

# COMBATANT


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## Bulletin of the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guiné

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### EDITORIAL



WOULD YOU LIKE TO TELL THE LISTENERS HOW MUCH THE GOVERNMENT HAS DONE FOR YOU?

For people accustomed to the monolithic forces behind conventional warfare in this technological age, guerrilla warfare is very difficult to comprehend. Its whole basis is different and requires the abandonment of traditional concepts on the nature and therefore the practice of the struggle. Though military capability is of course vitally, equally essential is a thorough, sound political awareness on the part of all involved, both civilian and military. Without it, a protracted war of this kind can never be successful. To smash the enemy through sheer force of strength is out of the question; he has to be gradually worn down. It clearly requires a complete understanding of the objectives of the struggle, and the problems that will inevitably arise, to be able to face constant physical hardship with courage and determination; to accept that two steps forward then one step back is almost inevitable, and to acknowledge that this could last a life-time.

Consequently, definitions of "success" or "failure" are not as simple as just winning or losing battles. The formation of hundreds of militant and politicised cadres is more important than the loss of a temporary base, or the mine detected before it can explode. At the same time, the destruction of a lorry containing a few soldiers is not dramatic, but repeated in many regions day in, day out, throughout the years, defeats the enemy more finally than does the traditional style of physical confrontation.

In terms of relations with the outside world, this sort of situation always favours the enemy in the short run, for he can present evidence of military success in terms and concepts that can be readily understood - so many thousands of troops, planes bombing missions, etc. - and thus for a long time maintain, with some credibility, that everything is under control, and that the "small bands of terrorists" are being contained.

Until recently, this was precisely the case in the Portuguese colonies. However, the situation is changing rapidly. The steady, often imperceptible advances of the liberation movements over the last five or six years have taken effect, with two important results.

Firstly, the image of the happy Lusitanian community has been smashed and the Portuguese can no longer conceal the extent of their involvement in bitter wars on three fronts - and this by their own words and actions. Massive offensives in all three territories of which the much publicized effort in Mozambique and the abortive invasion of Guiné-Conakry are only the latest,

all give the lie to their constant claims of security and peace in the colonies, and the colonial peoples' desire to remain Portuguese.

Secondly, as the struggle developed in Africa, to support grow in Europe and elsewhere, resulting in the formation of numerous groups like ourselves, with the dual aims of fighting their own countries' involvements in Portuguese colonialism and of providing practical material and financial assistance. The results achieved so far have been highly encouraging: for example, the political campaign against the Caboto Basse dam and grants made to FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC by the World Council of Churches. This increase in awareness is resulting in growing international criticism of Portugal's policies and growing support for the liberation movements.

This has not been without its repercussions on the Portuguese, as Caetano's recent speech to the National Assembly demonstrated. It contained a long tirade against the growing 'international conspiracy' against Portugal.

The Portuguese are obviously very worried, so we must make every effort to maintain the political pressure and agitation that has been built up, and also to step up the level of our material aid to the movements. Britain, in particular, cooperates badly in this respect with some other European countries.

Earlier this year the Labour Party Conference passed a resolution offering 'full support, moral and material, to the liberation movements in Southern Africa' and a group of MPs produced the 'African Manifesto' pledging the mobilisation of aid for freedom fighters'. Nothing has come of this so far, although the Swedish Social Democratic Party has been making financial grants to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies for some years. So far most material assistance received has been the work of one or two individuals. An ambulance was sent to FRELIMO a couple of months ago, and our first consignment of used clothing and medical supplies will be despatched shortly. Hopefully this will only be the beginning but it all depends on our supporters throughout the country taking the initiative.

Only the peoples of the Portuguese colonies themselves can fight and win their struggle for liberation. But their tasks will be made that much easier, and certain problems that such were insoluble, with constant and substantial support from outside.

# THE INVASION OF GUINEA

At around 2 o'clock on the morning of Sunday November 22nd some 300 - 400 foreign troops invaded Conakry, the capital of the Republic of Guinea, Sonakry, situated on a peninsula connected to the mainland only by a causeway, renders itself vulnerable to a surprise seaborne raid - especially one organized with such precision as this one. The attack was well timed. The approach of the invading vessels was unlikely to be noticed, first, because the moon was in its final quarter, and secondly, because in November, at the end of the rainy season, Conakry is usually enveloped in dense mists. Add to this the fact that most of the Guinean army was away in the interior of the country helping the peasants, and you have ideal conditions for launching an attack with every chance of seizing Conakry and depositing or murdering President Sekou Toure. Nevertheless, Conakry did not fall - the three sorties of the invading forces were all beaten back in savage street fighting.

But who had masterminded this invasion? Radio Conakry had no doubt whatever that the raid was an attempt on the part of the Portuguese to overthrow Sekou Toure and supplant him with someone more amenable to the maintenance of Portuguese rule in their neighbouring colony of Guinea-Bissau. On the whole the rest of Africa agreed.

Portugal has the best of reasons to desire Sekou Toure's overthrow - his whole-hearted support for the PAIGC (in contrast to the attitude of Leopold Senghor in neighbouring Senegal). As colonial wars are a great drain on Portugal's economy, it could be argued that to cut off the PAIGC supply lines may be thought essential strategy in Lisbon (The Scotsman 24.11.70). Furthermore in the Conakry headquarters of the PAIGC - which were destroyed in the raid - the invaders might well have expected to find Amilcar Cabral. 'The circumstances recall the assassination of Dr. Mondlane' noted the Times on December 5th.

However at the time of the invasion most of the British press was highly sceptical over the question of Portuguese involvement and took the occasion as an ideal opportunity to make a series of crude attacks on Sekou Toure. Here we have a balanced political appraisal from the editorial of the Daily Telegraph 'President Toure has been a nuisance and done his country no good ever since independence in 1958'. Similar dismissals of Toure as 'Marxist dictator' could be found in almost every other paper. And who was responsible for the raid?

'The most likely explanation on the basis of present available information, must be that Guinean dissidents - of whom there are very many outside the country - are responsible for organizing the attempted coup, on the understanding that they would get support from within Guinea once the invasion force landed' (Financial Times 24.11.70). 'Sceptical officials in Lisbon believe that the attack is a simple coup staged by opponents of President Sekou Toure' (Daily Sketch 24.11.70).

There were rather more crackbrained suggestions - the Birmingham Post refused to rule out the possibility that Toure 'is currently confronted with a revolt by the anti-Portuguese PAIGC terrorist organisation that has been operating against neighbouring Portuguese Guinea from bases in the Republic of Guinea' (24.11.70); and the Daily Telegraph clipped in to add 'It is also noted that whatever African country harbours guerrillas eventually suffers at their hands. Guinea is unlikely to be an exception to this' (24.11.70).

But on the whole the accepted theory was that dissident Guineans had launched the invasion. There is a group of exiled opponents of Sekou Toure, known as the FNLG, who have organised abortive plots in the past. Significantly, the most recent of these was foiled when 30 Guineans were arrested in Gambia near the border with Senegal and jailed



for attempting to overthrow Sekou Toure. When arrested, they had been about to board a Portuguese vessel which was to take them to Guinea-Bissau for military training. Nevertheless, not all Guineans living outside the country oppose the regime. In Freetown, Sierra Leone, 6,000 Guineans demonstrated in support of Sekou Toure.

And then there is the question of the ships - 'there is no convincing explanation as to how desperate Africans, no matter how determined, could manage to whistle up a destroyer, a frigate, and four landing craft on the night of Saturday, November 21, obligingly to provide sea transport to the waters off Conakry' (Guardian 4.12.70). Such ships could only have been supplied by an outside power and the desperate attempts of the Daily Telegraph to shift the blame on to every other nation in West Africa can only be treated with derision. Likewise the suggestion made by their correspondent, Brigadier W.F.K. Thompson (who, interestingly enough, covered the whole affair from Bissau) that Portuguese ships could not have been involved because he, W.F.K. Thompson, had seen a number of Portuguese ships 'either in harbour, under repair, or engaged in river patrols'. So there!

But no serious doubt could remain when the U.N. team investigating the raid produced their report and pronounced that the operations had been mounted by members of the Portuguese Armed Forces, working with members of exiled movements, opposed to Sekou Toure.

The fact that the five-nation (Zambia, Nepal, Colombia, Poland and Finland) report was unanimous made it difficult for Lisbon to make a convincing rebuttal. Nonetheless, the Portuguese continued in their attitude of outraged innocence - an attitude which carried less and less conviction as more damning evidence was produced. 24 members of the Portuguese army and air force who had been held prisoners in Guinea for some 5 years were set free during the raid and turned up in Lisbon where they have disappeared into a maze of highly

# FEB 4 - ANGOLA DAY

The armed struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa is ten years old. It was on 4 February 1961 that the first shots were fired in Luanda, the capital of Angola.

Since then, in spite of all the difficulties, the situation has developed steadily. The MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) suffered serious losses during the savage Portuguese reprisals - many of their cadres were killed or imprisoned, and the movement's organisation impaired, but they soon began to rebuild and prepare for the next phase of struggle.

Having learned the dangers of a too early exposure in urban centres the emphasis was now on establishing a national underground network which could support a protracted guerrilla struggle. By the end of 1964 the MPLA was able to open a new front in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, followed in 1965 by the establishing of the Eastern Front. The movement is now firmly established over 1/3 of this huge country, and is actively engaged in the work of social and economic reconstruction. Urban organisation has resulted in some sabotage operations.

Ten years ago there were demonstrations in the streets of European capitals with the slogan 'Hands off Angola!'. Ten years ago it was clear that Portugal was relying for support on her Western allies. Ten years ago, in this country, public pressure produced an official ban on sales of weapons for use in the Portuguese colonies.

Today, in 1971, critics of Government policy concerning Portugal's use of NATO weapons are still referred to that 1961 decision, even though the loophole it left for the delivery of weapons through NATO agreements has never been blocked. We are always reminded that Portugal is our ally.

But the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea are confident that, for all the allies that Portugal can command, and for all the tough times that are undoubtedly still ahead, their feet are securely placed on their own freedom road.

## TEN YEARS

Photo and visual exhibition of the struggle in the Portuguese colonies

Thursday 4 February

10.30am - 6.30pm

Holy Trinity Church Hall  
Kingsway, London WC2

(opposite Holborn tube)

TAKE THE CHANCE - COME, LOOK, DISCUSS



## Guinea Invasion (cont)

suspicious security arrangements. 'They have been whisked out of sight by the Ministry of Defence, which has refused all applications for information or interviews, even to the newspapers in Portugal which most enjoy the favours of the Caetano administration.' (Guardian 4.12.70)

This seems to have proved no slight embarrassment to Caetano, who would perhaps like to throw the whole blame for the invasion fiasco on General Antonio Spínola, the Governor of Guinea Bissau, and is reported to be considering his recall. If this were to happen, Spínola would be a sacrifice for Caetano's image of respectability. For a week after the U.N. Security Council report, a group of Portuguese officers in Guinea revealed the whole truth of the raid. These men were clandestine members of the Algiers-based Portuguese Patriotic Front for National Liberation. Their statement reads: 'The invasion plans were based on information supplied by the (Portuguese) Directorate General of Security, by the Governor General of Portuguese Guinea, General Antonio Spínola, and by Luciano Bastos, Commander-in-Chief of Portuguese Guinea's maritime defence. The operation was actually led by Captain-Lieutenant Calvaço. Calvaço first served in Guinea in 1963-4. He returned in 1968 and has been occupied in 'counter-insurgency' work. 'However, two weeks before he led the invasion he was in Lisbon where he was received by Caetano himself'. (Tribune 16.12.70) Coincidence?

This statement of the Patriotic Front ought to finally clear up the whole affair and lay the blame squarely at the feet of Marcello Caetano and his administration. Unfortunately, ever since the U.N. formally found Portugal guilty the British press seems to have lost interest in Guinea and virtually none of the papers have as much as mentioned the Patriotic Front report.

## SPINOLA

Spínola is not without British admirers. John Biggs-Davison MP, not only compares him to Lord Montgomery, but has this to say of him in his booklet 'Portuguese Guinea - Making a Lie': 'No chicken, he keeps himself in vigorous trim by an ascetic diet. He does not even take wine. This is a magnetic, powerful personality, not lightly to be crossed'. The mind boggles.

The Daily Telegraph correspondent, Brigadier W.F.K. Thompson, also thinks highly of Spínola: 'General Spínola, who spends much of his time visiting all parts of the country and talking to the people, proclaims himself to be a social revolutionary'. (30.11.70)

## O.A.U.

On December 10 the Organisation of African Unity held an emergency meeting to debate ways of preventing any repetition of the Guinea invasion. Increased aid was pledged to the resistance movements in the Portuguese territories and special measures called for to eliminate the use of armed mercenaries in Africa.

The O.A.U. ministerial council unanimously approved a resolution condemning NATO powers who 'allow through their complicity and assistance various attacks by Portugal against several African territories and states'. The resolution also demanded an end to military assistance to Portugal, full reparation by Portugal to Guinea for damage and casualties, that all who participated in or aided Portugal's aggression in Guinea should be punished - and said that a special fund should be set up to provide financial, military and technical assistance to Guinea.

# REPORT FROM

Last summer's reports of large-scale Portuguese manoeuvres in Mozambique were of especial interest to me as I had been discussing with FRELIMO the possibility of making another film in the liberated areas. We finally arrived in Mozambique in late September, the fifth month of the offensive and after the barrage of Portuguese claims in the press we were extremely glad to have the opportunity to find out what the true situation was.

We ourselves went to Western Niassa province, where the military situation had been comparatively normal, with the Portuguese isolated in a few bases and the people secure at least from surprise ground attacks. Some of the fighters accompanying us, however, had been fighting in Cabo Delgado province, the main target of the Portuguese, and they told us of intensive air-raids: in which villages were bombed by twenty planes at a time carrying both napalm and explosive bombs; of helicopter raids, modelled on American methods in Vietnam, in which commandos land, shoot at anything in sight and quickly retreat again; of groundattacks aimed largely at destroying the homes and crops of villagers. Yet despite this the liberated areas have remained in FRELIMO hands with the Portuguese unable to open new roads or seal the border, and suffering more casualties than usual.

FRELIMO's ability to resist and fight back stems partly from their military organization. The fighters accompanying us were nearly all experienced: some had been fighting constantly since 1964; they were well trained in political as well as military matters and all of them stressed the importance of teaching and helping civilians. The level of reconnaissance and communications was impressive: Alberto Joaquim, our commander, was kept informed about the military situation well to the advance and rear. When the operation was changed at a Portuguese base about 30 miles away he knew within a day that there was some unusual activity, and reports about the number of troops and vehicles involved soon followed. On our return journey we were met by a group carrying letters from the President only a few days old. Messages destined for the South of the province about 200 miles away would be less up to date on arrival but at least it was clear that they would

be delivered. Such organization was obviously important in enabling FRELIMO to adopt a strategy of counter offensive against the Portuguese. For instead of withdrawing all their forces to play a defensive role they intensified attacks in front-line areas and particularly in Tete province, so preventing the Portuguese from concentrating all their strength in the attack against Cabo Delgado.

To appreciate the present state of affairs in Niassa it helps to know a little about conditions there at the start of the war. Throughout the colonial period large numbers of people had migrated from Niassa to Tanzania, and at the start of the war in 1964 a new wave of refugees crossed the border leaving the province seriously underpopulated. As a result, in the early stages of the campaign the guerrillas lacked the advantages of effective local support which they had in the much more densely populated province of Cabo Delgado. One of their first priorities was to create conditions which would encourage civilians to stay or even return to the region but the low density of population also made this difficult to achieve. It could have been a vicious circle but sheer hard work has broken it and now signs of progress can be seen similar to those other reporters have described in Cabo Delgado.

Niassa, like Cabo Delgado, is organised in territorial divisions of which the largest is the province followed in order by the district, locality and cell. At each level an elected committee runs the day to day affairs of the area. Military and civilian problems are closely linked and the local bodies raise both with the army commanders and the political leaders. Juma, the Secretary of the Provincial Defense Department spends much of his time travelling from village to village discussing policy with the people locally responsible and he gave us a detailed description of the cell or locality committee: "It is composed of about 6 or 7 people according to the existing structure... It is formed of some leaders of the militia, some direct representatives of the people, women are represented. This depends on the committee but for example if there are 6 members, 2 or 3 will be women."

## PORTUGAL AND THE UN

In December, at the end of its 25th regular session, the General Assembly passed several resolutions pertaining to the Portuguese colonies. It reaffirmed its recognition of 'the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples and peoples under alien domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence by all the necessary means at their disposal. It urged that all States and UN agencies provide moral and material assistance to the liberation movements, and that UN bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund should withhold assistance from Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia until they renounce their colonial and racist policies. The activities and methods of foreign economic and other interests operating in dependent territories, particularly concerning the Cabinda Basin project in Mozambique, were condemned and the colonial powers and states whose nationals were engaged in such activities were requested to adopt effective measures to prevent new investments, especially in southern Africa.

On the basis of reports from the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly strongly condemned Portugal's persistent refusal to implement United Nations resolutions concerning the rights of the peoples of the territories, and condemned its collaboration with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

It demanded that Portugal put an immediate end to the colonial wars and called on the NATO powers to cease supplying Portugal with any assistance that enabled it to pursue the wars. It

also demanded that the Portuguese government stop using chemical and biological weapons and that it treat captured freedom fighters as prisoners of war. Previously, on 4th December, the General Assembly's Social Committee had voted on a motion stating that captured members of resistance movements and liberation movements in southern Africa and the colonized territories should be treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. There were 48 votes in favour, one (Portugal) against, and 42 abstentions. The resolution also qualified the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons as flagrant violations of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and called for new international agreements to ensure the protection of civilian populations and freedom fighters.

On December 8 the Security Council voted, 11-0, to condemn Portugal for the invasion of Guinea, and demanded that the Portuguese government pay compensation for loss of life and property. Four countries, the United States, Britain, France and Spain abstained, the delegates of the two former countries making it quite clear, however, that they endorsed the report of the UN fact-finding mission. They said they did not vote in favour of the resolution because, in their view, the text came too close to language that could be invoked by the African members in a demand for mandatory sanctions and even the use of force against Portugal. The Portuguese government rejected the proposals on the grounds that it could only result in incitement to violence and disorder in Africa.

# FRELIMO ZONE

by Margaret Dickinson

One of their most important activities is organising production and running cooperatives where the people have opted for them. These demand some knowledge of accounts and administration: The man entrusted with the responsibility is the Secretary of the committee. He makes up lists of personnel who participate in the work and after the harvest a list of the produce, then a meeting is held at which the produce is distributed: 3/4 or 4/5 is for the civilian population; 1/4 or 1/5 is given to the militants stationed locally. .... apart from keeping accounts of the produce they take a comparison between the current year and the previous one. If it has decreased they organise more communal and less individual work.\* At present only a small proportion of land is cultivated cooperatively but where this method has been tried it has been on the whole successful. The cooperative we visited seemed better tended than many neighbouring private plots. The main advance in agriculture, which affects private and communal plots, has been the introduction of dry season cultivation near water supplies. As a result many areas produce three harvests where before they only produced only one.

The low density of population creates special problems affecting the organisation of schools and medical services. In the case of schools this has led to a concentration on establishing boarding schools, so that one teacher can serve several small settlements too far apart to share one day school. We visited one school which had been opened only four months before. At the time it had 16 dry pupils and 11 boarders. Ages ranged from 5 to 15 and pupils were divided into two classes according to age. The boys in the older class had already learnt enough Portuguese to help with the younger boys, acting as interpreters for the teacher who did not speak the local language. Practical work was emphasised and every day started with a period of work on the school plots. The children had already cleared quite a large area of ground and the first crop of beans was coming up, the first step towards making the school self-sufficient in food. This particular school is scheduled to grow rapidly and become both a regional boarding school and a centre where teachers can be trained. There is

already a boarding school a few days walk from the village which has been in existence for about two years and has shown that the plan is workable.

The medical service solves the population problem by sending staff out from the centres to tour the scattered settlements setting up temporary posts about one day a month for each community. We talked to the nurse in charge of the first aid Post at the main base. He himself was mainly responsible for the army but was able to tell us something about the whole provincial service. There are 5 main centres in Western Niassa but apart from these five there are also first aid posts as at the central base, ... in every medical centre there are two nurses but at the camp I was on my own. We treat both the army and the civilian population. At the Central Hospital comrades go out and carry out treatment among the population. While I was working at the military base I treated 150-200 civilians. The commonest diseases are malaria, colds, coughs and abdominal complaints. We use various drugs, chloroquin, anti-biotics etc. but in general we have very little of all drugs. There are constant crises and shortages.\*

The problem of supplies affects every aspect of life. They are never enough clothes, agricultural implements, school materials and medicines. Even food is a problem because although plenty of maize is being grown new seeds and livestock are needed to enable other important foodstuffs to be produced. There are efforts to develop exports to help pay for such things, but although there is usually some surplus of maize and tobacco, the problem of exporting them in good condition, in a war situation, is considerable. In Gobo Delgado the position is rather worse because the Portuguese attacks have destroyed crops and other goods. Despite this, morale is high, the militants with us were welcomed enthusiastically by local people wherever we went and, as FRELIMO's guests, were sometimes given an embarrassingly warm reception. This was partly because they hoped that our visit meant the world was taking some notice of their struggle and that material help would follow. It should do, for they have worked hard enough to create conditions to make it effective and widely felt.

## FRELIMO AND NATO

During the preceding discussions in the Security Council, NATO did to Portugal came under heavy attack and the resolution itself urged all nations to refrain from giving Portugal any military assistance enabling it to continue its repressive actions in Africa. A few days later, in response to a similar accusation from the OAU, a NATO spokesman said that it had no responsibility for Portuguese actions in Africa as Africa was outside the NATO area. He also said that the statement did not imply acceptance of the accusations against Portugal. NATO as a whole had taken no position on the issue. True friends stick together!

Such a response was only to be expected. It's the old story that repeated again and again - NATO has no control over what Portugal does outside the NATO area and arms are only supplied for use within that area to meet NATO commitments. This argument was used recently by the British government which, however, went even further this time and conceded that it considered Portugal's military activities in the colonies justified. Defence Minister of State, Lord Balwill, told the House of Commons in November 1970 that Britain was satisfied that arms supplied to Portugal were used to meet its 'reasonable requirements' as a NATO ally and did not approve of the sale of arms for use in overseas Portuguese territories. However, he added that he did agree with Tony H.P. Patrick Hall who had told the House: 'The fact is that Portuguese territories of Africa have been invaded from Commonwealth countries such as Tanzania and Zambia, and every country has the right of self-

defence.'

Meanwhile, across the Channel in The Hague, Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns stated that an export permit was granted for arms and military equipment that could clearly be used against the populations of Portugal's African territories. He gave no indication of the criteria used to judge this, but added that civil aircraft did not come under the selective embargo. How on earth does he think the stuff gets out to Africa in the first place?

The United States has also jumped on the civil aviation bandwagon to further circumvent this problem. It has agreed to sell two Boeing 707s to the Lisbon regime, with limitations on their use, according to the State Department. Previously the US has sold planes only to T.A.P., the Portuguese civil airline, despite the fact that T.A.P. are consistently chartered by the government to fly supplies to the colonies, as well as transporting army personnel and equipment on scheduled flights. T.A.P. already has 12 Boeing jets in its fleet, their purchase financed by the US Export-Import Bank, a government agency. Despite all this the American government still maintains that the US will 'encourage peaceful progress towards that goal [self-determination of the colonies]' and that the US embargo on the shipment of arms for use in the colonies will be maintained. Embargoes that do not inhibit their range of activities must be very useful to governments.

# SIDE PO

## CAETANO'S SPEECH

Prime Minister Caetano's recent speech to the National Assembly, in which he indicated that the colonies were shortly to be given more autonomy, has been given considerable prominence in press reports. The immediate assumption has been that this could well be the first step towards independence, but nothing could be further from the truth.

In the first place, as Caetano himself pointed out, no real changes were being introduced: the experience of forty years had shown that the 1933 constitution worked and therefore it should not be replaced. There could, however, be 'renovation in continuity'. Indeed the kind of 'administrative decentralisation' proposed was often mentioned by Salazar as an ultimate goal.

The kind of elementary administrative autonomy that may emerge - and it exists in embryonic form already - has nothing whatsoever to do with political autonomy, let alone any kind of independence. Very early on, Caetano stresses the usual Portuguese argument that the peoples overseas do not want to be anything other than Portuguese, and indeed cannot be anything else, as they were nothing before the Portuguese arrived. He says that the subversive war from outside does not represent

the nation. In fact the swaying of 'national unity does not preclude regional variety' and 'a political and administrative organisation adapted to the geographical situation and social environment' is quite simply an attempt to introduce a modicum of efficiency into a system that is gradually grinding to a halt: from the necessity to refer all major policy decisions in administrative fields to Lisbon.

But the hoped-for side effects are in this case of equal importance. In the first place, the reforms may go a long way towards placating the growing anger and discontent among the settlers and thus eliminate the possibility of a UDI-type solution to their problems. In addition, although whatever gains that might accrue from the new arrangement will certainly improve only the settler's lot, no secret is made of the fact that the proposals will make a useful contribution to the psychological campaign constantly being conducted among the African population.

In dwelling at length on the nature of the 'subversive' war being fought in the Portuguese colonies, Caetano unwittingly underlined the nature of the guerrillas' success. 'Those who think that in this campaign the most important things are the



the wishes of old nations, unjustly deprived of their sovereignty, to regain their lost independence'. In the whole of the overseas provinces the green and red flag is loved and respected. In none of the provinces did there exist 500 years ago when they became Portuguese any ethnic homogeneity and political organisation which we eventually oppressed'. For people who find any suggestion of autonomy shocking, he has nasty reassurance: 'The sovereignty of the state which is unique and indivisible will not cease to affirm itself throughout the whole national territory through the supremacy of the constitution and of laws emanating from the central organs [where the provinces will increase their representation] and through the appointed governors who are delegates of the central government and whose rights of inspection and superintendence are kept unchanged.' In other words, the organs of the provinces have their own legislation but not their own authority. 'The autonomy of the provinces does not affect the unity of the Portuguese nation' for the central government retains control of international affairs, matters of 'superior interest of the state' (including annulment of local laws contrary to national interests), defence, the appointment of the governor who has powers of veto, the 'supervision' of financial administration, and the responsibility to assure the integration of the colonial economies into the economy of

military operations are wrong. A subversive war differs from a classic war. In the war in the overseas provinces, what is being disputed is not areas, villages or cities. Victories cannot really result from the clash of armed forces.' (So why all the recent offensives?). 'What is really being contested is the souls, the adhesion of the populations. Only routine justifies listing the number of enemy killed in military bulletins. The deaths are a fatality of the war of which we are not proud. But what counts is the number of people alive who, under our protection, our psychological action, our reason, together with the benefits of the administration, succeed in remaining firm and tranquil in their fidelity to Portugal. And it is because what is at stake are ideas, feelings and adherence. What the weapons which must be used are not only the classical weapons which wound, but the modern ones aimed at impressing and persuading the spirit.'

In the overseas territories 'the areas where peace reigns are predominant but subversion is insidious. It does not need terrorism. It can use subtle methods to reach the spirit. Therefore the Government has to have for these grave cases of subversion the necessary powers to face it whenever and wherever it manifests itself. This is what is proposed in the constitutional revision.' So the new measure kills two birds with one stone - the carrot, in the form of a measure of administrative autonomy, is offered to calm any restless feelings, but if this should fail the authorities will be able to act that much more quickly, taking whatever measures they consider necessary, including declaring martial law.

# UNREST IN PORTUGAL

The profuse given to the autonomy issue outside Portugal has tended to conceal the fact that this constituted a small part of the Caetano speech, most of which was devoted to the internal problems of growing unrest and instability, and how to cope with them. He begins by stressing that there will be no radical internal changes in Portugal and goes on to justify the maintenance of the present repressive regime. 'We cannot hesitate before the decisions we must take nor tremble at the shaking of a peace that is everywhere precarious, nor let us be disturbed by fashionable ideas with no axis - led by the winds of history' which are blowing for the benefit of interests and ideologies that are radically contrary to the interests of the Portuguese people. 'He goes on to explain that strength in determination must be a virtue of the ruled as well as the rulers. Over the years the Portuguese people had become used to the security to which they maybe did not contribute directly but which the institutions guaranteed 'with attentive vigilance and prompt repression'. It was the duty of the state to not loosen its protective activity for internal peace but it was wrong that under the shadow of that protection citizens should sleep in ignorance of the dangers which threaten society - growing revolutionary ideology, the revival of anarchism and the decay of traditional social institutions such as family, church and school.

The growing 'economic and social instability' he says partly

at the door of emigrant workers who bring back new ideas. Difficulties during the transitional period of entry into the European Common Market are also foreseen as destabilising forces, as is the 'vast conspiracy' abroad which 'finds its best pupil in the United Nations! For the first time a Portuguese leader openly acknowledges the growing hostility to the colonial wars. After speaking heatedly about 'the tiredness of protracted war, insinuation of objection of conscience, corruption of mentality, destruction of concepts of the personal owner, of civic duty and love for the country' he is then able to present his justification for the continuation of a virtual police state. 'In countries where there are very deep traditions of civic consciousness and where therefore individual consciousness limits their rights and the extent of their social duties, there it is possible that laws may be less explicit and the intervention of authority more restricted. But among us a very long time has still to pass before it will be possible to dispense with laws which regulate the exercise of liberties; to reduce the organs and agents of authority to simple spectators of citizens. Besides we do not believe that this is the tendency of most states. The appearance of large masses of people more and more impatient... the degeneration of customs of certain youth movements, increasing violence... all these demand that power does not disarm itself. On the contrary it has to reinforce the means of intervention...' In the face of such tremendous subversion 'the Government must continue to ask for sacrifices of increased liberties.'

## BOMBS IN LISBON

In any police state, it is always difficult to gauge the extent of active popular dissent within the country. But surely nowhere could one find a better indication of the discontent in Portugal than in these statements of the country's own Prime Minister. Recent developments have served to confirm this, with a wave of bombings in Lisbon, in October, an explosion tore open the hold of the ship 'Cunene', preparing to transport troops and military supplies to the colonies. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by an organisation calling itself Armed Revolutionary Action, which stated that it was beginning a campaign of armed insurrection to 'bring the Portuguese war machine to its knees' (Financial Times, 26.11.1970). A few days later there was a second explosion aboard another troopship in Lisbon harbour. Then there was a seven-hour blackout, the disruption of Lisbon-Opporto telephone lines and the derailment of two trains, all of which were never explained. On November 20 a more powerful bomb exploded outside the PIDE training centre in Lisbon, followed half an hour later by an even larger one which wrecked the American library. Later the same day the most powerful to date was set off in a retail trunk when luggage waiting to be loaded on a ship. But for bad weather the ship would have been at sea laden with troops and supplies for Africa. All these actions, and many other less dramatic protests, from strikes to demonstrations, that have developed over the last few years are the direct product of the suffocating repression of the Salazar and now Caetano regimes. What is particularly significant about some of the recent events, however, is that for almost the first time dissent and protest within Portugal is no longer merely confining itself to the domestic scene but is relating this to the colonial wars.

## ARMY DISCONTENT

Resistance is permeating everywhere, even it seems into the army itself. In December, the Portuguese Defence and Army Minister, General Sa Viana Rebelo, in his year-end message to the Portuguese armed forces launched a scathing attack against conscript officers and NCOs who came directly from universities, colleges and technical schools, which he described as 'veritable centres of subversion'. He claimed that the recruits undertook subversive activities once in the army and threatened to end draft deferment for students of 'berverion' within the armed forces continued. He claimed that this action had been so serious that only a few months ago six lieutenants had deserted to Sweden - the first time this event had been mentioned in Portugal.

'This is the first time a high Portuguese official has admitted publicly that there is an anti-war current among the young officer and NCO conscripts. Portuguese law does not provide for conscientious objection. Journalists who visited troops in Angola and Mozambique recently have reported increasing discontent among the young non-career officers who are particularly bitter about extended military service, which now last up to four years. There are also reports of increasing draft dodging among enterants who go to France to work.' (The Times 31.12.70)

This was confirmed by three more Portuguese officers who recently requested political asylum in Belgium. They also stated that South African helicopters were in constant use in the colonies - mainly to transport wounded. They spoke out strongly against the role of the Church in actively supporting the Portuguese government. They claimed that in the countryside, priests often threaten their villagers with eternal damnation if they do not vote for the government. They also give their full support to the colonial wars and in mass celebrated for every unit that leaves for the colonies the wars are presented as a holy crusade. (Le Monde 25.12.70)

# MOZAMBIQUE

## CABORA BASSA

'Cabora Bassa is a crime. It is a crime, not only against the Mozambican people, but also against the entire people of Southern Africa and of Africa as a whole. The complicity of the Western Powers in the realization of the construction project of Cabora Bassa has provoked the indignation of the popular forces of the world, in particular the popular forces of those same Western countries. A vast movement of solidarity is developing in the world, which envisages, in particular, the prevention of the construction of the dam.' (From statement made by Mr. Sharfudine M. Khan, Frelimo representative, at the 1888th meeting of the 9th committee on October 26 1970)

The Cabora Bassa project has run into another obstacle. Following upon President Kaunda's visit to Italy and the Italian government's withdrawal of all Italian credit backing the scheme, the only Italian member of the ZAMCO consortium has withdrawn. Societa Anonima (Elettrificazione) (SAE) was to have supplied high tension wires for the project. The withdrawal was due to the Italian government's failure to provide credits at assisted rates for 21 billion lire (approx. £19 million) which SAE required for the operation' (The Times 19.12.70).

The void they created has been quickly filled by a South African company - the Transmission Lines Construction Company. 'This additional contract gives South Africa a two-thirds stake in the project - an investment of about £117 millions out of a total estimated cost of just over £170 million' (Guardian 30.12.70).

United Transport Overseas has also run into difficulty. 'The managing director of United Transport, Mr. D. Lloyd Jones, refused to comment yesterday on the possibility that they might have second thoughts about the contract because their vehicles might be particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attacks' (Western Mail 29.10.70).

But on November 10, President Kaunda publicly announced that, owing to the Company's involvement in the Cabora Bassa scheme, United Transport Overseas would be asked to dispose of their 45% interest in the United Bus Company of Zambia. United Transport replied that they hadn't been informed that involvement in Cabora Bassa had any relationship to Zambia operations, and that in any case their involvement was minimal.

Meanwhile back at the House of Commons: 'Mr. Neacher asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will take all measures at his disposal to prevent British financial participation in the South African ZAMCO consortium for the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam, Mr. Maurice Macmillan: 'No'. (Written Parliamentary Answers, 15.12.70). It would have been naively optimistic to expect any other answer.

'The Students' Union of Aston University, Birmingham, is to sell shares worth £10,000 in four British companies in protest against their participation in the Cabora Bassa dam project in Mozambique. The four companies are Guest, Keen and Nettleton, General Electric, Rio Tinto Zinc and Charter Consolidated' (Sunday Telegraph, 18.10.70).

Work on the dam itself - according to Armando Gusuba, FRELIMO Inspector for Schools, and Jorge Rebelo, FRELIMO Secretary for Information, who visited this country last month, is some 6 months behind schedule. Seeing that the project only got under way 16 months ago, this means that the scheme is taking twice the time the Portuguese originally estimated. The Portuguese have, of course, laughed this off and claim that they are at most a month behind schedule.

NOT QUITE AS WE PLANNED IT.



Similarly the Portuguese are taking no chances round the dam site. The whole area has been declared a prohibited region that no one can enter without identifying themselves. And Portuguese commando troops have been combed the bush to the north of Cabora Bassa, evidently afraid that FRELIMO might launch an attack on the dam at any time.

According to 'Marchés Tropicaux' of 31.10.70, a film team directed by one Jean-Moel Pascal Argot is shooting a film about the construction of Cabora Bassa to be entitled 'The Reason Why'. The film will be for Eastmancolor wide-screen, will last an hour and will be produced in four languages. This enlightened project is supported by those doyens of culture, the Portuguese Ministry of Overseas Affairs and the Centre for Information and Tourism in Mozambique. Should be well worth watching.

# MOZAMBIQUE INSTITUTE

The Dr Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, which fundraises in Holland for the liberation movement, together with the Angola Comité, has raised in its 18 months of existence approximately Dutch fl. 330,000 (US \$ 90,000). \$27,000 of this was granted by the Dutch self-tax movement for running costs of FRELIMO'S Mozambique Institute. Most of the rest of the money was spent on medicine for the movements; and shipping 3 tons to PAIGC.

Furthermore, on December 2 a contract was signed between the Dutch government and the Mozambique Institute for fl. 250,000 (US \$69,000) for additional construction and the supplying of equipment for technical and vocational training, for the completion of the residential and training hospital at Mtwara and for the remodelling of the Mozambique Institute building in Dar-es-Salaam in order to accommodate the printing press and the publishing house, for the textbooks for the entire educational system of FRELIMO.



# MILITARY ACTIVITY

The last couple of months have revealed just how total was the failure of the grandiosely named 'Operation Gordian Knot' - the series of Portuguese offensives that resulted in the heaviest fighting of the whole Mozambican war. We shot down five planes - one a Fiat 691 jet - and destroyed many armoured vehicles. The Portuguese officially admitted that 331 soldiers were killed - and they always understate their combat losses.


'From captured letters we have seen that the morale of the Portuguese troops has collapsed. In letters we found in Cabo Delgado soldiers say "it is just like a cemetery", "mines grow like bushes here", "our platoons attacked Beira - we lost 32".

'On our side it was a big test. But now our people understand and face clearly the Imperialist nature of the attacks on their liberty, their schools. Their resistance was like a 'fogueira', a forest fire.

'Unlike the first years of the armed struggle, there were no refugees going across the border into Tanzania. Rather the people of the liberated areas were ready to defend their home. No longer could the Portuguese say FRELIMO was just a few terrorists'. (From an interview with Jorge Rebelo and Armando Guebuza in The Morning Star 17-12-70)

The Portuguese offensives finally petered out with an attempt to seal the border with Tanzania. Yet it seems clear that this objective has not been achieved and that FRELIMO forces can still cross freely from Tanzania to Cabo Delgado. The only crumb of comfort that the Portuguese can pick up is the defection of a former foreign affairs secretary for FRELIMO, Dr Miguel Murupa who now works for the Psychological Warfare Department of the Portuguese Army. As he left FRELIMO a year and a half ago it seems something of an exaggeration for the Times to report his defection as 'Among the richest prizes the Portuguese military command has to show after six years of fighting' (21-12-70). That doesn't say much for the other Portuguese 'prizes'.

But although unable to shake FRELIMO'S firm base of popular support in Niassa Tete and Cabo Delgado, the Portuguese were certainly able to do a fair amount of damage to FRELIMO'S work of reconstructions. It is not easy to destroy a people's will to resist - but it is easy to destroy crops, blow up schools, bomb hospitals etc. The havoc left by the Portuguese invokes the spectres of disease and famine - to fight off this threat FRELIMO urgently needs material aid in the next few months.



# ECONOMICS

'Japan is shortly to invest still undisclosed but large sums of capital in iron ore exploitation in specified areas in Southern Mozambique, according to reports reaching Radio Mozambique. Negotiations on the subject are currently in progress between the Japanese and Portuguese governments in Lisbon. A survey carried out by Sunifera produced good indications that large deposits exist in the area. The decision is in line with Japanese Government policy which supports Japanese investment in any part of the world where iron ore can be commercially exploited.'

Frelimo Communiqué no 14; (dated 22 December 1970)

The situation in the liberated zones of FRELIMO has returned to normal. Having been defeated in their 'big offensive', 'operation Gordian Knot', in September, the Portuguese forces have not tried any other operation of that kind. The great losses they suffered in men and material created new contradictions among the colonialist authorities. A strong movement, headed by the officers who have been involved in the war since the beginning, based on their experience, opposed what they called 'military adventures', which are extremely costly and which are not bringing any results.

But the Portuguese authorities had to try and save the prestige of their army, in the face of the big propaganda campaign they had mounted internally and internationally around this offensive. Their army would 'wipe out' FRELIMO in a few weeks, they had announced. So, the authorities had to continue issuing periodic war communiques claiming 'complete victory over FRELIMO', 'passage to a new phase of the offensive'. These claims are absolutely unfounded. As a cameraman who visited our liberated zones in Niassa Province in October and witnessed the development of our struggle rightly commented: 'The Portuguese reports have begun to defeat their own objective, for if FRELIMO had been wiped out in June, how could they be wiped out again in August and then in October and now again in December?'

## Military Reports:

During the period between 25 September and 7 November, 1970, FRELIMO forces in Cabo Delgado and Niassa undertook 34 major operations, in which 27 vehicles were destroyed, more than 200 Portuguese soldiers were killed, 2 bridges were blown up (by rivers Luabala and Rureca) and 6 posts and camps were attacked - in Milandá, (Iwice), Quimazi, Chitamba, Mandica, Marrup and Chamba.

One train was ambushed and the locomotive destroyed with a bazooka fire on the railway between Catur and Conjerenje in Southern Niassa.

And in Cabo Delgado a U.S. made aircraft was shot down near the post of Mangoleto between Mueda and Nacimboos-da-Prata. The markings were 'No. 5401 II Model VELLV Z9184 - 10 A8R 70 - PART 2,275,000 UNION N.J. U.S.A.'

According to the Diário de Notícias of 29-10-70, Portugal wants to clear 13,500 hectares of bush in Cabo Delgado for the settlement of European. 'It will be of interest to try to settle there a number as great as possible of demobilized soldiers because they know the region'. Delicate understatement.

(African Development Dec 70)

A Tribune, the Lourenco Marques daily quotes reliable sources as saying that Mozambique Gulf Oil has suspended prospecting and drilling operations in Mozambique - which have so far been successful. However the American International Oil Company, which is associated with Gulf, is said to be negotiating to take over Gulf's contract.

# ANGOLA GULF KILLS!

Portugal's economy remains solvent for one reason - the fact that Angola's trade surplus of \$20 million just about makes up for Portugal's balance of payments deficit. This surplus comes from exports of coffee, diamonds, iron ore and oil.

"Angola's oil industry produced 947,000 tons of crude oil in the first three months of this year - about double the output in the same period last year. A bulletin issued by the Commercial Bank of Angola said this year's total Production was expected to exceed 4 million tons" (Southern Evening Echo 3.10.70)

And one of the main companies drilling for this oil - indeed the sole concessionaire in the Cabinda enclave where the first strike was made in 1966 - is Gulf Oil, the tenth largest corporation in the United States. Gulf's support of Portuguese colonialism is blatant. Under a 1968 agreement between Gulf and the Portuguese Government, Gulf made advance payments when Portugal's financial position became desperate as she escalated her three colonial wars. These payments include surface rents, bonuses, income taxes, a 10% royalty payment on each barrel of oil and certain concession payments - all this provides essential foreign exchange for Portugal. In 1969 total payments exceeded \$11 million. In addition, Portugal retains in the contract the right to take all crude oil produced, or its equivalent, in refined products, should her military or political needs dictate it! This, quite evidently, is an enormous aid to Portugal - while at the same time robbing the Angolan people of irreplaceable natural resources.

In the United States, the American Committee on Africa (ACA), has started a campaign against Gulf, calling all sympathisers to boycott Gulf products. Last Spring, ACA achieved considerable publicity by entering the annual meeting of Gulf shareholders and disrupting it. Evidently Gulf began to panic - next inadvisably it has threatened to take legal action against the Ohio Conference of the United Church of Christ which approved a Gulf boycott. 'It would be a wonderful trial. The United Churches could subpoena all of Gulf's books and that might be edifying, seeing those figures that don't get into the annual reports. Naturally, Gulf, as the defamed, innocent party would win and could confiscate the Ohio Conference's churches; bailiffs might be sent into the sanctuaries to seize the silver crosses in satisfaction of the judgement and take them off where they could be melted down and recast in the shape of little oil derricks' (Washington Post 7.9.70). A little attention might be brought to bear on Gulf's misdeeds within the U.S. itself. For instance last year on a net income of just under \$1 billion, Gulf paid less than 1% in federal taxes - to be precise, 0.43%. (A man with a wife and the children earning \$7,000 a year would pay tax to the tune of 9.47%).

In 1969, Gulf paid \$4,264,000 in taxes while it spent \$17,250,000 - four times as much - on advertising. The advertising of U.S. oil companies is notoriously political - as it needs to be to combat the growing awareness of the pollution caused by these companies. 'The Federal Trade Commission hasn't investigated these ads to see if they are false and misleading, which a number of people concerned about the environment might well maintain. Instead, the Commission busies itself with reprimanding the Milky Way candy bar people for suggesting their piece of chocolate has the nutritional value of a glass of milk. 'The Federal Communications Commission has made no effort to provide equal rebuttal time to groups disagreeing with the disguised political commercials. No private group can compete by purchasing airtime to dispute with the oil companies. They couldn't, even if the oil people paid their fair share of taxes..... 'You could have thought with these advantages Gulf could have overlooked the little protests of the Ohio United Christians. The only explanation that comes to mind is that this industry is terrified of the public reaction should

information on what they're doing get widely circulated' (Washington Post 7.9.70).

But Gulf is a huge international corporation - a vast polyopus with tentacles all over the world; it needs international action to defeat it. 'Let willing governments and voluntary organisations start to implement the economic counteraction against colonialism and apartheid that the United Nations has called for. Let the corporations - whether or not Gulf is selected - who support and defend the southern African oppressor feel organized, concentrated, people-power. The U.S. corporations tell us they are not interested in politics - only in profits. Let us take the profits from them' (Statement of ACA to the Fourth Committee of the U.N., November 1970).



It is interesting to note that American interest in the Portuguese colonies is growing. Nixon himself made favourable noises about the Portuguese policy in Africa, denying that it bore the remotest resemblance to apartheid. In April Mr. George Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, toured Angola. Kennan is on record as regarding the late, unimpaired Dr. Salazar as 'a man of principle' when he was U.S. charge d'affaires in Lisbon in 1943; he arranged an assurance that the U.S. would 'respect the sovereignty of Portugal and its entire colonial empire'.

Secretary of State Rogers visited Portugal in July ostensibly for negotiations about the U.S. bases in the Azores. But according to the 'New York Post' in July, 'Portugal will ask Secretary of State William P. Rogers today for American backing of its military operations against guerrillas in its three African provinces, official sources said'. Portuguese Government officials later said that Premier Caetano had clarified to Mr. Rogers Portugal's position on her African territories... 'where have all the C.I.A. bombers gone?...Gone to Angola, everyone...' (Leaflet distributed at a demonstration in Chicago at a soccer match between Poland and Portugal).

# MILITARY ACTION

Despite the presence of South African troops in Mexico described in an MPLA communique as consisting of 'four companies of commandos, equipped with helicopters, artillery, automatic weapons and bazookas, and other extensive armaments; the Portuguese continue to receive heavy setbacks in this region of Angola. MPLA communique 12/70 for June/July announces continual harassment of detachments of

Portuguese troops in the districts of Moxico and Cuango Cubango, several mining incidents resulting in the destruction of Portuguese armoured vehicles and a total of between 50 and 100 Portuguese casualties. Following this several Portuguese barracks were attacked and during the week September 13-20 Portuguese troops were forced to withdraw completely from the barrack of Sete in Moxico.

# CHEMICAL WARFARE

The Portuguese use of herbicides and defoliants in Angola has continued - the following chemical agents have been recognised:

1. 2,4-D (2,4 dichlorophenoxyacetic acid)
2. 2,4,5T (2,4,5, trichlorophenoxyacetic acid)
3. cacodylic acid
4. picloran (from the Dow Chemical Company, with the commercial name of Tordon).

These products cause, inter alia, digestive problems, the vomiting up of blood, respiratory diseases; 2,4,5T acts on pregnant women causing congenital malformations, and cacodylic acid, which contains arsenic, is very poisonous, as a lethal dose is only one gramme for every kilogramme of bodyweight.

As for picloran, in a test conducted in a Puerto Rican equatorial forest, trees sprayed with the chemical remained without leaves for over two years.

Naturally Portugal has denied all allegations that she practices chemical warfare. But it is not only MPLA that indicts Portugal. Corroborating evidence comes from an unlikely source - 'The United States has indications that Portugal has used herbicides to destroy rebel food crops in Angola, according to State Department officials. They emphasised that information from the American consulate in Luanda, capital of Angola, was not conclusive, but said that American diplomats had been instructed to pursue the matter with Portuguese officials in Lisbon and Luanda' (The Times 11.12.70). It is worth noting that the only nations who voted in the U.N. General Assembly against a resolution that maintained an international treaty barred the use of herbicides in war were the U.S., Australia - and Portugal.

The situation is serious, since the destruction of MPLA crops threatens the liberated areas with famine, particularly as measures taken to counter the Portuguese atrocities cannot take effect immediately.

The Medical Assistance Services (SAM) of MPLA addresses an urgent appeal to all sympathisers that a massive and urgent campaign be launched to collect food, seeds and medicine - and money - for the liberated areas.



PLEASE SEND DONATIONS TO MPLA - Medical Assistance Services,  
P.O. Box 20793,  
Dar es Salaam,  
Tanzania.

Or contact in this country I. Martins,  
14, Chalfont Road,  
Oxford,  
(tel. Oxford 57092)

Or The Committee for Freedom in  
Mozambique, Angola & Guine,  
531, Caledonian Road,  
London N7,  
(tel. 01-607-2170)

To: Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guine  
531, Caledonian Road, London N7.

I would like to order a supply of *GUERRILHEIRO*  
on sale or return..... (quantity at 1/- each)

I enclose 8/- subscription to *GUERRILHEIRO*.....

I would like you to send me a Bankers Order.....

I also enclose a contributor to the work.....

NAME..... ADDRESS.....

.....

# FUN & GAMES AT DCO

On 13 January a demonstration took place at 54 Lombard Street in the City, where Barclays Bank DCO's annual shareholders meeting was being held. Two thousand leaflets were distributed outside, while inside the Chairman, Sir Frederick Seaborn, devoted most of his speech to a defence of the bank's policies. He maintained that a solution to South Africa's problems 'can only come after years of patient and constructive thought. When changes come in southern Africa, as they surely will, our long and world-wide experience will stand us and all the people there in good stead'. He put the campaign against Barclays down to one or two 'politically identifiable groups', bent on destroying society in order to impose their own minority ideologies.

The only opponents of Cabra Bassa that had shares and were able to attend were David Head of the Student Christian Movement and Mrs Laura Moss. They both managed to speak but not unexpectedly to no avail. On the face of it, therefore, the event was not particularly fruitful, but in fact it presented hard evidence of the success of the growing campaign. As one daily put it: 'It is the first time that the bank has paid its critics the compliment of a lengthy and official reply to their charges'.  
NOTE: The bank declared a profit of £14.3 millions and the AGM approved a final dividend of 7% on £40 millions of ordinary stock.

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The Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guine is the official British support committee for the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies - FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC. We are not a mass-membership organisation as our role is to inform, activate and co-ordinate. Our major fund-raising effort is directed towards gaining material support for the liberation struggles in Africa: money donated specifically for this purpose does not go on our running expenses.

But in order to do our work effectively we must have a secure financial basis, and our activities have expanded beyond the point of being able to survive on irregular donations.

We therefore ask our readers to associate themselves positively with the work of the Committee, by making a commitment of at least £3 a year by banker's order. As an associate you will receive this Bulletin, our annual report, notices of meetings and any other information we publish. Write to 531 Caledonian Road, London N7 for a banker's order.

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## AVAILABLE AT PRESENT

### LITERATURE.

- The Struggle for Mozambique by Eduardo Mondlane (Penguin 9/-)  
Revolution in Guiné by Amílcar Cabral (Stage One 9/-)  
The Liberation of Guiné by Basil Davidson (Penguin 4/-)  
Portugal and NATO Published by the Dutch Angola Committee (3/-)  
The Cabra Bassa Project and the UN Sanctions Resolution on Southern Rhodesia (6d)  
Cabra Bassa/Barclays leaflet (30/- per 1000)  
Fact sheets on British involvement in Cabra Bassa (30/- per 1000)  
Leaflet - "War on Three Fronts" (1/-)  
The Programme of the PAIGC (6d)  
Statutes and Programme of FRELIMO (6d)

### POSTER

- \*Cabra Bassa Dam - smash Cabra Bassa. (1/-)

### SPEAKERS

Speakers are available from the Committee to talk to public meetings and groups. Arrangements can be made with the Committee.