

20 JAN 1987

N  
Cox

# DAWN

vol 11

1987

Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe





## Contents

Editorial Comment: Let us hasten the process	--- 1
Learn with DAWN: How to make fuses	2
First Aid	
Organisation of an operation	
Armed Insurrection: The organisation of the proletariat armed forces	5
Heroes of Our Revolution Eulogy to Nicky Ntsewa Hlongwane	9
Masses at War: Death of a vigilante-----	12
MK Soldiers Viewpoint: Making of a revolutionary army-----	13
Comment: The ANC SACP Alliance-----	16
Guerillas and soldiers from other lands: The P L O _____	18
Short story:-----	19
DAWN Political word No. 6-----	24

# LET US HASTEN THE PROCESS

As whites flocked to the polling booths on May 6, the state of emergency, the most severe in the thirty nine years of apartheid rule, was and still is in full force. Racist soldiers and police are still roaming our townships killing and maiming scores of people. Botha's vigilantes are still on the rampage, wreaking death and destruction to lives and property. Tens of thousands of people, among them thousands of children, are daily facing gruesome torture in the tyrant's detention cells. Black unemployment stands at over four million.

Destabilisation and aggression against the frontline states continue unabated. In fact, the recent raid in Livingstone, a town in southern Zambia, which left four innocent Zambians massacred in cold blood, was a confidence-building measure in the NP's electioneering campaign. Therefore the landslide victory of the National Party in the elections means that the white electorate has endorsed Botha's minority rule, the state of emergency and all the crimes we have listed above. And they are just a small fraction of the crimes committed by the boer regime for, indeed as one observer noted, if we were to compile all their crimes into a single charge sheet, the Bible would be dwarfed into a pocket notebook.

We the oppressed have and always will view the boer parliament as an instrument of oppression, a vehicle for legislating white privilege and repression, detentions, torture and massacres for the black majority. To us the May 6 election was as irrelevant as all those proceeding it. To use the words of Comrade Joe Slovo "this election is seen as yet another obscene racist ritual." We realised decades ago that our lot will not be improved in parliamentary debates in

racist parliament. Hence the racist elections were for us another occasion to express our anger at white minority rule as witnessed in the massive response to the stay-away call on May 5 and 6. Umkhonto we Sizwe the people's army also registered its presence with bombs, limpet and landmine explosions.

## RESULTS

With regard to the results of the elections, appraised as a swing to the right mainly because of the losses suffered by the PFP and the gains scored by Treurnicht's Conservative Party, it is necessary to point out that they indicated further deepening of the political crisis gripping apartheid rule. Even before the elections the ruling National Party was rocked by divisions hitherto unknown in its four decades of rule. Staunch National Party MP's like Wynand Malan and leading academicians deserted the National Party.

The ultra right Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party failed hopelessly to present an election front as they had intended earlier. Witwatersrand and Cape Town universities, both mainly white universities banned election speakers from their campuses. They were later to be joined by other white universities in becoming hot battle-grounds as the campuses were invaded by police who were out to ruthlessly suppress anti-election campaigns waged by the universities. It is worth noting that all university students, age wise, qualify for registration as voters.

The Independents, far from left as they are, presented the NP with a challenge not to be ignored. Wynand Malan defeated the NP candidate by votes, while Deniis Worrall lagged behind Chris Heunis, the Cape leader of the NP by only 39 votes. Dr. Esther Lategan, another Independent, lost by a mere votes.

It is true that though these divisions within the white power block and resignations from the NP indicate the growing crisis or white rule, and therefore add an advantage to the revolution, they are as yet not far-reaching. Many whites, though realising that Botha is leading them into a dark abyss out of which they will never emerge, still desperately search for answers within the confines of white politics. They pretend not to have realised what Slabbert and Boraine did, that no change can be worked for within the white parliament.

Some still remain prisoners of racism as seen in their moving in the direction of open fascism like the AWB. Others, though still a tiny minority, have seen the truth that they can only contribute meaningfully to finding a solution to the problems of our country by joining, in struggle, the oppressed black majority. These have found their way to the democratic movement whilst the most advanced have joined the African National Congress and the people's army Umkhonto we Sizwe.

This crisis the Botha regime is facing has been brought about by our struggle. The intensification of the war on all fronts with particular emphasis on taking the war to the white areas, will result in the deepening of this crisis even further, ultimately resulting in the collapse of the boere regime like, as Joe Slovo says, a structure built on sand. Let us hasten that process.

# LEARN with DAWN

## You too Countryman, can be a Freedom Fighter

### FUSES

IN the last edition of *Dawn* we dealt with a number of explosive mixtures for making landmines and charges in general. But for your landmine or any other charge to be initiated you still need the following: fuse, primer, and container. Therefore in this issue we shall be dealing with fuses.

To be away from the target before the explosive charge goes off you need some type of fuse. There are many kinds of fuses but we shall deal with only two which are easy to make.

#### a) ACID FUSE

Acid eats through certain materials and produces heat and flame when it comes into contact with certain chemicals. E.g. using an eye-dropper, as in the diagram, carefully place some sulphuric acid in a balloon. After an hour or so (this entirely depends on the thickness of the balloon) the acid eats through the balloon. You can use this method to detonate your charge.

Of course, acid by itself cannot detonate a charge. So you will need some in-between stage, called primer, which is sensitive to acid and will detonate or activate the main explosive charge upon producing heat.

**Safety Warning!** Great care must be taken to ensure that the acid does not contact the explosive mixture before you want it to. You must make sure that the balloon is perfectly clean on the outside before placing it in the plastic bag. The balloon must be reasonably strong. If it has a small hole or some fault in it the acid will eat through it sooner than intended, and the explosive charge will go off in your hands.

### CAPSULES

Gelatine capsule (obtainable from the chemist) are useful containers for acid. You can use them instead of a

balloon. Separate the two halves and carefully fill the larger half with sulphuric acid using an eye-dropper. Again, make sure that there is no acid on the outside of the capsule. Close it with the other half.

The capsule is then placed in a primer which can be in a plastic bag or balloon. The acid will take about half hour to eat through the capsule and detonate the primer, which in turn activates the main explosive charge.

**Safety Warning!** Always check that the outside of the capsule is free from acid before you place it in the primer. It can flare up as soon as it contacts the primer and burn you. Gently wipe with a damp cloth. Also examine the capsule carefully to ensure that it is not faulty. If it has got cracks or weak points, the acid will eat through it sooner than expected and the explosive charge might go off in your hands.

### GLYCERINE FUSE

When pure glycerine comes into contact with very finely ground potassium permanganate, an intense flame is given off. Potassium permanganate (common name 'Candies Crystals') is used for medicinal reasons, including washing fruit and vegetables.

Unlike acid glycerine does not eat through a capsule. A fuse can be made the following way: You need: tube, ballpoint pen, two cork stoppers, glue, tissue paper, and tape.

- Take a length of plastic or glass tube about 10 cm long, open at both ends. A tube for tablets can do – you can cut open the closed end.
- Remove the fine inner ink-tube from a ball point pen and wash it clean. Cut two pieces approximately 2½ cm long from it.
- Make two cork stoppers that will exactly fit into the tube. Make a

small hole in each so that the ball-pen tube can be pushed through the hole. Push the tube through the hole in the cork so that it sticks out 2 mm. Glue around the ball-pen tube so that it is firmly in place and make sure you have a perfect seal which allows no leaks.

- Now place the corks into the main tube as in the diagram and seal firmly into position. Again make sure that you have a perfect seal which allows no leak.
- Leave one end of main tube open and cover the other end as follows: cut two pieces of tissue paper same circumference as tube. Place finely ground potassium permanganate on one piece of tissue paper (d) Glue around edge of tissue paper (e) and stick (e) over (d) sealing the potassium permanganate within the tissue paper. (b) Push this neatly into bottom part of tube and seal end of tube with sticky tape so that the tissue paper cannot drop out.

You must have three separate chambers A, B, and C completely sealed off from one another. The fuse is ready to work.

**Safety Warning!** Be absolutely sure that the chambers are sealed off from one another. If the glycerine leaks down the sides from chamber A to chamber C you will have no fuse at all.

### HOW IT OPERATES

- Glycerine is poured into open end of tube to fill chamber A.
- Glycerine drips into chamber B through tube 1. When glycerine level rises in chamber B to cover top of tube 2, it starts to drip into chamber C.
- The effect of glycerine dropping on to the potassium permanganate enclosed within the tissue paper in chamber C produces intense heat and a flame.

## HOW TO USE IT

The device must always be placed in a vertical not slanting position. The tube can be made to fit neatly into the neck of a plastic bottle by wrapping a strip of cloth around it if the neck of the bottle is too wide for the tube to fit.

Carefully follow out a space in the explosive powder so that the tube fits into position. After pouring

glycerine into the tube, tightly close the lid.

**Note:** This is a useful combination because glycerine and potassium permanganate can both be bought quite openly at a chemist. But you will only get a good reaction if the potassium permanganate is very finely ground. Glycerine is used for treating sores in and around the mouth, but make sure the chemist gives you pure glycerine not the one mixed with rose water.

**Safety Warning!** Double-check that the fuse does not leak before using it with an explosive. If it does the explosive will go off in your hands.

## FIRST AID

### No. 1 Introduction + how serious is the injury?

IN the growing confrontation between the people and the forces of repression in our country, injuries are a common occurrence. In addition our living and working conditions are generally unsafe, leading to a high rate of accidents at the home and at work.

**DAWN** will be running a series of articles on First Aid so that injured comrades, workers or children at home get emergency help as quickly as possible, thereby limiting the damage they suffer. The sooner the injured comrade is seen by a skilled health worker, e.g. nurse or doctor, the better. (In unrest situations hospitals will probably have to be avoided.) But there is much that can be done on the spot or shortly after-

wards by people without any formal training to relieve pain, make the injured person more comfortable and limit the damage caused by the injury.

### General observations and things to do:

- \* Try to stay calm yourself — this will help you to observe things and give good care.
- \* Find out what happened if you did not see the accident or injury yourself: ask the injured person or those around him/her. This information often helps in deciding where the injury is and how severe it is.
- \* Ask the injured comrade how he/she feels — this also helps in assessing the situation.
- \* Decide whether the injury is very serious/life-threatening or not so serious (see later).
- \* Send for nursing/medical help unless the injury is not severe and you are not worried.

### Deciding how severe is the injury

The following suggest severe or life-threatening injury:

1. Injuries occurring during "unrest" situations, or due to gunshots, stabbing, car accident or fall from a height.
2. Injuries involving the head, chest, abdomen (stomach) or backbone. Limb injuries are only severe if there is much bleeding or loss of tissue, i.e. a big wound.
3. Unconsciousness, especially if more than a few minutes, is a sign of severe injury.
4. Difficulty in breathing — this usually means a severe chest or head injury.
5. "shock". This is a medical term meaning not enough blood circulating around the body, and not that the injured person is frightened and in pain. The signs of shock are: the person is cold and pale, the skin is cold and sweaty, the pulse is weak and fast, the person may be very weak and complain of thirst.
6. Beware of the person who is conscious but quiet and withdrawn after the injury, particularly if she/he is lying down. This can mean a serious injury. People who

are crying, making a lot of noise and moving around a lot are generally not in a serious condition — they may get worse, so watch them.

7. Bleeding can be deceptive. Blood on the floor/ground, i.e. external bleeding, often looks worse than it is, while internal bleeding can be hidden. Therefore rely on other signs to assess the severity of the injury. If there is a lot of bleeding (internal or external) there will be shock (described above).
8. numbness (no feeling) and paralysis of the legs after a fall, car accident or gunshot injury, or blow to the spine.

Don't rely on just one of the above when deciding whether the injury is serious or not — if the comrade has 2 or 3 of the features described the injury is probably severe. For example, a person who is unconscious and has breathing difficulty; or someone who is quiet and withdrawn and has the signs of shock.

A good method of assessing the severity of injury is to check the following 4 things in an orderly way:

- + The conscious level:— is the comrade-bright and alert  
— drowsy and confused  
— unconscious
- + The breathing :  
— easy breathing;  
— difficulty in breathing;  
— no breathing.
- + The pulse:  
— strong  
— fast and weak;  
— no pulse
- + The skin (feel the hands and face)  
— warm and dry skin  
— cold and clammy (sweaty) skin

All of the above only takes a minute or two to decide — you can rapidly assess the severity of injury therefore. You don't need fancy instruments like a stethoscope — all you need to do is stay calm and look carefully. Don't forget to send for help immediately you decide there is serious injury. If the comrade has none of the problems described above, the injury is unlikely to be serious

**“ATTACK, advance, give the enemy no quarter,”** was the central message of our Commander in Chief to our People's Army, Umkhonto we Sizwe. The call goes to all our military strategists, tacticians, to the commanders and commissars of our forces, to all our men and women on the battle-field — the order of the day is attack!

### **An offensive**

An offensive is strictly a rapid and active assault combat operation against the enemy. In the offensive, the assaulting party determines the initial direction of blows, through which it may dislodge the enemy, capture its position, destroy it or retain a tactical initiative on the battle-field for the further continuation of its combat offensive.

In our growing people's war we use a number of tactical combat operations against the enemy, amongst others:

- Sabotage
- Raid
- Ambush
- mine warfare

In an offensive, the assaulting party must always retain the tactical advantage of leading its adversary into battle. The assaulting party must prepare and determine the time and place of engagement.

However, every offensive is incessantly mixed up with the defensive as the enemy might try to gain an upperhand through a counter-offensive. This, therefore means that our offensive operations must be swift, devastating and thorough to deny the enemy the time and ability to re-organise itself. The goal of our offensive at this stage must be:

- To inflict as much casualty on enemy personnel as possible.
- To disorganise the enemy defences, its communication and supply lines including its support units.
- To outstretch the enemy forces and tie them into isolated pockets of defensive units around the country — pushing its forces more on the defensive.
- To continuously harrass the enemy, sapping its strength and undermining its capability to launch any offensive..

In our offensive, as in the defen-

sive; that part of the enemy force which in its destruction will give us a decisive advantage must be the object of our attacks. With any combat assault operations we must have all probabilities for success based on precise reconnoissance and intelligence information at our disposal.

Any offensive must give the enemy the impression of being attacked from all fronts, it must give the enemy the impression of us being in preponderance both in manpower and fire power through the skillful use of our weapons and tactical deployment of our forces. At the same time our strength and fire-power must be concentrated on our designated target depending on the strategic mission of our offensive. It goes without saying that the strategic and tactical advantages must be in favour of the victory of our offensive

### **Principles guiding an offensive in general**

- Speed and high mobility of our combat forces, both in deployment and preparation for combat and in retreating to deny the enemy any chance to prepare its defence for a counter-offensive.
- A surprise swift attack on the enemy is very decisive for the success of our offensive. This element must of course be combined with the choice of the time when the enemy's vigilance is relaxed, when it least suspect an attack, a time when it is least prepared for combat engagement.
- We must have utmost secrecy in planning and execution of our battle plans. It means then that our movements must be skillfully concealed and camouflaged both in reconnoissance or in actual deployment for battle.
- Support and active collaboration of local people is fundamental

for the survival of our combat forces. This is imperative for our army which carries the historical duty of mobilising and leading our people into the battle against the regime. Umkhonto we Sizwe is at the head of a growing and popular people's war in which we must impart military skills and know how to our people.

- An active propaganda offensive must be an intergral part of our military offensives, to strengthen our people's determination and their faith in the victory of our revolution. Our propaganda must epitomize the strategic goal of our revolution, the armed seizure of power.
- Selective propaganda must be directed against the enemy armed forces to weaken and demoralise the enemy — to destroy the political direction of the enemy forces.

### **Combat support operations**

Our operations must be based upon two very important combat support operations without which we can not speak of any combat operation.

1. precise reconnoissance and intelligence information;
2. proper and thorough planning of the combat mission.

### **Reconnoissance and intelligence information**

In the last issues of Dawn we discussed reconnoissance as the main combat support operation. We can not venture into battle without precise data on enemy strength deployment, armament, vigilance and its state of combat preparedness.

continued in page

## THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PROLETARIAT'S ARMED FORCES

ONE of the main objectives of the party of the revolutionary proletariat in an immediately revolutionary situation is the creation of proletarian armed forces, i.e. the formation of a combat organization. The need for this combat organization is indisputable.

The experience of the armed insurrections which have taken place in numerous countries in the past teaches us that however excellent the Party's work in the bourgeois army (and armed forces generally) may be, it will never be possible to have subverted the entire army by the time the insurrection is launched. It will never be possible to win over all the army to the revolution, nor even to neutralize it entirely simply by the political work carried out within it. There will always remain units and groups loyal to the reactionary high command, who will fight actively against the proletariat. In his 1906 article: 'Lessons of the Moscow Uprising', Lenin wrote:

We have carried on work in the army and we will redouble our efforts in the future ideologically to win over the troops. But we shall prove to be miserable pedants if we forget that at a time of uprising there must also be a physical struggle for the troops.<sup>1</sup>

Every army possesses many tested units, recruited from the offspring of social elements loyal to the bourgeoisie (officers' and NCOs' training academies, special detachments of the police or the army, 'Mauzerists' as in China, etc), and well paid. There are also all kinds of volunteer organizations (very widespread in the West) which are specially designed for waging an active struggle against

the revolutionary proletariat. Moreover it must be borne in mind that the bourgeoisie, during the insurrection, will employ all methods (corruption, lies, drink, repression, etc.) to keep the wavering troops in its grasp. It can therefore be asserted quite categorically that the proletariat will never succeed in wresting the army completely away from the influence of the ruling classes, or in winning away from the counter-revolutionary command all those soldiers who are wavering, and bringing them over to the revolution. *The subversion and neutralization of these units will only be possible after they have been disarmed by the armed forces of the proletariat. Whence the absolute necessity of constituting in good time adequate proletarian armed forces, capable of allying themselves with such army units as come over to the revolution, so that together they can annihilate the military basis of the old regime definitively.*

*In future insurrections, above all*  
In future insurrections, above all if the immediately revolutionary situation does not occur in the aftermath of a war, it will often happen that the entire weight of the first decisive battles must be borne by the red guard detachments, without any help from revolutionary soldiers.

The revolutionary army is needed for military struggle and for military leadership of the masses against the remnants of the military forces of the autocracy. The revolutionary army is needed because great historical issues can be resolved only by force, and, in modern struggle, the organization of force means military organization.<sup>2</sup>

The structure of the proletariat's combat organization varies from country to country. Only one thing is certain: the detachments of that combat organization must base themselves on the masses (factories, plants big firms, etc.) and must be numerically strong. Their structure must more or less resemble that of the red guard in Russia, the Proletarian

Hundreds in Germany in 1923, the combat squads in China, etc.

The red guard cannot simply be formed in any political situation whatsoever:

The Red Guard is an organ of rebellion. It is the duty of the Communists to agitate for the establishment of such a Red Guard and to organize it when an immediate revolutionary situation arises.

Under no circumstances must it be forgotten that the existence of a proletarian militia or a Red Guard, in imperialist countries, under a bourgeois State and in a state of 'peace', is absolutely impossible.

The mass military organization of the proletariat (the red guard) must be created as soon as the Party puts the question of dictatorship of the proletariat on the immediate agenda, and reorients itself towards direct preparation for the seizure of power.

## SKILLED POLITICO-MILITARY CADRES

The lesson of Petrograd, Moscow, Germany in 1923, Canton, Shanghai etc., show that, in an acute revolutionary period, it is relatively easy to create a vast combat organization. Ordinarily, several months will be available for this. But a really combat-worthy military organization can only be formed as quickly as this if there already exists a sufficiently large number of cadres with adequate military and political training. Without these cadres, who will provide the skeleton of the combat organization, i.e. its commanders, the military organization will not be worth much in fighting terms.

In Petrograd, Moscow and the other Russian towns in 1917, the situation was extremely favourable from this point of view. As commanders and instructors, the red guard had communist soldiers and often officers. These instructors, who commanded the red guard detachments during the October fighting, had previously taught the combatants to use their weapons, and had also taught them the princi-

ples of tactics and of military science in general.

The situation which we have observed in Germany in 1923 was a quite different one. Here some 250,000 red guards, grouped in Proletarian Hundreds, had been organized in the space of a few months. But there were not enough cadres with military training (the whole mass of red guards only had a handful of communist ex-officers). Moreover, the commanders were ignorant of the fundamentals of street-fighting tactics, indeed of tactics in general, and knew nothing about the organization or tactics of the government's armed forces. The result was that the military value of these Hundreds left much to be desired. This was all the truer in that they only had a very limited quantity of arms at their disposal.

The same could be said for Canton. The red guard, as we have seen had little idea how to use the arms available to it, and was consequently unable to utilize them in the fighting. It suffered heavy losses and a whole series of its operations failed because it was led by untried comrades who knew little of military science. For the number of communists in Canton who had any military training was extremely limited.

Communist parties, in practice, pay too little attention to the formation of cadres. Yet this is a question of the utmost significance especially in countries like China where the proletariat has few possibilities for forming its cadres inside the existing armies.

As a result of various specific features discussed below and which distinguish it from the ordinary tactics of regular armies, the tactics of insurrection and street fighting (all insurrections in towns take the form of street fighting) is extremely complicated. Its study requires prolonged effort and perseverance.

## TRAINING THE MASSES

Thus a revolutionary party which remains Marxist through and through – i.e. which treats insurrection as an art, and propagates the idea of armed uprising in the working class – must confront in practice the question of how to train the cadres of the future insurrection, and must resolve it in one way or another. Every proletarian party must set about resolving this question without waiting for an immediately revolutionary situation (when it will be too late); it must do so independently of the current political situation.

The problem, despite its apparent difficulty, is not an insoluble one. Side by side with the study of Marxism-Leninism, the Party

Marxism-Leninism, the Party leadership must organize the study of military science, with particular emphasis on the lesson of past insurrections – especially those of Russia, Germany and China. This study can take place in communist circles and Party schools (legal, semi-legal or illegal depending on circumstances); by recording the lessons of proletarian armed struggle in the Party's publications; by studying military science in practice (sending comrades into the army); by creating legal or illegal military organizations ('Red Front' in Germany, 'Revolutionary Ex-servicemen's Association' in France).

A knowledge of theory is naturally not enough to form tried military leaders for the red guard detachments. However, it is a precondition for doing so, and should under no circumstances be neglected.

The great semi-military organizations of the proletariat (like the Red Front and the Revolutionary Ex-servicemen's Association) play an immense role in forming the military cadres of the future insurrection, and providing the proletarian masses with training in military science. These organizations can in no sense be identified with the red guard; they are not instruments of direct struggle

for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their basic purpose, as we have shown in the preceding chapter, is to mobilize the proletariat and educate it in the spirit of class struggle, and to wage a political struggle against the military organizations of the bourgeoisie. But, in addition, they allow tens of thousands of proletarians to obtain a military training, and a preparation for civil war. As the combat organizations of proletarian self-defence, these groupings are simultaneously champions of the idea of civil war and a powerful means for propagating this idea throughout the working class.

The military training of the masses can also to some extent be carried out in various legal organizations; sporting associations, rifle clubs, etc. The Communist Party, wherever possible, must make use of these societies to give the revolutionary youth a military education.

When the immediately revolutionary situation arrives, the military training of the masses (the handling of weapons; the basic tactics of insurrection and street fighting; reconnaissance and liaison work; studying the organization and tactics of the army and police, etc.), the arming of the people and the formation everywhere of red guard detachments must reach their peak. Special attention must be paid in this respect to the decisive centres of the country's political and economic life (the capital, the great industrial centres, the railway junctions, etc.) To neglect these questions means exposing oneself, in the critical moments of the revolution, to extremely fateful consequences.

In the Canton insurrection, about three quarters of the workers who took an active part in the fighting did not know how to fire a rifle and were incapable of making any use of such weapons as they had captured in the initial stages of the rising. There were cases of workers shooting their own comrades by



# SHORT STORY

**SERGEI KOVROV** was an experienced military scout on the 3rd Bylorussian Front during the second world war. He had carried out some 300 intelligence missions, captured 64 enemy soldiers for interrogation. He was called by Front Headquarters and assigned a mission to Vitebsk in the enemy rear.

From: *Arise, O Mighty Land!*  
— Progress Publishers.

“Comrade Senior Lieutenant Kovrov, you will go to Vitebsk, where our people have obtained plans of the enemy’s defence zones, and bring them back to us.”

I had previously seen General Chernyakhosky only in photographs, which was why my first thought upon seeing him in the flesh was how closely he resembled them. He was tall, powerfully built, good looking, a man of evident courage; my admiration for him as a man was aroused and I forgot that before me stood a great military leader.

The general looked at me attentively, then invited me to sit down on a sofa, seating himself beside me. He began to talk about the mission.

“Vitebsk is about 18 kilometres from here. The intervening territory is a tactical zone and therefore one of heavy troop concentration: second echelons, artillery units, headquarters staff, supply dumps, etc. Parachuting in this zone is dangerous and, in any case, even if the drop were successful, you would have to return on foot: an aircraft could not land and pick you up. Is that clear?”

“Yes, comrade commander.”

He motioned me to remain seated and went on.

“You will have to get to Vitebsk and return on foot. Your superiors have recommended you as one of our best military scouts, who has been in the enemy rear on many occasions.”

“I shall do everything necessary to carry out your orders comrade commander”.

“Excellent, you must leave today — this is an urgent matter. And you must return as soon as possible.”

“Comrade general, I believe that papers are ready for him?”

“Yes, comrade commander. It remains only to photograph him in German uniform and his identity papers will be ready in an hour.”

“It is more difficult to cross the front in group,” General Chernykhovsky told me, and you must therefore go alone, wearing German uniforms, but avoiding encounters with the enemy. How good is your German?”

I confessed that at school and in military college my marks had only been average, the fear crossing my mind as I said this, that he might interpret it as an attempt to get out of the mission.

“All the more reason for avoiding conversation,” he observed. “Some of our men speak fluent German but they do not know how to operate under field conditions — their job is to work deep in the enemy rear. You on the other hand, are quite at home in areas where enemy troops are densely concentrated.”

He shook my hand and his voice took on a more informal note as he fare-welled me:

“Your task is not an easy one. Take care of yourself. Remember that you are a Russian and must outwit the nazis.”

In the administrative section I put on the uniform of a German lance corporal and was photographed. Then I began to study the password routine I would use to contact our people in Vitebsk and memorised a map of the town. I had never been there and I should know in advance from which side to approach Vitebsk and how to find my way

about the town without asking.

I then turned my attention to a topographical map of the area I must cross to reach Vitebsk. In about forty minutes I was brought a service card with the name of Paul Schutter, a lance corporal in the 86 infantry division, duly stamped with the eagles and swastika and having my photograph. The card was genuine and looked worn. Only the name of its former bearer had been erased and Paul Schutter written and the photograph replaced with mine.

I was driven to the front in the company of an untalkative major. We were met in a village close to the front by the captain in charge of divisional intelligence in whose section my crossing was planned. The captain told me of features specific to the terrain and how the Germans operated within it, and behind the enemy lines to a depth of five kilometres.

When we arrived at the front it had become completely dark. Five scouts and three sappers from the division awaited us in the first trench, wearing white camouflage dress, their weapons wrapped around with white cloth. I also put on a white camouflage dress and said good-bye to the officers and slipped out of the trench after the scouts.

Crouching, we moved from bush to bush, following the gullies. The scouts knew this section of no-man’s land well and advanced confidently. As we approached the barbed wire our advance became increasingly slow and cautious. Machine-gun fire began to crackle nearby and the scouts dropped to the ground. From here we moved on hands and knees.

The nazis were firing not because they had discovered us but because this was their usual practice. They raked the surrounding area with short bursts. I knew that the

from above, from the outside; they must procure everything themselves."

And Lenin goes on to stress that 'under no circumstances should the formation of the group be abandoned or postponed on the plea of lack of arms'.

In reply to the account of the Combat Committee of the St Petersburg Committee, which noted the slowness with which the combat contingents were being formed and the shortage of arms, Lenin urged:

"Go to the youth. Form fighting squads at once everywhere, among the students, and especially among the workers etc., etc. Let groups be at once organized of three, ten, thirty, etc., persons. Let them arm themselves at once as best they can, be it with a revolver, a knife, a rag soaked in kerosene for starting fires, etc."

Lenin's instructions on how to form the revolutionary army contingents and how to procure arms remain valid to this day.

It must be reckoned that in future insurrections, in the East as much as in the advanced capitalist countries, the proletariat (or at least certain elements of it), until it has managed to seize an adequate quantity of modern arms (i.e. at the outset of the insurrection), will often have to content itself with the most unsatisfactory weapons. But it would be quite wrong to make this a reason for abandoning the whole enterprise, since with these primitive and unsatisfactory weapons the fighting contingents can and must obtain real, modern arms.

The insurrection is led by the Party, and each Party member is a soldier in the civil war. This principle makes it obligatory for every communist to have a weapon. This is most of all true in those parts of the country where the class struggle is most turbulent, and where all kinds of specific conditions make a revolutionary explosion more likely.

## ORGANISATION OF COMBAT SQUADS

Returning to the formation and structure of the red guard (revolutionary army) the following main factors emerge from such experience as has been acquired in this field in various countries.

When an immediately revolutionary situation arrives, the red guard must be formed in all factories and cities, while the Party issues ever more radical fighting slogans, and invites the masses openly to prepare the armed uprising. The red guard detachments must be composed in general of non-Party workers, students and poor peasants.

The Party must make the most strenuous efforts to ensure its leadership in these detachments; to have reliable men in position of command; to supervise their military training, etc. In many countries, it is not impossible that red guard detachments will have to be formed illegally, at least initially. The degree of legality of the red guard will depend on all kinds of conditions: above all on the depth of the revolutionary movement among the oppressed classes; on the extent to which the ruling class apparatus of government has disintegrated, etc. The Party's duty is to take account of the real political situation in each region, and to propagate among the masses slogans whose realization will ensure the legal existence and the progress of the working-class organizations, including the Party and the red guard.

It must never be forgotten that the question of the red guard's legality will ultimately be resolved by the struggle of the working-class masses, and only by that. The Party must make every effort to explain to the masses that a successful struggle to create the revolutionary army will, to a considerable extent, determine the possibility of a successful outcome to the struggle during the

insurrection. For this battle for the creation and legal development of the red guard is in fact a battle for the principal means of access to the decisive positions, i.e. it is the beginning of the direct struggle for power.

In this period, skirmishes with the armed forces of the bourgeoisie (troops, police, gendarmerie, fascist units) will be inevitable. And partial defeats will be equally inevitable.

In the light of past experience, the basic organizational structure of the red guard detachments can be resumed as follows. As long as they have to operate in conditions of illegality, the armed forces of the proletariat will consist of small groups (of three, five or ten men) organized in each factory, etc, and subordinated via their commanders to the higher instances (factory or neighbourhood red guard commanders, etc). The formation of larger units (companies, battalion) is not to be recommended in this period, for security reasons.

With the development of the campaign to create a red guard, as soon as the idea has fired the working-class masses to the point where they are bursting all the bounds of legality, and as soon as the formation of revolutionary army contingents takes on a mass character, the Party will have to provide the red guard with an appropriate organizational structure, based on the requirements of street fighting and on the weapons available. This structure must be simple and comprehensible to every worker. It is a mistake to aim for a complicated structure, or to form large units. The Party should rather strive to group together the small base units in a really solid fashion: squads and groups (from ten to twenty men), sections (from thirty-five to forty-five) and companies (two or three sections). In certain cases it will be possible to combine two or three companies into a battalion.

The formation of still larger units (regiments or divisions), as was done in Germany in 1923, is not advisable

— indeed is even dangerous. For it obscures the importance of the smaller red guard units in street fighting, and is symptomatic of a failure to understand the nature of this kind of combat, all of whose weight falls on groups and detachments corresponding numerically to the squad, section or company.

The formation of large-scale units will only become necessary after power has been seized in the city, when conditions exist for the struggle to be extended outside — i.e. for warfare in open country.

In the formation and military training of the red guard, great attention must be paid to the preparation within base units such as the squad or company, of men or groups with special functions: couriers, scouts, nurses, machine-gunners, artillery-men, engineers, drivers, etc. This is extremely important, for the presence of all these specialized skills (even when the weapons in question are not available) will in the first place allow a better defence against those weapons when they are used by the enemy, and in the second place, when such weapons have been captured, will allow them to be used effectively. Couriers (on bicycles if possible) and scouts will always be indispensable in street fighting. It is therefore absolutely necessary to train certain comrades or groups of comrades in each section and company to carry out scouting and liaison work.

In appointing and training the commanders for these detachments, it must be borne in mind that during the fighting they will be required to display great independence and initiative; the ability to orient themselves in the complex conditions of street fighting; personal courage; the ability to take independent responsibility for solving any tasks which may arise during the fighting; and, lastly, a limitless devotion to the revolutionary cause.

The selection of the red guard's leading personnel must take th

requirements into account. It must not be forgotten that in street fighting and during insurrections, the ability of the individual commander plays an immense role. — END

---

### A EULOGY TO NTSIZWA NICKY HLONGWANE

**THIS is an eulogy for a giant, this is our belated epitaph. This is an obituary we could not read at your lonely grave the dirge we never sang. To you Dear departed Commander, Commissar, Fighter and Hero this is our silent salvo in your honour. It is in place of a deserved gun salute.**

These are tears that dried on mother's cheeks, the words that stuck in our unbelieving throats. This is our love, our pain, our loss. This is an affirmation of a vow. As men lives, so shall he be sung in after-time. Ntsizwa lived nobly, he graced our world with virtuous attributes and left us a legacy of good to imitate.

Let us tell the story of the short life he lived so fully. . .

Alexandra, that seething, strutting, robust township welcomed its new inhabitant Nelson Nicky Hlongwane in 1952, the first child in a family of six. Soon the child was beckoned to the inviting, beaten, screaming streets to be schooled in survival.

In Alexandra in those years, everything gun blazed, knives flashed. At dawn the lonely muddy roads were peopled by corpses awaiting the arrival of the 'black maria.' This tale of violence, and widowed mothers is a grim reminder that apartheid and all oppression brutalises its victims and turn them into fratricidal animals.

People lived with danger, so did Ntsizwa. He escaped its wicked fate, the knives, the bullets, the tomahawks and kwashiokor. Life seemed hopeless, but courage held sway. All seemed so vain, so base, but loftiness persisted. The dark hand of oppression sought to suppress all, drown all, but talent could not be contained, men reached out for freedom. Leaders were born, great struggles were fought. Alexandra emerged from the dark abyss of crime, ignorance and despair to which the architects of doom had sought to consign her. Today, she stands as a model of struggle and sacrifice.

Ntsizwa escaped some of Alexander's cruel fate, but one blow caught him in his young days. His father died as he entered high school and that was the end of his schooling career. He had to support his family. He learnt to play guitar, and joined a band. But when the Soweto up-risings took place, Ntsizwa dropped his guitar and took off to Swaziland to join Umkhonto we Sizwe.

He had seen children cut down like dogs in the streets; touched by the plaintive cries of inconsolable mothers and beheld the piteous despair of man; for his rhythmic guitar, he chose the cold staccato of the machine-gun. He had seen it all.

All that is dard, vile, and base. He decided that only the ANC could purge our country of the evil, and that he will join Umkhonto we Sizwe. For a man so deeply scarred, you would think a wild, fire eating, hell-bent beast would descend on MK enjoining a pogrom of blood-letting to redress his sacred land from centuries old devastation and profanation. However, a dove came to nestle in our midst. The ready smile, the mild manners, the utter humility . . . Johannes Ntsizwa Maduke simply warmed himself into every heart.



NICKY NTSIZWA HLONGWANE

Ntsizwa was hard working, selfless and disciplined. After his training in the Soviet Union he stayed a short while in Angola, where comrades have only fond memories of him. His deployment in the front in 1978 marked the beginning of a glowing chapter in the glorious history of Umkhonto we Sizwe. This was the period of the return of the June 16 are a worthy successor to the indomitable Luthuli detachment.

None of the pages of this chapter could be truly credible, were they not to be graced with the name of Ntsizwa. He is one of the pioneers and principal actors of that period. Of the galaxy of mk field commanders, Ntsizwa was among the most brilliant. He stands along-side Barney, Dladla, Clement, Monty, Piwe, Zandi for sheer grit. All these men knew no fear.

By December 1978, Ntsizwa had already organised combat groups in several parts of the reef and put them into action. They carried out a few operations, including the Boksburg police station blast, and he participated in everyone of them. In 1979 he was put in command of fully trained cadres. This was the G-5 unit, which is undoubtedly one of the best units Umkhonto we Sizwe has ever

produced, and Ntsizwa can claim large credit for its unity, discipline and success. By quiet persuasion and force of example he helped mould G-5 into a coherent efficient machine. This small man with the heart of a lion won the respect of all the people he worked with.

A lot has come to pass since the first rifle assault on an enemy installation, the Moroka police station which was left in smouldering ruins. In its wake, Umkhonto we Sizwe has surpassed itself with dramatic operations as Sasol, Voortrekkerhoogte, the Pretoria bomb blast which had eclipsed Moroka and others in the imagination. But, we in MK have forgotten the harbingers of Sasol, the Solomon Mahlangu's who inspired us, people like Ntsizwa and the G-5 who stirred us with their boundless courage. Their success showed us that the enemy is vulnerable and afraid.

**SHORTLY after the handing of a hero of our revolution, Comrade Solomon Mahlangu Moroka police station was raided by a unit of four gallant fighters of MK The Unit was code named 145 with such fighter as Marcus Motaung and Simon Mogoerane under the command of a diminutive Nelson Nicky Hlongwane known to us as Johannes Moduke The unit was pioneer of of dug-out survival in peri-urban areas.**

Nicky popularly known as Ntsizwa within our ranks met his death in December 1986 following a car accident in Swaziland. He was in a coma for two weeks before he died. He cherished life, but had always wished that if death catches up with him before liberation, then it must be on the battle field in South Africa.

I met Ntsizwa in a flat in Manzini on transit in July 1976. We were all fresh from South Africa eager to get military training. When we moved to Tanzania we stayed at the same base. This is where I

got to know Ntsizwa who was always bubbling with eagerness to return to South Africa and participate in the destruction of the racist regime.

We had political and military orientation classes before we went for training. In one tactics class under the topic of a raid we hypothetically discussed a raid on Moroka police station as an example least aware that one of us would in actual fact lead a raid three years later against the same police station

I was left in Dar when he joined a group which went for training in the USSR. There was excitement and sadness as we parted, because we had hoped to go for training together. The reunion came in Maputo in 1977 when he was deployed with our units. Once again it was a sad moment when he was assigned a mission to command crash course units in Soweto in 1978. Despite serious problems he encountered when training this unit, he nevertheless, managed to carry out some operation in Mlamlankhunzi and New Canada railways station. Later he was moved to the East Rand where he teamed up with another comrade in the Boksburg police station bomb blast.

Comrade Ntsizwa was later withdrawn for further preparations to assume command of the G-5 group. After the preparation of this group, Ntsizwa went in again to prepare conditions for the reception of the unit . . . He made the initial preparation for base construction for the whole unit. During the construction of their base, he participated fully with every one.

His and his frank and open disposition won him the respect of the unit.

The conditions of staying underground in a hole for most of their time was quite demanding. There were problems experienced within the unit, however, he encouraged constructive criticism and self-criticism, political discussions and

analysis of the situation in which they were existing. This approach won Ntsizwa the admiration of his unit, and consequently it cemented unity and effectiveness in operations.

In the planning of operations each member of the unit was allowed to express his views before he finally took a decision on what to be done. He was aware that his effectiveness as a commander depended also on ideas from his unit members which he showed a great respect for. With such a unit, unshakeable in its determination and revolutionary enthusiasm, they ran over the Orlando police station leaving the enemy dumb struck with shock.

Following this operation, the enemy summoned an emergency meeting to discuss the tightening of security in all police stations. It became clear to the enemy that Orlando was no mere co-incidence, Comrade commander Ntsizwa and his unit were prepared to take them on one by one. For this purpose, G-5 was further strengthened.

Ntsizwa led again his unit, now against the Booysen police station, despite tightened and improved security. The unit now consisted among others heroes like Gordon Dikebu (the 'Lion of Chiawelo) and Anthony Tsotsobe. The first ever MK RPG - 7 shell to be fired was at this police station, ripping open the roof of the police station, while the police who manned the station ran amok without firing a single bullet. Before Ntsizwa's transference to Pretoria he participated in a number of other sabotage operations with his unit.

In Pretoria, he led a brilliant raid with a new unit, except for Mogoerane who was his commissar. The daring raid on the Wonderboom police station once more revealed that no target can be far from our reach when we want it destroyed. Commander Ntsizwa was withdrawn following the arrest of Mogoerane when the enemy

threw a country wide net for his arrest, dead or alive.

For over a long period he struck fear in the heart of the enemy. Ntsizwa led G-5 and later other units like the G-6 and G-7. There are other smaller operations and sabotage actions he took part in. He narrowly escaped arrest with the capture of Mogoerane and Jerry Mosolodi. His picture was splashed on newspapers and television, making it difficult for him to operate. He was instructed to leave the country for a while and work with structures in forward areas.

On November 24 last year, Ntsizwa capsized in a van in a heavy fog in Swaziland. He died after weeks in a coma on December 13. He was buried on December 22. We his comrades, could not attend his funeral on Swazi soil where we are always hounded by apartheid agents on what should be a sovereign territory a bitter reminder that independent neighbouring Africa will be bullied until we rid our country of the hateful apartheid regime.

»LET NO QUARTER BE GIVEN. WE MUST CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE TO THE BITTER END. VICTORY IS OURS!

THE ENEMY WILL BE CRUSHED».



*"There are those who struggle for a day and that is good; and there are those who struggle for a year and that is better; there are those who struggle for twenty years and that is better still; and there are those who struggle all their life and they are the ones we cannot do without."* — BERTOLT BRECHT —

# DEATH OF A VIGILANTE

IMBALI students were boycotting classes demanding the release of a COSAS member detained for being in possession of a petrol bomb. A committee consisting of representatives from the Imbali Civic Association and COSAS was formed to approach the DET for negotiations on the issue.

Pending the outcome of these meetings we also launched a bus boycott. Then Inkatha came into the scene. Their's was to fight the civic association and the youth organisation under the guise of "stopping violence in the township". They organised meetings in which one notorious killer, Mandla Madlala, featured prominently. Mandla was feared and hated. It was believed he used strong muti. In the meetings he vowed to kill our people, labelling us trouble makers.

News of the threat reached us the very same evening. They began carrying out their threats by attacking the house of Vusi Duma, the president of the I.C.A. and setting alight a visitor's car. The attack was led by Mandla Madlala and councillor Abdul Qwetha, known as Inyanga. The following day some children from Inkatha parents went back to school but the comrades attacked and chased them away. During that clash we suffered no casualties except for one young girl who was watching. She was stabbed by a vigilante.

That afternoon the vigilantes went to the township's entrance where we had established a roadblock to stop the buses from entering the township. They set up their own roadblock to counter ours by preventing taxis from entering the townships. All passengers were to get off at the township's entrance. The taximen held a meeting to discuss and plan counter measures against this harassment.

Because the taximen were co-operative we joined them in fighting the vigilantes who were led by this Mandla. We then attacked them at the roadblock. Realizing that they were no match for us they took to their heels, leaving their cars behind. We stoned the cars, damaging them.

After this confrontation we prepared petrol bombs and went to attack the houses of the vigilante who stabbed the young girl during the battle at the school. We set his house and car alight, after which the vigilantes got together and decided to revenge.

That evening news that Inkatha was preparing to attack the house of our youth organisation's vice-president reached us. We then went to guard his house. The taxi-drivers assisted with transport enabling us to check the house at regular intervals.

I was in the front car, which stopped a short distance away from the vice-president's house. I ran to the house to check the situation. I heard a burst of gunfire, followed by shooting from all directions. The vigilantes were attacking us with guns and there was panic and we ran. In the process some comrades were stabbed and kombis set alight.

After that event many people got scared of vigilantes. Even the taxi drivers became reluctant to assist us. One of the taxi drivers we had been working with crossed the floor and joined the vigilantes. All for the fear of this Mandla. Mandla. Mandla in fact was feared even by his own supporters and Inkatha. When he went to fetch them for operations he would hoot outside their houses and anyone who failed to respond promptly would be accused of supporting the UDF.

Mandla Madlala was posing a

serious problem. He went to schools when there student meetings were held and would introduce himself to the principal and teachers as 'the Mandla that people talk about', and had come to break the meeting. He would be in the company of his vigilantes and they would chase all the students away. If he managed to catch a student he would beat him up thoroughly, bundle him into the boot of his car and drive him to the police. His name sparked fear throughout the township.

It was under these circumstances that we decided to eliminate this criminal. We got together and formed a unit of four. I was part of the four. We managed to organise two pistols from friends. The other two were to be armed with knives. We observed Mandla's house, which is at stage 2 Imbali.

Mandla's car had recently been involved in a car accident and was using public transport to and from work.

After observing him for two days we went to the bus stop at five but did not find him. The following morning we got up very early, reached the bus stop and waited for him. Two comrades deployed at the bus stop advanced and shot him in the shoulder. Mandla turned around and threw a parcel he had at the comrade who shot him. We then all advanced towards him. The other two comrades buried their knives in his back. Realising he was overpowered he tried to run away but was tripped and he fell. As he was trying to get on his feet we pumped four bullets in his chest. He then fell, never to get up again. Once we were sure he is dead we ran away leaving the killer Mandla cold in the street.

# MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

*(Regional Commissar, Che O'Gara looks at the role of the political and revolutionary army in our struggle and in particular its role in an armed uprising.)*

**SOUTH AFRICA** stands at a threshold of revolutionary transformation. In the words of Comrade Joe Slovo, the uninterrupted upsurge which can be dated back from August 1984 is not a passing phenomenon that the all-round economic and political crisis confronting the regime has become permanent and irreversible. Within a period of three years, our vanguard movement the ANC has made historic calls to our people to render South Africa ungovernable; and the apartheid system unworkable; and from ungovernability to people's power.

Events have confirmed the timeliness of these calls. The revolutionary upheavals in the course of this period throws light on the practical significance of these calls and make us determine more clearly and precisely the tasks of our struggle at the present stage. Among the fundamental pressing tasks facing our revolution today is the relationship between a political army and the revolutionary army.

The emergence of a political army is one of the strategic questions in the struggle for political power at one level, and the revolutionary army (an integral part of a political army) at another level — is a principal instrument of an armed uprising.

## Opening the crisis

As the movement develops, as the class consciousness of the masses grows, as the economic and political crisis becomes acute, it continuously gives rise to new and varied methods of struggle; of defence and attack. We are beginning to see the emerg-

ence of factors which make possible a major historic breakthrough.

The ruling class is daily demonstrating its inability to continue to rule in the old way, while our people are no more prepared to be ruled in the same old way. With unprecedented historic actions, the masses have rendered ungovernable most of the urban level of administration, and replaced these with embryos of popular power. The past painstaking and goal conscious years of propaganda, agitation and armed struggle carried out by the liberation alliance is bearing fruit.

The regimes brutal military reprisals have educated the masses and prepared them for higher forms of revolutionary struggles: strikes, boycotts, partial uprisings and street fighting etc. which have become a permanent feature of our situation. In area after area, the people are creating a new order based on the Freedom Charter. They have set up street and area committees, people's courts, militia type combat groups and similar bodies. Thus ungovernability released people's energies, and also their creative activity.

## The political and revolutionary Army

The significance of the current phase lies precisely in the fact that our struggle has thrown up a powerful political army, and, as it grows in strength, so are the conditions maturing for a revolutionary transformation. Experiences of the International revolutionary demonstrate that a revolution is successful only when the conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production grows white hot, when there is a wide political army of the revolution capable of resolving the conflict and clearing the road for historical necessity.

We have already stated that the

political army is a vital condition for the success of any revolution, but victory cannot be secured by the political army alone without the revolutionary army which is its integral part. In the 1847 Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels declared that the aims of revolutionaries can only be attained by the forceable overthrow of all existing social conditions. And, this can be made possible by a great variety of forms of struggle, legal and illegal, armed and unarmed and in particular the combination of all these.

## The political army

The political army unites all those that are discontent with the existing social order. It must have a clearly pronounced class character and its composition is determined by the character and motive force of the revolution. It should be noted that, its composition changes at every phase of the revolution. Failure to observe this rule, might have disastrous consequences for the revolution.

The political army can be successfully built by a vanguard armed with a revolutionary theory, a political programme and scientifically substantiated strategy and tactics. It is formed over a long period of time, demanding painstaking commitment, loyalty and revolutionary work by a vanguard genuinely committed to the interest of the masses and capable of articulating their aspirations and waging a resolute and active struggle against the oppressors. The political army engages itself in strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, rallies etc. These actions will intensify with the ability of the vanguard to treat the revolution as an art and initiating the creativity of the masses.

## **The revolutionary army**

The revolutionary army is an integral part of the political army of the revolution. It is formed and is successful only when a revolutionary crisis obtains only with the support of the entire political army of the revolution, that rises against the entire system of oppression and exploitation. Outside these conditions, without this of the entire political army, armed struggle does not have a perspective of success.

Like the political army – the revolutionary army has a pronounced class character and its composition is determined by the character and motive forces of the revolution. It is composed of the most conscious and militant from the political army who cross over to its side.

### **Composition**

The revolutionary army consists of three main component parts:–

- The first component are the armed workers, peasants, youth ready to take arms against the enemy and fight for political power.
- The second component is the advanced armed representatives of these classes, i.e. the advanced and militant representatives of the working class, the peasants and the youth – who form the nucleus of this army.
- The third component of the revolutionary army is part of the enemy armed forces that cross over to the side of the revolution.

The role of the vanguard is absolutely crucial in the creation of the revolutionary army – that it must be a vanguard Party that is armed with the most advanced revolutionary theory to be able to show the role and place of military questions in the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the reactionary regime.

One of the fundamental tasks of a vanguard is to be able to show under what conditions armed forms

of struggle could be used – to demonstrate the close dependency of these forms of struggle to the socio-political factors leading to the maturing of the struggle, – the general political tasks and of military strategy and tactics of the oppressed working masses. This vanguard must be capable of undertaking the complex and difficult tasks of building up its combat forces i.e. the study of military science, setting up of military organisation and combat units; their training and armament.

Lenin in his book 'What is to be done' emphasises the decisive role of military organisation, he says to deal with the question of an armed uprising, not only by political means – that is raising the political consciousness of the masses . . . but also by organisational and tactical means, demonstrating the need to create an organisation capable of leading the masses in decisive battles, but to decide when and how to take those arms and direct the entire movement.

### **Tasks of the revolutionary army**

The tasks of the units as defined by Lenin, is to proclaim insurrection, to give military leadership as essential in a civil war as in any other war, to create strong points for open mass struggles, to spread the uprising to neighbouring districts, to establish complete political freedom, if only at first in small part of the country and to give full scope to the revolutionary creativity of the masses; who participate, but a little in these activities in times of peace, but who come to the fore-front in revolutionary epochs.

The revolutionary army employs all forms of weapons in this war both modern and primitive. Everyone can be a member of these combat units, men and women; old and young; the crippled etc. there can be no condition set not to join the peoples army. Every citizen in a peoples war has a role to play.

## **The Political and Revolutionary Army in South Africa**

The present political upheavals have called into existence a powerful political army of the revolution, threatening the very foundation of the racist colonial system. It is a powerful army in the making, growing and maturing in the crucible fires of struggle. In the Green Book adopted by the extended meeting of the National Executive Committee and the Revolutionary Council in 1979 – the position of the movement with regard to armed struggle is emphasised as:

“The armed struggle must be based and grow out of the mass political support, and it must eventually involve all our people, all military activities must at every stage be guided and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and resistance, with the aim of progressively weakening the enemy's grip on his reign of political, social and military power, by a combination of political and military actions.”

The Green Book further continues;

“It is therefore vital to have under continuous survey the changing tactical relationship between those two interdependent factors in our struggle and the place which political and military actions (in the narrow sense) occupy in each phase, both nationally and within each of our main regions.”

It is on the basis of this perspective that the political army of the revolution is developing and maturing. It is constituted in the mass democratic organisations throughout the length and breadth of our country; in the UDF, COSATU, civic and youth organisations in areas and street committees, in people's courts etc. Alongside MK the political army is organising itself in the form of Amabatho, and paramilitary type people's militias.



## **Preliminary forms of a Revolutionary Army**

One of the fundamental advantages of MK in its formation was that it was rooted among the people with a small combat groups in the main centres and in the townships armed with rudimentary weapons. While MK enjoyed and relied on the political leadership of the revolutionary alliance of the SACP and the ANC for political guidance, at the same time the army leaned strongly to the people as its organised political base. MK has grown and developed rallying around itself all patriots and combatants who have come to grasp the urgency of the armed seizure of power. We are witnessing at this stage the emergence of preliminary forms of a revolutionary army.

As we observed that a revolutionary army emerges when a revolutionary situation obtains; it is a phenomenon whereby as MK deepens its roots amongst the masses in its actions; merging with those of the people; it at the same time transforms itself into a revolutionary army as an integral part of the political army and the principal element of an armed uprising.

## **The advanced vanguard of the Revolutionary Army**

Umkhonto we Sizwe represent the nucleus of a revolutionary army, its most advanced vanguard. It is composed of highly trained and professional combat units; sabotage groups, and other specialised combat squads operating throughout the country; in urban areas and on the countryside, in factories and industries. The most revolutionary patriots, confronting the regime's forces with arms in hands, conscious of the armed destruction of that regime for the seizure of political power, acting under the political guidance of the political army and under the centralised military command of Umkhonto we Sizwe constitute the second component of our revolutionary army.

The third component is the unit of the enemy armed forces that cross over to the side of the people for the destruction of that regime. Depending on the conditions and peculiarities in each country, the third component might be extremely difficult to organise, yet it remains a vital ingredient. Although this is not the subject of our discussion, but in countries like Nicaragua where the third component was almost non-existent, the revolutionary forces relied on its armed blows and mass actions of the political army to seize political power.

## **Building the forces**

The task of building these forces is complex and difficult, nevertheless, it stands as one of the overriding tasks facing the liberation alliance. In this regard it will be proper to highlight and emphasise the following tasks:

- The key to successfully building the political army is the ever escalating struggle inside the country and strengthening of the underground presence of the ANC to guide the conscious participation of the masses in the revolution.
- The creation of the political army demands centralised organisational leadership, from top to bottom: from national leadership regional district and area leadership etc. which concretely means politico-military committees at all levels.
- The strength of the political army lies at strengthening peoples formations at grassroot level which is the basis of the mass democratic organisations. In this respect, it means that our underground presence must be able to guide the mass democratic formations and the rudimentary organs of people's power.
- Organs of peoples power must be rooted within the masses, enjoying their support, being thoroughly democratic with the

perspective of the armed seizure of power as the fundamental question of our revolution.

Finally, we must speed up the linking of the actions of Umkhonto we Sizwe with those of the political army of the revolution to strengthen and expand the support and power base of our revolutionary army the principal element in any armed uprising.

'It is our task now to give utmost support to these efforts, to explain to the broadest masses of the proletariat and peasantry; the nationwide significance of a revolutionary army in the struggle for freedom, to assist various units of this army; to unfold the popular banner of freedom, the banner capable of attracting the masses and rallying the forces that will crush the Tsarist autocracy.'  
V.I. Lenin.

# THE ANC SACP ALLIANCE

**THE ANC was founded on the rock of unity. This has become a principle that has guided us down the years as we feel our way forward. The nature of unity and alliances that the ANC has been involved in has grown, developed and matured in the last seventy four years of bitter struggle against racial and national subjugation. It has become principled unity of all democratic forces ranged against the forces of exploitation and oppression in our country.**

Obviously international reaction and the Pretoria racist regime are enraged by the unity in action achieved by the patriotic forces of our country. They try desperately hard to break this unity and to divide the forces of liberation and set them against each other.

But above all the enemy would like to drive a wedge between the African National Congress and The South African Communist Party. It has tried various schemes to destroy the living alliance of these two organisations of our people, which is the product of our own history of struggle. For several decades the enemy has accused the ANC of being a front, pawn or surrogate of the SACP. The Freedom Charter, the revolutionary programme of the ANC, has been labelled a socialist blue print. Even the racist court during the 1956-61 Treason Trial could not agree with this enemy's assertion. Recently the Pretoria regime has published a pamphlet titled "Talking with the ANC" aimed at discrediting the fighting alliance between the ANC and SACP.

There can be nothing far from truth than these racist assertions. The correct explanation to the unique and brotherly relationship between the ANC and SACP was clearly spelt out by the late member of the NEC of the ANC General Secretary of the SACP, Moses

Mabhida when he said: *'Our party's relationship with the ANC is based on mutual trust, reciprocity, comradeship in battle and a common struggle for national liberation. Our unity of aims and methods of struggle are a rare instance of positive alignment between the forces of class struggle and national liberation.'*

The nature of this alliance was further emphasised by Comrade President O.R. Tambo during the funeral of Moses Mabhida when he said:

"Moses Mabhida knew that the durability of the alliance between the ANC, the Communist Party and the trade union movement lay in strengthening each as an independent formation and in securing their cooperation on an entirely voluntary basis. He therefore always worked to ensure that these formations respected one another and developed among them a deep-seated feeling of revolutionary unity and interdependence . . . None among us was more conscious than he that the African National Congress could only carry out its historic mission if it maintained the character it had come to assume that of a parliament of all the people of our country, the representative of our future, the negation of the divisions and conflicts that racial arrogance and capitalist greed have imposed on our people."

## NATIONAL QUESTION

The SACP is the political vanguard of the working class of South Africa which forms the majority of our oppressed and exploited masses. It champions the struggle of workers in alliance with all other oppressed classes. While it fights for the power of the working class, it bases its strategy and programme on the fact that the national question has not

been solved in South Africa. Hence national liberation is at the top in its agenda and agrees with the programme of the national liberation movement headed by the ANC. It has become an inseparable component of the national liberation movement.

On the other hand the ANC is not a class organisation championing the interests of one class. It is a representative of all the patriotic force of our country. It is a true parliament of all our people. It is recognised by all the elements of the national liberation movement including the SACP, as the leader of this alliance.

The membership of the ANC is composed of Christians, Hindus, Muslims, atheists, communists and non-communists, bound together by their resolve to sacrifice all for the liberation of South Africa. In our meetings and work we do not look at one another as communists or non-communists. Hindus or Christians, believers or non-believers. We regard ourselves as members of the great and noble family of national liberation.

Communists in the ANC follow the spirit and the letter of the policy of the ANC which is democratically evolved and formulated by the entire membership of our organisation. They do not form a conspiratorial clique to defend and promote each other or try to impose their ideas on the ANC. Those among communists who have been entrusted with high responsibilities in the ANC have achieved that not because they are communists but because of their hard work in pursuit of the aims of the ANC. This goes for all other members of our organisation. This is our experience of working with communists.

While the ANC and the SACP have been in alliance for several

decades, each of them maintains the ideological and organisational independence. This has resulted in no conflicts between the two organisations. Instead this has led to the strengthening of each other as the main two pillars of our struggle. There is absolute respect, confidence and non interference in the affairs of each.

We are not worried about the distortions of the enemy on the question of this alliance. The Botha regime wants to tell us with whom to form alliances What racist arrogance!

The majority of our people have understood and accepted our alliance with the SACP. This is evidenced by the hoisting of the flags of the ANC and the Party at mass funerals in all corners of our land. No racist arrogance will divorce these two pillars of our struggle from each other. It is an alliance that has been forged under difficult conditions of struggle. Many patriots have lost their lives to achieve this. We cannot betray them.

Comrade President O.R. Tambo fittingly described the alliance when he said:

"The relation between the ANC and SACP is based on a natural and an inevitable development. Our alliance is a living organism that has grown out of the struggle. We have built out of our separate and common experiences. It has been fertilised by the blood of the countless heroes, many of them unnamed and unsung. It has been reinforced by common determination to destroy the enemy and by our shared belief in the certainty of victory."

South African Communist's do not come from anywhere else, neither do they originate from Moscow. They come from amongst us, they are a product of our people's



President OR Tambo and Secretary General Joe Slovo symbols of the never-dying ANC-SACP alliance

struggles for freedom. The South African Communist Party too is a product of those struggles and our people's will and determination to be free.

Communists are simple, yet dedicated people of unquestionable loyalty to the ANC and the liberation of their motherland. The late President Aghostino Neto, the father of the Angolan revolution said:

"What is important is to solve the problems of the people and this is what communists stand for. They are selfless, they serve no personal interests . . . Their interests are subjected to those of the people . . . they are the servants of the working people. This is what communists stand for."

It is against this background that we must guard jealously against

the attempts of the fascist regime to sow confusion among our people about the so-called threat of communism.

The alliance between the ANC/SACP is very clear, its goal is the establishment of a national democratic, non-racial state, a popular government of the people based on the Freedom Charter. The South African Communist Party is committed to this goal as much as the ANC is. Communists have always been found with the people, leading them, in the heat of the struggle against the apartheid regime.

We must always remember that we are at this stage of our struggle, so near to victory, because of this alliance that Botha and the imperialists want so badly to destroy.

# The Palestinian Liberation Organisation

THE Palestine people face two forms of occupation. On one hand there are over half a million Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and since then they have been under military administration. On the other there are 600,000 Palestinians who have lived in Israel since 1948. These are under-privileged, racially discriminated against and oppressed by the Zionists.

The Palestinians have a rich history of resistance to Zionist occupation. In 1921 and 1924 there were great revolts against Zionist emigration to Palestine. The biggest revolt was in 1936. The Palestinian people staged a strike

which covered the whole land and lasted for six months. The years 1942 and 1948 also witnessed two other major up-risings.

## ARMED RESISTANCE

Armed resistance to the occupation of Palestine began in 1965. It was marked by a number of small-scale, hit-and-run attacks. Well-trained and well-armed by guerilla standards, the PLO fighters have proved their worth in numerous battles against Israeli soldiers. On March 21st 1968 twenty thousand Zionist soldiers attacked the village of Karameh. At the time there were only 500 PLO guerillas at the village. They offered stubborn resistance,

forcing the enemy to retreat from the village after 8 hours of fierce fighting. About 100 enemy soldiers were killed, 38 tanks and 138 cars destroyed.

Formed in 1964, the PLO is a front, bringing together many Palestinian organisations. The major ones are Al Fatah, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat; the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) under the leadership of George Habash; the DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the Arabic Front.

This PLO guerilla fighting on the Golan heights is kitted-out in vilian clothes, which include the famous shemagh head scarf. PLO troops usually wear military uniform. Armament comprises an automatic pistol, worn at the waist, and a Degtyarev RPD light machine gun. Capable of a practical rate of fire of 150 rounds per minute the RPD is fed by two 50-round ammunition belts held in a drum magazine.



# VIVA PLO

mistake because they did not know how to use the rifles they had been given.

And precisely because the insurgents did not know the elementary rules of handling weapons or of street fighting; because they were ignorant of the techniques of reconnaissance and liaison; because they did not know the strong and weak points of the militarists' army — for all these reasons, they suffered heavy losses. In this respect, the Canton insurrection showed up the inadequacies of the Communist Party in military matters, and the errors which it had committed in that field throughout the preceding period.

In July 1905, in his article 'The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government', Lenin wrote as follows on the need to study military science:

No Social-Democrat at all familiar with history, who has ever studied Englas, the great expert on this subject, has ever doubted the tremendous importance of military knowledge, of military technique, and of military organization as an instrument which the masses of the people, and classes of the people, use in resolving great historical conflicts. Social-Democracy never stooped to playing at military conspiracies; it never gave prominence to military questions until the actual conditions of civil war had arisen. But now all Social-Democrats have advanced the military questions, if not to the first place, at least to one of the first places, and they are putting great stress on studying these questions and bringing them to the knowledge of the masses. The revolutionary army must apply the military knowledge and the military means on the practical plane for the determination of the further destiny of the Russian people, for the determination of the most vital pressing question of freedom.

The previous Central Committee meeting of the Chinese Communist

Party (i.e. the one preceding the August conference) had followed an extremely opportunistic line with respect to arming the masses and creating a powerful proletarian armed force, and with respect to work in the national army:

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party never thought seriously about arming the workers and peasants or about the need for any such action; nor in general did it consider how peasant units or truly revolutionary military cadres might be formed. Its military commission displayed a total lack of activity in this respect. Nothing was done about military training for all Party members, which should have been the Party's first duty. No attempt was made to unite the various isolated worker or peasant detachments systematically into an organized force capable of defending the revolution effectively as it developed.

Almost no measures were taken to procure arms (even where they were actually available), or to distribute them to the workers and peasants.

The Central Committee judged the problem of arming the workers and peasants to be a non-existent one and even considered it as a threat to its political accommodation with the Kuomintang high command. And then all of a sudden, after this long period of inaction, it did manifest a certain activity — but in the opposite direction, by proposing to the Wuhan pickets 'in order to avoid conflicts and provocations' that they should voluntarily surrender their arms. How is it possible to characterize such an attitude of the Central Committee, in the face of vital requirements of the revolution, as anything other than open liquidationism?

#### ARM YOURSELVES AT ONCE

These errors of the old Party leadership — errors which to a certain extent had fatal consequences at the

critical hour of the 1927 revolution — are at present being corrected.

One difficult problem to resolve when preparing for insurrection is that of arms. It has great political importance. Under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (in 'peacetime'), the proletariat is ordinarily deprived of any possibility of arming itself. And yet, despite the difficulties, this problem is not insoluble. In any political situation in which the seizure of power presents itself as a practical question (i.e. in the event of a rapid growth of revolutionary tendencies among the workers, significant waverings on the part of the petty bourgeoisie and a weakening of the bourgeois machinery of government), the proletariat, given proper leadership from the Party, will be able to obtain arms. It will be able to do so by buying them; by disarming the fascist leagues; by capturing arms depots; or by manufacturing them (at least primitive ones). It will then be in a position to arm the combat organization sufficiently to more or less guarantee, when the insurrection breaks out, the success of such actions as may be undertaken to procure further arms.

When working out the plan of insurrection, the leadership must pay serious attention to this question of capturing weapons, and of arming such combat squads as have no arms and such revolutionary workers as are willing to fight.

In 1905, in his article 'Tasks of Revolutionary Army Contingents', Lenin wrote:

"The contingents . . . must arm themselves as best they can (rifles, revolvers, bombs, knives, knuckledusters, sticks, rags soaked in kerosene for starting fires, ropes or rope ladders, shovels for building barricades, pyroxylin cartridges, barbed-wire, nails against cavalry, etc., etc). Under no circumstances should they wait for help from other sources,

more experienced machine-gunners among the Germans communicated with one another by means of their weapons. a short playful burst indicating that everything was in order. while longer bursts meant an attack. They were firing short burst now.

Occasionally a rocket would burst. While it threw a brilliant, unsteady light over the area, we lay motionless, our faces pressed into the snow; then, when the rocket had burned out we moved forward, taking advantage of the temporary blindness its glare would cause enemy observers, I could see from this that my companions were 'old sweats' well aware of these brief moments of relative safety and able to utilise them.

A further proof of their experience was provided by the fact that during burst of machine gun fire, they would scabble through the snow at full speed, disregarding the noise they made. Less experienced soldiers would have pressed themselves to the ground, but these men knew that when a machine gunner is firing he can hear nothing but the sound of his weapon. They also knew that however terrifying the whistle of machine gun bullets may be, the sound meant that the bullets had gone past; you never hear the sound of the bullet that is going to hit you.

Ahead of us a grey strip cut across the snow; the barbed wire fence. Only about fifty metres separated us from the enemy trench. The sappers crawled ahead, feeling with their bare hands for wire triggers of mines. One sapper lied on his back to hold up the barbed wire while another was cutting through it with silent wire cutters. The sappers worked slowly for if the wires made a sound we should inevitably be discovered, it was not hard to imagine what would happen, we were only about forty metres from a machine gun. We held our weapons in readiness.

"Its already". A sapper raised his

hand in farewell and I looked at my watch: it was past 1 a.m. — it was time for me to move. I burrowed myself carefully, trying not to catch myself on the barbs, as I slipped under the wire. It was not easy to will myself to crawl through the gap and approach enemy trenches, where I had to enter the trench somewhere between two sentries.

Cautiously, I raised myself on my hands and looked to left and right: was there any sign of a grenade in my teeth. The trench was curved and deserted as far as the eye could see — a sector of about ten metres. I did not waste time and jumped across the trench, trying to remain close to the ground, and crawled into the dark bushes beyond.

The second trench was easier to cross. There were fewer sentries and they carried out their work less vigilantly. I could hear nearby a dugout German soldiers talking quietly among themselves. I crawled to one side, continuing to move forward. In front I could see the dark outline of a village. I stopped for I had to decide what to do next: to by-pass the village through the snow drift would be difficult and would take up a lot of time, but to walk into the village without knowing who was living in the houses would be dangerous. What should I do?

However as I approached the village I noticed that lights were burning in some of the houses. This meant that there were Germans in the village because local inhabitants would never sit up to early hours of the morning. I would have to go around the village.

Crossing the snow-covered fields was not easy, and by the time I had by-passed the village and came to the road I was perspiring. I realised that I was making slow progress and would not reach the village before dawn on foot.

An idea soon came to me. Taking off my white camouflage dress, I buried it by a recognisable tree —

I could see it again when returning. Then I returned to the road and began looking for an approaching sledge. I did not have long to wait before one came. We reached the outskirts of Vitebsk as dawn broke. The country road on which we have been travelling had turned into a suburban street and a stripped pole blocked the way: it was evidently a check point.

I commanded the peasant to stop, and getting off the sledge I waved him to continue. I left the road and entered the town along quiet snow covered lanes. The further I entered into the town, the larger the houses became; many had been burnt out or destroyed by bombings. Somewhere in one of these houses, people were waiting impatiently for me. They knew that I was coming because they have been informed by radio, and I had to find them.

I crossed the tenth street and seeing a sign I realised that I had evidently miscounted several streets when I entered town. This was not important, the main thing was to find the right street and then the right house which was No.-27. The entrance to the house was clean and well lit; flat No. 8 was on the ground floor. I placed my hand on the pistol in pocket: one must always be on guard in our work. Our scouts might have been discovered and there might be Germans lying in ambush behind the doors of flat No.8, arresting everyone who came there.

I knocked quietly in order not to awaken the neighbours. After a moment a soft female voice asked: "Who is there?"

Trying to give my voice a peculiar German ring, I gave the pass word: "I come from Hauptman Becker with urgent work for you." The door opened and the woman gave the answer: "In war time all work is urgent."

I entered and, after locking the door, the woman shook my hand.

She smiled and invited me into the living room.

"Nikolai, it's him," she said in a whisper.

Nikolai Markovich gave me a cheerful look and said: "You got here quickly, I thought you would come tomorrow."

Nikolai's wife came with breakfast, and as I ate I could feel warmth returning to my frozen body. I relaxed and for the first time since leaving Headquarters I began to feel tired.

"Well it's time for me to go to work," Nikolai said, getting to his feet. "Have a good sleep and get your strength back — you must go back this evening."

It had scarcely begun to get dark when I started to get ready for my journey. Nadedza sewed the micro-film of the plans into the collar of my jacket. The originals lay in a safe somewhere, locked up and under guard, and no one in the German Command suspected that copies of their plans were on their way to Soviet Army Headquarters.

It had taken me about seven hours to get to Nikolai's flat, which meant that I could reach our side by two o'clock in the morning. But I must not hurry. I had to cross the frontline at about 3.00 a.m. when the sentries would be tired and cold and there would be no other soldiers hanging about.

The barbed wire would present a problem, because there would be no sappers to help me and no silent wire cutters. It would of course be impossible to find the gap through which I had passed. I could either have to burrow under the wire or climb over it: my clothes would be torn and the barbs would catch in my flesh, but the main thing was to get past the wire.

As I was leaving we drank 'to success'. That drink was to play an important role. The streets were almost deserted, and the occasional passers-by, scared by my uniform, were invariably most courteous in

giving way. I walked unhurriedly, the pistol in my pocket cocked and ready for instant action. Nikolai and his wife followed a little way behind me, as if out for a stroll.

In this way we reached a busy section of town. This was evidently the main street and, as in every town, people had come out in the evening for a walk. Officers strolled along the pavement. I waited until the intersection was almost free of officers, then stepped off the pavement on to the roadway: a few more steps and I would be in the concealing darkness of a side street. But at that moment a patrol stopped me.

There were two of them, each with a white arm-band emblazoned with a black swastika. They began to question me about something and I could feel myself turning hot and cold. Fearing to give myself away by my accent I silently produced my papers, assuming that this was what they wanted.

One of the soldiers examined each and every page of my service card, then asked me a long question. I could catch occasional words, from which I could understand he was asking me why I was in Vitebsk when 'my' regiment was at the front.

"Do you have leave papers?" he asked.

It was a natural enough question, for how did I come to be lounging around in the rear when 'my' regiment was in action? But I had no other papers — how could our people there have failed to realise that I would need some kind of authorisation documents?

I said nothing. At that moment I doubt if I could have spoken Russian without stammering, let alone German — with my accent. I remained silent. The soldiers' questions became more insistent.

It seemed that it was the end and I glanced furtively around the crowd, looking for the highest ranking officer. I still had my pistol, and if I had to die I would do my best to take the most valuable person there

with me. Suddenly the soldier laughed. He bent towards me, sniffed and said in amusement:

"He is drunk as a lord!"

No one wastes words with drunkards, I was unceremoniously turned in the right direction, ordered, 'komm' and led towards the commandant's office. We were passing a heavily bombed two storey house. The window frames were gone and inside it was dark: I could not expect a better opportunity. I seized my pistol, fired point blank range at the patrol and jumped on to the window sill and then into a building. Behind me I could hear desperate shouts and someone firing hastily at me. I ran to a window on the other side of the court yard.

Instead of jumping through the window as those behind would expect, I stopped around a corner, and soon as someone burst into the room, fired directly into his face. Another soldier rushing after him, tried to stop but, driven forward by his own speed, stumbled, arms widely swinging, continuing to run straight into me. I fired at him, then directed several shots into the darkness before jumping into the courtyard and running towards the fence.

I knew that my pursuers would be lying low, cautiously investigating the approach to the turn around which I had fired, unaware that I was no longer there. This was one of the methods we used to shake those close on our tracks. I leaped over a fence and ran through a garden, crossed a road after making sure that it was empty and entered another courtyard.

Although I was out of breath, I moved off, continuing my hurdle race. The sound of pursuit had died away and that meant the Germans had lost my trail. I moved with caution because I knew that by now every point in and around town would have been alerted to catch me. The Germans would have discovered that the Paul Schutter described in the service card I had

left with the patrol did not exist and that I was a Soviet scout.

I approached a fork in the road, one bend led towards the dark forest and was obviously more frequently used than the other, which turned towards the north. I decided to walk towards the forest, where, I thought it would be easier to remain out of sight. But as I approached it I realised my mistake — the forest was full of sounds: tanks were being warmed up, soldiers were shouting to each other and branches were crackling and I could see barrels of guns.

I turned back to the fork and took the other bend. There were no large forests in this area and finding my way with a compass presented no problem. At last the first rocket burst appeared on the sky, still far off, but indicating that I had reached the trench network. The density of troops stationed in this zone was higher and the danger proportionally greater.

It was plainly impossible to move across the snow in my green German great coat: at night it would appear black to an observer and I would be visible at a kilometre distance. What should I do? Suddenly I had a brain-wave, I went into some bushes and stripped naked, the cold stinging me for a moment like red hot iron. Quickly, I put on my jacket and trousers and then my underwear over them. The great coat I had to abandon. I knotted the corners of my handkerchief to make a cap.

I continued to advance in short dashes, running from one place of concealment to another. I covered about two kilometres without any hinderance. In front of me, about fifty metres away I could see some ruins, and I planned to make my next stop there. But as I came closer I realised that I had been mistaken: what I had seen were not ruins, but a munition dump, covered with a tarpaulin.

Before I could decide what to do I saw the dark figure of a sentry walking directly towards where I was

lying. I grasped my knife: I would have to finish him off silently if I could. The sentry was hopping on the spot closer.

He was evidently frozen to the marrow, his chest, his forage cap pulled down over his ears and his feet in enormous straw boots, like two baskets. Two paces away from me he turned towards the dump, lifted the tarpaulin and crawled under it to get warm. I took the opportunity to get away. That is how I advanced, alternately dripping with sweat from the effort when I was crawling over the snow, and freezing when I was obliged to lie motionless for long periods by the sudden appearance of Germans.

At last only a single trench and a barbed wire fence remained between me and no-man's land. By then I was so cold and exhausted that I could barely move, and I thought of only one thing — getting through the wire. But there was still a trench to cross, and that trench was patrolled by a nazi soldier, also frozen to the bone. I could hear him loudly stamping his feet.

I reached the edge of the trench. Had I wished I could have reached out and touched the sentries helmet. The next move was to finish him off noiselessly with my knife and get to no-man's land. But by now I was so exhausted that he could easily fight off my attack, while if I shot him the noise would bring other sentries running. The only way out was to gather all my strength and hit the sentry on the head with my pistol as he passed me.

I got my range and then, when he drew level with me, struck him on the head with all my strength. The pistol glanced off his steel helmet and he cried out loudly in fear, and took to his heels. I fired at him but it was too late. His cries had been heard and the trench was already reverberating with the sound of heavy boots. I jumped up, leaped across the trench and began running

towards the barbed wire fence: I grabbed a support pole and climbed it up, using the strands of wire as rungs.

Behind me I could hear shouts and the sound of firing. I reached the top of the pole and jumped across to the second line of wire, tearing my clothes and flesh as I forced my way through it. Suddenly, I felt a heavy blow on my head and lost consciousness.

I have no idea how long I lay unconscious. When I came to, lights flashed before my eyes and I felt an acute pain somewhere in my body. Some where nearby the nazis were talking among themselves. I could hear someone digging behind me. Slowly I came to realise what was going on.

Evidently I laid unconscious for only a short time. The Germans thought I had been killed, but they were on the other side of the wire. They were digging under the wire in order to drag me back. They would not take me alive — I could expect only torture. While I was thinking, the Germans had dug through to my feet, and I could feel them trying to pull me through. I was lying across the wire, so that when they tugged my feet my clothes caught on the barbs. Next they poked a spade with a long handle through and pushed my back with it in an effort to free me from the barbs.

It was now or never. I jumped to my feet and dashed towards our trenches. For a moment the Germans were thrown into confusion, and I was able to cover about forty metres before they opened up on me with rapid and intensive fire. Bullets were whistling from all directions. Dropping to the ground and throwing myself from side to side, I continued to run. I reached some bushes and abruptly changed course.

The Germans continued to fire in the direction I had originally taken. I crawled some distance along the front before turning again towards



our trenches. In the middle of no-man's land there was a frozen stream and as I was crossing it my strength left me; overcome by exhaustion and loss of blood, I lost consciousness for the second time.

I came to as I heard the soft crunching of someone moving around on the snow nearby. I tried to pull out my pistol, but I had become too weak even to do this. Someone turned me over on my back and examined me then said in Russian: "Well, pick him up lads." I was carried to the regimental commander's dug-out where, as soon as my head was bandaged, I tore the collar off my jacket and asked that the micro-film be taken to headquarters immediately.

Now I was sitting in warm dug-out, unable to get my fill of gazing at the friendly faces of my fellow countrymen. It seemed an eternity since I had last seen them. Yet as I glanced at my watch, and saw that it was about three o'clock in the morning, I realised that only twenty-four hours had passed since I had set out on my mission.

from page 4

**Intelligence information is very valuable for planning operations to divert enemy attention, or releasing deceptive information to the enemy, or conduction deceptive action to dis-attract its attention or divert it from our potential target.**

The actual planning of a combat operation must also receive high priority. A thorough planning is very decisive for the success of our combat mission. Our planning will automatically be based on the strategic goals of our combat mission while our intelligence and reconnoisance information will greatly influence the tactical execution of our combat mission.

**Our planning must as a rule comprise the following:**

- the strategic and tactical goals of our combat missions;
- our main target to be attacked;
- other secondary targets to be destroyed;
- proper designation of the roles of our combat groups/units;
- a route of retreating.

#### **Conditions for the offensive**

Lastly, before we launch our offensive, we must fulfill these conditions then we can be sure of the successful accomplishment of our combat mission:


- the choice of time;
- careful planning;
- adequate preparation;
- a high combat spirit of our units.
- \* The timing of our operation must take into account the enemy habits, its deployment, when the enemy is less vigilant or when our target is poorly guarded etc.
- \* We dealt with planning which we said must designate the main concentration of our fire power or the main target to be destroyed. The planning must also highlight other secondary targets to be neutralised, e.g. sabotage of automatic fire alarm systems or fire extinguishers, alarms or

silencing guards.

We also highlighted that during planning, the role of each subordinate support unit must be clearly defined. There must be a clearly defined route of retreat and a pass word where necessary.

\* Preparation for a combat mission must take into account all necessary equipment, arms and ammunition needed for the combat mission. The adequate preparation of the soldiers for the mission and where possible facsimiles of the target can be made to rehearse the combat operation.

\* A high combat spirit and enthusiasm reflective of the soldiers determination and confidence in the success of his mission must be achieved. Combat readiness born out of adequate military preparation, physical fitness and high political motivation must be the source of the soldiers strength. In the spirit of no surrender and self sacrifice he will uphold the glorious traditions of our army.



**ACROSS**

1. Procession of persons riding on horses
6. Informer
8. Noncommissioned officer
9. A - of a city shows streets and parks
11. Attack
13. The whole of
14. The largest province of South Africa
16. Thank you
17. Related by blood
18. —XH is a South African helicopter
20. Not sane
22. Plan or plot (e.g. mischief)
25. Submarine mine
26. Umkhonto we Sizwe

**DOWN**

1. Places for soldiers to live in a fortified town
2. Things to be done
3. Rank above lieutenant-colonel
4. Layer of skin beneath the epidermis
5. Angola's army
7. African Communist
10. Lead to the — means marry
12. Intercontinental ballistic missile
15. Chaplain in the army
19. Pan African Women's Organisation
21. Archbishop
23. Editor
24. Soviet assault rifle

DAWN Jlitixword No. 5 - Answers

ACROSS: 1. UMSEBENZI 2. CANNON 6. CANNON 9. L.A.S. 10. DOSE 11. ELASTIC  
13. BE 14. YE 15. GOD 19. SOYUZ 20. COP 23. ORDINANCE 17. RE

DOWN: 1. UNCLE 2. SUNDAY 3. BOOST 4. ZULU 5. ABDELAZIZ 7. NOSE  
8. NEIGHS 12. CO 16. DOYLE 18. RPD 21. OR 22. MA

See Answers in DAWN Vol. 11 No. 1

VOLUME 10 NUMBER 6 1986

# **DISCIPLINE IS THE MOTHER OF VICTORY**

## **LISTEN TO RADIO FREEDOM**

VOICE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND  
UMKHONTO WE SIZWE; THE PEOPLE'S ARMY

### **RADIO LUSAKA**

Shortwave 31mb, 9605KHz

7.00 p.m. Daily

10.15-10.45 p.m. Thursday

9.30-10.00 p.m. Wednesday

10.15-10.45 p.m. Friday

8.00-8.45 a.m. Sunday

Shortwave 25mb, 11880KHz

### **RADIO WANDA**

Mediumwave 60mb, 4820MGz

Shortwave 25mb, 11955KHz

7.30 p.m. Monday-Saturday

8.30 p.m. Sunday

### **RADIO MADGASCAR**

Shortwave 49mb, 6136KHz

7.00-9.00 p.m. Monday-Saturday

7.00-8.00 p.m. Sunday

### **RADIO ETHIOPIA**

Shortwave 31mb, 9595KHz

9.30 p.m. Daily

RADIO TANZANIA 31mb, 9750KHz

8.15 p.m. Monday, Wednesday, Friday


6.15 a.m. Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday

***Attack! give the enemy  
no quarter***

***Advance to people's power!***

# ACT NOW!

## STOP THE RACIST MURDER OF COMRADES



1. Mojalefa Reginald Sefatsa (30)
2. Reid Malebo Mokoena (22)
3. Oupa Moses Diniso (30)
4. Theresa Ramashamola (24)
5. Duma Joshua Khumalo (26)
6. Francis Don Mokhesi (29)
7. Solomon Mankopane Maowasha (20)
8. Alex Matshapa Matsepane (23)
9. Patrick Manginda (23)
10. Desmond Majola (27)
11. Dickson Madikane (26)
12. Josiah Tsawane (29)
13. Daniel Maleke (19)
14. Elile Webushe
15. Moses Mnyanda Jantjes (21)
16. Umlamli Wellington Mielies (22)
17. Paul Tefo Setlaba (22).
18. Mziwoxolo Christopher Makaleni (22)
19. Makheswana Menze (43)
20. Ndumiso Silo Siphenuka (26)
21. Similo Lennox Wonci (22)



ADVANCE TO PEOPLE'S POWER!

# 75 YEARS OF STRUGGLE