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**REPORT**

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**TAKING SIDES**

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


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# Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 2 No. 4

February 1987



## Southern Africa REPORT

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# Taking Sides

One of the crosses to be borne in English-speaking Canada is the apparent centrality of the *Toronto Globe and Mail* - "Canada's National Newspaper" - to establishment thinking. This cross becomes the more burdensome if a *Globe* reader happens to be at all concerned about Southern Africa. For the paper's position on developments in that part of the world is just about as unhelpful to advancing its readers' understanding of the situation there as it could possibly be.

The most egregious recent example in this regard was the extensive space granted, on the paper's prestigious *op-ed* page, to its sometime medical columnist Dr. W. Gifford-Jones - in this case writing about South Africa under his real name, Kenneth Walker. Identifying Walker blandly as "one of 64 Canadians who recently returned from a fact-finding tour of South Africa" (thereby blurring the fact that the tour was sponsored by the South African government itself) the *Globe* banner-headlined the article as presenting "The good side of white South Africa". Moreover, the paper coyly illustrated the article with a shot of what was, self-evidently, a white Johannesburg dowager being supported down the street by her black domestic servant. The caption (no irony intended, apparently): "Racial harmony in South Africa!"

As for the article itself it seems safe to say that even in South Africa few newspapers would have had the nerve unashamedly to publish unadulterated a blend of South African government propaganda and racial prejudice. "Democracy in South Africa?" you ask. Ring in an all too familiar *non sequitur* like "Some estimate that, in one day, more people are killed in the rest of Africa than in one year in South Africa". Or "suppose that of 25 million Canadians, five million were En-



ANC flag carried at Gugulethu funeral, Cape Town, Nov. 1985

glish and French and the other 20 million black ... would we be willing to give up control to the blacks by agreeing to one man, one vote?" Small wonder that Walker can then quote, with apparent sympathy and understanding, the Afrikaner who remarked to him: "Why should we allow the blacks to form a majority government merely because they breed like rabbits? Is the ability to breed the best criteria as to who should govern?"

It may, of course, be argued that Kenneth Walker is perfectly entitled to his opinions, however racist

and inhuman, and entitled, too, to the free expression of them - although one could still wonder at the *Globe's* choice of writer for so prominent an opinion-piece when there are many Canadians who know very much more about South Africa than this. More worrying, however, is the direct evidence of the paper's own considered judgement on the subject of South Africa as manifested in its editorials. There is, in this regard, the long record of *Globe and Mail* hostility to sanctions against South Africa, hostility which has found the paper, over the past few years, both willfully distorting the argu-

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ments that can be made on behalf of such sanctions and also ignoring the voice of that majority of South Africans who have actually called for them.

Yet as even the Canadian government has begun to "take sides" in South Africa by moving into the sanctions camp the paper has become ever more worried and worried now not merely about sanctions *per se* but about *just how far the taking of sides might go*. Most worrying of all, it seems, would be any steps taken towards strong and unequivocal support for the African National Congress of South Africa. "Thus, when U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz meets ANC leader Oliver Tambo later this month (January), it is an occasion to pressure Pretoria rather than enhance the status of particular black activists" (from the editorial entitled "The ANC's Struggle" in the *Globe and Mail*, January 13, 1987).

True, in this editorial (written to mark the ANC's seventy-fifth anniversary) the *Globe* does not use many of the epithets of the extreme right wing, acknowledging that charges of "terrorism" and "Communist domination" levelled against the movement are misleading. It even professes to find the ANC's economic programme potentially rather moderate, preferring instead to concentrate its attack on the long-term threat to democracy which the ANC is said to represent. In so arguing, however, the *Globe* fails to make reference to the ANC's oft-repeated public commitment to the establishment of democratic institutions. Why does it so argue? One might be more mystified by this approach if the other half of the paper's agenda were not so patently clear. For the ANC is condemned, in particular, for being loath "to share power with groups such as Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha or the black consciousness Azanian People's Organization" (AZAPO). And as the *Globe* had argued only a few weeks before (in an editorial entitled, grandly,

"For Chief Buthelezi") "Buthelezi remains the best hope, if not the only hope, for the emergence of a moderate black leadership from the ashes of apartheid"!

As Pippa Green's case-study of Inkatha's cruel harassment of the trade union movement in Natal demonstrates in this issue of *Southern Africa REPORT*, this is a picture of Buthelezi which is almost entirely misleading. True, Buthelezi is deeply committed to a capitalist future for South Africa. Nonetheless, the application of the word "moderate" to a movement (and a leader) characterized, as Inkatha is, by the populist and narrowly nationalist (Zulu chauvinism) demagoguery of its right-wing ideology, by the graft and strong arm methods used to mobilize its chosen constituency and by the unparalleled brutality of the treatment it metes out to its black political opponents, is almost obscene. Given the considerable P R effort being expended on Buthelezi's behalf in Canada, this is probably a theme to which we will have to return again and again in future issues. Here, however, what does need "enhancing" - in light of the efforts of the *Globe and Mail* and others to have it otherwise - is precisely "the status of particular black activists", that is, of the ANC, so very much more central than either Inkatha or Azapo to the current moment of the struggle in South Africa. It is certainly no accident, for example, that it is the ANC which is most closely in touch with the United Democratic Front, about whose dramatic activities on the ground in South Africa one of its leaders, Frank Chikane, speaks so eloquently to *Southern Africa REPORT* elsewhere in this issue.

This theme, the centrality of the ANC, will provide the focus of several of the articles which follow but it bears emphasizing that this is not, in the end, merely or even primarily a matter of countering the disinformation campaigns of the *Globe and Mail* editors and their ilk - im-

portant though that task may be. Far more crucial is the fact that we write at a moment of considerable importance for the determination of Canadian government policy towards South Africa. Brian Mulroney's recent trip to Southern Africa does suggest that, influenced by the various leaders of the Front-Line States, he has taken some significant further strides forward on the question of South Africa. He seems determined, for example, that more effective sanctions be forthcoming against South Africa. And he even professes to have some sympathetic understanding of why the ANC might feel compelled to fight for its freedom under the conditions which characterize contemporary South Africa. We even learn that a meeting with Oliver Tambo, the ANC president, is in the offing.

This is certainly progress - yet not quite enough. For it is, in fact, necessary precisely to "condone" the ANC's resort to force of arms (something the Prime Minister says he cannot quite bring himself to do), necessary to provide positive aid and succour to those who must seek to overthrow the apartheid regime in South Africa by whatever means necessary. As we have argued in critiquing Canadian government policy in a previous issue of *Southern Africa REPORT* (Vol. 2, No. 2, "Sanctions: What's Left?"), the imposition of sanctions by a global community is not best conceived as being some kind of alternative (although this is the way Mulroney continues to put the case for them) to the use of force which undoubtedly is necessary (along with other means) to overthrow the apartheid regime.

Rather, by promising to weaken the South African state, sanctions can merely be expected "to help shorten the day of bloodshed", in Chief Lutuli's memorable phrase in their defense. Since this is the case a genuine taking of sides must also involve embracing those who give greatest promise of producing both

# The good side of white South Africa

BY KENNETH WALKER

Dr. Walker is a Toronto gynecologist who writes a weekly syndicated column called the Doctor Game under the pseudonym, Dr. W. Gifford-Jones. He is one of 84 Canadians who recently returned from a fact-finding tour of South Africa.

**J**OE CLARK, Canada's External Affairs Minister, is applying sanctions against a country he has never troubled to visit. South Africa is a country that has much in common with a cornered lion. It is cornered by ill-informed churchmen, sanctimonious do-gooders, hypocrites, a biased media and a continent that judges other countries by one moral standard, yet uses another one for South Africa.

What is fact and what is fiction about South Africa? How would Canadians react if they were faced with the same problems?

Canadians and the Western world have been brainwashed on the subject of South Africa by television. The TV screen invariably portrays Soweto, a suburb of Johannesburg, as the worst slum in the world — a tortured black township where the major pastime is tossing stones and burning buses. But Soweto no more represents South Africa than the ghettos of New York represent the United States.

No one disagrees that there is unrest in Soweto, as in any poor area. But I saw many \$400,000 homes in Soweto, with BMWs in the driveways. All the homes are separate, single-story dwellings, many freshly painted, with flowerpots in the windows, and surrounded by green grass. A mere 2 per cent are slum huts. Given the choice of living in Soweto or in the high-rise, crime-ridden slums of New York, Chicago or Detroit, it would take me one second to pick Soweto.

It will also shock Canadians to hear I would prefer to be injured or taken ill in Soweto than in many Canadian cities. There are eight Government-run clinics and several private physicians in Soweto, and the Baragwanath, a superb university hospital with 2,900 beds and 700 doctors of specialties, where cardiovascular surgery is performed 894 open-heart operations a year. The Baragwanath is the largest hospital on the African continent. The door, the St. John Eye Hospital is famous for treating glaucoma, retinal diseases, traumatic eye injuries and optical diseases.

By the moralists of Canada and the United States join in the chant, "end apartheid." Few people, including many South Africans, argue that apartheid is anything.

But the National Party of South Africa admitted the horrendous



otherwise forget the recent history of other African nations. More than 600,000 Lango and Acholi tribesmen have been killed in Uganda in the past 15 years. In Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, more than 3,000 Ndebele perished at the hands of Robert Mugabe's Shona tribesmen. Black critics of white monopoly power in Africa rarely share power once their own country becomes independent. Prime Minister Mugabe leads a one-party Marxist state in Zimbabwe, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia has held power since his country's independence in 1964. "One man, one vote" in Africa has historically meant, "one man, one vote, one time."

Repeatedly, a major tribal chief has become the tribal dictator and blacks have died. Forty-three black nations in Africa have sunk into a political, socio-economic nightmare. Some estimate that, in one day, more people are killed in the rest of Africa than in one year in South Africa.

Catchy slogans ignore another major South African problem.

An army patrol in Soweto; racial harmony in Johannesburg.

Year after year the disparity in income between the whites and blacks grows wider. This intensifies tension and prevents South Africa's economy from keeping pace with the demands of the black population.

South African President P. W. Botha should shoot from the hip and make a dramatic announcement to his international critics, even if it ends his political career. He should remind the world that white South Africans created a country which is the envy of every other African nation, but that the legislation of apartheid was a disastrous error. And now such legislation will be repealed on a specific date.

But I fear the Government still hasn't grasped the urgent need to send that message. It has postponed a decision on the Group Areas Act, which would allow all South Africans access to any residential area.

the political focus and the military clout which can effectively challenge the state. First and foremost, as we shall seek to show, this must mean our embracing the cause of the ANC more actively and positively than ever; in doing so we should, in particular, press our government to go at least as far as the several Scandinavian governments in providing the ANC with direct material assistance.

There are other dimensions to the debate in Canada about the ANC, of course. There are, for ex-

ample, those on the left — both in Canada and inside South Africa — who feel the need not merely for political change in South Africa but also, given the severe inequities of economic control and reward which are part and parcel of South Africa's racial capitalist system, for radical economic transformation as well. They will wonder at the truth of the *Globe and Mail's* smug judgement that the ANC is capable merely of a very moderate economic reform programme indeed. Recall, too, that alongside Buthelezi, the *Globe* mentioned the "black consciousness" al-

ternative in South Africa. There are those — ironically they tend to be more prominent in black communities abroad than they are inside South Africa itself — who wonder whether the ANC is quite "black" enough, quite culturally nationalist enough, to warrant legitimacy as the chief cutting edge of the revolution in so viciously racist a society as is South Africa. We will also begin to address ourselves to these concerns as we explore some of the implications of "taking sides" in South Africa in the pair of articles which follow.

Globe & Mail, December 2, 1986

# Why the ANC?

As is well known, the African National Congress of South Africa is no newcomer to the South African scene. Indeed this year marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of its founding in 1912. There is no need here to recount in detail the history of most of these intervening years, except to reemphasize one particular fact, often taken for granted: the ANC attempted for the first fifty years of its existence to win real change in South Africa by entirely peaceful means. But the situation of the vast mass of the population in South Africa did not improve; instead, it deteriorated. The National Party which came to power in 1948 proceeded, by means of its apartheid policy, to lock ever more brutally into place the structures of segregation and control over the black population which had become part and parcel of South African capitalist development over the years. And that government (the one which is still in power) moved to exclude the black population ever more forcefully and definitively from active participation in the political arena.

In response the resistance movement, with the ANC at its core, became more radical, still non-violent in principle and practice throughout the 1950s but attempting to innovate in the use of such tactics as mass-based passive resistance. It was during this period - with the Defiance Campaign and the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1956 - that the ANC struck particularly deep roots in the country, establishing a firm hold on the imagination of the black population, a hold which it has retained right up to the present day. In the short run, however, the work of the Congress Alliance was to no avail. When the apartheid regime cracked down even more definitively on all democratic opposition at the beginning of the 1960s - banning the ANC and

the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) - the ANC was forced to rethink its premises and move reluctantly to develop the capacity to meet state violence with a military strength of its own. Initial efforts to do so were easily foiled by the state, however, and an enforced passivity settled temporarily over a defeated population in the 1960s. The ANC, with many of its key leaders (Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki and others) imprisoned, found itself in exile or very deeply underground, unable, for the moment, to mount an effective challenge, biding its time but also, as events would prove, preparing itself for the next round of struggle.

Indeed, the very fact that the ANC survived the darkest years of exile more or less intact may have been the movement's most significant accomplishment during this period. This was certainly in sharp contrast to the tendency of the PAC, its only real rival, to self-destruct in exile. But the ANC also used the time to firm up a strong network of international contacts, in various western circles but also in eastern bloc countries which alone were prepared to support the movement militarily. Then, as the situation heated up inside and as the ANC in exile gained somewhat easier access to South Africa with the victories of liberation movements in border countries, the ANC could dramatically underscore its presence on the scene by means of "armed propaganda" (sabotage actions and the like). The latter, in turn, helped to revive the memory of the ANC's historical centrality to the resistance movement. Moreover, many older people with personal histories of ANC involvement began to resurface within the above-ground popular organizations of the late 1970s and early 1980s and, as we shall see, many younger people found themselves pulled in the same direction.

The establishment of an ANC underground designed for political as well as military purposes, and linking together inside and outside, gave further coherence to the ANC presence.

In fact, the resurgence of the ANC to the forefront of resistance movement politics in South Africa is one of the most dramatic single developments there in recent years, especially in light of the fact that the ANC was far from being solely, or even primarily, responsible for the reactivation of resistance in the 1970s. The two key ingredients of that reactivation were: (1) the rise of working class action, notably in Durban in 1972-3 but gradually fanning out across the country and leading to a growing network of above-ground trade unions, and (2) the rise of a student movement, to a significant degree mobilized around the ideology of "Black Consciousness", which found political expression most dramatically in



Winnie Mandela at Mamelodi rally

the youth-based uprisings of 1976, in Soweto but in many other places as well. These various initiatives transformed the South African political scene as nothing had before and the force for change which they epitomized has continued to build.

It has built across quite a broad front, as is well known, although there is not the space here to explore the wide range of assertions involved – the trade unions, the various ongoing initiatives of students and youth more generally, urban and rural women's organizations, township-based organizations, the broad national coalitions (most notably the United Democratic Front). What seems undeniable, however, is the aforementioned pull toward the ANC that has been manifested in virtually all of these sectors. In addition to the explanations for this cited above one must give full credit to the subtle political sense and considerable skill shown by the ANC in divining the public mood and then helping to give added resonance and concrete national programmatic expression to popular aspirations. Witness the role the ANC played in the definition of such effective focusses and formulae as the campaigns against the South African Indian Council and Republic Day, the Free Mandela initiative and the attack upon the tricameral parlia-

ment, the widely publicized emphasis upon first "ungovernability" and then "from ungovernability to people's power", and the successful attempt to bring the Freedom Charter back into prominence as a crucial touchstone of the broader movement's demands.

Similarly, even if the precise nature and extent of the ANC's interface with the UDF is difficult to determine, the latter has been of obvious importance in giving visible institutional form to ANC initiatives; the consultative role which the ANC has apparently come to play *vis-à-vis* the National Education Crisis Committee, provides another example of the ANC's increasing centrality. Needless to say, in many of these activities and campaigns the ANC has been responding to assertions already bubbling up in the community at least as much as it has been mobilizing popular energies from scratch. Yet this latter observation is no criticism; it is precisely the manner in which a revolutionary organization must grow and change and develop its capacities. Nor is it any wonder, under the circumstances, that Professor Tom Karis, writing in the pages of the prestigious American establishment journal *Foreign Affairs*, can conclude (conservatively) that "in a free election in South Africa, the now outlawed African National Congress could possibly win three-fourths of the black vote as well as some white votes"!

As Karis immediately notes, "no such election is in sight", but the ANC continues with its political work in order to bring further pressure to bear against the intransigent apartheid state. Moreover, it is precisely in the vibrant interplay between the ANC itself and the diverse components of the resistance movement broadly defined that much of the promise for continuing progress in post-apartheid South Africa lies; as we shall see, this is especially true, perhaps, of its relations with the trade union movement. For the

moment, however, the ANC's most pressing challenge is to move past the phase of armed propaganda and to develop a more effective military backup for resistance based in the townships and bantustans. This has not proven to be an easy task, and the brute capacity of the state to bottle up the challenge (although not to crush it outright) has yet to be deeply threatened. Nonetheless the fact remains that for anyone who wishes to see significant change in South Africa there is no alternative but to support the ANC in its attempts to succeed with its military undertakings.

\* \* \*

This kind of perspective on the ANC might be thought by now to be relatively uncontroversial – were there not people like those *Globe and Mail* editorialists quoted earlier in this issue trumpeting the cause of Chief Buthelezi. Few within the anti-apartheid movement will be confused by this latter kind of advocacy, however. Perhaps the claims of those who press the case for organizations that see themselves as the "pure" inheritors of the Black Consciousness movement may appear somewhat more convincing. Recall the opening lines of the Freedom Charter: "That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people". Both inside and outside South Africa there are those who see the "Charterists" – the ANC, the UDF and the like – as not being sufficiently racial either, in their definition of the ideology which can best focus resistance there. It is a concern which has some resonance in so racist a society as South Africa. Moreover, a combative spirit of black nationalism has, from time to time, had a revitalizing effect on the movement in South Africa.

It was, for example, a theme around which the ANC's African Youth League rallied in the 1940s



Julie Frederikse, S.A., A Different Kind of War

and provided an emotional springboard for its successful effort to radicalize the ANC itself. Such future leaders as Mandela, Sisulu and Tambo were all party to that heady spirit, although these men were soon to carry their analyses further and to see that the exclusivity of this kind of focus could quickly turn counter-productive. Moreover, this was not seen merely as a question of the danger of driving away many potential white allies by such an emphasis or of forfeiting the opportunity of dividing the white community against itself. More important were seen to be the potential costs of narrow black nationalism on the black side of the political equation.

\* This was a lesson regarding the severe limitations of black nationalism, narrowly defined, that the liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola were to learn a decade or so later. When it became apparent that the most reactionary and potentially collaborationist

For it could too easily degenerate into merely a radical-sounding cover for black middle class opportunism, while producing an approach that would fail to provide any analytical tools for comprehending the complex class dynamics which interweave the structure of racial oppression in South Africa.\*

Small wonder that, without abandoning their strong sense of the importance of African nationalist assertions, Mandela and others were to move beyond their narrowly "culturally nationalist" phase to a position far more sensitive to the claims of non-racialism (epitomized, in the 1950s, by the Congress Alliance),

elements in their ranks were precisely those (like Uriah Simango in the case of FRELIMO) who garbed themselves in the mantle of racial purity and black nationalism, this discovery made a powerful contribution to these movements' radicalization.

Marxist analysis and class struggle. Others had more difficulty in doing so, however, and it was they who became the architects of the late-50s split from the ANC which produced the PAC. As the latter movement reeled opportunistically towards virtual self-immolation in exile, some of the limits of "Africanism" revealed themselves. But the radicalizing potential of black nationalism was soon to be in evidence once again as "Black Consciousness" emerged in the late 1960s. It was a doctrine that emphasized usefully the importance of blacks regaining pride, self-confidence and psychological regeneration in what was a very dark period for the resistance movement. Moreover, Black Consciousness had positive political effects; though not very important in the revival of trade union activity it did help, as we have noted, to crystallize the dramatic thrust onto the stage of the student movement in the mid-1970s.



Transvaal Free Mandela Committee



Yet once again the pattern of the 1950s has repeated itself, albeit at a much higher level of development of the overall anti-apartheid struggle. The best of the Soweto generation took strength from Black Consciousness - and moved on. They became increasingly sensitive to the role of the working class in guaranteeing genuine change in South Africa, and more sensitive, too, to the claims of a broader, more inclusive democratic struggle. They passed, in exile, into the ranks of the ANC or, inside the country, they began to link themselves to "Charterist" organizations at local and national levels (see, for example, the revealing biographies of such important ex-BCM figures as Johnny Issel, Popo Simon Molefe, Terror Lekota and Aubrey Mokoena in Sheagh Gastrow's *Who's Who in South African Politics*). Particularly striking is the fact that the most prominent student organizations also have followed this trajectory as, for example, in the case of the (now banned) Congress of South African Students (COSAS); in this connection, too, the recent decision of the (former) Azanian Students' Association (AZASO) to abandon use of the neologism Azania (a name closely associated with the Africanist tendency) in favour of a new name for the organization, the South African National Students' Congress, is most revealing.

If much of the "Black Consciousness" initiative has thus found its way into the revolutionary mainstream in South Africa it is, of course, the case that it has also continued to spawn a separatist tradition, one institutionalized in such organizations as the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), the National Forum and the new CUSA/AZACTU unified trade union central. All evidence suggests this to be a distinctly minority tendency - not to be dismissed for that reason but certainly not to have its significance blown out of proportion. There is, how-



Louise Gubby/J B Pictures/Newsweek

ever, enough of a distinction between Charterist and Black Consciousness tendencies to have led to some bitter, even bloody, conflict inside South Africa itself; enough of a distinction too, to have fueled confusion in North America.

True, the predominance of the ANC is sufficiently well established at home to retain its rightful hegemony within the anti-apartheid movement abroad. But the superficial plausibility of black consciousness formulae about the struggle in racist South Africa (plausible, in particular perhaps, to blacks in the diaspora who have themselves experienced the realities of racism) has allowed Black Consciousness advocates in Canada and elsewhere some room both for overstating the scope of Black Consciousness activities inside South Africa and for caricaturing the nature and the role of the ANC. Indeed, at its worst this latter tendency can produce the sad self-hatred implicit in the portrayal of proud leaders of a predominantly black organization like Mandela and Tambo as the likely pawns of white

liberals and/or white leftists! The architects of apartheid's modes of thinking could not have hoped to produce much more confusion than that. It is fortunate, then, that such misinformation about the ANC is not widely effective in dissuading people from taking the ANC's side in Canada and elsewhere.

\* \* \*

The ANC, in short, is at the center of the struggle to overthrow apartheid, not alone certainly, but very much the principal actor, the main reference point, within the South African resistance movement broadly defined. As we have seen, the extent to which the ANC can develop its capacity to give political focus and military clout to that resistance movement is the major determinant of how rapidly the struggle for freedom in the country will advance. The Brian Mulroneys and the George Shultz's now have no alternative but to take the ANC seriously. And, as argued above, those of us within the anti-apartheid movement need not be distracted by sideshows from doing the same.

# The ANC: Beyond Apartheid

The preceding article, which argued the ANC's centrality, both political and military, to the struggle to overthrow apartheid, did leave some questions unanswered. Recall, in particular, the point made in our editorial: "there are those on the left - both in Canada and inside South Africa - who feel the need not merely for political change in South Africa but also, given the severe inequalities of economic control and reward which are part and parcel of South Africa's racial capitalist system, for radical economic transformation as well" Clearly, the number of unpredictable factors which are likely to affect the manner in which a transition to a post-apartheid South Africa will take place make it difficult to address such a concern in any definitive manner. But it is perfectly relevant to speculate about such matters, not least in South Africa itself where such discussion is well advanced and where, particularly in certain trade union circles, the question of the degree of radicalism of the ANC's long-term intentions has begun to be raised.

What of the ANC as viewed from a socialist perspective then? There are, of course, the voices of the right, both in South Africa and abroad, voices which present a possible victory for the ANC as being more or less equivalent to a Soviet takeover. This kind of red-baiting is rather easily dismissed. More perplexing for those on the left, are those observers, liberal and conservative, who see the ANC as ripe for cooptation into the "business as usual" ambience of a moderate, more-or-less deracialized, post-apartheid capitalist South Africa. In the words of Heribert Adam and Koghila Moodley, "since the ANC ... to all intents and purposes represents an aspiring but hitherto excluded middle class ... a his-

toric compromise among big capital, small traders and bureaucrats would not founder on class antagonisms". In a parallel fashion Conor Cruise O'Brien apparently sees the ANC as eminently recruitable to his proposed "multi-racial bourgeois coalition" (that "coalition of all those with something to lose, whatever the colour of their skin" which he is prepared to set in future against "all the 'outs' of black society"!); "(Oliver) Tambo himself is essentially a liberal", O'Brien suggests.

The shrewdest of capitalist actors in South Africa are inclined to agree, Tony Bloom of the Premier Group recently professing himself "desperately concerned that both Pretoria and Washington are making a historic and tragic mistake in refusing to negotiate with or recognize the ANC ... (L)asting stability will never be created without it". Moreover, "the ANC leadership may be very different in three years, when thousands more have died"! "Only one man may be capable of achieving cohesion among blacks. People who have recently visited Nelson Mandela have come away deeply impressed with his moderation. Can he be South Africa's Charles de Gaulle? We simply have to take the chance". Or, for a much cruder but somewhat related scenario, there is some vintage Ronald Reagan, recorded as the latter elaborated on his fears about communist control over the ANC: "... we know there are still sound people ... So, no, if you could do business with, and separate out and get the solid citizens of the ANC to come forward on their own, that's just fine".

But should capitalists be quite so sanguine about the ANC? Certainly some statements by senior ANC militants suggest that they might be. For example, Thabo Mbeki (writing in the *Canadian Journal of African*

*Studies*) maintains that "the ANC is not a socialist party. It has never pretended to be one, it has never said it was, and it is not trying to be. It will not become one by decree or for the purpose of pleasing its 'left' critics". Moreover, the broader problematic which the ANC has developed in order to comprehend and guide the process of change in South Africa seems to be designed to make a similar point. Thus, in much of the movement's literature, the situation in South Africa is characterized as being one of "colonialism of a special type" And "national liberation", not socialism, is then stated to be the present goal, any advance towards socialism being very much relegated to some possible "second stage" of future struggle.\*

Not all ANC formulations are so rigid, however. Thus, the movement's *Strategy and Tactics* document, adopted at Morogoro, lays great stress on "economic emancipation" and the "possibility of a speedy transition from formal liberation to genuine and lasting emancipation". Moreover, many ANC cadres continue to suggest the need to balance even-handedly the importance of the nationalist struggle against the claims of class analysis and class struggle. Thus Joe Slovo, a leading cadre of both the ANC and the South African Communist Party, has strongly criticized

\* *In its most dogmatic formulations this approach defers not only socialism but also women's liberation to some vague future. Significantly, in the South African debate which we are reflecting on in this article, none of the views, right, left or centre, makes this latter point a central one. This fact - as well as some of the discussion of the issue which is taking place in South Africa - is something we can hope to focus on in a future issue of Southern Africa REPORT.*


any rigid, two-stage model of the South African revolution: he argues that the "dominant ingredient of later stages must already have begun to mature within the womb of the earlier stage" and that in South Africa there is indeed a certain simultaneity to the struggles "for social as well as national emancipation".

Moreover, Slovo goes on to suggest, the "most important" determi-

nant of whether the revolution will move toward the "true liberation" which socialism represents is precisely the "role played by the working class in the alliance of class forces during the first stage of the continuing revolution". It bears noting that, in the text quoted from above, Thabo Mbeki immediately qualifies his stark statement that "the ANC is not a socialist party" by emphasizing the "notion of both an all-class common front and the determined

mobilization of the black proletariat and peasantry". Indeed, the "ANC is convinced that within the alliance of democratic forces that will bring about the outcome (i.e., "the defeat and overthrow of the present ruling class and the birth of a new democratic state"), the black working class must play the leading role, not as an appendage of the petty bourgeoisie but as a conscious vanguard class, capable of advancing and defending its own interests" (socialism?).

Mbeki's attempt to complement the ANC's vocation as a multi-class, multi-racial, "nationalist" movement against racial oppression with an emphasis upon the centrality to the project of the working class is, of course, tension-ridden, but he is not wrong when he attacks "the strange view that national consciousness and national liberation are the deadly enemies of class consciousness and class emancipation". For this is potentially a creative tension, one which suggests the movement to be quite open to being carried forward to a more radical posture in the course of time. Why, then, the various formulations that remain less than clear about the movement's long-term trajectory? In part their ambiguity may be designed quite self-consciously for tactical reasons, of which there are two principal ones: (1) to keep as wide a range of social groups and classes within South Africa itself on side for the anti-apartheid struggle (the ANC's eminently cordial 1986 Lusaka meeting with representatives of NAF-COC, the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce, being seen by some as a prime example of such a tactic), and (2) to expand the range of international forces inclined to oppose "apartheid pure and simple" and to encourage divisions within the South African elite (making South African capital, for example, more likely to risk an accelerated pace of change - which it might, à la Tony Bloom, gamble on then containing).



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To some extent, then, the weights assigned to "nationalist" and "socialist" themes by various ANC statements and spokespersons will reflect differing hunches about the tactical "mix" most appropriate to any given moment of the struggle. But another layer of complexity needs to be added here. For there is every reason to believe that the "mixes" will reflect differing *class lines* within the movement, will reflect - however much this may be muted in the short run by the importance of comradesly solidarity and the deeply felt need to maintain a united front *vis-à-vis* the apartheid state - class struggle. But even the most minimal exposure to a range of ANC personnel will quickly demonstrate this fact, revealing a range of positions stretching from a quite narrowly premised "petty-bourgeois nationalism" to a clearly articulated social revolutionism.

Then, too, there are those within the ANC who see the institu-

tional guarantee of the working-class and socialist presence in the South African revolution to lie in the South African Communist Party. Without falling into the bizarre red-baiting of many right-wing commentators, many socialists will, nonetheless, be uneasy with some of the SACP's proposed division of revolutionary labour - in which an "official" Communist Party defines itself as the (more or less exclusive) vanguard of the working class. The SACP has an honourable and often heroic history of commitment and struggle. Indeed, more than many such parties elsewhere, it has shown a capacity to keep pace with the evolution of popular aspirations in its own country, and it may well continue to do so. Yet it is also true that as regards many of the most questionable canons of "Marxist-Leninist" orthodoxy, the SACP has not been one of the most open and independent of Communist parties.

It is fortunate, therefore, that such misgivings - as well as the

whole question of the prospects for the continuing radicalization of the ANC - can be placed in a much broader and more promising context. Recall the emphasis in the preceding article on the extent to which the ANC has re-established its centrality within the broader resistance movement at least as much by "responding to assertions already bubbling up in the community ... as it has (by) 'mobilizing' popular energies from scratch". The main promise that the ANC will stay the course of radicalization lies here: "South Africa's major extra-parliamentary opposition movements bristle with anti-capitalist sentiments. There is no doubt that there is a growing hostility towards capitalism among black youth. The reason is simple: capitalism is seen as the driving force behind apartheid" (observed in Patrick Laurence, "White Capitalism and Black Rage", *The Weekly Mail*, Johannesburg, 13-19 September, 1985). Certainly there is a very




Julie Frederikse, S.A.: A Different Kind of War

large group within the ANC, both inside and outside the country, that is fully sympathetic with this mood and alert to the possibility of wedding the struggle for socialism to the cause of national liberation. They are confident that they can continue to strengthen this emphasis within the ANC, even confident that they can carry with them many whom Adam and Moodley might consider eminently available for cooptation by the capitalist class. But they are aware that it is an ongoing challenge to do so and that it will require effective political work, if not necessarily outright political confrontation, within the movement to achieve success.

The point can be specified further. For those on the left the promise offered by the ANC lies not merely in the movement's positive interaction with the broad range of democratic forces at work in South Africa but perhaps particularly in the interaction with those – the actual, not hypothetical, working class! – represented by the vibrant and profoundly democratic trade union movement in South Africa. This has been a theme much discussed in previous issues of *Southern Africa REPORT* and there may be little need to rehearse the argument here (see *Southern Africa REPORT* Vol. 2 No. 1, June 1986). But certainly one finds in the interesting exchanges between the ANC and the crucially important Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), South Africa's largest trade union central, a mutual recognition of the need to link *in practice* the twin themes of national liberation and working class action, of socialism and democracy.

True, within the resistance movement inside South Africa the different bearers of these emphases can sometimes find themselves polarized, the so-called "populists" on the one hand squaring off against the so-called "workerists" on the other. Yet the aforementioned exchanges give promise of a growing under-

standing of the potentially positive interplay between the two: while the broad democratic movement can contribute a hegemonic thrust to working class action, helping it to define its goals more broadly and comprehensively and thereby avoid a narrow corporatism; so too a marked strengthening of the working class presence within the overall movement can help hold at bay any possible petty-bourgeois hijacking of the liberation struggle!



What of the ANC's Freedom Charter – now more than ever the centrepiece of the ANC's presentation of itself – in this respect? The Charter does state the case strongly for the democratization of South Africa but with respect to socio-economic policy its thrust is somewhat more ambiguous. Certainly it can be interpreted in an eminently petty-bourgeois and reformist manner (and, indeed, has been, even by Nelson Mandela, albeit many years ago). Yet it also contains the seeds of a more radical possibility – in terms of land reform, in terms of the popular ownership of the mines, banks and "monopoly industry". But, workers' control? Cooperativization? The nature of planning? The extent of any short-term tactical compromise with capital? On such crucial points the Freedom Charter is, in the main, merely

"not inconsistent with an advance towards socialism", in Joe Slovo's phrase. Indeed, as the latter has recently stated, "in practice, the question as to which road South Africa will begin to take on the morning after the liberation flag is raised over the Union Buildings will be decided by the actual correlation of class forces which have come to power".

Yet the argument of this article is that, given the nature of the interplay between the African National Congress and the broader resistance movement, the "actual correlation of class forces" already gives promise of tipping the scales for the future in a more, not less, socialist direction. And in a more, not less, democratic direction as well. For one might expect that the weight of the organized working class (but the weight, also, of organized women and other forces mobilized for progressive change on the ground inside the country) can help draw out the best instincts of the Congress Alliance in this respect as well; divert from the twin authoritarian precedents, so ready to hand, of institutionalized petty-bourgeois nationalism elsewhere in Africa and institutionalized "Marxism-Leninism" elsewhere in the "socialist bloc". Hence the broader significance of a resolution passed in 1986 at the congress of the important COSATU affiliate, the Metal and Allied Workers Union. Noting that "true socialism" is "fully democratic", the resolution goes on to state that "the working class must have open and free debate on all issues, all ideas and all policies ... We must build a tradition of democracy and free debate for the future. Sectarianism can suppress free debate and can be a stumbling block in our efforts to build a democratic socialism". Moreover, it is in just such a democratic environment that – for reasons we have discussed – the ANC can be expected to develop its full potential as the most important of the various forces striving for a socialist future in South Africa.

# Between Pain and Hope

## A Conversation with Rev. Frank Chikane

Frank Chikane, former Vice-President of the United Democratic Front, spoke with TCLSAC during his December visit with anti-apartheid groups in Europe and North America. Chikane, who has been detained five times, was one of 15 UDF members arrested between February and May, 1985, on charges of treason. His house was fire-bombed after his release. In the face of the current crackdown, Chikane, like many other prominent activists, went into hiding. He left South Africa through clandestine channels to make the visit.

In this, the first of a two-part article, Chikane talks about the resistance of the township communities to the "total strategy" of the apartheid regime. In the second part, to be published in the next issue of SAR, he discusses the issue of violence and the regime's frantic and fraught attempts to win internal and international support.

### Reform and repression

We have a crisis today in South Africa. In order to understand it, you have to look at the 1983 period and the events that preceded it. In the late 1970s, after Soweto, strong resistance to the apartheid regime emerged once again and a strategy to contain it was needed. The regime faced a crisis in terms of how to handle the resistance, and proposed a strategy which they called "Total Strategy." It was conceived as a strategy against the total onslaught of what they called "communist" and "revolutionary" forces that were seen as actually threatening the security of the South African state. They saw the strategy as having two legs, both reform and repression. The inter-relationship between reform and repression clarifies the nature of the reforms they were talking about. If you were talking

about change in the true sense of the word, you wouldn't worry about repression. But that you bring them together has an implication.

The system wanted to coopt the so-called "Indians", the so-called "Coloureds" and the middle class within the so-called "African group" of people within the community. The idea was to build up a power base which would justify the position of the white minority to maintain white supremacy. The ordinary people in the country understood the strategy differently from the international community and

the whites in that country. The regime calculated that if they talked about "communism" and "revolutionary forces", the West would buy the story. The West would believe that there was reform, and find it strange that "radicals" were resisting. The regime knew that the whites in South Africa would also believe it, simply because of the amount of propaganda which goes on there. In South Africa, if you declare Frank Chikane a "communist", you qualify him for death to be shot, and everybody will feel it's justifiable.



Interviewed Frank Chikane

And of course they call the ANC and other groups there "communists". And they say, "We are fighting against the ANC. Support us." I have argued that I am not prepared to support them. They can't invite us into a war. We don't know what war they are fighting. What we are fighting against is the pain we are going through and the system that is causing us the pain. And that is the basic thing that we are dealing with.

### Formation of the UDF

The people in the country have seen the fallacy of this "total strategy" and begun to challenge it. In 1982 there were discussions which led to the formation of the United Democratic Front. There was a big debate during the last part of 1982 when we came out of prison. There had been mass detentions in 1981 and the last lot, of which I was a part, came out in June of 1982. We began to discuss again what we were going to do against this new strategy that the regime had come up with.

Some people said, "We must take up arms and fight once and for all. We can't be wasting our time with the system." Others of us said, "There must be some possibility of political action that will actually expose the fallacy of that system." They said in reply, "— but the ANC and the PAC and all the other groups tried. The ANC in particular — fifty years. And they learned a lesson in 1960. Why are you still trying to repeat the same process?"

And some of us, I remember, used the statistics of the Minister of Defence. He used to talk about 80% political and 20% military, referring to the need to win the hearts and minds of the people. He said, "We need a political process and an ideological onslaught to actually maintain the system. And that's 80%."

So I used the strategy and said, "They are using 80% political. We also are going to use 80% political to win the hearts and minds of the people. Those who aren't comfortable

with violent options have got 80% of the work to do. Therefore there is no reason why anyone shouldn't be involved in the struggle."

Some people said, "We warn you. You'll end up in prison. People are going to be tortured. People are going to die. Is it worth it?" That's what people asked us. "Is it worth it?"

But we said, "If we leave the regime to go on with this strategy and we don't challenge it, the world will believe them. And therefore we must expose it. And we must make sure that it fails." And it is for this reason that the United Democratic Front was formed, to challenge the whole strategy.

We felt we needed a broad front which was strategically based to challenge the system. We needed the type of front that would not be easy to handle, one that was difficult for the system to deal with.

The UDF went into a programme

which lasted more than a year. And, of course, just before the elections, we used the "legal space" that appeared, because they wanted to prove the elections were free and open. We used that "legal space" to mobilize the masses against that system. That's exactly what we did — we mobilized the masses. The degree of mobilization that occurred is still unbelievable. People stood up in those townships, to defend their rights to be human beings and to say "We don't want this constitution."

But the system ignored our wishes, the wishes of the masses. They went ahead to apply that constitution, irrespective of the wishes of the people.

### Refusing to be governed

Some of us said, "If you ignore the people, the people will refuse to be governed on the basis of that constitution you are implementing." In the treason trial, they quoted me in



Resister

that way. "You said that the people will refuse to be governed. And that's why people are refusing to be governed. So you caused them to be ungovernable. You said that if we ignored the people and closed all options of struggle in the country, people would become violent. You were motivating people to be violent because you suggested people would be violent. They are following your theory."


The treason trial actually worked on that basis. They tried to determine that we actually created a violent climate, one that made it possible for violence to happen. They claimed we had violence in the back of our minds. I remember the advocate saying in court: "Do you mean to say that I must go into the minds of these people and try to find out what violence they were think-

ing about in the backs of their minds - violence which hasn't even been practised?"

What has happened is that, since 1984, the people have simply refused to be governed on the basis of that constitution. The uprising of the Vaal townships [in September 1984] marked the beginning of this refusal to be governed. All the townships followed, one after the other. All the management councils began to collapse. All the councilors had to run for their lives, because they knew they were not there on the basis of the will of the people. People also began to refuse to pay rent. A month or two ago, we were talking of 54 townships which had refused to pay rent. My statistics, if I have done my homework properly, are that although there are about 200 townships in South Africa, the

54 which have refused to pay rent include the major townships. So the people who are boycotting the rents in that country actually comprise two-thirds to three-quarters of the urban population.

The people are simply refusing to collaborate with the system. When the rent issue was discussed in Soweto, I attended two of the meetings. Old women and men who came to that meeting spoke out. I argued in the Civic Association that we, as the leadership, couldn't talk for the people. "The people must make the decision. If I don't pay rent, the church pays. The church will pay my salary and I can bank the money for six months. If the campaign collapses, I can go and pay." Some of those people who sat in the Civic Association are so privileged that they've paid for 12 months. One



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person said, "I don't have time to go there every month and pay. I've paid in advance."

We are the wrong people to make the decision. The people who must make the decision are the people like my father who cannot spare that amount of rent. If it's not paid, well, he has been going hungry anyway, so he will use the money for food. These are the people who must make the decision.


## Organizing resistance

I went to those two meetings. Women and men stood up and said, "We have been attacked. There have been hit squads. There have been vigilantes. The council police have been attacking us, killing our children. The army is killing us. We are not going to give the system money to buy guns to kill us." They were not using heavy, sophisticated analysis. They understood it exactly as they were analyzing it. They said, "We are not going to pay rent from now on. We pay them nothing. We are going to form street committees. We are going to form defence committees. We are going to defend ourselves. We won't go to the police station anymore, because the police stations are used as military bases to attack the people." The army has to be in the townships and they use the police stations as their bases. So you can't go and report crime there, when the police station has become a base for the army which is attacking you.

The people formed disciplinary committees which moved into people's committees. Every street formed a committee. The plan was that, if anyone got attacked in the street, or was kidnapped or disappeared, that street committee had to account for it. That is the discussion that happens within those street committees. In Diepkloof, they decided that they were going to patrol the area because they wanted to see who it was that was attacking them. In the process of patrolling, the police came and shot them and

sent them back to their houses. And now they have problems of how you deal with the patrols. The patrols can actually get rid of the enemy but then the enemy comes and shoots us.

People are beginning to say, "How do we deal with an army that shoots us when we try to patrol our streets?" The language is beginning to shift. In the UDF, we used to discuss posters, slogans, T-shirts. Now the pamphlets are



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banned, the T-shirts are banned, the slogans are banned, the meetings are banned, the press releases are banned, the press conferences are banned. The people sit in meetings and say, "What can we do?" And the only language is, "We need guns. We need to fight." I'm talking of ordinary people. I'm talking about street committees consisting of people who are completely frustrated.

## Escalating repression

The whole system of reform has collapsed because the people refused to be governed. This leaves the system with one leg. And that leg is repression. That explains the conditions in which we find ourselves now. The only way the state can continue governing in that country is to kill the people. There is no way in which that system can do otherwise. The conditions are not like those during the previous outbreaks in the country. You had June 1976, and it passed. You had the sixties and the

fifties and all of them passed. But now, in terms of the degree of consciousness, in terms of the commitment, in terms of the politicization, in terms of the willingness to die, in terms of the type of hope people have, that struggle has reached the stage where you cannot water it down. You have to shoot the people and kill them.

When the people refused to be evicted in August last year, the army had to come the following day to remove all the policemen in that township and the councilors. They came in military trucks, loaded everything up and removed the whole police force there. The only contact that exists between the people and that system is when they send in the army to kill us. That's the only way in which they can still express themselves as a government. Some of the townships have been cordoned off. In some of them, they've used security fences, barbed wire etc.

## Pain and hope

The declaration of the state of emergency is an indication of the crisis that system is facing. That they declared a second state of emergency is an indication that the first one didn't help. That they have now strengthened it after six months and closed down on all press coverage is an indication that, after six months, it has not made a difference. It means that the resistance is at a level where you cannot quench it at all. And therefore the system is going to use more brutal methods than ever before. We're going to see the type of violence we've never seen in that country. It is a painful reality we have to face.

Yet it is the hope that is amazing to me. The young people, the way those young people in the streets face death - it's not explicable. You cannot understand it - their willingness to die. They say, "I know that I won't be there when we get the freedom, but I'm going to die for it." They are prepared to die, and to sacrifice their lives.

# The Real Inkatha

BY PIPPA GREEN

*[Our editorial referred to the increasingly ugly role played by Chief Buthelezi and his Inkatha movement on the right wing of South African black politics. A recent book by Gerhard Maré and Georgina Stevens, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance"* (Ravan Press, 1985), gives a richly detailed picture of how Inkatha seeks to build its ethnic base and retain its political hegemony in Natal against all comers. Perhaps the principal challenge to it in that province has come from the country's most important trade union central, COSATU. In response, not only has Inkatha sought to crush politically the latter union but has also started a sweetheart union of its own, the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), in an attempt to derail COSATU, oppose disinvestment and, by controlling the workers, ease the position of capital. In fact, so blatantly opportunist has this ploy been that it has helped further to undermine any sense of representativeness that Buthelezi has had in Natal. Nonetheless, as Pippa Green records in the first-hand article that follows, the pursuit of this union project by Inkatha has added a new chapter of horror to Inkatha's already grisly record.]*

Barely two weeks after President Reagan had entertained Chief Gashu Buthelezi in the White House, members of the Zulu chief's organization, Inkatha, launched an armed attack on the peaceful but poverty-stricken village of Mpophomeni in a rural area of Natal, South Africa.

Eight people died in the attack, which lasted two days, and scores were injured. Three senior members of the powerful Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) – a key Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) affiliate – were abducted and beaten. Two were killed, as was a village woman on December 5. On December 6 – day two

of the attack – a 19-year-old youth was hacked to death and an old man died in the ensuing fracas. The attackers were allegedly escorted from the hostile village by policemen from the Kwazulu homeland.

The news was duly reported in two paragraphs in the New York newspapers. Three MAWU members, they said, had been killed by men identified as members of Inkatha. The dead were not named.



The incident confirms a pattern of violence which has become an integral part of Inkatha's battle for political control of the region. It also confirms a pattern of often close collaboration between the authorities and Inkatha – an organization which the White House administration appears to have accepted as a credible opponent of the apartheid government. Perhaps one of Chief Buthelezi's attractions for the US is his public opposition to disinvestment and the armed struggle. Buthelezi has argued that both strategies cause unnecessary violence and suffering without being effective.

But violence has become a frighteningly regular part of Inkatha's political programme in the Natal

province. Particularly threatened have been members of youth groups, the United Democratic Front, and now, since the formation of the giant COSATU, black factory workers and trade union members.

Traveling to Mpophomeni for the first time, nine months ago, I was struck by how peaceful the village was, compared to the turbulence in most other black townships in South Africa at the time. I had gone to meet representatives of the 1000 workers who had been fired by the British company, British Tyre and Rubber (BTR) Sarmcol, after going on a legal strike to urge management recognition of their MAWU union. For 12 years the workers had battled to get MAWU recognized and finally, in desperation, went through the cumbersome and lengthy legal procedures that in South Africa entitle black workers to go on a legal strike. But there is no clause in the complicated legislation prohibiting companies from firing legally striking workers and the entire workforce was promptly dismissed.

In a move that was described as "unprecedented" by COSATU officials, the workers had set up co-operatives to help the community of 27,000 stave off starvation while they fought for reinstatement. Already operative were a T-shirt printing cooperative and a "cultural cooperative" consisting of nine workers who had, with dramatists from the nearby Natal University, written a play about the Sarmcol strike.

Mpophomeni is deceptively attractive compared to the grim uniformity of other black townships. It is set in the undulating green hills of Natal, overlooking Midmar Dam. But behind the greenery and the vista, families were struggling to live. For close on 60 years, the community had been largely dependent on employment at Sarmcol, about ten miles away in the white village of Howick, for its daily bread. The sudden termination of that income had devastating effects on the community, which in the

ten years preceding the strike, had suffered the retrenchment of over 3000 men. MAWU was distributing weekly food parcels at the time containing little more than maize meal, sugar, tea and powdered soup, but the union funds were running thin.

"Here we have only one place to work," Phineas Sibiya, chief shop steward, explained at the time. "If the government does not build factories here then we must make our own."

Today Sibiya is dead. Stabbed and shot, according to MAWU, by members of Inkatha which, despite its leader's public abhorrence of violent change, is showing increasing lack of tolerance for any alternative organizations in the Natal province, the Zulu organization's traditional base. According to MAWU, Mpophomeni was plunged into darkness on a Friday evening, as busloads of people from outside the township came into the area and occupied the community hall. Hours later, part of this group went to the homes of the union activists, abducted them, took them to the hall and beat them, before driving them out of the township.

Slain with Sibiya was Simona Ngumane, also a shop steward and an actor in the Sarmcol play. Called "The Long March", the play records the strike, a massive one day stay-away in Natal in support of the Sarmcol strikers and the international implications of the strike. "Maggie", one of the actor-workers tells Ngumane, who for the occasion donned a white nose and blonde wig, "You are losing touch about the Sarmcol workers in South Africa... each time you talk of reform and democracy in South Africa, I suffer, I suffer." "Maggie Thatcher" is now dead - stabbed and shot, his body found with Sibiya's in a charred car.

Killed too was an Mpophomeni woman, Flora Mnikhathi, a union supporter. A third shop steward who has not been identified by the union, was stabbed and beaten and

put in the trunk of a car. But he escaped, rolled down the river bank, spent the night crouched in the river and lived to tell this tale to the union.

Oscar Dhlomo, Buthelezi's deputy, has denied only that the attack was "one-sided", not that Inkatha was involved. He said members of the Inkatha Youth Brigade had planned to hold a rally in Mpophomeni and, on hearing rumours that MAWU planned to disrupt the rally, sent an advance guard to protect the hall. In a statement that has been noted as "unusual" in



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South Africa, Dhlomo said Inkatha "unreservedly condemned the violence from both sides." Buthelezi, who was still in the United States at the time of the incident, is wont to either deny Inkatha's involvement in similar incidents, or to accuse the UDF and its associates of violence. Either way, he is seen as tacitly condoning many of the more militaristic activities of his members.

The morning after the initial attack - December 6 - there was fighting on the streets of Mpophomeni between an Inkatha impi (battalion) of about 200 and residents. At least five other people died in the fracas. MAWU alleges that the impi went to a community hall in the village where they waited until policemen

from the Kwazulu homeland arrived to escort them out.

The attack has been the most violent incident in a steadily growing list of incidents of violent attacks against black unionists by Inkatha. More sinister, perhaps, is the role of the South African government in the conflict. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the South African police served notices on a union official banning all funerals and meetings in Mpophomeni. In other parts of Natal (and indeed throughout the country) union members have been detained by police under the state of emergency regulations and many have been held for several months.

Jeffrey Vilane is a traditional *imbongi* - a praise-singer - and famed in his home village on the northern Zululand coast near the Mozambican border. He was until April this year president of MAWU, the union to which the Sarmcol workers belonged. He is now vice-president. He is a full-time shop steward at a giant Swiss-based aluminum smelter in the Northern Natal port town of Richards Bay. Designated an "industrial growth point" by the government, it is situated on the edge of the Kwazulu homeland about 300 miles from Mpophomeni.

Vilane is a short, well-built man, who speaks with an air of authority that combines a self-confidence with the certain knowledge that he speaks as a leader of most of the 10,000 COSATU members in the region.

Sitting in the office of his firm's personnel manager one month before Inkatha launched its own trade union, the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), he expressed pride in his Zulu background: "I have read the history of the Zulu kingdom and all the history about Shaka and I am familiar with these things," he told me then. Fiercely opposed to the formation of UWUSA on the grounds that it would divide the workers, Vilane was nevertheless an Inkatha member at the time. "My mem-

bers say they regard MAWU as a union that is well-organized in the factory, but when we walk out of the factory we still maintain our membership to Inkatha to represent our grievances to the Government." About two months later - a week before UWUSA was launched - Vilane awoke in the early hours of the morning to the smell of gasoline fumes. Outside he saw a group of heavily armed men gathered on his front lawn and his car on fire. Minutes later, a gasoline bomb was flung through his living room window. As he escaped with his children through the back door, a man lurking in the shadows shot him in the arm with a hand gun.

There was little doubt in Vilane's mind that he had been targeted for assassination by members of Inkatha or UWUSA. He had been attacked in the Zulu press by the initiators of the Inkatha union, Kwazulu businessman Simon Conco, and former union member M. P. "Sicefe" (which literally means "nuisance") Gumede. "Have you checked his membership card?" Conco asked me when I commented that Vilane was a member of Inkatha. "All the time before COSATU was formed, he was running to us in Ulundi (the Kwazulu

homeland's capitol) pretending that he was our man." No, it did not matter to Conco that Vilane was a member of Inkatha. What mattered was that he was a powerful union leader in the region who, notwithstanding his Inkatha loyalties, had been central in persuading Zulu-speaking workers not to join UWUSA. The attack was a turning point in the already strained relations between Inkatha and the black unions. Many workers were or had been Inkatha members, partly because a tribal traditionalism in Zululand has more historical resonance than it does anywhere else in South Africa. But relations between Inkatha and the black working class in Natal/Zululand had been growing steadily cooler. When Vilane was attacked, a MAWU official told me recently, "there were mixed feelings, but the dominant feeling was one of anger." "When we called a COSATU workers meeting, this hall was really full and the shop stewards were angry. There was no feeling of fear and the workers started talking about what to do in the case of such armed attacks. They knew who had shot their leader. After the anger had been allowed to run, the workers began to discuss it and we realized that this was only the start of it."

Indeed it was. Six weeks after the attack, hours before the national state of emergency was officially declared, Vilane was taken from his home at midnight on June 12 and imprisoned under the state of emergency regulations. Five other key COSATU officials and members in the district were arrested at the same time. Three days later, on June 15, police raided a hall in Empangeni where the COSATU regional committee was meeting and simply detained everyone present.

Northern Natal was the only region where UWUSA was actively trying to recruit members and organize against COSATU. One of the first questions the police asked Vilane was why he had dissuaded workers from joining UWUSA. Most workers in the region were convinced that UWUSA/Inkatha played some role, even if indirect, in the massive state crackdown on COSATU supporters.

Durban-based COSATU education officer, Alec Erwin, articulated some of these suspicions in an application in the Natal Supreme Court for the release of the unionists.

UWUSA had been the only union unaffected by detentions under the state of emergency, said Erwin in papers before the court. It

### CHIKANE ON BUTHELEZI

Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of the Kwazulu Bantustan, has recently visited Canada. His ethnically-based organization, Inkatha, stands in dramatic opposition to the UDF. Recent months have seen much violence from Inkatha directed towards UDF affiliates in KwaZulu.

During Buthelezi's visit to Canada, a good deal of media attention was given to him, including a supportive lead editorial in the *Globe and Mail*. He was presented as a moderate voice that deserved to be listened to. He spoke in Toronto at a meeting sponsored by the Fraser Institute. The meeting was picketed by anti-apartheid activists. SAR asked Frank Chikane for his opinion of the role Gatsha Buthelezi is currently playing. His reply was as follows:

CHIKANE: *It is strange to me that when I went to Germany, I found that Gatsha was more popular there than we ever thought in South Africa. He is popular*

*in Europe and the USA and among business people, but he is not popular amongst the people at home. I made a joke in Germany, saying that if I were part of the intelligence service using Gatsha, I would have handled him in just the opposite way. I would have made him support the ANC, support the UDF, call for sanctions etc., making him popular in the country; and then used him strategically. But what they have done is exactly the opposite. They have destroyed the poor man - and I sympathize with him. Gatsha is one person who had a chance to be part of the broad liberation struggle. When you go into history, you discover that he addressed the South African Students' Organization rally in 1970. He had every chance to be part of the whole liberation movement. He just made the wrong decision. He's in the situation now where the west is using him, the business people are using him and they have completely destroyed him.*



Police with Inkatha, Durban 1985

had been "most active in recruiting support in the Empangeni/Richards Bay area, Isithebe (an industrial growth point in Kwazulu) and Newcastle (in the Natal hinterland, near Mpophomeni) and the effect of these detentions ... is to leave UWUSA unhampered in their efforts whilst limiting the ability of the affected unions to respond to this challenge." Northern Natal, the smallest COSATU regional division, with only 10,000 members, had nevertheless been hardest hit by detentions, Erwin pointed out.

"The only inference that can be drawn is that their arrests and detention result from a conscious decision by the police officers responsible either to destroy or to handicap severely the activities of (COSATU) and its affiliated unions in the area of the Northern Natal (police) command."

Of course, evidence of complicity between elements within Inkatha and the state had existed long before the attack on the Sarmcol workers or even the state of emergency. In the past year, civil rights lawyers have collected sworn statements from union officials and members, particularly in the inland areas of Northern Natal. Many allege violent attacks by Inkatha, often in the face of indifference by the South African security forces.

The elderly Mr. Samuel Dlamini from the Ntuzuma township near Durban is one of them. Dlamini's son, Kisa, is an organizer for the Health and Allied Workers Union and a member of the National Education Crisis Committee, set up by black parents and scholars to deal with the crisis in black education. In an affidavit, Dlamini said that at midnight on March 25, 1986, his house was attacked by a group of men armed with sticks, *sjamboks* (whips) and shot-guns. Shots were fired through his windows and he was dragged outside and assaulted with whips and sticks. He reported the attack to the police the following day but "the policeman on duty would not even take a statement from me."

The following day the family received a message allegedly from the head of the Inkatha Women's Brigade in the district, telling them that if they did not leave the house immediately "she would ensure that we would be killed and that our house would be burnt." The next day the house was again attacked and the old man was shot in the face and neck. Again the police refused to take a statement "although I indicated to him where I had been shot." After a third attack on the house, Dlamini and his family decided "that we should no longer live

in the house at Ntuzuma Township as it was exceedingly dangerous for us to do so. We accordingly packed our belongings and left the house."

Yet not even in Natal, Inkatha's home-base, has tribalism scored a resounding success over trade unionism. If anything, Buthelezi's attacks on COSATU and his launch of UWUSA have further undermined his representativeness. One reason is that the trade unions have brought real material benefits to workers in the region. Another is that the unions, with their democratic mode of operation, have shown workers a different style of organization from the hierarchical one practiced by Inkatha.

The Sarmcol workers were anathema to Inkatha not merely because of their union work but because, even beyond the workplace, they looked to their union for political guidance. The cooperatives were established under MAWU's auspices and through their play, the Sarmcol workers established a national presence completely outside of Inkatha.

Thus, in the end, it comes down to politics. The black trade unions are proving increasingly formidable political foes for Inkatha. Mpophomeni is the one area in rural Natal where the union has established itself as the unchallenged democratic representative of the people in the community. It has thus proved a potential threat to Inkatha's power-base.

In eSikhawini, for example, the Inkatha-controlled town council, of which UWUSA's Gumede is a member, has banned all union meetings in the workers' residential area. "I don't think the unionists are being discriminated against," said Gumede when asked to explain, "but for the sake of security things must be done under some sort of order ..."

It was Inkatha's attempt to re-establish that "order" that cost Sibiyi, Ngumane and the others in Mpophomeni their lives.

# Tambo in Washington: A Foot in the Door

BY JIM CASON & MIKE FLESHMAN

ANC President Oliver Tambo's meeting with US Secretary of State George Shultz in Washington was the centerpiece of his 14-day trip to the US in late January, yet neither side expected dramatic policy changes to emerge from the meeting. Secretary Shultz was so eager to downplay the event that he refused to be filmed with the guerrilla leader. But the mere fact that they met is a major political victory for the ANC and for the movement's strategy of isolating Pretoria from its political and financial supporters in the West.

First and foremost, the meeting was a victory for the South African people. Only the strength of the resistance at home and the overwhelming support for the ANC in the townships could have forced a reluctant Reagan administration into a high-level meeting with what Washington has described as "communist-backed terrorists."

If it was a victory for the people of South Africa it was also a major setback for the South African government, which has portrayed the ANC as "Soviet surrogates" and itself as the West's first line of defense against Russian penetration of the region. The meeting between South Africa's closest Western ally and its most hated enemy set off alarms bells all over Pretoria. And the strategy pursued by the veteran nationalist leader during this recent visit is likely to keep them ringing.

In contrast to earlier visits, much of the American political and financial establishment went out of its way this time to cultivate contact with the resistance movement. In New York, the ANC leader met pri-

vately with several corporate leaders on Wall Street and with former secretary of state Henry Kissinger. He also dined with New York governor and presidential hopeful Mario Cuomo and addressed a luncheon of corporate and political leaders hosted by the elite Foreign Policy Association.

At that luncheon Tambo reiterated his movement's commitment to the armed struggle and vigorously defended both the ANC's alliance with the South African Communist Party and its relationship with the Soviet Union. He also dismissed Western efforts to promote bantustan chief Gatsha Buthelezi as a moderate alternative to radical change, calling it a "lapse of realism."

The South African reality, Tambo reminded his audience, was one of "massive" support for the ANC and its program inside the country. The strength of the ANC internally, Tambo said, guaranteed it a place at the negotiating table. "If the whites look for something other than the ANC," he warned, "they will find it in a den of blood."

But while taking a hard line on the present situation, Tambo sketched out broad social democratic positions when he spoke of South Africa's economic and political future.

Speaking to an audience that included Mrs. Laurence S. Rockefeller, Ford Motor Company Vice President Wayne Fredericks and Citicorp Vice President Wilfred Koplowitz, Tambo reaffirmed the ANC's commitment to a democratic and non-racial society, "where people are not conscious of the color of their skin, let alone anybody else's skin."

"Some of us have read and re-read the American Declaration of

Independence," Tambo continued. "And to us it says all the right things .... The ANC calls for a united South Africa - one people, one nation and one government, one that derives its authority from the consent of the governed."

Political democracy, Tambo told his listeners, would be accompanied by economic change as well. "Under apartheid there is no distribution of wealth whatever - abject poverty among great wealth." Poverty takes the lives of 50,000 black children each year, Tambo asserted. "This must be redressed."

But he reminded his largely corporate audience that key sectors of the economy are already state-owned and that the ANC had met with a delegation of South African business leaders headed by Gavin Relly, chairman of the mammoth Anglo-American corporation. When Relly came to Lusaka, Tambo said, "We met as brothers from the same country" to debate the current and future role of private enterprise in South Africa. "And we continue to debate these things."

In his carefully crafted speech, Tambo seemed first to be putting his corporate audience on notice that the ANC was a force that had to be dealt with and then assuring the listeners of the movement's broad, democratic nature. But the central theme of this talk, and of most of the ANC leader's speeches during this trip, was a quest for legitimacy and recognition from the American political mainstream.

Of course, Tambo's reception wasn't entirely positive. He was questioned unceasingly by the media about the ANC's "violent tactics," the killing of whites and the movement's ties to the Soviet



Alon Reininger/Contact/Newsweek

*Oliver Tambo with Jesse Jackson at Riverside Church, N.Y.*

Union. And while Tambo was meeting with Shultz, demonstrators outside the State Department protested the meeting and held mock necklacings of people on the pavement; fourteen far right members of Congress sent a letter to Shultz protesting the meeting. Republican presidential hopeful and Senate leader Robert Dole felt strongly enough that he plans to introduce legislation urging the US to oppose negotiations with the ANC unless it renounces violence.

Anyone who doubted that anti-ANC feelings still abound had only to read an editorial in the top US business paper, *The Wall Street Journal*, which condemned the meeting and argued that the government should promote such "constructive blacks" as Buthelezi and right-wing churchman Isaac Mokoena.

The *Journal's* editorials, however, are consistently more conservative than many business leaders and, if recognition was the immediate goal of Tambo's trip, it was clearly a success. The ANC leader was featured in dozens of newspaper articles, TV interviews and other media profiles. Business and government officials lined up to meet with Tambo, to hear the ANC's position and, in some cases, to talk with the movement that many assume will become the future government of South Africa.

The State Department was also trying to take advantage of the Shultz/Tambo meeting to revive US policy towards South Africa, which Shultz conceded earlier this month was "stuck in the mud." Washington is apparently annoyed with its allies in Pretoria, whose absolute intransigence was a factor in prompt-

ing Congress to override Reagan and vote for sanctions last year and could begin to threaten long-term US interests in the region.

The meeting, however, was more than merely symbolic; some clues to the US strategy can be found in the State Department report on "Communist Influence in South Africa," released in early January. According to the report, the South African Communist Party (SACP) has considerable influence in the ANC, but does not control it (an analysis that, interestingly, is now also articulated by the White House's own National Security Council). The report suggests that "SACP interests are served by an inflexible South African attitude toward negotiations with the ANC, by isolation of the ANC from contacts with Western governments, and by the ANC's focus on increasing military pressure on South Africa."

Most interesting, however, is the last paragraph of the report, which begins: "If Pretoria reconsiders its opposition to negotiations or if ANC relations with Western countries (and hopes for recognition by them) continue to improve, serious policy differences could surface within the ANC." Such a strategy of cultivating the "genuine nationalists" within the ANC and trying to wean them from the communists is not new, but it may provide some additional clues to the US strategy for the Shultz/Tambo meeting and Secretary Shultz's continued emphasis on violence and communism.

During his trip, however, Tambo made it clear that this strategy had no chance of success. Speaking at the Foreign Policy Association, the ANC leader went out of his way to defend the ANC's alliance with the SACP and to stress that the Party had completely accepted both the ANC's political program and its leadership. Again and again during the trip Tambo made the point that, although in the early years of the ANC there may have been hostility toward the Party, the ANC-SACP alliance today is a very strong one.

**Recognition but not Support**

The Tambo trip symbolizes the growing acceptance within the American mainstream of the ANC as a key political factor in the South African struggle. And even without any substantive discussions, the meetings at both the business and government levels in the United States certainly add to the pressure on South Africa.

But in transforming this recognition into active political support, the movement faces major obstacles, some of which were evident during the January trip. For instance, Tambo's attempts to focus on the need for international pressure and sanctions were consistently submerged as he was forced in the media into lengthy defense of the ANC's armed struggle and its alliance with communists.

Furthermore, the Shultz/Tambo meeting is unlikely to result in any substantive change in US policy. In a talk with foreign correspondents just before the meeting, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker seemed to make this same point when he said the US still recognizes the white government in Pretoria as the "legitimate sovereign government" and that US policy must still focus on influencing that government.

In fact, the US is likely to push for major political concessions from the movement in exchange for further recognition - concessions such as the abandonment of force. During this recent trip the ANC has responded to this pressure by militantly and in some cases quite graphically defending its armed struggle and its alliance with the SACP while continuing to insist on the need for sanctions.

The anti-apartheid movement needs to pick up this challenge and press for greater recognition of the liberation movement and defend the South African people's right to take up arms. It also needs to begin to deal more forthrightly with the issue of communism and to defend the South African people's right to form alliances with whomever they please.

Just before Tambo's visit we asked the ANC's Chief Representative in the United States, Neo Mnumzana, about the changes in the US attitude toward South Africa and the ANC over the last few months. He responded by noting the importance of grassroots mobilizing efforts in the US in pressuring Congress and the administration and then said, "We succeeded in opening the door, however slightly, and our challenge is to open it completely."





# South African Liberation & the Rebirth of Pan African Consciousness in Canada

BY FREDERICK IVOR CASE

*Frederick Case is the Chairperson of the Department of French at the University of Toronto*

Anyone associated with African people living in Canada\* realises that it is impossible to identify a unanimous ideological reaction to any one social, economic, moral or political issue. We are like all other people in our diverse and individualistic ways of looking at the world. However, it is possible to identify certain general tendencies particularly as far as reactions to the South African situation are concerned.

Few African Canadians are aware of the intricacies of the hypocritical 1979 "Code of Conduct" which determines Canadian policies toward investments in South Africa; few people pay much attention to the words of Joe Clark or Stephen Lewis; even fewer could remember the name of more than one of the leaders of the racist regime of South Africa. Yet this seeming lack of knowledge is not an indication of indifference toward the situation in South Africa. Indeed, as far as the struggle of our sisters and brothers of South Africa are concerned there is a profound consciousness, a deep anger and resentment that are occasionally manifested in the most unlikely circumstances.

In May 1986, during the week of activities that culminated in the visit of Bishop Desmond Tutu to Toronto, there were some popular events which were very spon-

\* Fred Case uses the terms *African people* and *African Canadians* to refer to all people of African descent living in Canada, regardless of their country or continent of origin.

taneously successful. A celebrity brunch was organized at the Jamaican Canadian Centre at which those of us who were serving were constantly aware of the possibility of running out of food since far more people turned up than the organizers had anticipated. The price of the brunch ticket was well within the reach of the poor and the low wage earners who wished to make their contribution destined to be used for various South Africa related projects. In their hundreds the secretaries and nurses, the unemployed and the students, the janitors and teachers, the cleaners and salespeople sat down to a strange meal the likes of which they would never have prepared in their own homes. Even when we no longer had this or that delicacy the calm and patience remained because no one was looking for money value, everyone had come to do what they could to strike a blow at apartheid. This meal was, for me, the most important of the events organized that week since it demonstrated a level of popular commitment we are rarely aware of. The Jamaican-Canadian Centre was packed and no doubt this type of popular activity could easily be repeated.

The march to Queen's Park also produced a number of indelible impressions. Priests, nuns, ministers and lawyers joined the same people who had attended the brunch. Individuals who would never normally be seen in a demonstration were shouting themselves hoarse, brandishing placards and undoubtedly enjoying it. At the very touching service at St. Paul's I met one of the kitchen staff from a college of the University of Toronto, a very Christian woman who does not like "noise and public carrying on." I later drove her home and listened to

her very explicit views on the situation in South Africa and how "we" should resolve it.

There is no doubt that the current South African situation is the only issue that unites African Canadians (Canadians of African origin) and transcends cultural, religious and social barriers. For many of us the South African situation has been a topic of conversation at home, in our churches, clubs and private gatherings since our infancy. We have lived with this festering sore in our consciousness of ourselves. It has generated shame, hatred and anger. It has acted as a stimulus to action and as a crutch, but it has always been there. Now that everyone knows that the end is in sight there is a growing impatience and a deepening identification with the suffering of our sisters and brothers of South Africa; more than Garvey or Nkrumah, more than the barbarity of the British in Kenya, the crimes of the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola, more than the massacres by the French in Madagascar or by the Belgians in Zaire, the systematic oppression of Africans in South Africa has made us all aware that we are all African peoples and that a pan-African vision of the world is neither racist nor futile.

When, at Hart House in the Fall of 1985, Lennox Farrel threw the ceremonial mace at the South African Ambassador he unwittingly started a series of events which continue to have repercussions to this day. A few months later four professors at the University of Toronto sought an injunction against the return visit of the Ambassador of South Africa to speak at the university. For a while there was significant media coverage of our attempt to prevent the dissemination of racist hatred in

Canada. During that period and since, I have been surprised by the number of Blacks – people I have seen for years on my regular TTC routes or even some who live on my street but with whom I had never spoken – who have in some way or other made their solidarity known. There was not unanimous solidarity with the action we took, but for once the University of Toronto had generated an issue that was the topic of conversation in the homes, in the barber shops, in the churches and in the clubs of African Canadians. For once an event at this august institution had touched the lives of African Canadians in the wider community.

The series of events around the visits of the South African Ambassador brought to the fore the question of boycotting South African produce and it appears that even those who were uncertain of the consequences or usefulness of the boycott became aware of the fact that this was a tangible way of expressing their very deep feelings. At the same time there was an intensification of media coverage concerning South Africa and the words of Winnie Mandela and Desmond Tutu were listened to, quoted and discussed as carefully as our parents would treat the week's readings from the Bible.

There is no doubt that the names of Nelson and Winnie Mandela, of Desmond Tutu and the late Steve Biko are better known among African Canadians than those of ministers of our federal or provincial governments. This is not an indication of lack of interest in Canada, but it is an indication of consciousness that it is only with the liberation of our African sisters and brothers that we can begin to attain our human dignity in this country where we have been enslaved, generally deprived of adequate educational facilities and systematically kept away from the avenues of political and economic power.



Rally Against Apartheid, Toronto, May 1986

Whether or not the individual African Canadian is aware of the intricacies of the "Code of Conduct," he or she is aware of the blatant hypocrisy of the public statements that are made repeatedly by those who condemn apartheid in South Africa, speaking of justice but refusing to recognise the necessity of the armed struggle. In keeping with the practice of our ancestors who consistently sought the means of liberating themselves we have generally rejected the subservience inculcated by certain ways of interpreting biblical and other religious texts. We realise that for our sisters and brothers of South Africa the only way to clear the path of freedom is through the bombs and bullets they are using.

The example of South Africa is introducing a new militancy in our ranks as we become increasingly impatient with a state of affairs that has lasted for centuries in Canada. We are all very much aware of the humiliation of our children in an educational system in which *Huckleberry Finn* is defended tooth and nail by almost every teacher of English and every school board; we are all very much aware of the further crimes committed against our children as they are channelled into lower level secondary school streams

to languish, drop out and become the dispossessed lumpen class of our society; we are all very much aware of our individual struggles in our places of work, the misguided paternalism and the veiled or explicit insults that constantly reveal a very pervasive racism; we are all very aware of the stereotyping of entire areas of our cities and regions of our provinces because of the presence of a majority or large minority of African Canadians living there.

We are also very aware of the fact that the immigration of South African Whites to this country has been steadily progressing over the past few years and we are fearful of the consequences. There is no doubt that as apartheid groans to its inevitable end Canada will once again become a haven for some of the most fascist elements in the world and we will undoubtedly have to suffer from their presence since our country has for centuries institutionalized racism and we have not as yet developed the means of eliminating the vehicles of this racism.

As the fight in South Africa comes to its culminating point so are relations increasingly strained between Blacks and Whites in Canada. We have allowed ourselves to be duped too many times in the past

and are much more careful in identifying those who are truly in solidarity with us. We can no longer entertain subtle ambiguities since the direct correlation between the state instituted system of racism in South Africa and the state condoned system of racism in Canada is obvious. The condemnations of apartheid in South Africa must be accompanied by action at home against the increasing ghettoization of poor Blacks in our cities. Rejection of the bantustans must also mean political action to bring about significant positive change in the situation of communities of African Canadians in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and of Native Peoples throughout this country. Cries for justice in South Africa are meaningless if nothing is done about the persistent police harrassment of our young people. Collecting funds for the education of South Africans is meaningless if our children in Canada are systematically excluded from the opportunities of realising their potential. Those who claim solidarity with our sisters and brothers of South Africa must also demonstrate their solidarity with us in our struggle in Canada. Our fate is inextricably linked to that of our sisters and brothers of South Africa and we know very well that we all have a long and arduous road ahead.

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## Jelinek's End Run

BY BRUCE KIDD

*Bruce Kidd teaches physical education at the University of Toronto.*

A week before last summer's Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh the Department of External Affairs proposed to Cabinet that Canadian athletes be asked to withdraw from the Games in solidarity with the African-led boycott to protest Britain's continuing support

of apartheid South Africa. By then it was clear that the overwhelming majority of non-white Commonwealth teams would withdraw from the Games. (In the end, only 9 of the 42 non-white sovereign states which had submitted entries actually participated.)

Apparently the initiative came from three Canadian High Commissioners in Africa, who argued that Canadian endorsement of the boycott would significantly step up the

pressure on British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to impose sanctions and was necessary to maintain Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's African credibility on sanctions. Although the proposal has never been made public, *Southern Africa REPORT* has learned that it called for the immediate exit from Edinburgh of the large Canadian government delegation attending the Games - Sports Minister Otto Jelinek, Sport Canada Director-General Abby Hoffman,

and their officials – along with an appeal to Canadian athletes to follow suit. Ultimately, the proposal was rejected, but not before the debate it provoked forced an embarrassing 24-hour delay in Jelinek's pre-Games press conference.

Jelinek was never consulted during the boycott debate – ordinarily Fitness and Amateur Sport must follow the lead of External on international questions – but since the Games, he has sought to pre-empt the political evaluation of the boycott, and he has broadly hinted that he would like to end Canada's longstanding prohibition of sports contacts with the apartheid regime.

Just weeks after the Games, in a formal address to the International Sport Summit in New York, an annual conference of the sports marketing industry, Jelinek condemned not only the specific Edinburgh withdrawals, but the whole strategy of the international sports boycott. "Our government (has) taken a leadership role in working against apartheid and dealing within the Commonwealth and elsewhere to see what measures can or should be taken against Pretoria and against apartheid as a whole. And that thrust continues, but *not* on the playing field," he said.

"I believe our decision (to stay in Edinburgh) ... may serve to encourage new thinking around the Commonwealth and elsewhere on the dubious value of using international sporting events as a forum for political protest," he continued. "Nothing is achieved from boycotting ... It is our duty, *our duty* (italics in original) to utilize sport for building bridges between nations and peoples ... Boycotts are a disease which cripples healthy relationships." Although Jelinek did not mention South Africa in this section of his speech, these are the very phrases used by the leaders of the apartheid sports organizations in their desperate attempt to get back into international competition.

The Sports Minister has often repeated these views and his New York statement has been repeated in *Champion*, Fitness and Amateur Sport's glossy bi-monthly, and widely distributed.

There is little danger Jelinek will succeed in renewing sports contacts with South Africa. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, who fully supports the boycott, is a much more influential player in the Mulroney Cabinet. When pressed, Jelinek says he adheres to the existing policy. Supporting the international campaign has provided a succession of federal governments with a relatively painless mechanism for demonstrating Canada's commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle. But Jelinek's statements have had an unfortunate effect upon the insular Canadian sports community. By distorting the nature and effect of the Edinburgh withdrawal, he has encouraged athletes and sports organizations to disregard and even to reject the entire international campaign.

His claim that "nothing is achieved by boycotting" is based on an extremely narrow reading of the summer's events. To be sure, the Boycott failed to push Mrs. Thatcher into sanctions, but for several weeks the daily announcements of withdrawals dramatized opposition to the British Government's complicity with apartheid in a way which reached far more people than diplomatically worded communiques from Prime Ministers' conferences. The boycott significantly disrupted and weakened the athletic events – surely a telling measure of effectiveness. And it won widespread support. In Canada, even without a public campaign for withdrawal, many people phoned open-line radio shows and wrote letters-to-the-editor to call for such a step, an unprecedented show of support. In Edinburgh, athletes and spectators publicly blamed Mrs. Thatcher for the Games' disruption and booed her in Village and Stadium.

Jelinek has accused the leaders of the Edinburgh boycott of victimizing the athletes involved, but many of them spoke out in favour of it. "To me it was the right decision", said Nigerian sprinter Chidi Imo, who would have been Ben Johnson's chief rival in the 100 metres. "I don't like people to suffer just because they are black. If that's the reason (for the boycott) they were right." Jamaican sprinter Grace Jackson said that athletes were very disappointed at missing the Games, "but overall we feel in solidarity."

What Jelinek forgets is the powerful symbolism of international sport. In a highly visible way, the boycott demonstrated that it's not just "business as usual" with apartheid, that if Britain and the white settler dominions want a vital, united Commonwealth Games – they can only do so on the basis of solidarity against apartheid.

Unfortunately, Jelinek's statements have encouraged the very opposite conclusion. Despite the requirement that federally funded national bodies speak and vote for the expulsion of South Africa from the international federations, following the Edinburgh Games the Canadian rowing and gymnastics associations voted to protect South African membership in their respective federations. A growing number of prominent Olympic athletes have begun to speak out against the boycott as an interference with their "right to participate". And Jelinek's own officials refuse to enforce their own policy against prominent associations such as Tennis Canada which continue to invite South Africans to their competitions.

South Africa's white sports administrators have recently stepped up their campaign to discredit and circumvent the sports boycott. Whether he has intended it or not, the sports minister's well publicized views provide them with welcome support.

# Challenging Their World

BY LINDA GUEBERT

Beverly Naidoo, *Journey to Jo'burg: A South African Story*, illus. by Eric Velasquez, J.B. Lippincott, 80 pp., \$9.95 U.S.

Toeckey Jones, *Skindeep*, Harper & Row, 250 pp., \$12.95 U.S.



As they are growing up, children are very much caught up in the world they live in. They rarely have the ability to step back and see the circumstances of their lives in another way, or to envision a life different from that they have always known. However harsh or unaccommodating it may be, it is their world, and to them it is the only world. Even extreme conditions of war and violence are seen as the norm by children who have grown up without experiencing anything else.

For the young people in these two juvenile fiction books set in South Africa, apartheid is the norm - it is the only world they know. Told from two very different viewpoints, both stories chronicle the growth of

their characters from a passive, uncritical acceptance of their world - the everyday life of family separation and material hardship in a black village in one case and of white privilege and isolation in the other - to the realization that the system they have grown up with is destructive and harmful and there are powerful reasons for wanting to change it. The challenge to their view of the world does not take place under the same circumstances for these characters, but the decision they come to at the end is the same - they must be among those who are working for that change.

*Journey to Jo'burg* tells the story of thirteen-year-old Naledi and her nine-year-old brother Tiro who decide they must leave their village and go to Johannesburg, where their mother works. Their baby sister is sick and they are convinced that bringing their mother home is the only way to save her. Their journey takes them from the quiet of their own village near the Botswana border through orange groves and mining areas to the bustle and noise of the big city. It is here they first come face to face with the blatant manifestations of apartheid - segregated buses, policemen demanding passes and arresting people who don't have them, their mother's subservient attitude in front of the white Madam she works for. But it is also here, and during an unexpected sidetrip to Soweto, that they first become aware of the struggle of other black people to end apartheid, and they return to their village recognizing that there is a far more important journey still in front of them.

*Skindeep* is told in the first person by its main character, a young white woman named Rhonda. Rhonda's life revolves around her comfortable home and family, and increasingly around Dave, the enigmatic young man she meets at the

college she attends. Dave's shaved head initially puts her off, but she soon finds herself fascinated by him and falls deeply in love with him. His frequent mood changes, his reluctance to tell her about his background or take her to meet his family, and his periodic attempts to push her away from him, however, make the relationship far from easy for her. Rhonda's lack of interest in political issues throughout most of the story (she's "not politically



inclined," as she puts it) contrasts sharply with the strong commitment to change she exhibits after the dramatic (although not altogether unpredictable) climax of the story.

*Journey to Jo'burg* is intended for young readers aged nine to twelve. It is short and simply written and contains very effective black-and-white illustrations. The subject matter and issues raised in *Skindeep*, on the other hand, demand more maturity and experience and would be suitable for older readers, probably at the "up" end of the "twelve up" designated as the target age group. Both authors have created very realistic characters and relationships between them, and Jones particularly seems able to capture accurately and acutely the concerns

and cares of young adults. To those not familiar with patterns of travel among black people in South Africa, Naidoo's children might seem a little foolhardy setting out on a 300 km journey without taking nearly sufficient food or water; but this will no doubt appeal to children anyway, since they often dream of adventure without considering such mundane details. Both books define words and expressions which might be un-

familiar outside South Africa, but which add to the authenticity of the story dialogue.

These two books are interesting and informative, and young people will no doubt enjoy reading them. In sharing the experiences of the characters as they confront the realities of apartheid, however, young people are provided with more than just a "good read." *Skindeep* is especially

effective in focussing the issues in a highly personal and emotional way, and *Journey* contains poignant images of apartheid's damaging effect on children. It seems certain that young people, even those comfortably encased in middle-class North American society, will find that they have been affected by the events depicted in these books and that their own view of the world has also been challenged.

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## Popular Education: A Tool for Change

BY COLIN MacADAM

*Colin MacAdam is an educator with the Canadian Jesuit Refugee Program and has been active for many years in Latin American solidarity work.*

*South Africa on the Move: A Tool Kit for Education and Action*, produced by CIDMAA, CUSO, IDAFSA, OXFAM and TCLSAC, available from CUSO, ECSA Desk, 135 Rideau St., Ottawa, Ont. K1N 9K7, \$10.00

One important outcome of the growing popular education movement in Canada has been to focus the attention of solidarity activists on how they can use this approach to communicate the struggles they are involved with to other sectors of the population. Given the broad range of fronts where people are fighting for social change and justice, and given the absence of a broad, unified movement in Canada, popular education is providing a key connective function between the sites of struggle.

Popular education begins with where people are, in their current race, class and gender struggles. Acknowledging and supporting people's personal efforts at the outset of a learning process and building on that experience through the education program or workshop creates a willing and committed group of learners and a powerful vehicle for action. This "popular" learning ap-

proach has been developed on the basis of Latin American movements which have grown within marginalized communities with the objective of overthrowing systems of oppression. For this reason popular education lends itself well to international solidarity work.

To date, however, there has been an absence of popular education resources that take a specific solidarity struggle and lay it out in ways that people can readily relate to. In this respect the new kit produced by CIDMAA, CUSO, IDAFSA, OXFAM and TCLSAC, *South Africa on the Move*, is a tour de force. The kit is divided into three sections: **Methods and Ideas**, **Tools and Background Information**. Its stunning layout and graphic design easily direct the user to the different sections.

Included in the **Methods and Ideas** section are the Educator's Handbook and the User's Guide, which do a superb job of introducing popular education to South Africa activists. The Handbook in particular challenges the activist to think like an educator. It argues that outreach and education should be targeted at those sectors in Canadian society whose counterparts in South Africa are leading the liberation struggle. And it argues that a popular education methodology is the best suited for maximizing the benefits for both contexts. Detailed instructions on how to implement

this approach are given, as well as some concrete examples of workshops.

The Tools are materials to be used by the public (or publics, in this case) to help get them thinking and talking about the issues. One of them is a series of "Myth Exploders." Each of these six sheets takes a message commonly found in the mainstream press and counters it with graphics and information about the opposition in South Africa. The futility of sanctions, the threat of a bloodbath, Botha as a reformer and Canadians as helpless bystanders are some of the myths addressed. This Tool is designed as part of a process whereby people are asked to identify the most common images of South Africa in the Canadian media and analyze them. It is one example of how the kit helps break down elitist concepts of knowledge and expertise and engages people in producing their own knowledge.

A second Tool, the "Dialogue Series," uses simulation and role-play techniques in conveying the South African experience to Canadians in four targeted sectors: Youth, Women, Church and Labour. The other two Tools, "Apartheid and the Freedom Charter" and "Culture and Resistance" focus on different ways that oppression and resistance in South Africa can and are being expressed. These two pieces lend themselves well to use in schools, as

teachers can easily fit the materials into specific subject areas, such as history, social studies, literature, etc.

The Background Papers, included in the third major section of the kit, provide factual material on the resistance movement in general and the involvement of the specific sectors mentioned earlier. Written in clear language and with strong graphic imagery, they are ideal preparation for teachers or activists preparing to use the other kit materials. One interesting aspect of the Background Papers is that they enable readers to appreciate the rapid changes taking place in this struggle, for example, in the level of Canadian corporate and economic

support for apartheid. Information about these rapid changes and the growth of resistance in South Africa can be used with Canadian audiences to illuminate ANC positions which are also discussed in the kit.

Unlike the curriculum *Strangers in Their Own Country* (reviewed in *Southern Africa REPORT*, Vol. 2, no. 2, Oct. 1986), the *South Africa on the Move* materials give full prominence to the role of women in the resistance movement, and are not designed only for school use. In fact, this kit is so well documented and comprehensive that perhaps its only shortcoming is that it may overwhelm an unsuspecting teacher or activist. In this respect, brief introductions headed

"For the Teacher," "For the Church Activist," etc., might have helped overcome some initial disorientation, but this is clearly a minor drawback.

The critical element in this kit is the clarity and insight it lends to the question of how to bring more Canadians into active solidarity with the struggle in South Africa, while at the same time forwarding our own efforts for social justice. For this reason the Educator's Handbook is almost by itself worth the cost of the kit. The thoughtful planning and commitment to change in South Africa in evidence throughout the kit should make us want to redouble our efforts to create forums where it can be used.

## Witness to Apartheid

BY BARBARA EMANUEL

"... if I had had anything dangerous at that point, I think peaceful change would have been for the birds. I would have thrown anything. If I had a hand grenade at that time, I would have blasted that policeman to pieces ..." says Leah Tutu, wife of Bishop Desmond Tutu, as she sees her son Trevor being grabbed by policemen at a funeral. The words of a moderate anti-apartheid activist.

*Witness to Apartheid* is a powerful testimony by victims of daily police terrorism in the black townships of South Africa. The story is told mainly through the voices of children and through some narration by Bishop Desmond Tutu. We listen to a young boy barely able to speak after two weeks of beatings in detention, and to members of the banned Congress of South African Students, their identities hidden for fear of arrest. We share the grief of the helpless parents of a teenage boy shot dead in his school playground by a policeman. Doctors - black and



*Lord's Prayer scene from Witness*

white - interpret the graphic evidence of torture. An undertaker tells us about the multiple bullet wounds of the 34 victims he has buried.

However, after watching the film and letting my intense feelings of anger, revulsion and sadness settle, I was left with a somewhat uneasy feeling about it. True, the film was not devoid of all sense of struggle and defiance. For instance, we hear a version of the Lord's Prayer recited by a group of youths who were in hiding: "Our father who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name. Thy


freedom come. Thy will be done in South Africa as it is in Lusaka. Give us those weapons, our daily military training, and forgive the South Africans our leaders. And lead us not to apartheid. For thine is the kingdom, the power and the victory. For whatever be what never. Amen." Yet I couldn't help but feel that, in the absence of a strong and more self-conscious presentation of the realities of organized resistance to the regime, such glimpses of defiance emerged more by accident than by design. As a result, with particular audiences the film could too easily be reduced to the dreaded and ultimately unhelpful "blacks as victims" stereotype.

That said, it bears emphasizing that the film was made under severe restrictions inflicted by the State of Emergency and that the end result remains, on the whole, admirable. It does contain a lot of very powerful footage, including some haunting images of daily life in the black townships. It thus becomes an important document, testifying to the violation of basic human rights which is so widespread in South Africa. Watching this film, one cannot remain indifferent.

# TAKING SIDES

## *in Southern Africa*

**National Conference on Canada's role in  
international action to end Apartheid  
and to support SADCC**



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