


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APRIL 1985



SECHABA

official organ of the african national congress south africa



TAMBO AND MANDELA

SECHABA

APRIL ISSUE 1985

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Our front cover shows a picture taken in the early sixties of two leaders of the ANC, Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela. Our back cover shows Albertina Sisulu, one of the Vice-Presidents of the United Democratic Front, and at present a prisoner on a charge of high treason.

EDITORIAL

Forward to the Year of the Cadre and the People's Parliament

The ANC conference scheduled to take place this year will definitely take a form of people's parliament, not only because this will be the biggest and most significant meeting of the ANC since the 1969 Morogoro Conference, but also because the ANC itself has undergone changes in terms of its strength (military and otherwise), its social composition, its popularity amongst the people at home, and so on. It is the hope of our people, who are expecting a lot from this conference.

South Africa itself has changed since 1969. Trade unions, women's organisations, youth movements — the whole nation is moving forward with the Freedom Charter, to the Freedom Charter. Umkhonto We Sizwe has become the shield and spear of the people. Nelson Mandela is not only a leader of the ANC — important as that is — but a leader of the nation.

Internationally as well there have been changes. Vietnam is not only liberated but united. Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau are independent. What about Nicaragua, Zimbabwe and so on?

This combination of favourable — relatively speaking — internal and international conditions fills us with hope. There have also been setbacks — Grenada, the Nkomati Accord. These setbacks fill us with more determination, not only to continue the struggle but to intensify it. This determination and confidence can be seen in the 'furious' and enthusiastic unending discussions in position papers and documents, in meetings and discussions — everybody arming himself to the teeth for the

coming harvest, the military and political defeat of the racist Botha regime. Many questions are being raised, solutions being put forward, criticisms being made and changes being suggested.

This conference takes place in the year of the 30th anniversary of the Congress of the People, which adopted the Freedom Charter. The continuity, the commitment and identification, cannot be more evident. This is the year in which Nelson Mandela, for the first time since his arrest in 1962, talked — through his daughter, Zinzi — to the South African people, telling them: Your freedom and mine cannot be separated. Again, the continuity, commitment and identification cannot be more evident.

By the way, Nelson Mandela is a founder member of Umkhonto We Sizwe, and in a sense he was addressing Umkhonto cadres. That is why armed struggle will be central in the conference deliberations. Mandela is a youth inspirer — their problems will also be central. Mandela is a political and military strategist — this explains our preoccupation with these questions.

It is not surprising that this conference takes place in 1985 — the Year of the Cadre — and in the ANC everybody (young and old) is a cadre; all are determined not only to live up to expectations but to rise to the occasion.

This is why we call this conference a People's Parliament — people will decide about the future of their country, the future of their nation, the future without and against the racists and imperialists.

MANDELA'S REPLY TO BOTHA

'Your Freedom and Mine Cannot be Separated. I Will Return.'

This is the full text of Nelson Mandela's response to the conditional offer of freedom made in Parliament by the State President, PW Botha.

The response was read on Mandela's behalf by his daughter, Zinzi, at a rally in Jabulani, Soweto, on February 10th, 1985.

I am a member of the African National Congress. I have always been a member of the African National Congress and I will remain a member of the African National Congress until the day I die. Oliver Tambo is much more than a brother to me. He is my greatest friend and comrade for nearly 50 years. If there is any one amongst you who cherishes my freedom, Oliver Tambo cherishes it more, and I know that he would give his life to see me free. There is no difference between his views and mine.

I am surprised at the conditions that the government wants to impose on me. I am not a violent man. My colleagues and I wrote in 1952 to Malan asking for a round table conference to find a solution to the problems of our country, but that was ignored. When Strijdom was in power, we made the same offer. Again it was ignored. When Verwoerd was in power we asked for a national convention for all the people in South Africa to decide on their future. This, too, was in vain.

It was only then when all other forms of resistance were no longer open to us that we turned to armed struggle. Let Botha show that he is different to Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd. Let him renounce violence. Let him say that he will dismantle apartheid. Let him unban the people's organisation, the African National Congress. Let him free all who have

been imprisoned, banished or exiled for their opposition to apartheid. Let him guarantee free political activity so that people may decide who will govern them.

I cherish my own freedom dearly, but I care even more for your freedom. Too many have died since I went to prison. Too many have suffered for the love of freedom. I owe it to their widows, to their orphans, to their mothers and to their fathers who have grieved and wept for them. Not only I have suffered during these long, lonely, wasted years. I am not less life-loving than you are. But I cannot sell my birthright, nor am I prepared to sell the birthright of the people to be free. I am in prison as the representative of the people and of your organisation, the African National Congress, which was banned.

What freedom am I being offered while the organisation of the people remains banned? What freedom am I being offered when I may be arrested on a pass offence? What freedom am I being offered to live my life as a family with my dear wife, who lives in banishment in Brandfort? What freedom am I being offered when I must ask for permission to live in an urban area? What freedom am I being offered when I need a stamp in my pass to seek work? What freedom am I being offered when my very South African citizenship is not respected?

Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter into contracts. Herman Toivo Ja Toivo, when freed, never gave any undertaking, nor was he called upon to do so.

I cannot and will not give any undertaking at a time when I and you, the people, are not free.

Your freedom and mine cannot be separated. I will return.

ANC AND SWAPO APPEAL

STOP OILING APARTHEID WAR MACHINERY

In March 1985, the ANC and SWAPO launched an appeal to the countries of the world to enforce the oil embargo against the apartheid regime. The call was signed by President O R Tambo and President Sam Nujoma, and we give the text of it here.

In December 1979 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for an oil embargo against South Africa, as part of the international campaign for sanctions against the Pretoria regime and in support of the peoples of Namibia and South Africa.

Yet, to this day, Pretoria continues to meet its oil requirements with the assistance of governments, companies and individuals who permit or facilitate the supply and transport of crude oil, the provision of finance, capital equipment and technology for South Africa's own petroleum industry, and for prospecting and development of resources in Namibia and South Africa.

The strategic importance of oil and petroleum products for Pretoria's military capacity cannot be overemphasised. Oil is a key factor in the racist regime's illegal occupation of Namibia, in the acts of aggression against the People's Republic of Angola and other neighbouring states, and in the terror, repression and death meted out against the peoples of Namibia and South Africa.

At the same time, it is an incontestable fact that the apartheid regime is vulnerable to an oil embargo, as it is, and will remain, dependent on international sources and assistance for a significant part of its liquid fuel needs.

Rather than meet the demands of our peoples and the rest of humanity, the apartheid regime is today embarked on an attempt to entrench the apartheid system through so-called constitutional reforms, and continues to seek new ways to consolidate its colonial domination over the people of Namibia.

However, the peoples of Namibia and South Africa who have, for decades, waged a life-and-death struggle to liberate their countries from colonial and apartheid domination, remain ever committed to genuine liberation and independence. In pursuit of these noble goals, popular resistance in our countries continues to escalate and is stretching the apartheid regime to its limits. Now is the time for all men and women of goodwill to act decisively in support of our struggles.


On behalf of the millions of oppressed and struggling peoples of Namibia and South Africa, we appeal to those who have it in their power to restrain and stop the continued oppression, imprisonment, torture and slaughter of the men, women and children in our countries.

Stop oiling the war machinery of South Africa and help bring about genuine peace in our region.

President O R. Tambo (ANC SA) and
President Sam Nujoma (SWAPO)

Lusaka, 7th March 1985

On the same day, 7th March, the ANC and SWAPO released to the press a list of companies known to have been involved in the oil embargo, together with an account of the vast



SASOL burns after attack by soldiers of Umkhonto We Sizwe, June 1980.

sums of money Pretoria has paid for this illegal oil and oil technology. This was new information that had never been released before. We print here the analysis of what the oil embargo has cost the apartheid regime.

The Cost of the Oil Embargo

The South African economy is being drained of billions of dollars annually by the Pretoria regime's efforts to overcome the embargo imposed by most of the world's oil-exporting countries. These costs have been hidden from the South African public. In Parliament and official inquiries it is suggested that the only additional costs arising from the embargo are the premiums that have to be paid for the clandestine purchase of embargoed oil amounting to \$150-200-million per annum. The real cost is many times that figure and in the last year exceeded the country's budgeted military

expenditure. These unpublicised amounts have contributed to the present economic problems and to the recent 40% increase in the price of fuel.

Billions of dollars have been wasted on uneconomic projects that have been undertaken purely in order to reduce the impact of the oil embargo. The Sasol plants cannot be justified on economic grounds as the process is at least 20% more costly than the conventional method of refining crude oil. Some experts estimate the additional costs to be much higher. South Africa claims to have stored up to two years of its crude oil needs in contrast to the 90 days supply stockpiled by most industrial countries: an excess of 21 months needs. It is the determination to maintain apartheid that has led the regime to consort with criminals and resort to corruption in order to buy oil in the international market place.

Pariah Costs	Million US\$
Construction of Sasol plants and ancillary facilities written off over 15 years	700
Additional annual costs of production of 85 000b/d using Sasol process ..	175
Excessive oil stockpile (21 months) write-off of preparation of storage facilities	40
loss of interest on outlay for purchase of excess oil in stockpile @10% per annum	525
Exploration costs	150
Premiums, kickbacks, bribes or commissions paid for purchase of embargoed oil averaged over five years 1979-1985*	390
Loss on frauds: Salem, 'sniffer planes', written off over five years	10 US\$1 990

* These costs are based on some of the contracts, the information in the Advocate-General's Report June 1984 and evidence presented in the South African courts.

The above figure of \$1 990-million does not include the loss of potential earnings on the export of coal used in the Sasol process, or the costs of pollution and ecological damage e.g. Sasol used 100 million litres of water a day while the country is short of water resources. The loss of opportunity on capital tied up in unnecessary projects would, on a conservative basis on 10% per annum, amount to an additional \$1 050-billion.

Even then the basic figure of \$1 990-million at the current rate of exchange exceeds the military budget, is more than double that of health and welfare and many times more than that for education and training. If the Mossel Bay project is carried through to production, South Africans will be faced with an additional cost of at least \$167.75-million per annum for the next eight years. Notwithstanding this vast expenditure, apartheid South Africa has not achieved self-sufficiency, is not immune to the oil embargo and has cause to fear its extension.



WARMONGERS WHO TALK OF PEACE

United States Strategy in Southern Africa

By Brian Bunting

The reaction of the majority of the people of South Africa to the re-election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States was expressed by the publicity secretary of the United Democratic Front in the Western Cape, Mr Jonathan de Vries, as follows:

"Although the result was expected it still came as a disappointment to us. We can now expect another four years of US connivance with the South African authorities behind a smokescreen of "constructive engagement." Internationally the election result will also be a shock to peace-loving and democratic forces in general. With his belligerent foreign policies President Reagan is one of the greatest threats to world peace."

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the danger resides in the person of Reagan himself. The President is still little more than the B-movie actor he was when he first came to public notice 50 or so years ago; he has merely transferred his activities from the big screen of the cinema to the small screen of television. Far more sinister are the forces behind the President, who manipulate him as a puppet, who write his scripts and feed him gags. It is the military-industrial complex which he represents that constitutes the real danger to the world.

Human Rights and the Western Countries
We will never be able to interpret the politics of the cold war, and in particular the motives of the so-called western democracies, unless we understand that the devotion of their ruling-class politicians to "freedom" is in essence a devotion to "free enterprise," to capitalism as a way of life which they consider superior to all others. The appeal to "democracy" and "human rights" is merely a cover. It is not the alleged violation of human rights that outrages a Reagan or a Carter and inspires them to describe the Soviet Union as an "empire of evil." It is the fact that the exploiters of man by man have been expropriated, that there is neither stock exchange, Wall Street nor Bond Street in Moscow, that fills them with alarm.

It is the pursuit of private profit that turns the wheels of the economy in the United States, Britain, West Germany, Japan and other capitalist countries. After the Russian revolution of 1917, the armed forces of 14 nations invaded the territory of Soviet Russia in an attempt to restore capitalism. They were the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, China, Finland, Greece, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and Japan. The Red Army beat off the attacks at the time, and in the intervening years a number of those 14 countries have undergone

a change of government and are today also following the socialist road. With one or two exceptions, those who remain form the core of NATO, still desperately hoping to be able to create a situation, by subversion or aggression, in which the historical process of social change can be slowed down or reversed.

It is only when contemporary politics is seen in this context that we can understand why, in the western media, the murder of one Polish priest is considered a greater outrage than the murder of the Archbishop and 40 000 other citizens of El Salvador by right-wing death squads; why the killing of thousands of our people in 1984 by the racist army and police forces is ignored; why the fate of Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa is considered of more consequence than that of Rodolfo Seguel, the Christian Democratic leader of the Chilean copper miners, who has suffered infinitely greater persecution, but whose name has never been mentioned by Ronald Reagan; why our great leader Nelson Mandela rots in gaol while Jonas Savimbi is feted in Cape Town and Washington, as an ally in the fight for "freedom and democracy."

The United States and Liberation Movements

The United States was born of revolution against the tyranny of the British monarchy in 1776, but today stands opposed to revolution against tyranny everywhere in the world. It is a sad fact of life that the US has not supported any genuine liberation movement anywhere at any time. When the Monroe Doctrine was adumbrated in 1823, 43 years after the American revolution, the US President, James Monroe, warned that any intervention by a foreign power in the Western hemisphere would be regarded as "dangerous to our peace and safety." Even at that early stage "our peace and safety" were regarded as justification for US hegemony over the whole of North and South America, and US troops have invaded the territories of Central America alone more than 25 times in the ensuing period in order to preserve that hegemony, culminating in the brutal invasion of Grenada in 1983 and the aggression against Nicaragua in 1984. Nor is US

hegemonism confined to the Americas. US warships bomb Lebanon and patrol the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to protect what Reagan calls "our vital interests" — mainly Arab oil, which accounts for 40% of US consumption. And this extension of the Monroe doctrine to cover the whole globe also justifies Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" with the Botha regime to guarantee continued US access to and control over the resources of our sub-continent.

United States Interests and South Africa
Reagan was quite open about this when, on television, shortly after coming to office, he called South Africa a "friendly country" and asked:

"Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we've ever fought, a country that strategically is essential to the free world in the production of minerals we all must have?"

And in 1984, US Secretary of State George P Schultz listed four reasons why Africa is important to the United States:

"First, we have a significant geopolitical stake in the security of the continent and the seas surrounding it. Off its shores lie important trade routes, including those carrying most of the energy resources needed by our European allies.

"Second, Africa is part of the global economic system. Our exports to Africa have dropped by 50% in the last three years; American financial institutions have felt the pinch of African inability to repay loans. And Africa is a major source of raw materials crucial to the world economy.

"... Africa is important to us politically because the nations of Africa are now major players in world diplomacy. They comprise nearly one-third of the membership of the United Nations, where they form the most cohesive voting bloc in the General Assembly.

"Finally, Africa is important to us, most of all, in human terms: 11% of America's population traces its roots to Africa."

Missing from these declarations is any real concern for the welfare and happiness of the 100% of the peoples of Africa themselves. Western policies determined by the 'me first' principle of private enterprise, place African interests nowhere. In the capitalist countries, profit comes before principle. Take the record of the United States under President Reagan. Of the 38 resolutions concerning South Africa considered by the United Nations General Assembly from 1981 to 1983, the United States failed to cast a single affirmative vote. It abstained five times and voted 'no' 33 times. It abstained on every resolution concerning Namibia. During 1984, when the South African people were in revolt against Botha's new constitution, which has no place for the African 70% of the population, the United States and Britain abstained on resolutions in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, declaring the new constitution null and void — resolutions endorsed by the overwhelming majority of UN member states.

A Decade of Hypocrisy

The hypocrisy of the west over South Africa has been exposed by the events of the past decade. In 1976 there were disturbances at Soweto and elsewhere as Black children demonstrated against inferior education. Over 1 000 Africans, mostly school children, were shot dead by the police. In 1977 a number of Black Consciousness organisations and newspapers were banned, and world opinion was outraged by the murder of Steve Biko by the security police. On November 4th, 1977, the United Nations Security Council — for once, unanimously — passed Resolution 418, imposing an arms embargo on South Africa, though a call for the imposition of economic and oil sanctions was rejected by the western powers. However, an arms embargo was an achievement for which we had been working for nearly two decades. After the vote was passed, the UN Secretary General said:

"We have today clearly witnessed a historic occasion. The adoption of this resolution marks the first time in the 32-year history of our organisation that action has been taken, under Chapter VII of the Charter, against a member state."

Hopes that this resolution would be followed by effective action against the racist regime were dashed. On April 9th 1984, the chairman of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid, Major-General J N Garba, reported to the Security Council:

"We had hoped that the mandatory arms embargo would at least reduce the capacity of the apartheid regime to carry on its wars against the people of South Africa and Namibia, and against the independent African states, and indeed persuade it to begin the process of dismantling apartheid. I need hardly tell you that these hopes have not been fulfilled."

Pretoria's Arsenal

On the contrary, the military budget of South Africa increased from R1 650 million in 1977-1978 to nearly R4 billion in 1984, and South Africa's Armaments Corporation (Armcor), the regime's armaments production and procurement agency, now owns assets totalling nearly R2 billion, with 15 factories and a work force of over 100 000 and an annual expenditure of over R2 billion of which about half is spent overseas in countries which are supposed to be implementing the embargo. South Africa's nuclear capacity in particular is due to the support and encouragement it has received from the US, Britain, France, West Germany and Israel.

The western countries do not lack reasons — both economic and strategic — for ensuring the survival of the apartheid regime. The United States is South Africa's biggest trading partner, while Britain is the biggest investor in the South African economy. Hundreds of US, British and other western companies are established either directly or through subsidiaries in South Africa, and draw huge profits from the cheap labour system in operation there. It is largely for this reason that General Garba, in his report to the Security Council already referred to, added:

"The powers concerned — especially the major western powers — have not shown the will to stop the criminal acts of aggression and destabilisation by South Africa, nor indeed helped to preserve peace in Southern Africa"



Aggression and destabilisation: the army of the Pretoria regime.

Under the umbrella of Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" South Africa has been encouraged to regard itself as a regional power in Africa in the same way as Israel in the Middle East, with the same disastrous consequences. Charging that it is being subjected to a "total onslaught" by "Russian imperialism" and "international communism" the Botha regime tried to draw the western powers into its support — or should we put it the other way round?

The United States and 'Linkage'

US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, has admitted that it was the United States which gave birth to the doctrine of "linkage" between Namibian independence under Security Council Resolution 435 and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Whichever way one approaches this question, one fact is obvious — that Reagan's re-election will draw still tighter the bonds which unite South Africa and America against what they regard as their common enemy. With striking

unanimity, South Africa's business interests, English and Afrikaans (as reported in the *Rand Daily Mail* of November 8th 1984):

"greeted President Reagan's re-election as a guarantee of economic stability in the US and a spur for the South African economy. The chairman of Anglo-American, Mr Gavin Relly, said policy stability arising from Mr Reagan's victory should be regarded as a plus rather than a minus, but the US's political initiatives in Southern Africa could be taken further."

What are the United States and South African initiatives in Southern Africa? If we are to judge by their input in the Nkomati Accord on Mozambique and the Lusaka Agreement on Angola, the racists and imperialists are united in their determination to strengthen the basis of colonialism of a special kind in South Africa, to preserve or restore the front line states within the orbit of capitalism, and to destroy the liberation movements, the ANC and SWAPO — at least in their present form.

In a speech at the beginning of December 1984, Chester Crocker defended US policies on Southern Africa, insisting that "constructive engagement" with the Botha regime opened the way for peaceful reform, which was preferable to the alternative of violence.

Pretoria Regime — Source of Violence

The fact is, however, that it is the Botha regime's denial of democratic rights to the majority of the population that is the source of all violence in the region, both inside South Africa and beyond its borders. South Africa calls its army a Defence Force, but this is a misnomer. Since its foundation as a unitary state in 1910 South Africa has never been attacked or threatened with invasion by any front line state or combination of states. On the contrary, it has itself been a source of suppression and aggression against its own people and its neighbours. Its posture towards Africa and the world has been aggressive, not defensive.

Everybody has seen in the recent period the mass murders perpetrated by the regime in South Africa and Namibia, where hundreds have been killed by the military and the police and thousands gassed, whipped, baton-charged, detained, tortured and 'disappeared.' Reagan and Thatcher make polite noises about their "detestation" of apartheid, but do nothing to stop the bloodshed. On the contrary, the flow of weapons and the sophisticated technology required by South Africa to pursue its aggressive policies continues without interruption, apart from an occasional hiccup, like the arrest of the Coventry Four.

Let us not forget that it was South Africa's blatant invasion of Angola in 1975 which led to the Luanda government's call to the Cuban government for assistance in repelling this aggression from outside. Today the United States and South Africa have the impertinence to demand the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola before they will consider conceding independence to Namibia in terms of Security Council Resolution 435 — yet South African occupation of Angolan territory — the original provocation which led to the Cuban "intervention" — continues, in spite of the Lusaka Agreement of February 1984, that all

South African troops were to be withdrawn from Angola by the end of March 1984. The most recent Angolan proposal setting out, with Cuban backing, a plan for winding down the tension over Angola and Namibia and leading both to Namibian independence and a Cuban withdrawal has met with a negative response in Pretoria and Washington.

Death and Devastation For The Innocent South Africa, with the connivance of the US and other western states, has been guilty of military attacks on all the front line states, which have led to death and devastation for hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and children. The South African excuse is that it is engaged in "hot pursuit" or "pre-emptive strikes" in the course of defending itself against the "total onslaught" to which it claims it is being subjected. The human and material damage the South African racists have inflicted on the front line states has been a major factor in the planned destabilisation of their governments.

The Nkomati Accord signed by Presidents Botha and Machel last March was aimed to halt the alleged incursions of the ANC into South Africa from Mozambique, while in return South Africa pledged to withdraw support from the MNR rebels operating in Mozambique. The ANC has never operated militarily from Mozambique, but has nevertheless been compelled to withdraw its personnel except for a token mission of ten in Maputo. But the activities of MNR in Mozambique have been vastly extended since the Nkomati Accord was signed, leading to further destabilisation of the FRELIMO government and attempts by South Africa and the US to compel it to change its ideological direction. Behind the ambiguous wording of the October 3rd Pretoria agreement (FRELIMO, MNR and South Africa) can be discerned a clear attempt on the part of South Africa to dictate to Mozambique what type of government it shall have, what policies it shall follow — and even the hope that South Africa will be 'invited' to send its troops into Mozambique to monitor a ceasefire.

Similar pressures are being brought to bear on Lesotho and Botswana, and there is no

doubt the ground is being prepared for further aggression against Angola to compel MPLA to accept UNITA as a partner in government. Swaziland was bludgeoned into submission three years ago. Zimbabwe, too, is increasingly being brought into the line of fire. In all this South Africa is following to the letter the tactics employed by the United States in Central America and Israel in the Middle East — using its military and economic muscle and all manner of dirty tricks to install governments of its choice in the neighbouring states.

Counter-Revolution Imposed

Nor do the ambitions of the racist regime stop there. The leaders of the ruling Nationalist Party have long regarded it as their historic duty to take on the White man's burden allegedly abandoned by the colonial powers and win back the African continent for the West. Shortly after taking office as Minister of Defence in the late 1960s, P W Botha said that in the

fight against "terrorism" South Africa should "carry its influence over its borders." (*Rand Daily Mail* April 4th 1968) On April 11th 1984, Defence Minister General Magnus Malan boasted in the White Paper he presented to Parliament that it was South African military aggression that had paved the way for the Nkomati and Lusaka Agreements:

"Forceful military action by the South African security forces during the last decade or more has provided sufficient time to allow Africa to experience the dangers of Russian involvement in their countries, as well as the suffering and retrogression that follows upon the revolutionary formula."

Yet the peoples of Africa know only too well that the suffering and retrogression they have experienced has been inflicted on them by the counter-revolutionary formula imposed on



An Angolan victim of one of the attacks by the Pretoria regime.

them by South Africa's troops and the imperialists, not by "the Russians," who have no military presence anywhere in Africa.

South Africa's imperialist ambitions can only grow in the wake of Reagan's election victory. Already in September 1984, after the biggest military manoeuvres held in the country since World War Two, the divisional commander in charge, Brigadier George Kruys, was quoted as saying:

"South Africa has become expert in blitzkrieg-type warfare and intends getting better at it."

Defence Minister Malan added that the exercise had shown that:

"we could go right through to Cairo."

(*Rand Daily Mail* September 10th and 13th 1984)

Clearly the time has come for the world to administer a decisive rebuff to the ambitions of the South African racists and their imperialist allies. The South African gangsters must not be allowed to run amuck in Africa. They must not be allowed to murder and destroy either in South Africa itself or in the front line states. They must be called to account for the crimes they have committed in war and peace, for their repeated violations of the UN Charter and the various UN declarations relating to Southern Africa.

We Must Fight on All Fronts

The racist-imperialist offensive against the independent states and liberation movements of Southern Africa must be combated on all fronts:

★ The armed struggle must be intensified and ever more weighty blows struck against the enemy.

★ The struggles of the oppressed peoples in South Africa in the schools and colleges, in the townships, in the factories, on the buses, in the bantustans, must be raised to a new level and co-ordinated. The underground presence of the ANC and SACP inside the country must become an effective reality so that the mobilisation of the masses can become a continuous process, and proper political leadership provided to the people. More determined efforts

must be made to win to our side increasing numbers of White democrats.

★ International solidarity action must be stepped up to isolate the South African regime militarily, politically and economically.

We Have a Reservoir of Support

Let us not be dismayed by the apparent drift to the right in the western countries. The reactionary policies pursued by Reagan and Thatcher represent a frantic attempt by the counter-revolutionaries to claw back something of the sweeping gains registered by the progressive forces world-wide in the 1970s. The mass struggles being waged against imperialism everywhere are a guarantee that in due course the tide will once more turn in our favour.

Furthermore, for all their claims of "sweeping successes" in this year's elections, neither Reagan nor Thatcher enjoys majority support among the electorate. Reagan was returned to office winning 59% of the votes cast in a 56% poll, which means that only 33% of US voters actually voted for him. Mrs Thatcher was likewise returned to office despite the fact that she was rejected by the majority of Britons who went to the polls. These figures mean that in our international solidarity work we can appeal to a substantial reservoir of opinion in the leading western countries which does not support the adventurous and reactionary policies represented by Reagan and Thatcher.

The African National Congress is now recognised nationally and internationally as the leading force in the liberation movement, the force most capable of uniting the South African people of all races in the struggle to overthrow the apartheid regime, and in the genuinely free and democratic society which will be established thereafter on the lines set out in the Freedom Charter. Even the enemies of the ANC have been compelled to recognise its strength and authority. During 1984, approaches were made to the ANC by both the US administration and the Botha regime, indicating the lines on which "talks" may be arranged to settle the conflicts in Southern Africa.

We must beware of warmongers who talk of peace. The Crocker-Botha plan which is be-

ing mooted amounts to a call for total surrender by the ANC. It has three main objectives:

- ★ The ANC must abandon its tactic of armed struggle.
- ★ The ANC must abandon its alliance with the SACP.
- ★ The ANC must sever its relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Were these conditions to be accepted, the ANC would go into the debating chamber naked and defenceless, having thrown all its weapons away. Nevertheless, we can expect the Crocker-Botha offensive against the ANC to be intensified in the wake of Reagan's re-election, for the destruction or subversion of the ANC is, after all, the main objective of the racist-imperialist strategy.


The ANC Must Defend Its Gains

The ANC must defend its hard-won gains. Nothing must be allowed to disrupt the unity it has built in its ranks, and between itself and its allies. We must all recognise that the hostility of a Reagan or a Botha to the ANC is not due only to the ANC/SACP alliance or the ANC's relations to Moscow, but to the fact that the ANC has developed its own anti-imperialist philosophy on the basis of its own historical

experience. The anti-Communist and anti-Soviet line adopted by the enemy in its approach to the ANC is merely another form of the old imperialist tactic of "divide and rule." Separate the ANC from its allies, bring division into its ranks, undermine it, weaken it, subvert it, then it will collapse — that is the enemy's strategy.

We must cherish the unity that has been built in decades of bitter struggle like the apple of our eye. In the crucial coming period, we must not allow ourselves to be diverted or sidetracked by witch-hunts or red herrings; we must allow nothing to distract us from our main task, which is to gather strength to implement our decisions and defeat the enemy. Far from narrowing our alliances, we must broaden them, seek new friends on the basis of our basic principles. In Africa we must work to strengthen the front line states so that they are in a position to withstand the Crocker-Botha pressures, sabotage and subversion. We must call on the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN to help us in this task.

Our front line, the front line states, must be aided and strengthened; the Botha regime must be isolated and weakened. That must be our battle-cry in the coming period. That is the way to victory.



*Southern African leaders:
Nujoma, dos Santos, Masire, Nyerere, Mugabe, Kaunda, Machel, and Tambo.*

ANC INTERNATIONAL



DANISH COMMUNISTS SUPPORT ANC

At the invitation of the Communist Party of Denmark, the ANC was involved in a week-long activity in solidarity with the struggling masses of our country. Comrade Francis Meli, on behalf of the ANC, had a range of meetings organised for him by the Danish Communists. He spoke to small groups (seven people) and larger groups (400 people). The enthusiasm and support for the ANC (especially SOMAF-CO) received is beyond description.

Besides this week of solidarity, the Danish Communist Party also organised a week-end seminar on problems of Latin America and Africa. Many people came — all members of the Communist Party. The seminar was organised to launch a solidarity fund for the liberation movement in South Africa, for the ANC.

At the seminar there were representatives from Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, the Chilean Communists, and others. It was a rendezvous of revolutionaries. The Angolan ambassador to Stockholm (in charge of all the Scandinavian countries), Vas Contraes, spoke about his country's involvement in the conflict in Southern Africa. He got a standing ovation when he told the audience that Angola has no relations at all with apartheid — economic or otherwise. The only relations Angola has with apartheid is in the sphere of military confrontation — in the battlefield.

Comrade Roberto Cigano, member of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of

Ethiopia, was destroying the imperialist lies about 'too much whisky in Ethiopia' when he said:

"Upon the inception of the Revolution, besides tackling other wide-ranging radical steps, that ushered in a new era in Ethiopia, the first major task the Revolutionary Government undertook was to create a commission that would expedite swift measures in order to assist those in famine, and to rehabilitate them. This was how the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, the only organisation of its kind in Africa, came into being."

The struggle of the people of South Africa, a struggle led by the ANC, was handled by Francis Meli, who thanked the Danish Communists for inviting the ANC and for committing themselves to solidarity with our people — a commitment which was a commitment to the decades-old traditions of solidarity, solidarity which is an aspect of class struggle. Solidarity strengthens us all, said Comrade Meli.

Solidarity in Denmark means first of all to help finance the ANC office in Copenhagen, a point which was appreciated by Comrade Aaron Mnisi, the ANC Chief Representative in Copenhagen.

These acts of solidarity release new forces in Denmark — forces which are vital for our struggle, and which at the same time strengthen the forces on the Danish left.

STUDENTS' SOLIDARITY WORK IN GREECE

Important solidarity work was done in Greece last year by a group of Southern African students, who attended the youth festival of the Communist Party of Greece, in Salonika in September. They were given an opportunity of addressing the festival. The speech dealt with the new constitutional arrangements in South Africa. Pretoria's policy of destabilising her neighbours, the involvement of the West in this military aggression, and the Nkomati Accord. The speaker stressed that SWAPO and the ANC are increasing their efforts for national liberation.

Moves to Isolate Pretoria

Meanwhile, the 49th International Fair was taking place in Salonika, and South Africa had

again been asked to participate. The Southern African students had pressed for the exclusion of South Africa, and had approached the Greek Committee for World Democratic Solidarity, and the Communist Party of Greece. The Communist Party raised the question in the Greek parliament. (Earlier in the year the Communist Party had stopped a secret coal deal with South Africa by raising the question in parliament.)

The Committee for World Democratic Solidarity agreed to organise a demonstration at the fair, jointly with the Southern African students. From the 10th-16th September, the demonstrators held placards outside the fair. On the 15th, they forced their way inside, to the South African pavilion. 10 000 leaflets were distributed, and the demonstration attracted much attention.



The Netherlands Ambassador to Tanzania, His Excellency R Fruin, (left) is greeted with a bunch of flowers by a pupil at the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College, on the occasion of his visit to the SOMAFCO complex in January 1985. With him is the Director of SOMAFCO, Comrade Mohamed Tikly.

STREETS OF FIRE



CROSSROADS

On the 18th and 19th of February at least 19 people were killed and more than 250 injured resisting forced removal.



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RESPONSE TO COMRADE MZALA

By Nyawuza

'Discussion articles' in *Sechaba* are always welcome because at times they are thought-provoking and therefore useful. They are a sign that our members, and therefore our movement, are alive to issues. It is in this light and spirit that I read and therefore am responding to Comrade Mzala's article, *Cooking the Rice Inside the Pot*, in *Sechaba* January 1985 — an article coming as it does just before the planned conference of the ANC, and therefore part of those 'furious' pre-conference discussions.

I was not worried by the title until I came across some unfortunate formulations, on p.25:

"We often meet people who imagine that when we talk of working people swelling the ranks of our movement we are referring to the **exile structures** of our organisation. This is incorrect thinking ..."

"History's great call to our movement headed by the African National Congress is to begin a process of **de-exiling ourselves**, or transferring the initiative of the liberation process to the **actual arena of our struggle, inside South Africa.**" (my emphasis)

I am a bit concerned and worried about this clear-cut demarcation/separation between "exile structures" (I am not quite sure what that actually means) and the "actual arena of our struggle, inside South Africa."

There are many reasons for my concern/worry about this clear-cut division. Firstly, if we do not look at our struggle historically, I am afraid we shall run into some problems. To explain what I mean I will quote one of the leaders of the African liberation movement —

if I am not mistaken, it was George Silundika of ZAPU — who once remarked that those who are supporting the liberation movements should not only look at the achievements/successes, and/or failures/mistakes of these movements, but also at the depths from which these movements have emerged. I am not suggesting that I want to go too deep into these "depths" — otherwise I will have difficulty emerging — I will confine myself to two points which relate to our post-Soweto experience.

The ANC Is Everywhere

It is common knowledge that the ANC was not **visibly** there during the Soweto uprising — at least, not in a **military** sense. There are many reasons for that. The incidents surrounding the arrest in 1977 of Solomon Mahlangu were the first signs of our **military** presence in the country during those turbulent days. What has happened since then — in terms of our military presence in South Africa — is everybody's knowledge. Even the military top brass in South Africa had to admit: the "problem" in South Africa is that the ANC is everywhere. I think it is only on that point that we can agree with them, with the qualification that it is their "problem," not ours; it is a "problem" for them and not for us.

The second point I want to make — and this is a political/ideological one and not a military one — is that it was in 1980 when the **ANC in Lusaka** declared that year the Year of the Charter. I am not quite sure what Comrade Mzala meant by "exile structures" but I would regard the **ANC in Lusaka** as an external structure, that is, physically and geographically, but not politically.

The Charter Discussed and Debated

All the same, the decision by our headquarters in Lusaka to declare that year The Year of the Charter had a snowballing effect inside the country, leading to an intensified political and ideological struggle. The Freedom Charter was 'revived,' popularised, discussed and furiously debated and accepted by many mass organisations, trade unions, youth and students' organisations, women's organisations, church groups and individuals, including Bishop Tutu. This is not to suggest that the Freedom Charter was being introduced for the first time, but our activities here externally have a direct impact on the political developments in the country. By the way, the ANC here abroad has been involved in the "Release all political prisoners" campaign for decades, since before this became an issue in the country. (This campaign has now taken the concrete form of "Release Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners unconditionally.") This should be food for thought to be more precise and to know exactly what we mean when we talk of "de-exiling ourselves."

The Tasks Shouldered

But the examples I have given above — a few samples, I must admit — should be no reason for complacency — hence I appreciate the "revolutionary impatience" in Comrade Mzala's article. What puzzled me more than his "revolutionary impatience" was his latent pessimism — an odd mixture which can easily develop to be an odd compound. After

outlining what he calls tasks facing us (admitting that we are doing that) he concludes with what I regard as an anti-climax:

"Unless our liberation army shoulders these tasks, its fighting will lose its meaning and also the reason for its existence."

Writing thousands of miles from what Comrade Mzala calls "the actual arena of our struggle inside South Africa," I would have thought that this is actually what Umkhonto We Sizwe is doing. Maybe he knows better. But I really do not understand the significance of that sentence. My problem is that this sentence comes just before he elaborates on the "Spanish experience" — again there is a note of pessimism latent in the remarks. But our situation is characterised not only by heroism, revolutionary enthusiasm, sympathy, support and active participation, but by the resolve of our movement not only to continue the struggle but to intensify it. President Tambo has said this more than once. Therefore, the "Spanish experience" is different from ours.

What I really could not understand in Comrade Mzala's article was his remark:

"Yes, let us always remember that while we engage ourselves in building pyramids in Egypt, the main task is still to cross the Red Sea back into our own land." (p.25)

I only hope that by these "pyramids in Egypt" Comrade Mzala is not referring to SOMAF-CO, otherwise that will be uncomradely of Comrade Mzala.



PREPARING THE FIRE BEFORE COOKING THE RICE INSIDE THE POT

Some Burning Questions of Our Revolution

By Alex Mashinini

Quite a number of articles have so far appeared in the journals of the liberation movement dealing with one of the most important issues of our revolution — the 'arming of the masses.' Undoubtedly, to raise once more the theoretical significance of this question, as well as its practical implementation in accordance with South Africa's own set of historical and concrete conditions, becomes too imperative and relevant to be regarded purely as an academic exercise.

In their articles in the *African Communist* No 86 of 1981 and No 89 of 1982, and *Sechaba* of January 1985, Khumalo Migwe and Comrade Mzala dealt extensively with this issue, but failed to emerge with comprehensive solutions to this problem because they omitted, firstly, a closely linked aspect of this question — under what conditions is the programme of arming the masses realisable in South Africa's own set of conditions?

This failure on their part has often led to imaginations (though theoretically important) which hang on a very very thin thread connecting them to reality; the questions of "guerrilla warfare leading to armed insurrection" (Comrade Mzala, *AC* No 86, pp.88-9); of "liberated areas" (Khumalo Migwe, *AC* no 89) in which democratic elections can be held to create "provisional revolutionary government" (Comrade Mzala, *Sechaba* January 1985, p.23).

Secondly, a lot of confusion confronts the reader as far as some revolutionary concepts are concerned. Here the authors use freely and interchangingly, such concepts as, guerrilla warfare, armed struggle, revolutionary violence, armed violence, armed insurrection,

people's war, people's army etc. This may appear to be a 'slip of the pen,' but can lead to the confusion of priorities, since any concept (if such concepts are not mere abstractions used in polemics, but are employed only insofar as they help us understand a given concrete situation) necessarily denotes the existence — actual or potential — of a given situation together with its relevant forces.

Finally, the authors treat the issue of "arming of the masses" in isolation, while it is only an aspect (as this paper argues) of the general military question of our revolution, which is the subject-matter of this article.

The Issue is Power

The basic issue in every revolution is that of power, and our own revolution is by no means an exception to this rule. The question, however, is: How do we perceive the form of the seizure of power in the South African revolution? And since:

"force is the instrument with the aid of which social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilised political forms,"¹

what, then, is the final aim, the ultimate objective of the military component part of our popular and generalised political offensive against the South African system?

These are questions of strategic importance, for it is only on the basis of their solution that such closely linked issues as the "arming of the masses" and so on can find elaboration and formulation. I've opted to single out these questions for the reason that the modern history

of popular revolutions (socialist, national-democratic and national liberation revolutions) has registered several forms of the seizure of power which are worth noting, and their varied and rich experiences can, whenever necessity arises, 'help' us place our own revolution.

But before we embark on this aspect, a few remarks regarding some revolutionary concepts become necessary in order to ward off ambiguities and misunderstandings.

Engels remarked:

"Where there is no reactionary violence which must be overthrown, there can be no question of revolutionary violence of any kind."²

But in extremely rare situations where revolutions develop peacefully (as in Chile in the '70s), it is usually the case that the ruling classes are not in possession or are deprived of armed reactionary violence, especially its main instrument, the armed forces, against the revolutionary masses. In such cases, the masses do not resort to violence in its highest, armed form. They employ violence in the form of economic, political and ideological struggles.³

I've used this example to break up into two parts the concept of revolutionary violence, that is, into armed revolutionary violence, and revolutionary violence.

Our main concern here rests with the former, a factor necessitated by the existence in South Africa of the crudest, most savage form of armed reactionary violence.

Therefore the strategy and tactics of the liberation movement aimed at resolving this conflict situation, should have as its basis a clear definition of the nature and character of this "most savage form of armed reactionary violence" which finds its expression in the brutalities and truculence of the apartheid system. This formulation is of utmost importance because it is only after we have answered the question: Who is our enemy? and what are we fighting for? that we can, firstly, identify relevant revolutionary forces and their varied potentialities and proceed, therefore, from this basis to answer the question: how do we mobilise these armed forces into action, using

different but appropriate forms of struggle to unleash an effective, consistent and sustained campaign to secure not only the victorious end of our revolution, but also to be in a position to defend it?

Furthermore, this will also help us establish a true relationship between revolution and reform, between the revolutionary transformation of society on the one hand, and its peaceful evolutionary change (talks and dialogue) on the other, as strategies for liberation in the South African socio-economic political situation.

The Gist of the Matter

To begin, with, apartheid is a form of capitalist state power in the hands of an internally settled White minority which has institutionalised racism and violence as instruments of coercion to perpetuate the racial domination, the racial oppression and the racial exploitation of the aboriginal African majority, the Coloured, Indian and other national minorities of South Africa. And this state is essentially fascist!

Therefore, the gist of the matter in South African politics is not and should not be a struggle by the oppressed majority to win victories in order to participate in the decision-making process of the country. No. On the contrary, the essence of this struggle lies in the total destruction of that system, in the armed seizure of power from this internally settled white minority and its transfer into the hands of the majority. The real issue is not half a loaf, the the whole bakery! This is absolute, and any slight deviation from it can, in the final analysis, only lead to the ruin of the revolutionary forces.

It follows, therefore, that the basic principle from which to move is that: every form of struggle — even those forms of it which are geared to achieve certain short-term victories, should have as its fundamental, long-term objective, the total destruction of the South African system.

Combination of Forms of Struggle

Translated into reality, this means not only the realisation and recognition of the dialectical unity between short-term and long-term objectives of different forms of struggle, between

revolutionary violence and armed revolutionary violence, but it also calls for conscious efforts to always strive for the creative combination, in action, of all these forms of struggle.

To illustrate this contention, let us formulate a hypothetical situation.

A number of workers in a given factory go on strike for higher wages, better working conditions, recognition of their independent trade union, etc. Instead of conceding to these demands, the employer decides to dismiss these workers and, more, to call to his rescue the police and army to arrest and even to kill the strikers!

One factor has to be established here, and that is: not only have the workers failed to achieve their objectives, but also that the employer, in close connivance and co-operation with the state, has thrown them into the army of the unemployed, arrested some of them and even killed the others. This is a striking feature in South African trade unionism. And, as far as the workers are concerned, the only logical and legal measure is to hit back at their tormentors with equal, or even greater, efficiency, by partially or completely hindering the continued operation of that factory.

Revolutionary and Evolutionary Struggle

Herein lies the fundamental difference between revolutionary opposition and evolutionary opposition of strategies for liberation in South African politics. While revolutionary opposition always strives to destroy that system and replace it with a new, non-racial and democratic one, evolutionary opposition seeks to change it through relaxing certain of the legislation of the country.

This latter strategy (in essence) sees the problem in South Africa in terms of the irrationalities of apartheid rule, presiding over what it sees as the otherwise rational capitalist economy of the country. The inherent limitations and shortcomings of this strategy have been borne out by the whole history of struggle in South Africa since 1912, and its assured failure is confirmed by the recent history of apartheid brutalities, truculence and intransigence.

The world-wide history of revolutions confirms the validity of the truism that, in certain given situations:

"a material force can only be overcome by a material force."

Elsewhere in this paper, I referred, in passing, to different forms of the seizure of power registered by the modern history of popular revolutions. Broadly speaking, these forms assumed the following patterns:

- ★ The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia,
- ★ Guerrilla warfare leading to armed seizure of power, as in Nicaragua, Angola, and so on,
- ★ Popular uprising leading to seizure of power, as in Iran,
- ★ Guerrilla warfare leading to seizure of power through settlement, as in Zimbabwe,
- ★ Intra-parliamentary struggle leading to popular seizure of power, as in Chile in the '70s.

While a detailed analysis of all these forms of the seizure of power would be useful to us, I have, however, opted to examine the concept of insurrection as it took place in Russia in October 1917, drawing from the wealth of scientific experiences, theoretical as well as practical lessons as formulated by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

A brief review, therefore, of Marxist conclusions drawn from 19th century European revolutions to the Bolshevik revolution is worth making. More emphasis here will be laid on one of the principal aspects of every revolution — namely, the military programme of the revolutionary masses.

Now, regarding insurrection in Russia, the following conditions had to be satisfied for its successful execution, that is, the insurrection had to rely on the presence of:

- ★ The advanced classes — that is, the revolutionary army, which consisted of:
 - armed workers and peasants,
 - organised and advanced contingents of the representatives of these classes,
 - units of the government siding with the revolution.
- ★ Country-wide revolutionary upsurge.

★ Vacillations in the ranks of the enemy and in the ranks of the weak, half-hearted and irresolute 'friends' of the revolution.

The first condition is of utmost interest to the South African revolution here, and before we dwell on its meaning the following conclusion is worth noting. The unconditional breakdown of the armed forces — as an instrument of armed reactionary violence in the hands of the ruling class — is the universal law of any revolution.

And summing up the experiences of revolutions in Europe, Engels drew the conclusion that:

"the disorganisation of the army and the total breakdown of discipline have hitherto become the indispensable condition and result of all victorious revolutions."⁵

In Russia, this precondition was fulfilled, due to the following circumstances typical in all developed capitalist countries:

★ Universal compulsory military conscription equipped the masses with the rudiments of warfare and the knowledge of handling weapons, and enabled them ... "to make their will prevail against the warlords in command."⁶

★ The homogeneous nature and the commonness of the revolutionary demands and aspirations of the army — soldiers and sailors — of Tsarist Russia on the one hand, and, on the other those of the workers and peasants from whose ranks the army was drawn.

The importance of these two conditions is seen in the fact that the Bolshevik strategy for the armed uprising rested on the fact that in the decisive centres of struggle, they had the support not only of the overwhelming majority of the workers and peasants, but also of the majority of the revolutionary soldiers and sailors. On the eve of the October Revolution, there were Bolshevik units in almost all centres of the capital.

The following statistics (see table) are the results of voting to the Constituent Assembly, and show the popularity of the Bolsheviks in the armed forces.

Petrograd and nearby garrisons:

Parties	Votes	%
Bolsheviks	162 293	71.3
CDs	15 399	6.7
SRs	31 025	13.6
Mensheviks	2 456	1.0
Nationalist Parties	6 535	2.8
Total	227 542	100.0

Garrisons of the Moscow District:

Parties	Votes	%
Bolsheviks	122 827	74.3
CDs	12 334	7.5
SRs	22 550	13.6
Mensheviks	2 897	1.8
Nationalist Parties	1 369	0.8
Total	165 403	100.0

Summary data for 92 garrisons:

Parties	Votes	%
Bolsheviks	529 739	57.8
CDs	53 533	5.8
SRs	189 686	20.6
Mensheviks	24 328	2.7
National Parties	97 255	10.6
Total	916 711	100.0

Quoted from P Golub, *The Bolsheviks and the Armed Forces in Three Revolutions*, Moscow, 1979.

Moreover, it was observed that the key element in the crisis which led to the victorious seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, was the unremitting disintegration of the armed forces. And as Lenin accurately concluded:

"unless the revolution assumes a mass character and affects the troops, there can be no question of serious struggle."⁷

And:

"if the revolutionary party has no majority in the advanced contingents of the revolutionary classes and in the country, insurrection is out of the question."⁸

I've singled out this aspect of the presence of the advanced classes, that is, the revolutionary army, which, according to this brief discourse, is an indispensable condition, not only for a successful revolution, but also for its defence.

With due consideration of some other related factors, it can be stated that one of the greatest deficiencies in the South African revolution is the absence, under present-day conditions, of the aforementioned feature of armies — that is, universal compulsory military conscription and the universality and commonness of revolutionary demands and aspirations of the masses of the people on the one hand and the soldiers and sailors on the other.

Needless to say, the racial factor in South Africa has definitely deprived our revolution of its important component parts. And the absence of these factors makes itself the more felt, and its omnipresence dominates wherever and whenever the issue of the seizure of power comes under discussion.

Undoubtedly, our struggle against the armed reactionary violence of the Pretoria regime includes (from 1961) its sharpest-armed form, with the ultimate objective of overthrowing that system and seizing power ... which is the business of a revolution, anyway.

How Is Power To Be Seized?

Now, given the deficiencies referred to above, how, then, do we conceive of the role of force in the South African revolution? How, then, do we perceive the form which the seizure of power is going to assume in South Africa? These questions, indisputably, faced other victorious revolutions as well, which suffered the very same deficiencies as we do — for example, Angola and Mozambique.

But it would be naive, and even dangerous, to draw rigid comparisons between South Africa and these countries, for this mode of analysis fails to appreciate, or deliberately ignores, *the unique nature of South Africa, which makes most of its features unconventional and unusual.*

Definitely, these deficiencies do not spell doom upon our revolution. What, then, is to be done to compensate for these deficiencies? What methods then do we have to apply to produce such effects as would compel the South African armed forces to weaken, become impotent and finally disintegrate in the face of popular, country-wide upsurge for the seizure of power? These are questions of topical

strategic importance, especially when the issue of an all-round politico-military build-up towards popular uprising ranks high on the revolutionary agenda, for:

"unless we learn,"

Lenin advised,

"to apply all methods of struggle we may suffer grave and sometimes even decisive defeat, if changes beyond our control in the position of the other classes bring to the forefront a form of activity in which we are especially weak."⁹

Some Burning Military Questions

Top start with, the full knowledge of one's opponent, that is, his strong points as well as his weaknesses, is central to military science and hence to the formulation of a viable strategy as an art of waging war (aimed at winning a given war) and tactics (as an art of fighting directed at defeating the enemy in a given battle). Needless to say, strategy and tactics form an inseparable, dialectical whole, with strategy determining tactics and not the other way about.

A wrong strategy will, in the final analysis, lead to the total defeat of the army pursuing it, while wrong tactics may not necessarily lead to the failure and defeat of strategy.

But when, on the other hand, the tactics are continuously wrong and not compatible with strategy, this will inevitably lead to strategic failures.

And since tactics are only applicable to a given battle, this in turn calls for their constant up-dating, due to different battles which are to be fought. Conversely, since a war comprises all battles — won and lost — it follows, therefore, that strategy is not a static concept, but that it is always in motion, for war itself is a great social movement.

The South African Case

Our struggle, our popular war against the South African system, is a war of extremely unbalanced material forces between the belligerents, in which the enemy commands larger material forces than we do.

Hence ours has to be a guerrilla war, not as

a war waged by professional guerrilla units, but as a:

"tactics of the people as a whole."¹⁰

This means, therefore, that the main force in our drive to seize power in South Africa should be the political army of the armed masses, supported by the advanced, organised contingents (Umkhonto We Sizwe), primarily as a shock force to handle hard military targets, and not the other way about.

General Giap remarked:

"This is because in general an insurrection is an uprising of the masses, while a war opposes two armies."¹¹

Therefore, the guiding principle of our strategy is to protract the war while striving for, and working towards, the achievement of rapid and decisive victories over the enemy in every battle. To protract the war will offer us an opportunity to build, consolidate and arm our people in different politico-military organisational levels, step by step, from a materially weak position into a position of superiority over the enemy, while, at the same time, engaging the enemy in all fields and with every means to gain rapid and decisive victories in all battles.

The More We Fight, the More We Grow

For the more we fight, creatively and actively combining all different forms of struggles, the more will our forces grow, with new experiences, and heightened moral superiority over the enemy. And with each victory scored in every battle, the more stimulated and reinvigorated we shall emerge to meet new and complex challenges. On the other hand, the more the enemy fights, the more weary and demoralised his forces shall become. And with each defeat sustained by the enemy in every battle, the more disillusioned and disorganised his force shall become, and the more unpopular he shall emerge from these defeats.

This is the essence of protracting the war while striving to gain rapid and decisive victories in every battle.

Of course, the process of building, consolidating and arming our forces in different

politico-military levels presupposes an access to, and possession of, war material and equipment of relevant technique and fire power, with which to build these forces. This calls, first and foremost, for revolutionary creativity and self-reliance, in which everything becomes a weapon against the enemy. Secondly, while the existence of a rear base in friendly neighbouring countries has tremendous material advantages in terms of better training conditions of cadres, logistic and organisation in a less hostile (or friendly) atmosphere (as in the people's war in Vietnam after the victory of the Chinese revolution), the unique nature of South Africa's own set of historical and concrete conditions, which transcends its border to impose similar unique features over the whole region, calls for the liberation movement to exert more efforts in converting the South African mighty war machine into a resource depot for arming the masses of our people, in order to carry out their historic mission. As Le Duan observed:

"Revolution is creation, without imagination and ingenuity, a revolution cannot succeed."

By definition, guerrilla warfare, as a war of the materially weak against a materially strong enemy, implies the avoidance, under all circumstances, of launching frontal attacks against your enemy, that is, to approach and strike at the strongest points of the enemy. To neglect this rule presupposes, on the part of the guerrilla movement, (and if this attack is not aimed at a thoughtless display of heroism) a large concentration of forces and superior fire-power as preconditions for victory in conventional warfare. Generally, in such cases, and as experience has shown, the guerrilla unit will suffer great losses (even if it wins that battle) partly because of its inherent limitations (lack of high mobility, superior fire-power and so on) and partly because of the better organisation, training and skills of the enemy forces who have been trained especially to meet such situations.¹³

Guerrilla warfare as a tactics of the whole people, therefore, is an art of fighting to defeat a stronger and better equipped enemy with less

material and human resources, while always striving to preserve our own forces and annihilating those of the enemy. Flank and rear attacks are common methods used in engaging a superior enemy, and these methods employ the tactics of sabotage, ambush, raid and so on, which in turn use the element of surprise to achieve rapid and decisive victories in every battle.

This is true, not only of purely military confrontations with the enemy, but also as basic principles applicable even in non-combat situations.

It implies therefore that: always identify the weakest link of the enemy, concentrate relevant forces, and attack with the utmost vigour and ferocity. Continue the campaign resolutely and consistently, until the strongest points of the enemy become weaker and his stronger points become the weakest. In that way, his strongest points will, in the final analysis, be his weakest link, and this will be the opportune moment to concentrate all your forces, including reserves, to deliver the final and decisive blow.

The Weak-Link Principle

Now this brings us to the subject-matter of this paper, to identify the weakest link of the South African state.

South Africa is a highly industrialised society and therefore is not an exception to the rule that its security depends, in the first place, on the ready access to strategic and essential minerals and resources. Without this, not only would its military power erode but its economy would stagnate and society would begin to disintegrate and collapse in the face of consequent civil disorder and ungovernability.

Moreover, as Engels observed:

"All social power and all political force have their source in economic preconditions¹⁴ ... And nothing depends more on economic preconditions than precisely the composition, organisation, armament, strategy and tactics of an army."¹⁵

The need, therefore, to analyse the workings of the South African economy becomes imperative at this stage.

We will not indulge extensively in statistics; a fleeting glance at the South African economy will reveal the following main patterns:

- ★ Mining (especially gold, which accounted for 60% of all South African mining output in 1981) is the central nerve of that economy. This accounts also for the bulk of the country's export goods, and brings, in return, over 70% of the country's foreign exchange earnings.
- ★ Export and import is the primary concern and preoccupation of the whole economy.
- ★ Manufacturing industry is highly dependent on foreign technology and is heavily dependent on foreign capital.
- ★ Almost every sector of industry is dominated by the oppressed majority, who constitute the bulk of the country's work force.

This list of the main patterns of the South African economy is far from exhaustive, but it exposes its weakest link, the systematic disruption of which could lead not only to the erosion of military power, but also to the stagnation of the economy and the disintegration of society in the face of consequent civil disorder and ungovernability. For:

"revolution is most intense, furious, desperate class struggle and civil war. Not a single great revolution in history has taken place without civil war."¹⁶

But then what are the forces which can best effect or produce this situation? What is the nature of such forces and under which circumstances can these forces at best execute their roles? and last but not least, what are the prospects of setting into full motion the high potentialities of these forces?

Trade Unions and Revolution

The high industrialisation of any society (and that of South Africa as well) presupposes the existence of a considerable working class. In South Africa the overwhelming majority of this labour force comes from the oppressed Black nation. This is the main pillar of the revolution. Theoretically, under all circumstances, their strength alone is capable of bringing that economy to a virtual halt.

But several obstacles, permanent in nature, stand in the way of achieving this hypothetical but realisable objective.

★ The fascist nature of the South African state, which, among other things, forbids the open organisation of Black workers into their own trade unions (in spite of recent 'relaxations' of industrial legislation).

★ The migrant labour system makes the organisation and political mobilisation of workers towards long-term objectives almost impossible. Moreover, in industries which employ a higher percentage of African labour (the mines and South African Transport Service for example) the bulk of the work force comes from neighbouring African states and the so-called 'independent homelands' and are also forbidden by legislation to organise, let alone initiate or take part in, a strike.

How Can the Workers Play Their Role?

It is therefore to these deficiencies that we have to address ourselves urgently and conscientiously. The question, however, is: How do we work towards the creation of a situation in which the worker front plays its appropriate role in the popular mass struggle for the destruction of that system, without being check-mated by South Africa's racial and oppressive labour legislation and the omnipresent armed reactionary violence?

As stated elsewhere in this article, the basic premise from which to move is: every form of struggle in South Africa, even those forms of it which are geared to achieve short-term victories, should have as its fundamental, long-term objective the total destruction of that state. This calls for conscious efforts to creatively combine, in action, non-combat forms of struggle together with armed revolutionary violence.

There is no demarcation line between these forms of struggle. On the contrary, the line that connects them into an inseparable, dialectical whole is determined, among other things, by the nature of the problem to be solved and the conditions under which that problem has to be solved, and also by the (predictable) actual response of the other side — the enemy — in solving this problem.

Where peaceful means meet with police violence and army terror and brutality, armed revolutionary violence becomes a logical method and principle of fighting in that particular battle. This is fundamental.

"Experience has shown,"

writes Le Duan,

"that a revolutionary movement may mark time or even fail, not for lack of clearly defined orientation and objectives, but essentially because there have been no appropriate principles and methods for revolutionary action."¹⁷

One of the aspects of strategic significance in any revolution is the ability by the revolutionary movement to detect cracks, contradictions and divisions in the enemy ranks created by our own conscious activities, and seize the opportune moment to exacerbate these contradictions in order to weaken the enemy from within and thus render ineffective his ability to offer resistance against the tide of the revolutionary masses.

Lenin advised:

"The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skilful and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between enemies ... and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional."¹⁸

There are undoubtedly cracks, contradictions and divisions within the White ruling class and within the general White population as part (albeit subordinate) of the ruling class in the broader meaning of the term.¹⁹ These contradictions found their full public expression for the first time since 1948 in the November 1983 whites-only referendum on the so-called new constitutional order.²⁰

Whites Themselves Are Not Equals

If there is any lesson to be drawn from these events then it is the fact that while all social

classes and strata within this population group benefit from the spoils of racial domination, oppression and exploitation of the Black South African majority, they do so not as equals. It is therefore on the basis of this inequality in benefits²¹ that the contradictions within the White population will find full expression, reaching a point of disintegration as our revolutionary war for the destruction of that system continues to escalate in both its ferocity and its magnitude.

This therefore calls for the urgent need to encourage and work towards the creation of White anti-apartheid movements. They alone *man* the real power — including the armed forces — of the South African state. For the struggle for the armed forces is one of the most crucial and difficult areas of any revolution.

"Unless the revolution assumes a mass character and affects the troops, there can be no question of serious struggle."²²

The urgent tasks, therefore, of these white anti-apartheid movements should centre around the following issues:

- ★ Vigorously fighting compulsory military service,
- ★ Actively opposing the war in Namibia and in the Front Line States,
- ★ Actively opposing the war fought by the regime and the South African Defence Force within South Africa itself,
- ★ Vigorously fighting the programme of the militarisation of society, and other issues related to state power.

Any success, however small, scored in all of these fields will definitely contribute towards compensating for our deficiencies on the military side of our revolution.

This now brings us to the gist of the matter: What is to be done to compensate for our great deficiencies referred to in this article?

The ANC, Our Movement.

For the ideals enshrined in the Freedom Charter to be realised (that is, for full national liberation and social emancipation of the oppressed majority of our country and also to make this emancipation complete and mean-

ingful, there is one and only one condition which has to be satisfied. That is the violent revolutionary overthrow of the present system, the armed seizure of power by the revolutionary masses, the destruction of the present state power and transfer of that power into the hands of the democratic majority. This, as a strategic principle, is absolute. And this is realisable only through the ANC leading the liberation movement in South Africa for the total liberation of that country.

Put in a nutshell — no other methods of struggle short of an insurrection will succeed in ensuring the meaningful, complete and total liberation of our people from the obnoxious, fascist regime in South Africa.

Isolate the Hard-Core Fascists

While employing armed revolutionary violence for purposes of propaganda, and while inflicting human and material losses on the enemy, our movement should put even more tremendous efforts towards systematically disrupting the weakest links of the South African state, to isolate the most fascist elements within the White population and also as a necessary component part of our general popular drive to overthrow the state. These weakest links are:

- ★ The mining industry and other strategic sectors of the economy,
- ★ Harbours and airfields,
- ★ Rail and road networks,
- ★ The telecommunications network and other strategic targets.

The effectiveness of such an all-embracing strategy depends on the campaigns not being protracted.

The result would be a choking effect in which:

- ★ No minerals would leave the mines or harbours and there would therefore be no revenues,
- ★ No goods would enter or leave the country,
- ★ There would be no regular supply of strategic resources and minerals (oil, metals, energy, and so on) to the manufacturing industries,

★ There would be no continuous communication to facilitate the smooth running of business,

★ There would be other irregularities in those sectors of the economy which are dependent on the normal functioning of 'big shots.'

In this hypothetical situation, the result and effects would be:

★ Deepening crisis, growing disorder and ungovernability,

★ Retreat of foreign capital,

★ Helplessness of the army in the face of this form of revolutionary warfare, for which it is not trained,

★ Other social irregularities found in any society on the eve of a revolution.

For, we repeat:

"revolution is the most intense, furious, desperate class struggle and civil war. Not a single great revolution has taken place without a civil war."

And as Lenin continually emphasised, to accept class struggle and fail to accept civil war is tantamount to betrayal of revolution.²³

An Integral Part of the Total Struggle

Of course, such a strategy should not be viewed as a form of revolutionary short-cut, nor as divorced from other forms of popular struggle. No. On the contrary, this strategy finds its essence in the fact that in the South African situation (under the circumstances of colonialism of a special type) it is only under the conditions, primarily of *relative* socio-political and economic crisis which will develop into its absolute state, that several preconditions for waging a successful insurrection can be realised. These preconditions are the training and arming of the masses; the intensification of the process of building, increasing and consolidating, at different organisational levels, our politico-military forces from the great political army of the oppressed majority.

In other words, under conditions of relative economic, social and political stability, no comprehensive programme of the revolutionary masses, which is all-embracing, and which has as its ultimate objective the insur-

rectionary overthrow of the present state, can be realised to the full. This is perhaps another unique feature of the South African revolution.

It goes without saying, therefore, that it is only under conditions of *absolute* nation-wide economic, social and political crisis, of complete disorder, chaos and confusion in the ranks of the enemy and his troops, of nation-wide revolutionary upsurge and ungovernability by the masses armed in different politico-military organisational levels, that an armed insurrection becomes a logical and final step to complete and thus end this great social conflagration.

How this act of the insurrectionary seizure of power is to be implemented in real life (observing, of course, the laws governing this form of popular military strategy) depends, primarily, on the extent to which we shall have compensated for our great deficiencies; on our ability to render ineffective, from within and from without, the most powerful state and army on the African continent, and smash it. This is the uniqueness of the South African revolution, and herein lies its greatness, its international significance. And it is precisely in this particular aspect that our revolutionary creativity and dynamism will be tested. And it is also answering the question: How do we seize power? that history will pass judgment on the correctness, and hence the scientific character of our revolutionary theory and activities.

Some Urgent Revolutionary Tasks

Our deficiencies in the military field, — the lack of the rudiments of military knowledge and training by the masses of our people, and how we go about ensuring the successful elimination of these deficiencies, is one of the central and burning issues of our revolution.

This calls for revolutionary creativity and ingenuity on the part of the liberation movement to ensure the absolute material, as well as the moral, superiority of our forces over those of the enemy, as a precondition for launching the final and decisive blow against fascist terror in South Africa, our country. It calls for a conscious, skilful, co-ordinated, comprehensive, continuous and vigorous revolutionary

military educational programme that will affect the entire oppressed nation.

Arm and Train the Masses

Using different methods of reaching the broadest sections of the oppressed nation, such as the underground press, pamphleteering, the underground radio, and so on, the liberation movement should embark on a comprehensive and systematic military programme aimed at educating our people in the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. These are the principles of attack and defence and of creating defence structures such as dugouts, tunnels and underground depots; the principles of survival tactics such as the fundamentals of first aid; the principles governing the creation of underground cells; the rudiments of handling basic weaponry such as revolvers, pistols, rifles and hand-grenades; the principles of manufacturing crude weapons such as Molotov cocktails, home-made explosives and how to handle and use them, and other elementaries of military science.

This will enable the broad sections of our people to take part fully and actively in the struggle to liberate themselves. With political initiative on their part, and also commanding adequate and necessary skills of guerrilla warfare, our people will be in a position not only to defend what they've forcibly wrested from the enemy, but also to consolidate those victories and emerge strong, with new and higher skills and experiences, to meet new and higher challenges ahead of them.

It is only when we've embarked on and successfully carried out the programme of "every house a guerrilla base, everything a weapon, everyone a soldier," that we can be in a position to build up an invincible political army of the armed masses as a main force in our just war of liberation for the creation of a free, democratic and non-racial society in our country, South Africa.

*De l'audace, de l'audace, encore de l'audace,
Dare, dare and dare again,
for the establishment of people's power in
South Africa.*

Footnotes:

1. F Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, Moscow, 1978, p.211.
2. K Marx/F Engels, *Werke* Vol.38, pp.489-90.
3. P Golub, *The Bolsheviks and Armed Forces in Three Revolutions*, Moscow, 1979, pp.17-18.
4. General Giap, *Selected Writings*, Hanoi, 1977, p.322.
5. F Engels, *Selected Military Works* (Russian translation) p.643.
6. F Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, p.196.
7. V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol.2, p.174.
8. V I Lenin, *Selected Works*, (in three volumes) Vol.2, p.388.
9. V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol.31, p.96.
10. Truong Chinh, *Selected Writings*, Hanoi, 1977, p.112.
11. General Giap, *op.cit.*, p.406.
12. Le Duan, *Selected Writings*, Hanoi, 1977, p.189.
13. K Marx/F Engels (in three volumes) Vol.1, p.196-7. (*Class Struggle in France*, Introduction by F Engels).
14. F Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, p.347.
15. *Ibid*, p.406.
16. V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol.2, p.376.
17. Le Duan, *op.cit.*, p.189.
18. V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol.31, pp.70-71.
19. J Slovo, *No Middle Road*, p.22.
20. *Sechaba*, December 1983, *South Africa — the Crisis of Power*.
21. *Sechaba*, July 1984, *Revolution and the White Population*.
22. V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol.2, p.174.
23. V I Lenin, *Selected Works*, (in three volumes) Vol.1, p.741 (*The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution*).

BOOK REVIEW



This Is Apartheid, December, 1984.

This Is Namibia, December, 1984.

Both published by International Defence and Aid, London, December 1984, 50p each.

These two little companion booklets are both subtitled, *A Pictorial Introduction* and are intended for readers without much knowledge of South Africa or Namibia. The reader is, therefore, not burdened with much detailed information in the text, though the headings range comprehensively over most aspects of the situation in the two countries: the history of colonial conquest, population and its distribution, control of economic resources, pass laws and labour, living conditions, health, and so on, and, of course, resistance and the struggle for liberation.

The photographs and other illustrations seize the attention and hold it. They could hardly have been better chosen and arranged; pertinent, stark, clear and powerful, they give the text its substance and make the booklets interesting for the better-informed reader as well as for the novice in Southern African affairs. They show Black dwelling areas; schools and hospitals in the countryside; resettlement camps; the inside of a mine workers' hostel, and working conditions underground; the body of Lungile Tabalaza who died in detention; Andimbo Toivo Ja Toivo, newly released from prison; soldiers of the white racist regime, and soldiers of the people's armies of SWAPO and the ANC. There are maps showing how the land has been divided.


Both booklets should prove very useful to our solidarity work in the external missions.

Massacre at Maseru: South African Aggression against Lesotho, International Defence and Aid, London, January 1985, 50p.

This is No 12 in the series of well researched and well written pamphlets which IDAF publishes as 'fact papers.' It gives an account of the occasion in December 1982, when, on the eve of Human Rights Day, the armed forces of Pretoria flew into Maseru by helicopter and fired on the homes of some ANC refugees and some nationals of Lesotho, killing 35 — some bodies were reduced to ashes. One section deals with heart-rending accounts of the events of that night, given by eye-witnesses and survivors.

The pamphlet does much more than describe the raid itself. It places the raid in its context, describing the situation of Lesotho, that small, embattled and courageous mountain country, and her economic dependence on the powerful and menacing neighbour that surrounds her; the series of blockades and border raids with which she has been harassed, both before December 1982 and since. It shows this harassment as part of Pretoria's policy of destabilising the Black independent states of Southern Africa.

JM



The Road to Freedom

*Long is the road to freedom
Your impatience
Will not make it shorter comrade
I know heart
Is bursting with anger
Your brain burning
With the heat of vengeance*

*Waiting tortures
Waiting waiting waiting
Here there nowhere and everywhere
Longing
Lingering questions
Suspicion
Who is who isn't
I know your pain
Many have felt it from time began*

*Unpraised burial without lamentations
Many have trod on this road
Before you
Often bloody footprints
Landmarks
For you and me
To follow
The long uneasy road to freedom*

Freddy Reddy

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**Albertina Sisulu
IMPRISONED AGAIN**
