


GM's Contingency Plan for South African 'Unrest':
Private Commandos to Protect Plants — see document, page 3

VOLUME XI NUMBER 5

SOUTHERN AFRICA

JUNE/JULY 1978

\$1



Student Divestiture
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
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
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SOUTHERN AFRICA

VOLUME XI NUMBER 5

JUNE/JULY 1978

ISSN 0038-3775

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Southern Africa is published monthly, except for July-August, when bi-monthly, by the Southern Africa Committee, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10010.


Subscriptions: Individual (domestic and foreign)/\$8.00; Institutional/\$18.00; Airmail: Africa, Asia, Europe/\$20.50; South and Central America/\$17.50.

Southern Africa is available on microfilm through University Microfilm, Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Mich. 68206, and is listed in the Alternative Press Index.


Distributors: Delhi Distributors, c/o NRS Books, 1181 Amsterdam Ave., New York, NY 10027; Carrier Pigeon, 88 Fisher Avenue, Boston, MA 02120; Third World Distributors, 100 Worcester St., Boston, MA 02118; Liberation Information Distribution Co., 1622 New Jersey Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20001; Guild News Agency, 1118 W. Armitage Ave., Chicago, IL 60614

COVER: Students demonstrate at Princeton. / *Blanca Rivera*

Contents



- 2 **GM'S CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN UNREST**
 - PRIVATE COMMANDOS TO PROTECT PLANTS
 - 3 GM SOUTH AFRICAN - CONTINGENCY PLAN IN EVENT OF SERIOUS CIVIL UNREST
 - 5 ATTACHMENT "B"
- 8 **SPECIAL REPORTS**
 - 8 'BREAK ALL TIES ...'
STUDENT MOVEMENT ESCALATES
 - 10 CIA AGENT REVEALS U.S. ROLE IN ANGOLA
- 12 **SOUTH AFRICA**
 - 12 'IDLE BANTUS' AND 'PLURAL DEVELOPMENT'
CHANGING THE NAME BUT KEEPING THE SYSTEM
 - 14 POLITICAL TRIAL BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
- 16 **CULTURE**
 - 16 BLACK AS I AM
- 19 **INTERVIEW**
 - 19 HEALTH CARE FOR THE NEW ZIMBABWE
- 21 **ZIMBABWE**
 - 21 A NEW WAVE OF TERROR
 - 23 CRACKS IN NEW REGIME
- 25 **NAMIBIA**
 - 25 SOUTH AFRICA LAUNCHES ATTACKS ON SWAPO IN ANGOLA
 - 26 SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACK KNOCKS OUT SETTLEMENT TALKS
- 28 **MOZAMBIQUE**
 - 28 FLOODING IN THE ZAMBEZI RIVER VALLEY
- 29 **UNITED STATES**
 - 29 NAMIBIA POLICY LEAVES CORPORATIONS UNCHECKED
 - 31 WASHINGTON NOTES
- 15 **OVERVIEW**
- 18 **UPDATE**
- 32 **LETTERS**
 - 'TIME SURE FLIES BY FAST WHEN YOU ARE HAVING FUN ...'
 - U.S. MERC WRITES HOME
- 32 **ACTION NEWS NOTES**



GM's Contingency Plans For South African 'Unrest'

Private Commandos to Protect Plants

In May 1978 *Southern Africa* obtained copies of secret General Motors Corporation documents which reveal detailed company plans for dealing with what it termed "civil unrest" in South Africa. The contingency plans involve close collaboration with the South African government, its military and police, and expose GM's total identification with white interests in the face of a potential black challenge to the apartheid system.

The plans appear to have been developed following on the nationwide explosion of black resistance after the Soweto uprising in 1976. On May 6, 1977, the then managing director of General Motors South Africa forwarded to D. Martin, assistant regional director for Africa in the US, a summary outlining the background and the basic plant protection measures developed to meet any possibility of civil unrest.

To preserve secrecy, the package was hand delivered from South Africa to Detroit.

On July 20, 1977, L. H. Wilking, the new GMSA managing director sent a further memo and the outline of a second contingency plan to Martin.

General Motors has over \$150 million invested in two plants in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. In 1977 it employed 1,744 whites, 1,464 Coloureds and 432 Africans. An early signature of the Sullivan principles, GM has long defended its role in South Africa as contributing to progressive social change.

Hostility to Change

The contingency plans expose the dishonesty of that claim.

GM indicates its profound hostility to any real challenge to apartheid in the documents. It believes that any period of civil unrest will involve a conflict between black and white, in which company interests will be the same as

those of the whites—who will thus logically provide both civilian, police and military security in the plant.

The documents stress that in periods of unrest the GM management will rely on what it euphemistically refers to as "the law enforcement authorities," in other words the police and army.

In an expression of frank racism (and political ignorance) GM also assures its US parent that blacks in South Africa are unlikely to sustain their struggle for any length of time because they traditionally "lack purpose." As for the degree of repression that might be involved in crushing the people's actions, GM chooses to refer to this as "strict social sanctions."

Key Point Status

The strategic importance of GM to the current South African system is revealed by the designation of GM facilities as National Key Points under the government's "overall contingency plan" within the framework of the Civil Defence Act No. 39 of 1966.

Such designation means that in periods of emergency the South African government would take over all responsibility for the security of the plant. It is already supervising security standards on a day to day basis, with full company collaboration.

Hanging In

GM would be willing to continue operations even with black workers under military or police duress, and would cooperate with the government to meet "imposed requirements," i.e. produce what the government told it to.

Summarizing the potential situation the company says:

At the point when government takes action in terms of the Civil Defence Act No. 39 of 1966, such as in the form of placing a military presence

on the property...all aspects of security will fall under their control.

Even at this point GM would feel no compulsion to cease operations. It appears that only at the point where the Ministry of Defence actually sought to take over the plant would GM feel compelled to at least examine the question as to whether this situation was acceptable.

Military Implications

There is one obvious gap in the GM document—the military implications of continuing a South African operation.

GM only refers obliquely to this question when it reports that

GM South Africa has, for example, been requested to supply vehicles such as the K25, K31, 4x4 LUV for Defence Force purposes and refusal to offer such might be interpreted as reflecting doubt on the motives of the Company.

By continuing to operate inside South Africa the corporation must inevitably feed into South African defense needs, even if it avoids making overt military equipment. Troop carriers, four wheel vehicles, light trucks—all these are essential for a mobile army.

Importance of Documents

Southern Africa is publishing major extracts from these documents because they provide a crucial insight into the nature and extent of the links that bind US corporations operating in South Africa to the repressive South African state.

It seems that the only way those links can be broken is for US companies to get out of South Africa. Thus the GM contingency plan provides one of the most powerful arguments yet advanced for the immediate withdrawal of US corporations from South Africa.

GM South African—Contingency Plan In Event of Serious Civil Unrest

Introduction:

South African industry in general is poorly prepared to handle industrial disruption and civil unrest.

The task of containing any such action is vested in the South African Police with the tacitly acknowledged availability of military support should a situation warrant it.

Although a Civil Defence Act was passed in Parliament in 1966 it is only over the past few years that any degree of attention has been given to the concept of Civil Defence in the principal centres of the country. Control centres and organizations have been established in urban areas and a basic communication network exists and is being further developed.

Industries or services designated as National Key Points by the National Key Point Committee will be accorded protection in emergencies through the medium of the Citizen Force Commando system. Within this concept, plant personnel have had military training and who still have training commitments to meet are encouraged by the authorities to volunteer to join a local Commando unit. One or more such units would, for example, have responsibility for the respective General Motors' plants.

As all White male South African citizens up to age 65 years are liable for military service in terms of the Defence Act a Reserve call-up would supplement these citizen force units in a case of national emergency.

Thus the "GM Commando" would assume guarding responsibility for the GM plants and would fall under the control of the local military authority for the duration of the emergency. It is envisaged, for example, that plant personnel could be engaged in a composite function, i.e. part normal work and part guard duty in such situations.

It should be noted that in terms of the S.A. Defence Act as presently written, compulsory military service is applicable only to White male citizens. The concept of utilizing plant personnel in a dual function is related to the fact that key skills, technical and managerial expertise are concentrated in the same population group from which defence requirements must be drawn.

SECTION 1


Key Point Status:

General Motors' facilities at Kempston Road and Aloes have been designated National Key Points in the overall South African contingency plan.

The security rating at both locations is indicated as being 70% of desired standard. Surveys have been carried out at both plant locations by the authorities and it is expected that recommendations to bring the security rating up to 100% will follow shortly.

It is indicated that as the proposed level is not unreasonable and in the best interests of the company, these will be carried out as a matter of self interest. The National Key Point Committee has powers under the Civil Defence Act No. 39 of 1966 to enforce the improvement of security arrangements and to recover the costs from the company concerned.

Each designated undertaking will be inspected from time to time by the appropriate authorities to re-assess the standard of security.



GM Memo

It is specifically pointed out that (in the case of GM South African) the Managing Director is entirely responsible at all times for the security of the undertaking against subversion, espionage and sabotage.

When an emergency occurs and on the decision of the appropriate Command/Police authorities concerned, GM South African plants will be guarded against external threat.

No definition has been provided to date regarding the point at which civil unrest would be considered to severe enough to be classified as an emergency. It is felt, however, that such action would not be taken unless there was a direct threat to a key point industry.

SECTION 2

Basic Plant Protection Plan:

Proposed action to be adopted in case of civil unrest or emergency affecting GM South African plants—

The following plan outline is based on self-help action in the event of civil unrest or industrial interruption assuming emergency proportions. It is designed to deal with such situations under day shift plant operation, partial occupancy of premises and almost vacant plants.

Wider coverage will be necessary to provide equivalent controls and services should unrest continue over an extended period or full plant operation.

Objectives —

1. To protect lives and property;
2. To preserve the organizational structure; and
3. To assure continuity or the early resumption of production.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The section proceeds with a vulnerability analysis pointing out external weaknesses such as the "close proximity of the Kempston Road Plant to the non-white townships," the "isolation of the engine plant," the "large number of ex-employees, unemployed, with a sound knowledge of factory layouts." Internal weaknesses include the "lack of identification of employees (identity cards issued but not of the pin-on visible type)" and the accessibility of water supplies, communications, electrical cables, vital records and data processing.

Action Plan

Initial action to be taken by Plant Protection in the event of a riot or civil unrest developing as a threat to GMSA property will be the formation of a Management Advisory Committee. The Plant Protection Manager will act as Co-ordinator of Disaster Planning.

In the event of a direct threat to GM South African plants, the action by the Co-ordinator or his Deputy and all Plant Protection personnel on duty at the time, will be as follows:

1. Close all gates and foyer entrances and regulate traffic
2. Place Danert wire to secure the low front wall in front of the main administration block
3. Arm Security Staff
4. Man armed observation posts at strategic points throughout the threatened plant
5. Maintain a detachment of Security staff at the Control Centre with transport and dogs to act as directed in order to protect lives and property
6. Contact Labour Relations with regard to employee reaction within the plants and otherwise liaise at all times
7. Alert by whatever means available all Plant Protection staff not on duty, S.A. Police, Civil Defence, Fire Services and Management as per priority listing

EDITOR'S NOTE: Items 8 through 15 deal with details such as evacuation of personnel, protection of records and vital points, emergency duties of employees. The section concludes with the report that to "ensure best possible handling of potential bomb threats the Emergency Controller and telephone exchange staff will be trained to deal with such calls," using a special check list technique.

SECTION 3

International Service Personnel:

EDITOR'S NOTE: The plan makes provision for protecting and possibly evacuating foreign nationals, in co-ordination with "the appropriate national representative" and concludes the section by pointing out that:

In the Port Elizabeth area there is a fairly significant American community and tentative contacts have already

ATTACHMENT

DUTIES - EMERGENCY CONTROLLER

RECEIPT OF INFORMATION OF YOUR THREAT :

1. ESTABLISH - FROM TELEPHONE CALLS :

TIME OF RECEIPT OF REPORT
TIME OF EXPECTED DETONATION
TIME AVAILABLE FOR SEARCHING/EVACUATION
PROBABLE SIZE OF BOMB

2. SEARCH - COMPANY SEARCHERS GIVING THEM FULL DETAILS AND ASKING THEM TO REPORT EACH AS SOON AS ANYTHING SUSPICIOUS FOUND IN THEIR AREA. TELL THEM OF TIME SEARCH MUST STOP AND WHEN IT MAY START AGAIN.
WARN THEM NOT TO TOUCH OR MOVE SUSPICIOUS OBJECTS.
POLICE - GIVE DETAILS OF WHAT YOU INTEND TO DO.
MILITARY WITH DISCREET - STATE WHETHER STILL SEARCHING OR HAVE LOCATED SUSPICIOUS OBJECT.
MANAGEMENT,
OTHER COMPANY EMERGENCY CONTROLLERS ON SAME FLOOR / FLOORS BELOW OR ABOVE / ADJACENT BUILDINGS.
(TO PREVENT PANIC STATE - POLICE INFORMED - KEEP IT CONFIDENTIAL)
FLOOR WARDENS. (TELL IN CONFIDENCE TO OBTAIN NOMINAL ROLLS).

3. EVACUATION - EVALUATE THE THREAT FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. HUMAN LIFE BEING OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE.

GM Memo

been established for the purpose of co-ordinating action in the event that a situation calls for co-ordination of action and possible ultimate evacuation.

SECTION 4

Operations:

- (a) Unless civil unrest or industrial interruptions precluded the plant from operating by reason of reduced supplies, withholding of labour, failure of transportation systems or a combination of these factors, normal plant operation is assumed.

The extent of plant operation would be dictated by

- (a) the factors indicated above,
 - (b) the sales demand, and
 - (c) advisability of maintaining a stabilizing influence among the workforce.
- (b) In the event that an emergency situation is declared, it is likely that there will be imposed requirements, e.g. trucks and commercial vehicles to meet national needs. Under such conditions it is almost certain that manpower requirements would have to be supplemented and would most probably be controlled by a central authority such as the Manpower Board. Vehicles may be taken over for Civil Defence purposes.

Constraints on free movement of employees within industry would be likely and screening of employees is a distinct possibility. In normal times, GMSA's workforce contains a variety for foreign nationalists [sic], particu-

larly among skilled tradesmen. It is almost certain that screening and selection would be given attention, particularly in sensitive areas where the ability of the plant to meet production requirements could be jeopardised by sabotage.

- (c) Should the emergency situation escalate nationally, it is fair to assume that the Government would declare the country to be virtually in a state of war. This in effect would place the industry at the disposal of national

authorities and it is almost certain that National Key Point industries would be taken over by an arm of the Ministry of Defence which would regulate output and co-ordinate the entire industrial effort.

At such time, operating control of plants like General Motors and Ford as well as others would most certainly be vested in South African nationals and all materials, manpower and production requirements would be tied into the overall national requirements.

Attachment "B"

EDITOR'S NOTE: The assumptions and comments excerpted below are attached to the first contingency plan, forwarded May 6. They provide a useful background to company thinking, illuminating its racism, its unquestioning assumption that in any period of unrest GM's interests would lie with the whites, and its willingness to collaborate closely with all agencies of the South African government.

RELATED ASSUMPTIONS

It is assumed that almost 100% of White employment at GMSA would not be party to creating or stimulating civil unrest and that the population groups involved would be African and Coloured.

1 & 2: Factory labour availability would be reduced for the following reasons:

- (a) Public transport in African townships is normally withdrawn when any such threat arises. While buses run to and from the perimeter of the African areas, there is usually a strong intimidatory influence exercised on those persons who wish to have no part in the unrest and go to their place of work in the normal way.
- (b) By nature of their more scattered layout and a somewhat different outlook on the part of the people, the Coloured area has been less subject to such influences.

Under Condition 3, escalation of civil unrest could result in a local emergency being declared, at which time the ordinary forces of law and order (South African Police) would most probably call in support from the Army and it is fair to assume that African townships would be virtually sealed off, but Coloured townships would not be as tightly isolated.

This would result in effects similar to 1 and 2 above, but it is doubtful whether the authorities would resort to compulsory work attendance unless the industry(s) concerned are likely to be affected for a long period and interrupt essential supplies.

Condition 4 is seen as equivalent to state of war and it can be expected that in such event full control of labour in all areas would be by central directive.

It is not considered likely that such a situation would be of long duration, but a return to normal operation might involve up to two weeks, dependent upon return to normal conditions in the urban townships.

Since it would be possible to maintain any measure of normal production, there would be little option but to close down the Plant and lay off all but essential workers pending return to reasonably normal conditions.

The effect of lack of income on social conditions and to some extent the historic lack of purpose among non-White

peoples on what may be regarded as strictly political issues could almost certainly result in a wish to return to work within a fairly short period. There would be other very strict social sanctions applied in the form of restricted movement, etc., which would accelerate the wish to return to the normal base.

In the event that public demonstration reached the level referred to, the course of action that the Plant management could take would almost certainly be determined by the authorities responsible for law and order until such time as the emergency is deemed to have passed.

COMMENTS

EDITOR'S NOTE: The section contains GM's views on the possible effects of increasing international isolation including oil sanctions, and of US foreign policy in relation to the Pretoria regime. It concludes that sanctions, reduction in investment capital and political pressures would "almost certainly lead to economic depression and further social unrest," and possible government attempts to direct the nature of GM products.

The already scarce availability of certain skills would be aggravated by loss through emigration, making the prospect for recovery, irrespective of political outcome, unfavourable to say the least.

Under normal conditions, the motor manufacturing and assembly industry is one of the largest in the country with considerable economic weight... it is almost certain that should economic conditions decline sufficiently far, there could be a directive issued on model build by various companies—firstly to preserve the capability of building vehicles and secondly, to ensure sources of supply in the case of greater emergency requirements.

Under conditions of a severely depressed economy, the implications of unemployment on the non-White communities in particular are tremendous.

Allowing for the effects of a directive with regard to vehicle build and/or component or other manufacturing activity, there would be a point at which operation of the GMSA facility would obviously become uneconomic. The options open would be to attempt to obtain more business, or alternatively, to close the Plant operation down completely, liquidate all available productive and non-productive materials and "moth ball" machinery and equipment until such time as the economic climate improved to the point where operations would again be viable.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Commenting on US policy the document describes it as "intent on forcing a confrontation" and regards this as dangerous, because of the nature of Afrikaner intransigence. Conceding that "U.S. economic influence is important to South Africa" it suggests the unlikely scenario that any threat to withdraw may produce retaliation which might lead to the severance of ties with the US and "the suspension of U.S. based business."

Thus, through a series of events, not necessarily affecting the economy in the short term, GMSA could find itself obliged to cease doing business and obtaining supplies, know-how and other forms of assistance from its U.S. based parent corporation. Options open at such time would be to either close the Plant down and "moth ball" it or dispose of the assets to a local buyer.


EDITOR'S NOTE: This section contains a good summary of possible government action and GM reaction.

Action by the local Government in terms of any or all of a series of possibilities arising from conditions of social unrest or further economic decline can be seen broadly as follows:

- on the basis of National key point status, assume responsibility for guarding premises, training plant personnel for military type duties and upgrading of security facilities to a specified level.
- exercise a measure of control over facilities to be used to meet imposed requirements, e.g. trucks and commercial vehicles, passenger or modified passenger cars and possibly other wheeled, non-fighting vehicles such as trailers and supply or medical units.
- assume responsibility for assigning scarce categories of manpower and possibly crash training of lesser skilled trades.
- impose requirements with regard to security rating of employees, with particular reference to foreign nationals employed in the industry.
- screening of employees to eliminate possibility of sabotage.

These conditions would amount to virtually having the South African Government as a partner in the business and poses the question as to whether or not this situation would be acceptable to the Corporation and/or international community.

Based on the philosophy of the central government of developing, since the early 1960's, the local motor vehicle



GM Memo

manufacturing and assembly capability through the introduction of the local content programme, it would be fair to assume that under conditions of National emergency the major elements of this industry would be taken over by an arm of the Ministry of Defence (Armscor?) which would completely regulate output and co-ordinate it within the entire industrial effort. [NOTE: Parenthesis in original; ARMCOR is government corporation charged with overseeing all armament production.]

At such time, if not before, the question of continuing American participation in South African business might well be finalised and operating control of Plants such as General Motors and Ford would most certainly be vested in South African nationals.

The terms of such a takeover could only be assumed at this time to be either nationalisation of the assets or a negotiated sale under prevailing conditions.

GM South African—Contingency Plan In Event of Serious Civil Unrest

EDITOR'S NOTE: This summary of GM's contingency plans was forwarded to the US on July 20, 1977, along with a memo from the then managing director, L. H. Wilking and copies of the previous documents.

While substantially the same as the previous plan, it refers in greater detail to some issues including the type of equipment requested of it by the South African Defence Force, and is therefore reprinted in full.

In assessing the potential effects and probability of serious civil unrest developing in the Port Elizabeth area and formulating contingency plans, the following factors have been taken into consideration:

IN PLANTS:

- The present breakdown of male employment strength on plant sites is as follows:

	White	Coloured	African
Kempston Road	1,515	1,381	388
Aloes	229	83	44
	1,744	1,464	432

There are, in addition, 255 White and 52 Coloured Female employees, all but 10 of which are located at Kempston Road.

2. Assessment of the in-plant situation indicates that the risk of open unrest among employees on the premises is low. The White employee group would not be party to such action and could be relied upon to take action to contain it and/or isolate any outbreak pending arrival of law enforcement authorities.
3. Possible incidence of sabotage in the form of damage to product, materials, equipment, premises, etc., is ever present and surveillance over vulnerable points and key areas and likely opportunities for such action is maintained by supervision and Plant Protection personnel.
4. Strike action either in form of stay-away, sit-down or covert work-to-rule, motivated for political reasons can occur despite legal procedures to be followed in cases of dispute.
5. Action against management/supervisory personnel on plant premises could develop, but is likely to be isolated incidents, if it does.

Contingency action in these areas will be as follows:

- (a) Identify affected area(s) and contain disturbance to minimum dimension.
- (b) Assign supervisors to reinforce Plant Protection personnel on tasks of controlling demonstrators, isolating areas and sealing off vulnerable points.
- (c) Call in law enforcement authorities.
- (d) Attempt to clear plant of dissident group.
- (e) If necessary, close down entire plant and evacuate all personnel via safe routes.
- (f) Provide available measure of protection in employee car parks.
- (g) Assess situation and prepare for resumption of plant operations.

OUTSIDE OF PLANTS:

On the basis that when any form of disturbance in Black areas of Port Elizabeth develops, the entire area is sealed off, transportation into the area is withdrawn and movement is severely restricted and the risk of having a mass demonstration march to Kempston Road is low. The more likely possibility is that at shift end, when the majority of factory employees are leaving the Plant, agitators could initiate demonstrations immediately outside the main entrance.

Contingency action in such event would be as follows:

- (a) Take steps to protect lives and property.
- (b) Maintain control and discipline on plant premises.
- (c) Institute strict surveillance on all vulnerable plant areas and reinforce protective measures.
- (d) Close off all entrances/exits and mount guards in immediate areas—call in law enforcement authorities.
- (e) Contain demonstration to areas outside GM premises.
- (f) Adopt a strictly passive/defensive stance to avoid escalating the situation.

The Plant Protection Manager will institute the Contingency Action Plan outlined on Page 2, Section 2 of Attachment "A." [*The previous plan, Ed.*] Further action will be dictated by how the law enforcement authorities may wish to handle any possible escalation or repeat demonstrations.

ACTION AGAINST MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL OUTSIDE PLANTS

All executives have been briefed on known patterns and potential situations based on overseas experience. To date

no such incident is known to have occurred in South Africa, but details of the recommendations made by Corporation Security Division have been made known and are available for application at any time.

DETERIORATION OF BUSINESS CONDITIONS:

Because of the wide geographic spread of principal centres in South Africa, it is unlikely that successful co-ordination of civil unrest could be achieved to the point at which it could cripple business on a short term or predetermined timing basis. The cumulative effect of such action, however, could in time severely depress the economy.

The more likely pattern of events might be:

- (a) Gradual enforced reduction in economic activity through trade recession and financial stringency affecting ability to maintain job opportunities.

Business could and in many cases would reach a point of non-viability, at which time the only options would be to cease operation, disperse material and human resources and mothball facilities or go into liquidation.

- (b) There is a possibility in the interim period that U.S. based companies might incur the "annoyance" of the South African Government by apparently failing to meet their (the government's) view of support from local enterprises.

GM South African has, for example, been requested to supply vehicles such as the K25, K31, 4x4 LUV for Defence Force purposes and refusal to offer such might be interpreted as reflecting doubt on the motives of the Company.

Such interpretation or a variation thereof could lead to direct loss of other government business and seriously affect GM South African's share of the vehicle market and very likely threaten its viability.

Alternatively, should international political issues compound the situation postulated, it is within the bonds of possibility that the Government might request that GM South African be shut down.

DECLARED NATIONAL EMERGENCY:

In the event that a National emergency is declared, there is little doubt that control of GM South African's facilities, already designated a National Key Point industry, would be taken over by an arm of the Ministry of Defence and its production capabilities integrated into the national industrial effort. It is highly likely that in a developing situation affecting the national stability and maintenance of law and order, some measure of government direction would be introduced ahead of time.

At the time of declaration of a national emergency (state of war), if not before, the question of continuing American participation in South African business may well have been resolved and operating control of the GM South African facility be vested in South African nationals.

ACTION RELATIVE TO ABOVE POSSIBILITIES:

At the point when government takes action in terms of the Civil Defence Act No. 39 of 1966, such as in the form of placing a military presence on the property, it is understood at this time that all aspects of security will fall under their control. Plant management and personnel will have specific requirements to meet and there will undoubtedly be additional security facilities required.

The full implications of such eventuality cannot be assessed at this time.

'Break All Ties ...'

Student Movement Escalates

The following report by Stephanie Urdang is based on information from Liberation News Service, Joel Saxe and Rhodes Gxoyiya.

One thousand demonstrating students stood in front of the Harvard University building in which their Board of Trustees had just met. Their chant, in perfect unison and mounting crescendo—reverberated beyond Harvard yard and could be heard into Cambridge. "Bull Shit!! Bull Shit!! Bull Shit!!" It drowned out the voice of the Board's spokesperson as he told the assembled group that the Harvard Corporation had postponed their decision on whether it was prepared to divest its stock in companies doing business with apartheid South Africa.

The roar had not died down, when Derek Bok, president of this highly prestigious academic institution, emerged out of the building and headed across the yard. In an instant he was surrounded by over 100 taunting demonstrators, who zig-zagged after him as he attempted to make a get away. Finally, plainclothes policemen came to his rescue, whisking him into a police car and driving him through an impromptu barricade of students—to the sound of the students pounding on the roof of the car.

This apparent re-enactment of a '60s/early '70s student demonstration had a target different from the Vietnam war: it was apartheid. And what was happening mid-April at Harvard was not an isolated incident, but part of an energetic campaign being waged by students at university and college campuses across the country as they present their demands for their universities to—in the words of one Columbia chant—"Stop the lies, break all ties, divest now."

One Hundred Campuses

After a period of seeming political apathy which settled on campuses once the Vietnam war came to an end, students from over 100 universities have been resorting to demonstrations, sit-ins, confronting university trustees and/or occupations of buildings to press their demand: that their universities sell all stocks and bonds in corporations that invest in apartheid South Africa. What began in May 1977 as a sit-in at Stanford University in which almost 200 students were arrested, has escalated into a nationwide movement which shows no signs of abating, even as exams and summer approach.

At Harvard, for instance, the campaign began back in the fall, gaining ground steadily until this spring, when the campaign had ignited the fervor of a large proportion of the students. Their demands are typical of those at other campuses, and like other campuses, have been pressed by a coalition of different student groups including Black, Asian-American, Chicano, Puerto Rican and Native American Associations. They are calling for the university to ultimately divest all its stocks, with three immediate steps: sell any stock in banks doing business in South Africa; support shareholder resolutions against investment in South Africa; and make a public statement to the effect that US corporations should withdraw all investment which helps prop up the racist white minority regime.

In early April, the Harvard Corporation called a meeting to listen to the students. However, they were keen not to listen too hard, and made every effort to publicize it as minimally as possible. Nonetheless, the meeting drew 400 angry students for a long and heated interchange.

On April 21, 400 students rallied in preparation for the corporation's upcoming vote, followed by the 1,000-strong demonstration. A few days later, the student newspaper published the board's decision: Harvard would *not* divest. Their anger now at fever pitch, 4,000 students took to the streets the night of April 27, carrying candles and torches and marched for hours in protest through Cambridge.

But Harvard is only one example. At Princeton, for instance, students have been picketing the administration daily without stop since mid-March. Members of the student People's Front for the Liberation of Southern Africa have brought out a minimum of 15 pickets every day—their goal was ten—climaxing to 850 on one occasion when 250 students took over the Administration Building to support demands for divestiture.

But more. In April alone there were demonstrations and sit-ins at Rutgers, Cornell, 17 state universities and colleges in California, Yale, Dartmouth, Brandeis, Williams, Swarthmore, Atlanta (George) group of six black colleges, Amherst, University of Illinois, of Indiana, of Chicago, Brown, Miami, Smith, MIT, Wesleyan, Tufts—and the list goes on.

Political Awareness

Black South African Rhodes Gxoyiya has been travelling under the auspices of the American Committee on Africa to campuses across the country, talking about the conditions in South Africa and helping to politicize students. After visiting over ten campuses he spoke with *Southern Africa* in May about his impressions.

The level of political awareness and organization varies, he said. At some colleges it exists only in embryo; students are beginning to do research into their college's involvement, the necessary groundwork for future activities.



Making the links: Kent State students hold protest to commemorate slain demonstrators.

At others, such as the University of Washington, Seattle, the campaign is very advanced. The UW "Out of South Africa Committee" has done detailed research into the university's investment and presented it before a regents' committee hearing to counter the inadequate data that the administration had presented in defense of its own case.

Campus groups range from linking issues to Carter's 'human rights' campaign, to groups who have formed coalitions with the goal of transforming this popular anti-apartheid sentiment into concrete support for the liberation struggle in South Africa.

Broadening the Base

One weakness that has only been overcome in a few places, is the absence of strong black student involvement. Gxoyiya said he was struck by the composition of the student groups leading the campaign at the colleges he has been in touch with. With a few notable exceptions (such as Princeton), where the People's Front was formed at black initiative), the active students are almost solely white.

"When I spoke to black students, they emphasized their focus on the interrelationship between the agents of oppression in South Africa and their own oppression in the US. They felt that the white students were not making these links. What is important to the blacks is not a question of 'human rights' but the need to link the black struggle in South Africa with the struggle of blacks in the US."

Some black students were cynical about white efforts directed against what they saw as an 'overseas problem,' which provided an excuse for not dealing with issues back home.

Commented Gxoyiya, "when I emphasized the importance of the divestiture campaign to blacks in South Africa, as a demonstration of solidarity, they responded more favorably to the idea."

Regional Coalitions

Co-ordinating groups have been established that give the campaign added national impetus. The North-east Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa (NECLSA) called a highly successful conference at Yale in

March, attended by representatives from 40 colleges. The South Africa Catalyst Project has played a key role in providing resources, skills and energy to the movement both in California and the rest of the nation, and is helping to plan a west coast conference for June. In addition, campuses in other geographical areas have been co-ordinating their activities and sharing resources.

Making Connections

Joel Saxe, NECLSA coordinator, spoke to *Southern Africa* about the background to the recent upsurge.

The movement on campuses, he explained, is matched by the growing movement against apartheid in the US as a whole. Suddenly, after the June 16 Soweto student uprisings, stories of the rapidly growing struggle of the South African people were splashed across US newspapers.

"Students, often newly exposed to the horrible brutality of the apartheid system," he said, "were amazed and impressed by the example of teenagers battling the racist state."

The murder of Steve Biko happened at a time when the divestiture movement was already escalating. Feelings of anger and protest among American students grew in lockstep with the commitment to oppose the economic support that resulted from US investment in South Africa. "Often the organizing committees were made up largely of younger students," Saxe continued, "who had limited, if any previous involvement in political activity."

Saxe emphasized that students are calling for immediate divestiture rather than pressing for university administrations to support shareholder resolutions, even where these urge the corporations to leave South Africa.

"Our call makes a very strong and clear political statement against US investment, and avoids confusion over the notion that there is a possibility that corporations might serve as progressive vehicles of social change. Proxy resolutions have been proposed for many years, and rarely, if ever, have they been passed. The process of working through shareholder resolutions takes at least several years. The worsening situation in South Africa demands that corporations withdraw now."

Victories

As can be expected, we have not been treated to the spectacle of the universities hastening to their brokers to drop offending stock in their port-

folios like proverbial hot bricks. Nonetheless, there have been some successes. The University of Massachusetts, Oregon State universities and colleges, Amherst, Hampshire College, University of Wisconsin, Miami University in Ohio have all responded to a greater or lesser extent to the call for divestiture. More commonly the response has been to look for strategies to avert confrontation with students. Many university administrations have shuffled the issue into 'shareholder responsibility' committees. Most of these committees have no power and are intended only to give the appearance that the administration is taking the matter seriously. With a number of notable exceptions, they have acted as rubber stamps and are packed with students, faculty and alumni sympathetic to university interests.

A more recent strategy has been evolved by Columbia President William McGill with the aid of Rev. Leon Sullivan, a Philadelphia Zion Baptist pastor and a member of the GM board. They have called together officials from nine prestigious private schools in order to try and defuse the movement. They have already met twice and have discussed the adoption of the so-called 'Sullivan principles' as their guideline.

Sullivan maintains that the way to effect political change in South Africa is to work from within. To this end he has proposed what amounts to a program of affirmative action for US corporations there, which cover six steps to be taken by the companies in order to provide more equitable working conditions for their black employees.

So, instead of divesting, McGill drafted a letter to be sent out to universities throughout the US, urging them to press all corporations in which they held stock to adopt these principles.

Sullivan Rejected

This has done nothing to defuse the movement as the majority of students recognize the futility of opposing the whole system of apartheid with a self-imposed corporate affirmative action program. In some places it has intensified actions.

Students at the five colleges in the Amherst area turned out to picket a meeting at Mt. Holyoke which was addressed by Rev. Sullivan, and then challenged him with pointed questions. This kind of action makes clear that the campaign is for divestiture and that this—for the majority of students in the rapidly escalating movement—is not negotiable.

Backlash

The corporations, their US allies and the South African government and its agents, are all working furiously to undercut the student campaign.

Gxoyiya saw signs of this as he travelled. "In many of the audiences I addressed there were persons who regurgitated a lot of statements and statistics obviously obtained from official South African sources." At Omaha he was shown a booklet published by the South African Information Office. "It has been assigned by the school system as a resource on South Africa."

Right wing elements seizing on this eagerly, are using smear tactics such as the old allegation of "communist affiliations" to attack student organizations.

Corporations have begun to black-mail university administrations threatening to cut off scholarship grants and endowments in retaliation for divestiture action.

But the commitment of the students is strong. And it is growing daily. A pledge by the Princeton students encapsulates some of the ideals: "I pledge in the name of the children of Soweto to guard the freedom of liberation and I will do my best—every day and for the rest of my life—to fight racism at home and abroad." □

SPECIAL REPORTS

CIA Agent Reveals US Role in Angola

As the Carter administration groped in mid-May to find some way to rationalize American involvement in the present crisis in Zaire, a *New York Times* editorial remarked that the US government had over-learned the lessons of Vietnam. What the *Times* meant—a sentiment that most of the major media have echoed—is that the Vietnam war has made the government too cautious in considering military responses to crises overseas, especially when those crises appear to be the result of 'aggressive' Soviet policy.

The recent publication of John Stockwell's *In Search of Enemies* gives the lie to the belief that at least the executive branch has been cautious since Vietnam. An unauthorized ac-

count of the CIA's covert war in Angola in 1974-76 written by the agent who headed its Angola Task Force, *In Search of Enemies* also provides some framework to question seriously the present intentions of the Carter administration in Zaire particularly, and in Africa generally.

Stockwell's book charges—and the CIA has not seriously attempted to deny—that the CIA ran a covert war in Angola after the Portuguese dictatorship fell in 1974, and lied to the American people, the press, and the Congress about it. Far from being handcuffed by the 'lessons' of Vietnam, the CIA, sometimes with and sometimes without the knowledge of Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger and the National

Security Council, leaped willingly into the Angolan conflict.

Previously head of CIA operations in Tay Ninh province in Vietnam, Stockwell was hardly home three months before the CIA offered him charge of the Angola Task Force. Although he did not leave the CIA for another 22 months, he had begun to question CIA methods. But ambitious and still career-oriented, Stockwell took the job.

Kissinger Role

Stockwell believes that, from the beginning, it was Kissinger who pushed the agency to get involved in Angola. "Kissinger saw the Angolan conflict solely in terms of global politics," Stockwell writes, "and was deter-

mined the Soviets should not be permitted to make a move in any remote part of the world without being confronted militarily by the US... Uncomfortable with recent historic events, and frustrated by our humiliation in Vietnam, Kissinger was seeking opportunities to challenge the Soviets. Conspicuously, he had overruled his advisers and refused to seek diplomatic solutions in Angola."

One of the only lessons that Kissinger and the CIA had learned from Vietnam was that any involvement in Angola would have to be secret. Yet in order to be secret, the operation would have to be relatively small. "Kissinger would like to win," one of Stockwell's superiors told him in 1975. "No doubt he would like to stop the Soviets cold. But he knows that we can't get that kind of program through Congress." Thus from the outset, CIA policy was to prevent the Soviet Union from "winning a cheap victory" in Angola.

US Provoked Escalations

Stockwell corroborates two vital aspects of the Angola story that anti-war activists and foreign policy critics asserted at the time. First, that the initial move by an outside power in Angola, and each subsequent escalation of the war, was made by the United States, not the Soviet Union or Cuba. Stockwell confirms a *New York Times* account that the National Security Council's 40 Committee first approved funds for Holden Roberto, leader of the Zaire-backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), in January 1975.

But Stockwell also confirms another aspect of the Angola story rarely if ever acknowledged by American officials or the press: that Cuba sent troops to Angola largely on their own initiative, not as the 'pawns' of the Soviet Union. "After the war," Stockwell writes, "we learned that Cuba had not been ordered into action by the Soviet Union. To the contrary, the Cuban leaders felt compelled to intervene for their own ideological reasons."

False Denials

Stockwell writes that foremost among the lies that the CIA director told Congress and the American people was that CIA military advisers were not 'on the ground' inside Angola itself. Stockwell describes his own trip to Angola in August 1975 to meet with both Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, the Angolan group eventually backed by South African troops. After visiting both FNLA head-

quarters in Uige and Ambriz in northern Angola, and flying to Silva Porto, site of Savimbi's headquarters in southern Angola, Stockwell drafted a report advising Washington that "the opportunity existed for a total victory" against the MPLA "if we provided abundant, immediate support."

In recommending expanded CIA military backing for FNLA and UNITA, Stockwell acknowledges that he was going against the counsel of the



US-backed Jonas Savimbi in Silva Porto, 1976. More aid to come?

US consul general in Luanda who "believed the MPLA was best qualified to run Angola and that its leaders sincerely wanted a peaceful relationship with the US." Stockwell also admits that CIA and 40 Committee decisions were based on non-existent, or at best poor, intelligence about the three movements themselves.

Revelations

Among Stockwell's other revelations:

- 83 CIA officers were dispatched to Kinshasa, Luanda, Lusaka and Pretoria and "managed the air, ground, maritime and propaganda branches" of the Angolan war.
- 150 British and American mercenaries were recruited directly by Holden Roberto using CIA money. The CIA itself recruited French and Portuguese mercenaries.
- The CIA secretly funded and plotted strategy for FNLA and UNITA delegations that came to New York and Washington to lobby the UN, Congress and black groups. This was a clear violation of statutory restrictions on the CIA's involvement in domestic politics.

• A CIA propaganda team fabricated and disseminated reports of Cuban soldiers raping and pillaging, and the CIA via UNITA planted a story with the *Washington Post's* normally reliable David Ottaway that Soviet advisers were serving in Angola.

Annexing Cabinda

At one point the agency wanted to send Redeye missiles to Angola in response to reports that the MPLA had been using Russian MIGs. At it turned out the reports were false. Stockwell also says the CIA supported Zaire President Mobutu's efforts to annex the oil-rich Angolan enclave of Cabinda which was under MPLA control. The CIA flew in a 1000-arms package for use in the invasion of Cabinda, and CIA officers visited the training camps of the 'liberation movement' that Mobutu created to take over Cabinda.

Collaboration With South Africa

In October 1975, South Africa invaded Angola in force. Despite Stockwell's inability to point to direct US involvement with the invasion, he does discuss US collaboration with the apartheid regime.

Stockwell says his superiors welcomed the South African arrival in the war. "To the CIA," Stockwell writes bluntly, "the South Africans were the ideal solution for central Angola." CIA officers 'clamored' for permission to visit South African bases in Namibia. The CIA briefed the South African secret service, BOSS, on its Angolan operation and "nearly all" CIA intelligence reports were relayed to Pretoria. "The CIA has traditionally sympathized with South Africa and enjoyed its close liaison with BOSS," Stockwell writes. "The two organizations share a violent antipathy toward communism."

In a press conference announcing the publication of *In Search of Enemies*, Stockwell called the CIA "racist, toward African countries and its own employees." He said that if the CIA had anything to do with it, black majority rule would never come to the white-dominated countries of southern Africa.

The Cuba Effect

When Cuban troops in large numbers began to arrive in Angola soon after the South African invasion, Stockwell's superiors began to change their policy.

"Competitive juices stirred in Washington," he writes, "and the no-win rationale was dropped at all levels. Ambassador Mulcahy [to Zaire] flew to

Kinshasa to reassure Mobutu of our determination and full support. The National Security Council ordered the CIA to outline a program which could win the war. Sophisticated weapons were now discussed freely: Redeye ground-to-air missiles, antitank missiles, heavy artillery, tactical air support, C-47 gun platforms. The working group considered major escalations: the formal introduction of American advisers, the use of American army units, a show of the fleet off Luanda, and the feasibility of making an overt military feint at Cuba itself to force Castro to recall his troops and defend the home island."

Defying Congress

Throughout, the single obstacle was public opinion. Congress responded and passed the Tunney Amendment, prohibiting further covert military involvement in Angola, one of the 'restrictions' Carter has complained about during recent Zaire fighting.

As late as February 1976, however, even after President Ford signed the Tunney Amendment into law, the White House and the CIA were still hoping to reverse the course of the Angolan war. "The CIA continued making arms shipments into Angola, sending 22 additional flights from Kinshasa to the air strip in Gago Coutinho in eastern Angola, delivering an additional 145,490 pounds of arms." Even Kissinger, who Stockwell calls "half-genius perhaps, and half-clown," sent the American charge in Kinshasa a cable, instructing him to tell UNITA leaders that the US would continue to support it as long as it demonstrated the capacity for effective resistance to the MPLA. "By that late date," Stockwell points out, "Kissinger knew full well that we could provide no more support to UNITA."

New Involvement

By Stockwell's account, then, only the Congress has learned any lessons

from the war in Vietnam. There are indications that the Carter administration has, since taking office, constantly been on the alert for ways to re-involve the US in support for anti-MPLA forces.

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski inquired soon after taking office whether there weren't ways the US could evade the restrictions on its Angolan involvement, according to a lengthy but revealing profile in *The New Yorker* in early May. Now with the crisis in Zaire rapidly achieving international proportions, press reports are filled with the suggestion that Carter would like to find some way of re-supplying Savimbi with money and arms. Only two years after the war in Angola and four years after the final end of the war in Vietnam, the US government is again displaying anxious readiness to become involved militarily in a Third World conflict.

Such are the lessons of Vietnam. □

SOUTH AFRICA

'Idle Bantus' and 'Plural Development'

More than six months have now passed since South Africa's all-white electorate returned Prime Minister John Vorster and the Nationalist Party to power with the most massive landslide vote in almost 30 years of unbroken rule. Time enough for Vorster and his slightly reshuffled cabinet to give the voters a good dose of what they wanted—more of the same.

During the months since the election, the Pretoria government has engaged in more than its normal amount of tinkering with the legal framework of apartheid. But the results have hardly confirmed suggestions by apologists for white supremacy that the security of an overwhelming electoral mandate would permit a relaxation in racist regulations.

True, Vorster and company have sponsored a few cosmetic changes. The demeaning term "bantu" has been erased from the official vocabulary, replaced by talk of "blacks" and "plural relations." The government has also announced that the five million blacks

living in urban townships will be allowed legal ownership of their homes (though not of the land on which they stand). And those of them rich enough to afford it will even be allowed to rub elbows with whites at theaters, exclusive sporting clubs and expensive private schools.

But this is about the extent of the changes Vorster appears to have in mind—changes which fall far short of eliminating even the "petty apartheid" regulations deplored by the white opposition. For instance, Sports Minister Piet Koornhof announced with some fanfare that racially mixed sporting events would now be allowed. But a few days later 300 white university students were barred from attending the first multi-racial soccer game in Soweto. Officials explained that there are no toilet facilities for whites at the stadium.

No Citizenship for Blacks

Meanwhile, the thrust of more significant legislation introduced by the

government makes it clear where the Nationalists are steering the country: toward a goal which, Vorster's new Minister of "Plural Relations" Connie Mulder stated with complete candor, would be a state in which no black person would hold citizenship.

Under the proposed "Bantu Laws Amendment" bill, for example, any black living in the cities who is out of work for more than 122 days out of any calendar year will be subject to arrest. It will not matter whether the four months of unemployment are consecutive or not. Either way, an "idle" black will face the threat of detention in a rehabilitation center, farm colony, "or similar institution established or approved under the Prisons Act."

Mulder explained that the bill had been drafted to keep "idle and work-shy blacks in check." And Nationalist backbencher du Plessis elaborated on why these "idle blacks" needed to be kept in check, labeling them "the shock troops of the uprising of the black youth."



Soweto: Rows of overcrowded homes, but no citizenship

UN/Contact

But neither man explained how a system of forced, unpaid labor would solve the problems of massive black unemployment. According to the government's own conservative figures, 12.4 percent of the labor force is presently unemployed, including 600,000 blacks.

Other studies set the figures considerably higher. A survey conducted recently by the Development Studies Research Group at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, put the total unemployment rate for all races during 1977 at 22 percent of the "economically active population" (a term which excludes many out-of-work blacks).

Many economists calculate that between 15 and 28 percent of the black labor force is now unemployed, yielding an astronomical total of two million blacks with no work. And a careful look at the statistics suggests that the high level of unemployment will not disappear, even if the South African economy does rebound from its current recession. For the *rate* of black unemployment actually rose throughout the

1960s, even as the South African economy and foreign investment were growing rapidly.

All of this tends to support theoretical arguments that even a flourishing South African economy will spin off a "surplus population" of unemployed blacks, at least as long as it flourishes on the basis of cheap black labor and increasing concentration of capital. With its "idle bantu" bill, the government apparently has decided to attack these complex economic questions with a blunt instrument.

Back to the Bantustans

A second bill introduced by Mulder fits the same general pattern. Known as the "Bantu Citizenship Amendment" act, this second piece of legislation will tighten up the mechanism for dumping unwanted black workers back into the "bantustans." The bill stipulates that any citizen of an "independent bantustan" will not automatically receive South African citizenship upon relinquishing citizenship in the "homeland." In addition, blacks born in

urban areas would no longer have permanent residential rights there.

Under existing definitions, these rights are guaranteed to all blacks born in urban areas whose parents are not "foreign blacks." The proposed amendment would also deny permanent residency to children born in "white" South Africa whose parents had been declared citizens of an "independent bantustan."

Figures released in February in Johannesburg show that more than 25 percent of the legal residents of the African township of Soweto have now lost their South African citizenship and have been declared citizens of the so-called independent Transkei and Bophuthatswana.

Looking ahead to the day when all South African blacks will have turned in their passbooks for a bantustan passport, Mulder made no bones about what the government has in mind. As *The Economist* reported, "He has also presented the country with a vision of where government policy is taking it—towards an all-white South Africa—

which is more extreme than any picture painted before.... Every black person will be a citizen of a bantustan, whether he lives in one or not—and about 60% do not. Blacks will still provide the labor force for white South Africa. But they will be able to stay only as statutory foreigners and on the white man's terms so long as their labor is needed; as soon as they become unemployed, they will either be repatriated or sent to a 'rehabilitation center' to do prescribed work."

A White Azania

There is nothing startlingly new about this vision. Legislating blacks out of all rights in "white" South Africa has always been the logical conclusion of "separate development," although Mulder did add one new cosmetic nuance. He suggested that the completion of the process would be marked by the end of South African citizenship for whites as well. Instead they would be handed citizenship in a white "homeland" (which reportedly might

even appropriate the African nationalist name "Azania"). The term South Africa, said Mulder really denotes a sub-continent rather than a nation.

But the name hardly matters. The intent is clear—to take apartheid to its logical end. And showing its customary creativity, the government also took steps recently to place more of the economic burden of reaching that end on the black population. Finance Minister Owen Horwood presented an "austerity budget" to be financed by reduced company and personal taxes (paid mostly by whites) and a new broadly-based four percent sales tax (which will definitely hit blacks hardest).

Political Trial Behind Closed Doors

One of the latest and, according to the defense lawyers, most important Terrorism Act trials to date, is now in progress in the little town of Bethal, two and a half hours drive east of Johannesburg. It began early in January and promises to continue for some months yet.

Before the court stand 18 blacks, charged with two main counts of participating in 'terrorist' activities, under both the notorious Terrorism Act and the Internal Security Act. Alternative counts include furthering the aims of the banned Pan Africanist Congress, and public violence relating to a June 1976 student uprising in Kagiso Township where several buildings were burned.

In addition to the 18 accused, 86 co-conspirators are cited, including the late Robert Sobukwe, founder and first president of the PAC.

More significant than the fact that a special Supreme Court has been convened in this small rural town, is that for the first time, proceedings are being held in camera. Only press are permitted to attend—and then after special permission has been granted them by the security police.

The Johannesburg *Star* refused to comply with this restriction, and withdrew its reporter from the trial. An editorial in the international edition of the paper reports that the judge ordered all public officials and court reporters to obtain police press cards before they would be allowed to enter the courtroom. The *Star* refused to comply on the basis that the security police do not have the right to decide who is an acceptable and *bona fide* court reporter or observer.

In late March, a special application to allow representatives from the Swedish and US embassies to attend the trial for one day was turned down by the judge.

Refusal to Recognize Legitimacy of Court

The oldest of the accused is Zeth Mopheng, a founding member of PAC. He created a stir in the courtroom at the beginning of the trial when he refused to recognize the right of the court to try him. His stand was then repeated by all but two of his co-defendants.

Reports in the *Rand Daily Mail* mention that all 18 accused—whose ages range from 20 to 65 years—have since pleaded not guilty, although details of how this came about were not indicated.

By the beginning of May, most of the State's evidence was still centered on the Young African Religious movement, which, they contend, is a cover for PAC.

But all is not going well for the prosecution. A State witness was found under cross-examination to be lying. He then told the court that he was held for five days in leg-irons after one of the accused, Johnson Nthathi, had 'jumped' four floors from the Krugersdorp Police Station while in detention. Nthathi has since demanded \$23,000 from the police commissioner as compensation for the injuries sustained in the so-called jump. He may be the only detainee who has lived to accuse the police of throwing him out of the window while in detention.

Meanwhile the trial continues, setting an ominous precedent for future closed-door proceedings. □

Voters Stay Home

Vorster's government may be in a position to force blacks to foot the bill for apartheid. But it is in no position to force political compliance, as the recent attempt to stage elections in Soweto proved once again.

For the second time within two months, the government tried to get Soweto residents to elect a "community council." For the second time, Soweto residents stayed home. Despite a major publicity campaign that included an airdrop of pamphlets and the release of several jailed members of Soweto's Committee of Ten, less than six percent of the eligible voters went to the polls, and the government now finds itself in the somewhat embarrassing position of being committed to a 'mayor' of a city with more than a million people who won his seat with only 97 votes.

The election marked a major setback to what had emerged as a new element in the government's apartheid strategy—the effort to transform Soweto into an urban "bantustan." The proposal to allow ownership of township homes clearly suggested that government thinking had shifted in this direction. And the intention became even clearer as the government tried to cast the Inkatha Party headed by KwaZulu's presumptive leader Chief Gatsha Buthelezi as the leadership of Soweto.

This latter scheme was underscored when the Committee of Ten's chairman, Dr. Nthato Motlana, was released from jail a few days before the elections. A government car picked Motlana up from the jailhouse gates and drove him straight to the home of Inkatha's Soweto chairman Dr. M. S. Nvembezi.

But Motlana refused to collaborate with the Community Council elections. And so did 94 percent of the people eligible to vote. □

Overview

The recent recurrence of fighting in Zaire's Shaba province has confused many people who have supported the cause of liberation in Africa. Was it or was it not an invasion? Are the Katangese secessionists? To whom do they owe their allegiance? Were the Russians and Cubans involved? What are their objectives in the region?

The area is remote, and the Zaire government has successfully managed to control most of the news that has filled the front pages. One conclusion is relatively safe to draw. Due to the corruption and ineptness of the central Zaire government, Mobutu Sese Seko, the country's president, simply cannot provide security for the massive Western mining interests in Shaba. Whoever they are, the Shaba guerrillas have the power to disrupt the mining operations, causing hearts to flutter in boardrooms from New York to Johannesburg.

The West has moved swiftly to solve this problem, at least in the short run. An essentially NATO-controlled military force now controls the major towns of Shaba. So far, it is claimed, Americans are only flying transport aircraft, while American diplomats are doing everything they can to convince sympathetic African nations to provide the troops on the ground. Africa's counterpart to 'Vietnamization,' this is one lesson of Vietnam the American military has learned well. For the time being, such a force is likely to be sufficient to counter Katangese attacks.

The swiftness and scale of the Western response has led some to wonder whether there is something more going on than simply the propping up of the chaotic Mobutu regime. What is emerging through the dense smoke of the Carter administrations recent relentless assault on Soviet and Cuban 'penetration' of Africa is the not-so-faint outlines of a strategy to contain revolution in southern Africa. In this context the present military moves in Shaba could play an extremely dangerous, but key, role.

The Carter administration, from its first days, has sought a way to substantially resupport UNITA and FNLA in Angola. Despite some of the better advice within the foreign policy establishment, the President's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has always viewed the MPLA as a puppet controlled by Soviet strings. From Brzezinski's perspective, the Soviets, since 1976, have continued to extend those strings into Namibia and Zimbabwe, through the strong Cuban military presence in Angola.

Shaba has given the Brzezinski's of the Carter administration, of whom there are not a few, the opening to

Angola they have been waiting for. Soon after fighting began in Shaba in May, hints appeared in the press that the administration, having blamed Angola for the 'invasion,' was casting about for a legal way to begin resupplying the Angolan factions opposed to MPLA. Within days, it was revealed that the Director of the CIA had actually drawn up such a plan and had sounded out key Congresspeople on its feasibility.

At the same time, the FNLA has embarked anew on a campaign to raise Congressional support. A representative has been active in recent weeks on Capitol Hill. Given John Stockwell's newly published account of how the CIA engineered a similar lobbying campaign using UNITA and FNLA representatives during the Angolan war, this activity further confirms current US intentions.

Several recent news reports indicate that UNITA has used Shaba province as a base area for infiltration into Angola. One European magazine even claims that UNITA has established its general headquarters in Kolwezi.

If all this is true—and we think it is likely to be true—then the West, primarily under NATO command, has established military control of a strategic central African locality from which it can now supply directly a guerrilla force opposed to the MPLA in Angola.

We think the US government is anxious either to overthrow or at least destabilize the MPLA government in Luanda. If that can be achieved, it would have grave implications for the future of the liberation struggle in the remainder of southern Africa. If Angola is successfully removed as a staging area for SWAPO, South Africa could proceed with its own internal settlement there without fear of increased guerrilla warfare. Such a settlement would obviously also affect a Zimbabwe settlement. In each case, it would be much easier for the US government to accede to and even recognize such settlements if the prospect of continued guerrilla warfare is removed.

The strong Cuban military force in Angola presents a major stumbling block to this strategy. Without a major escalation of western intervention that would probably involve US troops, it is presently impossible to overthrow the MPLA.

So the Cubans are the obstacle, and thus the target of increasingly harsh and dangerous attacks by President Carter. When Cuba's Vice President told the recent UN Special Session on Disarmament that he heard the "drums of war" in recent Carter statements, he had sound reason for his fears.

Black As I Am

There's an unknown river in Soweto
some say it flows with blood
others say it flows with tears
a leader says
it flows with health and purity
the kind of water
that nobody drinks in Soweto

There's an unknown tree in Soweto
some say it bears sorrow
others say it bears death
a leader says
it bears health and purity
the kind of fruit
that nobody tastes in Soweto

There's an unknown river in Soweto
there's an unknown tree in Soweto
the body
the blood
both unknown

The following poems and photographs are excerpted from *Black As I Am*, recently published by the Guild of Tutors Press in Los Angeles.

The photographs are by Peter Magubane the internationally acclaimed South African photographer. This graphic depiction of the reality of apartheid in South Africa has been compiled by a man who has been covering it professionally for more than two decades. For his work Peter Magubane has had success—more than fourteen international awards—as well as hardships, having been banned and imprisoned twice, including 586 days in solitary confinement.

The poems are by Zindzi Mandela who is the 16 year old daughter of Nelson Mandela, imprisoned president of the banned African National Congress, and of Winnie Mandela, an active opponent of apartheid, who has spent long periods in detention, and is now banished to an isolated area of South Africa. Zindzi's poetry is powerful and warm as it reflects the youth of a young black girl growing up in South Africa. The poetry which Zindzi began writing to vent the frustrations of her early life has matured into an important voice against the oppression that she and her compatriots face daily.

The Guild of Tutors Press will soon publish *Black and Fourteen* by Zindzi Mandela, a group of her earlier poems, as well as Peter Magubane's *Riot At Soweto: This Is My Body, This is My Blood*.





Yes, it is me
and in spite
of life's ups and downs
I will live on
eternally
and leave my dust
on every rough path
with each stone
marking my every inspiration
my every breath
my every existence
and each step I take
I will walk quicker
and dissolve in my environment
and appear in space
as a solitary anthem
sung by every voice
swelling with sound
and rising to a crescendo
of my visions and thoughts

Yes, it is me
Study me carefully
tear me and rip me apart
turn me inside out
unfold my mysteries
digest my realities
soothe my deep pains
drown in my matured eyes
and find yourself
in the darkness surrounding me

I saw as a child
a small white boy
sitting in a car

and I never knew why
when my home was so far
and his so near
I had to walk
I saw as a child
a tall building
beautiful and empty
and I never knew why
when my home was so small
and this so big
we were overcrowded

I saw as a child
a tarred road
clean and lonely

and I never knew why
when our street was so busy
and this so alone
it was uncared for



update

Namibia Talks to Resume

The Western attempt to revive stalled negotiations between South Africa and the Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO, appears to have been a success.

Following a southern African tour by US envoy Donald McHenry in early June, a SWAPO representative in Luanda, Angola, announced that his organization was ready to continue with the settlement talks.

SWAPO suspended the negotiations in April as a protest against the major civilian and military casualties it suffered during a South African raid into Angola. Prior to the raid South Africa had announced its tentative acceptance of the Western proposals on Namibia's future.

Western diplomats face a difficult task in persuading SWAPO to endorse that plan, however. The liberation movement has argued that the proposals give moderate political forces already operating in Namibia the upper hand in the envisioned elections. And SWAPO has encountered heavy-handed repression from South African authorities in the territory, such as the recent Angolan attack and the arrest of numerous party officials.

In addition, South Africa is also expected to take a hard line in upcoming talks, confident of what Prime Minister Vorster recently termed "an apparent change of opinion in the West about the Marxist onslaught against Africa."

More Atrocities in Zimbabwe

Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole have both spoken out against the Rhodesian Security Forces following a mid-June raid that resulted in the slaying of more than twenty black civilians.

Reports of the incident are lacking in detail on account of strict censorship now being enforced.

A government communique claims that the Security Forces opened fire when they spotted armed guerrillas with a group of civilians in a village eight miles from Salisbury, the Rho-

desian capital. The communique says 22 were killed in the "crossfire," a figure that includes mostly civilians.

Press reports, however, quote eyewitnesses as saying that the death toll was far higher, that almost all the victims were women and children, that the attack was unprovoked, and that many of the victims were slain as they huddled in their houses seeking shelter.

The incident was similar to a raid mounted by Security Forces on May 14 near Fort Victoria. Over 50 were killed in that attack.

Angola, Portugal Normalize Relations

Upon his return from Angola in early June, special Portuguese presidential envoy Melo Antunes announced that the two countries are finally moving to normalize relations.

Antunes said that Angola's first ambassador to Lisbon will be arriving within weeks. He said also that the Portuguese government is considering measures to limit the activities of the Angolan dissident groups UNITA and FNLA, both of which operate inside Portugal.

New Angola Role for US?

Press reports from Washington and other Western capitals indicate that the Carter administration has re-involved the US in the Angolan war—but done so in such a way that no federal funds are being illegally spent on the project.

Journalists working on the story estimate that upwards of \$20 million may be getting channeled to the Angolan dissident group UNITA from a consortium of nations including South Africa and possibly Iran, France, Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Speculation has it that the US has helped plan the scheme, and is consulted on developments.

These reports follow a steady stream of White House criticism of the Congressional restrictions placed on the President's actions in Africa.

The White House, however, has apparently decided not to seek repeal

UPDATE is written by Africa News Service, which also publishes a weekly digest available to individuals for \$20 per year. Address correspondence to P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702.

of the Clark Amendment, which prohibits US assistance for military actions in Angola.

Zambia Faces Financial Crisis

Italy's AGIP oil company, which supplies Zambia through a pipeline from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, has threatened to cut off supplies unless bills are paid, according to a report in the *Times of Zambia* late last month.

Sales of Zambia's chief foreign exchange earner, copper, meanwhile, have dropped from \$70.5 million per month to only \$1 million per month. And over 100,000 tons of copper are stockpiled, awaiting transport through the clogged Dar es Salaam port.

Black Lobby to Challenge US Policy

Transafrica, a new black lobby on Africa and the Caribbean that opened its offices in Washington early this month, is striking a theme which is out of favor in official circles these days. A draft of the group's position paper criticizes American preoccupation with "geopolitical roulette between the major powers" in Africa.

Transafrica's executive director Randall Robinson says the group is also pushing for much stronger actions against South Africa than the Carter administration has been willing to adopt.

A group of prominent black Americans, including Robinson, an attorney and former aide to Rep. Charles Diggs, has been organizing Transafrica since a Congressional Black Caucus Conference endorsed the idea in 1976.


Tanzania Ousts Lonrho

Tanzania's President, Julius Nyerere, early this month ordered the trading and mining firm known as Lonrho to leave that country within three months.

Nyerere accused the London-based company of breaking UN sanctions against Rhodesia while "posing as the friend of free Africa." Nyerere also said Lonrho had "undermined the freedom struggle in southern Africa through its activities elsewhere."

Lonrho's holdings in Tanzania, which the firm has been ordered to sell "at a fair price acceptable to the government," include farm machinery, office supplies and cotton farms.

In response to the Tanzanian order, Lonrho said it was "proud of its record in Africa" and had been unfairly accused by Nyerere.



Healthcare
brought
to refugee
children

Health Care for The New Zimbabwe

The following interview with Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze was conducted on May 5 in New York by three members of the Southern Africa Committee, Sheila Bruton, Andy Marx and Richard Knight.

Dr. Ushewokunze is a member of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Central Committee and is in charge of the ZANU health program. He recently visited the US on a speaking tour that took him to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Boston and New York. The main purpose of the tour was to appeal for material aid for the health programs. People interested in aiding Zimbabwe refugees and ZANU medical activities should contact the ZANU Mission to the United Nations, 211 East 43 Street, New York, NY 10017.

"My purpose in coming to the United States is purely medical," commented Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze. Then he smiled. "Of course, you can't divorce politics from medicine. You could call it a medical trip with a political flavor."

The description defines Dr. Ushewokunze as much as it does his recent trip to the US. For in addition to being a physician, Ushewokunze is also a long-time militant in the struggle for genuine independence in Zimbabwe.

Up until last July, Dr. Ushewokunze was the only doctor active with ZANU, which made him the only doctor to cope with the medical needs of thousands of refugees who were fleeing Smith's troops and pouring across the border into neighboring Mozambique. Since then he has been joined by four

other doctors. And it's a good thing. Because the demands on a guerrilla movement's medical system increase hand in hand with military and political advances. And ZANU has been advancing rapidly.

According to Ushewokunze, Smith, on his side, has stepped up aggression against local communities in Rhodesia in order to force them into agreement with the conditions of the recent Salisbury settlement. Meetings addressed by Muzorewa, Sithole or Chirau are backed by the police and army. People are forced to attend for fear of death—they are shot on sight otherwise.

New Arrivals

As a result of the continued repressive actions, the ZANU refugee camps in Mozambique are being flooded with



Zimbabwean refugee struggles for life

ZANU

newcomers fleeing from Rhodesia. Many former Muzorewa supporters ("the only significant camp" inside the country) are also leaving to join the armed struggle. Their reasons? They did not believe Muzorewa would sign the betrayal document in Salisbury. When he did, it spurred them on to a decision to move out as quickly as possible.

"Just before I left to come here," Ushewokunze added, "we received a communique from the southern part of the country. Some people refused to go into a 'protected village.' They were shot. One hundred people. And that was only last week."

The transit camps, in the meantime, are still trying to recover from the devastating attack on them last November by Smith's armed forces. They have appealed to friends and supporters for help in rebuilding their supplies and for the essential needs of the men, women and children who still flock to them for survival.

"The transit camp attacked in November was probably the hub of our medical services," Ushewokunze acknowledged. "And by some queer stroke of fate's ironies we all had our transport in that vicinity that particular day and it was completely destroyed."

Despite the destruction of most of ZANU's medical equipment and all of its ambulances and other transport,

Ushewokunze feels that ZANU's medical staff "responded very well" to the crisis. "We exceeded our own proficiency," he said. "With help from the Mozambican government we were able to deal with most of the emergency cases."

From Square One

But dealing with the destruction of medical equipment and the steady influx of refugees has now become a long-term crisis. "We are having to start from square one," Ushewokunze said. "We have an urgent need for surgical equipment, transport, medicines, and also clothing and food. Malaria is rife. Recently we had an outbreak of typhoid; and we haven't got any typhoid vaccine."

"Some people walk long distances from their homes to come to Mozambique," Ushewokunze continued. "They come starving. And as a result, we get a high incidence of disease. We could have tanks and tanks of medicine, but if we have no food it will do no good."

From a strictly medical point of view, the situation sounds bleak. And a note of urgency enters Ushewokunze's account as he appeals for help to meet the need for medicine, food and clothing.

But Ushewokunze doesn't approach the problems from a strictly medical point of view. As he said, "You can't

divorce politics from medicine." And ZANU confronts its imposing medical difficulties with political strategies and political optimism.

Self Reliance

For instance, the problem of feeding the thousands of people in the refugee camps: "We have embarked on a series of self-reliance schemes, agricultural projects so that people can grow their own food. But many of the projects were destroyed when the enemy attacked and poisoned our crops. So we're starting from the beginning again."

The theme of self-reliance comes through again as Ushewokunze explains how ZANU has built up its medical corps, starting from a beginning that consisted of just one doctor—himself.

"Having shown the example," Ushewokunze said wryly, "four other doctors left the big bad world and joined the struggle. So we have five doctors now. And we have some state registered nurses who came to join the armed struggle."

But for much of its medical work ZANU depends on people whom it has trained itself.

"We have a very extensive program for training medics," Ushewokunze said. "They form a type of 'barefoot doctor' group. We also have a group of public health workers who assist in organizing the location of wells, digging latrines and that sort of thing. And we train psychiatric advisors, nutritional assistants, first-aid workers, and laboratory assistants. We have got a very active training program. And we run a decentralized medical system."

If the system weren't decentralized as a matter of principle, it would certainly be as a matter of necessity. "We have got to deal with people along a thousand mile border and in three operational provinces," Ushewokunze pointed out. "Almost every military section that gets into the country has a medic. And we have to spread our medicine to include the people in the liberated and semi-liberated zones, the contested areas, and even the 'protected villages.' Often we sneak in at night when we hear someone is seriously ill."

Guerrilla Presence

Providing medical assistance is just one way that ZANU has moved to meet the needs of the people in the countryside of Zimbabwe, even as the white minority regime has abandoned what

minimal services it formerly provided. In the camps, Ushewokunze said, "we run schools from infant schools up through secondary school. We have nearly 8,000 students now. And we have schools in the liberated and semi-liberated areas as well. We have also opened up clinics and established our own civil administration.

"Our presence is being felt in three quarters of the country. The only places where our presence is diluted are the cities; and only 10 percent of the African population lives in the cities. Some 64 percent lives in the rural areas and 26 percent lives on white-owned farmsteads. And we do as we please in these areas."

The Rhodesian response in these areas has been to impose a dusk-to-dawn curfew. Anyone who strays more than 50 yards from home during those hours is shot on sight. And more and more people are being forced into "protected villages," which, he added, are really concentration camps. They were set up as a punitive measure by the Smith government which was trying to remove the people from the in-

fluence of the guerrillas. Because people in the villages were suffering, ZANU has sometimes attacked the guards and released the people (after pre-warning them of the attack) and helped them go to the camps.

South African Troops

There are many deserters from the army and the police force (which is a para-military organization), Dr. Ushewokunze said, who leave to join the guerrillas. After a period of repoliticization, they are useful to the struggle. White prisoners, mercenaries, come from many countries such as West Germany, France, Israel, South Africa, England and the United States. Contrary to Smith's policy they are not tortured but are kept in safety well behind the lines. South African military forces are still being used in Rhodesia, he added, only now they wear Rhodesian uniforms.

Ultimate Goals

Advances on the battlefield mean difficulties on the medical front. But both advances and difficulties mark

progress toward the ultimate goal—the full rights and responsibilities of freedom for the people of Zimbabwe.

"Of course we are fighting for political power, not for the use of once white-only toilets," Ushewokunze said. "We are fighting for control of the army, the police, the civil service, the judiciary, and lastly the parliament," all of which are now completely white-dominated.

Ushewokunze predicts with absolute confidence that victory will come "this side of 1980, unless there is intervention by the western powers on the side of Ian Smith." It may come through negotiations or through armed struggle. But in either case it will be determined by the strength of the guerrilla forces, "because you can't win at the negotiating table what you did not win on the battlefield." And he is certain that the Patriotic Front has the strength to win on both accounts.

"We know Smith's track record," he concluded with a broad smile. "He won't let us down... So the struggle will continue until final victory." □

ZIMBABWE

A New Wave of Terror

by Sister Janice McLaughlin

Recent reports indicate increased government repression of the African population since the signing of the Salisbury Accord on March 3. Despite concessions such as the release of 700 political detainees, news filtering through the regime's strict censorship reveals that the army and police have stepped up their terrorist tactics, making those opposed to the internal settlement their special targets.

The mounting violence has been acknowledged by one of the parties to the internal agreement. In a statement

Sister Janice McLaughlin, a member of the Maryknoll Sisters, worked in Rhodesia in 1977. She was a member of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission which prepared and published an extensive report (Rhodesia: The Propaganda War) documenting Smith regime atrocities. She was arrested and deported on September 22 after three weeks in prison.

on May 3. Muzorewa's party, the United African National Council (UANC) said that nothing had been done to create a climate conducive to holding free elections in the rural areas. "Security forces," the settlement declared, "especially the internal affairs district assistants are known to have intensified their ill treatment of the population."

The UANC made these accusations in the wake of the dismissal of Byron Hove, their appointee as Co-Minister of Justice, Law and Order in the interim government. He too had accused the security forces, and the police in particular, of using excessive brutality against the people, a factor in his abrupt dismissal on April 28, after only a few weeks in office.

The Hove affair illustrates the duality of the government position. On the one hand it makes a few concessions to win African support, while on the other it attacks any opposition with extreme repression. The release of 700 detainees, for instance, was accom-

panied by new arrests of those who oppose the internal settlement. According to a Voice of Zimbabwe radio broadcast from Maputo on May 3, "the number of those released is far less than of those who have been detained for protesting against the government."

Arrests and Assassinations

Among the protesters were students from the University of Rhodesia, one hundred of whom were arrested April 25 when they held public demonstrations in Salisbury.

Police and army repression was used to break up a large anti-internal settlement demonstration in Mpopoma Township in Bulawayo on April 2. According to press statements issued by ZAPU, more than 75,000 persons gathered to show their resentment against the settlement deal were dispersed by the police using tear gas.

Civilians continue to be the target of security forces. On April 3, the notorious Selous Scouts ambushed a car



Refugees in Mozambique: Their numbers are increasing

returning to Sinoia from the Bulawayo demonstration. All four occupants were killed including Mr. and Mrs. Tamangani and a relative, Norman Nkomo, who died in custody a few days after the incident. Mrs. Tamangani was the organizer for the internal wing of ZAPU, ANC-Z, for the Sinoia area and more than 100,000 people attended her funeral later in April. Condemning the murders, Joshua Nkomo said in Lusaka on April 4 that a "new wave of terrorism had been unleashed" and that the regime "even resorted to killing innocent relatives of those involved in political activities." He was referring as well to the murder of the parents of high-ranking ZAPU officials at the beginning of 1978. The mother of Dumiso Dabengwa, ZAPU's Chief of Logistics, was killed by Selous Scouts in January as was the 75-year-old father of Naison Ndlovu, who was a Director of Projects for ZAPU.

Another prominent political figure was killed on March 16. George Simbi, assistant treasurer of the People's Movement, ZANU's internal wing, was shot by Rhodesian troops near his farm at Gutu. The government claims

that he was breaking the curfew in the area. In his late 40's, Simbi was a well-known businessman and farmer and had been a member of ZANU's delegation to the 1976 Geneva conference.

Botswana Incursions

The police and army continue to violate the borders of neighboring countries. On April 27 Rhodesian troops allegedly pursuing guerrillas killed two women in Botswana who were working in the fields. This followed a border violation in February in which 15 Botswana soldiers were killed and nine others wounded by Rhodesian forces.

Massacres

Large scale massacres are also still taking place. According to a Voice of Rhodesia broadcast on May 3, more than 100 people were killed and many others wounded in a large raid on March 28, about 50 km from Beitbridge. The air attack backed by ground forces leveled a village which contained 317 civilians. The villagers were being punished for refusing to move into the so-called "protected villages." According to a ZANU official in

New York another 45 civilians were killed at Bindura early in May, when soldiers attacked from helicopters.

The "protected villages" continue to be a major source of controversy. Far from being dismantled, even more people are being herded into them. A week before the Salisbury accord was signed, Rhodesia's domestic radio service announced that 20,000 more people were being moved into seven new villages in the south of the country. A security force spokesman told the RBC news service, "The aim of the protected villages is to isolate terrorists and limit their subversion of local tribesman."

Catholic Commission Reports Atrocities

Reports of atrocities are still being made to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia. The April newsletter cited oppressive conditions in Maranke Tribal Trust Land since the imposition of stringent curfew regulations on January 20. It also described the January 30 arrest, for the third time, of Alexander Sakarombe, a secular priest working at St. Andrew's

Mission in the Marake area. He was held for 17 days and "subjected to cruel treatment."

The number of people fleeing across the border to escape the oppression has increased dramatically since

March 3. Sources in Botswana report that at least 200 people are arriving in Francistown every day. Refugee camps in Zambia now hold more than 35,000 people, and 300 to 400 are said to be crossing the border into Mozambique

on some days. It is unlikely that support for the internal settlement will grow. As the opposition hardens, the government is resorting to a mounting spiral of violence to enforce its will on the reluctant population. □

Cracks In New Regime

The picture that emerges two months after the launching of the transitional regime headed by Prime Minister Ian Smith and three Africans is of an administration that seems even more seriously threatened, both from within and outside the country, than the Smith government has been in the past. The inability of the administration to win support within the country despite its inclusion of black faces is dealing serious blows to its credibility. The visible intrigues that plague the new administration—between Smith and his black officials and among the blacks themselves—have already upset the fragile unity of the interim regime. Press reports indicate that this, too, has damaged already slim prospects for internal support.

Student Protests

Trouble became visible for the Salisbury signers soon after they began making forays into the countryside and abroad to test their support and to woo 6.7 million Zimbabweans and the international community. In mid-April, Bishop Abel Muzorewa traveled to Gaborone for meetings with Botswana President Seretse Khama. The bishop was clearing aiming first at a weak link in the five front-line states, since Botswana's economy is greatly dependent on income earned from the rail link it provides between Rhodesian industrial centers such as Bulawayo and South African ports.

But Muzorewa was greeted in Gaborone by a large demonstration of black university students. "You are supporting the racist Smith regime, you are supporting a betrayer," the students protested. According to a *Manchester Guardian* account, their shouts were accompanied by eggs and rotten meat; Muzorewa was forced to leave, and his sessions with Khama were rescheduled for Lobatse, 40 miles south of Botswana's capital city.

Inside Zimbabwe protesting students held two public demonstrations in Salisbury on April 24 and 25. Many were arrested as they marched outside

the Parliament building carrying banners reading "Down with the Sell-Out Pseudo Agreement," and condemned internal settlement leaders as "miserable power hungry birds of prey."

The students expressed support for Patriotic Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo in an open challenge to the leaders of the so-called majority rule settlement.

The character of the interim administration was somewhat crudely displayed on April 28, when the four-man executive council dismissed the transitional minister of justice, Byron Hove, because he had refused to retract statements he had made attacking the composition and actions of the police force and judiciary. Hove, a black, Rhodesian-born lawyer with a lucrative London practice, is by no means a radical, even by Rhodesian standards. Attacking an important weakness in the transitional government, he had simply called for what are essentially affirmative-action hiring practices in the Rhodesian police and judiciary system. Both are now dominated by whites, and the transitional agreement

has said that they, along with the security forces, will remain intact in that they must "be free from political interference."

Speaking after his removal had been ordered by the executive council, Hove acknowledged that there had been widespread skepticism about the interim government. "People in our country have been looking for evidence that the agreement is leading toward majority rule," he said. "Now they have evidence to the contrary. Far from adjusting toward majority rule, Smith and his machinery are trying to cheat us, to take us for a ride, and to cheat the whole world."

Reaction to the move came on two levels. There were immediate popular support demonstrations in Salisbury, which called for the removal of Hillary Squires, the white minister of justice who first denounced the black official. Bishop Muzorewa, who had appointed Hove, made public threats to quit the interim government if Hove was not reinstated. However, behind the scenes, according to a subsequent account by Hove himself, Muzorewa



Botswana demonstrators frighten Muzorewa off

Botswana Daily News

had supported an "expression of concern" by the executive council over Hove's remarks, in order to quiet fears among white settlers. Smith, the Bishop maintained, then used that as an excuse to call for Hove's dismissal in the name of the council.

Chief Chirau and the Rev. Nda-baningi, who with the Bishop and Smith make up the executive council that leads the interim regime, apparently supported the move from the first, largely because Hove was the Bishop's man. Soon after the firing Sithole announced that it would be "a complete waste of time to give further consideration to the Hove issue." Muzorewa, meanwhile, continued to protest. He failed to participate actively at the special session of the council held to review the matter; more importantly, he did not accompany his three counterparts on a key trip into the countryside May 9. Speaking about Sithole, Muzorewa said in a *New York Times* interview, "He would want to take advantage of [the Hove incident] in order to see his rival, in fact his most threatening rival, humiliated and if possible destroyed. And I would say the same thing of chief Chirau."

Stony Silence

Following the Hove dispute, Muzorewa promptly refused to join Smith, Chirau, and Sithole on their May 9 visit to Mrewa, a black community east of Salisbury. It was to be a demonstration of unity among the four men and a support-gathering propaganda session for the people of the all-black district.

Only 600 people showed for the meeting, and the reception, according to reports in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, was cold and without applause for the announcements that majority rule had been achieved. At the same time, Muzorewa's absence may have been a more calculated political move. He is a favorite in the Western press for his huge rallies in Salisbury, but observers note that outside the capital his support is very low. He may simply have realized that he wasn't missing much in Mrewa, save a little embarrassment.

Muzorewa's United African National Council announced May 14 that it would not withdraw from the interim regime. A UANC spokesman stated that the group "realized that withdrawal would result in the immediate collapse of the coalition."

But the Hove incident had already demonstrated the deep distrust and intrigue plaguing the transitional regime. From the first there were

numerous theories among government supporters that Hove was planted by Smith or by the British in order to discredit Muzorewa or to disrupt the transitional government. For its part, the Bishop's organization has speculated that Smith was attempting to force Muzorewa's withdrawal in order to forge a deal with Joshua Nkomo. Indeed, in announcing the decision to remain in the government, the UANC spokesman denounced "the conspiracy against the UANC within the transitional government." He added: "Why should we resign—that's what they [Smith, Chirau and Sithole] want us to do."

Losing Support

The Salisbury settlement seems to have been a costly one in terms of rural support—an all-important factor in waging a guerrilla struggle or in opposing one. And of the three Africans in the agreement, Muzorewa had the most to lose. But there have been more and more reports that rural support for "the boys in the forest"—the guerrillas fighting in the Patriotic Front alliance—has been growing. One example of several appeared in *The Times* (London) in late April. After interviews with a group of people in the Zwimba tribal trust land west of Salisbury, *The Times* wrote: "Almost all of them had in the past supported either Bishop Muzorewa or Rev. Nda-baningi Sithole, another member of the interim government, but had shifted their allegiance. One teacher, who like everyone else I spoke to declined to give his name for fear of reprisal, said: 'I used to support Muzorewa because I thought he was in touch with Mugabe and could get us genuine independence. But now I think he is as bad as Smith.'"

Such developments are of primary importance for the government's plan, announced May 2, to defuse the guerrilla struggle by offering amnesty to fighters returning home "in peace." But accounts from the countryside lend credence to the comments of the many observers who think that Muzorewa and others are being too optimistic for the success of the amnesty plan. There are said to be anywhere from 7,000 to 15,000 or more nationalists now fighting, with many more in training. It is not likely that they will do anything other than escalate the war they are certain to win in the long run.

For one thing, the new Smith government has not fulfilled one of the key demands of guerrilla representatives negotiating with Muzorewa's UANC

for any possible acceptance of amnesty: the release of political prisoners. These are said to include 77 members of the internal wing of ZAPU, Nkomo's organization, and senior officials of the People's Movement, the internal wing of Mugabe's ZANU. Salisbury has made a great political show of releasing some detainees; it claims to have let 700 out of jail. According to the *Washington Post*, it has announced that "the remaining 200 cases are being examined." Missionary sources say, however, that there are at least 1,500 political prisoners in Salisbury's jails. And that figure is very likely a conservative estimate.

There has been no sign whatever of a let-up in the armed struggle since the March settlement. The Patriotic Front seems far more concerned with hammering out its own political line than with the prospects of joining the Salisbury signers. There was one major guerrilla raid early in May, when nationalists attacked a resort hotel north of Umtali along the Mozambican border. There were two casualties.

False Promises

On May 16 the government announced the deaths of 50 Africans and the wounding of 24 others in what it said was a shootout between patrolling security forces and Patriotic Front guerrillas in the Gutu district near Fort Victoria. The government's official report said that its troops had stumbled on a meeting between Patriotic Front officials and local African representatives and had opened fire. It said the civilians were killed in the crossfire when Front fighters counterattacked.

Black witnesses at the meeting disputed the government report the day after it was issued. They said that there was only one guerrilla present at the meeting of some 200 African farmers, and that the only firing during the incident came from government guns. They also disputed the official figures on the death toll issued in Salisbury, claiming to have counted 94 bodies after the five-minute massacre was over. Some witnesses said that grenades were also thrown into the unarmed crowd. Africans in the region are said to favor heavily the Mugabe faction of the Patriotic Front. Both ZANU and ZAPU were technically legalized in Rhodesia at about the same time the government announced its amnesty program, but this latest episode confirms suspicions that such government offers are made only for propaganda purposes and reflect no change in policy. □

South Africa Launches Attack On SWAPO in Angola


6 a.m., May 4, at a refugee transit camp in southern Angola. The sound of planes breaks the morning calm. Down from the sky come bombs, paratroopers, and an arsenal of heavy weapons. South Africa is teaching another lesson on the costs of fighting for liberation. Under fire from Angolan and SWAPO forces they withdraw six hours later leaving 600 Namibians and Angolans dead, and hundreds more wounded.

Three thousand people, including 500 primary school-aged children, were housed that day in the SWAPO transit camp near Cassinga, 155 miles north of the Namibian-Angolan border. Many of those killed had arrived from Namibia only a few days before the attack. For most refugees the transit camp was only a first stop after their flight from South African-occupied Namibia. From there they would go on to other camps or countries for training or to a permanent refugee camp. The camp itself consisted of a few permanent buildings for the school and clinic, and numerous large tents and small thatched wooden structures which the refugees had built for shelter. Only their charred ruins remain.

Eye Witness Reports

Luanda-based reporters flown by the Angolan government to the site of the massacre interviewed survivors and saw first hand what the South African troops and planes had left behind. Sara Rodrigues writing for the *Guardian* reports the slaughter:

A second mass grave contains 460 dead. [The first held 122 bodies. —Ed.] It was a terrible thing to look upon as I arrived here shortly after the attack. Brightly colored cotton frocks of the young girls; jeans, checkered shirts of the boys; a few khaki uniforms, and the swollen bodies of the dead. The victims were mostly very young, and had no defense. They had left home a few days or weeks previously to learn how to resist, how to organize for liberation. But before they had learned, the racist regime coldly murdered them....



SWAPO base in Cunene under attack

Immediately after the bombing began, survivors told us, four US-made C-130 Hercules transport planes began dropping South African paratroopers at different points around the camp. Also parachuted in were land mines, mortars and other weapons. The paratroopers—who included some Portuguese mercenaries and whites of another nationality whose language the Namibians could not identify—swiftly blocked off the entrance and exit to the camp with anti-vehicle land mines.

As they moved in on the camp's population, some ran to take cover in trenches dug around the camp perimeter when it was set up two years ago. They were hauled out by the South African forces and shot at point-blank range. Pools of dried blood and the discarded rubber gloves of the burial teams lay in the trenches, silent witnesses to what wounded survivors told us.

Many of the camp residents had run westward, toward a shallow river. The paratroopers pursued them, shooting many.

The camp was not camouflaged at all but located on a low hill in open coun-

try. Its distance from the border—and the front—was considered its main protection. The invaders were finally repelled by a SWAPO unit which happened to be in the camp in transit to the front, aided by Angolan forces stationed in the nearby town of Cassinga. SWAPO estimates that South Africa may have lost 40 dead and about 100 wounded. When they retreated, the South Africans were careful to take all their casualties with them.

Angolan military planes began evacuating the wounded the same day. "Angolan and Cuban medical teams performed emergency surgery," writes Rodrigues, "while blood donors rushed to hospitals in the capital in response to radio appeals. Extra medical supplies were flown to the south to major hospitals dealing with the most critically injured."

Murderous Bombings

Interviewing survivors at the Luanda airport three days later, a correspondent of the French daily *Le Monde* reported that planeloads of wounded were still arriving, and wrote:

The majority of the wounded, a large number of them young children and infants, are first cared for at the airport before being transported

to the military hospital by the Angolan health corps and by Cuban aides from the medical service.

In a corner of the departure lounge, transformed into a temporary hospital, an Angolan woman feeds a baby several months old that was wounded in the arm by a bomb splinter. The mother is dead, she thinks, unless she had been moved to a village near Cassinga.

The wounded are dazed, their eyes full of terror. Those who can reply to the questions confirm that the first bombings, between 7 and 8 in the morning, were the most murderous. One young woman describes the dropping of paratroops on the village after the first attack by Mirage jets. . . . A young man asks for an interpreter to thank the Cuban orderly who is taking care of him 'for all that he has done.' . . .

One man recalls how, with several others, he tried to hide from the first bombs, some of them in the woods, others in the bed of a river. The South African soldiers dislodged them, thus putting them in the path of the invasion.

Military Camps

Simultaneous with the blitzkrieg attack on the refugee camp, South Africa launched a large scale air and group assault on some SWAPO military camps in Angola's Cunene Province near the border. Fighting continued for 48 hours in this area, 15 miles inside Angola near the villages of Dombondola, Cuamato and Tchetequere. "Softened up" first by heavy bombing, the South Africans put 40 tanks and many ground troops into action. Reports indicate that SWAPO, the Angolan army FAPLA, and Angolan border guards fought hard and well despite the South African army advantages of surprise and superior armament.

Cripple SWAPO


The raid was clearly part of a plan to cripple SWAPO which remains the major obstacle to South Africa's puppet solution for Namibia. Pretoria fears that really free elections would result in a SWAPO victory. Further, SWAPO has recently stepped up its military campaign in the north of the country where the ongoing war represents a significant drain on South Africa's military manpower.

In preparation for its version of "free elections" South Africa has therefore begun a systematic program inside

Namibia to discredit SWAPO's aims and to eliminate its leadership. A government-backed press campaign portrays SWAPO as interested only in war, terrorism, and violence, and not at all interested in a negotiated settlement. On April 18, Marthinus Steyn, South Africa's Administrator General for Namibia, who rules by decree, issued another of his proclamations, AG 26, entitled "Provisions for the Detention of Persons in order to prevent Political Violence and Intimidation." Having thereby given himself the legal means to jail people indefinitely without having to be bothered with formalities of court of law, Steyn ordered the detention of leading SWAPO militants. Information available in New York in early May indicated that at least 22 of SWAPO's national, regional, and local leaders had been detained, including four members of its national executive. Others had gone underground or slipped out of the country, including the national secretary of SWAPO's Youth League, Nashilongo Taapopi.

The May 4 attack on SWAPO's military base camps in Cunene Province was intended to deal a direct blow against the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) itself. Commenting on PLAN's strength, a Swedish journalist Per Sanden recently returned from two months of covering SWAPO's military operations in Namibia and Angola, and reported 7,000 to 10,000 Namibians under arms in the base camps he visited. He found a string of base camps stretching 100 miles into Angola.

Sanden was also able to interview Johan van der Merh, the 24-year-old South African prisoner of war captured



South African soldiers with weapons captured from SWAPO

February 18 in a SWAPO attack on a South African camp at Elundu. Van der Merh told Sanden he was surprised at the good treatment he had received from SWAPO, and explained that under South African draft laws he had no choice but to go and fight against SWAPO.

The attack on SWAPO's camps served some additional purposes. It was designed to punish Angola for help already given to SWAPO and as a warning of future reprisals if this solidarity with the Namibian people is maintained. The South African military demonstrated its alleged all-powerfulness to those who have fled its repression. This invasion of Angola could also serve as a sop to South African political forces to the right of Vorster, who have attacked the recent negotiations over a political settlement in Namibia as a sellout of white interests. □

South African Attack Knocks Out Settlement Talks

Andrew Young must be banging his head against a wall. Apparently aware that an "internal" South African settlement in Namibia without SWAPO would lead to a drastic escalation in the war there, he and other Western diplomats have worked relentlessly to get both SWAPO and South Africa to agree to their version of independence for Namibia. Just when he might have felt he could relax a bit after South

Africa recently announced its acceptance of the Western proposal, the South Africans invaded Angola, killing close to 600 Namibian refugees and some Angolans.

The UN Security Council, called into session at the request of Angola, condemned the invasion but stopped short of imposing sanctions while warning that it would take such steps if South Africa repeated its action.



Map published in South African press proudly shows presence of troops along border.

SWAPO president Sam Nujoma left New York, ending any chances now for further talks. And all the State Department could do was muster a grossly understated response. "We do not feel that the raid was justified under the circumstances," said spokesman Hodding Carter III. "We think that the raid obviously had an unfortunate effect on the talks."

General Assembly Session

The South African raid came just after the UN General Assembly's special session on Namibia had ended May 2. Although the assembly had voted 119-0 in favor of a resolution that condemned South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and urged the Security Council to adopt comprehensive economic sanctions against the apartheid regime, most diplomatic sources said events surrounding the assembly had placed SWAPO on the defensive.

South Africa had announced its agreement to the Western package as the assembly began. With that, the real diplomatic maneuvering began outside the stylish tranquility of the General Assembly hall where deliberations were virtually *pro forma*.

By most accounts, SWAPO came under intense pressure from African countries including the front-line

states as well as the West, to compromise and accept the Western proposals.

SWAPO Position

SWAPO has raised basically four objections to the West's plan. It wants the residual force of South African troops stationed in southern Namibia, not near the northern border. It wants the proposals to spell out more precisely the superiority of the UN Representative in Namibia over the South African Administrator General during the transition period to independence. Further, it wants the UN military force to accept the role of policing the territory. Presently the West's plan leaves that power with the South African police.

Finally SWAPO wants the status of Walvis Bay as Namibian territory included in the agreements. In 1977 South Africa claimed the territory's only deep water port as part of its own Cape Province, and the Western powers want the resolution of that question put off for now.

Diplomatic sources say that even the front-line states have advised SWAPO to press only on its demand for Walvis Bay. These sources say that the Western powers had been prepared to issue a joint statement with SWAPO acknowledging Walvis Bay's historic, economic and cultural link with Namibia, but SWAPO refused, pressing instead for a stronger, unequivocal statement. The West has been reluctant, fearing that such a statement might cause South Africa to back off an agreement.

No Compromise

South Africa chose not to attempt to address the General Assembly but did reiterate its position in a letter to the UN Secretary General. "Under international law," South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha claimed, "South Africa has sovereignty over Walvis Bay. Whatever arrangement might be reached between South Africa and a duly elected government of an independent Southwest Africa is a matter for these two governments." Warning of his government's unwillingness to see the Western package further modified, Botha asserted, "The final product is delicately balanced and cannot be disturbed without wrecking the edifice."

The South Africans made their letter public just as the US representative,

Donald McHenry, took the podium to reiterate the US position and announce that further talks with SWAPO would begin after the General Assembly concluded its deliberations. Sources said that the US had worked furiously to reach an agreement with SWAPO in the final days of the assembly. It had been expected that the Security Council would take up the question of Namibia quickly. Without SWAPO's blessing, any Security Council resolution would likely be vetoed by the Soviet Union. That could force the Western powers into open support for a South African internal settlement, and at least publicly, the US is fearful of such a stance.

Security Council Meets

Immediately Angola called for a session of the Security Council which met on May 5 and 6. Angola's representative, Elísio de Figueiredo, said that South Africa's aggression had been aimed both at destroying SWAPO, and destabilizing the situation inside Angola. He also pointed out that abstention by the Western powers on the General Assembly vote—21 countries abstained—gave Pretoria the encouragement it needed to embark on the invasion of Angola.

Figueiredo added that South Africa was planning a large-scale invasion of Angola this year. He reported that South Africa had reinforced its troops with thousands of mercenaries and that it had shipped large quantities of ammunition to Namibia.

Shielding South Africa

Proceedings at the UN Security Council session revealed yet again Western reluctance to take strong measures against South Africa. The five powers who have been pushing the "internal" sellout solution on SWAPO stood knee-deep in crocodile tears as they condemned the Pretoria regime's action while skillfully blocking the African group's plan to get the Security Council to implement immediate sanctions against South Africa.

Accusations were made at the session that the five had colluded with South Africa in the invasion. A *New York Times* editorial even helpfully suggested a motive: "The raid also in effect notified the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), whose camps it hit: Accept the deal or risk a more savage war." US officials issued their denials of involvement in an atmosphere of great cynicism, and

suspensions were heightened with the publication in mid-May of *In Search of Enemies*, ex-CIA agent John Stockwell's account of the agency's involvement in Angola in 1975-76, which made it clear that the agency had consistently lied to Congress, and ignored certain administration directives, while carrying on its secret war in Angola.

Resolution Adopted

The resolution unanimously adopted by the Security Council strongly condemned the armed invasion and demanded immediate withdrawal of all

South African forces from Angola. Delaying any immediate action it called on the Council to meet and consider "adoption of more effective measures"—generally considered to mean economic sanctions and an oil embargo in the event of further South African attacks on Angola.

A defiant South Africa responded by announcing on May 10 that it would repeat the strike against Angola if SWAPO continued its attacks.

SWAPO Cancels Talks

SWAPO canceled further talks after the Security Council session. In its

statement SWAPO said that recent "sinister developments" suggested that "intrigues are afoot to try to prevent Namibia attaining authentic independence."

The US has not, however, given up hope of achieving a "settlement" for Namibia. "The United States continues to hope that SWAPO will accept the Western plan for a settlement," one State Department spokesperson said. Another official conceded, "We're in sort of a holding pattern now," adding that the West had now to "recapture the momentum we had built up on our proposal." □

MOZAMBIQUE

Flooding in the Zambezi River Valley

By Barbara Barnes

For five days the three Chinsomba children and their parents sat huddled together on the roof of their small home waiting to be rescued from the swirling flood waters of the Zambezi River. Finally a barge, crammed full with other peasant families and livestock, maneuvered its way among the roof and tree tops to reach them.

The Chinsomba's experience was not unlike that of almost 219,000 other Mozambican peasants who lost everything in the March 1978 floods along the Zambezi. A land area stretching from the Cahora Bassa dam in northwestern Tete down through central Sofala Province to the sea at the southern edge of Zambezia Province was totally devastated and at least 45 people drowned.

The human suffering and economic loss has been enormous. At a meeting with flood victims in Sofala Province, Minister of Development and Economic Planning Marcelino dos Santos explained the hard reality. "Everything that you have made and cultivated will be consumed by the river and not by you and your children."

The Toll

The Zambezi Valley floods are believed to have been the worst in this

Barbara Barnes, a member of the Southern Africa collective, is currently teaching in Mozambique.

century. 937,350 acres of maize, cotton, groundnuts, sunflower, and beans have been destroyed. Sugar cane at the economically important Sena Sugar Estates was submerged. More than 2,000 head of cattle were drowned, and the total cost in loss of cattle, goats, and chickens is estimated at more than one and a half million dollars.

Transportation in the devastated areas is in disarray. Bridges, railroad lines, and roads have disappeared into the flowing river. More than 150 schools and commercial establishments have also been destroyed.

Party Militants Act Quickly

The swift action of rescue teams led by FRELIMO party militants prevented more damage from occurring. They evacuated thousands of families to higher ground, rounding up cattle and other livestock to transport them, often by boat, away from the rising flood waters. Round the clock efforts to reinforce dikes along the Zambezi River were also generally successful.

Solidarity with the flood victims backed up by contributions have come from worker and peasant organizations throughout Mozambique. For example, workers in a Beira factory have given 690 shirts and sweaters and 100 pairs of trousers. Peasants in Gaza Province, affected by similar floods last

year, are also donating money and goods.

The floods were caused by extremely heavy rains in northern Mozambique and Zambia which led to the opening of the flood gates at the Cahora Bassa dam complex and the flooding of the Zambezi Valley. The opening of flood gates at the Kariba dam complex in Zambia a short time earlier created a quick and intense build up of pressure at Cahora Bassa, forcing engineers there to open Cahora Bassa's flood gates as well.

Assistance Requested

In early April the Mozambique government appealed to the international community for assistance for the flood victims. Food, clothing, educational materials, seeds, tools, and medical supplies are needed for a ten month period, the estimated time which it will take for those who have lost their homes to re-establish themselves. In the interim at least 158,000 adults and 60,000 children must be provided for.

Medical problems in the part of the country devastated by the floods are potentially very serious. These areas already have a high incidence of malaria. With the receding flood waters, pools of stagnant water will provide excellent breeding ground for mosquitos. The materials requested to

prevent and fight disease include 400 Hudson reverse pumps, 50 Fontana insecticide application instruments and insecticides, and 50 million anti-malaria tablets.

An inter-provincial commission has been set up in Beira to coordinate relief for the flood victims. The National Commission for Communal Villages is also working to resettle as many of the flood victims as possible in communal villages where government support for agricultural production, health care and education can be more easily provided. Thousands of families have already begun to build new lives, working together to construct communal villages.

After floods last year in Gaza Province, which took a similar toll in loss of lives and property, many new communal villages were created. People who had previously lived in isolated homesteads joined together and, after a year of hard work, the quality of their lives, in terms of production and social services, has improved measurably. The hope here is for the people in the Zambezi Valley to advance now in the same way. □

Materials Requested By the Mozambique Government For Flood Victims in the Zambezi Valley

- 43,603 tons of foodstuffs, such as dried fish, tinned meat, tinned fish, condensed milk, vegetable oil, beans, maize, rice
- 243,783 capulanas and blouses
- 153,282 pairs of shoes
- 120,000 pairs of trousers, dresses, and shirts
- 500 tons of soap
- 140,000 hoes
- 50,000 machetes
- 50,000 axes
- 300,000 notebooks for school children
- 160,000 pencils
- 300 blackboards
- 1,000 boxes of chalk
- 30,000 erasers
- 2,190 tons of maize, bean, groundnut, sesame, tomato, pumpkin, sunflower, and green vegetable seeds
- 400 Hudson reverse pumps
- 50 Fontana insecticide application instruments and insecticides
- 50 million chloriquine or amodiaquine anti-malarial tablets
- 500,000 millilitres of chloroquine syrup
- 50 first aid kits
- aspirin, penicillin, sulfaguanidine, tetracycline, and anti-tetanus serum

For further information on handling funds and material aid, contact Paul Irish, Africa Fund, 305 East 46th St., New York, NY, 10010.

 UNITED STATES

Namibia Policy Leaves Corporations Unchecked

Anglo Report Documents Conditions in US-Owned Mines

US State Department policy officially discourages all US investment in Namibia while the country remains illegally occupied and governed by South Africa. The State Department formulated this policy in 1970 after the US had backed decisions by the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice which called for an end to foreign investment in the mineral-rich land.

Recent evidence, however, indicates that American officials have repeatedly offered private encouragement and support to the American

mining giants operating in Namibia in defiance of international law.

And other recently revealed evidence indicates that the largest mining operation in Namibia, which is American owned, has been paying what could best be described as starvation wages to its African employees.

Tsumeb Mines

Through their two-thirds ownership of the Tsumeb Corporation, Namibia's largest mining operation, two US companies, American Metal Climax (AMAX) and Newmont Mining Corpo-

ration continue to bolster the apartheid regime in Namibia. Each of the US corporations owns some 30 percent of Tsumeb stock and appoints six members to the 15-person Tsumeb board. In addition Newmont acts as manager of the operation.

The US Commerce Department recently estimated that the \$45 million AMAX/Newmont stake in Tsumeb represents about 90 percent of all US investment in Namibia and almost half of all foreign investment there. Tsumeb remains the largest single employer of African labor in Namibia, quartering most of its 5000 black miners in austere barracks near the mines, hundreds of miles away from the miners' wives and children who are forced to live in the Ovamboland bantustan.

Bad Conditions

Now in a recently discovered report prepared in connection with potential negotiations to buy out AMAX's share of Tsumeb, an official of the Anglo-American Corporation, South Africa's largest mining company, has said that Tsumeb failed to pay its African employees adequate wages. The report also said Tsumeb failed to place African workers in any but the lowest jobs. Further, according to the report, it appears likely that Tsumeb is evading US taxes.


The Anglo report, submitted in June 1975 by Anglo official J. Ainsworth, was uncovered by Renfrew Christie, a former South African student leader, in the course of his doctoral research at Oxford University. It substantiates repeated claims by various church groups and others about poor conditions at Tsumeb.

In discussing what costs Anglo would incur if it should buy out AMAX's share in Tsumeb, the Anglo report comments, "It was felt that the present wages paid to black workers at Tsumeb are out of line with those paid in similar operations in southern Africa and in the base case it has been assumed that wages would have to be doubled to bring them into line," a move that the report estimates would cost at least \$2.8 million a year.

In a breakdown of wages, the Anglo report shows that the lowest paid African worker at Tsumeb as of April 1, 1975, was being paid about \$27 a month. In that year, African miners in South Africa were averaging about \$107 a month while the poverty level for an urban African family was estimated to be \$162 per month.

The Anglo report says that at Tsumeb, "no effective use is made of black labor other than as laborers, carriers of tools and vehicle drivers... Formalized training of black labor is very limited except for drivers of vehicles." Even then, the report reveals, the company does not want to pay black workers commensurate with their skills.

Tsumeb, while maintaining that things have improved of late, has not disputed statistics compiled by church groups which show that over the past 30 years, blacks have received less than 5 percent of all wages while making up more than 80 percent of the Tsumeb work force. Newmont officials refused to comment on the Christie



Tsumeb workers break for lunch

UN/Raynor

revelations, claiming "no knowledge" of the documents.

Primitive Housing

In addition to its comments on the inadequacies of African wage scales and training programs, the Anglo report also contained observations on housing and recreational facilities. Until last year, no African workers were permitted to bring their families to the mine, but were required to live in hostels provided by the company.

In all Tsumeb operations, the report said, "the housing standards are primitive." Aside from one swimming pool at one of three mines, the report said that "the only recreational facilities are a primitive soccer field and an open cinema at each hostel area." It suggested that \$5.7 million would be needed to bring housing, recreational and training facilities up to what Anglo regarded as acceptable levels.

Tax Issues

The Anglo report also indicates that Tsumeb has probably been avoiding paying US tax. It notes that US tax authorities some years ago claimed that Tsumeb should be paying US taxes because it carried on business in the US. The government was demanding payment of more than \$26 million but settled for almost \$1.3 million, plus interest, the report said.

According to a 1973 report on Tsumeb prepared for the Corporate Information Center of the National Council of Churches, through 1971, AMAX and Newmont had received a total of about \$165 million in dividends from Tsumeb and through 1969 Tsumeb had paid more than \$140 million in taxes to the South African government. Church estimates put Tsumeb revenues over the past 30 years at close to \$2 billion. According to the Anglo report, net profits for the years 1952-74 were \$256 million.

There have been numerous legislative and other proposals that the US no longer grant US corporations operating in Namibia tax credits for the taxes paid to the illegal South African government. The Administration has refused to revoke the credits, despite a 1973 Treasury Department ruling that such a revocation would be legal.

Many who have followed and supported the Namibian people's struggle for independence have cited this inaction as only one example of the ambiguity of official US policy, which, while "discouraging" all investment in Namibia, leaves unclear what type of American interests the US government would attempt to protect in the event of expropriation by a future independent Namibian government.

Cordial Relations

Commenting on actual policy a vice president of Newmont, Tsumeb's managing company recently said that State Department officials have offered repeated informal assurances that the US government stands ready to offer full protection to all of the company's Tsumeb operations. The vice president said that these assurances cover

all facilities—such as the \$5 million complex at Matchless—which have been completed since the 1970 US policy announcement. State Department officials deny that Newmont has received such assurances.

In Congressional testimony, State Department officials have described their contacts with the US firms operating in Namibia as limited to occa-

sional letters restating US policy. But a Newmont vice president describes his company's relations with State as cordial, and says he contacts the State Department regularly by telephone. Sometimes, the Newmont official says, he receives calls from Africa desk personnel requesting information from Tsumeb on the latest political developments in the occupied area. □



House Committee Votes Ex-Im Cutoff

On April 26 and May 1 the Banking Committee of the House of Representatives voted to end all Export-Import Bank insurance, guarantees and credits for South Africa until the President determines that there is "significant progress toward the elimination of apartheid." The margin of victory on the measure, which had been introduced in the subcommittee on International Finance by Paul Tsongas (D.-Mass.), was substantial, 28-16 against a motion to strike.

This vote represents the first time any Congressional committee has ever voted for an economic disengagement measure aimed at South Africa. Popular pressure, capitalizing on the groundswell of campus and labor union interest, helped make this vote an exciting win.

South Africa's lobbyists, headed by Donald deKieffer, were caught off guard at first and played hard catch-up ball. Some representatives from heavily industrialized areas with southern Africa commercial links came out siding with the *apartheid* regime. Some like Hannaford and Patterson of California, Moorhead of Pittsburgh and Ashely of Ohio who voted against Tsongas have had a generally good record on African issues. But economic interests didn't always prove decisive. Vento of St. Paul and Blanchard of Michigan, who had initially been

against the South Africa cutoff, were convinced to support it in the end by the unique character of South African repression.

The Ex-Im Bank bill will probably reach the floor for a vote in early June, where it is given a fair chance of passage given the strong Committee endorsement.

In the Senate, Riegle of Michigan offered the "Tsongas amendment" in the Banking Committee on May 3, but an amendment by Stevenson of Illinois requiring the President to construct a list of countries eligible for Ex-Im Bank assistance was adopted instead. Senator Clark, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on African Affairs, is facing a very tough battle for his Senate seat in Iowa, so he may be hesitant to take on a big fight on the Export-Import Bank on the Senate floor. However, Senate action will depend mostly on how strong a showing is made in the full House vote.

House Moves Against Mozambique, Angola

Congressional conservatives are again trying to block US aid going to Mozambique or Angola, although the prohibition they are advocating appears so far to be less stringent than that enacted last year.

The Carter Administration requested \$500,000 in the fiscal year 1979 foreign aid bill for a training program in Mozambique. No aid was requested for Angola, since the US still does not officially recognize the MPLA-led government. Last year, Congress prohibited all bilateral aid to either country, and got the Carter Administration to agree to vote against assistance to Mozambique or Angola in international financial institutions such as the World Bank.

Republican conservative Robert Bauman of Maryland's eastern shore

proposed an amendment to this year's foreign aid authorization bill on May 12 preventing aid from being given to Mozambique and Angola unless the President decides that the aid "would further the foreign policy interests of the United States." The amendment was accepted with little objections from liberals, since the loophole allows aid to go through anyway. A more restrictive amendment without a Presidential waiver was then adopted in regard to Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba and Uganda similar to the one in which Angola and Mozambique were included last year.

The debate on the provision was terrible—Rep. Derwinski of Illinois called the Patriotic Front "Marxist murderers." But it appears that, despite their rhetoric, conservatives interested in southern Africa have come to see the importance of trying to cultivate relationships with the front-line states, and have therefore softened the aid prohibition.

A fight still lies ahead, though, on the foreign aid appropriations bill. The relatively conservative Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee has already adopted an amendment denying all direct aid to Mozambique or Angola, without a Presidential waiver. It is not yet clear whether liberals will feel they have the strength to delete this provision from the bill when it reaches the floor. The Senate has not yet become involved in the debate over southern African aid, because of the long delay caused by the Panama Canal debate.

If both amendments were to be passed as they now stand, the more restrictive language on the appropriations bill would be applied, leaving the situation much as it was a year ago. The only improvement would be that aid could go through United Nations agencies to Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique, which was twice prohibited this year.

'Time Sure Flies By Fast When You Are Having Fun...'

US Merc Writes Home

The following two letters, written by a US mercenary fighting in Rhodesia, were sent to us by one of our readers.

17 March 1978

Hello:

Time sure flies by fast when you are having fun. I've been back since middle January and am finally getting around to saying hello to friends again.

Militarily speaking things have remained basically the same. Since as soldiers we are not politically oriented, or shouldn't be, we don't have any real insight or inside into the settlement that has been worked out. I only know that if things don't work out now, we are gonna be in big trouble. Anything can happen as we see it. We are frightfully outnumbered by quantity, but not quality, which is where our strength lies.

This is still an exciting vital place to be historically, and I am motivated by that sense. We have a number of things at stake here and particularly the foreigners realize our place in history.

In terms of the future, as have most of us, I have just decided to flow with the current. It is impossible to project your own aspirations on to this uncertainty. Traditional goals and values must be set aside for the time being and let things happen around you.

Life in town, 10 days every 6 weeks, is fun. On the edge of collapse everyone has turned to partying. More clubs now than ever before in Rhodesia's history. With all the men in the bush at various and extended periods there are many women around so that is also a bonanza. Although I keep far away from married types, unfair to hubbie and dangerous—because everyone carries guns and an angry husband is to be avoided I always say.

Hope you are well and prosperous.

17 March 1978

Howdy:

Yah well, I'm sure you've seen that we've set up an internally based black interim government. The world won't recognize it so we are still in the shit.

Better for me. I'd love to have a go at the Cubans. I'm a paratrooper here now, but no \$110 a month in this place. For free baby. Drop at 500 feet, very low I can assure you. About 30 sec in the air—hard landings. With 50 lbs. of kit too. WOW!

I'm cool but have no idea what the future will bring. Have just thrown things to the wind. I really have no idea and don't feel very anxious about it. Funny, in a very tense arrangement I'm very relaxed. Only uptight in town. I'm so strange. Many women these days, but because town is so small, run into ex's all over the place. Lately been seeing a Hungarian from Argentina—good sex and 4 languages. But they don't wait around for you. 6 weeks is a long time to them. The amazing thing is that I've become very disoriented lately. Culture or future shock has set in. Many of my old values have been inverted. Right and wrong no longer exists in its usual framework. Its a very tenuous thing dependent on situation and society. I'm beginning to believe in strength more than I used to. That determines right and wrong. If reaching a goal is all important—and to a soldier that is your only consideration—then you are left with very clear cut decisions. Anything goes. Sorry I am a bit [word omitted] but I see leaders pretend to represent their constituency then fail to act in any way but to aggrandize themselves. Newspaper that should act as a public informer—but tell blatant lies. Your strength lies in your own beliefs and no one, not even governments, should act in your behalf. Feeling a bit of an anarchist.

Well, naturally, I hope you are cool but I think Hollywood is a difficult place to do that in. Any words of encouragement would sound patronizing so take that for granted. Remember what Oscar Wilde said, paraphrasing: "It doesn't matter if someone is good or bad, just so they are interesting."

Face down in gravy,
C.

BANK CAMPAIGN PROGRESS... Unions, church groups, and individuals have withdrawn at least \$35 million from banks doing business with South Africa.

On March 21, anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, Boston's Church of the Covenant announced withdrawal of \$50,000 from First Boston, and in Chicago a cultural association withdrew \$10,000 from First National Chicago. In Minneapolis, the announcement that over \$1 million had been withdrawn from Northwestern National Bank was followed within an hour by the bank's announcing a new policy prohibiting Krugerrand sales and loans to the South African government.

In Rochester demonstrators protested at branches of New York-based banks involved in South Africa.

Other actions have taken place in many parts of the world, including England, Canada, Ireland, and Holland. Nigeria's government has instructed its public sector agencies to withdraw their funds from Barclays Bank to protest its activities in South Africa.

At the spring stockholders' meeting Manufacturers Hanover Corporation shareholders defeated a United Church of Christ resolution that would have prohibited the bank holding company from making loans to the South African government and its agencies. The UCC resolution did receive the largest positive vote of the four minority shareholders' proposals on the agenda—5 percent.

Shareholders of J.P. Morgan and Co., holding company for Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., defeated a proposal to get the bank to disclose loans made to South Africa since 1970. When Tim Smith of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility said he understood that Morgan has a de facto moratorium on loans to the South African government, bank Chairman Walter Page declined to deny his allegation, replying only, "I don't know how you learned that."

TCLSAC activists in Canada have slipped 80,000 dummy bank slips into Toronto banks in recent months. Exact

THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA
SAVINGS ACCOUNT
DEPOSIT SLIP

YOU SHOULD SEE THAT YOUR DEPOSIT IS ENTERED IN YOUR PASS BOOK WHEN MADE, OR YOU SHOULD PRESENT YOUR DEPOSIT SLIP IN DUPLICATE AND REQUEST THE TELLER TO RECEIPT AND RETURN THE DUPLICATE COPY.

DATE: DEPOSITOR'S INITIALS: TELLER:

STOP!

Do you know where your money is going?

CREDIT ACCOUNT OF: CUSTOMER'S SIGNATURE:

TURN OVER TO FIND OUT.

ACCOUNT NO.:

LIST CHEQUES IN COLUMN 1 AND IN COLUMN 2 WHEN NECESSARY

TOTAL CANADIAN CASH (INCL. COUPONS):

U.S. CASH: CON. EQUIV.:

SUB-TOTAL:

LESS CASH RECEIVED:

NET DEPOSIT:

FORM 1732 (12 76)



replicas of the banks' deposit and withdrawal slips, they contain information about bank loans to South Africa. The tactic seems to have the tacit support of some bank tellers, despite bank management instructions to report 'slippers.' Bank headquarters have been circulating memos justifying South African loans in all regions of Canada.

US 'slippers' are circulating Chemical Bank forms superimposed with the hand-written sentence "Racism is a Chemical reaction."

STOCKHOLDERS SPEAK . . . An unofficial tally of 1978 stockholder actions shows the following results: First National Bank of Boston shareholders won a sizable 8.2 percent favorable vote, an impressive achievement. Activist stockholders of Bank of America came in with 5 percent in favor; Citicorp, with 4.6 percent; Continental Illinois, with 7.2 percent; Eastman Kodak, with 4.8 percent; First Chicago 4.5 percent; Manufacturers Hanover, 5.51 percent; Texaco,

under 3 percent; Union Carbide, 4.96 percent; and US Steel, 5.77 percent.

All resolutions winning 3 percent favorable votes or more may be brought up again at next year's shareholder meetings. A resolution receiving consideration for a second year must receive a 6 percent favorable vote. Thus Manufacturers Hanover, Texaco, and Union Carbide resolutions, second-timers in 1978, cannot be replaced on the 1979 agenda, but the others may.

The first formal shareholder protest over Eastman Kodak's role in South Africa failed to produce any concessions from the corporation, which declared its intention to continue doing business with the South African government. An American Baptist Churches-sponsored resolution would have barred Kodak from selling photographic products to the South African government. Kodak's chairman said the company has been complying with US trade restrictions involving South Africa and sees no reason to go beyond them.

About 5 million Kodak shares voted in favor of the South Africa resolution and 103 million against it.

As demonstrators picketed the North Carolina National Bank's annual meeting in Raleigh, stockholders questioned the bank's loans to South African corporations—reported to total \$1.6 million. Bank officials responded by saying loan decisions are based on economic rather than political considerations.

Trustees of Miami University (Ohio) voted in April to divest stock of South Africa-related companies valued at around \$150,000.

AID GIVEN AND SOUGHT . . . The Boston Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa has donated \$1,000 worth of surgical equipment to the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front. Dr. Paul Epstein and Andy Epstein, a nurse, presented the equipment to the Patriotic Front offices in Maputo soon after arriving there to work for the Mozambique Health Service.

The Central Church of Orange, Massachusetts, has raised \$1,000 for a windmill for drought-stricken Cape Verde.

Two SWAPO members are about to begin technical training in running a printshop in Luanda. Liberation Support Movement has raised funds to supply the shop with basic equipment and now seeks \$5,000 more to cover the trainees' living expenses and supplies.

ALBANY ACTION . . . With the support of the Black and Puerto Rican Legislative Caucus, New York State Assemblyman Albert Vann and Senator Major R. Owens have introduced a bill which would restrict the New York state government from doing business with US corporations collaborating with South Africa. Public hearings have already been held.

SUPPLIES NEEDED FOR ANC SCHOOL . . . The ANC (SA) is building a school for its cadres in Morogoro, Tanzania. Among its needs are reading and writing material, games (scrabble, chess, playing cards), cloth for sewing classes, and sports equipment.

Donations may be sent to ANC (SA), P.O. Box 2239, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Name _____

Address _____

New

Renewal

CHANGE OF ADDRESS
ATTACH OLD LABEL HERE
FILL OUT NEW ADDRESS ABOVE

SUBSCRIPTION RATES:

Individuals (Domestic and Foreign) \$8.00 per year
Institutions (Domestic and Foreign) \$18.00 per year

Airmail:

Africa, Asia, Europe \$20.50
South & Central America \$17.50

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