

JAN 1987



# SECHABA

official organ of the african  
national congress south africa



75 YEARS  
**THE ANC LEADS THE STRUGGLE**

# SECHABA

## JANUARY 1987

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# ANC — 75 Years Old, But Younger Than Ever

On January 8th, the ANC commemorated and celebrated its 75th anniversary. There was every reason for this.

The roots of the ANC run deep in the history of our people. This particularly refers to the tradition of resistance, which is as old as colonialism itself. The first recorded war of resistance was in May 1659, seven years after the occupation of the Western Cape. The Khoi and the San people fought valiantly. This was followed by 250 years of armed struggle, which was fought by our people throughout the country, and culminated in the 1906 Bambatha Rebellion.

Six years later, the ANC was formed. The ANC was the product of this glorious tradition. When it was formed in 1912, our people had learned the lessons of history re: overcoming the problems of fighting separately, at different times, using inferior weapons, and lack of unity.

On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the ANC we would like to single out three aspects (out of many) which have characterised the movement in its long history. First, is the ability to change with changing times and situation. What do we mean by this? When the ANC was formed in 1912, it was an organisation of Africans only. It defended and promoted the rights of the Africans; it fought against the colour bar in the 1910 constitution; it fought against land robbery (the 1913 Land Act) and against the extension of passes to women — in other words, it continued the struggle waged by our forefathers.

The ANC, by its very existence, established African political thought as an autonomous factor in its own right in the history of South Africa. Today the ANC is the voice of all the people of South Africa. These developments,


these innovations, came about after many battles and sacrifices, and the leadership of the ANC — especially those who are serving life imprisonment and those outside the country, President Tambo in particular — played a very important role in this process.

The second point is the question of unity. When the ANC was formed in 1912, the central question was to overcome "tribal differences." The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union was formed in 1919, and this introduced a class factor into our politics. By 1974 the question of unity had been brought to a higher level. The Xuma-Dadoo-Naicker Pact of 1947 laid a foundation for African and Indian co-operation. The 1949 Programme of Action of the ANC — which injected a new spirit of militancy into the ANC — helped to strengthen this unity. The formation of the ANC Youth League in 1944 and the African mineworkers' strike of 1946 were equally important milestones on this road to unity. In the 1950s this unity expanded to include the Coloureds and democratic Whites.

Today, this unity is being cemented at higher levels, not only uniting the people who adhere to the Freedom Charter (adopted in 1955), but including those who accept "aspects" of our policies and programmes. Some of our allies in struggle today support the Freedom Charter but are against armed struggle.

What this means is that unity does not necessarily mean *unanimity* on all points. Differing does not necessarily imply contradiction. What we mean is that the inter-class unity in South Africa is headed by the working class under the umbrella of the ANC, which leads the alliance of democratic and revolutionary forces in our country.

Unity has to be fought for and jealously defend-



ed. The question of unity today is more vital than ever before. It is not unity for its own sake, but principled unity around burning issues; issues that strike a chord in the population. This unity can only be under the leadership of the ANC.

The third point I want to mention is the question of internationalism, a concept which has undergone changes in the course of struggle. Long before the ANC was born, our people were conscious of the need for continental unity — African unity in struggle. In 1897, Enoch Mankayi Sontonga composed a song, *Nkosi Sikele' iAfrika*, which talks of Afrika (and not South Africa) and "uphondo lwayo" (its horn), meaning Somalia, Ethiopia and the countries of that region were to be lifted high. This song is now an ANC, or rather a South African, national anthem (which will replace the racist one) and is a national anthem of many countries in Southern Africa.

By 1912, the African leaders had failed to have the colour bar clauses removed from the constitution, but they succeeded in preventing the High

Commission Territories — Swaziland, Lesotho, then Basutoland, Botswana, then Bechuanaland — from incorporation into South Africa. Now these countries are independent, and are members of the OAU, UN and the Non-Aligned Movement.

In March 1918 the ANC protested against the incorporation of the then so-called German South-West Africa (Namibia) into South Africa. The ANC was perhaps the first organisation in the world to state in its constitution that it believes in the principles of "Pan Africanism," which, in the parlance of today, would be African unity. This was in 1919, almost 50 years before the formation of the OAU.

It was at this time that the ANC leaders met Dr Du Bois and co-operated with his Pan-African Movement.

In the 1930s there were large demonstrations in South Africa organised by the ANC and CP in protest against the invasion of Ethiopia by fascist Italy, and, in the 1940s the ANC condemned the barbaric invasion of the Soviet Union

by Hitler Germany and supported the anti-fascist resistance. There are innumerable such actions of solidarity by our people with other peoples.

This was a two-way traffic. In the 1960s, ANC leaders and cadres were received and trained militarily in independent African countries and in the socialist countries. Recently, Mikhail Gorbachev received President Tambo in Moscow — this relationship is one the ANC has had with the Soviet Union since 1927, when Josiah Tshangana Gumede, ANC President-General, visited the Soviet Union. President Tambo has met almost every head of state that matters.

What we are saying is that the ANC, while struggling to solve the national question, did not neglect or overlook its international responsibilities. This is the essence of the ANC's internationalism: its far-sightedness.

Today the ANC is making preparations for the final onslaught on the citadel of racism, colonialism and imperialism. This struggle is not just against the Pretoria regime but also against international imperialism. This is a difficult struggle, because imperialism is also ready to

strike — it is striking.

In this situation, we rely on our traditions of resistance, unity and internationalism. Talking about internationalism, we should remember that an important development in the international solidarity front, especially on the question of sanctions, is that the international community is not only fighting against the Pretoria regime, but also against those countries which collaborate with Pretoria. This is a welcome development. It helps our people in their difficult struggle, and, at the same time, broadens and deepens the democratic movements in the capitalist countries. It weakens the capacity of the Western countries to strike at us and at the democratic movement within their boundaries. Solidarity strengthens us all.

On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the ANC, we expect this solidarity to grow. We, on our part, pledge to continue in the spirit of the founding fathers of the ANC — the spirit of struggle, unity and internationalism.

*Middelburg, Cape 1986*





**ADVANCE TO PEOPLE'S POWER!**

## **75th ANNIVERSARY THE ANC APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD**

On the 8th January 1987 we shall be observing the 75th Anniversary of our movement, the African National Congress.

This historic anniversary occurs at a critical moment in the struggle for the liberation of our country. Its observance will give both our membership and the people of our country as a whole an opportunity to adopt new initiatives aimed at making further advances toward the birth of a democratic South Africa.

The continuing struggle inside our country, combined with the inspiring actions taken by the international community against racist South Africa, have driven the apartheid system into a deep and worsening crisis. Inside our country, the balance of strength between the forces of democracy on the one hand and those of racism on the other has shifted to such an extent that our victory over the apartheid regime is now in sight.

That confidence in the certainty of victory continues to inspire our people to carry out great feats of heroism in the struggle to liberate South Africa and bring peace to our region. The heightened offensive for democracy that has gripped our country for more than two years now is both unstoppable and irreversible.

In the face of these developments, the apartheid regime finds itself with no alternative but to admit the utter bankruptcy of its policy and resort to extreme measures of repression that are doomed to failure. All its actions are those of a regime that is fighting for its very survival.

Indeed, 75 years of our existence have been characterised by resistance and survival against heavy odds. We have survived martial law and states of emergency. We have been hounded, abducted, raided and massacred in various countries only to emerge, each time stronger and more resolute, to rid our country and the world of the scourge of apartheid.

It is therefore most appropriate that, as we observe the 75th Anniversary of our movement, we should focus our attention on the central question of the destruction of the oppressive and evil system of white minority colonial domination and its replacement by a new democratic and non-racial political and social order.

To do this, and inspired by the greatly increased strength of the democratic movement in South Africa and the anti-apartheid movement internationally as compared to the increasing weakness of the apartheid regime, we must mount the most massive all-round offensive that the apartheid system has ever faced. Our own people are ready to confront this challenge.


We appeal to the world community to join us in this effort. Let the nations across the face of the globe impose comprehensive sanctions against apartheid South Africa. Let the people of the world not only isolate the racists but also reject their criminal regime as illegitimate.

Let us see the entire peace-loving humanity rally behind the ANC and the rest of the democratic movement of our country. Let us see not only greatly increased moral and material support to the forces of liberty and peace in South Africa but also their recognition as the genuine representatives of the people of our country.

Let the peoples of the world further increase their support for SWAPO and the people of Namibia in their struggle to liberate their country from apartheid colonialism and military occupation. Let all rally to the support of the Front Line States and other states of Southern Africa to help them withstand Pretoria's campaign of aggression and destabilisation.

We are certain that, if together we take measures, we will make a decisive movement forward towards the birth of a free South Africa, an independent Namibia and a peaceful, secure and stable region of Southern Africa. The masses of our people have no doubt whatsoever at this time of great hope and confidence in the future that the international community will march side by side with us to transform the retreat of the enemy into a rout.

**Forward to the 75th Anniversary of the African National Congress!**  
**Democracy will triumph!**  
**Victory is certain!**

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a series of loops and strokes, positioned above the printed name.

**O. R. Tambo**  
**PRESIDENT**

# 75th ANNIVERSARY PROGRAMME OF ACTION

The 75th Anniversary of our Movement coincides with a period characterised by unprecedented mass upsurge and armed action led and directed by the ANC and the People's Army — Umkhonto we Sizwe. It also comes at a time of unparalleled international activity which has led to apartheid becoming the single political and moral issue around which people from all walks of life and political convictions could be mobilised into effective action on a world scale.

The consolidation of these historic gains and the intensification of the struggle at the national and international levels can be heightened by a rigorous application of this programme of action. It sets out broad guidelines on what we and our allies and friends can do, and leaves ample room for regional, national and international initiative and creativity.

## **JANUARY 8th, 1987, Founding Day of the ANC**

- ☆ The 75th Anniversary will be officially launched by Comrade President O.R. Tambo. Isithwalandwe Awards will be conferred, and there will be cultural activities.
- ☆ Internationally, the 75th Anniversary will be commemorated by Regional Political Committees, missions and solidarity groups. Where possible, during the week of January 8th, religious communities should be asked to pray against the injustices and brutalities of the apartheid regime against the people of South Africa.

## **MARCH 5th, 1987, South African Congress of Trade Unions' Day**

- ☆ There should be rallies, meetings, and so on.
- ☆ The issues to be highlighted are, amongst others, the historical alliance between ANC and SACTU, the role of the working class in the national democratic revolution spearheaded by the ANC, and the sentencing to death of Theresa Ramashamola by the South African fascist courts.

## **MARCH 21st, 1987, International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination**

- ☆ The ANC calls for all-round mandatory comprehensive sanctions against racist South Africa at the UN. A special session on this should be called at the General Assembly, if possible.
- ☆ National symposia should be organised as joint initiatives with representatives of people from countries which still suffer from racial discrimination.
- ☆ The call for the total eradication of apartheid and all other forms of racism, should be made at rallies, meetings, and so on, especially organised for the occasion.
- ☆ Where possible special races and marches against racism and apartheid should be organised.
- ☆ Special messages to prominent personalities and organisations should be sent on this day to solicit their support in the campaigns of the ANC.

## **MAY 1st, 1987, International Workers' Day**

- ☆ All ANC contingents should join the Day rallies en bloc and carry distinctive ANC-SACTU banners and slogans. Commemorative publicity material should be distributed on this day.
- ☆ Solidarity fund stands should be organised wherever possible.

## **MAY 25th, 1987, Africa Day**

- ☆ Portable art and photo exhibitions should be on display, highlighting the history of our liberation struggle and the vanguard role of the ANC in that struggle.



- ☆ There should also be portable art and photo exhibitions showing the history and struggle against colonialism and imperialism in Africa and featuring the ANC as an integral component in that struggle. Regional Political Committees and our missions in Africa should co-operate with regional organisations, and joint ventures with solidarity organisations should be mounted.
- ☆ Cultural activities should project the history of the Liberation Movement in South Africa and the continent as a whole.

**JUNE 16th, 1987, South African Youth Day**

- ☆ Our effort should be to highlight the heroic role of our youth in our struggle, particularly the courage of the youth in Umkhonto we Sizwe — the People's Army.
- ☆ Demonstrations and other activities should protest against the occupation of the townships by the fascist army, against the dumping of our children in concentration camps, the issuing of identity cards to Black pupils and students, and the suppression of youth and students' organisations.
- ☆ There should be large youth cultural performances wherever possible.
- ☆ Students/pupils, parents and democratic organisations should intensify the campaign for an alternative education system — the people's education.

**JUNE 26th, 1987, South African Freedom Day**

- ☆ We must strive to popularise the Freedom Charter.
- ☆ Free South Africa concerts should be held internationally as well as rallies, meetings, cultural activities, and so on.
- ☆ There will be an INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON APARTHEID
- ☆ All countries should call for severing of diplomatic relations with racist South Africa.
- ☆ There should be picketing outside South African embassies and consulates.
- ☆ The ANC and SACTU will call to all trade unions not to handle goods coming from or going to South Africa.
- ☆ Special commemorative material should be prepared for this day, highlighting in particular the 35th Anniversary of the Defiance Campaign. Such material should capture the defiant mood inside the country and project the march from ungovernability to people's power.

**AUGUST 9th, 1987 South African Women's Day**

- ☆ There should be appropriate commemoration of the event, featuring material on women in the pass campaigns; women and forced removals; women as the force behind the rent and consumer boycott, and women in the People's Army — Umkhonto we Sizwe. We should publish profiles on the heroines of our struggle.

**OCTOBER 11th, 1987 International Day of Solidarity with Political Prisoners in South Africa and Namibia**

- ☆ We should project the 25th Anniversary of Nelson Mandela's incarceration; demand the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners in apartheid dungeons; and present petitions to this effect.
- ☆ We should demand the release of all detained activists and young fighters in Botha's concentration camps.
- ☆ There should be picketing of South African embassies and consulates.

**DECEMBER 16th, 1987 South African Heroes' Day**

- ☆ There should be mass circulation of material on all activities marking the 75th Anniversary of the Movement.
- ☆ We should highlight the role of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the armed political struggle in our country.
- ☆ Mass rallies should highlight the major theme of the year.

**AMANDLA! MAATLA!  
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!**

# ANC INTERNATIONAL

## BENELUX COUNTRIES

In October, the mayor of Charleroi in Belgium received the ANC Chief Representative, Comrade Godfrey Motsepe, and presented him with a plaque on behalf of the city. The presentation was followed by a demonstration of about 1 000 people and a meeting at the university.

### "Does Your Bank Support Apartheid?"

VAAK, the Flemish anti-apartheid co-ordinating group, is a broad federation of non-governmental organisations that works closely with the ANC. Under the slogan, "Does Your Bank Support Apartheid?" this group has been conducting a campaign against bank loans to South Africa and the sale of krugerrands.

Local anti-apartheid groups have held demonstrations outside the banks, and groups of eminent people have discussed the matter with the banks. One bank stopped the sale of krugerrands, and the banks have now appealed to the Belgian Government to take a decision.

Parliamentarians of four different political parties have co-operated in drafting a Bill calling for an end to collaboration between Belgian banks and the apartheid regime.

All this activity has been well covered by the Belgian media.

### Apartheid-Free Cities in the Netherlands

Some 65 cities in the Netherlands have now declared themselves to be apartheid-free zones. The city council of The Hague expects to pass an important motion, linking itself with the ANC, inviting the ANC to establish an information centre in the city, and initiating a major anti-apartheid programme.

## GREECE

In Athens, the ANC participated in a joint assembly of ambassadors, parliamentarians and representatives of the Greek Government. Comrade Benny de Bruyn, ANC chief representative in Italy, opened an exhibition of anti-apartheid posters, organised mainly by socialist members of the European Parliament.

## ITALY

On several occasions recently, the people of Italy have made a point of recognising the ANC, and not the Pretoria regime, as the true representative of the people of South Africa.

In Turin, the joint Synod of the Valdesian and Methodist Churches voted overwhelmingly in favour of comprehensive mandatory sanctions by the Italian Government against racist South Africa. The ANC was invited to the Synod, but the racist South African embassy in Rome was not.

In Venice, representatives of the racist embassy were barred from the annual boat regatta, an important event in that city.

In Milan, at the 42nd annual festival of L'Unita, the journal of the Communist Party of Italy, special emphasis was laid on the situation in South Africa. There were stands displaying anti-apartheid posters, and debates in which Comrade Cedric Mayson of the ANC took part.

## UNITED STATES

United States Senator Frank R Lautenberg recently sent this letter to Comrade Francis Meli, member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC and editor of *Sechaba*:

"I deeply appreciated the time you took to meet with me and relay your organisation's perspective on South Africa. Please accept my apologies for the delay in writing you.

"I know that you share my joy in the fact that the Congress overrode the President's veto and finally imposed sanctions on South Africa. I was proud of my country on that day and will continue to work to keep America's policy on that track. I truly hope that, somehow, change can come to your country without more violence or disruption.

"Again, thank you for your help and time. I look forward to meeting you again in the future."

## OR Tambo's Statement from Moscow

*An ANC delegation, led by President O R Tambo, visited Moscow in November 1986, at the time the Soviet people were celebrating the 69th anniversary of their revolution in 1917. This statement from Comrade Tambo was presented to the Press in Moscow on November 6th, the day before the anniversary.*

We are currently in Moscow as a delegation of the African National Congress which is here to hold discussions with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and the public organisations of this country. We have also been kindly invited to join the Soviet people in celebrating the 69th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

As you know, we have already met the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev. We have also held discussions with Comrade Anatoly Dobrynin, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. We have also met the leadership of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, whose delegation was headed by its First Vice-Chairman, Dr Vladimir Totstikov. Our Secretary-General, Comrade Alfred Nzo, is currently having conversations with the Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Anatoly Adamishin.

Later today we shall participate in a public meeting organised to commemorate the October Revolution. We will, of course, be present at Red Square tomorrow. Until we leave over the weekend, we shall be holding further informal discussions with our Soviet colleagues.

Tomorrow is November 7th, a very important holiday for the Soviet people and an historic date on the world political calendar. We would like today to extend our greetings and congratulations to the people of this country and wish them the best as they celebrate the 69th anniversary of the revolution.

The few days that we have spent here have helped us to understand better the tasks that the Soviet people have set themselves, including the central objective of achieving disarmament and

world peace and radically improving their own material and spiritual well-being. We wish them success in all these endeavours and are certain that progress on these issues will benefit not only the Soviet people but humanity in general. Therefore we say 'Sprazdnikom' to all the citizens of this country and many thanks for having us as your guests as you rejoice over your hard-won successes during the last 69 years.

We have held what was, for us, an historic meeting with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev. We emerged from this meeting greatly strengthened by the knowledge that the Soviet Union stands firmly with us in the struggle for a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa, an independent Namibia and a peaceful region of Southern Africa. We draw immense satisfaction and inspiration from the fact that the Soviet Union is resolved to contribute everything within its possibilities and, within the context of our own requests, to assist the ANC, SWAPO and the peoples of our region to achieve these objectives.

We would like to state it here as our firm conviction that in taking these positions, the Soviet Union is acting neither out of considerations of selfish interest nor with a desire to establish a so-called sphere of influence. We are therefore more than ever certain that in the CPSU, the government and people of this country we have a genuine ally in our struggle against racism, colonial domination and aggression. We are honoured that Mikhail Gorbachev could find time in his busy schedule to receive us and wish to thank him most sincerely for this.

During our visit, we have also had occasion to listen to a moving account of the efforts of the Soviet leadership to help rid humanity of the threat of a nuclear war. We believe that no thinking person can avoid being a partisan for disarmament and world peace, because to guarantee the survival of humanity demands that all of us must act for peace. The Reykjavik Summit has



*President O R Tambo and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*

come and gone. But it would seem to us that the promise it held for the human race must remain a factor motivating all peoples to fight even harder for disarmament, because Reykjavik demonstrated that peace is possible, thanks to the extraordinarily bold, but necessary, proposals that the Soviet Union put on the table. The promise of peace must be a spur to its realisation.

We understand the urgent need for peace because we are ourselves victims of repression and war. Throughout Southern Africa people are dying daily because of a desperate effort by the apartheid rulers to maintain themselves in power. Only recently, this untenable situation claimed the life of the President of Mozambique, the late Comrade Samora Machel, who died in circumstances which have yet to be explained.

The Pretoria regime is caught in a deep crisis from which it cannot extricate itself. Whatever it does, including the imposition of a vicious state of emergency and the latest reshuffle of the apartheid cabinet, will not save it from defeat and destruction. Our people and those of Namibia, led by SWAPO, are set on an unstoppable march to liberation. Similarly, the peoples in the rest

of Southern Africa are determined to resist apartheid aggression and destabilisation and to contribute what they can to the total liquidation of the apartheid system.

Clearly, the US policy of so-called constructive engagement has not succeeded to save the Botha regime nor to strengthen the positions of its authors, the Reagan Administration. We are entitled to conclude that the Congressional elections in the United States, two days ago, in part represented a vote against the pro-apartheid policies of the US Government.

This result creates even better possibilities for us and the world anti-apartheid movement further to advance the campaign for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the apartheid regime. We are certain that in this area we shall continue to score new victories resulting in the further isolation of apartheid South Africa and, accordingly, an improvement of our possibilities to bring into being a democratic South Africa with reduced bloodshed and destruction.

On the 8th of January next year, we shall be observing the 75th anniversary of the ANC. We believe that this will provide a uniquely ap-

appropriate occasion for the world community to implement programmes of action designed to ensure a speedy end to the apartheid system. East and West, North and South can and must act together in a decisive manner for the triumph of democracy in South Africa, the emergence of a society in which Black and White will live

together as equals, in which all our people will have the right and possibility to decide as free men and women how to shape their destiny.

This is one of the great imperatives of our time. We are glad that we have found complete understanding and support for these positions in the Soviet Union.

## **Communique from the Meeting Between the ANC and the Northern Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa**

*This Communique was issued jointly by the Northern Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa and the African National Congress.*

On the 12th and 13th of November 1986, delegations of the Northern Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa and the African National Congress met in Lusaka, capital of the Republic of Zambia. The delegations were led by the Bishop of the Northern Diocese of ELCSA, S E Serote, and Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the African National Congress.

The meeting was held at the request of the Northern Diocese of ELCSA which was in Lusaka at the invitation of the Christian Council of Zambia. The discussions took place against the backdrop of the escalating conflict in South Africa, characterised by massive repression by the government against democratic forces on the one hand, and a determined struggle by the people on the other. The delegations were at one that the central cause of conflict in our country is the system of apartheid, and that its resolution lay in the creation of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

Such a solution cannot be attained through reform, neither can it be realised without the participation of the African National Congress, which is recognised by the majority of South Africans as their genuine representative.

The ELCSA Northern Diocese outlined its platform and the role it is playing in the endeavour to achieve peace and justice in South

Africa. As an institution representing a constituency relegated to destitution and untold suffering, ELCSA participates actively in the process to eradicate these evils.

In this regard, the ANC concurred with the view that the church as a whole has an important role to play in the resolution of the crises afflicting South Africa. The ANC further explained its policies on a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. On reviewing current developments within the country, the delegations noted the importance of the efforts to consolidate the unity of all democratic forces, the campaign to end the occupation of townships and villages by government troops and police, the need for a democratic resolution of the education crises, the efforts to secure the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees, an end to the detention, abuse and indoctrination of children, and united action for the lifting of the State of Emergency.

The delegations further agreed that South Africa is one and indivisible, and that any attempts to divide the people on ethnic or other grounds would fail inasmuch as they only compound the problems facing the country. The future lies in justice and democracy on the basis of one-person-one-vote. This will be achieved only at the instance of united action by all forces opposed to the system of apartheid.

Both sides agreed that the meeting constituted a valuable and historic experience. They agreed to meet again if and when the need arises.

# KWA NDEBELE PEOPLE STEEL THE ANVIL TO RESIST THE COMING HAMMER

*By Nyawuza*

The situation in Kwa Ndebele is not hilarious pure music hall comedy, although some cynics may think that way. It is tragic. Kwa Ndebele was supposed to be an "independent" bantustan on December 11th 1986, but the people stopped the rot.

The turmoil in Kwa Ndebele began on January 1st 1986 with the incorporation of Moutse and the abduction and assault of residents of Moutse and Kwa Ndebele residents by Imbokotho vigilantes. What happened since then was a bloody struggle between the forces of reaction and the democratic forces. But before we relate this story, let us tell the story of the developments that lead to the current crisis.

## **The Background**

The land of the Ndebele was confiscated by the Boers in the 19th century, and the Ndebele people were subsequently forced to work as landless labourers on Boer farms, or to seek refuge elsewhere. In 1925, some Ndebele farmers bought a farm, Weltevreden, which ironically means "world peace."

It should be remembered that when Verwoerd, the architect of apartheid, unveiled the centrepiece of his plan to grant "separate freedoms to the Bantu nations" no provision was made for the Ndebele. They were not included in the eight "nations" recognised under the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. What we are saying is that the bantustan programme has assumed new and uglier proportions.

In 1974, Indzundza Tribal Authority was recognised as a regional authority, and the Manala Regional Authority was established a year later. It became a nucleus around which the future Ndebele "homeland" was built. The paramount of the Ndzundza people is King David Mabusu Mabhoko Mahlangu. Simon Skosana became chairman of the new regional authority and was later Chief Minister of the then formed Kwa Ndebele Legislative Assembly.

Skosana kept on pressing for the recognition of a "separate nation," and money was collected

from the people to buy land and to finance the drive; Kwa Ndebele was created in 1980 out of 16 farms about 70 miles north of Pretoria.

What we are saying is that Kwa Ndebele is the most difficult offspring of the apartheid dream; it is a costly artificial creation carved out of the South African bush.

## **A Powerful Magnet**

Winterveld, near Bophuthatswana's twin townships of GaRankuwa and Mabopane, has been a priority area for squatters, but Kwa Ndebele has now risen to prominence. Kwa Ndebele's dramatic population increase — it rose by more than 400% during the decade 1970-80 and has since risen even more spectacularly — has made Kwa Ndebele a congested assortment of tin shanties, mud huts and brick houses. These people were brought in from outside the "homeland" — at times at the rate of 20 families a day. Kwa Ndebele is like a magnet, a powerfully "attractive" magnet. Newcomers must pay a R40 fee to the local induna for the "development of the Ndebele nation."

Why did the people come to Kwa Ndebele? The abolition of labour tenants on White-owned farms has forced thousands of Africans to leave in search of land on which to settle. Therefore the population is of mixed ethnic descent: about 50% are non-Ndebele, that is, Pedi-speaking, and as many Ndebele-speaking people live outside their designated homeland. There is inter-ethnic osmosis. Some Ndebele have abandoned their language as a living, workaday language, and have adopted Pedi — that is, their original Nguni language lapsed into disuse and they have become Pedi-speakers. But they retain their sense of identity through their beadwork and their painting. The walls of Ndebele huts are decorated with distinctive colours and patterns. This is our culture, tradition and heritage.

Many of the families who built their houses in the settlement areas of Tweefontein, Vlaklaagte and Kwaggafontein are not fired with

zeal to resurrect the "Ndebele nation." Kwa Ndebele is the closest they can get to the industrial heartland of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) area without incurring the risk of harassment, expulsion, uprooting and relocation.

The tension between Tswanas and Ndebeles in Winterveld, a huge squatter area about 50 kilometres north of Pretoria but within the Bophutatswana bantustan, a tension which is caused by Mangope's policies, drove many Ndebele people to look for an alternative place to settle. Kwa Ndebele became the natural

choice, not because it was a Ndebele area, but because it was within commuting distance of the PWV area, where many people already worked. The availability of subsidised transport to the PWV was another powerful factor and "incentive" in the decision to settle in Kwa Ndebele. The same can be said about the African labour tenants who were forced off White-owned farms in the highveld.

### **Cheap, Commuting Labour**

From Kwa Ndebele they can work as daily, weekly or monthly commuters in the PWV area. What people need is a plot of land on which to



*People of Kwa Ndebele celebrate their victory in the struggle against bantustan "independence"*

establish themselves; they need permanency and security. The rigorous application of influx control laws in the PWV area does not reverse the flow of people into the cities and towns: it merely diverts them to the area closest to the PWV area, where influx control is either non-existent or applied less strictly, and that is where the regime wants them to be.

**Instead of building houses for the people, Pretoria is prepared to subsidise transport so that the people should be perpetually on the move and insecure, or if this fails it enforces "influx control."** The two are not mutually exclusive; they are two sides of the same coin.

### **Moutse**

With an area of about 75 000 hectares (800 square kilometres) Kwa Ndebele is one of the smallest and poorest of the ten homelands. It has a population of 400 000. It was set up as a reservoir of Black labour for the Pretoria area, a dumping ground for people coming from various areas.

The incorporation of Moutse into the area added another 66 000 hectares to Kwa Ndebele, and an estimated 300 000 people, mostly Pedi-speaking. Moutse is a bloc of land situated near the Transvaal town of Groblersdal. Dr Koornhof excised it from Lebowa in October 1980 and placed it under the control of his department — "Co-operation and Development." Lebowa rejects "independence."

In April 1981 Kwa Ndebele received a "self-governing" status. In May 1982, "independence" talks began with Pretoria, and Kwa Ndebele agreed to accept "independence." Now Moutse can be incorporated into Kwa Ndebele.

The whole thing can be reduced to a simple formula: those who resist "independence" (Ka Ngwane, Kwa Zulu and Lebowa) lost parts of their territory, which are given to those willing to accept "independence." Additional land is the price for loss of South African citizenship and all that goes with it. This "reward" is at the same time a punishment to those opposed to "independence."

In the case of Moutse it was less of a problem of ethnicity and tradition — though one cannot rule that out — but an outright political question. Moutse has four representatives in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly — all opposed to "independence." Now the absorption of Moutse by Kwa Ndebele means that people opposed to

"independence" become citizens of an "independent" territory against their expressed will. Inter-ethnic tensions have been created by the bantustan authorities, and this compounds the problems of these rootless people — the Ndebele and Pedi people.

The loss of South African citizenship is another factor; "independent" bantustan citizens have no more rights than any other foreigners, despite the so-called abolition of the hated pass laws.

### **Politics and Education**

In Kwa Ndebele there are 75 000 pupils and 1 900 teachers in 88 schools. There is only one teacher training college. The school drop-out is frightening. In some cases there are 500 pupils in Standard Two, but only 75 go on to Standard Three. Chief Skosana himself, a former vegetable seller, went as far as Standard Six. None of the Cabinet attended high school.

The demand for education in Kwa Ndebele outstrips the supply — if one family has two school-going children that means providing a classroom every day. These schools are the corrugated iron ones — freezing in winter and boiling in summer.

The school population has risen from 36 600 in 1979 to 75 000 in 1982. In 1980, Kwa Ndebele spent R2 million on building schools and R600 000 on furniture from the R9 million education receives as its share of Kwa Ndebele's R28 million budget. Out of the territory's 1 900 teachers, 51% are unqualified. Their level of formal education ranges from Standard Six upwards. If one considers that the older generation of the Ndebele people grew up on White farms, where no schooling was provided, this is not surprising. The lack of proper qualifications leads to nepotism — a tendency to appoint relatives in teaching and other posts.

### **Living Conditions**

Although Holiday Inns and "entertainment centres" are not scarce in Kwa Ndebele, an estimated 180 000 people are living in more than 12 "resettlement camps," that is, more than doubling the original population of the area. Apart from these "resettlement camps," there is only one town, Siyabuswa ("we are being ruled"), specially built as a capital. The business establishments belong to members of the "homeland" Cabinet, and the coffin-making

*Continued on page 19*



THE FOUR PILLARS OF OUR STRUGGLE

# UNITED MASS ACTION



Unban the ANC and release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally!



People's Power means organisation, unity and discipline



Workers lead the struggle towards the realisation of the Freedom Charter

"Our revolutionary struggle rests on four pillars. These are, first, the all-round vanguard activity of the underground structures of the ANC; second, the united mass action of the peoples; third, our armed offensive, spearheaded by Umkhonto We Sizwe; and fourth, the international drive to isolate the apartheid regime and win world-wide moral, political and material support for the struggle."

President Tambo

## UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES & UMKHONTO WE SIZWE



Above: MK cadres learn the art of war

Left: The youth in South Africa enact war

Above right: Today, Mandela is an inspiration to all South Africans fighting for liberation

## Man in jail for painting slogans

By MONK NKOMO

THE RANGED African Nationalist Congress (ANC) has launched a massive publicity campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela, the Pretoria Regional Court was told yesterday.

## 'Two made ANC flags'

CP Correspondent

TWO Cape Town people, including a prominent trade unionist, have appeared in the Wynberg Regional Court this week charged with furloughing the aims of the ANC by allegedly manufacturing black, green, and gold ANC flags.

## Policemen accused of aiding ANC

From Patrick Lawrence in Johannesburg

The nation's attorney-in-chief of two black youths involves an charge of furthering the aims of South Africa's outlawed African National Congress triggered speculation yesterday among political pundits.



## 'I'll die for ANC'

CP Correspondent


A ZWELITHENBA man appealing against a 15-year sentence for gun-running the Cape Town Supreme Court this week when he said during cross-examination he was prepared to die for the ANC and he appeared a 15-week trial for the first time.



THE FOUR PILLARS OF OUR STRUGGLE  
**INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY**



Demonstration outside the Commonwealth mini-summit in August 1986: Front row, (left to right) Comrade Solly Smith, ANC Chief Representative in Great Britain and Ireland; Comrade Alfred Nzo, ANC Secretary General; Dame Nita Barrow of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group; Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, President of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and Shapua Kaukungua, SWAPO Chief Representative in Europe.



The other South Africa: students in Johannesburg display the Mozambican flag after the death of Comrade Samora Machel



Over 100 000 people marched in solidarity with the South African struggle, London, June 1986

business is one of the most flourishing.

Four-fifths of the working population, 17 000 workers, commute to "White" urban areas outside the "homeland" on subsidised bus services, spending up to eight hours a day travelling to and from work. Every morning 75 PUTCO buses ferry workers from Kwa Ndebele to their places of employment outside the bantustan, and then back again at night. For the daily commuters, the working day is a very long one, and many rise as early as 2.00 a.m. to catch buses. Many stay in hostels or with friends near their places of work, returning home only at week-ends or the end of the month.

### **Economy**

In real terms, only about 15-20% of land in Kwa Ndebele is arable, and the main agricultural activity is livestock farming. Kwa Ndebele must import vital commodities such as maize. In other words, agriculture is almost non-existent. The reservoir being built is an experimental project for 15 farmers. Water supply is a problem. In some villages there is only one tap for every street of 20 or 30 houses, and this only works for two hours a day — sometimes there is no water for a whole week. There are only 17 949 head of cattle, 2 646 sheep and 17 224 goats in Kwa Ndebele.

The question of unemployment — only 2 640 people (1.6% of the population) are employed within the "homeland" — affects people's health. In 1981, there were 2 300 new cases of tuberculosis. There are no hospitals — only 20 clinics. Rural poverty and unemployment drives the people to the cities, where — even before the Rieckert-inspired strategy of offering urban Blacks a better deal at the expense of their rural kinsmen — living conditions were slightly "better"

In the midst of this poverty and unemployment, the Kwa Ndebele authorities were planning to build a R3.7 million "independence stadium" before December 11th 1986 — the "independence day." By the way, the bulk of Kwa Ndebele's income comes in the form of grants, totalling R50.3 million, from Pretoria. This is money from Black and White taxpayers — another proof that apartheid oppresses both Black and White citizens of the country. This also explains why we put "independence" in inverted

commas.

The Institute of Race Relations sends more than 600 food parcels to the area a year, and estimates are that up to three times this amount is needed. What this means is that in the South African situation today "humanitarian aid" — though it helps — is not enough and is definitely not a solution. Apartheid must be abolished and destroyed — by force.

### **The People Resist**

In Kwa Ndebele there are 79 members of the Assembly — the majority are appointed by the Tribal Authority and there are 16 elected MPs. **Women do not have the vote.** In Kwa Ndebele's only election to date, in 1984, a total of 600 out of an eligible 50 000 voters participated. In 1982, the Legislative Assembly of Kwa Ndebele voted unanimously in favour of "autonomous status" and in January 1986 the decision to take "independence" was announced.

Since then, unrest, which coincided with the ANC's call to make South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable, has engulfed Kwa Ndebele. People knew and know the bitter experiences of other "independent" bantustans. Accepting "independence" would only serve to escalate unrest which was on the increase. People are rendered homeless, have lost their jobs, and there have been too many deaths because of the "independence" issue. The people are prepared to die for their rejection of it; **they are also prepared to kill for the same cause.** This crisis is related to the apartheid regime's unwillingness to acknowledge any opposition to "independence."

In May 1986, more than 3 000 "Comrades" (a name the progressive Black youth in South Africa give themselves) peacefully attended the funeral of the 22-year-old Johannes Motshiloane, a victim of Imbokotho vigilantes. The Comrades clashed with Imbokotho. Prince James Mahlangu, the chairman of the Ndzundza Tribal Authority and son of Chief Mapoch (also known as King D H Mabhoko, the 73-year-old man who was tear-gassed in his house as police dispersed 3 000 people) is reported as having said that he was living in fear for his life because Imbokotho gangs were using "dirty tricks."

### **Umkhonto We Sizwe Intervenes**

Imbokotho is a ruthless vigilante group organised by "government" ministers, businessmen and

members of the Legislative Assembly in Kwa Ndebele to terrorise the people. The group's acknowledged leader, Home Affairs Minister Piet Ntuli, died when his car exploded minutes after leaving the heavily-guarded government compound. Chris Hani, the Army Commissar and Deputy Commander of Umkhonto We Sizwe, explained this incident in his interview with *Sechaba* of December 1986:

"But what is also important, especially as regards our struggle in the bantustans and in the countryside, is that in Kwa Ndebele where there was a militant mass movement against bantustan independence, the intervention of MK led to the elimination of the most notorious of the collaborationist elements, Piet Ntuli. The elimination of Piet Ntuli by an MK unit galvanised the population in Kwa Ndebele and led to the government actually being forced to suspend the independence which was scheduled for this year."

What this means is that the operations of Umkhonto We Sizwe are geared towards the solution of the day-to-day grievances of the people, that is, besides the long-term strategies of our movement.

In Kwa Ndebele there was fierce fighting between those forces opposed to and those supporting "independence." Police fired tear gas into the crowds from a hovering helicopter, and as people scattered they clashed with Imbokotho. Youths were abducted or kidnapped by Imbokotho and many of them went missing — they were not at police stations or hospitals.

### **The People's Demands**

Several respected members of the territory's royal family, with normally conservative views, joined forces with young political activists in bitterly opposing "independence." The battle for and against "independence" was taken to the corridors of the "homeland" National Assembly. At Ndzundza Royal Kraal, Prince James Mahlangu, spearheading the opposition to "independence", was giving one interview after another.

The 2 000-strong civil service went on a three-day strike against Chief Minister Simon Skosana's decision for "independence" on December 11th. Even the White civil servants, numbering around 200, left the area after police

fired tear gas and birdshot to break up a march on homeland "government" buildings in Siyabuswa. Nearly all businesses have been burned to the ground. Two Kwa Ndebele businessmen, Jan Buda and Piet Ngoma, who hired thugs to burn shops of their rivals, were necklaced in front of more than a thousand shouting people at Kamelrivier township. Buda and Ngoma hired thugs to burn other shops so that their businesses could prosper. They were brought to a meeting where they confessed. The damage in areas such as Weltevreden, Waterval, Kliplaatdrif, Kwaggafontein and Tweefontein is estimated at R4 million, and the State of Emergency had no impact in Kwa Ndebele.

What the people of Kwa Ndebele are demanding is that the sjambok-wielding Imbokotho vigilantes must be disbanded immediately; "independence" must be cancelled; the 23 MPs designated by the Ndundza Mabhoko Tribal Authority must resign and the army must withdraw from the homeland townships.

The people have won part of the battle — they have stopped the drive towards "independence." But the struggle continues. What is significant about Kwa Ndebele is that the people imposed their will on the situation, and Umkhonto We Sizwe was there **with the people**. This is a characteristic feature of our times in the politics of South Africa.

In November 1986, Simon Skosana died at the age of 60. That was three months after a severe political defeat, after a bloody struggle over the "independence" issue, when the Legislative Assembly reversed a previous decision to make Kwa Ndebele South Africa's fifth nominally "independent" state. On his deathbed, Skosana ordered the detention of Prince James and his cousin Prince Andries Mahlangu and at least nine others.

The fate of Kwa Ndebele has not yet been decided. There are forces which want to revive the now banned Imbokotho vigilantes. What about the renewed quest for "independence", or rather the reversal of the defeat of August 12th? What about the fate of those detained by Kwa Ndebele's Commissioner of Police, Brigadier Hertzog Lerm? Or the minutes and records dating back to 1980, which were seized by the police? So many questions ...

# Building People's Forces for Combat, War & Insurrection

Part 2



By Mzala

*The first part of this article appeared in the December 1986 issue of Sechaba.*

After 1976, what was to be done?

Two approaches are possible in answering this question. One angle is that of an arm-chair critic or abstract theoretician, who sits somewhere in the safety and seclusion of his compartment, with a ready paper and ink in hand, quick to pass judgment about events in which he himself might not even have participated. The other angle is that of an actual practitioner, who is faced with the task of relating theory to practice, who has to see both the single tree and the whole forest, and who plans for activities whose results he cannot predict with precision. We shall adopt the latter approach, because we are basically not writers of history but makers of it.

We must remember that in 1969 the ANC made a deliberate decision to shift its approach from sending into the country armed groups of persons to 'spark off' guerrilla warfare, and instead emphasized the need to first extend and consolidate an ANC underground machinery as well as to generally mobilise the people, especially the Black working population, into active mass struggle around both local and national issues. This was seen as a period of political reconstruction.

## June 16th Uprisings an Accident?

The events of 16th June, 1976, found this programme in progress. However, the level of organisation and internal leadership at that stage, had not yet reached the point where the vanguard movement could masterfully and boldly knit together the various threads of popular initiative

and energy into a well organised nation-wide uprising, or probably even arm the people for a general insurrection. The underground structures that existed did their best under the circumstances to co-ordinate the various semi-organised activities, and were particularly effective in giving safe routes and other assistance to thousands of those who wanted to leave the country to acquire fighting skills from abroad.

It must be pointed out that the events of June 16th came as a complete surprise for everybody. Not even the most far-sighted analyst in the world could have predicted that uprising in 1976. When Marx and Engels advanced their philosophy of history, they maintained that it would be of a very mystical nature if accidents played no part in history. "These accidents," Marx wrote in a letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, "naturally form part of the general course of development and are compensated by other accidents," and this included the accident of the shooting of the first victim in Soweto, Hector Peterson. Engels went further in elaborating this philosophy by pointing out that in the historical process of development that which is willed happens but rarely: "in the majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and conflict with one another, or these ends themselves are from the outset incapable of realisation or the means of attaining them are insufficient. Thus the conflict of innumerable individual wills and individual actions in the domain of history produce a state of affairs entirely analogous to that prevailing in the realm of unconscious nature." (*Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*)

They did not mean that chance determines

historical development, they were only emphasizing that it is a form behind which inner laws which govern historical development of society hide themselves. Here then lies the relationship of chance to historical necessity. Proceeding from these historico-methodological principles, it becomes easy to understand the predicament of the ANC, which was not prepared for these historic events, as soon as an examination of the history of that period is seriously undertaken from this dialectical materialistic angle.

### **Vanguard Must Lead at All Times**

Was our approach to the question of immediate military actions to remain the same after the fascist regime had unleashed a reign of terror on the unarmed men, women and children? Should we have continued, even under those circumstances, to insist on patient political organisation, postponing all armed activity until we had built sufficient forces to sustain it?

People were not made for strategies, but strategies for the people. Swift and radical adjustments had to be made. The ANC happens to be a genuine liberation organisation of the people, and it is viewed by the people as the custodian and inheritor of the history of resistance to colonial oppression. To play this vanguard role, the ANC is obliged to be part of the people during all occasions and also to enjoy their confidence in the process of its leadership. And unless the ANC demonstrates at all times its capacity to meet racist violence with revolutionary violence, it would forfeit this leadership position of the South African liberation struggle. During times like the Soweto uprising, bold military action was itself a vital way of mobilising people. Not that such military action becomes a substitute for the painstaking task of political mobilisations and organisation; the point is, without its introduction into the political scene, the very prospect of political mobilisation and organisation becomes seriously undermined.

Anyway, when Umkhonto we Sizwe was founded, it announced itself to be "the fighting arm of the people against the government ... the striking force of the people for liberty, for rights and for their final liberation." Also, if MK did not avenge the death of our martyrs, even the apartheid regime would have interpreted its 'silence' as a sign of weakness. Our military perspective has always been to demonstrate prac-

tically that MK is the popular spearhead, the military combat force, in the struggle to smash the apartheid system. Under conditions of fascism, revolutionary violence is bound to be a permanent feature of the struggle.

It was under these considerations that our movement arrived at the decision to begin a phase of armed propaganda, which would utilize the maximum sophistication and advanced military technology of our army to demonstrate that the enemy is not invincible. Attacks on police stations and other vital economic and military targets were proving precisely this point. These special operations have made a tremendous political, as well as military, impact on SA. They have been living examples to millions that it is MK and not the apartheid regime that is really invincible. These are the operations that made our people say, even as they buried their dead, that here is an army of liberation equipped and capable of leading them to victory. No amount of censorship of the mass media has been able to hide the flames and explosions that rocked the sanctuaries of the racist palaces, as our combatants entered where eagles dare.

### **We Mixed Tactics With Strategy**

These successes, however, began to carry with them certain strategic mistakes, which we realised later than we should have. Armed propaganda was supposed to be a phase, but not the permanent characteristic of our armed activity. And these special operations were meant to be only an aspect of, but not a substitute for, the main groundwork of military organisation and building of combat forces from among the people. And therefore when the overall pattern of our armed activity became these hit-and-retreat tactics, the main task began to suffer somewhat, and this began to show. How? Like in any war, mistakes often show themselves by the rate of casualties.

It has been said that an organisation's attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the organisation is and how it fulfills its obligations toward the people it is leading. Frankly acknowledging a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, and thrashing out the means of its rectification, said Lenin, "is the hallmark of a serious party" — that is how it should perform its duties, and how it should educate the masses. If we had not done so, probably my sheer sense

of partisanship would have stopped me from even discussing this aspect. Now it belongs to our military history.

The problem was not in the adopted strategy, and neither was it in the interpretation nor in the understanding of that strategy. It was at the tactical level of practice. Trained guerrillas went inside the country successfully, fully equipped to survive, and then relied on the assumption that all our people were clear about the need to fight the regime, particularly after the experience of the Soweto uprising. However, on numerous occasions, we discovered that some people did not understand who the guerrillas were, we discovered that political consciousness and people's readiness to support guerrilla fighters was not to be assessed from headlines of newspaper reports about mass attendances at political funerals. When our guerrilla units found difficulty in hiding among the very people they had come to fight for, they resorted to living in the terrain — in dug-outs far from the eyes of the people.

The press in those days used to carry pictures of underground guerrilla bases in the veld, even in the urban areas, when some of them had been captured by the fascist police. Even during political trials in those days, the accused guerrillas were almost all people who had trained abroad, and who came into the country to carry out military operations.

The terrain, however, is not where the guerrillas should ultimately be based, because this negates the whole essence of the theory of guerrilla warfare. To engage in revolutionary guerrilla warfare means, by definition, engaging in war conducted by the people themselves, not on their behalf. Revolutionary armed struggle develops from the grass-roots of the masses, it develops when the overwhelming majority of the people are presented with no other alternative but to fight. Che Guevara used to remark that "guerrilla warfare is not, as so often thought, a small-scale war, a war conducted by a minority grouping against a powerful army. No, guerrilla warfare is war by the entire people against the reigning oppression. The guerrilla movement is their armed vanguard: that is, the base and grounding of the guerrilla is the people." (*Granma*, December 3rd 1967)

### **Learning from Vietnam**

In 1978, a high level delegation of the leader-

ship of the ANC, led by President O R Tambo, went on a study tour of Vietnam. We wanted to make a detailed examination and attentive study of the methods that were used by the legendary Vietnamese people in their victorious war against the French and later the United States forces.

Students of strategy know that although no revolutionary struggle exactly repeats the experience of previous revolutions, we can nevertheless learn a lot from the experience of others. There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the revolutionary experiences of other peoples, the understanding of which is indispensable in the analysis and planning of people's war in our own circumstances. In Vietnam the ANC delegation had discussions with the political leaders as well as military commanders who actually led the Vietnamese revolution, including Generals Vo Nguen Giap and Van Tien Dung.

The Vietnamese experience tended to confirm our own belief that the armed struggle must be based on, and grow out of, mass political support and it must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must, at every stage, be guided and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and resistance, with the aim of progressively weakening the enemy's grip on his reins of political, economic, social and military power, by a combination of political and military action.

The successful conduct of the 1945 August Revolution, taught the Vietnamese revolutionaries in the then unliberated south of the country, that any revolution with a marked popular character must use both political and military forces to secure victory. If one considers revolutionary violence merely from the point of view of military struggle, mistakes will be inevitable, because one will not dare mobilise the masses for engaging the enemy in one thousand and one other fronts as well as for insurrection when the time has come. General Giap put it neatly: "The fundamental point of our Party's line of revolutionary war is this: the whole people, the whole country fights the aggressors with the people's armed forces as the hard core. By mobilising the entire people to resist aggression, by bringing people's war to a very high level, and by displaying unprecedented courage and creative power, our Party has firmly grasped the rule of revolutionary war in Vietnam, thus generating a mighty



force to get the better of any aggressor."

### **Organising and Fighting Patiently**

Another experience of great importance consisted in their amount of patience - the patience of a farmer who buries seeds in the soil with the full knowledge that when the time comes, they will grow into full plants. Such patience is only generated by confidence in the certainty of final victory and the justness of our cause. Despite all their setbacks, betrayals and numerous disappointments, the Vietnamese never rushed to take short cuts, they understood that a revolution is a process, involving the organisation of people from one stage to another. Their revolutionary mass bases were built not so much by military activities as by the long and patient work and experience of organisation and political education around the daily life, needs and demands of the people. Patient organisation — this was a decisive factor!

The aura of glory associated with the victory of Dien Bien Phu and other military feats that were performed by the Vietnamese combatants, has often obscured hard and prosaic truths and realities of the extent of political work done and organisation created at the grass-root level of the masses, by showing them the real alternative within their grasp and the need to take up arms in an organised way.

There are many other lessons which our delegation to Vietnam brought back for consideration and discussion by the broad leadership. I am far from suggesting that we resolved to uncritically or mechanically apply their techniques to our situation. Nevertheless, their experience will forever enrich the living revolutionary tradition of struggle in South Africa. This trip to Vietnam was historic, as subsequent decisions of our National Executive Committee were to prove.

### **Period of Political Preparation**

After the analysis of the report of the mission to Vietnam, and basing our assessment on the recent experiences inside SA, the ANC leadership resolved that we needed three years of active political mobilisation and organisation, in both town and countryside, before a proper commencement of people's war. We wanted that when our military cadres finally take their rightful position in the revolution, they should relate to the masses in the same way as the waves relate to a stormy sea. We are fully aware that

no amount of mopping up operations can uproot a guerrilla force that is part and parcel of the masses: no creation of the so-called protected villages can stall their combat actions against the racist army and police. When partisan units have been created in every locality, among the people, the enemy would know of no rest, he would be stretched thin throughout the length and breadth of South Africa and compelled to fight on an extremely long front, while at the same time patrolling railway lines, manning roadblocks, parading townships and encircling villages; wherever he would be, he would be made to feel that he is in an unfriendly territory, and danger would lurk in every house and from every bush. We too had resolved to learn the genius of patience.

Probably no other stage better illustrates the crucial role of the masses in guerrilla warfare than this initial political preparatory phase. We no longer wanted to base anything on general assumptions. Our own hard experience had convinced us that mass support for guerrilla activity is never automatic. We are dealing with people who, we must not forget, have been terrorised by the enemy for a long time, who are unarmed, who had been the victims of lies and demoralising propaganda about the so-called invincibility of the enemy, and who had been deprived of all initiative by long colonial domination.

We were now bent on systematically creating political machinery, training political cadres, who went inside the country not to fire shots or to destroy power stations but to begin a determined and single-minded campaign of political organisation.

Some day we will be able to tell the story of many courageous men and women who, without arms in hand, developed our underground ANC structures and fulfilled key tasks of political education of the people in struggle and the raising of their combat spirit. These gallant comrades, in many unrecorded cases, planned and executed their missions and built a foundation on which our people's army was to be built; they too, like the military combatants, are the heroes of our revolution, their names will last forever, and one day all our people will know of them and will need them for their courage.

The first strategic pillar of the ANC continues to be the building of the ANC underground machinery. We have learnt over the years that

without an underground ANC presence inside the country, there are very many practical problems of the revolution that we would not be able to solve, including the major problem of providing internal leadership of the struggle. This is one area of our work which constitutes an arena of sharpest confrontation between our movement and the enemy, and this is so because the regime is itself aware that all the work that we do in conditions of secrecy inside and outside the country, depends finally on the strength and maturity of our underground structures. It is this level of work, more than any other in fascist conditions like South Africa, which has the key to our progress and to the decisive defeat of our enemy.

That our enemy also attaches great importance in his counter revolutionary work against us to strengthening his underground machinery, is shown by the desperate efforts of infiltrating his spies within our ranks, both at home and abroad, with the aim of neutralising our organisational nerve-centres. The flood that joins our movement during stormy times carry not only fish but also crabs. Our underground structures have necessarily included our own intelligence and security organs in order to protect our revolution.

The second level of political preparation is overt mobilisation of the masses as the political army of the revolution. Our strategy, as already indicated, gives special attention to the



*People of Queenstown, ready for battle, December 1985*

strengthening of mass organisation, both local and national, with the aim of linking them up with the political campaign for seizure of power. It is only when there exists this democratic mass movement that we can successfully select and recruit capable cadres into the underground political and military network.

An impression must not be created that this political army of the revolution exists solely as a base from which underground cadres are to be recruited; the organised mass movement constitutes in itself a distinct and vital component of the striking force of the revolution. It is with this understanding that our movement has attached great importance to the unity in action of the oppressed people. In the course of the general struggle, situations arise which demand and create the opportunity for bringing together the united weight of all the contingents of the democratic movement: workers, rural masses, women, youth and students, religious communities, civic organisations and even democratic sections of the White community, in one single national action, asserting the unity of the purpose of our democratic movement. United mass action prepares the people for the crucial stage of insurrection, for the final assault on the weakened bastions of racist power which will ensure the transfer of power to the people.

Our priority in this instance is the organisation of the working class. Since South Africa's level of social development has reached the stage of monopoly capitalism, having created enormous instruments and machines of production which concentrate millions of industrial proletariat in single enterprises during the production process, capitalism has thereby nurtured an army for the destruction of apartheid, it has objectively unified the very combat weapon for its destruction: the working class. The South African working class is being organised not only into the democratic trade union movement but also into ANC and MK units. Over the years, an increased political awareness of the Black section of the working class has been expressed in their combining economic with political demands. The existence in South Africa today of both the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), while they are not the product of the ANC, is nevertheless a culmination of hard work by the political organisers of the revolution to

bring this political army to its most organised form.

This has also necessitated the mobilisation of the rural masses. To a large extent, the political organisation and general mobilisation of the rural masses lagged far behind that in the towns and cities, yet more than half the African population in our country lives in the bantustans and White farms. These rural people are the natural allies of the industrial working class. They are landless and jobless — and this provides our political organisers with very favourable conditions for drawing them into mass democratic organisations as well as into the structures of the ANC and MK. The forced removals of our people from the White farms to the bantustans, and from one bantustan to another, have once again focused our attention in SA on the land question — that most sensitive and emotive issue in our history that agitated our peasant ancestors to fight long and bitter wars of resistance, in defence of the land that was being taken away by the colonialists. The rebelliousness of the rural masses is illustrated by their revolts in Pondoland, Sekhukhuleni, Zeerust and Zululand towards the end of the '50s and the beginning of the '60s.

### **Correct Decisions Need Implementation**

Events subsequent to the decision of the leadership of the ANC to devote a special period of three years to political preparation, have proved practically that this was the most brilliant, the most far-sighted and strategically correct decision.

During this process of 'political preparation' our army did not lock itself in a cocoon. The ANC has never subscribed to the tendency that absolutely postpones all armed activity until a 'perfect' point is reached in political organisations. Our army continued with its operations. Just as 'political preparations' could never have been confined to a fixed period, so could the 'armed propaganda' not be confined to a fixed period. Our approach to the relationship between mass political action and armed struggle was succinctly put by the first Commander-in-Chief of MK, Comrade Nelson Mandela, who said in a message from Robben Island:

"Between the anvil of united mass action and the hammer of armed struggle we shall crush apartheid racist rule."

# PRETORIA'S SECURITY SYSTEM THE NETWORK THAT SPREADS ACROSS THE COUNTRY

*By Comrade Ramat*

The National Security Management System (NSMS) of the racist regime has recently been the subject of much publicity and debate. On the one hand, this security system has been described as: "The uniformed web that sprawls across the country," (*Weekly Mail*, October 3rd-8th 1986) and on the other hand the spokesmen for the regime have attempted to portray the system as merely an advisory body with no executive authority.

What is the real role and significance of the NSMS in the decision-making process of our country? Is this system a vehicle for a greater militarisation of the South African state? And how does this system affect us in the national liberation movement as we attempt to build and consolidate underground structures within the country, in our bid to achieve the strategic objective of Power to the People?

This article attempts to answer some of these questions. Given that the racist regime over the years has vigorously discouraged investigation into the security apparatus, much of the currently available information does not come from independent sources but from the regime itself.

## **NSMS: Structure and Organisation**

The NSMS is a structure that exists in parallel to the traditional state structures of the racist regime, and is made up of five components.

■ The State Security Council (SSC), which is one of four Cabinet Committees, is the first component. Set up under the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act of 1972, it is the only Cabinet Committee that has been established by law. Deon Geldenhuys, in *The Diplomacy of Isolation — South African Foreign Policy Making*, pointed out that in statutory terms, the role of the SSC is to advise the regime on the formulation and implementation of "national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the republic." The SSC is the central organisation

through which security is determined, coordinated and implemented. The Committee is composed of the most senior Cabinet Minister, together with the Ministers of Constitutional Development and Planning, Finance, Defence, Law and Order and Justice. Also included are the Chief of the South African Defence Force, the Commissioner of Police, the Director-General of Justice, Director-General of Foreign Affairs and an appointed Secretary of the SSC, who is at present a member of the SADF. Other ministers can be co-opted as necessary.

■ The second component, the SSC Work Committee, is the engine of the SSC. It does most of the preparatory work, and makes recommendations to the SSC. It co-ordinates the activities of the director-generals of government departments and the Chairmen of Cabinet Work Committees in regard to security. The Work Committee is composed of 14 members, and these include the heads of government departments and the chairmen of the Cabinet Committees for Financial and Economic Affairs, Social Affairs and Constitutional Affairs. This Committee is chaired by the Secretary of the SSC, who is at present Lt. General van Deventer.

■ The third component, the SSC Secretariat, co-ordinates and evaluates the work of all intelligence systems. The secretariat is the vehicle through which Cabinet security decisions are passed for implementation by the NSMS as a whole. It is made up of the following branches:

- Strategy
- National Intelligence Interpretation
- Strategic Communication
- Administration

The staff of the secretariat consists of 45 persons, excluding personnel from subordinate committees. Approximately 70% are SADF personnel, 20% National Intelligence Service personnel and 10% from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. General van Deventer, is head of the secretariat.

■ The fourth component, the Interdepartmental Committee, co-ordinates public sector activities of the NSMS in the security field. In this role it has the power to refer strategies or particular problems to the relevant government department. Many of the national security policy recommendations originate here. The committee is composed of the interdepartmental committees for Manpower, Civil Defence, Transport, Security, National Supplies and Resources, Government Funding, National Economy, Telecommunications and Electrical Power Supply, Science and Technology, Community Services, Culture and Political Affairs. A member of the SADF sits on each of these committees.

■ The fifth component, the Joint Management Centre (JMC), is responsible for co-ordinating all government departments in the implementation of area strategies to deal with security problems. Currently, JMC areas are based on the 11 SADF Command boundaries. This is expected to change to the Economic Development boundaries some time in the future. The JMC is composed of three branches:

Joint Intelligence Committee  
Political, Economic and Social Committee  
Communications Committee


Except for the Department of Justice all other government departments are represented in the JMC. In addition the SADF Area Commander is a member of the JMC. Normally the chairman of the JMC is either a senior military or police officer.

There are 60 Sub-Joint Management Centres nationally. They are basically JMCs that operate at a regional level, the SADF regional commander being a member.

There are also 338 Mini-Joint Management Centres nationally, covering just about every population area in the country. Mini-JMCs operate at the local authority level with the chief of police being a member.

### The NSMS and Decision-Making

The NSMS was set up — says Geldenhuys — to bring "regularised and formalised decision-making procedures" to government. The components of the NSMS plug into the traditional decision-making state structures from the highest level of Cabinet down to the local authority (see diagram).



It is at this level of executive decision-making that the SSC comes into its own. With an assignment that covers just about every area of government action both nationally and internationally, and given that it is the only Cabinet Committee set up by law and chaired by the President, the SSC is the most important Cabinet Committee in the decision-making process. According to Geldenhuys, the SSC "plays a role in policy formulation that is far more substantive than the limited functions entrusted to it by law."

In its formulation of recommendations, the SSC seeks expert opinion and has discussions with all interested and relevant agencies. At the stage of presenting its recommendations to the Cabinet, these recommendations carry the stamp of authority of the President himself, the most senior Cabinet Minister, and at least four other Ministers. The President personally conveys these recommendations to the Cabinet. In reality, therefore, the role of the Cabinet has become one of symbolic significance; it may formally have the final say, but this is merely a euphemism for rubber-stamping recommendations from the SSC, making them into decisions of state.

Furthermore, the NSMS has enhanced the position of the President as the chief decision-maker.

### **The Role of the Military in NSMS**

The NSMS is not part of the SADF. However, the military are to be found at all levels of the NSMS. Of particular importance is the role of the Secretary of the SSC, Lt. General van Deventer. As chairman of the Work Committee and head of the Secretariat, the Lt. General occupies a crucial position, where agendas are determined and, to a considerable degree, he can control the input reaching the State Security Council. SADF personnel are to be found on all important interdepartmental committees. In addition to this, SADF or police personnel normally chair meetings of the various levels of the Joint Management Centre. It may be tempting to presume from this that the military have total control over executive decision-making. However, currently this will not be an accurate assessment. What is certainly evident is that the military have been formally brought into the decision-making process and have secured for themselves a much

wider role in policy-making. In *The Militarisation of South African Politics*, Kenneth W Grundy makes the point that, "the SADF has made its considerable organisational skills available to Botha and in the process has seen its role grow in power and stature." Whether this eventually leads to the military wresting control of the state machinery is at present speculation, and only time will tell.

### **NSMS and the National Liberation Movement**

The State Security Council is the structure that now determines and develops strategies against the ANC and its allies. These strategies will reflect the input of experts in the political, socio-economic and military fields. Of specific importance is the fact that both national and international strategies will be considered as an organic whole within the State Security Council. The State Security Council will determine whether, for example, negotiations should take place with the ANC or whether the ANC should be attacked militarily in the forward areas and so on.

For our cadres operating on the ground inside the country, the Joint Management Centre network, that spreads right across the country, poses serious problems. The Intelligence Committee allows the police, military, National Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence to pool information at a local level. This co-ordinated action of all intelligence systems is new, and gives the racist regime an improved capability in identifying individuals and groups that are opposed to it. James Selfe, a Progressive Federal Party worker doing research in this area for an academic thesis, notes that the JMCs: "know precisely who was at what meeting and what was said by whom. They also keep tabs on those regarded as important community figures."

The growing revolutionary situation in our country has provoked the racist regime into re-organising and rationalising its decision-making processes. Within this context it is not surprising that the security establishment is in ascendancy. The NSMS is seen as the means of survival for the White establishment. At the end of the day there is no amount of organisational and administrative changes that can halt the onward drive for liberation. At most, those changes will only postpone it.

# 'THE PRESS MUST DO MORE' BOESAK SPEAKS TO BRITISH JOURNALISTS



*Dr Allan Boesak, President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and co-founder of the South African United Democratic Front, was asked by the National Union of Journalists in the United Kingdom to address a meeting during his four-hour stop-over in London on October 28th 1986. The meeting took place in Westminster Central Hall, and was attended by about 500 people. We give here the text of his speech.*

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Some two weeks ago we thought we had 15 to 20 000 people in gaol in South Africa under the Emergency Regulations. Now I hear through a report of the Parents of Detainees Committee that it is something like 23 000 people. Even of that we are not sure. There may be more. But because of the restrictions on the Press it is not possible to know, it is not possible to tell.

In urban areas there are always Press people around and the story may leak out, someone may be courageous enough to write about it and print it. But much goes on that we don't know about, that newspapers don't report even if they do hear about it. I shudder to think what happens in the rural areas where, under normal circumstances, the Press don't go. What happens to them will never come out because mostly they are not important people for the Press, they don't have names to attach a story to.

The father of a young girl hitch-hiked from a little place about 850 kilometres from Cape Town to tell me that the **entire** youth population of that township had been thrown in gaol. No one knew about it; no one would have known about it; we would not have been able to try and see if some legal representation could be found for the children, if that father had not taken three days to come to Cape Town to tell me.

## Repression Concealed

A recent survey by the BBC showed that the State of Emergency means there is a 60% reduction in coverage of South Africa — that is, 60% of what you thought you knew cannot be published.

What does it mean that 40% of the detainees under Emergency regulations are less than 18 years old? What are we to make of a very short news item that the South African Government has camps where these children are being taken for so-called "rehabilitation"? God protect those children. I would not like to see any child disappear into a special camp organised by the South African Government, with their particular fascist minds, when it is so easy for them to bring up their own sympathies for Nazi Germany and their own admiration for Hitler. I fear for what our children must go through as much as I fear for what happens to them in the townships when they have to go to school and the schools are guarded by soldiers with guns. When they stay out of school it is because they don't want to face soldiers.

What is now the level of torture in South African prisons? We have heard of three deaths in detention. Regular as clockwork the old excuses come out again — he hanged himself; he fell out of the ninth storey window; he slipped on the soap in the shower; he committed suicide because, as a committed Communist, that's the first thing you do when you get caught.

## Pretoria Tells Lies, Unchallenged

In a situation where we do not even have the opportunity to protest peacefully any more, we have to depend on the willingness of those who work in the Press to try to continue to tell the story of South Africa's struggling people. You can't do that if you don't go to extraordinary lengths to find out what is happening, what are the human realities behind the cold figures that you get from the Bureau of Information, which almost always have to be lies because that's the reason why we have a State Bureau of Information, that is the reason why journalists are not allowed to go into the areas, and that is the reason for the restrictions on the Press — so that the South African Government can lie, unchallenged, about what is happening to our people.

If you do not have that willingness and those people who take some risks in order to show the

truth as our people see it, we have lost yet another ally in the struggle against repression in South Africa.

We have a civil war in my country, in which our people are systematically eliminated. Yet so many of the people who write in the Western Press are so easily impressed with what the South African Government does. They look for signs of what they call hope and optimism. You must ask yourselves why. When the United Democratic Front challenges the Government in court, the Press here says, "Aha, you see there is still the rule of law in South Africa." But new regulations have been made leaving us no legal loopholes, and so the situation for us has become progressively worse as far as that is concerned. But it seems to me there is no understanding of that situation when you write in the Press.

## No Such Thing as a Black Press in SA

The White South African liberal Press can do more. There is no such thing as a Black Press in South Africa since all Black newspapers belong to White companies. We must not live with that illusion in Britain, that because you see something in *The Sowetan* that is what Black people say or think.

Since the State of Emergency, reports are filed with the notice that, "this report was made under Emergency Regulations." I don't think that that is particularly brave. I think the White South African liberal Press can do much more than it is doing now. All those newspapers belong to Anglo-American. Anglo-American can decide to challenge the Government. Why don't they simply decide that they will go to Black people and hear what has happened in the Black areas and that they will print all those atrocities committed by the security troops? Why don't they do that, and then let the Government decide to close down all those newspapers all over South Africa? Until they do that, the Black people will continue to believe that those newspapers are not there to serve the truth as they should, but to cover White interests. They are making a mistake.

I have pleaded in South Africa that those newspapers should begin to make a new and better contribution to the struggle in South Africa than they have been able or willing to make until now.

There's another problem. Many or all of the



foreign journalists in South Africa are White. Many of them are very fine journalists. The problem is that in that situation where it is so difficult for White people to even enter Black townships, how are they reporting? How can they begin to understand what is happening to Black people, what we are saying and what we are thinking, so that our words can **actually** be reported?

What can I do with interpretations of what I think, when it always has to come from a person who doesn't know me that well, who lives in a White area, who has never smelt tear gas except by accident when they've been with us at a funeral, who doesn't know what it means to be confronted with police and dogs every day of your life, who doesn't know what it means to send your children to those schools when you are not sure they will come home that night, or will be alive that night?

I have great difficulty with the fact that such people are the only people who interpret what I think and what I say and what happens in that country, to the British public.

that somehow newspapers in Britain must also do a little more than they have been doing so far.

### **Dutch Reformed Church Still Not Reformed**

Let me give you an example which I don't think is important, but which explains what I mean. I've been travelling in Europe. I read in the papers that the White Dutch Reformed Church has suddenly declared apartheid sinful. I read this and think, "My goodness. How come I don't know this?" But apparently what happened was that the White DRC had said that racism is sinful. But apartheid is not racism, you see, and is not covered by that decision. So they have instituted a Commission of Enquiry into the policy of separate development to see what has to be changed in that policy. That Commission will report in 1990 when the Synod meets again!

They also said that our members can now become members of the White Dutch Reformed Church. That's very nice. But, you see, that means nothing unless the Government immediately scraps the Group Areas Act. You see, we live 20 miles from each other. My people, who have to get up at six or five or four to catch buses and trains to get into the White areas to

work, and get home late at night, must now get up at six o'clock again on Sunday morning to get on a bus and then on a train and then another bus to go to a White church which still, in my church's point of view, is heretical. You could almost say that the Dutch Reformed Church took this decision because they knew how perfectly safe they were.

### **Our Country, Our Lives, Are at Stake**

So I don't understand why journalists cannot go to the trouble to find out that the Dutch Reformed Church rejects with a two-thirds majority a proposal that our churches should become one church — what does that say about their support of apartheid? Journalists who listen to these debates don't understand that for this White church it is still a question of choosing between the apartheid of Eugene Terre'Blanche or, in the middle, Mr Treurnicht, and then, to the very 'left' of all of them, Mr P W Botha.

I have been waiting for the DRC to say, "We understand now the pain and suffering of our brothers and sisters, how their children have died on the streets, how their ministers are gaoled or restricted so that it is almost impossible for them to do their pastoral work — and so we see we do not any longer need another Commission of Enquiry into apartheid to find out that it is in fact bad for Black people."

I would like journalists here to understand. We are not unwilling to help you, to smuggle you into townships if that is necessary. We're not afraid to take the risks. But it seems that when you send someone to South Africa there should be a basic requirement that such a person will take very, very seriously Black voices in South Africa who dare to speak under very difficult situations. It's not only the voices of Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak I'm talking about. There are other voices which speak at much greater risk than I.

We will not ask you to go to gaol in our stead, or to give up the future of your children as we have had to do. We will not ask you to face tear gas and guns. Those are the things that we must do. It's our country, our children, our future, our lives, our dreams that are at stake.

But I must ask you to do more than you have already done.

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