embargo had seen the transformation of South Africa from a basically defensive military power into a major offensive one, capable of striking far into Africa.

The building of South Africa into such a power continues to coincide well with US foreign policy objectives. This explains why for all its rhetoric the Carter Administration has not cut off the flow of aid to South Africa. In the face of international and domestic pressure last year, the US did support a "mandatory" UN embargo, though vetoing all economic measures. However, the Government still continues to provide direct and indirect military assistance to South Africa, and critics

point out that there are still serious loopholes in the regulations established to enforce the arms embargo.

On December 14, 1977, less than six weeks after the UN embargo, the State Department approved the sale of six Cessna reconnaissance planes to South African "non-military" personnel, and in March 1978 another sale of 70-80 light aircraft was authorized. The terms of this latest sale state that these planes cannot be used by military personnel or the "civilian" Air Commandoes. However, this stipulation is meaningless because under the South African Defense Act any "private" assets can be seized in the event of an emergency.

In addition, the Carter Administration continues to allow US corporations to supply the oil, transport and computers needed to run South Africa's military establishment. There has also been a refusal to end the transfer of nuclear technology to South Africa.

Spokesmen Young and Brzezinski argue that by cutting off such technology, we would be losing our "moderating" influence over the apartheid regime. It seems more likely that South Africa is being strengthened to combat liberation forces and preserve capitalist interests throughout the region.

by Malik Reaves



T-shirt advertised in *Soldier of Fortune*

SPECIAL REPORT

In Zimbabwe 1000 American Mercenaries Fight Against African Liberation

Under US law it is illegal to recruit or fight as a mercenary. Yet despite the mounting public record of US mercenary activity in southern Africa, there have been no prosecutions.

As the Rhodesian authorities face the ever tightening noose of a national liberation war, they are increasingly forced to depend on Western mercenary forces. Hampered by a relatively small white population, now little more than 200,00 and shrinking rapidly, the rebel Salisbury regime has forced more and more Africans into its army, now 80% black, according to the *New York Times* (but still white officered). As the Patriotic Front continues to win both popular support and military victories, informed observers note that the African soldiers will likely become increasingly unreliable.

Given these difficulties, the US and the European powers have responded by increasing available white mercenary forces from 1,000 two years ago to perhaps as many as 5,000—a considerable number considering that Rhodesia's regular armed forces totalled some 10,000 in 1977.

The present American mercenary contingent numbers more than 1,000, constituting the largest group of foreign troops. Front spokesmen have indicated that many more Americans are on their way, a belief borne out by the announcement in early Fall that a Chicago-based church was sending 300 former Green Beret "Christian soldiers" to Rhodesia to protect missionaries.

The Rev. Paul Lindstrom, leader of the Church of Christian Liberty, announced that the force would reopen the Elim Mission in eastern Rhodesia where three British missionaries were killed in June. "We see ourselves as crusaders," said the force's leader, Vietnam War vet Giles Pace, to the *Washington Post*. "We are not interested in dialogue or detente" with the Front popular forces. "We will shoot the bastards on sight." The *Tanzanian Daily News* reported that Giles added that he might call on 500 Cuban exiles to join his force later.

The Rhodesian regime blamed the Elim Mission killings on Front guerrillas. The Front and other informed Rhodesia-watchers have pointed to the terrorist actions of Salisbury's Selous Scouts who dress up as guerril-

Malik Reaves, a long time Southern Africa activist and organizer for the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa is now a member of the Southern Africa collective.

las and commit atrocities in an effort to turn the people against the Front.

Last year, a British mercenary deserter confessed to participating in the killing of two priests at a mission which was friendly to the guerrillas. He told the British weekly, *The Sunday People*, "It was in the interest of the Rhodesians that missionaries should be stopped from helping the blacks."

The British Pentacostal group that operates the Elim Mission has announced plans to re-open the mission on its own, denying any need for the American intervention. The Rev. Ron Chapman, head of the mission, told the South African *Star* that Pace's mission was "a lot of nonsense."

On September 16, Radio Salisbury reported that the 300 man force had left London and was "on its way to southern Africa."

No Prosecution

Recruiting mercenaries or serving as one is clearly illegal under Federal laws. Yet despite the illegality and the wide-spread press publicity given to the Church's efforts in recent weeks, as of press time, no official steps had been taken to stop the action or prosecute those involved.

This is not the first time such actions have gone without a response from US legal authorities. Numerous self-confessed mercenaries or mercs, as they call themselves, and recruiters have been interviewed and given wide publicity in the media, particularly since the CIA-backed mercenary operations during the Angolan "Civil War" in 1975. The Angolan exercise was richly documented in ex-CIA agent John Stockwell's book, *In Search of Enemies*, yet our investigations indicate that *no one has ever been prosecuted.*

Consider the following:

Last year, David Bufkin talked to reporters from the *Chicago Sun-Times*, the *Washington Post*, and National Public Radio about his background as a mercenary in Latin America and the Congo in the 60's, his stints in Korea and Vietnam, and his mercenary recruiting experiences for the CIA in Angola. He admits to placing recruitment ads in California newspapers and raising 12 mercs for service in Angola. Stockwell confirms his presence in Kinshasa during CIA operations in Angola and indicates that a CIA agent purged Bufkin's records from CIA files. *Newsday* reported that the CIA told the Justice Department that it would not

cooperate with a pending investigation of Bufkin; he was never prosecuted. The *Washington Post* revealed that Bufkin also worked with Rhodesian intelligence. Conceivably, he still does.

Both *Internews* of California and the British *Guardian* report that University of California-Berkeley student Lawrence Meyers was recruited to fight in Rhodesia by the head of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) there in 1976. He was told there would be no problem getting to Rhodesia with "the help of friends in Washington." After further urging, *Internews* reports, Meyers wrote the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington and the RIO illegally sent Meyers applications for the Rhodesian military. (The FBI announced an investigation had been launched against the RIO for illegally funding Americans travelling to Rhodesia. No court actions have been reported to date.)

Meyers fought for the Rhodesians but deserted to neighboring Botswana and then was deported home, according to the *International Herald Tribune*. The FBI launched an investigation but Meyers was granted immunity from prosecution. The ROTC head who recruited Meyers left that post but reportedly no legal actions were taken against him either.

Soldier of Fortune

The extent of US government involvement in mercenary recruitment is graphically illustrated by the history of Lt. Col. Robert K. Brown, *Soldier of Fortune* magazine, and the Special Forces Group of the US Army Reserve.

Brown, who admits to having worked with anti-Castro Cuban exiles during the 60's, has been a mercenary recruiter since at least 1974, the year in which the armed struggle in Rhodesia expanded rapidly. Brown's firm, Phoenix Associates, began placing ads in military-oriented magazines and distributing "information packets" containing propaganda and applications for the Rhodesian Army and military police.

In June 1975, Tapson Mawere, ZANU representative in the US, exposed the presence of some 400 American mercenaries in Rhodesia. He charged that many of these men had been recruited through a network that reached into the US military through people like Brown and operated with the tacit approval of the US government. Brown denied the charges and, true to form, a State Department official, Temple Cole, also disavowed that Brown was actually recruiting. As reported by the *New York Times*, Cole said that Brown was just providing informa-



Mercenary at work in Zimbabwean countryside

Armed Soldier of Fortune editor
Brown (left) with member of
the Rhodesian army

MERCENARIES AND THE LAW

"Whoever, within the United States... hires or retains another... with intent to be enlisted in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district or people as a soldier... shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years or both."

United States Code Title 18, Sec. 959 (a)

"In addition," said Robert L. Keuch of the Department of Justice before the House Committee on International Relations in 1976, "Section 958 prohibits a US citizen from accepting and exercising a commission in a foreign service in a war against a foreign nation with which the United States is at peace"—such as the oft-raided Mozambique.

"The Justice Department's failure to investigate and prosecute, in the face of widespread, open recruiting," wrote National Lawyers Guild Vice President John Quigley, "constitutes a violation by the United States of the law of nations." In a recent memo written to the Department of Justice concerning American mercenaries in Nicaragua, Quigley goes on to note that the US is party to an international Hague convention dating from 1909 which requires that "corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral power to assist the belligerents."

The National Conference of Black Lawyers is currently defending Haitian exiles living in the US who are being prosecuted under these same Federal codes. The black exiles are charged with conspiracy to overthrow the Haitian government. In its defense, the NCBL is challenging the Government's selective pattern of prosecution which somehow excludes Cuban exiles who plot and act against the Cuban government and white mercenaries who kill blacks in southern Africa.



tion.

Late in 1975, Brown began publication of a glossy bi-monthly magazine, *Soldier of Fortune*, which has since served as a major recruitment vehicle for mercenary operations in Rhodesia. Brown, who was a major in the 12th Special Forces Group (Airborne) US Army Reserve when he started recruiting, was promoted to Lt. Col. at about the time his magazine appeared.

Every issue of *SOF* carries at least one feature article on mercenary operations in Rhodesia, with titles like "How Does an American Become a Mercenary in Africa?" *SOF* has also run interviews with major Rhodesian military figures such as Commander-in-Chief G.P. Walls and army recruiter Major Nick Lamprecht. The tone of the articles tends towards fantastic and highly glorified accounts of mercenary exploits ("George Bacon III—A 20th Century Crusader," "American Mercenary Destroys Cuban Espionage Ring"), couched in racist ("this embattled outpost of European civilization") terms. In addition, *SOF* regularly carries ads giving the names and addresses of merc recruiters, mercs in search of a war, military and paramilitary hardware, war booty, right-wing newspapers, books and pamphlets.

CIA/Special Forces Links

The little that is known about the origins and operations of *SOF* suggest strong ties to US government and military figures. In late 1976, the magazine revealed that a known CIA agent had been involved in starting *SOF*. George Bacon, idealized and idolized by *SOF* following his death as a merc in Angola, was a close friend of Brown and had discussed with him possible uses for the magazine in supporting counter-insurgency overseas. According to *SOF*, Bacon told Brown just before the magazine appeared that it "could be an excellent way to spread the good word" about the CIA-Angola operations and other such efforts.

The *SOF* article also revealed that Bacon, like Brown, had been a member of the Airborne Special Forces which carried out extensive counter-insurgency operations for the CIA in Vietnam. Of Brown's current editorial staff, a ZANU Support Committee report reveals that three are identified with Special Forces Reserve Units, two specifically with the 12th Special Forces (Airborne) and one as a Special Forces medic.

In September 1976, two Chicago-based Jesuit priests confirmed that members of the 12th Special Forces

continued on page 32

Open Oilgates to Rhodesia— Exposure Causes British Scandal

by Karen Rothmyer

On March 27, 1968, George Thompson, then British Commonwealth Secretary, rose in the House of Commons to discuss the Wilson government's attitude toward sanctions against Rhodesia.

"No other country does more in the field of sanctions than the United Kingdom," Thompson said. "I do not claim any special virtue for this. It is Britain's duty to do it."

In fact, as recent revelations have shown, the British government has known all along that British Petroleum, which is 51% owned by the British government, and Royal Dutch/Shell, which is 40% British-owned (the other 60% is Dutch), were ensuring a steady flow of oil to Rhodesia through their South African subsidiaries until only a few weeks ago.

Three other companies also have been involved over the years in sanctions breaking operations: Total, owned by a company in which the French government has a controlling interest; Mobil; and Caltex, which is jointly owned by Standard Oil of California and Texaco.

How much the US government knows about the two American companies' operations is still unknown, but the fact that a 1976 official investigation which followed the publication of secret documents



Gas being trucked from South Africa to Rhodesia after UDI

New African

detailing Mobil's involvement was at best cursory and at worst a whitewash suggests that Washington, like Whitehall, has preferred to look the other way on the sanctions issue.

Mobil, at the time of the investigation, did not deny the central allegations of sanctions busting, but said essentially that it had no control over its South African subsidiary.

Shell Admission

In the case of the British companies' involvement, perhaps the most revealing account of the government's thinking is contained in a September 5 letter to *The Times* of London written by Sir Frank McFadzean, chairman of Shell.

According to McFadzean, very soon after sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia in 1965,

"the companies informed the United Kingdom Government that there was no way of preventing oil reaching Rhodesia short of blockading South Africa from where the relevant oil product movements were controlled. At no stage was the Government prepared to do this: indeed, one can appreciate their reasons for believing that it would not have been in the country's interest to have attempted to do so. At the same time there was reluctance to face up to the harsh reality that the Government had embarked on a

**Government Investigation
Reveals UK and US
Oil Companies Broke
Sanctions
With Knowledge of
Cabinet Ministers**

policy that could only be brought to fruition at a price it was not prepared to pay."

Instead, the government decided to settle for a situation in which the letter of the law was to be obeyed but not the spirit, so that the government could declare its innocence to the world without jeopardizing its economic and political interests.

Oil Swap

As documented in the recently released Bingham report, which was commissioned by the current government following earlier revelations on sanctions breaking by British economists Bernard Rivers and Martin Bailey (*Southern Africa* September 1977) and former Portuguese Minister Jorge Jardim (*Southern Africa* August/September 1978), Shell and BP managed to do their part to satisfy Rhodesian oil demands through a variety of methods including sales to phony intermediaries and swap arrangements, whereby oil was sent to Rhodesia by another company in South Africa from its own stocks (Total was first used for this purpose, and more recently, SASOL, the South African state oil company), while Shell and BP supplied matching quantities for the cooperating company's customers within South Africa.

Thus, as the Bingham report comments in discussing the Total swap (the SASOL swap was made public by Rivers and Bailey after the report was completed), "To HMG the arrangement was acceptable because it took British oil companies out of the line of supply to Rhodesia and enabled it to be said that British oil was not reaching Rhodesia whereas to company representatives, the exchange might have appeared to be merely an alternative means of making a supply."

As a result of the Bingham report, which documented in detail the methods used by companies in the oil supply process but did not attempt to apportion political blame, pressure is building in England for a second inquiry aimed at learning the roles played by various politicians.

Past Prime Minister Implicated

Meanwhile, the politicians have been engaging in a good deal of backing and filling. Former Prime Minister Harold Wilson has claimed total ignorance of sanctions-busting operations, but George Thompson, his Commonwealth Secretary, has

claimed publicly that Wilson knew very well what was going on.

Wilson, still an MP, was encouraged not to attend the recent Labour Party conference because of his potential for causing the party embarrassment. The revelations are also believed to have accounted in part for the Labour government's decision to postpone elections until the spring.

In the US, the "Oilgate" affair has generally provoked little attention. That there is ample cause for further investigation, however, is suggested by material in the Bingham report as well as by other sources.

US Companies Involved

For example, Bingham provides further documentation of the part played by the US companies in the form of figures on the quantities of oil sold to Rhodesia by each. It also suggests that the companies were anything but reluctant participants.

One item contained in the Bingham report is a memo written in July 1974 by Ken Geeling, the head of Shell South Africa, in which Geeling describes a meeting held between him and Bill Beck, until recently head of Mobil South Africa, and the South African Secretary for Commerce Joep Steyn.

Beck and Geeling, according to the memo, were representing all five oil companies.

The purpose of the gathering was to discuss alternate routes for supplying Rhodesia in the event that Mozambique could no longer be used (because of the expected change in government following the Portuguese coup).

According to the Geeling Memo, "Both Beck and I felt that although Government would naturally have to give very serious


consideration to possible consequences, they would nevertheless be almost compelled to assist because of the strategic and emotional significance of the matter.

"We also suggested to Steyn that if all supplies were to emanate from South Africa, consideration should be given to SASOL directly handling all these supplies and balancing through inter-company exchanges. Steyn seemed to fully appreciate the advantages of such a route and said it would certainly be given consideration."

As is known now, the alternative of using SASOL was eventually agreed on. One thing that is not known is whether the US companies are continuing participants in this latest deception.

While there is some talk in Washington of a further Congressional investigation of the US oil companies' actions, the considerably lower level of interest in the Rhodesian situation in the US as compared with England—to say nothing of the great power of the oil giants—makes it uncertain whether the guilty parties will ever be exposed.

And even if the oil companies come in for close scrutiny, there is no way of knowing whether they, in turn, will implicate any members of the present or past administrations.



Unchecked by West, South Africa Plans for Control

“They’re playing games.” That’s how one well-placed United Nations source described the most recent efforts of the five Western powers to bring about a compromise settlement for the independence of Namibia.

By all indications, SWAPO and the frontline states agree. Calling them “no plan at all,” SWAPO flatly rejected the proposals announced jointly by the foreign ministers of the five Western members of the Security Council and South Africa in Pretoria October 19. SWAPO UN representative Theo Ben Gurirab said his organization had the full backing of the frontline states and the Africa group at the UN. By the end of October, the Africa group had called for a meeting of the Security Council, and Gurirab said the group would introduce a resolution calling for comprehensive, mandatory, economic sanctions against South Africa.

It did not take long for most to figure out the tangled language of the joint Pretoria communique. Most important of all the terms: the South African government will proceed with its internal elections in Namibia scheduled for December 4. Afterward, the South African government declared, it will “use its best efforts to persuade [those elected] to consider ways and means of achieving international recognition.”

The Pretoria proposals go on to call for a second round of elections, supervised by the UN, for next year.

But the South African government offers no guarantees that such elections will take place. South Africa only states it will attempt to “persuade” those elected in December to cooperate with the UN.

Negotiations a Failure

For their part, the Western powers stated that they regard the December elections as “null and void.” But clearly the five were unable to prevent South Africa from proceeding with its internal settlement plans. From anyone’s point-of-view, the Pretoria negotiations were a failure.

Even if those elected on the first round—SWAPO of course will be excluded, and several other minor parties have announced they will boycott the voting—decide to allow a second round of elections later, the Pretoria communique leaves open the possibility that any of the strengths of the transition plan the UN has already accepted could be weakened.

For example, the present UN plan calls for 7500 troops in the military contingent of UNTAG, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group. When it announced it was withdrawing its support for the UN plan back in September, South Africa indicated this number was much too high. Now the Pretoria communique says, “The composition and the actual total figure of UNTAG [troops] would be determined by the Secretary General after consultations by his

Special Representative with the [South African] Administrator General.”

“Consultations” is a diplomatic euphemism for renegotiation and the number of troops is not the only term on which there could be consultations. In order for South Africa to “persuade” those elected in December to cooperate with the UN, the UN Special Representative “would consult with the Administrator General on all aspects” of the present plan.

South Africa, in a separate communique, also amended one other crucial aspect of the present plan. The already-accepted independence plan called for the withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1500 South African troops within several weeks of elections. South Africa now says that once the date for UN-supervised elections is fixed, those elections must take place “irrespective of whether there is a cessation of hostilities and a consequent reduction of South African troops.”

Elections Controlled

In another development, completely unnoticed by the Western press, South Africa published September 20 its provisions for elections in Namibia. That was the same day that former Prime Minister John Vorster announced both his retirement and South Africa’s withdrawal from participation in the UN plan.

Although South Africa had indicated that elections were to be held by secret ballot, the provisions state that each voter must enter his or her voter registration number on an envelope into which the ballot is placed. While there is also a provision for destroying the envelopes later, such a procedure provides the state with the capacity to monitor who votes for whom, reinforcing the view that South Africa is determined to control the outcome of these elections.

After the Pretoria meetings, which lasted for three days, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance hailed the agreements as "a step forward," and his British counterpart David Owen called them "a breakthrough." Immediately the Western five began lobbying efforts at the UN to have Secretary General Kurt Waldheim send his Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari back to Windhoek, the Namibian capital, to begin further "consultations." Sources say that Vance literally screamed at Waldheim over the telephone to convince him to dispatch Ahtisaari.

But Waldheim has not reacted hastily. The Africa group has clearly opposed such a move. SWAPO representative Gurirab said it would be "ill-advised, counter-productive, and dangerous" to send Ahtisaari. Gurirab also said that the 20 or so UN personnel still in Namibia after the first UN mission there this summer should be withdrawn.

"Cold War" Invoked

If the diplomats who negotiated with South Africa in Pretoria are optimistic about ultimate South African cooperation with the UN, they shouldn't be. And they need not look for reasons beyond the opening remarks of South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha as the Pretoria negotiations got under way October 16. Botha took advantage of his captive audience to develop a cold war scenario for events in southern Africa that would have made the late John Foster Dulles proud.

"We deplore the ideology of communism," Botha began. "There could be little doubt that Sam Nujoma's SWAPO has already become a Soviet pawn and is determined to seize power by subversion, intimidation and other forces."

What would happen, according to Botha, if SWAPO were to gain power in Namibia?

"South West Africa together with Angola would provide the USSR with a solid bloc along the west coast of



The people have no doubts: Greeting Commissioner Ahtisaari in Namibia

central and southern Africa, enabling it to be used at will to the detriment of southern Africa and the free world.

"Cuban troop presence in Angola could be reduced, making the Cubans available for further adventures on behalf of their Russian master, e.g. against the western supported state of Zaire.

"If Mobutu's shaky hold on his country were to be broken, he would almost certainly be replaced by a marxist and we would then be faced by a situation in which the marxist-orientated countries of Congo, Zaire, and Tanzania would form a belt across Africa from east to west, effectively cutting Africa in half and

isolating southern Africa to be dealt with at leisure.

"The isolation of the Republic of South Africa, economically, politically and militarily is now complete and final, and Russia would be standing before her ultimate strategic goal in Africa."

Thus for white South Africa, the linchpin to its own survival, in its Prime Minister's own words, is Namibia. A SWAPO victory in Namibia would signal the end of white South Africa. From this perspective, it is not surprising that South Africa has offered, and will continue to offer, no guarantees to the UN. □

The Impression of a Movement Ready to Run the Government

George Houser talks about his visits with the Patriotic Front to Mike Shuster

Few Americans have had as much contact with the liberation movements of southern Africa as George Houser. Houser is the executive director of the New York-based American Committee on Africa, and since the mid-1950s, has made almost thirty trips to Africa.

Houser returned in early October from his most recent visit. He spent five weeks in Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique where he met with both Patriotic Front leaders, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. Having talked to dozens of militants and visited some of the Front's refugee camps, Houser is in a particularly good position to assess the present state of the struggle for Zimbabwe.

You've had contact throughout the 1960s and 1970s with both wings of the Patriotic Front, ZAPU and ZANU. We understand you were particularly impressed this trip by the growing strength and level of organization of both groups.

That's absolutely right. In Zambia I was able to visit some of the refugee camps that are partly under the administration of ZAPU. There are in one camp, for example, about 6000 young women. That's a lot of people to be brought into an area where, at the beginning, there weren't any buildings. They were living in tents or huts made out of what was available.

Now they are putting up more substantial buildings. They expect another 5000 young women to arrive in the next few months. They were constructing 30 buildings for classrooms and dormitory space when I was there, and they had another 30 planned. This is a sizable operation.

In Mozambique I was not able to visit the camps because of the almost daily bombings. But I talked with a great many people about them. There

are huge areas which sometimes accommodate 30,000 refugees. Obviously they have to be divided up into separate villages within this area.

The organization is probably not quite as tight in these camps because of the large number of people and because it has all been so sudden. It's all happened within the last year or two with thousands of people pouring across the border.

But there is efficiency at the center where the planning is being done. ZANU is educating 20,000 young people in Mozambique, not counting those thousands in the liberated areas of Rhodesia. ZAPU is doing the same.

One gets the impression of movements that are prepared to take over the running of government because they are already doing this.

Ian Smith has said in Washington that his government is in complete control of Rhodesia. What is your assessment of guerrilla strength inside the country?

I didn't go into the country, but I believe from many reports that at least a third to half of the country is under guerrilla control.

One bit of evidence that supports this is Smith's announcement to open up what are called protected villages. These were villages that were set up to keep people from having contact with ZAPU and ZANU. Some 50 of these villages were opened up simply because they were in areas that were under Patriotic Front control.

What was the point of keeping these people under curfew when the Rhodesian forces were in no position to do anything to "protect" them? This is a sign that Smith is not in control of large areas.

Another indication is the number of Rhodesian schools that have closed and the number of schools that the Front has opened up. The guerrillas are using some of the same areas,

some of the same buildings. And they are supplying their own educational materials, their own books that they are now getting printed up.

There are also considerable medical services. They just send in medicines, they send in doctors, nurses, just as the MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC used to do in their large liberated areas. For the first time, within the last year or so, there are liberated areas really under the administration of the Patriotic Front inside Rhodesia.

There have been reports that ZANU has shouldered a greater share of the fighting than ZAPU. Is that true?

I can't speak absolutely authoritatively on that one, again, because I wasn't inside Zimbabwe. But I have the reports to go on that I pick up from a lot of different sources.

Certainly more fighting is being done from the Mozambique base, the ZANU areas. But the ZAPU forces are involved. I think there are probably more refugees pouring into Mozambique. Probably about twice as many refugees are in Mozambique with some 45-50,000 in Zambia, and maybe 100,000 in Mozambique. Both groups are fighting. More action on the ZANU front than on the ZAPU side? Correct I think.

From your meetings with the leaders of the Front, what has been the effect of the meetings between Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo in Lusaka last August?

There has been a psychological effect, at the very least. Certain suspicions have arisen, which they would readily admit. Here you are involved in a united front, and one party to it got involved in some secret discussions that the other party didn't know about until after it was completed.

Looking at it in its best light, Nkomo said he could not go any further without Mugabe being involved.

In the final analysis, Nkomo said, "We are preserving the Front. I cannot talk with Smith about going back to Salisbury and participating in an internal settlement, unless it is the Patriotic Front. Mugabe and I have to do it together."

When I talked with Nkomo about it, he said very strongly that this was his position. He said that Smith came saying that he was prepared to turn power over to the Patriotic Front, and it was under those terms that Nkomo was discussing it with him.

I think this is credible, because in fact the main problem they had after the meeting on August 14 was how to inform Mugabe. ZANU rejected it, and Nkomo accepted that rejection. The frontline presidents met, and they rejected it. Maybe there were some difference among them about whether it should have been done the way it was done, but it hasn't wrecked the Patriotic Front.

There have been reports that the frontline states are divided over support for ZAPU and ZANU. Is this true?

The frontline presidents deny it. There is a tendency in that direction, in that Nyerere of Tanzania has made public statements against the secret meeting between Nkomo and Smith. Generally speaking, Mozambique and Tanzania have taken a common position. Botswana has joined with Zambia mostly, and Angola has had a long relationship with ZAPU. But the frontline presidents, as a group, have very strongly taken the position that the Patriotic Front must stand together. I think there is no sign they are going to change from that position.

Ian Smith was in the U.S. for several weeks in October. How are the leaders of the Patriotic Front affected by this visit?

I doubt if they are affected very deeply by it, in that I don't think it can change their situation, their military or political strength.

It hurts the U.S. That's the main effect of it. It simply deepens the suspicions that not only the Patriotic Front would have, but I would say the frontline presidents who are very deeply involved. They will not understand why this had to be done at this very sensitive point. It will hurt the U.S. at the UN among the African representatives there, and at the OAU.

It will also cause Smith and his colleagues to feel an artificial strength, I believe. It might give them more



Some of the 20,000 students ZANU is educating in Mozambique

desire to continue their present policies.

The U.S. has advocated an all-party conference on Rhodesia. Smith has changed his position on this several times. What are the difficulties in bringing together all parties at this point?

The Patriotic Front feels it has the initiative at this point. Its leaders feel they don't need the all-party conference as much as the Rhodesian forces do. The general military position of the Patriotic Front is good. If one can trust statistics that are available, there are 1500 Rhodesians

net who are leaving the country every month. The total number of Rhodesian whites could be down below 200,000 (from 280,000).

They're losing whites at a very rapid rate and that is the reason Smith sought the secret meeting with Nkomo.

In other words, they're having trouble on the inside, and externally both ZAPU and ZANU feel in a strong position. Therefore, the Front would argue, if we're going into an all-party conference, we have to feel that it's going to be worthwhile, because we are going to win.

Salisbury struggles to survive

The Salisbury government's fight for survival appears to have entered a crucial, possibly final phase. Developments last month on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts would indicate that this is, at least, how the so-called interim regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith perceives the current position. Hanging in the balance, of course, is defeat on the battlefield and political survival. The latter would now appear to require an increased measure of Western support.

Prime Minister Ian Smith's much-noted public relations mission in the US did not succeed in winning support to the extent he expected. Basing his visit on the hard core of conservative congressmen who have long advocated a shift in US policy toward full backing for Rhodesia, Smith spent several weeks in October campaigning among government, business, and media leaders in Washington, New York, Texas, and California. While Smith may have further consolidated his staunch supporters, there is little sign that he succeeded in significantly broadening this base, either among government officials or in the American public, although he received very sympathetic handling from the press and TV. His steps were dogged by hundreds of protestors wherever he went. Most important, overt support from the Carter administration was not forthcoming.

US Policy

In fact, Smith stepped into the same foreign policy struggle encountered a month earlier by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, one of three black officials on Salisbury's four-man executive council (*Southern Africa*, October). The State Department remains anxious to promote a modified version of the Anglo-American plan

designed last year, and is thus determined to convene an all-party conference. Washington's ultimate policy goals—to install a moderate, internationally acceptable black government in Rhodesia while protecting white and western interests—have not been altered. But while Smith remains an integral part of that plan, spending much time with him in the US was not in the administration's interest. The minority leader met briefly and unsuccessfully with Secretary of State Vance, but not with President Carter.

It is surprising, in fact, that Smith's expectations for gaining support in the US remained as high as they did. The conflict between the State Department and Capitol Hill conservatives was plainly visible even before he arrived in the question of whether Smith or Chief Jeremiah Chirau and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who also participate in the executive council, should be granted visas.

It is likely that the State Department had intended to grant visa requests from the first, and that its resistance to the 27 congressmen who sponsored Smith was meant mostly to preserve what credibility Washington has with black Africa. But even if that were the case, it was evident that Smith and his co-signers would not get a public show of support from Carter.

In fact, the only major figure to offer encouraging words for the minority leader's cause was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who is thought to be gearing up for the Republican senatorial race in New York. "I'm not saying we should support the internal settlement," Kissinger stated after meeting with Smith. "I'm saying we should give his approach an opportunity."

Regardless of the administration's posture, Africans reacted strongly to

the Smith mission. In a statement released at the UN after Smith's visa request was approved, the Organization of African Unity stated that the "development casts serious doubts on the administration's much-vaunted 'new policies' toward our continent." The OAU statement also said that the permit to allow Smith's entry "is contrary to the UN Charter and is in direct violation of the letter and the spirit of UN Security Council resolutions. . . ." [For US reaction see Washington Notes.]

More important, the ZANU wing of the Patriotic Front reacted immediately by saying that the administration's action excluded it from any further role as a mediator in the Rhodesian issue. ZAPU had already formally rejected the possibility of an all-parties conference. Now, ZANU said, "The only colonial power is Britain. . . . We don't have to negotiate with the United States." Although the bargaining picture has changed frequently over the past few months, the ZANU announcement was perceived as a blow to the Carter administration's efforts to convene a conference that would include the Front and the Salisbury government.

Smith Switches Line

Midway in his trip, possibly because of the unexpectedly low level of official response from Washington, Smith suddenly announced that he and his three partners would be willing to attend an all-party conference with the Patriotic Front if there were no preconditions set for such a conference. This was a complete reversal of Smith's earlier position, which was to require that any negotiations with Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo be based on the Salisbury accord signed last March 3. As expected, Bishop Muzorewa, who has the most



Sen. Hayakawa, Smith's major US backer, hosts Capitol Hill Press Conference

to lose in any such conference, showed some reluctance to support Smith's offer.

Nevertheless, the Carter administration received Smith's surprise offer with a mixture of suspicion and enthusiasm. The White House immediately invited Smith and his traveling companions for further talks, which were held at the State Department on Friday October 20th, and the development was generally viewed as a policy breakthrough. In the immediate aftermath, there was even some talk of bringing Mugabe and Nkomo to the US immediately, possibly to convene a preliminary session. In fact it is unlikely that such talks will even reach the table—the Patriotic Front are likely to see that the "no pre-conditions" leaves Smith in an unclocked position—able to unleash his troops at any moment; relying on Smith's "good faith" would be a risky exercise.

US hopes were somewhat dashed in succeeding days. From his Lusaka headquarters, ZAPU leader Nkomo categorically rejected such a possibi-

ty, this time using even stronger language than he had in earlier rejections. "There can be no all-party conference in a war," Nkomo stated. While ZANU President Mugabe had not responded to the opening at *Southern Africa's* press time, it was expected that, if he would agree to such a conference at all, it would only be on the basis of the Anglo-American plan forged last year. That has been the Patriotic Front's bargaining position for some time.

Rhodesian Army Invades Zambia/Mozambique

Nkomo's remarks came just days after Rhodesia's largest raid into Zambia in the military history of the conflict, an attack coupled with renewed raids on Mozambique. The attack, part of Salisbury's first two-pronged offensive in the history of the war, was launched against 12 ZAPU camps in Zambian territory with jet fighters, helicopters, and ground troops participating. October 19th reports from BBC radio quoted Zambian government sources as

estimating up to 300 dead in the raids; both ZAPU and the Lusaka government maintained that the main target, Chikumbi, just 12 miles outside Lusaka, was a refugee camp, not ZAPU's military headquarters, as the Rhodesian military maintained; at least one women's camp had also been attacked.

In later press reports from Salisbury, the Rhodesians claimed to have killed up to 1,500 nationalist guerrillas but ZAPU denied this figure and indicated that six days after the raids some Rhodesian troops were still trapped in Zambia. The figure, which has not been verified, would make the attack into Zambia the most costly yet for the Front. Certainly, it was one of the deepest—penetrating some 80 miles inside Zambian territory—and involved some clashes with the Zambian army. In all, the Rhodesian government claimed the destruction of three major Front bases in Zambia.

There was little available detail on the Mozambican front of the two-pronged offensive, where the raid had



One of the hundreds of air raid shelters in Mozambique for protection from Rhodesian raids. For ten years, while fighting Portuguese colonialism such shelters proliferated the liberated zones. Now, three years after independence, they are being built again.

started one day prior to the Zambian action and followed on a similar four-day strike 40 miles into Mozambique in late September. Rhodesian government troops were said to have penetrated some 60 miles into Mozambican territory in the Chimoio area. Chimoio has been the scene of the bloodiest raids of the war, where up to 1,200 Zimbabweans were killed late last year.

It was not clear what impact the attacks would have on diplomatic efforts to convene the all-party con-

ference. They appear to have strengthened Nkomo's resolve against entering such talks, as reflected in his rejection of the prospect several days after the attack. The other factor to be considered is Zambia, which has occupied a complex position in the Rhodesian issue recently.

Divide to Rule

One part of Western strategy on Rhodesia has for some time been to divide both the front-line states and

the Patriotic Front. The secret Smith-Nkomo talks held in August and disclosed in September were extremely important in this regard; in the aftermath, both ZANU-ZAPU relations and front-line unity appear to have suffered considerably. Zambia sponsored those talks.

After talks with British Prime Minister James Callaghan in Nigeria in September, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda also mounted a campaign among African leaders to get the all-party conference moving again after Nkomo had pronounced it "dead and buried." Those talks were ostensibly Callaghan's apology to Kaunda for Britain's part in breaking the oil embargo against Rhodesia, then being exposed in the British

THE CASUALTIES MOUNT

September was not yet over before it appeared to be the bloodiest month of Zimbabwe's war. An announcement in Salisbury September 27 put the death toll inside Rhodesia at 725 for the month—almost twice the casualty rate of the previous month, and nearly four times the monthly average before Prime Minister Smith's March 3 internal settlement. Most casualties are of course black, and many were non-combatant men, women and children.

The Rhodesian government's figures do not include the military raids made in Mozambique or Zambia against camps belonging to the Patriotic Front. A new wave of attacks was mounted in mid-September. Those raids, the Rhodesians claim, struck 25 bases in Mozambican territory; the death toll was said to have been in the hundreds. The October attacks were even more bloody.

Inside Rhodesia, meanwhile, Front attacks are intensifying rapidly. In mid-September, for instance, Mozambique-based guerrillas launched at least two rocket attacks on Umtali, a city near Rhodesia's eastern border with Mozambique and the country's third largest.

In what police portrayed as a routine exchange of fire with nationalist guerrillas last month, official spokesmen said the Salisbury police killed "two suspected terrorists" in Harare, a black township outside the capital. The death toll was five on that occasion: a six-month-old girl, her mother and grandmother, and two men said by neighbors to have been unarmed and not part of the guerrilla forces. Police later declined to say if they had been fired upon.

New light was shed last month on the June slayings of 12 British missionaries—that gruesome incident seized upon by many Western news-

papers to illustrate the increasing barbarity of the guerrilla forces. Four independent British lawyers returned to London after a visit to Maputo, according to a *Manchester Guardian* account, "with new evidence which convinced them that the massacre . . . was carried out by order of the white Rhodesian government."

The source of the valuable but none too surprising account was a defector from the Rhodesian police, a black who said he had taken part in the massacre. "He claimed he had helped to club and batter the missionaries for two hours, and had been a member of the firing squad that shot seven of them," the account said. "Then he and his colleagues had daubed 'Down with Smith, Forward with ZANU,' on the mission walls."

The defector, who went only by the name Flint, has apparently joined the ZANU wing of the Patriotic Front in Mozambique. □

press; but it now appears that the current Rhodesian situation loomed large on the agenda of the meeting.

In what may be Zambia's boldest move, Kaunda announced early in October that borders with Rhodesia would be reopened to allow rail traffic through to South Africa. Zambia's pressing agricultural and economic needs cannot be disputed; but the impact of the move was far-reaching—both in widening the rift within front-line leadership and in providing the Rhodesian minority with a hopeful sign that its economic isolation may be ending on the strength of the internal settlement.

The Rhodesian raids into Zambia might thus appear to be an attempt to guarantee that the conference to which Smith pledged himself in Washington would never be convened. But it is also possible that Smith hoped to increase Kaunda's vulnerability, thus increasing pressure on him to urge Nkomo into a settlement. In Washington, the minority

leader denied any foreknowledge of the security forces' actions; Bishop Muzorewa, meanwhile, defended the raids as necessary for Rhodesia's security. "Advance word is unnecessary," the bishop added. "The army is given this freedom of action in defending the country."

"Reforms" Announced

While in Washington, though, it was plain that Smith had planned an announcement at home designed to bolster his efforts to gather support in the US. Shortly after he arrived it was announced in Salisbury that all racially discriminatory laws were to be struck from Rhodesia's books. The impact in the US, however, was almost nil, because the announcement also stated that a system of what amounts to economic discrimination was simultaneously approved.

According to the new law, blacks will no longer legally be excluded from buying property in formerly all-white areas, for instance, or from us-

ing formerly white hospitals and schools. But blacks are effectively excluded by the economic requirements imposed on such things by the system approved along with the new law. Access to "equality" will depend on one's level of income. Nevertheless, Bishop Muzorewa, who was then still in Salisbury as acting head of the executive council, said, "Discrimination is finished, scrapped. I'm so happy I could jump off the roof."

A more accurate picture of the Salisbury government's line on civil liberties came early in October, when the government closed Rhodesia's major black circulation newspaper, *Zimbabwe Times*. The daily, owned by Tiny Rowland's giant African conglomerate Lonrho, which had a circulation of 20,000, had editorialized in favor of an all-parties conference that would include guerrilla leaders Nkomo and Mugabe. The banning order said the paper was closed "in the interest of public safety and security." □

ZAMBIA


Kaunda Opens Border to Rhodesia

The timing of the announcement—when Smith was in the US—could not have suited the illegal Prime Minister better.

Despite Zambia's widely acknowledged problems of extreme dependence on copper and lack of viable rail links to the sea, many questions and suspicions have been aroused by President Kenneth Kaunda's decision in mid-October to open the Rhodesian border to rail traffic. Kaunda's frontline allies, Samora Machel and Julius Nyerere, felt compelled to fly to Lusaka in an attempt to dissuade Zambia from taking this step at this time, despite reports that they had been discussing the possibility of opening the border since early this year.

Most observers point to the International Monetary Fund as a major factor in Kaunda's decision. Earlier this year the IMF granted Zambia a three-year \$390 million loan as part of an aid package from the major Western powers that has already totaled more than \$1 billion. "According to persistent reports in Lusaka," reported the South African *Rand Daily Mail* in March, "the International Monetary Fund loan to Zambia was made on condition that

Railroads of southern Africa: other options were ignored—such as the Benguela railway or commitment to solving the problems of the Tazara railway.



cheaper routes were found for its copper exports." The Tazara railway through Tanzania, by which Zambia has shipped all of its copper since 1975, is a costly operation. It has been operating at only 15% of its capacity and has been glutted with 150,000 tons of copper awaiting shipment.

Reassurances

The *Washington Post* reported that the IMF has been "pressing the Kaunda government to do something about its tangled transport problems if further payments of [the] IMF loan. . . are to continue. Faced with bankruptcy and debts of \$1.2 billion, Kaunda's government this summer reassured officials from Citibank, which may be providing Zambia with \$200 million as a part of the Western aid package, that it supported their intentions to open a branch in

Lusaka.

In an era when developing countries are finding it increasingly difficult to get financing, how has Zambia managed to attract such largesse? During the June summit in Paris, where the major Western powers put together Zambia's aid package, the *New York Times* reported that "the Western powers have made it clear to Kaunda that they hope he will do his best to promote a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia and keep Cuban troops out of this part of Africa in return for financial assistance."

Earlier, the *Times* noted that some Western strategic analysts, "increasingly anxious about growing Soviet influence in southern Africa, [feel that] Zambia holds the key to political fortunes in the region." These analysts contend that "if Zambia moves toward Moscow, as Kaunda has threatened in the past, the pros-

pects that moderate black nationalists would come to power in Rhodesia and South-West Africa would fade."

Despite the dangers implied in this strategy, Joshua Nkomo, Patriotic Front co-leader based in Zambia, has pledged his co-operation with the border opening. Nkomo said that he would insure that his forces did not interfere with goods traveling along the rail through Rhodesia bound to and from Zambia.

Domestic Considerations

As far as the timing of the border opening is concerned—Kaunda made the announcement just as Ian Smith was leaving Salisbury for Washington—observers feel that Kaunda was prompted most by domestic considerations. Zambia faces an imminent crisis in agriculture if 100,000 tons of fertilizer stockpiled in Maputo do not reach maize farmers before the November rains. As much as half of the crop, which is a Zambian staple, is endangered—a disastrous situation, particularly since Zambia also exported 100,000 tons of maize last year, earning badly needed foreign exchange.

In addition, Kaunda is faced with presidential and parliamentary elections in December amid critical shortages of vital foodstuffs and growing pressure from powerful commercial sectors to open the border. Two of Kaunda's opponents for the presidency had been pressing for the border opening.

Still, many questions remain. Machel and Nyerere reportedly felt that the decision could have been avoided and that the timing of the announcement served to strengthen Salisbury's stance. Granting the imminent agricultural crisis and the tremendous copper stockpiles, why wasn't the border opening limited to the time needed to avert the worst of the crisis? Why not commit long-term energies to solving the problems of the Tazara railway? And what about the Benguela railway through Angola? Previously damaged by guerrilla incursions against the Portuguese and later by UNITA rebels, the Benguela railway is expected to reopen soon.

Coming as it has some four months after the economic "recolonization" of its neighbor to the north, Zaire, and following closely on dangerous new developments in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the Zambian action could set in motion troubling new dynamics in the region.

New Leader—Same Policy

But Black Pressure and Shifting White Interests
Create New Tensions for Apartheid's Guardians

As South Africa's defense minister for the last 12 years, Pieter Botha earned the nickname "Piet Wapens" (Pete Weapons). As of September 28, he became Prime Minister Weapons.

Meeting to select a successor to ailing John Vorster, the National Party predictably chose the hardest of hardliners, the man who directed South Africa's invasion of Angola in 1975 and managed the quadrupling of the military budget over the last five years. And his first words after taking office as the new prime minister gave no indication that Pieter Botha is about to relinquish either his nickname or the stance as "the key man responsible for the white seige mentality" that earned it for him.

In fact, Botha chose to deliver his first press conference as prime minister at the Defense Ministry which he has headed since 1966...and which he says he will continue to head for the foreseeable future. And his statements sounded quite in keeping with the threats he issued ten years ago to send his troops into neighboring African states as "a hard retaliation in the defense of self-respect and peace." This time around, Botha's remarks were full of references to white South Africa's "God-given duty" to protect sea-routes around the Cape and of vows that "We will not bend our knee to Marxism or revolution."

But Botha may not have an easy

time keeping a stiff upper hand and knee. For he is not only inheriting the task of filling the shoes of a man headlined as "the architect of pragmatic apartheid." He also is inheriting the tab for years of "pragmatic" white supremacist rule—in the form of several full-blown crises.

The most immediate and urgent crisis erupted on the eve of Botha's selection as prime minister. At one eventful cabinet meeting in mid-September, John Vorster announced both that he was stepping down as prime minister and that South Africa was backing out of the western-backed plan for UN-sponsored elections in Namibia.



Pik Botha, Cyrus Vance and David Owen arriving at talks in Pretoria

The first decision led to Botha's promotion to prime minister. The second brought U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the British, West German and Canadian Foreign Secretaries along with a senior French diplomat scurrying to South Africa to meet with the new leader of the apartheid state.

As Defense Minister, Botha reportedly lobbied hard for scuttling the UN plan for Namibia. He has shown little concern in the past either for diplomatic niceties or for offering cosmetic compromises to shore up support from the US and other western powers. True to his nickname, he has brandished weapons both as the backbone of white power and as proof that the US and its allies who have been selling more than \$1 billion worth of them a year to his Defense Department actually need South Africa as much as it needs them.

In the case of the west's Namibia plan, at least, this last presumption appears to have been borne out. While western diplomats at the UN lamented that scrapping the plan would almost certainly bring economic sanctions against South Africa, Vance & Co. arrived in South Africa more in a mood to plead than to threaten. And Botha emerged from his first face off with his publicly reluctant allies looking like a master of pragmatic apartheid diplomacy in his own right.

Growing Resistance at Flame

But Botha faces a host of other problems. The military balance has now swung decisively against white domination in South Africa's other northern neighbor, Zimbabwe. And the most intractable problem of all lies right at home, where black resistance to apartheid continues to grow.

Evidence of this resistance is everywhere—in the almost daily accounts of the firebombing of government institutions, of strikes, of clashes between police and students, or, with increasing frequency, between police and armed guerrillas. Its impact is reflected in the most unlikely place of all, within the Afrikaner community itself, generating conflict as to how to deal best with black pressure.

Friction in the Ranks

One hint that growing unrest had opened a breach even in the National Party laager surfaced with the heated

contest for prime minister, which pitted Botha against so called "liberal" fellow cabinet member Pik Botha.

Perhaps the most revealing clue to the tensions in Afrikanerdom came with reports that the chairman of the powerful Afrikaner secret society, the Broederbond, had met secretly with Dr. Ntatho Motlana, chairman of Soweto's Committee of Ten and other black leaders.

The meeting was not unique: Afrikaaner intellectuals have sought contact with conservative elements of the black leadership before, in an effort to sell the grand bantustan design. But it did indicate a sense of new crisis. Here was the head of a secret society which has nurtured an almost religious ideology of white supremacy sitting down across the table from a man only released from jail a few months ago for his role in opposing apartheid and since banned from speaking to any gathering on the subject.

Further, the suggestion that there might be cracks in the Bond's avowed goal of "a healthy unanimity among all Afrikaners" has been underlined by other recent events.

One indication of divisions in the ranks came during the same week Broederbond head Prof. Gerrit Viljoen indicated to Dr. Motlana that he believed "apartheid's original formula could not cope with the new situation facing the country." Government leaders warned that there would be no change in the policy which is one focus of Dr. Motlana's resistance—the insistence that urban blacks have no political rights where they live but only in their "homelands."

Another indication came with the holding of National Party congresses during which fierce arguments broke out over whether apartheid was being "watered down" too much or not enough. Not that any of the delegates were advocating major changes in the system or ideology of white supremacy. Even at the "liberal" end of the spectrum, the National Party remains unimpeachably racist, as exemplified by one "liberal" delegate paraphrased by the *Rand Daily Mail* who argued that "blacks should be regarded as children who needed to be trained by whites." Said another delegate, according to the *Financial Mail*, "God had given man different skins—and it was not for man to ignore the divine plan." No one in the party was challenging the basic separate development plan, but

"verligtes" were looking for potential safety valves.

Blacks in South Africa are well aware that they cannot look to "liberals" of this sort for any meaningful assistance. They are aware, indeed, that they need look no further than themselves.

New Interests Involved

But for South Africa's new prime minister, even such seemingly insignificant divisions in the ranks could complicate matters. And there is sound reason to believe that the divisions may widen rather than narrow. For economic developments in recent years have significantly altered the overlap of class and cultural identities that has been the base of the National Party.

The party emerged as a vehicle for the interests of most of the Afrikaner population—an alliance between agricultural capital and white working people, forged in opposition to the international mining and finance interests and cemented by white supremacy. Tactics were simply perceived: protect white jobs, no competition from a black working class, no black middleclass, just white privilege and black poverty.

But Afrikaner success has spawned a powerful new Afrikaner capitalist class with distinct interests of its own, and other interests shared through joint ownership with such international concerns as Toyota, Honda, Avis Rent-a-Car and Massey-Ferguson.

Such a class may seek new ways of protecting its privileges and attempt to build new alliances with some black sections in order to do so.

Following the recent takeover of a major retail chain by the Afrikaner company Federale Chemiese Beleggings, financial page reports spoke of "giant inroads into the fields of finance, mining, industry, construction and commerce." While holding onto control of 80 percent of the country's agriculture, Afrikaners have expanded their share in the rest of the private sector of the nation's economy from less than 10 percent to 25 percent.

On the financial pages, these economic advances are written up as a phenomenal success story. For Pieter Botha they may spell yet one more difficulty, one more political ball to juggle while black people battle to bring the whole juggling act to an end. □

Arms Embargo Regulations: Weak on Paper, Weaker in Practice

In spite of official US pledges to implement the voluntary arms embargo against South Africa in 1963, and the mandatory embargo in 1977, successive administrations have not developed effective enforcement machinery. All that has been established is a complex, sometimes contradictory set of procedures, over which at least two separate departments—State and Commerce—preside with unclear responsibilities.

The US embargo was originally instituted in January 1964 by directives kept classified for twelve years, until 1976, thus shielding them from critical scrutiny.

The most extensive review of embargo regulations now available, has been provided by Robert Sylvester, who pieces together some of the elements involved in the puzzle, in the newly published US Military Involvement in Southern Africa.

One area of State Department

Last February, following the November 1977 Security Council passage of a mandatory arms embargo, the Carter administration announced that it was outlawing the export of all US goods and technology to the South African military and police.

On the face of it, the new Commerce Department regulations issued

responsibility arises because under the Mutual Security Act the Secretary of State is responsible for controlling all US non-governmental arms exports. The function is carried out by State's Office of Munitions Control; controlled arms or implements of war are contained on an extensive Munitions list, and items on that list have been embargoed for sale to South Africa. Indeed it appears that most such overt military equipment has not gone directly from the US to South Africa, but has been filtered through subsidiary licensing loopholes in Europe. [See the US—Still Arming Apartheid]

Both State and Commerce Departments are involved in controlling "dual purpose" or "grey area" so-called civilian goods—that is commercial items such as radios, airplanes, computers, helicopters, shotguns, equipment which could be used by civilians for civilian activities, but which can also be used for

at that time appeared to do just that. Time, however, has shown that the regulations are virtually meaningless, in part because of difficulties inherent in making any embargo effective and in part because Commerce officials themselves are opposed to the regulations.

"You have a nice moral posture, but to me, it's throwing people out of

military or police purposes. This dual use concept kept open a vast loophole through which flowed masses of equipment, officially going to "legitimate" firms in SA. It did so, says Sylvester, because it rested on the shaky proposition that it is to whom a sale is made, rather than the nature of the good that determines the use to which equipment is put. In addition, sales to police and military were unrestricted if the equipment was deemed not to strengthen South Africa's military or internal security capacity.

Licenses for the export of such dual equipment have ultimately to be granted by the Commerce Department. The administration claims to have tightened the regulations governing Commerce decisions, but Southern Africa's Karen Rothmyer, who has been checking the effectiveness of the new controls reports that the major loopholes seem still to stand wide open.

jobs," says Jeanne Nelson, a senior official in Commerce's office of export administration. Nelson adds: "You can't do a thing like this unilaterally, anyway. Already we have evidence that the South Africans have started to procure certain important items from other countries."

Under the new regulations, companies cannot sell either directly to

the military or police or to persons or firms that the exporter "knows or has reason to know" will resell to those bodies. Technology developed after the regulations' effective date also cannot be exported for use in making items that go directly or indirectly to the police or military.

The regulations cover exports by a US parent to a South African subsidiary—for example, parts for trucks assembled there or technology needed to produce a new kind of tire—as well as fully assembled items going directly or indirectly to a South African military or police customer.

However, the regulations leave the old "dual purpose" loophole unplugged; civilian aircraft, helicopters, or police equipment like teargas guns can all be freely supplied—so long as they appear to be exported to or for civilians.

Masking the True Customer

Direct sales to the military and police were negligible even before the regulations, according to Phillip Christenson, an international trade specialist in the Commerce Department. In part, he speculates, this was because the US was not a reliable supplier, given the growing public hostility toward South African trade.

Far more important, according to Christenson, was the fact that "95% of what is bought by the South African government is bought by a general office"—much like our own General Services Administration.

Companies may have a good idea, of course, for whom the goods are intended. To cite one example from earlier this year, before the new regulations took effect, Ford Motor Company responded to an inquiry by the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility with precise figures on military and police sales. General Motors, however, responding to the same inquiry, hid behind the contention that it sells only to the central authority.

Ford noted in answering the ICCR request for information that "had Ford South Africa not sold directly to the government, the same vehicles could have been purchased by government agencies from Ford South Africa's dealers."

Key Checks Lacking

The key to the effectiveness of the new Commerce regulations, then, becomes indirect sales—those where the company knows or has reason to know that resale to the military or

Gun Running to South Africa

A few companies and individuals have been prosecuted, but lax procedures, loopholes aplenty and official indifference allow the trade to continue.

Trial has been set for November 20 in the case of a Michigan gun company executive, his firm and a South African gun wholesaler—all accused of smuggling hundreds of weapons to South Africa.

Seymour G. Freilich, secretary-treasurer of Concealable Body Armor of America, Inc., police equipment suppliers of Oak Park, Michigan, and Richard Beck, doing business as Aimcom Ltd. of Bryanston, South Africa, were charged in an indictment

handed down in August by an Illinois federal grand jury.

They are accused of participating in the illegal export of 405 handguns and rifles and about 4,550 rounds of ammunition to South Africa. They are also accused of conspiring to export additional amounts of such items.

According to the indictment, the arms that were shipped were misidentified for customs purposes as playground equipment and underwater breathing devices bound for a Swiss customer.

The indictment also charges that Beck and other unnamed South African dealers ordered from Concealable "arms, ammunition and implements



Members of South African Defense Force works on a Cessna plane

police is likely.

Here, however, the Commerce Department has decided to interpret the regulations as liberally as possible. All companies are obliged to stamp on invoices and other documents a warning that the goods cannot be resold to the police or military.

But just how many inquiries they make as to their goods or technology's final destination or use is a matter of individual conscience.

According to Nelson, one recent inquiry from a US company as to the extent of its liability brought the official response that "sale to a non-military, non-political government agency or to a distributor with a variety of customers does not, in

itself, constitute knowledge of sale to or for use by a political or military entity."

"Obviously it's a knotty problem," she says. "They can't be expected to interrogate customers through 13 degrees."

No Enforcement

As for enforcement, the Commerce officials say that it would be difficult to detect a breach of the regulations simply by examining export licenses, even if the manpower were available.

Which it is not. "There's too much to process even to examine closely those items on the specialized list," says Christenson.

That specialized list contains items including certain machine tools and most computer parts that require specific licenses for export to any country, including South Africa.

Instead of aggressive investigation, the department relies on informal observations by US officials on the scene and on tips from individuals or the companies' competitors. The two Commerce officials complain that observation has been hampered by the withdrawal of a commercial attache from the US embassy in Pretoria, allegedly in response to anti-investment pressure in the US.

For the most part, according to Nelson, "We have to go on the bona fides of the companies." □

of war, including but not limited to, handguns, rifles, rifle scopes, rifle sights, firearms parts, ammunition, bullet casings, firearms magazines, firearms primers, explosive powder and firearm rigging equipment valued at approximately \$354,187."

The Chicago incident is the latest in a series of cases involving arms shipments to South Africa. Such shipments have been illegal since 1963.

Last March, Olin Corporation of Connecticut pleaded no contest—a tacit admission of guilt—to a federal indictment charging that the firm had falsified export applications for 3,200 firearms and 20 million rounds of ammunition. No individuals were cited as having participated in the scheme, which operated for at least four and one-half years between 1971 and 1975.

In 1976, a former employee of another East Coast arms manufacturer, Winchester, which is now owned by Olin, had pleaded guilty to illegal arms sales to South Africa.

Earlier this year, four Ohio men,

including a lawyer and a former bounty hunter in Rhodesia, were charged in connection with an attempt to buy 615 semi-automatic handguns for shipment to Rhodesia and possibly South Africa. All four pleaded guilty to lesser charges.

And in Canada, reports have circulated for several months that a consignment of weapons including field cannon and mortars passed through that country in 1977 on its way to South Africa and eventually Rhodesia. The shipment was said to have originated in the US.

Regulations Tightened Up

According to Bernard Feminella, special assistant to the director of the State Department's Office of Munitions Control, which must approve all arms export licenses, there has been a tightening up of procedures since the discovery of the illegal Olin sales.

For the first time, according to Feminella, importers of US arms must provide permits from their own governments showing that such governments approve of the arms'

importation. This is to prevent countries from being used as transshipment points.

These dealers must also give assurances that the weapons will not be resold to countries on the embargo list. In the past, according to Feminella, such assurances could be demanded but rarely were.

Penalties on importers for violations of the ban include being refused the right to import additional US goods. US companies can be punished by being denied export licenses.

According to Feminella, several investigations of illegal arms shipments currently are under way, but he declined to say if any involves South Africa.

One type of weapon which requires no State Department export license is the shotgun. Such guns are not regarded as arms, and require instead export licenses from the Commerce Department.

Since November 1977, according to Feminella, sales of shotguns to South Africa have been stopped, a fact verified by Commerce officials.

Smith Parties in New York

Security was tight all through Smith's visit to the US. He was constantly surrounded by Secret Service men and demonstrators often found themselves faced by hundreds of policemen. Attendance at the New York American-Rhodesian Association party was by invitation only—but a Southern Africa reporter found a way through the network to bring you this report.

Chirau and Muzorewa were greeted with polite applause. Sithole's joke about eating missionaries produced appreciative if restrained laughter.

But it was Ian Smith who brought the crowd of 250 to its feet, smiling, cheering, and clapping. And Smith, whose October 13 appearance in New York was part of a cross-country tour

aimed at bringing the "true facts" about Rhodesia to the American people, did not disappoint his American supporters.

In a campaign-style speech laced with references to the Free World and Marxist Communists, Smith attacked the Patriotic Front for trying to overthrow a government "which is recognized by the highest courts in our land," while maintaining that he has always been prepared to meet Mugabe and Nkomo at an all-parties conference.

To shouts of "hear, hear," Smith derided the notion of disbanding the current government's security forces, pledged his transitional government to maintaining "decent standards," and dismissed the British proposal to install a temporary commissioner as tantamount to turning the country over to a "socialist Labor Party dictator."

The crowd, mostly middle-aged, decidedly well-heeled, and all white with the exception of a couple of newsmen and those in the various Rhodesian entourages, appeared to love every minute of the Smith performance.

Obviously at home in the tasteful, wood-paneled surroundings of the Biltmore Hotel, sipping the single drinks to which their \$10 contributions to the sponsoring American-

Rhodesian Association entitled them, they seemed delighted at the opportunity to play-act the camaraderie and romantic stalwartness of their counterparts in Salisbury.

Under the good-spirited supervi-



Americans in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, protest Smith's visit outside US Embassy

Uhuru, Tanzania

sion of chairman Robert Morris and president Robin Moore, author of *The Green Berets* and self-styled US ambassador to Rhodesia, they chatted pleasantly with each other, crowded around Smith, and generally emitted a sense of collective eagerness to display a stiff upper lip.

Sometimes, the efforts at recreation got a little heavy-handed.

As Smith emerged prior to his speech to mingle with the crowd, one woman called out in a high-pitched voice, "Oh, he must have a sun-downer" (colonial for a cocktail or cocktail party). Behind the bar, several Latin-looking waiters, one wearing an "I Love New York" button, hastened to comply. (For the record, the Prime Minister takes Scotch and water, not too much ice.)

A minute later, while Farleigh-Dickenson University founder Peter Sammartino was offering Smith his services as an educational consultant, another admirer approached Smith to shake his hand.

Introducing himself as a longtime supporter, he announced dramatically, "You've held the bridge for a long time."

It was not possible, of course, to maintain the pretense completely. Aside from a gaggle of security men easily identified by the plastic buttons in their ears and the discomfiting reality represented by scattered black faces, the unseen presence of an estimated 2,000 demonstrators outside the hotel inevitably made itself felt.

Asked his feelings about the demonstrators, Smith replied, "I'm told one can hire these people by the day. I understand there are a lot of people unemployed so I'm glad to see them with work, but I do think they could be better employed."

Elsewhere, left, as it were, to the crumbs of the crowd, Bishop Muzorewa, shunning his clerical garb for a blue suit and blue patent leather shoes, was accosted by a Black columnist for *News World*.

The columnist, exasperated at length at the bishop's tortured defense of plans for reserving a certain number of seats in the new Parliament for whites, retorted with a dry, "Stop kidding me."

In the end, however, there was no denying that the evening was a triumph of illusion over fact for both Rhodesian and American racists.

For one night, time was suspended, blacks were properly subdued, and the company at the club was first-class. □



Visa For Smith

The State Department's inept handling of the decision on whether to grant Ian Smith a visa brought anger from both the right and the left.

The invitation from 27 conservative southern and western Senators on September 22nd to Ndabaningi Sithole and Ian Smith to come to the United States put President Carter in a difficult political position. Senate conservatives had already seized the initiative during the summer, forcing the Administration to sign into law a provision which conditionally lifted sanctions, pending a willingness on the part of the Rhodesian government to attend an all-parties conference and the holding of free elections. Now they argued that rejection of Smith's visa would mean Carter was against "free speech." Granting Smith a visa promised the Administration a week of propaganda in this country against its own stated policy.

Extended debate before the visa was granted October 4 left the Administration open to criticism from both sides. By September 27, Senator Hayakawa of California, the principal Senate inviter, was accusing the State Department of "spinelessness and helpless pusillanimity" for its delaying tactics. Five days earlier, President Carter had told reporters that "my guess is that the State Department would approve the visas." But three days later, a State Department spokesman told reporters that Smith would not be granted a visa "at this time," only to be followed the next day by a second Department statement that the visa application was still pending.

The conservatives' invitation got unanimous support from the establishment media. A *Washington Post* editorial on October 4th said the State Department should grant the visa on "exceptional humanitarian grounds" since Smith is "trying to end a bitter war." What is at stake, the editorial said, was whether the US "has the whites' legitimate interests at heart." The *Washington Star's* editorial made the incredible statement that

Smith was important because "he, alone, stands above the swirl of tribal rivalries in Rhodesia."

National black political figures were almost unanimously against Smith's coming. TransAfrica, a new black lobby in Washington, organized a letter to Carter protesting the visa as granting "tacit endorsement" to the internal settlement. The letter was signed by Congressional Black Caucus chairman Parren Mitchell, NAACP President Benjamin Hooks, Rev. Jesse Jackson of PUSH, Vernon Jordan of the National Urban League, Harry Belafonte, and Rev. Leon Sullivan among others. TransAfrica also unsuccessfully challenged the visa in court, on the grounds that its granting violated international sanctions. Rep. Charles Diggs, however, cabled approval of the visa to Carter, urging a Camp David-type conference on Zimbabwe while Smith was here.

Spokesmen from the State Department's Africa Bureau, admitted privately that granting Smith a visa damaged American standing with the front line states and the Patriotic Front. This was quickly born out when ZANU leader Robert Mugabe said one day after Smith's arrival in Washington that he no longer regards the Carter Administration as "impartial" in the Zimbabwe negotiations. Leaders of Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria immediately protested the Carter Administration's granting of the visa.

The State Department hoped to be able to please everyone by allowing Smith to come to the US and then arranging a negotiating session while he was here. One State Department source said that State asked Jesse Helms, one of the key members of the group of 27 which invited Smith, whether he would object to the Department also inviting Nkomo to come to the US. The answer was "no." Representatives of both ZANU and ZAPU said they would not participate in a conference in the US. Another source indicated that both Nkomo and Mugabe had been invited to come. While State held up the visa decision, it tried to clear the idea of a conference with the front-line states, but was apparently unsuccessful. The US still wants to set up an all-parties conference but Smith's US visit has exposed yet further the fundamental Washington refusal to abandon some form of constant intervention on his behalf, which is certain to reinforce African caution in approaching such a meeting. □

Seeking Some Peace To Grow In



Presidents Neto and Machel embrace in Maputo. While seeking economic aid from West, Angola maintains its solidarity with progressive states building socialism. In September President Neto made an important state visit to Mozambique.

The potentially fragile reconciliation negotiated this summer between President Neto and his northern neighbor, President Mobutu of Zaire, appears so far to have yielded some positive effects for Angola.

Angola and Zaire signed a series of diplomatic and commercial accords in August and have subsequently held continuing discussions on issues such as the reopening of the Benguela railway line. This line used to provide the quickest and cheapest export route for Zairian (and Zambian) minerals, and the hard-pressed Zaire

economy would benefit from its early reopening.

Angola's principal aim had been to bring peace to its thousand-mile-long Zairian border, which had been the object since 1976 of constant attacks from anti-MPLA factions. The attacks ceased almost immediately following the signing of the agreements.

Viewed from Luanda, the Angola-Zaire settlement, coupled with Angola's support for the UN-sponsored peace plan in Namibia, was intended to bring a tranquility to

Angola's borders that it had not enjoyed since gaining independence in November 1975. The subsequent apparent collapse of the Namibia plan means that the prospects for peace on Angola's southern border remain uncertain. Angolan support given to the Western-backed plan after meetings in Luanda both with US officials and front line state leaders had played a key role in gaining SWAPO participation. But even before the South African withdrawal from the plan, Luanda officials had expressed the need to treat any Pretoria "commit-

ment" with caution.

"If the decisions made in Luanda on the Namibia question are not fully respected," remarked Neto in mid-September, "if there isn't honesty, principally from Pretoria, the consequences will certainly be grave for the entire world. And the countries of Western Europe as well as the US will bear alone the full responsibility."

Despite some continuing tension in the south, for the time being the calm now prevailing in northern Angola is reflected throughout the nation.

Prisoners-of-war Exchanges

There have been some indications that Pretoria and Luanda may be seeking at least a truce in their relations. Within weeks of the signing of the Zaire accords, Angola and South Africa announced the exchange of prisoners-of-war held since the South African invasion of Angola in 1975, and the *Washington Post* reported that the Angolan government had asked the giant South African diamond mining company, De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. for help in reorganizing its troubled diamond industry.

Eight South Africans were released from Luanda jails September 2 and exchanged, under the auspices of the International Red Cross, for three Cuban soldiers that South Africa had held captive.

Upon their release, the South African prisoners told the South African press that they had been held in prisons staffed mainly by Cubans. All eight praised the treatment they received from the Cubans. "They treated us like people, not enemies," said one South African. "At all times their treatment of us was correct." Their Cuban guards even held a party with the prisoners when they were informed of the repatriation plans.

The South Africans said the food had been adequate. "It was not what we were used to," one remarked. "We shared food with our Cuban guards."

South Africa's treatment of those Cubans it held was apparently equally humane. The three Cubans released in the exchange were held in Pretoria where they were permitted to go shopping and see films and sporting events, according to the *Johannesburg Star*.

But South Africa had taken many more than three Cuban and MPLA soldiers prisoner. After the prisoner exchange, a South African Defense Force spokesperson revealed that South African military authorities

had turned over all, save the three Cubans, who needed special medical care, to UNITA. South Africa had claimed for more than a year that it had invaded Angola in October 1975 only to give limited support to UNITA forces. "It was never our responsibility to take and keep prisoners," the spokesperson said. The fate of those prisoners turned over to UNITA is not known.

Angola still holds one South African soldier who was taken prisoner by SWAPO earlier this year.

Political Prisoners Released

Two weeks later Neto made another startling announcement. In a speech in Cabinda September 15, the Angolan president declared that most of the country's political prisoners would be released. Some former members of the MPLA, who supported factions known as "Active Revolt," and "Revolt of the East" have been held in detention for almost four years. Neto stated that they would be freed, as well as hundreds who collaborated with the FNLA and FLEC and hundreds who supported a 1977 anti-MPLA coup.

Neto emphasized that the release of the former political opponents is part of the effort to bring about a greater degree of internal unity and a genuine peace with neighbor states such as Zaire. Those being released, he said, would go free and "contribute, as certainly they themselves desire, to the reconstruction of the country."

Speaking about continuing security problems, however, the president condemned South Africa for its support of anti-MPLA activity by UNITA, and made no mention of freeing UNITA collaborators, stressing instead that the government would be hard on those waging armed combat in the country.

Western Links

At the same time, Angola has seized on this apparent lull in Western hostility to initiate some relationships with Western nations that it sees as beneficial to the development of its economy.

The industrial infrastructure that the Portuguese colonialists left behind in Angola was based exclusively on imported technology from Western Europe and the US. Now Angolan officials see as important the establishment of commercial relationships with the West to reconstruct those sectors of the economy abandoned or badly damaged in the war.

From this point of view, it is not surprising that Luanda should have opened its doors to Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonnet, the first Western government minister to visit Angola since its independence. Simonnet spent five days in Angola in mid-September. Afterward he said that the Angolan president has asked Belgium for help in arranging accreditation to the European Common Market with the eventual aim of Angola's joining the Lome Convention. The convention is the Common Market's treaty with developing countries that seek cooperation with the Western trading system.

Western reports have generally taken the view that Simonnet's visit and Angola's subsequent overtures toward the European Common Market are ample evidence that Angola is trying to shake its "dependence" on socialist countries. "With the recent establishment of relations with Zaire, the meeting between President Neto and President [of Portugal] Ramalho Eanes in Bissau, and the visit to our country of the Belgian Foreign Minister, there is a certain tendency to interpret these facts as our moving closer to the West," remarked Angola's Foreign Minister, Paulo Jorge. Jorge said that these acts were nothing more than "our government carrying out the principles of its foreign policy, corresponding to the necessity of diversification of foreign relations."

Thus at the same time that Angola was exploring commercial relations with the Belgian Foreign Minister, the Central Committee of the MPLA Worker's Party announced the passage of new laws governing the exploitation in Angola of oil and natural gas. Declaring all petroleum and gas reserves "the property of the Angolan people," the new law gives the state company Sonangol the exclusive right to their exploitation. It will be up to Sonangol to decide which, if any, foreign firms will aid Angola in the development of its petroleum industry.

Two foreign companies, Gulf Oil and the Belgian firm Petrofina, are already extracting Angolan oil. Sonangol announced in late September that it will take over a 51% share in Cabinda Gulf Oil. Previously Gulf owned 100% of its Cabinda operation and paid the government of Angola more than half a billion dollars a year in royalties.

Angola has also decided to create a separate Ministry of Petroleum, it was announced. □

book reviews

Let Freedom Come: Africa in Modern History, by Basil Davidson, Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, 1978, 431 pp., \$12.50.

Those seeking deeper perspective on Africa in today's world will welcome *Let Freedom Come: Africa in Modern History*, by Basil Davidson. Davidson, whose numerous works on Africa have been penetrating as well as pioneering, has made a concentrated effort to develop an analytical model that explains why Africa seems to be in a constant state of upheaval and change in the twentieth century. Davidson describes the interplay of historical events, ethnic customs, and socio-economic formations within a framework based on "structure" and "contingency"—or, in Davidson's own comparison, the interplay of the river's flow (contingency) with the river's bed (structure).

Davidson begins by noting that the "history of modern Africa is above all a history of the ideas and development of nationalism through the twentieth century." He seeks to integrate this with a discussion of the way in which the control over land, labor and resource distribution evolved. The nature of this control, the basis of colonialism, is a structural determinant in Africa's modern history, and the rise of nationalism is a response to its restrictions.

Davidson speculates that by the mid-nineteenth century, "African society greatly needed modernizing and reorganizing" to deal with the internal problems and external civilizations. The seeds of Africa's twentieth century were planted in this period. By the early years of this century, previously agrarian subsistence economies had been coerced by several centuries of European interaction into serving alien needs as they evolved into commercial trade/export economies. As a result, the precolonial African community, which provided the individual a moral and psychological identity, ceased to exist.

The precolonial economies in Africa were based on subsistence production and exchange and had proved capable of large and continuous expansion. Capitalism was unable to develop in Africa as the Europeans desired because, as Davidson notes, African markets "could be sufficiently supplied without it." Consequently, beliefs and practices that corresponded to one type of economic system, capitalism, could not be easily imposed in Africa, which had its own indigenous economic and social structures.

Europe's attempt to impose its own system not only interrupted Africa's own historical evolution but also unleashed a dynamic whose transforming energy has not yet been fully realized. Davidson asserts that Africa's response is found in the earliest forms of nationalism. While many African communities resisted colonial intrusion by force of arms, the early twentieth century in Africa was also an era of protest that spread the awareness of the need for a reconstituted African community.

Individuals such as Harry Thuku of Kenya formed the Young Kikuyu Association in 1921 and staged mass-supported protests against colonial passes and taxes, planting the earliest seeds of mass-supported nationalism. In South Africa, radical ideas were also at work with the founding of the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party. Bolstered by the growth of newspapers, cultural alliances, and the influence of Africans educated in Western Europe, the desire for a nation-state on the European model had become a universal aim by 1945.

By this time European methods of colonial economic domination were at their height. Davidson chronicles such practices as enforced taxation and "contract labor," which was based on coercion and ethnic separation of rural workers.

In this environment, many Africans gave up rural subsistence farming to become "under-employed" in the economic main-

stream. By the 1930s production was geared for an externally controlled export market, which had the effect of weakening ancestral charters, dismantling African communities and introducing an auxiliary form of capitalism.

Seeking Alternatives

The political expression of Africa's socio-economic turmoil in the first half of the twentieth century was the effort to gain independence on the European parliamentary model. France and Britain agreed to political decolonization as they realized they could retain economic control over the new countries. Portugal did not decolonize because it was itself an underdeveloped country and thus dependent on direct control over the resources of its colonies. Belgium fluctuated over decolonization in the Congo (Zaire) to the point of disaster.

Some African leaders dismissed the "Westminster model" early on in the 1960s. Sekou Toure in Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Modibo Keita in Mali were among the pioneers who sought to develop a one-party state attuned to the post-colonial needs of the African situation. Unfortunately, these experiments often resulted in the creation of a no-party state as autocratic leaders placed ethnic or class interests in front of national needs.

For others such as Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Houphouët-Boigny in the Ivory Coast, at one time outspoken critics of colonialism, independence was the end of the struggle. They initiated development strategies closely tied, if not determined, by their colonial connections, thereby introducing a neo-colonial situation. In these states modernization was based on the promotion of a property-owning middle class at the expense of the predominant rural population. The series of coups in the 1960s and 1970s was based on factions eager to benefit from the fragile arrangements of national power rather than those willing to change

the power structure itself—with notable exceptions.

As the gap between the ruling elite and the masses became larger and more evident, a new political pattern began to develop—that of mass participation. Davidson has discussed this development, the politics of liberation, in other books.

Davidson discusses attempts by countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola and Guinea-Bissau to transform the society that they inherited from the colonial era, on the basis of an indigenized Marxist view. This transformation primarily revolves around the relationship between the party and the state, with the national party functioning as a democratic system of organization and mass participation from the villages to the central government. Single party democracies, in Davidson's view, can be effective in Africa as they are based on "the rich diversity of African culture [which becomes] a source of strength."

Davidson suggests that as the politics of liberation—in essence a revolutionary nationalism—become further refined it will imply a unity between African people greater than reciprocal relations between national governments. This would be a "unity that would mark the supercession of the frontiers of colonial partition, the threshold of a new era and the onset of a new history." Such a development would mean another profound and revolutionary transformation—not only in the way that African people produce for each other, but the role that they play in world events. □

—Witney Schneidman

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Branford, Jean. *A Dictionary of South African English*, Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Gerhart, Gail M. *Black Power in South Africa, The Evolution of an Ideology*. University of California Press, 1978, \$14.50.
- Jordan, A.C. (editor and translator). *Tales from South Africa*, University of California Press, 1978, \$12.50 (hb), \$3.95 (paper).
- Palmer, Robin and Parsons, Neil. *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, University of California Press, 1977, \$16.50 (hb), \$5.95 (paper).
- Seidman, Ann and Seidman, Neva. *South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations*, Lawrence Hill & Co., 1978, \$4.95 (paper).
- Turner, Richard. *The Eye of the Needle, Toward Participatory Democracy in South Africa*, Orbis Books, 1978, \$5.95 (paper).

action news notes



Demonstrating against Smith in New York

Nationwide Protests Greet Smith

Ian Smith's visit to the US sparked protests that hounded him wherever he showed up. On Saturday, October 7, the day Smith entered the country by way of Kennedy Airport, 300 demonstrators massed near the UN to hear speakers from ZANU, ZAPU, ANC (SA) and liberation support movement representatives. The action was followed by a march through mid-Manhattan.

Then on Monday, October 9, as Smith met with government leaders, close to 1,000, mostly blacks, demonstrated in front of the White House, demanding "No to US

military and economic aid to Rhodesia" and "No to the internal settlement."

Later that day, the DC forces delayed for two hours Smith's arrival at a reception attended by chief American Rhodesia apologist Robin Moore and ex-mercenary Mike Williams.

On Tuesday, more demonstrators protested before another Smith reception. The DC actions were led by a coalition of South Africa support groups called People for a Just Solution in Southern Africa.

Wednesday was marked by a highly spirited demonstration when Smith spoke to the prestigious National Press Club. Some 100 demonstrators forced Smith to flee to his car while his bodyguards were pelted with eggs and other objects.

Friday the 13th, Smith returned to New York and had to cross a picket line of about 100 people protesting his presence at the *Newsweek* building where he was visiting with the editors. When he emerged later he found a few hundred chanting protesters, buttressed by a force of about 1,000 helmeted city police and other security forces. A group of about 50 dogged Smith as he met with the Council on Foreign Relations and reportedly spoke with Nelson Rockefeller.

Later that evening, the coalition of more than 50 groups that had been orchestrating the New York demos, brought out hundreds of people for a rousing, militant demonstration outside another reception thrown for their chief by Robin Moore and company.

Demonstrators were rallied by strong anti-Smith chanting and speeches from ZANU, PAC, NY liberation support movement representatives and Brooklyn black minister, Rev. Herbert Daughtry. Daughtry, who has galvanized the black NY community in a continuing struggle with the city administration over local racism, was also supported by the presence of members of the city-wide Black United Front, whose placards read "Down with Smith," "Zimbabwe yes, Rhodesia no," "We support Nkomo, Mugabe, and Daughtry."

The demonstration itself produced typical city racism when some members of the massive police force present attacked a group of Black United Front demonstrators who had separated from the main body. Reportedly, at least three of their

number were beaten. Among the injured, according to BUF spokespeople, were two ministers from Rev. Daughtry's church.

The West Coast and the South were no friendlier places for Smith to visit. In Los Angeles, Smith was booed by a crowd of 1200 Monday night, October 16, outside a dinner given in his behalf. Chanting "Ian Smith must go" "Zimbabwe will be free", the demonstrators burned the rebel leader in effigy. Speaking at the demonstration were Jane Fonda, a ZANU spokesperson and a representative of the International Longshoremen's Union.

San Francisco challenged Smith with a protest march and rally and in Atlanta, Georgia, several hundred black people marched through the downtown area, chanting and singing denunciations of his visit, then rallied at a city park to listen to Mayor Maynard Jackson and other local leaders condemn Smith's visit and support liberation for Zimbabwe. □

MERCENARIES UNDER ATTACK

...A major anti-mercenary campaign, focussing on American mercenaries in Zimbabwe, is getting underway in San Francisco. The Southern Africa Solidarity Committee (SASC) is organizing the effort which already has brought together a Southern Africa anti-mercenary coalition in the Bay area.

The campaign will be targeting the role of the US government and *Soldier of Fortune* magazine in providing and protecting Americans who fight for the Rhodesian regime.

SASC recently completed an anti-mercenary slide show which will soon be available for outreach and mobilization. This valuable media tool comprehensively handles the American governmental involvement and cover-up, the recruiting network, the role of *Soldier of Fortune*, collaboration between the US military and the Rhodesian military, and the actual operation of American mercenaries in Zimbabwe. Also included is good background material on the national liberation war, conditions in Rhodesia, and western strategic designs and interests.

SASC welcomes any information on the merc apparatus generally and the California connection specifically. Write:

Southern Africa Solidarity Committee
660 Elizabeth St.
San Francisco, CA 94114



WW/Paddy Colligan

continued from page 9

were involved in "what appears to be illegal mercenary recruiting activity" for Rhodesia, as reported in the Support Committee's study. "We have since learned," said the ministers in a letter quoted in the report, "that the 12th Special Forces is a 'Green Beret' reserve unit."

Green Berets and Crippled Eagles

Another important figure in the Rhodesian mercenary network is Robin Moore, author of *The Green Berets* and *The French Connection*. Moore, a Sheraton heir, has established two institutions to promote the mercenary war and the Salisbury regime. The first is a mansion in Salisbury that Moore opened last summer as the unofficial "American embassy." It serves as a social and political center for American and other foreign mercs serving with the Rhodesians.

His other base is the Crippled Eagles Foundation, of Marina del Rey, California, which lobbies on behalf of Smith's internal settlement and raises money to support Moore's pro-Rhodesian activities.

One ex-merc was even emboldened to run for Congress. Major Mike Williams, a Special Forces captain in Vietnam and a former commanding officer in the Rhodesian infantry, was defeated in the Democratic primary in Florida's first district this fall.

"One is forced to conclude," says Rhodesia-watcher Professor Richard Lobban, "that the presence of

American mercenaries in Rhodesia is simply an unacknowledged portion of the American foreign policy for that nation."

Invading Mozambique

"Foreign soldiers form a crucial part of Rhodesia's defense system, especially near the Mozambique area," admitted a French merc deserter to *Le Nouvel Observateur*. According to this and other sources, American soldiers have been deployed mainly along the strategic eastern regions of the country. "One day," recalled the French deserter who was recruited in 1977, "the General Staff ordered a DC-3 to Mozambique to recover sabotage commandoes. The plane was flown by an American."

Patriotic Front sources confirm that many Americans in Rhodesia have been operating as pilots for the Rhodesian forces. The infamous airborne raids on the refugee camps at Chimoio, Mozambique in late 1976 which left more than 100 dead—mostly women and children—included American pilots on the bombing runs, Front sources reveal.

At least two Americans have admitted to participating in raids into Mozambique. Keith Nelson, a Special Forces veteran from Illinois, admitted to the *Chicago Daily News* that he had fought in Mozambique from Rhodesia and said that he went to Rhodesia because he loved military adventure.

Frank Sweeney confessed to the

Christian Science Monitor that he had participated in raids on Mozambique from Rhodesia. On his return to the US, Sweeney placed ads in *Shotgun News* asking "young Americans of European ancestry to write for free details pertaining to recruiting."

US Racism

American mercenaries, who operate in bands, according to Soldier of Fortune, have a reputation for particular viciousness.

The French deserter reported that he left because he "got tired of rifle-butting villagers in the mouth who were no more rebels than I was." No American has made such a statement, although some have deserted.

Racism and a violent fear of "communism" seem motive forces for the mercs who go to Rhodesia. Their activities reflect the continuing power of racism in the US. Young blacks in every ghetto still run the risk of being shot by an edgy white policeman; black inequality before so-called justice still runs rife.

US mercenaries refer to Zimbabwe's freedom fighters as "terrs" (terrorists). They seem not to see people, only targets, a view which has most certainly been reinforced by the fact that many of them have been fighting and killing non-white people across the Third World with impunity for the last twenty years.

It is not surprising that many, in the words of a Rhodesian official, "find adjustment to civilian life difficult" and relating to the people in a national liberation war impossible.

Yet as noted above, there have been desertions and they will undoubtedly rise, particularly as the coming rainy season favors guerrilla warfare. Most of the countryside is now liberated or hotly contested. One Rhodesian businessman recently admitted to the *Wall Street Journal* that "three quarters of the country is out of control." In this context, the reported Western plan to double the merc forces becomes increasingly significant to the life of the Rhodesian regime.

Yet, in spite of such aid, the words of the French merc deserter are perhaps prophetic: "In comparison to what I have heard, I found the guerrillas' potential to fight to be very high, much better than what we have been told. And I am sure that it is rising. After what I saw, what with the combativeness of the guerrillas, I think the Rhodesians are done for."

YOU CAN NOT EXTINGUISH THE INTENSE FLAME OF LIFE

RIGHT

1979

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1
9	10	11	12	13	14	15		
16	17	18	19	20	21	22		
23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
30								

DO YOUR HOLIDAY SHOPPING EARLY. Africa Fund is selling the 1979 South Africa Freedom Calendar now. Twelve individual posters in their original vivid colors. These dramatic works of art were selected from the entries in the first nationwide anti-apartheid poster contest. Produced by the American Committee on Africa in cooperation with the United Nations Center Against Apartheid. Proceeds to The Africa Fund for aid to the victims of colonialism and apartheid. \$5 each. Bulk discount: 5-9 calendars, 20% off; 10-19, 30% off; 20 or more, 35% off. The Africa Fund, 305 East 46th St., New York, NY 10017.

BA YE ZWA
The People Live
 Judy Seidman

Ba Ye Zwa is a penetrating portrait of life under apartheid in South Africa. Through the use of drawings, poems, folk songs, newspaper clippings and narrative, Judy Seidman presents to the reader a seldom seen picture of South African black culture—its resistance to white domination, and its embodiment of black dignity. The uniqueness of this pictorial study is that it is able to maintain this emphasis on the culture, language, and history of the blacks, while providing a comprehensive account of the political and economic structures that perpetuate the racist system of apartheid—the passbooks, the mines, the multinationals, the Bantustans, the schools.

"This book is memorable, urgent, and important."
 —*Basil Davidson*

\$4.50/13.00

**U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
 IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

Edited by Western Mass. ACAS

U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa explains and documents: how the U.S. has developed a rapid strike force capacity in the Indian Ocean; the role of the U.S. in facilitating the transfer of nuclear technology to S.A. with the potential for nuclear weapons use; the role of the CIA in covert operations in southern Africa; how the racist regimes are coming to rely ever more heavily on mercenaries to fight their wars and run their war machines; the specific mechanism by which airplanes have been illegally imported in South Africa; how the U.S. multinationals and government have systematically violated the U.N. arms embargo.

"An important contribution to understanding the United States' central role in maintaining white rule in South Africa.

—*James Turner and Immanuel Wallerstein*

\$5.00/12.00

South End Press is an activist publishing collective committed to publishing books which can aid people's day-to day struggles to control their lives. Help yourself and us—order directly—20% off for one to four copies, and 35% off for five or more copies. Please include \$.50 for postage and handling of the first book and \$.15 for each additional book up to \$1.00 total.

SOUTH END PRESS BOX 68 ASTOR STATION BOSTON MA 02123

**Africa
 Liberation
 Calendar
 1979**



Poetry, quotes
 complement colorful
 photos and drawings.
 10" X 14"

**LSM Press, P.O. Box 2077
 Oakland, Ca 94604, USA**

\$3.45

**book
 marks**

The new Bookmarks (#2) describes over 100 new and little-known books about:

**The Third World
 The Left • Imperialism
 Economics • Europe
 Feminism. . . . & more**

Look for it in all radical and feminist bookstores, or send \$1 for two copies to Carrier Pigeon, 88 Fisher Ave., Boston, Mass. 02120.

**GIVE GIFT
SUBSCRIPTIONS TO
SOUTHERN
AFRICA**

Southern Africa is in the news. Keep your friends up-to-date each month by giving them gift subscriptions to *Southern Africa* magazine.

The first subscription, either for yourself or a friend, is \$10 per year.

Each subscription after that is only \$8. In addition, we'll start the subscriptions in January and send you or your friends the December year-end round-up issue of *Southern Africa* free.

So subscribe now.

Please send the one sub @ \$10 to: And send additional gift subscriptions @ \$8 to:

Name _____	Name _____	Name _____
Address _____	Address _____	Address _____
_____	_____	_____
City State Zip	City State Zip	City State Zip

Southern Africa Committee
156 Fifth Avenue
Room 707
New York, NY 10010

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
NEW YORK, N.Y.
PERMIT NO.1613

6
Northwestern Univ Lib
Serials Dept
Evanston IL 60201

12/78