



# Southern Africa **REPORT**

Vol. 2 No. 2

October 1986



## SANCTIONS: WHAT'S LEFT?

*Working with Mulrooney.*  
by Linda Freeman  
*What Next?*  
by CIDMAA


*UK.*  
*Stonewalling the Future: Thatcher's "NO"*  
by Cosmas Desmond

*US.*  
*Congressional Action: How Important?*  
by Freshman & Cason

# Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 2 No. 2

October 1986



## Southern Africa REPORT

is produced 5 times a year by a volunteer collective of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC),

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*COVER: Anti-apartheid activists confront right wing vigilantes.*

We would like to thank Oxfam Ontario for the grant which made this issue of Southern Africa REPORT possible.

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Cover design by Art Work



## Sanctions: What's Left?

Linda Freeman's lead article in last year's October issue of *Southern Africa REPORT* focussed on sanctions too, but the matter has scarcely been laid to rest in the intervening months. Indeed, given the publication of the excellent report by the Eminent Persons' Group and the renewed congressional activity in the United States, given the drama of Margaret Thatcher's cruel intransigence in the face of Commonwealth demands, given the aggressive strides into the vanguard of verbal proponents of sanctions taken by Brian Mulroney, it is more, not less, of a story than it was last year. In consequence, we have given over an even larger number of pages to it in this October's *Southern Africa REPORT* than last time, complementing Freeman's fresh report from Ottawa with commentaries from Washington and London and with several up-dates and commentaries on grass-roots, sanctions-related activities in Canada.

We need scarcely repeat last year's editorial, however. Then we sought to situate Freeman's article about the politics of sanctions in Canada by documenting the ABCs of the case for sanctions. By now Mulroney & Co. have made many of these arguments their own. The kind of rationalizations for inaction which might have had a certain surface plausibility for many Canadians even a short year ago now, more than ever, stand exposed. They are recycled only by such last ditch apologists for the South African government as Thatcher and Reagan, these latter full of crocodile tears for those blacks whom sanctions will "hurt" (for all the commentary necessary on this point see Feiffer's brilliant cartoon reproduced elsewhere in this issue).

No, the time has come to dig a little deeper, to follow up quite explicitly on some of the questions which Linda Freeman begins to raise towards the end of her present ar-

ticle. Although noting that Tory rhetoric regarding sanctions continues substantially to outrun Tory performance, even in the most recent period, Freeman nonetheless insists that we *give the devil his due*. Yet how are we to explain that the Conservative government under Mulroney is so *on-side* on this issue, an apparently strange teammate for the general run of anti-apartheid activists? No doubt we must grant (and honour) the reality of Mulroney's own moral outrage at the enormities of apartheid as a factor. Freeman also suggests that the relatively small size of Canadian business' stake in apartheid gives Mulroney greater room to let his conscience be his guide.

But Freeman begins to open up even more fundamental terrain when she hints that the logic which underlies Mulroney's advocacy of sanctions is very different from that which underlies similar advocacy on the part of many of us in the anti-apartheid movement. This is, in

fact, the case and we feel that there is something important to be gained by clarifying, briefly, the difference. It turns around two key issues.

One issue has to do with the role of force in facilitating real change in South Africa. Mulroney and others like him seek to counterpose sanctions and violence as alternative and mutually exclusive means of bringing an end to apartheid. Hence the currency (in Freeman's words) of "the oft-quoted remark that the point of sanctions is to bring South Africa to its senses and not to its knees". Mr. Mulroney is welcome to his illusions in this respect and indeed it would be nice if he were correct. Unfortunately, he is not. There is no sign that the South African government is prepared to yield gracefully to the "inevitable".

The root cause of violence in South Africa is the decision by the South African government to suppress by every cruel means demands for a democratic resolution in South Africa. Those who make such demands have been left with no alternative but to develop further their ability to fight as one key means of winning their freedom. As Cosmas Desmond puts the point in his article in this issue, "sanctions aimed at persuading the Nationalists (South Africa's ruling party) to change are therefore irrelevant .... But they can help to make it difficult, and ultimately impossible, for them to continue to implement their oppressive policy". In other words, the implementation of sanctions cannot substitute for popular struggle, although it can facilitate it, can "shorten the day of bloodshed" in Chief Albert Lutuli's memorable phrase. The corollary to this point is important too. For the clearer we are on it the more likely we are to insist that the Canadian government complement its initiatives on the sanctions front with substantive assistance to those who are in the front-lines of that struggle - principally, that is, to the African National Congress.

If the first of the two central issues we mentioned earlier has to do, in this way, with differences of emphasis regarding the *means* of overthrowing apartheid, the second has to do with differences regarding the deeper *content* of that effort. Here it is worth underscoring one especially important sentence in Freeman's essay. She writes: "Mulroney has emerged, along with Malcolm Fraser, as a spokesman for the progressive wing of capital on this issue - trying to promote somewhat more substantial change in South Africa so that capital will have a future". The logic underlying this position was recently given pithy expression by one of South Africa's leading businessmen, Zac de Beer of Anglo American:

*We all understand how years of apartheid have caused many blacks to reject the economic system as well as the political system .... We dare not allow the baby of free enterprise to be thrown out with the bathwater of apartheid.*

In other words, if Thatcher and Reagan are trapped in a defense of capital's short-term interests, Mulroney and Fraser can be understood as seeking to defend its long-term interests. Change now, the latter are saying, before not merely revolutionary violence but *revolutionary socialism* are placed ever more firmly on the agenda in South Africa.

Yet once again there is a fatal flaw in the Mulroney scenario. The South African state remains firmly locked into its racist perception of the world and its authoritarian response to crisis. Moreover, when push comes to shove, South African capital itself seems nervous about the risks which might be involved in sacrificing the current system of domination for the hypothetical promise of some future indirect and neo-colonial style of control over a new black government. Certainly even the "progressive wing" of the South African business community is loathe to push very hard

for the kind of genuine deracialization - substantial democratization, for example - which alone might offer hope of slowing down the revolutionary momentum. Mulroney and Fraser seem, therefore, to be preaching to deaf ears in their efforts to use the threat of sanctions to help keep the South African capitalist system from acting upon its worst self-destructive instincts.

Dramatic change is on the agenda in South Africa. From the point of view of capital, Mulroney's gamble on the use of sanctions to preempt revolution and to attempt to guide and control that change may still make more sense than Thatcher's gamble on resisting change altogether. Moreover, to the extent that, as part of his gamble, Mulroney seeks to facilitate some kind of transition to political democracy in South Africa, we are happy to join him. But there is a difference. Like many other Canadians, we see the South African people as likely to use the space opened up by such a transition for purposes quite other than those Mulroney has in mind.

The fact is that vast numbers of South Africans see the socio-economic inequalities which have been essential attributes of racial capitalism's evolution in South Africa as calling capitalism itself into question. For this reason, they seek socialist solutions to pressing problems from their revolution. Unlike Mulroney or Fraser or Zac de Beer we are prepared to applaud this fact. We are also prepared to take a gamble or two of our own to embrace Brian Mulroney's sanctions (however much we may suspect some of the motivation behind them), to hold him to them, and to push for more. For we are confident that the popular momentum in South Africa will not easily be diverted, that any sanctions which weaken the South African government's ability to resist violently the popular will and which therefore advance the cause of democracy will also advance the cause of the long-term structural transformation of South Africa.

# What's Right with Mulroney?

## Canada & Sanctions, 1986

BY LINDA FREEMAN

*Linda Freeman, a professor of political science at Carleton University, is currently writing a book-length study of Canadian policy towards Africa.*

Let us give the devil his due. There is no question that, whatever their shortcomings, the statements and policy commitments of the Mulroney government on South Africa have gone further than any previous Canadian government. In the past year, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs have reiterated on several occasions Canada's willingness to contemplate full economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa. In addition, they have adopted a series of measures which have applied pressure on South Africa both unilaterally and in concert with other countries. The Prime Minister has taken a leading role at meetings of the Commonwealth in Nassau in October 1985 and particularly at the mini-summit in London in August 1986, in attempting to persuade Britain to participate in united action by Commonwealth members in tightening sanctions against Botha's apartheid regime. His speech at the United Nations last October had Africa delegates lining up to shake his hand.

### Major Advances

While the sanctions adopted so far are not comprehensive and many are not mandatory, they exist and they represent progress. Here are some of the major advances of the last year: The Canadian government has banned imports of South African agricultural products (worth about \$75 million in 1985). It has also banned imports of steel (worth about \$12 million), iron, coal and uranium. It has stopped government purchases of South African products

and government contracts with companies owned by South African capital and has asked provincial governments to follow suit. Finally, it has abrogated the Canada-South Africa double taxation agreement and has allocated \$7 million for

*All economic questions, except the most trivial ones, are basically political questions and all political questions are basically moral questions.*

*Joan Robinson, British economist*


an expanded programme of scholarships for black South Africans. (See the list of numerous other voluntary and symbolic measures which the government has adopted since July 1985). A heartening example of the government's new determination to mean business even on voluntary measures was its prompt and vigorous response to the flout-

ing of its request that the promotion of tourism in South Africa be stopped in Canada. When the South Africa Tourist Board published an advertisement in the *Globe and Mail* in September 1986 inviting Canadians to join a two-week guided tour to South Africa "to see for yourselves", the government announced it was closing this Board and also the offices of South African Airways in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. Joe Clark also publicly rebuked the *Globe* - a far cry from the days not too long ago when Canadian newspapers regularly devoted pages extolling the wonders of Kruger National Park and South African beaches.

Clearly, there is considerable room for tougher sanctions and for tightening up the measures which have been adopted. However, recognizing what has been accomplished sets in perspective the record of previous Canadian government actions. Only a year ago, the Mulroney government had offered little more than symbolic measures and it was still not clear which of its mixed signals on South African policy pointed the way forward. Sounding suspiciously like previous Liberal administrations, the approach had been to condemn apartheid loudly while doing little of substance in opposing the system. By the autumn of 1986, however, both Mulroney and Clark had nailed their colours to the mast, indicating that they were prepared to move forward rather than just to mark time.

### International Changes

The challenge, of course, is to understand the forces which have wrought this transformation in Canadian policy as well as to assess its limitations. Above all, events at the international level - both within southern Africa and in reactions from abroad have created an entirely different context for Cana-



Marlette/Charlotte Observer

dian responses. The ability and determination of black people inside South Africa to sustain their protest and struggle against apartheid – notwithstanding the enormous suffering and cost to their communities – has been fundamental. So far, South Africa's enormous repressive machinery has simply not been able to quell popular action and to regain effective control of the black townships as it was able to do after Sharpeville and, to a lesser extent, after Soweto. However, the successive states of emergency, the detentions of up to 12,000 people, reports of systematic torture, continued removals of populations and an adamant refusal to alter its 'homelands' policy have created a reputation sufficiently odious to reduce considerably the credibility of South African officials abroad and their sympathizers. Add to this South African aggression within the region – and especially the raids on three African capitals during the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group's (EPG) attempt to open up possibilities for a negotiated solution – and one understands how even a rogue elephant like Thatcher has not been able to sustain Britain's total opposition to any form of sanctions. With measures being contemplated by the EEC and Japan, and with an aggressive Congress pushing Reagan in the United States, there is no question that Canadian measures are congruent with the new international climate of opinion on South Africa.

#### Shifts in Ottawa

Within Canada, there have also been shifts as groups within the Conservative Party, the federal bureaucracy and the corporate sector have adapted to the changed responses to South Africa at home and abroad. In the past, these groups have acted to brake the kind of action which we have seen Mulroney take this year. Members of the Conservative caucus and Cabinet had been guests of the South African government on free trips to South

Africa and had come back with pro-South African sympathies. Some were Directors of South African-owned companies in Canada. However, in July 1985, Mulroney made it clear that free trips to South Africa for Conservative MPs were out. While a small group of about ten MPs made a few rumblings on this issue in fall 1985 (with their spokesperson William Van-Koughnet from an eastern Ontario

*Ordinary black people throughout South Africa look to the world for more than just moral clarity. Those outside who say that sanctions will "hurt the blacks" do not know how intense black suffering already is. It is, in any case, a judgement they have no right to make, when the blacks themselves see sanctions and any additional suffering they involve, as preferable to the far greater tragedy they would otherwise face.*

*Shridath S. Ramphal, Secretary General, the Commonwealth Secretariat*

riding even releasing a press statement suggesting that Canadian policy criticizing South Africa's human rights record was not fair), they have been marginalized as a right wing fringe and an embarrassment. Moreover, given the Mulroney government's domestic problems and the scandals (which have included such standard bearers of the right as Sinclair Stevens), it is unlikely that even these backbenchers are going to step out of line on one of the few areas where Mulroney has been earning praise both at home and abroad.

Until very recently, powerful forces and individuals working through the federal bureaucracy had remained wedded to the cautious anti-sanctions stance of the Trudeau years, and had acted to stall and resist the general direction in which Mulroney and Clark were heading. Unfortunately, some were central to the South Africa Task Force set up last year by the Department of External Affairs as a control centre for the Canadian response on this issue. In 1986 in private meetings with Canadian churches, trade unions and the press and in public testimony to the House of Commons Committee on Human Rights, the Task Force's then Director, Eric Bergbusch, continued to express views considerably closer to Thatcher than to Mulroney – with doubts about sanctions and considerable vagueness about planning for assistance to the front line states (FLS) in the event of international sanctions against South Africa.

In fact, this strand within External Affairs had attempted to block a CIDA study on the effects of sanctions within Southern Africa – both when it was commissioned and after it was written. It took some energetic pushing by the head of CIDA's SADCC division to get the study authorized and then an unauthorized leaking by a non-CIDA source to make the report available after it had languished for four months under consideration in External Affairs. Written by a South African born graduate student of Carleton University, Chris Davids, the report has received wide publicity in Canada and also in Southern Africa in its argument that South Africa is likely to be seriously affected by sanctions and that, given sufficient international assistance, the FLS will be able to develop alternative trade and transport routes from those presently going through South Africa. Significantly, while the Canadian Ambassador in Harare, Roger Bull, played a major role in publicizing and supporting Davids' findings, leading members of the Ex-

ternal Affairs Task Force were reported to be unhappy with the assumptions and the conclusions of the report.

Fortunately, both Bergbusch and his deputy, Ian Ferguson, have been moved to other diplomatic postings abroad, and an opportunity exists for their replacements, together with other more sympathetic members of the Task Force, to rescue its current reputation as unimaginative and administratively weak at best and obstructionist at worst. The new head, John Schioler, has had fresh experience of events in South Africa as he spent five months escorting Archbishop Scott in his travels with the Commonwealth's EPG.

Even before these changes, once the government had made up its mind last fall that it was moving forward towards stiffer sanctions, the bureaucracy had gradually begun to respond to the clearer signals of its political masters. One cannot underestimate the role here of Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, both in promoting this general direction and in keeping the momentum going. Apparently, he has had ready, direct access to the Prime Minister. In addition, key advisors in the offices of both the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs have played an important role in developing Canada's responses to the issues as they have appeared.

#### Corporate Cold Feet

At the same time as the Canadian state has been strengthening its stance against the current regime in South Africa, the corporate sector has been forced to respond, for its own reasons, to South Africa's growing political instability and deteriorating economy. In the past, Canadian corporations (in many cases linked to U.S., British and South African capital) had been influential in promoting economic relations between Canada and South Africa. However, general corporate opinion has come to understand that a political resolution to the current cri-

sis in South Africa is necessary for the survival of its stake in a system from which it has benefited so long. Capital has clearly moved ahead of the South African government, as can be seen in the decision of South African corporate leaders to go to Lusaka to meet with the African National Congress. For their part, western corporations have reacted to the changed terrain with a range of different strategies, and many have abandoned their original role of profiting from the system in favour of withdrawal.

*Help us. Please help us.  
Our country is burning;  
our children are dying ...  
Canada shouldn't - nobody should - wait, because we haven't got the time and it's desperately urgent.*

*Desmond Tutu, Archbishop of the Anglican Church in Southern Africa*

Canadian companies also reflect this confusion and uncertainty. At one end of the spectrum, there remains a core of diehard proponents of staying on, some using the defence of constructive engagement, some simply operating within the system. By late 1986, a rump of seventeen Canadian corporations remained with direct investments of about \$100 million, a mere fraction of the peak involvement. In this category are Quebec Iron and Titanium, developing the strategic mineral titanium in its subsidiary at Richards Bay; Rio Algom with holdings in a uranium mine in Namibia; Varsity Corporation (formerly Massey Ferguson) with subsidiaries producing bulldozers and diesel engines; Ford Canada and Bata, the ubiquitous manufacturer of shoes.

These companies steadfastly refuse to recognize the larger implications of their involvement in

South Africa - their links with the South African state through the tax revenues and foreign exchange which they generate, with the military through the nature of their production and participation in civil defence arrangements, and with the apartheid system through provision of substandard wages or segregated facilities or their repression of black unions.\* As recently as June 1986, Varsity Corporation chief, Victor Rice, opposed disinvestment demands, stating to its annual general meeting that the company's "purpose is to make money for its shareholders and thinks that politics should be left to politicians". However, many of them may just be putting on a brave face. With the value of the rand plummeting and the introduction of regulations on capital repatriation reducing the value of their holdings by another half, corporations stand to lose considerably now by selling their properties. They have told External Affairs, apparently, that they don't intend either to provide new investment or to reinvest profits in their South African subsidiaries - probably more for these economic reasons than in compliance with the intent of Canadian government sanctions.

Despite the serious problems of capital repatriation from South Africa, eleven Canadian corporations have withdrawn from South Africa in the past year - Alcan, Noranda's Canadian Wire and Cable, George Weston, Reed Stenhouse insurance brokers, Placer and Laurasia - to name the most prominent. Even as hard-nosed a supporter of investment in South Africa as Falconbridge has announced its intention to sell its minority interest in Western Platinum - citing the has-

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\* To take just one example, 5 Canadian companies have specifically been singled out by the Canadian government as paying their black workers at levels too low to sustain a modest standard of living. They are Bata, Falconbridge, AKA Varsity (formerly Massey Ferguson), Dominion Textiles and Moore Corp.

le factor from groups protesting its involvement over the years as well as economic reasons. Only a few weeks before the announcement, a Falconbridge executive, visibly troubled by the tough questioning of the Liberal MP Sheila Copps in the House of Commons Human Rights Committee, had staunchly defended the company's record in South Africa on the grounds that the company provided jobs for blacks and was working on improving living and working conditions. Compare Falconbridge's attitude of the late 1970s when External Affairs officials trying to secure compliance with the Code of Conduct, were briskly shown the

door. Further signs of cold feet can be seen in the decision well over a year ago of Canadian banks to stop providing loans to the South African government and its agencies and in the informal suggestion by Canadian underwriters that they will no longer subscribe to credits or bond offerings for South Africa.

#### Other Actions

At the same time as Canadian capital and the federal government have gone through a range of changes on the South African issue, other levels of government and important social groups have taken actions or sustained campaigns which

have kept the pressure on. On their own, provincial governments (with the exception of British Columbia) banned the import of South African wine and liquor while Ontario stole a march on Ottawa when it decided to proscribe purchases of South African goods for provincial institutions. In addition, Ontario has shown signs of reviewing its investments through a major provincial pension plan to consider divestment from companies doing business with South Africa. Trade unions, churches, universities and other non-governmental organizations have worked vigorously this year to urge tougher government action, corporate disinvest-

### MEASURES ADOPTED IN 1985-86 TO DEMONSTRATE OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID

- Strengthened the voluntary "Code of Conduct" Concerning the Employment Practices of Canadian Companies Operating in South Africa:

- appointed an independent and impartial administrator introduced a standard reporting format code made applicable to all Canadian companies including those with minority interests

- Tightened the administration of the United Nations arms embargo to end *exports* of sensitive equipment such as computers to the Government of South Africa and its agencies.

- Applied the voluntary UN embargo on *imports* of South African arms.

- Abrogated the Canada-South Africa Double Taxation Agreements.

- Terminated the use of the Programme for Export Market Development (PEMD) for the South African market.

- Terminated insurance to Canadian exporters to South Africa provided by the Export Development Corporation.

- Issued public guidelines severely limiting sporting contacts between Canada and South Africa.

- Announced termination of toll-processing of Namibian uranium.

- Introduced voluntary ban on the sale of Krugerrand gold coins.

- Monitored official contacts especially in sensitive sectors.

- Introduced voluntary ban on new loans to the Government of South Africa and its agencies or to the private sector in South Africa.

- Introduced voluntary ban on the sale of crude oil and refined products to South Africa.

- Applied embargo on air transport (cargo and passenger flights) between Canada and South Africa.

- Set up a National Register of Anti-Apartheid Measures to record voluntary actions taken by individual Canadians, other levels of government, as well as private organizations and firms.

- Allocated \$7 million for an expanded programme of scholarships for the black community to be administered through private channels.

- Announced appointment of an officer at the Canadian Embassy to facilitate cooperation in the labour area.

- Condemned the use of repression, such as the imposition of a state of emergency, and called upon the Government of South Africa to enter into an equal partnership with all South Africans.

- Ended Canadian Government procurement of all South African products.

- Introduced voluntary ban on the promotion in Canada of tourism in South Africa.

- Cancelled non-resident accreditation of the four South African attaches to Canada (Science, Labour, Mining and Agriculture).

- Closed the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria on Soweto Day, June 16, 1986.

- Introduced a voluntary ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa.

- Banned the import of agricultural products from South Africa.

- Banned Canadian government contracts with majority-owned South African companies.

- Banned the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa.

- Withdrew all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own nationals and nationals of third countries for whom Canada renders consular services.



ment, divestment of relations with companies involved in South Africa, and consumer and labour boycotts. Both the CLC and SACTU Solidarity Committee activities have acted in a myriad of ways to focus attention on South Africa - from long-shoreman actions in B.C. to hold up unloading of South African products, to public service employees' union pressure on Premier Peterson in Ontario, to Shirley Carr's outspoken support for sanctions and for the ANC at home and in international fora. Churches and, in particular, the redoubtable Taskforce on Churches and Corporate Responsibility continue to be in the forefront of actions to lobby the government and Canadian corporations. In August, the United Church of Canada decided it was time to abandon this direct lobbying and to sell \$28 million in shares in companies with direct investments in South Africa. At the other end of the spectrum, the Canadian Medical Association decided not to divest from its South African holdings in favour of a mild appeal to South African doctors to make every effort to end the apartheid system!

The Canadian university community has given mixed signals, although with some significant progress. McGill, York, Dalhousie and Windsor have decided to divest from companies with economic links to South Africa. At the same time, the University of Toronto, the University of New Brunswick, Queens University and Carleton University ignored popular demands for full divestment in favour of divestment only from companies that weren't in compliance with the Codes of Conduct, or the Sullivan Principles, while even milder measures were adopted by Western and the University of Alberta. York was also able to campaign successfully to remove Sonia Bata from its Board of Governors. Officials of the South African embassy have been active on many university campuses - defended on the principle of free speech and the

salutary effects of debate, but offensive to many African and Canadian students alike.

*The ultimate objective of those of us sitting around this table is to free twenty-five million people ... This meeting has nothing to do with balance sheets. It has to do with human dignity.*

*Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada*

#### Gaps and Shortfalls

Thus, in the past year, a willingness of the Conservative party to take Mulroney's lead on this issue, a lessening of rigid attitudes in the federal bureaucracy, some rethinking within the corporate sector and, now, actions and campaigns by provincial and municipal governments and broader social groups, has enabled the state to make the changes in policy discussed at the outset. Not that all is smooth sailing. The short-term pursuit of profit

and advantage by individual firms can still contradict the thrust of what the state has come to consider a good policy for the Canadian people and Canadian capital as a whole. As a result there is a gap between action and intention and many steps still to be taken. Especially when one turns from the area of foreign investment in South Africa to the question of trade, the old familiar attitudes quickly surface. So far, Canadian companies have shown no signs that they are prepared to boycott trade with South Africa until compelled by law to do so, leaving open large questions about their voluntary compliance with bans requested by the government.

For its part, the decision of the government not to move further on trade restrictions at this time has opened up a number of anomalies between the intent of actions taken so far and the predilection of Canadian capital for business as usual. While the Canadian government has participated in an embargo on air transport between Canada and South Africa (even though few links actually existed), it made no move to prevent Wardair helping South African Airways out of the difficulties caused by the sharp decline in tourist and business traffic attending sanctions. In fact, Wardair and other Western airlines have leased aircraft from SAA; in this case, with a \$25 million contract for three Airbuses. In a second instance, the government has decided not to purchase goods from South Africa or from majority-owned South African companies, but is still prepared to allow crown corporations to sell Canadian products to South Africa - witness the \$8 million sale of wheat by the Canadian Wheat Board to South Africa in May 1986. Even more important are large exports of sulphur to South Africa by western Canadian suppliers which include Petro Canada and the British Columbia crown corporation, B.C. Petroleum Corporation. Canadian sulphur exports constitute half the total of Canadian exports to South



Africa and are much more important for South Africa as a source of supply than they are for Canada.

Moreover, so far, the government has moved gently, choosing to impose sanctions with minimal adverse effect in Canada. Alternative sources of supply do exist for South African agricultural products and most other goods affected by existing import bans. While Canadian suppliers have lost contracts in South Africa because of the government's position on sanctions – in particular a \$3 million sale of nickel coins by Sheritt Gordon and a \$1 million sale of electrical machinery by the Electroliser Corporation – in other cases, Canada has actually benefited from the ban on some South African imports as a competitive supplier of uranium, coal, steel and especially gold coins. In fact by the end of 1985, the Canadian Maple Leaf gold coin had captured the market share formerly taken by the South African Krugerrand.

#### The Test Lies Ahead

It is not surprising that Canada has taken the easy options first, but it also means that the true test of the sincerity of this government's intentions lies ahead when more of the pain is felt in Canada. In the past, to say the least, monitoring of Canadian policy commitments has been loose and important components of these policies remain to be added.

Here are some areas to watch:

- While materials and equipment of potential use to the military, police or nuclear sectors in South Africa may not be exported if purchased by the South African government or its agencies, such goods are still available to the private sector. In the past, the Canadian government administered its existing ban using the narrowest possible interpretation of its meaning, letting slip activities by corporations like Space Research or Levy Auto Parts which clearly contributed to the South African military effort.

- The Canadian government has allowed Eldorado Nuclear, a crown corporation, to honour a contract to process Namibian uranium for at least another year, despite its own ban on further contracts and a U.N. resolution proscribing as theft the export of Namibian natural resources.

- Within South Africa, Canadian corporations continue to produce goods which directly or indirectly go to the military or nuclear sectors.

*You can't talk about jobs when people are being murdered.*

*Shirley Carr, President of the Canadian Labour Congress*

- Canada has continued a form of nuclear co-operation with South Africa through participation in scientific exchanges in Canada and abroad.

- The much-ballyhooed Code of Conduct still remains voluntary with no penalties for non-compliance.

- The Ministry of Finance still defends support for South African loan applications from the International Monetary Fund on "technical grounds". The list is long and the Canadian government has many options before it fulfills its commitment to the total economic and diplomatic sanctions that it has countenanced.

We will also be able to test this administration's sincerity in its decisions about assistance for the front line states and relations with the African National Congress. While the government has increased assistance for education of South African blacks to over \$7 million and for bilateral and multilateral development programmes in the region, it is quite likely that the needs of the FLS will increase dramatically as international sanctions begin to bite and South Africa follows through on its threats of retaliation. Davids' study for CIDA estimated that in the short term the region would need \$100 to \$150 million. More-

over, while Canada's attitude towards the African National Congress has improved over the nadir of the late 1970s/early 1980s, Mulroney has still not officially met Oliver Tambo, the ANC's President.

#### Speaking for Capital's Progressive Wing

Where then does this picture – of a government moving in a positive direction but still with a long way to go – leave us? Mulroney has emerged, along with Malcom Fraser, as a spokesman for the progressive wing of capital on this issue – trying to promote somewhat more substantial change in South Africa so that capital will have a future. On sanctions his attitude is eloquently revealed in the oft-quoted remark that the point is to bring South Africa not to its knees but to its senses.

For a number of years, it has not escaped even South African capital that a heightening of the current struggle may mean a more revolutionary denouement than it bargains for – hence its concern to mend fences with the ANC and to ensure its future role in even an ANC-governed South Africa. To be sure, not all representatives of capital are far-sighted, and Britain, West Germany, France, Portugal and the White House seem confident that they can postpone the inevitable indefinitely. However, in Canada, capital's stake in South Africa is comparatively marginal – dropping in half from its former share of 1% of total Canadian trade and investment. Therefore, Mulroney has had more space to take the long view, this factor then complementing his strong personal conviction, his desire to shine in international meetings and, perhaps, the uneasiness of some sectors of Canadian capital regarding their own involvement in South Africa. In consequence, while international factors will continue to govern the pace of Canadian actions and to condition what other measures might be taken, it is unlikely that this government will retreat or stray dramatically off course.

# Stonewalling the Future: Thatcher's "NO"

BY COSMAS DESMOND

*Cosmas Desmond, author of the classic study of South African population removals, The Discarded People, now lives and works in London.*

The Commonwealth mini-summit, held in London at the beginning of August, concluded with the Ministers, for the first time in the history of the organization, being unable to reach a consensus on a major issue. And Britain was the odd one out, accepting none of the twelve proposals agreed to by the other members. While the others agreed, among other things, to ban both new investment and the reinvestment of profits, the British government agreed only to a meaningless and voluntary ban on new investment. The ban on the promotion of tourism in South Africa was also only voluntary, and the Foreign Office has since stated that it could take up to six months even to issue guidelines on how it should be implemented. It further undertook to "accept and implement any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron and steel and of gold coins from South Africa." If these measures are implemented, it is estimated that only 2-3% of Britain's £2 billion trade with South Africa will be affected. The two major users of coal, the Central Electricity Generating Board and British Coal have already banned the use of South African coal; the import of gold coins - Mrs. Thatcher's "teeny-weeny bit" - has also been banned, though the ban has not been enforced.

Indeed, Mrs. Thatcher's autocratic style of government means that it is more accurate to speak of Thatcher's, rather than British, policy. She remained stubbornly intransigent in the face of threats of a

breakup of the Commonwealth, rumours of the Queen's displeasure, negative public opinion polls and reports of splits in the Cabinet and the Conservative Party. Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Foreign Office reportedly argued in favour of "further measures," while a group of neanderthal backbenchers, some with their own private vested interests in South Africa and to the right of Botha, were strongly opposed to any actions. Prior to the mini-summit even the right-wing press was reluctantly concluding that Thatcher would have to compromise on her unyielding stand against all sanctions. The *Times*, for example, while considering that "sanctions or 'selective measures' are as fruitless and perverse today as they were before Sir Geoffrey embarked on his pilgrimage," concluded that the fail-

ure of his mission "will almost certainly compel Ministers to acquiesce in some form of sanctions." Both the *Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* canvassed the suggestion of a ban on air links as being a sufficient and not too costly indication of disapproval. But in the event, the British government, in the person of Mrs. Thatcher, with Sir Geoffrey in attendance, made no more than token gestures. Neither the feared "royal clash on sanctions" (*Times*) nor the "party revolt" (*Guardian*) materialized.

But if the government's past record is anything to go by, it would have made no difference what they had agreed to. The British Anti-Apartheid Movement has recently published evidence showing that Britain has consistently violated the four existing international agreements to which it is part: the Gleneagles Agreement; the UN Arms Embargo; the "restrictive measures" agreed by the



EEC in Luxembourg in September 1985; and the Nassau "program of concerted action." Britain maintains more sporting links with South Africa than does any other country. A broad interpretation is given to "dual purpose" equipment, which means that South Africa can, and has, imported electronic and other equipment which can be used for military purposes. The ban on the sale of computers to the police and military is widely breached because of inadequate controls, while there is no embargo on oil, but only guidelines. The ban on security contacts is violated by exchanges of naval and other high level intelligence. It is little wonder, therefore, that Robert Mugabe and Kenneth Kaunda see Mrs. Thatcher as "an ally of apartheid."

British policy, which is to do as little as possible as slowly as possible, is riddled with contradictions, illogicalities and inconsistencies:


- *Thatcher claims that the only effect of sanctions is to increase the sufferings of blacks. Yet in justifying her decision to reject the Commonwealth sanctions package she maintained that British action in collaboration with the EEC would be more effective.*

- *Pressure on the South African government, she says, does not work and may even be counterproductive; only non-economic measures should be applied. She then boasts in Parliament that Britain has done more than any other industrialized nation to put pressure on the South African government. In a letter to the Leader of the Opposition she listed thirteen "measures" which the British government had taken, including such non-economic "measures" as a ban on all government loans and on the import of gold coins.*

- *Sanctions, she insists, require international cooperation, particularly by the US, the EEC and Japan. (The Commonwealth is clearly of little significance to her.) Yet Britain*

*has consistently vetoed the imposition of mandatory sanctions at the Security Council. In June this year it did so twice.*

- *It is also argued that sanctions would cause unemployment among black South Africans. On the other hand, it is claimed that sanctions will not work because they would create an economic boom, as South Africa would be forced to expand domestic manufacturing to compensate for the declining imports. Since sanctions would deprive it of both capital and technology, this boom would have to be generated by labour intensive means*



ANC News Briefing

*and so would actually create employment for blacks.*

Much of the confusion arises out of Thatcher's efforts to veil her pro-South African and anti-communist instincts under a cloak of morality and concern for black South Africans. She clearly believes both that the imposition of sanctions would be contrary to the interests of British capital (she is not known for her concern for other sections of British society) and that they would work. The stridency of her opposition is better explained by her fear that they would prove effective than by her newly-discovered concern for black South Africans. If

sanctions worked, they would help to bring about fundamental change, rather than reform, in South Africa. And Mrs. Thatcher and her government do not want change from a white, capitalist, virulently anti-communist South Africa to a black and probably socialist-inclined one. But that cannot be admitted by one who claims to be motivated by the highest moral principles rather than by political ideology; though she takes it as axiomatic that the apartheid system is preferable to the Soviet one. As she pointed out in an interview with Hugo Young in the *Guardian*, a boycott of South Africa would have a fantastic effect on the economy of the Soviet Union as the other major supplier of minerals: "To me it is absolutely absurd that people should be prepared to put increasing power into the hands of the Soviet Union on the grounds that they disapprove of apartheid." For her, it is immoral to weaken the economy of South Africa even though its political system might be nasty; but our disapproval of the Soviet system should be expressed through economic measures.

It certainly cannot be admitted that the fact that the victims are black and the oppressors white is of any relevance. But, as Malcolm Fraser, the former, and hardly radical, Prime Minister of Australia has pertinently asked, "What would Britain and other Western nations be doing now if 1800 whites had been killed in South Africa over the past twelve months? Would they be pursuing the same policies in those circumstances?" Another member of the Eminent Persons Group, General Obasanjo, in an open letter to Mrs. Thatcher, was even more blunt: "The economic sanctions you so energetically pursued against Poland, Afghanistan and Argentina were brushed aside in your determination to withhold their application to South Africa. Yet to many of us there is only one significant difference: the victims in South Africa are black."

The whole debate about sanctions tends to be based on the assumption that the international community is unanimously in favour of change in South Africa, but that there are differences about the most effective means of achieving it: constructive engagement or sanctions; building bridges or isolating the government. But the debate should really be about the end rather than about the means. What are the pro- and anti-sanction lobbyists trying to achieve? The former, I suggest, are trying to support the aspirations of the black people of South Africa for radical change, with majority rule as a minimum demand, while the latter are seeking to help the Nationalist government to introduce "reforms" which even it sees it is now compelled to do.

It is perfectly logical for the Conservative government, and others who are concerned only with "reform," to be opposed to sanctions, since sanctions are not an appropriate instrument for furthering the process of "reform"; they are directed towards change. Support for the "reform" process not only recognizes the legitimacy of the present government but also sees it, rather than black South Africans, as the arbiter of change. The Nationalists must therefore be maintained in power and be given a firm enough economic base to pursue alternative policies. Sanctions would only help to take the initiative away from them. As long as the initiative remains with them (and appeals to them and even the gradual imposition of minimal sanctions can only prolong that period), it remains in the interest of British capital to retain its links. Mrs. Thatcher's opposition to real sanctions as opposed to token "measures" is entirely consistent not only with her personal character - her arrogance, her self-righteous, patronizing attitude towards the rest of the world - but also with her politics: she will go to any lengths to protect the interests of her class. She clearly believes, rightly or wrongly, that sanctions are not

in the interests of British capital. Even if she is wrong, I do not believe that is for the pro-sanctions lobbyists to make the capitalists' case for them and to attempt to convince them that it is in their own interests to withdraw from South Africa. If it were in their interests, they would doubtless be the first to realize it. While it is true that they risk losing everything by continuing to support the present regime, the lack of buyers in South Africa, the low exchange rate and the introduction of the financial rand might make that risk worthwhile for those who have fixed assets in South Africa. At

of sanctions is part of her strategy. No one has ever claimed that sanctions would bring about the collapse of the economy and the automatic downfall of the Nationalist government. But it is nonsense to dismiss them as unable to achieve what was never intended. Thatcher's main argument, however, is that sanctions are immoral because of the negative effects they would have in South Africa; they would also impose too great a cost on Britain which has a greater stake in South Africa than any other country. But there is no evidence that the government has made any



present the sale of such assets would probably yield little more than 15% of their real value. They could hope to realize that much in profit in a couple of years if they were able to succeed in at least delaying the process of change. Thatcher's policy is clearly designed to give Botha, and British capital, as much time as possible. She was singularly successful in delaying any action by the EEC when she persuaded the meeting at Le Hague in June to postpone any decision pending the outcome of Sir Geoffrey Howe's predictably fruitless mission to South Africa. Clouding the issue by specious arguments about the morality and effectiveness

serious assessment of the potential effects of sanctions on either the British or the South African economy. Government spokespersons have, for example, confidently claimed at various times that the number of British jobs at risk from sanctions is 50,000 ... or 120,000 ... or 150,000. Yet in June 1986 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry stated that "estimates of the number of jobs involved in trade with South Africa in particular sectors are not available." There is little point, therefore, in seeking to counter her arguments with facts; they are clearly irrelevant. Even if it could be demonstrated that the

imposition of sanctions would *create* jobs in Britain, there is no reason to believe that Mrs. Thatcher would be deflected from her opposition. Job creation has not noticeably been one of her priorities.

Blind adherence to political bias can perhaps be understood in a jaded politician, but Thatcher's claim to be acting on moral grounds is both arrogant and hypocritical. It is arrogant because she assumes that her *political* assessment is the only valid foundation for making a moral judgement. It is hypocritical because neither she nor any other opponent of sanctions has shown any concern about the jobs and even lives which have been, and are still being, destroyed by British investment in and trade with South Africa. The British are not neutral observers who can calmly and dispassionately decide what should be done about the appalling situation in South Africa. They are already doing something and have been doing it for more than 150 years. They have been, and are, supporting

and benefitting from the exploitation and oppression of black South Africans. It is the *present* relationship of collaboration with apartheid that is immoral. Ending the collaboration by means of sanctions and the complete isolation of South Africa is the moral option. Any negative effects which they might have must be weighed against the negative effects which apartheid definitely does have. Black South Africans have already made that

judgement and have clearly decided that the known and experienced effects of apartheid are worse. Recent reports from inside the country tell of the South African government's virtual admission that Father 'S'mangaliso Mkhathshwa had been tortured. One of the reasons for his torture, according to his sworn statement, was his support for economic sanctions. Sanctions hurt, says Mrs. Thatcher. So does torture.



Tempo

## Congressional Action: How Important?

BY MIKE FLESHMAN AND JIM CASON

NEW YORK - The U.S. anti-apartheid movement won a surprise victory in Congress this summer when a reluctant House of Representatives passed sweeping economic sanctions against South Africa. Most Congressional observers had predicted passage of a weaker measure supported by the House Democratic leadership, instead of the comprehensive sanctions bill (HR 997) introduced by Oakland Democrat Ronald Dellums and supported by most progressives.

In mid-May one House Africa Subcommittee staffer told *Southern Africa REPORT*, "There is abso-

lutely no chance of passing the Dellums bill in the House. We're going to get a whole lot less."

But after an intense last minute lobbying campaign by anti-apartheid activists and under mounting pressure from a public newly outraged by the June 12 declaration of South Africa's second state of emergency, not even conservative Republicans dared to be seen as "soft on apartheid" in an election year.

So when the Dellums bill was introduced on June 18 the House voted unanimously to end all investment in South Africa and virtually all trade between it and its largest trading partner - the United States. The vote represented such a break with previous policy that even the

bill's sponsor, California Democrat Ronald Dellums, pronounced himself "shocked" at the outcome.

And there is good reason to be both surprised and skeptical at the House vote. By June 1986 the anti-apartheid movement had succeeded in persuading the public that a vote against full sanctions was a vote for apartheid. And no one running for re-election could be for apartheid.

That doesn't mean that Congress wants to sever U.S. economic and political links to white South Africa. The much weaker legislation passed by the Senate in August and endorsed by the House in September offers a much better indication of what the Congress really thinks. In seventy pages of rambling and sometimes contradictory language, the Senate bill limits only new U.S. investments, ends some types of bank loans and bans imports of certain specific commodities, including coal, uranium and agricultural products. But unlike

the House bill, it does not require withdrawal of U.S. firms from South Africa or ban most trade.

What the Senate bill does provide, are some useful insights into the workings of the American Senate and the highly ideological climate that dominates the foreign policy making process in the age of Reagan. Take, for instance, Senate thinking on the ANC. Although the Senate recognizes the importance of the ANC and calls for its legalization, it also considers the ANC to be a "communist infiltrated," "terrorist" organization. In one section the Senators go so far as to suggest the ANC "reexamine" its ties to the South African Communist Party and calls for a CIA study of "the extent to which communists have infiltrated" the anti-apartheid opposition.

The Senate view of violence is similarly skewed against the opposition. The South African government is urged to end its "unprovoked" violence, while the ANC is instructed to end its "terrorist activities" as a precondition for negotiations. Senate sensibilities are particularly offended by "necklace" executions of suspected collaborators. The legislation devotes an entire section to "necklacing" and specifically demands that the ANC condemn the practice. The upper chamber expresses no similar outrage over the murder of political prisoners or the well documented torture of children and other detainees.

Some of this language can be dismissed as right-wing rhetoric. But it must also be seen as part of a campaign being developed in the U.S. to delegitimize the use of force in the struggle against apartheid and even to discredit the ANC. And the broad premise of that campaign - that communism threatens vital, "legitimate" Western interests in the region and must be opposed - is accepted even by anti-apartheid liberals.

Another principal target of the Senate bill is the divestment movement. The original sponsor of the

legislation, Senator Lugar, has suggested that his legislation would supercede state and local government actions against South Africa - including divestment and selective purchasing measures passed by some 19 states and 65 cities and affecting more than \$18 billion worth of investments.


This little noticed parliamentary maneuver has put the anti-apartheid movement, which has fought so hard for sanctions legislation, in a position where it may have to choose between sanctions and twenty years of work for divestment.

Anti-apartheid lobbyists had hoped to strengthen the Senate measure when representatives of the House and Senate met in September to work out a common bill. But with time running out on the 99th Congress, Senate Republicans used parliamentary tactics to manoeuvre the House into accepting their legislation unaltered. The White House has vetoed the bill and, as this article goes to press, is trying to frustrate attempts to override the veto by adding a few additional measures

to the existing presidential executive order.

Once again the anti-apartheid movement, despite broad public support and months of painstaking lobbying, has failed to alter fundamentally U.S. policy toward South Africa. This failure has added new urgency to the debate within the movement over the importance of electoral politics and Congressional lobbying. Historically, the anti-apartheid/liberation support movement focused on grassroots organizing, and confrontation politics, fighting only defensive battles on Capitol Hill. But the problem for the anti-apartheid movement, as Washington Office on Africa lobbyist Jackie Wilson told us, is that "the movement has come to that crisis of how to keep its political integrity while moving into the mainstream" of American politics.

"What we try to do," she said, "is determine our bottom line and then not cross it." But that's not always possible. What motivates the anti-apartheid movement - sup-





age has met with criticism from the grass roots. "Something is not better than nothing," said one Philadelphia activist. "It's letting the liberals define the issue. In principle we can't be supporting anti-liberation movement legislation."

And with the expansion of the anti-apartheid movement over the past two years, the danger of liberalism to anti-imperialist politics in the movement is increasingly a danger from within. The movement is in the contradictory position of seeking to mobilize liberal political power to alter short term US policy towards South Africa without compromising its long term political agenda. The emergence of apartheid as a mainstream political issue has tempted some strategists to divert substantial movement resources away from grassroots organizing and into traditional Congressional lobbying.

But the anti-apartheid movement isn't there yet. Regardless of the outcome of the sanctions bill, the anti-apartheid movement needs to turn its attention back to grassroots organizing and agitation. Ironically, the success of campus divestment work and state and local legislative action has brought on a need for new campaigns for student/community activists. Jesse Jackson's recent tour of southern Africa has created a new opening for doing solidarity work with the frontline states and the South African and Namibian liberation movements. Education and organizing is what the U.S. anti-apartheid movement does best. It's time to get back to it.

port for the liberation of southern Africa - isn't what motivates the Congress. When Representatives think about South Africa, they think about U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region and their prospects for re-election. These interests are inherently hostile to the South African liberation struggle, and the anti-apartheid movement has attempted to manipulate Congressional re-election fears against them. But with mixed results.

The same House that voted "against apartheid" in June, for example, voted to support South Africa's defense of apartheid in Angola by endorsing "covert" U.S. aid to Jonas Savimbi in September.

What appears as a glaring contradiction in U.S. policy toward southern Africa is, in Washington at least, perfectly consistent. The two votes offered Congress the opportunity to be against both apartheid and communism.

The political gulf between anti-apartheid movement progressives and even its liberal congressional allies became apparent in September, when Congressional staffers and representatives of TransAfrica and WOA met to decide whether to accept the Senate bill unaltered. "We thought we had come to investigate 'options' for strengthening the Sen-

ate's language," Wilson said. "But when we got there it turned out the House had already decided the only option was to accept the Lugar bill - preemption and all."

After hard bargaining, movement lobbyists convinced the House to oppose the Senate on preemption, but failed to win House backing for a stronger bill. And in the end, the American Committee on Africa, WOA and TransAfrica, the three principal US anti-apartheid organizations, reluctantly - but publicly - endorsed the Senate's sanctions. In the name of political expediency, rightly or wrongly, by September the US anti-apartheid movement's bottom line had dropped.

And the national decision to accept the Senate's sanctions pack-





# The Sanctions Campaign: What Next?

BY CIDMAA

*CIDMAA, the Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique Australe was created in 1981 to provide resources for NGO's, unions, churches, women's and student's groups interested in Southern Africa. It is the de facto Quebecois network on Southern Africa.*

*A French-language version of this article will appear in CIDMAA's own journal, Afrique, Automne 1986.*

The August Commonwealth meeting has come and gone. Mrs. Thatcher was predictably intransigent. The other Commonwealth members imposed the economic measures against South Africa adopted at last year's Nassau Conference, strengthening them slightly (see list of various measures taken). The US Senate has followed the House of Representatives in ignoring President Reagan's pleas and voted overwhelmingly for a tough sanctions bill.

In short, to a casual observer, it might appear as if the international anti-apartheid movement has won its long battle for sanctions against the apartheid regime. Indeed Joe Clark has gone so far as to lambast publically the *Globe and Mail* for defying the "voluntary ban" by publishing South African tourism advertisements (perhaps P.W. Botha should teach us how you "ban" something "voluntarily"). Having implemented the limited measures announced by the Commonwealth, the Canadian government now probably wishes the whole issue would go away, and that South Africa would be retired from the list of this year's "in" news items as the World Series looms and the Hockey season draws near.

In many countries, including Canada, the limited actions taken by the respective governments have to a greater or lesser extent cut the ground from under the feet of the anti-apartheid groups. Certainly a lot of the energy has gone out of the campaign for sanctions, and in the public consciousness, a concerted campaign around the issue might now be seen to be just another example of the "crazies" on the left who are never satisfied and always need something to knock. In the wake of the Commonwealth meeting there is an urgent need for anti-apartheid groups to reflect on where the sanctions campaign is going, where it fits into an overall strategy, and on what specific targets to now concentrate.



## Our Focus to Date

We can best begin by reminding ourselves of the object of sanctions, while also reconsidering some of the ways in which we have argued for them in the past. Understandably, the argument for sanctions was overwhelming cast in *moral* terms - Canadians, their pension funds and even their investments should not be sullied through involvement with apartheid, should not be used to prop up the apartheid system.

It is this argument which has largely been won over the past year. In the light of the highly publicized

atrocities and intransigence of the regime, most Canadians would today probably agree with the moral argument for sanctions. Indeed the measures taken by the PC government have largely taken over this terrain from the anti-apartheid movement. While this is doubtless partly a victory, reflecting years of hard work and organizing, it has also deflated conventional arguments for sanctions, and deflected a great deal of the impetus of the sanctions campaign.

The argument with government policy seems now not over principle, but over detail - "they" have accepted the principle of sanctions, now "we" are reduced to arguing that the measures taken by the Mulroney government do not go far enough. In these terms the moral thrust underlying the old argument of the sanctions campaign seems - in the public mind at least - much weaker, and sometime close to sour grapes.

## A Shift in Focus and Tactics

Here I think a decided shift in focus and tactics is called for. Recognizing that we have won a partial victory, but that precisely because the victory is only partial it does offer enormous space for evasion on the part of the government, we need urgently to move the primary thrust of the sanctions campaign away from the moral issue and to focus centrally on the impact of sanctions on the apartheid system - on how particular individual measures, as well as a broader overall sanctions package, would operate to hasten the process of dismantling apartheid.

This was always one of the weaker areas of our argument. Very few people in the sanctions campaign had moved the argument beyond the simply moral level to show just how sanctions would be an effective instrument of change. The

campaign as a whole did not have a clear understanding – one which could then be presented both to the various constituencies we sought to mobilize and to the government whose policies we sought to prod – of what the impact of sanctions would be and how it would both hasten the process of dismantling apartheid and reduce the violence of this process. This is the area on which we now need to concentrate. It requires clarity on a number of issues.

We need to begin with a realistic understanding of the role of sanctions in the process of dismantling apartheid, to have a clear grasp of what sanctions can and cannot achieve. Of themselves sanctions, no matter how complete, will not bring down the apartheid regime. Rather, this will be done by the organized resistance of the South African people. Sanctions however will very materially affect the power of the regime to administer and enforce apartheid and its capacity to act against the population. They will therefore be a crucial variable affecting the balance of forces in South Africa.

The real objective of such sanctions is thus not moral pressure, not to “punish” the regime, and certainly not – as is argued by its detractors – to cause economic chaos and unemployment. Sanctions would rather be a positive intervention which seeks to shift the balance of forces in South Africa by weakening the apartheid regime.

How so? We need to be able to show what the real impact of such a positive intervention would be. There are both general and specific arguments to be made here. At a general level, it is fairly easy to show how the structure of South Africa’s industrial economy makes it extraordinarily vulnerable to international action – far more vulnerable for example than other newly industrialized economies such as South Korea, Brazil, etc. This vulnerability stems basically from the fact that the economy imports heavy machinery, equipment and technologies

without which its huge manufacturing sector, its highly mechanized agriculture and mining would simply not function. And it pays for these like any other Third World economy – by exporting mineral and agricultural products rather than industrial goods.

A sanctions program would directly affect South Africa’s capacity to import this essential Western equipment and technology, and so directly and rapidly affect production in all sectors of the economy. South Africa simply cannot sustain a “siege economy” in the medium term.

This would directly affect the balance of forces in South Africa in at least three ways. Firstly, analysis of the 1986/7 South African budget shows that probably 50% of the projected R37,481 million is allocated to the defence and administration of apartheid. In light of the already shrinking fiscal base of the apartheid state, concerted international economic action would rapidly limit the capacity of the regime to finance apartheid and repression.

Any limitation on the capacity of the regime to repress the popular struggle is a gain for this struggle. Sanctions would secondly, therefore, indirectly strengthen the resistance to apartheid (see below for proposals on direct assistance).

The economic consequences of sanctions would also cut into the privileged life styles of South African whites, thereby accentuating their political polarization, further weakening the already fragile political base of the Botha regime, and possibly forcing further concessions – which then weaken it yet again. However, a word of caution is essential here. The aim of sanctions would not be – as some advocate – somehow “to bring the whites to their senses”. White South Africa is not some collective biblical Saul on the road to Damascus, which can eventually be made to see the blinding light of justice. Whites will not bring about change, blacks will.

Sanctions must aim to weaken white power structures, while strengthening those of the democratic opposition.

This points to a clear need to identify the concrete areas in which the structure of white power is most vulnerable to external pressure and sanctions, and a concrete program of action (see below). The excellent study on Sanctions recently published in London by the Catholic Institute for International Relations begins to look at these areas. In Canada, we need to build on the work of groups like the SACTU Solidarity Committee who have made detailed studies of the precise economic linkages between Canada and South Africa, and the areas in which action can be most effective.

There is a final dimension to this stress on moving the sanctions campaign away from the negative “boycott mentality” into an emphasis on the positive. Punitive sanctions against South Africa must have as an integral aspect, positive and high levels of support for the victims of apartheid in general and for the countries of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). While some groups have emphasized the role of SADCC, in general too much of the focus of the Southern Africa network has been “South Africa-centered” and has not given sufficient emphasis to the fact that regional issues are central to the struggle against apartheid.

### **The Focus On Particular Audiences**

Finally it is also essential to distinguish between the different audiences to whom the new pro-sanctions arguments will be directed, and the different messages and arguments to be used with each. The anti-apartheid movement as a whole works on at least three levels. Some groups work mainly with specific constituencies – trade unions, church groups, etc. At this level, the suggested new focus here would

# sanctions

move the argument for solidarity away from moral issues, and even the need for solidarity with a people struggling against overwhelming racism and oppression, to focus centrally on just how effective sanctions would be, and the specific actions linked to that sector which these specific constituencies could take.

Other groups focus largely on broader information issues and seek to influence a more diffuse "public opinion". Again, because the moral issue has largely been won, we need to shift the terrain. The principle of Canadian intervention against apartheid seems largely to have been accepted by "the public at large". We need to build on this acceptance to show both how the measures taken by the Mulroney government are not really effective, and how particular other measures would be effective.

Taking these two levels together - specific constituencies and the broader public opinion - means working to create a new political groundswell for further sanctions, a groundswell which has identified

specific policy measures for action, rather than the diffuse notion of "sanctions".

This would greatly assist the third focus of solidarity work in Canada - the lobbying of various levels and structures of government to produce effective policies. In discussions both with officials of External Affairs, and at the July Parliamentary hearings on sanctions, it was very clear that nobody in government has a clear idea of what sanctions are supposed to achieve beyond making some moral distance from apartheid and involving unthought-out punitive action against the regime. These are essentially negative conceptions. To push the government further it is essential that the anti-apartheid movement begins to emphasize the positive aspect by showing how both particular measures and a wider sanctions package would be effective interventions helping both to shift the balance of forces in South Africa and reduce - it cannot end - the violence of the process of dismantling apartheid.

## Canada's Role

There are two final aspects to the Canadian role here. The first is largely economic. Canadian involvement in the apartheid economy is relatively small compared with the Big Four: UK, US, West Germany and Japan. However the Canadian connection is largely concentrated in highly strategic economic sectors, which give it an importance far out of proportion to Canada's investments in South Africa and Namibia. Canadian sanctions would have an important economic impact.

Canada is moreover uniquely placed in the international community to play a political role in wider international intervention far out of proportion to both this economic involvement and its ranking amongst the world powers.

While all international intervention against South Africa is vitally important in shifting the balance of power in the country, clearly if the Big Four could be brought into a wider international sanctions package, this would drastically increase its effectiveness. Here the role of

## Feiffer

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BLACK PEOPLE



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BAD FOR BLACK  
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I OPPOSE AFFIR-  
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


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Canada could be crucial. It is the neighbour and biggest trading partner of the US; enjoys a special relationship with Britain; is a member of both the Commonwealth and Francophone communities; and is highly regarded in the Third World and particularly in Southern Africa. No other country is better placed internationally to broker an international consensus on a sanctions package against apartheid.

The Mulroney government would now clearly like to concentrate on its numerous domestic woes. In our new campaigns around sanctions, the anti-apartheid movement should not only try to build a new public consensus for effective Canadian sanctions against apartheid, but should also seek to oblige the government to take advantage of Canada's unique international position to act more energetically in building an effective international sanctions package binding on the recalcitrant Big Four.

### Towards a Program of Action

Rethinking the focus of the sanctions campaign also requires a tighter and more structured identification of the primary targets of such a campaign. This is a project for the Southern Africa network as a whole. Here are simply advanced some preliminary ideas for action in the following fields:

• *Oil* – South Africa is especially vulnerable to an oil embargo. Canada does not sell oil to South Africa, but can act to strengthen the oil boycott. A punitive “anti-apartheid tax” should be imposed on all oil companies operating in Canada which maintain a presence in South Africa, e.g. Texaco, Mobil, Shell, etc. A consumer boycott campaigning against these companies is possible.

• *Trade* – There are a number of vulnerable areas here.

— South African imports to Canada: every South African product sold in Canada helps finance apartheid. We need to work towards

a total trade boycott, and legislation which makes the sale of South African products in Canada illegal.

— In particular the continuing illegal processing of Namibian uranium by Eldorado must be ended. Existing stocks of South African wines held by provincial liquor boards must be sold off and the proceeds given to the victims of apartheid.

— Effective monitoring measures must be developed, particularly to be able to identify South African products (mainly fruit and tinned food) passed off as products of third countries.

— Legislation banning the sale of any Canadian produce to South Africa.

• *Tax Penalties* – The ongoing disinvestment campaign against corporations, like Ford Canada, Quebec Iron and Titanium, Control Data, Dominion Textiles, Massey-Ferguson, Falconbridge, Bata could be escalated to demand the imposition of an “anti-apartheid tax”. Canadian corporations in South Africa, as well as those U.S. and European corporations operating in Canada which do business in South Africa should be penalised by our tax structure. These corporations should be denied any fiscal bonuses, and should not receive any grants or contracts from the federal or provincial governments.

— These penalties should also apply to South African subsidiaries operating in Canada, such as Carling O’Keefe and Rothmans.

— The equivalent of these monies should be granted by the Canadian government to the victims of apartheid in South Africa.

• *Disinvestment* – Through a demonstration of the ways in which each Canadian investment in South Africa props up the apartheid system, the disinvestment campaign should shift its focus mainly towards securing legislation obliging either disinvestment, or a high punitive “anti-apartheid levy” on Canadian companies with economic ties with South Africa.

• *South African Assets in Canada* – The disinvestment campaign could also be accompanied by the demand for the forced disposal of all South African assets in Canada. Though these are relatively small (except of course for Carling-O’Keefe) this would be part of an international effort to prevent South African-based transnational corporations such as Anglo American and Rembrandt shipping the wealth of South Africa abroad. It would require very careful monitoring and dealing with issues such as apparent minority control (e.g. Carling O’Keefe).

• *Assistance to the Victims of Apartheid* – A public campaign for contributions to a “Freedom Fund”.

• *SADCC Support Fund* – A similar fund-raising campaign which will include putting further pressure on the government to support SADCC and to organize international assistance for SADCC. The government has acknowledged the need to increase assistance to SADCC, and CIDA has commissioned a study on the specific mechanisms. It is essential that the new sanctions campaign makes this an integral part of our demands, that we ensure the assistance is given, and that the CIDA study is published so a public debate around the issue can begin. Specifically we should demand that the government change the “category 3” status of Angola and Mozambique in its official aid categories, so as to allow these countries to receive direct Canadian assistance.

• *Recognize the ANC* – The negative campaign for an end to diplomatic relations with apartheid could be complemented with an insistence that the government come to terms with political reality in South Africa and officially recognize the ANC as the organization representing the majority of South Africans. We should also insist that CIDA resume the matched funding of ANC projects terminated by the Clark government in 1979.

## Divestment at the University of Windsor

BY BARRY D. ADAM

*Barry Adam is Chair of the Pro-Divestment Committee at the University of Windsor.*

On April 29, 1986, the Board of Governors of the University of Windsor voted to divest its short term investment and endowment funds from companies with direct investment in South Africa. There were two dissenting votes.

The issue was first raised in 1984 when the University was considering changing its pension fund carrier and a resolution was passed by the Faculty Association Council specifying high return as the only principle for investing pension funds. Opposition to divestment was strong among the Faculty Association leadership and pro-divestment resolutions were turned down at subsequent meetings of the Council and through preliminary manoeuvres at two general membership meetings. The debate culminated in the fall of 1985 when a referendum was set for faculty and retirees, and *pro* and *con* divestment committees were struck to prepare briefs. The *pro* committee identified some 10% of the \$90 million pension portfolio as in need

of reinvestment, pointing out the active involvement of certain corporations in supplying the instruments for the maintenance of apartheid and the popular support for divestment in South Africa itself. Arguing that divestment need not entail financial loss, the Committee cited U.S. precedents and McGill's action which occurred at the beginning of the referendum period. The *con* committee argued against "politicizing" the Faculty Association, warned that divestment would harm the performance of the pension fund, and claimed that black South Africans would suffer from divestment. The *con* brief was accompanied by a "financial analyst's" report which stated that divestment is an "objective of communists and fellow travellers in the West" and that "many top grade investment managers will justifiably refuse to manage" divested funds.

During the referendum period, the Students Administrative Council and student press joined in calling for divestment, and Commonwealth Secretary General Sridath Ramphal, in accepting the first Paul Martin chair in International Affairs and Law at the University, noted Wind-

sor's historical record as the terminus of the Underground Railroad and asked whether Windsor might betray its heritage by failing to divest.

In February 1986, the faculty voted by 60% for divestment, and students, soon after in their own referendum, voted to ban South African products from campus (including beer produced by a South African owned company). With Student Administrative Council and Faculty Association presidents pressing the question at the Board of Governors, a subcommittee was struck which subsequently supported a resolution to divest the University's small endowment fund. (Divestment of the much larger pension fund remains under consideration.)

All observers' chairs were filled at the April 29 meeting of the Board as the University President ably defended the resolution from questions posed by nervous Board members. The Pro-Divestment Committees and Students Against Apartheid will continue to monitor the Board's progress on divesting pension monies while other campus unions are moving to their own referenda on the issue.

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## Divestment at York University

BY MICHAEL STEVENSON

*Michael Stevenson is chairperson of the York University Divestment Committee.*

Readers of Gene Desfor's contribution to this journal a little while back will be sorry to learn that his optimistic forecast of success in York University's divestment campaign has not been confirmed. The reasons for this may, however, be instructive about the complex and subtle ways in which the relationship between apartheid and foreign capital is institutionalized.

Despite the support by unions, student organizations, the university's President, and the university-wide advisory committee on the operation of the York University Pension Fund, the York Divestment Committee's motion calling for total divestment of the Fund was effectively defeated in May by the Fund's Board of Trustees. Put on the agenda earlier in the year by a union-nominated trustee, it was withdrawn on the grounds that the Trustees required clarification of their legal position *vis-à-vis* divestment. There has followed a whirl-

wind of mystification around the issue - mystification premised, it would seem, on a defense of the presumed rights of capitalists to freedom of action unconstrained by the interests of those from whom their capital is derived!

The centrepiece in this bag of tricks is a legal interpretation of the fiduciary responsibility of trustees to the beneficiaries of a pension fund. As conveyed to the York Fund's trustees in an opinion solicited from the law offices of McCarthy and McCarthy, the unambiguous meaning of "responsibility" derives from the

judgement in the British case *Cowan v. Scargill*. Neither the law firm nor the legal precedent can be considered politically innocent. The first is perhaps the establishment corporate law firm in Toronto and, therefore, perhaps in the country. The second is a case decided against the British Mineworkers Union during the national political crisis associated with the miners strike a couple of years ago. In reference, therefore, to political action against multinational corporate investment in South Africa, the advice given the York Fund trustees was, not surprisingly, opposed to divestment.

The judge in *Cowan v. Scargill* ruled that "in the case of a power of investment ... the power must be exercised so as to yield the best return for the beneficiaries, judged in relation to the risks of the investments in question ...". The bottom line is that trustees must invest where the best rate of return would be generated save in very exceptional circumstances. The case holds that a failure to make a good investment "for social or political reasons" is a breach of trust; that there is a duty of the trustees to seek professional investment advice, and that "it is the duty of trustees, in the interests of their beneficiaries, to take advantage of the full range of investments authorized by the terms of the trust, instead of resolving to narrow that range."

Cut and dried, according to McCarthy and McCarthy, who concluded on this basis that "... the proposed divestment policy of York University may expose pension plan trustees and trustees of other university funds to potential liability." One may note in passing how a question asked by one university was immediately treated as pertaining nation-wide. This is the authority with which nationally prominent law firms pretend to speak, and McCarthy and McCarthy warn York and all Canadian university pension fund trustees that they may be personally liable for any losses to the fund due to divestment.

The warning was sufficient for York's trustees to take cover, and agree that no action on divestment was possible unless they had unambiguous professional advice that no financial loss would result. In seeking such advice, they approached the three investment managers of the Fund. If these worthies were not technically being asked to act in conflict of interest, it was, nevertheless, to be expected that they would find it difficult to recommend an investment policy that contradicted the policy they had thus far recommended for the Fund. And so it was: unanimously they advised against divestment, as likely to lead to a financial loss.

With these two sets of authoritative advice at hand, the York trustees chose not to deal with the Divestment Committee motion, unanimously passing in its stead a strangely contradictory motion of their own. Here they declared their "abhorrence of apartheid", and their "strong desire to authorize a policy of divestment". They declared further their concern that Canadian firms in South Africa "work against apartheid or withdraw", and instructed their investment managers to favour, *ceteris paribus*, investment in corporations "with a socially responsible policy toward South Africa". The contradictions will need no elaboration for the readers of these pages.

The York Divestment Committee was understandably depressed, particularly since the various delays involved in the piecing together of this final decision meant, perhaps not coincidentally, that it hit the university community in the Spring, when it was most difficult to mobilize the community in opposition. The Committee chose, therefore, a three-pronged strategy to develop further action on the divestment front by this Fall. First, it got the Faculty union executive to pass a motion asking the Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations (OCUFA) "to investigate the feasibility of modifying Provin-

cial legislation to make divestment of Pension Funds easier". Second, it obtained a commitment by the university's President to seek from the Board of Governors a resolution to divest the operating and endowment fund. Third, it sought independent legal and financial advice concerning weaknesses in the opinions received by the trustees of the Pension Fund.

The fruits of that strategy now make it possible to remount the divestment campaign at York, and perhaps to help with similar campaigns elsewhere. The most impressive result has been the production by OCUFA of an excellent brief arguing the case for "ethical investment" of pension funds in general, and for divestment of South African related holdings in particular. The legal and economic arguments involved can be quickly summarized. The economic grounds include the numerous cases in which South Africa-free portfolios have outperformed undivested portfolios; the evidence and opinion favouring "ethical investment" more generally; evaluations by investment specialists of the unacceptably high risks of investment in South Africa at present; arguments against the views that divestment will lead to loss either as a result of the forced sale of South Africa related securities depressing their price, or as a result of the movement to smaller and potentially riskier companies than the typically large South African involved multinationals; and arguments against the significance of transaction costs related to divestment.

The legal commentary in the OCUFA brief points to the very limited case law on pension fund trusteeship. The orthodox position is based on only three major cases, and none of these is entirely relevant, dealing as they do with explicit problems in which union nominated trustees were alleged to have acted in conflict of interest. This would not be an issue in divestment decisions. Furthermore, what would be centrally at issue is what is most ambiguous in the case law:

the moral commitments of the beneficiaries and the definition of their interests as a result. As the OCUFA lawyers point out, the major text on trust law states that "the investor, though a trustee of funds for others, is entitled to consider the welfare of the community, and refrain from allowing the use of the funds in a manner detrimental to society". Further, they point to the very explicit indication by the judge in *Cowan v. Scargill* that "... I am not asserting that the benefit of the beneficiaries ... inevitably and solely means their financial benefit", and that it might be in the benefit of "adults with very strict views on moral and social matters, condemning all forms of tobacco and popular entertainment, as well as armaments" to incur a loss as a result of moving funds "from what they consider to be evil and tainted sources".

This would seem obviously to be of relevance to the divestment issue. Cannot contributors to university pension funds be presumed, or even by means of referenda, as at Windsor, shown to be adults with very strict views on apartheid and institutionalized racism in any form, and with a view of corporate investors in South Africa as tainted sources of pension income? If teetotalers need not have their contributions to pension funds invested in liquor distilleries, why should those who with the United Nations condemn apartheid as a crime against humanity have their "deferred wages" invested in it? The problem, as the OCUFA brief points out, is that

there is no legal basis for answering the question - that *Cowan v. Scargill* does not articulate any reason to distinguish between teetotalers, mineworkers or university employees.

What was a purely political judgement in that case, therefore, will be a largely political judgement in the next, even if it does articulate some legal rationale. And that means a considerable risk for divestment proponents in action that might come before the courts. The OCUFA brief accordingly suggests other strategies:

- a long term campaign for legislative change permitting ethical investment;
- the creation of a new pension fund with a new deed of trust permitting ethical investment, and therefore divestment, with a transfer of funds by employees in favour of it;
- for funds not explicitly entitled to ethical investment the preparation by the board of trustees of a careful motion to divest for economic reasons, in the light of supporting professional advice about the risks of South African investments and the availability of alternatives, with a preventive court application for directions on the admissibility of such a divestment strategy.

The York Divestment Committee is eager to pursue all such strategies. Its pressure for action on endowment and operating funds has resulted in a Board of Governors' motion earlier this month instructing the university administration

to withdraw its investments from firms with "material" investments in South Africa. Of course, the qualifying adjective "material" - added by the Board to the President's original motion - is a potentially dangerous one; no doubt it evidences the continuing reluctance of a heavily business-connected body to commit itself unequivocally to divestment - a reluctance only counterbalanced by a simultaneous interest in avoiding potential conflict in the university! Moreover, the size of York's bank accounts make this action of no significance in comparison to the McGill action reported earlier in these pages. Still it is some movement after the roadblocks against pension fund divestment, and it may even be of assistance in the new phases of this latter campaign. If the concentrated business experience on the Board of Governors has allowed that divestment is not in principle economically irresponsible, why should their representatives on the Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund do less? We are initiating a write-in campaign by faculty, staff and students to ask for Pension Fund divestment, and we are seeking advice to support the quickest and most direct of the OCUFA brief's recommendations, while simultaneously pursuing the initiative for legislation permitting ethical investment. We cannot, unhappily, recover the earlier optimism about divestment at York. But if we are sadder, we are perhaps also wiser, and better prepared for the struggle ahead.

## Direct Action in Montreal

BY MARIA CIAMPI

*Maria Ciampi lives in Montreal and is a member of the Direct Action Network Against Military and Nuclear Racism and of its women's affinity group.*

On the morning of August 27, a Norwegian ship owned by the Christensen Canadian African Lines (CCAL) entered the port of Mon-

treal. The Thorscape carried fruits, vegetables, and canned goods from South Africa and six shipping containers of concentrated uranium oxide (yellowcake). The source of the yellowcake is the Rossing mine in Namibia operated by the British Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Ltd. (RTZ) with the participation of Rio Algom Ltd., its Canadian subsidiary. Every

month, the uranium arrives in the port of Montreal where it is transferred from the ship to trucks and transported to Port Hope, Ontario. There, the yellowcake is refined by a Canadian Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear Ltd. (ENL) and then sold to Japan for use in their nuclear energy industry.

Since April, the Direct Action Network Against Military and Nuclear Racism has been organizing various protests and blockades coin-

ciding with the monthly shipments. The Network is composed of numerous autonomous collectives called affinity groups drawn from anti-apartheid, peace, anti-nuclear, environmental, gay and lesbian, anti-intervention, Native rights, and women's movements. Our group is committed to non-violent civil disobedience which emphasizes direct forms of action over other methods of lobbying such as letter-writing, petitioning, picketing and voting.

In early summer, women re-examined their role as members of the Network. We realized that we shared a common desire to be more publicly visible as participants in the group's activities. We also wanted to show our solidarity with women whose daily lives are disrupted by uranium mining. In addition, we felt that working together as women would be a unifying and empowering experience. We formed a women's affinity group and began planning for the first water blockade in the port of Montreal.

Following some preliminary research, we saw that as many participants as possible were required to maximize the chances of a successful flotilla. A "call to action" was distributed to activist groups in Montreal and the recruited individuals formed a second affinity group for the flotilla. Motor boats were borrowed and rented, the launching points were checked, and an on-water training session was held to ensure that plans would not fail.

On August 26, the Network was able to have an estimate of the Thorscape's time of arrival: 3:00 A.M. August 27. We decided that we would proceed with a night action despite the extra risks involved. To double-check the ship's arrival time, members of the Network stationed themselves along the St. Lawrence River to act as spotters. Meanwhile, the participants of the flotilla prepared themselves, ready to act on a moment's notice.

By 4:00 A.M., eight motorboats were berthed under the pouring rain waiting for the Thorscape to come

into view. An hour later, a spotter contacted the flotilla to inform them that the ship was three miles from its destination. Just as the group prepared to launch the boats, the Quebec Provincial and the Boucherville police arrived indicating that the boats lacked sufficient lighting for night-time navigation. The police intervention had its intended effect - the flotilla was immobilized and the Thorscape moored moments later.

At noon, two women from the flotilla action joined a third affinity group that had planned a land-based blockade. The six demonstrators chained themselves to the gate to prevent the uranium from leaving the port. When the Montreal Urban Community (MUC) police removed the chains, the protesters sat on the road to obstruct the trucks' exit. They were soon forcibly removed and arrested on a municipal charge of disturbing the peace and refusing to circulate.

Everything that potentially could go wrong during the action did. The Thorscape arrived in the middle of the night, and the rain would not let up. There were several setbacks in the transport of boats from the rental location to the marina including the arrest of a participant who had an outstanding fine from a previous action. Once the boats had been brought to the marina, technical difficulties delayed the launching. Finally, the police prevented us from embarking, and ultimately from attempting to block the ship's passage.

Within the affinity groups, there were tensions and problems. When the women's affinity group opened the water blockade to others, many important decisions had already been made. The new participants were asked to respect those decisions, but, naturally, new questions were raised and meeting-time was lengthened considerably. Those who initially organized the flotilla now realize that such an undertaking requires months of preparation and that we should not go back on essential decisions.

Although the flotilla did not occur, and in spite of difficulties working together, we had positive results. Two boats evaded police detection and were able to approach the Thorscape. The ship was escorted by ten police boats. Obviously our campaign is considered threatening, so much so that thousands of dollars and weeks of planning were spent to prevent us from attaining our goals.

The media reportage was complete and well-done. Journalists and photographers stayed awake all night waiting for the action. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) went as far as renting a yacht to film the event. Later in the day, photographs were taken of the arrests and appeared on the front pages of four Montreal newspapers. It is unfortunate that our campaign needs gimmicks like water blockades or protestors chained to fences to attract media. However, it is as a result of our civil disobedience campaign and the widespread media coverage that the public has been sensitized to the Namibian uranium issue.

From the groups involved with the water and land-based blockades came a great deal of energy. We were able, more or less, to overcome the language barrier that divides francophones and anglophones, and to communicate effectively by having bilingual meetings. Finally, among the women who have worked together for several months, there is a feeling of support and community that has made us strong and willing to continue with the campaign.

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*Note added at press time:-* The anticipated uranium shipment destined for Montreal in early October was delayed while Rio Tinto Zinc looked for another shipping line to carry its Namibian Uranium. Christensen Canadian African Lines has declined to carry the Namibian Uranium because of its sensitivity to public outcry. A spokesman for the line said that RTZ was seeking another shipper "... because of the problems it [the protest action] was causing us."



# Where Is Botha Going?

BY DAN O'MEARA

*Dan O'Meara is research director of CIDMAA. A French language version of this article will appear in CIDMAA's own journal, Afrique, Automne, 1986.*

South Africa's state of emergency was imposed on June 12. Behind tight censorship, the most extreme crack-down in South African history followed. The regime admitted to detaining 8,551 people in two months – bringing the total number of detentions in the first seven months of 1986 to well over 12,000. More than 200 people have died in "political violence" since June 12. Activists are hiding throughout the country.

During the first half of 1986 the opposition and its external supporters lived through a growing high, as the black urban uprising moved from apparent success to success. The latest censorship has made it virtually impossible to form an accurate assessment of the impact of the new repression on the resistance. Yet it has undoubtedly been severe. Three months into the Emergency, the situation is both unclear and confusing. While the resistance clearly continues, and the regime has not recaptured the initiative, it seems from the sketchy information available that something of a stand-off has been reached.

The "high" induced by the escalating resistance of the past two years is now tempered by a more sober realism. In this climate it is essential for the solidarity movement to evaluate the likely course of political developments over the next year or so. Here we look at the regime itself – leaving a discussion of the resistance for another occasion.

## The Botha Legacy

P.W. Botha came to power in September 1978 in the wake of the "Muldergate" crisis, pledged to re-

solving four interlinked crises confronting the apartheid state – its weakening control over the black population after the 1976 Soweto uprising; the defeat of the regional strategy in the first South African invasion of Angola 1975-76; the worst recession in 40 years; and sharply deteriorating relations with its major international allies.

From September 1978 to September 1984, the regime's Total Strategy sought to restructure domestic and regional political alignments by combining petty "reforms" with the intensified coercion against its opponents. Botha's "reformist"



policies were only ever intended to modernize apartheid by winning new black allies who would sustain white control on the old basis of divide and rule. But the inauguration of the new tri-cameral parliament in September 1984 precipitated a sustained black urban uprising which finally destroyed Botha's project.

Despite its collapse, the Total Strategy achieved three very important things for the regime. Firstly, for six years, it succeeded in reorganizing and rejuvenating the demoralized white establishment. Secondly, it inflicted horrendous damage on neighbouring countries, virtually eliminating them as potential supporters of armed incursions against the regime. And finally, with the coming to power of Thatcher,

Kohl and Reagan, the Total Strategy re-won the Western support for Pretoria which had become shaky after 1976. These were Botha's achievements. As the Total Strategy collapsed, the effect on each of these three achievements was uneven.

## The Impact of the Uprising

The most visible impact of the uprising has been to shift the balance of forces inside South Africa. It has destroyed – probably forever – the collective morale of the white establishment. The forces which rallied to Botha after 1978, particularly English-speaking businessmen and intellectuals – have decisively withdrawn their support, bitterly disappointed at Botha's failure to produce stability. The white establishment is profoundly demoralized and deeply disorganized. No force within it – whether big business, the military or any other – today has a coherent program which can do what Botha did in 1978, offer an apparent way out of apartheid's crisis.

The white population as a whole, and the white power bloc itself are sharply polarized at almost every level. Botha's own party, and even his cabinet, are profoundly divided. The historic base of Afrikaner nationalism has irretrievably shattered. Today three political parties, two secret societies and one parliamentary movement fight over what ten years ago was the unchallenged fiefdom of Botha's party. Botha himself has aged dramatically. At 70 years of age he is clearly tiring – humiliated by the vicious denunciations from the Afrikaner far right, seemingly overwhelmed by the depth of black resistance. After two years of prevarication he seems to have abandoned even the rhetoric of reform and finally joined those – like Law and Order Minister Louis le Grange – who have argued

that the repressive might of the state should be unleashed against the opposition.

While there is now an open struggle in the ruling Nationalist Party to succeed Botha, none of the leading candidates command substantial political support in the white electorate, and more importantly, none of them has any coherent solution to the current crisis.

Summing up the situation in mid 1986, one can say that the regime had clearly lost, while the opposition had not yet won. The regime had lost politically, ideologically, strategically, even economically – but not yet militarily. The democratic resistance on the other hand had won at all of these levels – except crucially, the military. The regime's political calculations were limited by this objective situation, and by its impact on the white population. Essentially, they involved a clearheaded recognition that the regime could not win – it could not restore the old order, some kind of change was essential to preserve the basic structure of white interests.

The debates within the ruling party over the last two years have been over the scope and speed of these changes. Some elements wanted to go farther and faster than others – including releasing Nelson Mandela in the hope that he would be swamped by the concrete problems of, and divisions within, the opposition. The leading elements in this faction of the NP are the Foreign Minister Pik Botha and Justice Minister Kobus Coetsee. P.W. Botha clearly flirted with this group, but finally turned against them.

The decisive moment seems to have come with the proposals put forward by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) in May. This plan called for Mandela's release in return for which the ANC was supposed to accept an indefinite "truce" in which it would not undertake armed action. It also seems that P.W. Botha came close to agreeing to this plan. Three developments in May probably account

for its final rejection and the decision to resort instead to pure force, and to live with the international consequences.

Firstly, the violent disruption of an NP rally by the neo-fascist *Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging* (Afrikaner Resistance Movement – AWB) clearly shocked the regime and accentuated – probably far too strongly – the threat from the paramilitary ultra-right. The AWB has strong support in police and army and the regime was panicked into its failed raids on three neighbouring countries simply to show the far right that it was not capitulating to the black resistance.

had weakened the white regime any further.

The third, and probably most decisive reason was that the organized scope, depth and strength of resistance was growing so quickly that if the regime was going to try to break it, it had to act before the resistance had grown so strong that it could survive even the most ruthless crackdown. That moment was approaching by mid-1986. Embryonic organs of an alternative popular power – the street committees, people's courts, people's defence committees, education crisis committees, etc. – had sprung up throughout the country.



Impact Visuals

*Riot police outside Khotso House, Johannesburg – May Day, 1985*

Secondly, the international outrage which greeted these raids probably led to the recognition that while an acceptance of the EPG proposals might briefly relieve a little international pressure, the demand for change would not end until apartheid was finally scrapped. The regime would be forced into concession after concession – and it has always been clear to anyone who bothered to look that Botha never intended to do away with the basic elements of white domination. In May Botha seems finally to have agreed with Minister le Grange that it was better to crack down now before concessions to international pressure

Even more significantly, through the structures set up in March at the National Education Crisis Conference in Durban, the resistance was beginning to be coordinated at a national level. The massive political General Strike organized on May Day by the newly-formed Congress on South African Trade Unions (COSATU) had demonstrated impressive strength. The regime simply could not allow the strike called for the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Soweto uprising on June 16 to be seen to be as successful.

The new and sweeping State of Emergency was declared on June 12. It was something of a panic mea-

sure. The Emergency was not debated in Parliament, nor even discussed in the Cabinet prior to its declaration and there are authoritative reports that even the military-dominated State Security Council (SSC) – which really governs South Africa – did not reach consensus on the issue .

### The Strategic Thinking Behind the Emergency

Whereas the strategic preoccupation of the Total Strategy was to restructure apartheid, now the main objective is simple survival. In its desperation to survive, and behind Botha's frequent zig zags, the regime is now applying in South Africa the strategy it has used so successfully in Namibia since 1978.

The ultimate objective of such a strategy is to bring about – in a future as distant as the regime can make it – a compromise settlement of a kind that no credible opposition group could now possibly accept, a negotiated compromise that preserves intact the essentials of white economic power.

Three clear tactics have been used in Namibia to pursue this objective, and the same three seem now to be being applied inside South Africa itself.


The first is to stall for time internationally. Deal only with conservative Western powers, promise them a few token "reforms", and then to get the Sir Geoffrey Howes and the Ronald Reagans of the world bogged down in discussions of the petty details. And when finally cornered and obliged to take firm policy decisions, abandon pretense at "reform" and act ruthlessly against the opposition. If these Western powers really object, they will be obliged to act against their own immediate economic interests in South Africa, thus rendering any sanctions program against South Africa at best half-hearted.

This then frees the regime to carry out the other and more important aspects of the Total Strategy. One important tactic

is to cultivate conservative black groups in opposition to the liberation movement. They are to be given political crumbs from the white political table, and eventually armed and incited into violent attacks on the democratic opposition. The variant of the "divide and rule strategy" is designed to ensure that the resistance is sidetracked into defending itself from attacks from conservative black groups. The whole vigilante and Inkatha phenomenon are part of this deliberate strategy to reduce black politics to a series of armed black groups at war with each other. The *Lebanon-ization* policy also has the ideological advantage that the propaganda of the regime can dismiss the national liberation

against popular struggles (such as the shooting death of 30 rent strikers in Soweto), it tries to sap the political energy of the black population as a whole and isolate, weaken, and fragment its political organizations.

Some might interpret this as exemplifying an Afrikaner scorched earth policy. Indeed, the present Commission of South African Police, General Coetzee, said precisely that in 1979 to a captured ANC official: "We (the white regime) know you (the ANC) will win in the end, but we will make damn sure there is nothing left for you to win". Perhaps it is best understood, however, as designed to ensure that in the end an exhausted opposition



struggle as "black on black" violence.

The final dimension of this strategy is to use the full repressive might of the state to bleed the opposition in a war of attrition. The regime knows it cannot win in any straightforward sense, but by systematically (and often physically) eliminating any politically experienced opposition leadership, and by using overwhelming but selective violence

is forced into compromises that it would never have accepted years before, compromises in which the basic structure of white interests are not completely dismantled.

Whatever may be the correct explanation, such developments do raise crucial questions: How long will it take before the white regime is finally brought down? How much damage will the peoples of South Africa suffer in the process?

# Strangers in Their Own Country

BY STEVEN DART

*Steven Dart teaches history and social science in a North York high school.*

William Bigelow, *Strangers in their Own Country*, Africa World Press, 1985.

Until recently high school teachers who wished to include a unit on South Africa in their senior social science or history courses have been vexed by a lack of suitable material. In most cases this problem has been solved by showing a few movies on apartheid and "cutting and pasting" readings together from *Time* magazine. This "time consuming" process often yielded unsatisfactory results. Magazines like *Time*, while written at an appropriate level for most high school students, invariably accepted the policy of the U.S. government towards South Africa. Thus, it was difficult to develop important skills of analysis and evaluation of material. Now, however, a curriculum is available which addresses a great many of these problems faced by the classroom teacher.

*Strangers in their Own Country* by William Bigelow (Africa World Press, 1985) provides sixteen lessons and thirty-eight student readings and is a highly useable curriculum on South Africa. The author, who teaches social studies at Jefferson High School in Portland, Oregon, recognizes that different teachers will choose to spend varying amounts of time dealing with South Africa. As a result, he suggests combinations of lessons which comprise a one, two, or three week course. Each lesson has clearly stated objectives. For example, in Lesson One the objectives are "to gain an understanding of the unequal distribution of land and income in South Africa" and to "appreciate a variety of problems arising from the structural inequalities in the South African system." The teacher is then instructed as to the materials (each

lesson has at least one and as many as three student readings) and the time which will be required in order to achieve these objectives.

Many curricula stop here and leave the teacher without guidance as to methodology and strategies; however, Mr. Bigelow has included step-by-step procedures for each lesson. Thus, this unit can be introduced almost immediately into the course of study. The very appealing aspect of these suggestions is that they include a wide variety of strategies: simulation exercises, document analysis, film evaluation, interpretation of novels and student research. This selection leaves the teacher with flexibility to choose from a number of methodologies. I found the material could be used successfully in group work, student presentations, and discussions as well as socratic lessons. In each case the usual result was a high level of student interest. The inclusion of an excerpt from Nelson Mandela's riveting Rivonia Trial speech suggests student role playing as a possible methodology for some of the material.

The content of the curriculum provides the student with details on the operation of both "petty" and "grand" apartheid and on the laws which keep the structures together. There are also lessons which deal with the Afrikaner experience, U.S. investment, resistance to Apartheid, and the role of South Africa in southern African politics. The political, economic, and social impact of apartheid on the black majority is brought out by statistics, maps, documentary readings, film (eg. "Last Grave at Dimbaza"), and selections from novels by South African writers. His curriculum does present a few problems which teachers should recognize. Canadian teachers will note that their country's perspective on South Africa will have to be filled in with other resources. This

is to be expected as Mr. Bigelow is an American teacher and wrote this curriculum with American students in mind. In addition, recent developments in South Africa have made some of the material out-of-date.

More problematic is the inclusion of documents produced by the South African government called "The Case for Homeland Independence". Some teachers may find it difficult to use documents which support a racist policy in a curriculum whose prime aim is to fight racism. Mr. Bigelow's rationale for including this material is to provide the students with an opportunity to "evaluate some of the ... arguments for and against South Africa's multinational strategy." Teachers have a responsibility to encourage their students to make well informed decisions on a wide range of material. They should be very careful, however, that these particular documents are used in proper context with other materials in the curriculum. Failure to do so introduces a risk that the students may accept uncritically the South African position, thus undoing much of the work of the curriculum.

A major oversight in this work is that it ignores the role of South African women in the struggle against apartheid. Mr. Bigelow's efforts would have been enhanced had materials been included on the work of Winnie Mandela, Albertina Sisula, Molly Blackburn, and Ruth First.

In a recent article entitled "The Depiction of South Africa in U.S. Textbooks", published in the *Inter-racial Books for Children Bulletin* (v. 5, nos. 7 & 8), Howard University professor Brenda Randolph-Robinson cites ten serious problems which occur all too often in the textbook writer's approach to South Africa. Chief among these is that the texts ignore the support given to the South African government by foreign investors and governments;

they avoid raising crucial questions related to the South African economy like, "who mines the gold?" and "under what conditions?"; they have extremely weak descriptions

of the Bantustans; and they tend to present apartheid as immutable. Mr. Bigelow's curriculum forces students to evaluate each of these issues and, notwithstanding the criticisms

mentioned above, it presents a package of objectives, strategies, materials and evaluation procedures which produces a high level of involvement for senior history students.

## People's History

BY MIKE MASON

Luli Callinicos. *A People's History of South Africa. Volume 1, Gold and Workers. 1886-1924.* Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981; rpt. 1985.

The idea of "people's history" seems to be closely connected to social history from below. It seeks to pursue the same question Bertolt Brecht posed in his poem "Questions of a Worker Reading History": "Who built the seven-gated Thebes?... Who paid the bills?" Originally history from below was identified with leftist English historians writing in the 1940's and '50's. It is still most closely associated with writers in the English-speaking world - Britain, the U.S., Australia, Canada, and Anglophone South Africa. Probably the best forum for the diverse tendencies encompassed within the concern for a people's history is the British History Workshop, simultaneously a journal, a series of publications, an annual conference, regional workshops and, above all, an angle of vision which encompasses the whole of the experience of ordinary people.

Luli Callinicos' first volume of *A People's History of South Africa*, covering the years 1886-1924, is in some senses a model of its kind. Many popular histories have been produced by local groups on a shoestring budget. In consequence, they often look somewhat drab. Callinicos' publication, with its glossy gold-lamé cover and its handsome 8" by 12" format, is inviting and accessible. The text, running to over 100 pages and suffused with photographs, seems to capture



"Inexperienced Afrikaners learnt a great deal from black miners 'on the job', both during and after the 1907 strike."

Luli Callinicos - A People's History of South Africa (page 75)

just the right balance of narrative and explanation to hold the interest of any reader. Perhaps the circumstances of its birth have something to do with this – this history was originally commissioned for and published in a now banned popular newspaper.

*Gold and Workers* begins with a glimpse of pre-colonial South Africa but quickly moves into the gold rush of the last decades of the nineteenth century. Its principal, almost exclusive, focus is on the making of the African working class, although there is brief consideration of both the mineowners and the white working class and, of “exotic” interest, mineworkers brought from China. But it is not about the dissolution of the African peasantry and certainly not about Progress and the “great white men” of South African History who are to be praised for making it possible. The combination of brisk narrative with illuminating diagrams and evocative photos is the most marked feature of the book. But there is no avoidance of the essential questions which structure our perception of all modern histories – and particularly in the case of South Africa: What are the specific requirements of capital? How does migrant labour work? How is South African industrialization special? As Brecht said: “Lots of questions. Lots of facts.”

One of the main concerns of social historians in the last couple of decades has been that of “resistance” versus “domination”. In the present book this is the story within the story, or at least, the story between the lines. Up to the mid-70’s it was widely assumed that the

South African system worked (as, apparently, did the Iranian system, the Nicaraguan system, the Haitian system and so on.) Thus, capitalism ruled, the whites were ok and, conversely, the Africans didn’t, weren’t and probably wouldn’t ever be. Resistance to colonialism, capitalism, apartheid and whatever was seen as heroic but doomed: *Strike a Blow and Die* one book was called. African history in South Africa became a book of martyrs. Suddenly, Soweto, and it never looked quite the same. It may not have been written very differently but you read it differently. This change is reflected in the way you regard Callinicos’ history: you read it not resigned to the fact that the South African state always keeps the lid on things, but looking for clues as to how South African workers bend to the system but also work around it, confronting it periodically, losing to its utter monopoly of violence, but never surrendering. Thus, in the accompanying photo, we look into the face of the experienced black miner crouching between two younger, less experienced but better paid white workers, both of whom are standing. What does the face speak to us of? Incomprehension? Resignation? Or, perhaps, a calculated waiting. In a similar picture taken today we would have a pretty good idea of what he was thinking.

There are things which are missing in this book. Callinicos says that on the Reserves “the women worked the hardest” (p. 30). Brecht asked “Who cooked the victory feast?” But cooks, mothers, female cultivators, beer-makers, maids are almost totally absent from these pages in

spite of the fact that women have become the most important subject within social history in the past decade. Perhaps the problem has arisen from a too conventional reading of the term “worker”, as if the question were being raised at a time when “work” meant “wage”. This narrow “workerist” definition of the working class leads backwards in time to the labour histories of the Hammonds and the Webbs in England where practically no interest was shown in experience other than work itself. If we ignore the totality of the experience of the working class, we are liable to forget that besides a struggle for existence, history is the struggle of people for ideas. But there is virtually no suggestion of the cultural side of the workers’ lives here; we have to imagine them living without drink or prayer. And where, in a peoples’ history, is the African intelligentsia – the ministers, lawyers, teachers and clerks who led the native congresses, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union and the A.N.C. – the ancestors of both Bishop Tutu and Nelson Mandela?

This volume is about to be joined by a second, which has now been printed, and a third, which is in the works. Together they will bring to the reader a picture of South Africa in the present century which in its vividness will provide a long overdue complement to the subtle but often academic political and sociological studies which other South African writers have made available.

Books published by Ravan Press in South Africa are distributed in North America by Ohio University Press, Scott Quadrangle, Athens, Ohio.



# Resources on Sanctions & Divestment

- ▷ *Trafficking in Apartheid: The Case for Canadian Sanctions Against South Africa*. SACTU Solidarity Committee 1986. An updated, comprehensive and detailed overview rationale for sanctions and a breakdown by province of Canadian involvement.  
From SACTU Solidarity Committee
- ▷ *Divestment, The Struggle and the Future: What Black South Africans Really Think*; Mark Orkin, Ravan Press 1986. Useful survey data which documents, among many other interesting things, strong support from black South Africans for sanctions.  
From Ravan Press, DEC
- ▷ *Keeping Up With the Joneses: Canada and South Africa*. Linda Freeman article in SAR Vol 1 no 2 Oct 1985. Useful overview demystifying official rhetoric and glimpses at interests underlying the Canadian connections with apartheid.  
From TCLSAC
- ▷ *Canadian Industry in South Africa: Misconduct or Code of Conduct* IDAFSA Briefing Paper June 1985. Review of the Canadian code and focus on four of the biggest investors.  
From IDAFSA
- ▷ *Investment in Oppression: Canadian Responses to Apartheid*. Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, 1979. Dated but still useful. Updates appear in TCCR's Annual Reports.  
From TCCR
- ▷ *South Africa and the Myth of Corporate Engagement: The Case of the Bata Shoe Co.* Aug 1985. CCSA Toronto.  
From CCSA.
- ▷ *Code of Conduct: Canadian Companies in South Africa*. Department of External Affairs 1986. The official report on the administration and observation of the Code of Conduct.  
From External Affairs, Ottawa.
- ▷ *Sanctions as an Effective Instrument for Change in South Africa*. Dan O'Meara, CIDMAA, 1986. An analysis of the economic and political effects of sanctions on South Africa delivered to the parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Rights.  
From CIDMAA
- ▷ *Afrique* Sept 1986 CIDMAA looks at sanctions movement in Canada and where we might go from here. (In English & French)  
From CIDMAA
- ▷ *Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report*. Findings of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, Penguin, 1986. Solidly researched and eloquently written, evoking the realities of South Africa and deepening of the case for sanctions.  
From DEC
- ▷ *The Siege Economy, a Resounding NO*. Financial Mail article May 30 1986. Leading South African economists explain why a retreat into an economic laager would be bad and dangerous.  
From CIDMAA (For cost of photocopy and postage)
- ▷ *Busting Sanctions*. Africa Confidential article Aug 20 1986.  
From CIDMAA (For cost of photocopy and postage)
- ▷ *Guide d'Action Syndicale*. SSC Sept 1986. The sanctions movement within the trade union movement, in French.  
From SACTU Solidarity Committee
- ▷ *Update on Canadian Bank Loans to South Africa* pamphlet. TCCR, 1986.  
From TCCR for 5 cents
- ▷ *South African Sanctions: What can Canadians Do?* (package)  
From United Church for 25 cents
- ▷ *The Canadian Connection to South Africa*. Dan O'Meara, 1986. Background paper, part of kit, South Africa On The Move: Education and Action on South Africa.  
From TCLSAC, CIDMAA, CUSO, \$10.00 for kit
- ▷ *Human Rights and the Question of Sanctions*. 1986. Joint submission by TCCR, ICCAF and Canadian Council of Churches to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Rights.  
From TCCR for \$2.00
- ▷ *Questions and Answers on Sanctions*. ACOA 1986. Concise arguments, accessible style and format.  
From ACOA for 35 cents
- ▷ *Questions and Answers on Divestment*. ACOA. Useful, concise, being updated.  
From ACOA for 30 cents
- ▷ *Voices for Withdrawal*. ACOA. Quotes of South Africans and the international community in support of sanctions.  
From ACOA
- ▷ *Hands Off Apartheid Goods*. Buttons and Stickers.  
From SACTU Solidarity Committee
- ▷ *Don't Buy South African Products*. Attractive buttons.  
From CCSA

## Addresses of Sources:

- SACTU Solidarity Committee, Box 490, Station J, Toronto, Ont. M4J 4Z2
- Ravan Press, Box 31134, Braamfontein, 2017 South Africa
- DEC (Development Education Centre), 229 College St., Toronto, Ont. M5T 1R4
- TCLSAC, 427 Bloor St W., Toronto, Ont. M5S 1X7
- IDAFSA, Box 1034, Station B, Ottawa, Ont. K1P 5R1
- TCCR, 129 St. Clair Ave. E., Toronto, Ont. M4V 1N5
- CIDMAA, 3738 rue St. Dominique, Montreal, P.Q. H2X 2X9
- United Church, 85 St. Clair Ave. E., Toronto, Ont. M4V 1N5
- ACOA, 198 Broadway, New York, N.Y., 10038, U.S.A.
- CCSA, Box 6468, Station A, Toronto, Ont. M5W 2K3



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