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SOUTH AFRICAN IMPERIALISM

VORSTER'S DRIVE TO THE NORTH

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THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST

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Imperialism, Israel and the Arabs

IN THE EARLY MORNING of June 5th, the government of Israel, instigated and armed by imperialism, launched an aggressive blitzkrieg against the United Arab Republic and other border countries. All reports, including those from Western sources, agree that the Israelis began the fighting. Their own first communiqué said that Egyptian forces were moving 'towards the Negev desert' and that their forces 'went into action to check them'. The whole operation, including the synchronised bombing of Arab airfields and advance into Arab territories, had obviously been planned well ahead.

A decade ago, Britain, France and Israel jointly launched a military attack on Egypt, following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The aims were obvious: to recapture the Canal for the millionaire investors in the West; to overthrow the anti-imperialist Nasser government; to enlarge Israel's territory as the jackal's share in the spoils. This criminal conspiracy was vigorously denied at the time; only now are all the facts being revealed in the memoirs and confessions of the conspirators themselves. Today, once again the detailed picture of immediate events is obscured by the thick screen of propaganda disseminated by the vast imperialist press and newsagency monopolies which dominate not only the West but a large part of Africa as well. A deluge of propaganda presented Israel as adopting a purely defensive posture against the threat of the numerically stronger Arab world. But this picture is given the lie, not only by the blatant fact of Israeli aggression, but also by the obvious aims of imperialism and its ally in the Arab world, by the background and events which led up to the renewal of fighting.

As in 1956, it was the challenge of the Arab liberation movement to the vested interests of the imperialists which aroused their anger and desire for vengeance—in this case the militant actions of the progressive government of Syria to restore the oil treasures of the area to the people. The aims of imperialism were again evident—to preserve the interests of the American, British and French oil millionaires; to overthrow progressive governments, particularly those of Syria and the U.A.R.; to secure the territorial aggrandisement of Israel and the return to colonialism—or ruthless expropriation—of Arab populations.

These were the underlying aims which led to the criminal act of aggression at the beginning of June. No doubt by striking thus the Israelis gained a military advantage. They disabled the Arab air forces and were able to overrun a good deal of territory—with appalling consequences for the inhabitants who were subjected to terror raids employing napalm, and driven from their homes along lines which parallel the American techniques learnt by Dayan on his visit to Vietnam. But these 'advantages' must be weighed against the universal condemnation of a flagrant breach of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, by virtue of whose authority Israel owes its very existence.

The first duty of Africans in every part of our continent must be to add their voices of protest and condemnation to those of the rest of the 'three continents', the socialist world and the revolutionary working-class movement of West Europe and North America. We do so not only because of our deep feelings of solidarity with our brothers of the Arab countries, and our fellow-Africans of Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Algeria and Tunis who are directly involved. We cannot overlook the fact that —knowing that their action might precipitate a conflict of the major powers—the government of Israel recklessly ignited the fuse to an explosion which might have well unleashed an international nuclear holocaust.

Swift Soviet initiative at the U.N. Security Council—taken, no doubt with the agreement and co-operation of the U.A.R. and other victims of aggression—succeeded in imposing a cease-fire. The European socialist countries, in a joint top-level declaration, joined in expressing their 'full and complete solidarity' with the Arab peoples in their just struggle, and undertaking to render them aid 'in the cause of repelling aggression and defending their national independence and territorial integrity'. They have followed this up with the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Israel, following the continuation of aggression after the U.N. ceasefire order.

Such determined evidence of resistance, coupled with the still unbroken unity of the Arab countries, have helped to curb the aggressive imperialist drive in the North of our continent. But the situation remains unstable, unresolved and extremely dangerous to peace and the cause of Africa.

So long as the Israeli ruling circles, who have aligned themselves completely with imperialism, remain in possession of Arab territories they have seized by aggression, so long as they refuse to permit the Palestinian Arabs, unjustly expelled from their motherland, to return, and so long as they maintain their violent resistance to the cause of Arab liberation, no lasting settlement is possible up North.

The latest events have evidenced certain unfortunate weaknesses within the Arab countries. The deeply moving demonstrations of the Egyptian workers and peasants, which irresistably brought about the return to office of President Nasser after his resignation, was a decisive and unprecedented intervention of the people, a rebuff and a warning to reactionary elements in the country. But there can be little doubt that feudalism and reaction will still have to be fought hard and decisively, under the leadership of a dedicated and convinced socialist vanguard. Only history will tell to what extent treason and lack of patriotic and socialist conviction played their part in the early reverses on the battlefield. But the arrest of hundreds of leading members of the officer corps may well indicate an influential element in the U.A.R. which is more interested in the defeat of the progressive socialist policies of the Nasser leadership than in the patriotic cause of the motherland.

We must draw attention, too, to the serious weaknesses of policy which allowed certain elements in the Arab front to becloud the just cause of the Arab peoples by wild declamations regarding the 'destruction' of Israel and 'driving them [the Israelis] into the sea'. Whatever the provocation, we in South Africa know all too well the dangers of confounding hatred of oppressors with racialism. Such ill-advised and unprincipled statements merely strengthened the propaganda of the Israel ruling circles, and made far more difficult the task of such genuinely anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist elements as the Israeli Communist M.P.s, Comrades Vilner and Toubi, whose heroism in standing out against the aggression, in the face of unbridled chauvinism and war-hysteria, was beyond all praise.

These weaknesses must and no doubt will be corrected. But first and foremost, for any sort of peaceful and lasting settlement to be reached in the Arab lands, imperialism must be repelled. The Israeli forces must be compelled to go back to the frontiers beyond which they have encroached. The Arab refugees must be readmitted to their homeland. The imperialists must stop their intervention and aggression, aimed at recolonising the Arab lands.

Only along these lines can there be a future for the State of Israel, which cannot coexist with the Arab countries without abandoning its alignment with imperialism, the bitterest foe of the Middle East peoples, of peace and freedom throughout the world.

The Nigerian Tragedy

To a very large extent the troubles of Nigeria, now exploded into armed conflict between the troops of the military government and those of the breakaway Eastern state renamed Biafra, are the legacy of colonialism. For a long time the British imperialists cultivated inter-regional and inter-tribal animosities in this country as in very many other colonies, with the aim of pursuing the classical policy 'Divide and rule'. They also favoured all kinds of privileged elements—tribal and feudal overlords and capitalists—confident that they would prove agencies of indirect government and control, and that they would join with colonialism in resisting what it fears most: the growth of radical mass movements, imbued with the scientific socialist and communist ideology.

The constitution for independent Nigeria, imposed by Britain as the price for withdrawal of direct colonial rule, was specifically designed to perpetuate all the features which had been cultivated as a result of these policies, and therefore to leave Nigeria, though the most populous African state, with a weak, pro-imperialist government, well-entrenched privileged classes, and profoundly divided internally. When, after years of corruption, capitalist policies and misrule, the government established under this constitution collapsed in the face of an army coup, the people of Nigeria rejoiced, believing that nothing could be worse than the sort of regime under which they had been suffering. But, in truth, the army takeover solved nothing; having overthrown the old order the army men had nothing positive to put in its place. To command an army is not the same thing as to lead a nation. One coup followed another, with rival groups of military men at their head. At no time were the masses of the people democratically consulted about the future of the country and drawn into the tasks of administration and national regeneration. Tribal and regional hostilities were not eliminated and merged into a greater patriotism. Political parties were outlawed, not only the discredited bourgeois groupings, whose corruption and lack of patriotism had led to the collapse of bourgeois parliamentarism, but also such a party as the Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party, whose unquestioned devotion to the interests of the common people held the key to a united, progressive and free Nigeria.

No African patriot can be in favour of the continuation of the divisive concepts of the imperialists, who would like to see our continent still further fragmented into mutually hostile states, none economically viable, all dependent on outside assistance, a fertile field for the intrigues and rivalries of the anti-African impérialist powers, among whom must now be included the Republic of South Africa, as Nkosi demonstrates in his article in the present issue of our journal. We are for African unity and for Nigerian unity.

At the same time, unity must be based upon consent, not force. It must be built on the foundations of equality, self-determination and democracy. Whatever the immediate outcome of the present conflict—in which oil and British interests therein plays a far greater part than either side is prepared to admit—one thing is sure: no genuine solution, unitary or secessionist, can be achieved by mutual slaughter of Africans by Africans. In the long run the unity of Nigeria, as of Africa as a whole, can only be found in common resistance to the main enemy—imperialism. And in the leadership as an independent force of the organised masses of peasants and workers, overriding the vested interests of the tribal, feudal, capitalist and military castes.

Again the Congo

President Mobutu declares that he is faced by an insurrection spearheaded by the Belgian, South African and other white mercenaries who have been the curse of the Congo (Kinshasa) ever since the first attempt to split off Katanga. No doubt the supporters of the traitor Tshombe (at the time of writing, a prisoner in Algiers, following the daring diversion of his private charter plane) are hoping to make a comeback. And clearly there is a serious threat to the Kinshasa government, spearheaded by the mercenaries who not long ago were given their long-overdue notice to quit the country, and backed by powerful Belgian and other imperialist interests behind the scenes.

But who does Mobutu speak for, and on which forces is he relying to maintain his government in power? The image he is striving to build up, as a revolutionary African patriot, defending Congo independence against foreign imperialism, is sadly tarnished by the news that the U.S. government is supplying him with aircraft and that he has requested—and been given—military assistance from the counter-revolutionary regime in Ghana.

What about his apparently militant action in 'nationalising' the great Belgian mining monopolies, whose underhand manoeuvres have for so long been the bane of Congo independence? The carefully documented survey by J. Jabulani, in this issue, must cause one to have second thoughts about this, too.

Such factors cannot but strengthen suspicions that this is no straight issue as between African independence and foreign intervention. Behind the 'patriotic' stance of Mobutu, we sense the phoney accents of the C.I.A., donning yet another mask.

Of course, everyone in Africa will be delighted to see, at last, the departure of the savage mercenaries from the heartland of Africa, together with their Belgian and other foreign backers. We agree, it is high time Tshombe was punished for his innumerable crimes. We shall be even more pleased when we see an end to U.S. and other intriguers using our African territory of the Congo for their rivalries and dirty deals, and the country and its wealth restored to the rightful owners: the Congolese peasants and workers.

A Worthy Laureate

All fighters for the freedom of South Africa will rejoice at the award of the International Lenin Prize (reported elsewhere in this issue) to that great son of our country, Abram Fischer. There could be no more worthy recipient of this honour. We consider the award as a tribute to the Congress alliance and the South African Communist Party, with both of which Bram Fischer was so closely connected, and to the South African people as a whole.

It is saddening to note that this great South African is reported, according to a recent account by Paul Trewhela, himself recently released from a prison sentence for committing 'Communism', to be treated most abominably by prison staff during his serving of a life sentence, and subjected to various crude indignities including being forced to clean out a lavatory with his bare hands.

Efforts must be redoubled to speed the release of Fischer, Mandela, Sisulu and all other South African political prisoners—this is an urgent task before the conscience of the whole world.

THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

B. KADES

I. Introduction

FOR MANY CENTURIES the colonial and dependent nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America have been mercilessly exploited by the imperialist powers. Now they are fighting to gain their independence, promote industrialisation and improve their economic and social conditions. The present article is concerned with only one aspect of this momentous historical process. It does not set out to show how growth was distorted by imperialism in the past, nor does it try to explain how the new imperialists, led by the United States of America, are today attempting to forge new (if less obvious) chains with which to subjugate the emerging nations. The legacy of backwardness and deliberate impoverishment exists and the big question is how to overcome it. The answer is obviously complicated and many-sided, but there is one fundamental economic problem which every developing country will have to solve if it is to achieve a high and sustained rate of economic growth—the problem of creating a surplus, raising the rate of investment and increasing the stock of capital goods.

A low level of investment is not the only barrier to economic development, and an expanded supply of capital goods must be supplemented by good managers, skilled workers, technical progress and adequate natural resources. Planning of the economy is also essential in order to make the best use of the available resources of labour and capital. But even with these reservations, it is right to place the problems of investment and the surplus at the heart of our analysis of the requirements for economic progress, and the article is devoted to certain crucial aspects of this problem.

II. The Accumulation of Capital

When Marx wished to explain the laws of motion of capitalism, he developed the concept of the accumulation of capital.[1] He analysed the process by which an initial fund, or sum of money, is converted into capital: part in the form of variable capital (v) or payment for labour power, and part in the form of constant capital (c) which represents the value of the means of production (raw materials, machinery,[2] etc.) used up in the process of production. The value of the commodities thus produced is greater than that of their component parts (c+v) and includes the surplus value (s). The owner thus gets back the capital originally advanced plus the surplus. When the commodities are sold this value is realised in a sum of money greater than that with which he started, this increased sum of money is again converted into capital, still more surplus value is produced, and so on over and over again. The more the capitalists accumulate, the greater the surplus value they can appropriate from the workers; and the more surplus value they appropriate, the greater the accumulation of capital. It is this process which Marx identified as the driving force of capitalism.

He further emphasised the tendency for the organic composition of capital (the ratio of constant to total capital, $\frac{c}{c+v}$) to increase, and showed that the expansion in that part of the constant capital which consisted of machinery, buildings, means of transport, etc. was the basis for the increasing productivity of labour.[3] It is this increased productivity of labour which in turn cheapens commodities and so: '. . . by shortening that portion of the working day in which the labourer works for himself, lengthens the other portion that he gives,

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[1] *Capital*, Vol. I, Chapters XXIII to XXV.

[2] Strictly speaking, the capital advanced in the form of machinery, etc. (what Marx called fixed capital or 'instruments of production') is not just the fraction used up—by depreciation or wear and tear—in the course of production in, say, a year but the whole cost of the machine. It is the depreciation which enters into the value of the commodities produced, but it is the machinery as such which is important in raising the productivity of labour. This is a complication which Marx side-stepped in Volume I, but dealt with fully in Volumes II and III. '. . . the surplus value is an increment, not only of that portion of the advanced capital which is assimilated by the process of production, but also of that portion which is not assimilated'. Vol. III (Kerr edition, Chicago, 1909), p. 47.

[3] Vol. I (Modern Library Edition), p. 682.

without an equivalent, to the capitalist. In short, it is a means for producing surplus value'.[4]

Here then we have the core of the process of economic growth under capitalism: an initial accumulation of capital is laid out in the form of labour-power, raw materials and machinery, and surplus value is generated. The surplus value plus the initial capital are again laid out and the increased machinery raises the productivity of the labour so that a still larger surplus value is created. In this way, the expansion continues until, under the capitalist mode of production, the internal contradictions produce a crisis which temporarily interrupts the process.

PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION

But if capital makes surplus value and surplus value makes more capital, it is clear that some initial accumulation of capital is necessary before the process can get under way. This Marx referred to as primitive accumulation 'preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalist mode of production, but its starting point'.[5] The last eight chapters of Volume I are devoted to an illuminating account of this process of primitive accumulation: robbery of colonies, expropriation of the peasant producers, plunder of the small-scale artisan, and so on. In Marx's biting phrase: capital comes into the world 'dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt'.[6]

Marx's profound analysis was, of course, designed to lay bare the laws governing the working of capitalism, a specific historical process with its own distinctive property relations. The most important of these is the separation of labour-power from the means of labour, the contrast between the proletariat forced to sell its labour-power in order to live, and the class of capitalists owning all the means of production and so enabled to purchase labour-power and thus to enrich themselves. It is only in this situation, where there is a relationship of exploitation of workers and peasants by property owners and landlords that we can talk of surplus *value* and the accumulation of capital.

We cannot, therefore, apply the same categories of political economy,

[4] Vol. I, p. 405.

[5] Vol. I, p. 784.

[6] Vol. I, p. 834.

or expect to find the same *relations* of production in systems not based on the capitalist mode of production. But does this mean that we must discard the whole of Marx's analytical approach when we turn to the problems of economic growth in a society in which some other mode of production is dominant? Surely not. Two major aspects of Marx's analysis of expanded reproduction are independent of the specific relations of production in which they are clothed, and must be used in order to understand how the process of economic growth can be promoted (or retarded) in *any* economic system.[7]

Firstly, although surplus value cannot exist in such a society, a *surplus*[8] certainly can, and indeed must be present as an absolutely necessary condition for economic growth. A surplus, in this sense, arises as soon as a labourer can produce more food than he can eat. For some purposes the relations of production which arise from the way in which this surplus is alienated are of primary importance, but in the present context it is more helpful to abstract from this aspect and to focus our attention on the underlying forces determining the size of the surplus and the use to which it is put.

Secondly, the crucial part played by machinery and other capital goods in raising the productivity of labour and so the growth of output is a basic economic (or technological) factor which remains valid irrespective of the type of economic system.

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[7] The most detailed theoretical examination of these problems in the context of an emerging *Socialist* economy was written in Moscow in the 1920s by the brilliant Russian Marxist Evgeny Preobrazhensky. Some of his major writing has recently been translated into English as *The New Economics*, Oxford, 1965. The following statement by Stalin is also very relevant: '. . . Marx's scheme of reproduction does not begin and end with a reflection of the specific character of the capitalist mode of production, it at the same time contains a whole number of fundamental tenets on the subject of reproduction which hold good for all social formations, particularly and especially for the socialist social formation. Such fundamental tenets of the Marxian theory of reproduction as . . . surplus product as the sole source of accumulation; the formation and designation of the social funds; accumulation as the sole source of reproduction on an extended scale—all these fundamental tenets of the Marxian theory of reproduction are at the same time tenets which hold good not only for the capitalist formation, and which no socialist society can dispense with in the planning of its national economy.' *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, Moscow 1952, p. 89.

[8] If we are dealing with a society in which the operation of the law of value has been replaced by the principle of planned socialist production, we must refer to surplus *product* and not surplus value. Similarly we may refer to accumulation of investment funds, but not to accumulation of capital. We may still, however, retain the term *capital goods* for the physical assets (machinery, buildings, dams, etc.) on which the investment funds are expended.

There are thus two crucial and inter-dependent problems which we must now study more closely:

(i) the relationship between the proportion of current output devoted to investment in capital goods and the rate of growth of total national output;

(ii) the way in which this proportion can be increased either by enlarging the size of the surplus product or by altering the use to which it is put, and the external and domestic sources of accumulation.

These two problems are closely related to, and overlap with, two other issues: the shortage of foreign exchange needed to purchase imported capital goods, and the inadequacy of the marketed surplus of agricultural products.

III. Investment and Economic Growth

One of the major determinants of the rate of growth of national output is the proportion of each year's output which is devoted to capital goods (i.e. to investment in machines and other equipment which will produce more goods in the future) rather than to goods available for immediate consumption.

It is possible to indicate the importance of this aspect very clearly, but we must first introduce the further economic concept of the investment-output ratio. This measures the amount of investment which (in combination with labour) is economically and technically necessary to produce a certain increase in national output.[9]

We can then show that if a country devotes 10 per cent of its national income each year to investment in capital goods and has an investment-output ratio of 4, then the rate of growth of national output (or income—the terms are synonymous) will be $\frac{10}{4}$ or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent p.a. If the proportion devoted to investment can be raised to 20 per cent

[9] For example, an investment-output ratio of 4 would mean that an increase in the stock of capital of £400 is needed—on average—to produce an increase in output of £100. (For some purposes it is relevant to use not investment, i.e., the *addition* to the total stock of capital goods, but the actual stock itself. We then have the concept of the capital-output ratio or capital coefficient, e.g. a capital-output ratio of 4 would mean that every £400 of capital goods would produce an average £100 of output.)

then the rate of growth would also increase, to 5 per cent per year.[10] If population is growing at, say, 2 per cent p.a. then income per person will rise at a speed of only 0.5 per cent per year in the first case, but at 3 per cent p.a. in the second. This is the difference between stagnant and rapidly improving living standards.

It is thus evident that the higher the proportion of national output devoted to investment and the lower the investment-output ratio the more rapid will be the rate of growth. The investment-output ratio is to a very large extent determined by technological factors in different industries (it requires more fixed equipment to produce £100 of steel than it does to produce £100 of textiles) and by the degree of utilisation of the equipment. Since there is not much a country can do to reduce the investment-output ratio, the requirement for increased growth of output must be an increase in the proportion of national output devoted to investment. Broadly speaking, it is necessary to raise this from the very low rate (around 5 per cent of national income) characteristic of under-developed and static economies, to the much higher rates (typically 15-25 per cent) found in developed and wealthy economies.

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[10] The reasoning behind this calculation can be indicated in the following manner:

Let y = the rate of growth of national output
s = the proportion of national output devoted to investment
k = the investment-output ratio

Then $y=\frac{s}{k}$

This follows automatically from the definitions. This can be seen if we let
O_1 = national output in year 1,
O_2 = output in year 2,

and therefore $\frac{O_2-O_1}{O_1} = y =$ the rate of growth of national output;

and I_1 = investment in year 1

and therefore $\frac{I_1}{O_1} = s =$ the share of investment in output.

We then have

$$\frac{O_2-O_1}{O_1}=\frac{I_1}{O_1}\times\frac{O_2-O_1}{I_1}=\frac{I_1}{O_1}\div\frac{I_1}{O_2-O_1}$$

But $\frac{I_1}{O_2-O_1}$ = the investment-output ratio, k

$\therefore y=s\div k.$

INVESTMENT AND SAVING

As this point is of such vital importance we must examine the concept of investment more closely. When we look at *investment* in terms of actual capital goods we can define it as that part of the annual output of final products which takes the form of productive equipment used to produce other goods and services, e.g. machines, tractors, factory buildings, hospitals, dams and roads. The remaining part of final output can then be defined in terms of goods and services for current *consumption*, e.g. clothing, food, medical services.[11]

It is also necessary, however, to look at the same process in terms of income received. We can define *saving* as that part of the annual national income not spent on the purchase of goods for current consumption but either (i) spent directly on the purchase or construction of capital goods (e.g. by peasant farmers or industrial enterprises); or (ii) lent to others (e.g. to banks or to the state) and used by them for the purchase or construction of capital goods; or (iii) paid in taxes of one type or another and used by the state for the purchase or construction of capital goods.

It is thus not difficult to see that investment and saving are simply different aspects of the same process and can be made, by definition, equal to each other. To revert to our basic relationship we can say that if a country wants to raise the rate of growth of national income it must raise the proportion of the national income which is *saved* in order to match the increase in the proportion of national output which is devoted to *investment*, i.e. to capital goods which cannot be consumed.

This basic idea can be clarified by an illustration which is very simple but nevertheless brings out the essential requirements for economic growth. Consider a small village community of 100 men all of whom are engaged in farming. All the farmers eat what they produce (except for a small amount set aside for seed). They have no implements. There is then no net investment or saving, and national output=consumption=the output produced (minus the seed). If next the community decides that twenty of its members should take time off from farming to make a plough and other implements it will be necessary to feed them while they are doing this and so the other eighty will have to share the food they grow with the implement-

[11] This distinction is similar to Marx's division of output between Department I and Department II, the former making producer goods, the latter consumption goods (see especially Volume II); but Marx's scheme includes not only the final products but also the raw materials, etc., which are needed to make them, e.g., in Department I not only the machinery but also the steel; in Department II not only the clothing but also the cotton.

makers. While these items are being made the total food produced and therefore the community's consumption will be lower, but this fall in consumption is matched by the investment in the construction of the plough and implements and so represents a form of saving. When the new capital goods are completed they will raise the productivity of the farmers, i.e. they will in future be able to produce larger crops than when they had no equipment, thus raising consumption and national income. If the community want to develop even further more men can then be diverted to making more or better implements and so the community will prosper. In a money economy the picture will be slightly more complicated but the basic economic relationships will be the same beneath the cloak of money transactions.

In practice it may not be necessary—as it was in the above illustration—to have an actual reduction in consumption in the early stages of economic growth (we consider this point again below), but it will be necessary to hold down the rate of *growth* of consumption below the rate of growth of national income. In other words, a large proportion of the *increase* in national income will have to be devoted to investment rather than to consumption. The more this is done, the higher will be the rate of growth. In fact, it can be shown that by restricting the growth of consumption and accelerating the growth of investment for a period of about ten-fifteen years it is possible



Fig. 1

The diagram illustrates the growth of consumption (assumed to be 9 units in year 1) with different proportions of national income devoted to investment. The investment-output ratio is assumed to be 3.

to raise the rate of growth of national income quite dramatically, and from then on consumption will always be higher than it would otherwise have been.[12] This is illustrated in the diagram opposite which is based on a model of economic growth by a Russian economist G. A. Feldman.[13]

This is, in essence, the secret of the success of the Soviet Union in the 1930s.

THE MARKETED SURPLUS

One particularly vital aspect of the consumption v. investment problem is the question of the marketed surplus of agricultural products. To analyse this let us continue the story of the farming community. As the economy grows, division of labour and specialisation take more workers (for example the implement-makers or handicraft workers) away from the agricultural sector, and they ultimately move off the farms and go to the towns. But they and all the others they meet there still have to be fed. Those who remain behind on the farms must therefore continue to provide food for them. It is, therefore, essential that those who stay in the villages do not take advantage of the fall in the village population in order to raise their own consumption (unless they can at the same time expand production). Moreover, this excess of farm production over consumption must be made available for sale (or exchange) in the towns. This gap between production and consumption by the peasants need not all represent saving by them, since they can use the money they get from selling food to the towns to purchase clothing and other manufactured consumer goods; but the supplies of food (and agricultural raw materials) must be made available to urban workers in the industrial sector.

A surplus of agricultural products available for sale in the market may also be needed for export. This is important because it is often the case that some of the investment takes the form of capital goods which can only be obtained abroad. In this situation it is not enough to have achieved the required level of savings, it will also be necessary to have the required amount of foreign currency with which to pay for the imports. By selling in foreign markets a developing economy can obtain the foreign exchange required for the purchase of capital

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[12] For further discussion of this and other points in this sector see the pamphlet by Maurice Dobb, *Economic Growth and Underdeveloped Countries*, Lawrence and Wishart, 1963, especially Chapters 4 and 5.

[13] See E. D. Domar, *Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth*, New York, 1957, Chapter IX.

equipment from abroad. In this way the surplus from the agricultural sector can help to overcome a further restriction on economic growth.

IV. The Sources of Savings and Investment Funds

It is now time to take up our final theme and to examine the ways in which an under-developed economy can raise the share of national income devoted to productive investment. We may consider the broadly typical situation of an independent country embarking on the socialist (or non-capitalist) road of development, in which a small and as yet undeveloped socialist sector in industry coexists with some private industry and trade and with a large, probably dominant, sector of small-scale peasant production in the villages.

Firstly, the economy may be able to call on *foreign* sources of capital. There are basically three ways in which this can be done.

(i) Direct aid in grants or loans from foreign governments; and private foreign investment.
(ii) Taxation of foreign companies or of foreign importers and exporters.
(iii) Export price policy by the state or socialist sector.

Let us look at each of these in turn; we shall see that there are important limits to all of them. Other socialist countries can be relied on to provide some aid but their own economies are still very tightly stretched and they do not have unlimited resources. If foreign aid and gifts can be obtained without strings from capitalist countries it is, of course, very nice but there is not very much of that available. Foreign loans and private investment are easier to attract but have two crucial drawbacks. Firstly, it does not take very long before the amount flowing out of the country in payment of interest and dividends on past borrowing is at least as great as the current inflow of new lending. Once this happens the borrower is in trouble both with regard to the internal savings problem and the external balance of payments problem. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the conditions required in order to obtain foreign funds from private investors and capitalist governments are in the long run such as to make industrialisation and rapid economic development more rather than less difficult.[14]

[14] For an excellent discussion of the way imperialism uses foreign lending to hold back genuine economic development see the article by Paul Sweezy in *Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth, Essays Presented to Maurice Dobb*, Cambridge, 1967.

There are certain possibilities for taxation of foreigners. For example, direct taxes on the profits (and/or dividends) of foreign companies operating in the country; import levies on goods brought into the country for use by foreign companies in their own operations (e.g. mining machinery) or for sale by them;[15] export duties which come out of the exporter's profits—where the exporting is done by foreign concerns—or are passed on to the foreign consumers. The limiting factor for such possibilities is firstly, that once a country uses its freedom and adopts an independent policy there are not likely to be many foreign companies operating in the economy; and secondly, if any companies do remain it is necessary to avoid killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. As long as the companies are needed, taxation should go as far as possible short of driving them out of operation.

Export price policy is much the same in principle as the export levy except that the exports are in this case assumed to be made by the country itself so that the object is to increase the price to the foreign consumer, not to tax the exporter. The restriction here is that under-developed countries are very often unable to control or even influence the price of their exports. These usually consist of primary products for which there are many suppliers, all competing with each other to sell to a few powerful monopolistic buyers who control the market. If the country can decide its export prices it has to be very careful not to go so high as to cut off demand or encourage the use of synthetic substitutes.

To sum up: for the majority of under-developed countries there is probably not very much scope for obtaining savings from external sources. They will therefore have to rely mainly on *domestic* sources. There are basically three forms of domestic savings:

(i) Voluntary saving: individuals or domestic companies may voluntarily set aside part of their income for purchase of capital goods (or lending to others) rather than for acquisition of goods for current consumption.

(ii) Taxation can be used to obtain involuntary savings in the hands of the state.

(iii) The price and wage policy of state-owned enterprises can be used to make profits which are available for investment.

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF CAPITAL

The possibility of voluntary saving is greatly restricted in Africa and certain other countries of the type we are considering by the low

[15] If for sale it is only appropriate if the price fixed by the importer is already the highest possible monopoly price, so that any import levy will represent a deduction from his profits, not an increase in the price charged.

levels of per capita income, and not very much can be expected from this source. In this respect the situation differs from that in an area like Latin America where despite (or rather because of) the acute poverty of the mass of the people there is a much more substantial upper class which *could* provide some domestic saving to finance productive investment.

Taxation can take the form of direct taxes on income or wealth; indirect taxes on commodities; and taxes on agriculture and/or on land. The scope for direct taxes is limited by the general absence or relative unimportance of large incomes referred to above. (Where such incomes do exist it is typically the case that they are not used productively—the owners generally prefer lavish consumption or else they send their money out of the country—and these incomes of the very rich do represent an existing surplus which could be heavily taxed or appropriated and put to productive use by the state.) Indirect taxes represent a more promising source and will typically occupy an important place in any scheme to increase savings. In a low income community these will generally have to be taxes on essentials—salt, matches, fuel, spirits, tobacco, etc. Such taxes on goods bought by the peasants constitute an important part of the process of increasing savings by the agricultural sector and raising the marketable surplus: the greater the amount of the peasant's income paid over in taxes of this kind the lower the real income he has to spend on consumer goods. And, of course, the less developed the economy is, the greater the proportion of the community in this category, and the more important it is as a source of savings.

Indirect taxes can, however, be evaded if the peasants refrain from buying the taxed goods, and so some form of direct agricultural or land taxes is usually needed. These can play an even more fundamental part in this process of drawing off the surplus from the agricultural sector and must occupy the central place in any strategy for the transformation of a backward, mainly peasant society. This can be done in various ways. In the U.S.S.R., for example, a system of compulsory deliveries by collective farms at extremely low prices was used from 1930. The food deliveries were then resold at high prices in the urban areas and the difference represented a tax in kind on the agricultural sector, and was used by the state to build up industry. To take another example, in Japan (at the end of the nineteenth century) a direct tax was imposed at quite a steep rate and was fixed in relation to the value of land in such a way that farmers had a strong incentive to increase output. This one tax provided the new Meiji government with over 80 per cent of its revenue. Various mechanisms of this type could be elaborated at length, but the essential point is straightforward:

in a society where the vast majority of producers are peasant farmers the main source of domestic savings must be found in this sector and tax policy must be directed to this end. In a poor society there can be no painless prescription for economic development.

It is also essential, however, to approach this problem from the other end and the state must help to improve the efficiency of farming so as to raise the output and 'taxable potential' of this sector. There are important ways in which this can be done without using much of the surplus: better seeds, double-cropping, more intensive use of fertilisers, etc.

The final source of domestic saving is in the socialist sector itself: state-owned industrial (or commercial) enterprises. The size of the surplus product generated in this sector depends firstly on the level of wages and secondly on the price charged for goods, particularly consumer goods, sold outside the socialist sector. For any given level of prices the surplus product will be greater the lower the level of wages, and in the early stages of industrialisation it will probably be necessary to ensure that the rate of growth of productivity (i.e. of output per worker) is *not* matched by a corresponding increase in real wages (i.e. of payment per worker). In this way an expanding surplus can be made available to the stage as savings.

The second aspect relates to the prices charged by the state enterprises—the higher these are the greater will be its surplus. In other words, the state enterprises can use a price policy for manufactured consumer goods to have an effect similar to that of indirect taxes levied by the state.[16] The actual source of savings will then depend on who buys the goods—peasants or factory workers or capitalists. The surplus generated by the wage and price policy of the state enterprises can be an important source of savings but there is, of course, the problem of getting them started in the first place. To begin with this is likely to be a much less important source than the agricultural taxes, but over time it will increase in relative importance.

MAKING INDEPENDENCE A REALITY

The main theme of this article can now be summarised: the key to an understanding of the process of economic growth is to be found in the problem of investment. The greater the proportion of its resources an economy can devote to the production of capital goods the more

[16] In the case of the taxes the surplus accrues directly to the state whereas the price policy leaves the surplus in the hands of the enterprise selling the goods. For various reasons the former policy may be preferable in the initial phase of industrialisation.

rapid its growth is likely to be. There are several sources from which the initial surplus can be obtained but the agricultural sector is of primary importance. Given that the agricultural sector must be a major source of savings one further important—and rather depressing—conclusion follows: one cannot expect very large savings to be available when so many of the peasants are living at or below subsistence level, and there can, therefore, be no easy solution to the problem of economic growth.

If, however, this conclusion seems depressing it is necessary to consider the only possible alternatives. These are either to continue at the present low level of development with all that that means in terms of poverty and national insecurity; or else to fall under the influence of the imperialists and follow the capitalist road. But this road will not lead to all-round economic development, it will bring benefits to only a small privileged minority, and it will involve the most severe exploitation of the workers and peasants. It will mean moreover, the loss of national independence and submission to economic and political domination by the imperialists.

A policy of internal accumulation and development along socialist lines is thus—however difficult—the *only* way to self-sustaining economic growth and real national independence. A socialist policy may involve hardships in the initial stages, a capitalist policy can only be disastrous.

SOUTH AFRICAN IMPERIALISM

Z. Nkosi

Both the South African and the foreign press are full of reports these days about the improvement in South Africa's 'image' since Vorster came into office as Prime Minister. The picture of the stern and forbidding police chief associated with 90- and 180-day imprisonment without trial and the torture of political prisoners has been replaced by that of a pleasant, golf-playing, joke-cracking politician of the old school. Vorster is presented as a man with the common touch, a man you can talk to and who will listen to what you say, unlike Verwoerd, who heard only his own voice as if it came from God. The impression is created that there has even been a 'liberalisation' in the application of the apartheid policy.

A cursory examination of the record of the Nationalist Government under Vorster reveals that, in fact, the apartheid policy in South Africa, far from changing for the better, has if anything deteriorated. The first full session of the South African Parliament under Vorster's premiership has placed a whole batch of new repressive laws on the statute book—a law placing education under the control of the central government which will facilitate the introduction of Christian National Education; a law making it more difficult for 'borderline' Coloureds to be classified White; laws tightening up influx control and giving the Government totalitarian powers over industry to ensure greater development in the border areas; a law providing for the conscription of Coloured youths into labour camps; a law prohibiting the publication of news about the South African Defence Force; a law barring named persons from the legal profession; a policy statement by the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. Botha, making it clear that Africans will never enjoy citizenship rights in 87 per cent of their country (the so-called 'white areas') and that 'the presence of the Bantu in White urban areas is for a limited purpose and of a casual nature . . . for work which the Whites cannot perform themselves'. Finally, a law making 'terrorism' or the harbouring of 'terrorists' punishable by death, and providing for indefinite detention without trial.

No sign of liberalisation here!

What, then, has Vorster done to win the golden opinions of the commentators? He has shaken hands and posed for photographs with Lesotho's Premier, Chief Leabua Jonathan, and three Malawi Cabinet Ministers who have been wined and dined in the best hotels in Cape Town. And he has announced a new formula for South Africa's participation in international sport which has been interpreted as a 'concession' although few people understand what it means and has made absolutely no difference to the sport position inside South Africa itself, which is still based on total apartheid.

This may appear to be little enough in itself, but it should not be dismissed without further consideration. What the world is witnessing is a wholesale reorganisation of South Africa's public relations with the outside world as a preparation for calculated political and economic aggression. After spending twenty years on the defensive inside the laager, South Africa now feels more confident about its ability to survive and is going over to the offensive.

VORSTER'S NEW LOOK

Shortly after he came to power, Vorster signalled the change in outlook which was to come. Africa and the world would hear about South Africa in a way it had never done before, he said. Ceaselessly since then, Cabinet Ministers have been plugging the same line, and in the main Western countries abroad the expensive propagandists of the South African Embassies and the South African Foundation have followed suit in the pages of their glossy magazines. In the opening days of the 1967 session of Parliament, the House of Assembly passed a private member's motion that 'this House approves the policy pursued by the government for friendly coexistence and fruitful co-operation with countries in Africa, with special emphasis on the Republic's ability to contribute to economic and technical development and the raising of the standard of living in Africa'. During the debate, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Muller, said he believed the hostile attitude of certain African states towards South Africa would gradually disappear and more and more of them would eventually accept South Africa's hand of friendship.

Addressing a students' symposium in Stellenbosch on May 17th, Vorster himself said 'separate development was not only a policy which would ensure a place in the sun for the different nations of different colours living together in South Africa, but it would make it possible for the Republic to take the lead in Africa. . . . As the rest of Africa became disillusioned, as they would to an increasing degree, they would turn their eyes towards South Africa'. (*Rand Daily Mail*, May 18th, 1967.)

The prospect of South African expansion in Africa has filled both the Nationalist Party and the United Party with enthusiasm. Writing in *Die Landstem* on April 5th, columnist Piet Beukes said that as a result of the 'new reasonableness' of Mr. Vorster's policy to the Black states and our country, a fundamental change had taken place in Southern Africa which was opening wonderful doors for all. Beukes noted that the nine countries south of the Zambesi, South Africa's 'true hinterland', had 34,133,500 inhabitants.

> Just north of the Zambesi is the second belt of countries falling within our hinterland. They are the following six countries with their populations: Congo 864,000; Congo Republic 14,150,000; Kenya 7,287,000; Tanzania 9,404,000; Uganda 6,538,000; Zanzibar, 299,000. Together they have a population of 38,542,000. This means that South Africa now has a chance to become the leader of a population group of about 72 million people living in one of the richest parts of the globe.

The possibility of milking the people of Africa of their labour and resources is making the South African imperialists' mouths water. Nor is it purely a matter only of economic profit. Referring to the visit of the Malawi Cabinet Ministers to South Africa, *Die Volksblad*, in an editorial on March 7th, 1967, said the greatest value of the visit was not in its economic aspect but in international policy.

> Here is tangible evidence that some Black states are prepared to accept South Africa in its role as the strongest commercial power in Africa and as the leading provider of capital goods, technological aid and other knowledge. The visit gives the lie in clear language to the impression that South Africa's enemies try to create—that the rest of Africa totally rejects her and fences her off in isolation on this continent.

Both economic and political factors are determining South Africa's present drive to penetrate Africa.

BACKGROUND TO IMPERIALISM

The economic position of the country is perhaps the main factor, for South Africa is now in the classic imperialist position of the manufacturing country seeking outlets for its capital and goods which are not available at home. Between 1955 and 1965 the net national income at factor cost rose from 3,395 million rand to 6,492 million rand (Minister of Finance, February 3rd, 1967, *Hansard* column 595). Of this total, manufacturing industry is now responsible for approximately 27 per cent, exceeding the combined total of mining and agriculture.

Mining is still tremendously important in the sense that it is the largest single source of the country's foreign exchange, and even much of the country's manufacturing capacity is determined by its needs. But mining is a wasting asset. Mr. Harry Oppenheimer has stated that diamond mining in South Africa might come to an end in another twenty years (*Sunday Times*, April 10th, 1966), and in his latest report on the affairs of the De Beers Corporation announces measures to expand the production of synthetic diamonds (*Rand Daily Mail*, May 11th, 1967).

At the annual meeting of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange on May 18th, 1967, the president, Mr. V. H. Simmons, said South Africa's gold mines will close within thirty years because of the fixed gold price. On the very same day the president of the Chamber of Mines, Mr. R. S. Cooke, echoed the warning. Both Messrs. Simmons and Cooke made it clear that the future of the country lay with manufacturing industry, and that steps should be taken now to make the transition as painless as possible.

The growth of manufacturing industry from a gross output of 122 million rand in 1924-25 to 1,400 million rand in 1963 has, of course, been the central feature of South Africa's economic and social development in this century. And side by side with this increase in production has gone an increase in exports, which reached the record figure of 1,186.3 million rand in 1966 (compared with 1,049.9 million rand in 1965). South Africa is now thirteenth in the list of the world's trading countries. Imports in 1966 were 1,645.6 million rand, as compared with 1,753.9 million rand in 1965, the decrease being due to the credit squeeze with a resultant improvement in South Africa's balance of payments (the gap, of course, being more than closed by gold sales).

TRADE FIGURES

As South African industrial production increases, it becomes necessary to find new outlets. An analysis of the pattern of South African trade shows that the Republic is in direct competition with the developed countries in the sphere of manufactured goods, and the bulk of South African exports to the developed countries consists of raw materials and the products of the primary industries, only about 6 per cent being manufactured goods. On the other hand, almost 75 per cent of South Africa's trade with the less developed countries consists of the products of manufacturing industry. The implications of this in relation to trade with Africa are obvious. The statue of Cecil Rhodes in the Cape Town botanical gardens points northwards and bears the inscription: 'There lies your hinterland'. The statue has stood there for decades and has been duly honoured by generations of pigeons. But the South African entrepreneurs are only now beginning to scrape off the grime and take the lesson to heart.

Even more than the ruling classes of other countries in the imperialist era, the South African ruling class finds itself unable to exploit to the full the potentialities of the internal market. Though precise statistics are unobtainable, it has been variously estimated that the share of the national income accruing to the African 70 per cent of the population is only between 20 and 23 per cent. Further, because so many Africans still live under a semi-subsistence economy in the rural and reserve areas, their share of the total purchasing power is even lower, between 17 and 18 per cent. The African share of the national income in 1936 was 19.6 per cent, according to the report of the Industrial Legislation Commission of 1951. In effect, this means that the enormous increase in the national income since 1936 has seen practically no change in the economic relations between Black and White. The stringent and rigid apartheid laws drastically limit the expansion of the internal market for the products of industry.

The ever stiffer competition for markets abroad would be intensified for South Africa if Britain were to enter the Common Market. In February 1967 the *Standard Bank Review* estimated that South Africa would have to find new markets for up to 9 per cent of its total exports if Britain abolished the Commonwealth preference tariffs which South Africa still enjoys although no longer a Commonwealth member.

Britain remains South Africa's main trading partner. In 1966 Britain took 383 million rand or 23 per cent of South Africa's exports and was by far the most important customer. South Africa imported R484 million of British goods which, at 5 per cent of the total export, made the Republic Britain's fourth largest customer. In addition, South Africa has 331 million rand invested in Britain, which is 24 per cent of the Republic's total foreign assets. But the arms boycott and the threat of sanctions has made South Africa wary of her dependence on her traditional trading partners. The Director of Export Promotions of the Department of Commerce and Industries, Dr. Z. J. Rabie, said in Pretoria in May that for the past five years the Government has campaigned to diversify markets abroad. 'We have found that too large a percentage of the Republic's exporters have depended in the past on the traditional market in Britain'. South Africa has tried to find new markets in Europe, the United States, the Far East and South America. And, of course, in Africa.

TRADE WITH AFRICA

For all these reasons, increased trade with Africa is a 'must' for South Africa, and in fact the Republic's trade figures with Africa have been steadily increasing over recent years. In 1966 South African exports to African territories were 193.9 million rand, compared with 147.1 million rand in 1965 and 130 million rand in 1964. Imports from Africa were 129 million rand compared with 108.8 million rand in 1965 and 90 million rand in 1964.

The bulk of this trade is with Rhodesia and Zambia, and it is one of the ironical outcomes of U.D.I. and sanctions that South Africa's trade with both countries has greatly increased since November 11th, 1965. The volume of South Africa's trade with what is called 'Black Africa' is only 10 per cent of her total African trade.

Dr. Diederichs, when he was still Minister of Economic Affairs, ruled out a Southern African common market on the grounds that the inequality of economic development of the various countries made it impracticable. What South Africa is after is not equality of economic relations, but domination.

Recent discussion on the topic in South Africa has grouped together the following countries as a natural field for South African exploitation —South-West Africa, Rhodesia, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Statistics compiled by an African Institute economist, Mr. E. van der Merwe, and published in a recent bulletin of the Institute, show that the external trade for the region totalled 4,755 million rand in 1964. South Africa's share of this trade is the largest—2,804 million rand or almost two-thirds of the total.

The bulk of the trade of the region, however, is not with its constituent parts but with the traditional metropolitan and other overseas countries. The various countries of the region traded with one another only to the extent of 1,102 million rand, while exports to the rest of the world totalled 1,697 million rand and imports 1,956 million rand. South African goods worth 275 million rand went to other members of the region and 863 million rand to the rest of the world. South

African imports respectively totalled 146 million and 1,519 million rand.

The withdrawal of Britain from the former High Commission territories, the economic breach between Britain and Rhodesia, the troubles of Portugal with her African colonies—all these factors present South Africa with what the Vorster Government regards as a golden opportunity to jump in and take over where the former imperialist powers are being forced to leave off. If the countries of Southern Africa could be persuaded to weaken their trade ties with Europe and strengthen them with one another, South Africa, as the most powerful economic unit, and physically ideally situated as the heartland of such a regional development, would stand to gain enormously.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

South Africa is not only interested in trade with the other countries of Southern Africa. Even more important from the long-term point of view is capital investment, which has the effect not only of bringing trade in its wake but also of exerting a strong political influence over the countries which take the investment. Tony Davenport, an economist attached to the South African Foundation, estimated that South African investment in the already mentioned nine countries of the Southern African region is approximately 650 million rand (*Sunday Express*, April 16th, 1967). Statistics are meagre, but it is known that South African capital investment in Rhodesia, for example, already exceeds that of Britain. Nor does South African investment stop at the Zambesi. The Anglo-American Corporation, the most powerful mining, industrial and financial group on the whole continent, controls investments valued at over £600 million, with tentacles embracing not only every country of the Southern African bloc, but also Tanzania, Congo (Kinshasa), other East and West African territories, as well as the United States, Britain, Malaysia, Australia and Canada. A more recent arrival on the African investment scene is Mr. Anton Rupert, boss of the Rembrandt Tobacco Corporation and a leading supporter of the Nationalist Government, who claims to make one out of every five cigarettes smoked in the capitalist world. Rembrandt, with assets totalling £197 million, now has investments in Rhodesia, Zambia and Kenya and is negotiating to establish itself in Tanzania.

Davenport, in another article in the *Sunday Express* on December 11th, 1966, looks forward to a steady growth of South African capital investment in Africa. 'Gross domestic investment in the South African economy since the beginning of 1960 has totalled 8,780 million rand.

However, this figure was exceeded by gross domestic saving of 9,133 million rand.'

If the recent net inflow of foreign capital to South Africa continues over the next several years, he says, and provided the balance of payments is kept in order, 'South Africa could find herself with such large and growing foreign exchange reserves that she would become increasingly able to place capital funds elsewhere. . . . Common sense would dictate that long-term money should go to the capital-hungry countries in southern and central Africa'.

The main force behind capital investment in Southern Africa in the future is likely to be the South African Government itself, just as it is inside the borders of South Africa. Both inside and outside the Republic, the Government, because of the size of the funds at its disposal, because of its growing totalitarian powers to direct the economy, and because it is willing to act where private capital often hesitates, is playing a more and more decisive role in economic developments in Southern Africa. The present scope of her efforts in this field may be limited, but they are bound to grow as time goes on.

'AID' TO MALAWI

South African aid to Malawi is an illustration of the economic forces at work which are bringing about significant changes in some African attitudes to South Africa. The Republic has already granted a 2 million rand loan to Malawi for the purpose of constructing a sugar mill. A South-African-based firm of consultants is planning the new Malawi capital at Zomba, and Malawi is looking to South Africa to provide much of the 22 million rand which will be needed for the move. Dr. Banda is also hoping South Africa will help with the raising of 6 million rand he needs for railway development and 120 million rand for the exploitation of bauxite deposits which would transform the economy of what is now one of the poorest countries in Africa.

It is worth noting in passing that since 1964, when Malawi became independent, her imports from South Africa have doubled. Since the trade pact with South Africa was signed in February 1967, a South African, Mr. Garth van Rooyen, former manager of South-West African Airways, has been appointed head of Malawi Airways. The South African Broadcasting Corporation is to supply personnel and also help train Malawians for the Malawi broadcasting service. Malawians may also go to South Africa to help with the S.A.B.C. broadcasts in the Malawi dialect of Chinyanja. Most significant of all, in May 1967 a team of South African Government officials headed by Dr. P. S. F. van Rensburg, Under-Secretary for Bantu Labour, visited Malawi to discuss plans for an increase in the number of

Malawians working in South Africa. The majority of African workers on the South African mines already come from outside the borders of the Republic. The total of so-called 'foreign natives' in South Africa is in the region of one million, drawn from Malawi, Zambia, Rhodesia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola.

While expelling 'foreign natives' who had been permanently settled in South Africa, the South African Government is anxious to increase the number of migrant workers from neighbouring territories who would be prepared to do the work on the mines and farms which local Africans are less and less willing to do, preferring the better-paid jobs in industry. *The Johannesburg Star* report on the visit of the South African mission to Malawi said: 'They will also seek ways of improving the regulation of labour from Malawi and to eliminate the traffic of illegal immigrants'. (*Star*, May 9th, 1967.) Migrant labour will obviously be another link binding the economies of the Southern African region together. South African politicians and economists constantly stress that the wages earned by 'foreign natives' in South Africa is an important source of revenue for their home countries.

The *Star* report added that the labour agreement with Malawi 'will also enable South African spokesmen to point out that conditions under apartheid cannot be as onerous as some critics claim if Africans from independent states are willing to come here voluntarily to seek employment'.

S.A. PENETRATION

South African penetration of other African territories has already taken place in similar fashion or is projected for the near future. The Lesotho Government, for example, has appointed three South Africans as 'advisers'—Professor Denis Cowen as political adviser, Professor O. Horwood, of Natal, as economic adviser, and Anton Rupert as adviser on industrial development. The Lesotho Premier, Chief Leabua Jonathan, disappointed with the scale of British assistance, now looks to South Africa to help with development projects like the Oxbow Dam, and has modified the Lesotho land policy to facilitate economic development and attract foreign investment. On his recent 'goodwill' visit to Malawi, Chief Jonathan suggested that White and Black states in Southern Africa should form an economic community within the context of their political differences. . . . Chief Jonathan condemned 'the disgruntled Pan Africanists' of the O.A.U. for the attacks on Southern African Black states who practised and advocated peaceful coexistence with South Africa. (*Rand Daily Mail*, May 16th, 1967.)

In return for favours already given and to come, Jonathan has already gone far on the road of collaboration with South Africa. He has slowed down and in some cases reversed Africanisation in the civil service; he has crushed the opposition by force and muzzled the King; he has proposed a visit to South-West Africa to provide him with ammunition to support South Africa's case at the United Nations; he has cracked down on South African refugees, deporting some into the hands of the South African police and compelling the remainder to choose between exile further north or facing repatriation to South Africa; he has launched mass raids on the South African-Lesotho border and arrested hundreds of his own citizens on charges of cattle rustling from the Republic—a step hailed by the South African Deputy Minister of Police, Mr. S. L. Muller, as a great contribution 'to improve relations between the people of the two countries'. (*Star*, May 10th, 1967.)

More sinister is the fact that South African pressure, exerted either overtly at top political level, or behind the scenes by means of secret police infiltration, bribery and intimidation, has assisted in bringing into power the most conservative elements in all three of the former British Protectorates. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland now all have right-wing governments, orientated towards South Africa, while the forces of the African nationalist opposition, more strongly opposed to collaboration with apartheid South Africa and seeking stronger ties with the O.A.U., have been isolated and crushed, even if only temporarily. The most bitter blow to the South African liberation movement has been the crackdown and persecution of refugees in Botswana, hitherto South Africa's only escape route to the north.

It is certainly unnecessary to labour here the vital role South Africa has played in shoring up Rhodesia since U.D.I.; nor the part played by South-African-recruited mercenaries in putting down the forces of independent Africa in the Congo. Evidence has also not been lacking of the existence of a network of agents of the South African special branch of the police operating in every independent African country. With each passing day, it becomes clearer that the main base of imperialism and White supremacy in Africa is the Vorster Republic, no longer sheltering from the gale of world hostility inside the laager, but poised aggressively for further conquests in Africa.

VORSTER FAVOURS INDEPENDENCE

South Africa has travelled far from the days when Verwoerd demanded the incorporation of the Protectorates. The Republic's own experience with the Transkei has made the Nationalist Government realise that there exist right-wing elements in most national movements in Africa who can, with skill, be brought or bought to co-operate with South Africa's White supremacists. In an interview with the U.S. journal *U.S. News and World Report*, Vorster stated there was no substance at all in talk of a 'White man's alliance' between Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and South Africa. Nor was there any mutual-defence arrangement or alliance. South Africa wanted good relations with all the states of Southern Africa, he said, White as well as Black.

> We do not at all fear these developments—the establishment of African governments in those states. It is a natural development as far as we are concerned. . . . We want to work with them as independent black states, to their advantage and to our advantage. . . . We wish to avoid the dangers of neo-colonialism in any pattern of assistance which may be agreed upon. . . . In many respects we have, with respect to much of Africa south of the Sahara, a responsibility for assisting in development—comparable to the responsibility which the United States had undertaken on a much larger scale with respect to the underdeveloped areas of the world as a whole. Although we do not publicise it, we are already doing quite a lot in this field. (*U.S. News and World Report*, November 14th, 1966.)

This line is now being plugged incessantly:

Mr. Blaar Coetzee, Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration:

> With this innate propensity of the Bantu to do repetitive work and with the knowledge, understanding and appreciation by the South African industrialist of the Bantu culture, I make bold to say that no country in the world can graft Western industrial development on to the developing areas within our borders and in Africa as a whole as well as we can. (*Rand Daily Mail*, December 14th, 1966.)

Dr. G. S. J. Kuschke, managing director of the South African Industrial Development Corporation, addressing the South African-German Chamber of Trade and Industry:

> Without South Africa's willingness to collaborate, no foundations whatsoever for economic development can be laid by certain countries in southern Africa. Our willingness to collaborate to the full must be gauged from what we are already doing towards the development of the Bantu states within our borders. (*Star*, May 4th, 1967.)

Dr. H. J. van Eck, chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation:

> Trade, financial and technical bonds connect many of the countries in southern Africa. The initiative and the construction of this wide combination came from South Africa, and it is there largely because of the Republic's technical progress and its willingness to make available its specialised knowledge to its neighbours, to the mutual benefit of everybody. (*Star*, May 20th, 1967.)

Three water development and hydro-electric schemes mentioned by Dr. van Eck were:

1. Hydro-electric power stations on the Kunene River on the border between South-West Africa and Angola. (The first agreement towards this was announced by the two countries on May 15th, a few days before Dr. van Eck spoke.)

2. The development of Kariba to its full potential and further schemes on the Zambesi between Rhodesia and Zambia.

3. A scheme on the Zambesi at Cabora-Bassa in Mozambique, with a potential of 2,000 megawatts. 'The Republic's own electricity development programme has reached a stage where even an ambitious scheme like Cabora-Bassa, which will cost about 260 million rand, is financially and technically possible.'

Mr. N. Cambitzis, chairman of the Rhodesian Industrial Development Corporation, advocated an industry-by-industry approach towards closer economic integration between Rhodesia and South Africa. He foresaw Rhodesia as in the main a supplier of raw materials to South Africa, which in return would supply 'more sophisticated manufactures' to Rhodesia. (*Star*, May 3rd, 1967.)

Dr. S. Meiring Naude, President of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, advocated the establishment of a scientific council to promote personal contact and the exchange of scientific information in Southern Africa. Opening the first Rhodesian scientific conference in Bulawayo, he said, 'South Africa had a special position by virtue of her geographical position. This virtually amounted to a moral obligation to arrange her participation at a level in keeping with the status of South African science'. (*Star*, May 17th, 1967.)

Mr. Colin Jacobson, President of Junior Chamber South Africa, said his chamber was about to embark on a full-scale effort to make contact and establish friendly relations with the independent Black countries in Africa to help them with their economic development. . . . His chapter was taking the lead by establishing Junior Chambers in four neighbouring states. 'I believe that the Junior Chamber in this country, through its 1,200 members, can play a significant part in influencing events in Africa. . . . I believe that a new wind of change is moving through Africa—that most doors are open to the breeze of genuine friendship and physical and economic assistance.' (*Star*, May 16th, 1967.)

Even liberal-minded South Africans have been infected by this 'new wind' imperialism, and the leader of the Progressive Party, Dr. Jan Steytler, has advocated the formation of a South African Peace Corps to crusade in neighbouring Black Africa. Speaking at a meeting in Durban, Dr. Steytler said, 'South Africa was only a midget at the moment but had to become a colossus'. (*Rand Daily Mail*, May 6th, 1967.) Student volunteers are already being sent on work projects in Lesotho and Botswana.

SOUTH AFRICA'S FRIENDS

'The new wind of change' proclaimed by British Premier Macmillan in Cape Town in 1960 blew South Africa into a state of almost total isolation in the following years. Now the wind has changed, and a counter-revolutionary hurricane is raging, not only on the African continent but throughout the world. South Africa is finding that she can win friends and influence people, not only White but Black as well.

Dr. Robert Gardiner, executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, on his return to his headquarters in Addis Ababa from a visit to the Republic last March called for an 'agonising reappraisal' of how Black Africa should approach the problem of South Africa. Unless the rest of Africa approached the problems of Southern Africa with some knowledge and understanding the issues would be confused, he said. While not condoning apartheid, he questioned the description of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland as 'South Africa's hostages' and said Banda might have his reasons for dealing with South Africa 'which other African states should try to analyse'.

Dr. Gardiner's statement was reported to have 'wrought havoc' in the O.A.U. secretariat. (*Star*, March 27th, 1967.)

Understandably, overseas businessmen with extensive interests in South Africa and the neighbouring territories are filled with enthusiasm by these new developments. Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, for example, who owns the largest chain of stores in Lesotho and has other sizable stakes in Southern Africa, said in Johannesburg recently that 'South Africa's policy of good-neighbourliness towards Black states might take a long time to mature, but it was important for the future of Southern Africa and perhaps Africa as a whole. Recognition of and talks with African leaders was a very welcome sign'. (*Star*, March 15th, 1967.)

Likewise, the President of the South African Foundation, Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, who also has extensive economic interests in South Africa, in an address at the University of Natal last April said: 'I welcome the new outward looking policy of this Government. Recent contacts are most encouraging and could lead to better things.' (*Sunday Times*, April 2nd, 1967.)

Most significant portent of all has been perhaps the reaction of the United States. Whereas the US Ambassador at the United Nations, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, in a public display aimed at the Afro-Asian bloc last March denounced South Africa's apartheid policy as 'one of the greatest offences against human rights still existing in the world' (*Star*, March 22nd), the US Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Joseph Palmer, in April came out with what was probably nearer to the true U.S. attitude when he said the United States was paying very close attention to South Africa's apparent effort to project a new image to the world. To the extent that South Africa's actions 'may prove conducive to improved international and human relations', he said, 'we certainly will welcome them—welcome them very much indeed'. (*Sunday Express*, April 9th, 1967.)

What these gentlemen are really saying is that the more Africa can be persuaded to accept South Africa, the less trouble they will have in continuing to trade with the apartheid state themselves. Both Britain and the United States were forced by the pressure of world opinion to impose an arms boycott against South Africa, and are still subject to pressure to extend the boycott to all trade, sport, culture and other forms of contact. If, however, African states can be found to traffic with South Africa, then it will become impossible for the world to point an accusing finger at the imperialist powers, who will be able to continue drawing their 15 to 27 per cent profits annually without further pangs of conscience.

Jonathan, Banda and their friends, therefore, are not merely being 'realistic', as they claim. By their actions they are breaching the international boycott, and paving the way for the collapse of sanctions as an aid to bringing about change in South Africa.

CHALLENGE TO AFRICA

Many leaders of independent African states have been outspoken in their condemnation of Jonathan and Banda. President Kaunda warned those who traded with South Africa that they stood in danger of being 'swallowed up by the Boers'. President Nyerere also spoke out. Press comment in many African capitals has been even sharper. Guinea radio declared that Chief Jonathan and Dr. Banda formed 'the first nucleus of African traitors advocating *entente*, coexistence and co-operation with racialist South Africa and colonialist Portugal'. A Brazzaville broadcast called them lapdogs of imperialism, meeting to form a new conspiracy against progressive Africa.

But there has been a heavy silence on the part of some African leaders, and clearly the weight of South African influence is already being felt in a continent torn by strife and conflict as the struggle for national liberation and independence nears its climax. With South Africa already reported to be capable of making an atomic bomb, the following comment in the Kampala newspaper, *The People*, pinpoints clearly the threat to Africa posed by the 'Vorster line':

> No doubt the time will soon come when South African paratroopers will restore shaky African Governments as the French restored President M'Ba of Gabon.

The paper adds that African states can have no reason to hope that the machinery of apartheid will be dismantled in the process of making friends and influencing people in Africa.

While Dr. Hastings Banda signs trade agreements with South Africa and Mr. Vorster shakes hands with Chief Jonathan, Mandela stays on Robben Island.

Being himself a realist, says *The People*, Vorster might increase the number of skilled Africans in the South African economy and try to persuade Black States that they can benefit from contact with the Republic. 'This way, he would hope to make African rulers guarantee the system of apartheid by withdrawing active opposition.

'Given enough capital investments, technical assistance and trade pacts, the South African Government will be in a position to affect African policies as effectively as the French have done in French West Africa. (Quoted in *The Star*, May 27th, 1967.)

It is a frightening thought—Africa under the shadow of the kruithoring. Africa is facing its Munich. The South African liberation movement, and the peoples of free Africa and indeed the whole world, must meet this new threat and give the appropriate answer before South Africa has time to complete its intended conquest.

MONEY SCREAMS IN KATANGA

J. J. JABULANI

When Katanga is hurt, money screams, and money has powerful lungs.
—*To Kananga and Back*:—CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN

ON NOVEMBER 3RD, 1966, the London *Financial Times* reported that talks between the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga and the government of the Congo had been temporarily suspended. The talks, it was reported, would however, be resumed shortly.

The Congolese delegation at these talks was led by M. Albert Ndele, governor of the Banque National du Congo, and Union Minière's delegation by M. Louis Wallef. Also present was a representative of Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. The paper also reported that Union Minière hoped to produce 300,000 tons of copper against the previous year's 285,000 tons; in addition the company would produce 9,000 tons of cobalt, this forming the main world supply of the mineral.

On January 1st this year, the government at Kinshasa, headed by General Mobutu as President, surprised, not least of all, the revolutionary forces throughout Africa by issuing an order expropriating Union Minière and taking over all its holdings, subsidiaries and other companies in Kinshasa.

The newspaper report already quoted does not immediately show a number of factors which have characterised the story of the Congo—Kinshasa since it attained independence.

The first of these is that the country has been in a permanent state of crisis. During this crisis we have witnessed the destruction of the first patriotic government under Patrice Lumumba—and the murder of that patriot together with a number of his colleagues. We have seen, also, a constant jostling for political position, lately ending in the military putsch which deposed Tshombe who had made a comeback from Spain after the collapse of the 'Katanga State' to assume the premiership of the Congo. Mobutu has since sentenced Tshombe to death, *in absentia.* Between the first government and the present there has been among other things the 'independent state of Katanga', the pro-imperialist role of the United Nations in the Congo and the direct intervention of the imperialist powers, in 1964 led by Belgium, to put down a popular armed struggle against the neo-colonialist government of the day.

The second of these factors concerns the constant difficulty to disentangle fact from fiction; to assess correctly the significance of the various issues that emerge whenever the crisis 'erupts'.

The third factor, the central point to be discussed here, is the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga. Governments may have changed rapidly in Kinshasa and the revolutionary peoples thrown into confusion; the Union Minière has lived through it all. Always around has also been Tanganyika Concessions as a constant reminder of the involvement of finance capital, other than Belgian, in the economy of the Congo, in copper and other minerals.

In keeping with other peoples in Africa, the patriotic forces in Kinshasa have over the last seven years, since the Congo was declared independent on June 30th, 1960, been concerned with the struggle to secure genuine independence for their country. Belgian imperialism never intended the Congo's political independence to be more than nominal. Indeed, it could not be otherwise while huge Belgian and other financial, mining and industrial companies exercised the same influence after as before independence. The independence would be only formal; any claim that the state was popular and democratic would be purely demagogic and the people of Kinshasa would be condemned to continued poverty, illiteracy and all the other ills imposed by imperialism on the people of Africa as a whole.

The final rape of the Congo had been completed by the end of the first decade of this century. In their annual report of 1909 the Société Générale de Belgique wrote:

> 'the changes brought about in the economic order of the Belgian colony, following the regulations submitted in our legislature, have been favourably received by the management of the company.'[1]

Of this period Joye and Lewin write: "Le règne de trusts va commencer." (The reign of the trusts begins.)[2]

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[1] R. J. Lemoine, "Finances et colonisation" in the *Annales d'histoire economique et sociale,* September 30th, 1934.

[2] Pierre Joye and Rosine Lewin: Les Trusts au Congo. Bruxelles, 1961.

It was to be a reign in which the trusts ruled and the colonial government ensured that their interests were not tampered with. The Union Minière du Haut-Katanga is an offspring of these trusts.

The Union Minière obtained its first flow of copper in 1911 at its mine in Lubumbashi. In 1960, when the various copper mines owned by the Union Minière produced 300,000 tons of copper, the company achieved a distinction behind the American companies Kennecott and Anaconda as the third largest producer among the Western companies.

It is said that Leopold II, King of Belgium, rejoiced in carrying through his 'royal programme' of founding the three '1906 companies', which included the Union Minière, in conjunction with the Société Générale de Belgique. (Joye and Lewin: op. cit.). The Société Générale in the end, however, managed to obtain effective control over these societies. At the time that the Congo obtained its independence, the principal shareholders in the Union Minière were the Congolese government, Tanganyika Concessions, the Société Générale de Belgique and the Compagnie du Katanga.

Before we finally come back to this question of ownership of the Union Minière, we shall try to disentangle what the company is and what it does.

The company was formed in 1906 with initial capital amounting to 10 million Belgian francs (B. Frs.).

The concession granted to it covered an area of more than 12,500 square miles—an area larger than the combined surface area of Belgium and Luxembourg.

Though the Union Minière is most well known for its activities as a copper-mining company, its mineral products are very diverse.

The mines can be divided into three geographical areas. There is a group in south-eastern Katanga. Here there are the mines at Kipushi and at Lukuni. From the former is recovered copper and zinc; from the second, copper and cobalt.

Then there is the central group of mines. The copper comes from the mine at Kambove. At Kankotwe the company extracts limestone and at Kisanga, iron. Then there is the mine at Shinkolobwe. This mine, running deep into 'exceptionally rich' deposits of uranium and radium, was the chief supplier of uranium to the United States during World War II. The mine was, however, closed down in April 1960 when the reserves which could be commercially exploited were exhausted.

The third group lies to the west. At the mines at Kolwezi, Musonoi and Kamoto is found copper and cobalt. The mine at Ruwe produces copper oxide.

It is, at this stage, important to note two facts. Around 1963, mineral production accounted for 60 per cent of the Congo's total value of exports. Of this, three-quarters originated from Katanga. The Congo, further, produced 53 per cent of the world's supply of cobalt and 61 per cent of its industrial diamonds. The latter come from Kasai, which also, under Albert Kalonji also tried to establish itself as an independent state.

This dominant position of the trusts, with Forminière leading in Kasai, thus becomes clear even before we discuss the full breadth of their activities. The Congo, of course, has other mineral deposits.

Apart from cobalt, it produces other 'hard metals', tungsten and vanadium. It also produces germanium, cadmium, berylium and littrium. These are all special metals, used in electronic and nuclear production. Further, the Congo has zinc, columbo-tantalite, manganese, gold—indeed a 'blue chip' colony! In 1959 the Union Minière employed 2,212 Europeans and 21,146 Congolese.

These figures, however, do not reveal the true significance of the position of the company in Katanga.

The Union Minière created a number of subsidiaries to carry on economic activities, largely to support the activities of the parent company.

One of the oldest of these is the Compagnie Foncière du Katanga (Cofoka). The company was established in 1922 for the purpose of building and managing housing estates for the personnel of the U.M.H.K., its affiliates and for the staff in the colonial administration. In 1959, Cofoka owned 1,689 properties in various centres such as Jadotville, Kolwezi and Elizabethville. The company had by then also ventured out into other types of property and property-dealing, including the building of offices and the issuing of mortgages.

The Union Minière also controlled the Charbonnages de la Luena. This company produced 456,000 tons of coal in 1955, though this declined to 250,000 tons in 1959 due to displacement of coal by electric power.

This power, however, comes from a subsidiary of the U.M.H.K., the subsidiary being the Société Générale des Forces Hydro-Electriques du Katanga (Sogefor). Sogefor on the other hand controls Sogelec——the Société Générale Africaine d'Electricité. This company distributes the electricity, not only to the production points of the U.M.H.K., but also to the large towns of Jadotville, Elizabethville, Kipushi and Kolwezi. Sogelec controls two other electrical companies who undertake the electrification of railways, the installation of electrical systems and so on. Thus we get a view of one of the complex patterns of control devised by the trusts, where subsidiaries sometimes own other

Continued on page 46



LENIN PRIZE AWARDED TO BRAM FISCHER

AMONG THE SIX laureates awarded the Lenin Peace Prize for 1967, jubilee year of the Russian Revolution, is Bram Fischer, outstanding South African revolutionary and lawyer, at present serving a life sentence in Pretoria. The others are Pastor Martin Niemöller (German Federal Republic), David Siqueros, Mexican artist and revolutionary, Professor Ivan Malik, Czech scientist, Rockwell Kent, American artist and writer, and Herbert Warnke, leading trade unionist of the German Democratic Republic.

In an article in *Pravda* the Chairman of the Committee for the Lenin Peace Prizes, Academician D. Skobeltsyn, wrote a glowing account of Fischer's life, the rejection of the 'brilliant career' which he could have had as the son of a distinguished Afrikaner family in favour of the hard life of a member of the Communist Party; his activities in the peace movement and the Congress of Democrats; his famous legal defences in political trials. After recounting how, following his arrest, Fischer rejected the opportunity to emigrate but stayed in South Africa to continue the struggle underground, his subsequent arrest and his great speech at his trial, Skobeltsyn concludes: 'The award of the international Lenin Prize to such an outstanding African public figure will lend him new strength in the struggle against reaction and will inspire all the fighters against neo-colonialism and for African freedom'.

subsidiaries which are, nominally in any case, bigger than they themselves.

In 1929 the U.M.H.K. further set up the Société Générale Industrielle et Chimique du Katanga (Sogechim). This company, with various factories in Jadotville, producing, among other chemicals, sulphuric acid, caustic soda and sodium chlorate, also produced vegetable oils, while also processing Jadotville's water supply. As a supplement to Sogechim, the U.M.H.K. also set up Afridex, to produce explosives and other mining accessories, while Afridex owns a subsidiary which produces safety matches, the Afrimeches company.

Katanga has other mining companies which are quoted in the financial columns of newspapers as independent establishments such as the Metalkat—the Société Metallurgique du Katanga, and Sudkat—the Société de Recherche Minière du Sud-Katanga.

The former of these companies, Metalkat, is concerned in the mining of zinc and cadmium and produces sulphuric acid at its works in Kolwezi. Sudkat, on the other hand, works the manganese deposits at Kasekelesa. This company ceded a part of its concession to a subsidiary of its own, the Société d'Exploitation de Mines du Sud-Katanga-Minsudkat. Thus Minsudkat mines lead, zinc, tin and copper.

Needless to say, these companies are also part of the Union Minière complex. They, also, play their part in the government of the people of the Congo by the cartels.

The Union Minière is, since even Union Minière's 'toiling millions' must eat, also involved in the food-processing industry. Thus it has a subsidiary, Minoteries du Katanga, literally, the flour-mills of Katanga. This company with establishments in Jadotville, Elizabethville and Kolwezi, produces flour from manioc, maize and wheat. It also produces various kinds of vegetable oil and further contributes oil-cake and stock-feeds.

It was perhaps to find use for this feed (or, which comes first?) that the Société d'Elevage de la Luilu was established. This company owned 10,000 head of animal stock in 1959.

The Union Minière further boasts an interest in the supply of building materials through its participation in the Ciments Métallurgiques de Jadotville. Apart from another iron-mining company in which Union Minière has an interest, it is further involved in mining through its involvement in the bauxite company, Société de Recherches et d'Exploitation des Bauxites du Congo, Bauxicongo. Foraky S.A. gives it an interest in diamond mining; the Compagnie Maritime Congolaise, a hand in ocean-going transport and companies such as the Compagnie Foucière du Katanga a chance to dabble in real estate.

In 1960 the 32,000 Europeans in Katanga formed 2 per cent of the total population of Katanga. Conor Cruise O'Brien wrote of this European population that:

> . . . (they) were not, however, really settlers in the normal sense. Hardly any of them owned land—except on the fringes of Elizabethville as a speculation—and few of them had their own businesses. They either worked for one of the great companies of the Union Minière group—Sogelec, Metalkat, Minsudkat, etc.—or for economically ancillary enterprises like the B.C.K. railway or the Simba Brewery—or they were professional men, making their money indirectly out of these companies. Or again they were soldiers and technicians whose pay came at one remove from these same companies when it did not come from the Belgian Government itself.
>
> (Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back*, Simon and Schuster, N.Y., 1962. (P. 79.)

It is because of the intricate and extensive character of the dominion of the Union Minière not only in Katanga, but also over the rest of the Congo, that the company has become identified in the minds of all revolutionary forces as the supreme example of why the imperialists and their cohorts have launched a counter-revolutionary offensive in Africa. The tactics the manoeuvres and the brazenness of the forces of reaction in the Congo, was a signal of what was to come in the rest of Africa.

The directors of the Union Minière could not and cannot be 'persuaded' to relinquish their flour-mills and their tungsten; their gold, radium and forests; their coal, chemicals and power stations; their stock-feed, copper, the railways they built and the ships to take this copper to Belgium; nor their unflinching dictatorship over the working class and the rest of the people of Congo Kinshasa.

The story of the Union Minière does not end here. It also has interest in companies outside the Congo. Its most direct participation in a company in Africa, is in the Wankie Colliery Company Ltd. of Rhodesia. Later we shall see how the Union Minière is in fact connected with other companies in Africa.

In his book *Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Capitalism* (Thomas Nelson, London, 1965), Nkrumah lists thirteen companies outside the Congo in which Union Minière has an interest. Most of these are Belgian companies.

The Union Miniére is the principal shareholder in the Belgian Société Générale Métallurgique de Hoboken. This company, employing 4,000 workers in 1961, refines and processes almost all the minerals extracted in the Congo, the copper, the radium, the precious metals. The final selling of the products of the U.M.H.K. is entrusted to their affiliated company, the Société Générale des Minerais.

In *Belgonucléaire*, the Société Belge pour l'Industrie Nucléaire, we also find a Union Minière holding. Further, they have an interest in the Compagnie Belge pour l'Industrie de l'Aluminium (Cobeal), in the Institut du Cobalt and in the Centre d'Information du Cobalt which carries out the programme of the Institut and carries on research work in conjunction with other research centres in Belgium, Switzerland, West Germany and America.

The Union Minière also has interests in Sabena, the Belgian air company. It is further connected with finance houses in Belgium, America and Paris.

Yet another aspect of the Union Minière has to be dealt with. This concerns its contacts and arrangements with other finance capital and mining houses in Southern Africa.

The Union Minière is owned largely by four groups. These are the Congo government, the Société Générale de Belgique (see below), the Compagnie du Katanga and Tanganyika Concessions Ltd.

The last of these groups, Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. (Tanks), is a British company. It, however, is inextricably tied up with the Société Générale de Belgique (Soc. Gen.) and the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa.

Thus it is that these three gigantic companies, the Anglo-American, Tanganyika Concessions and the Union Minière co-operate in ruling the roost over the lower part of Africa.

The Union Minière's holding in Wankie Colliery entitles them to a seat on that board of directors. Here they are represented by one M. van Weyenbergh. This Weyenbergh is Vice-President of the Union Minière. Wankie is, of course, dominated by Anglo-American. Thus this board is presided over by Sir Keith Acutt, K.B.E., director of many other Anglo-American companies.

On the other hand Lord Clitheroe and the Right Honourable C. Waterhouse represent Tanks on the board of the Union Minière. Here they meet M. van Weyenbergh. Van Weyenbergh, supported by E. P. van der Straeten and A. de Spirlet represent the Union Minière on the board of Tanganyika Concessions.

Oppenheimer's Anglo-American group meets up with the Union Minière again in the Société d'Entreprise et d'Investissements du Beceka. On this board sit both H. F. and P. J. Oppenheimer together with M. Louis Wallef, president of the Union Minière.

Two other groups representing monopoly capitalism are involved in this grand alliance. These are the two American interests of the Rockefeller Empire (of the Chase Manhattan Bank, Standard Oil, etc.) and the Ryan-Guggenheim group.

Ryan-Guggenheim has a holding of 25 per cent of the share capital of the diamond company of Kasai, the Forminière and A. A. Ryan sits on its board. Two Belgian groups, one of them the Soc. Gen. and the Congo government also have holdings in this company. Connection with the Union Minière is achieved by the presence of M. Louis Wallef on Forminière's board of directors.

Further, as Angola produces diamonds, so must these companies be involved. Thus H. F. Oppenheimer and A. A. Ryan sit on the board of the Companhia de Diamantes de Angola. Belgian and Portuguese interests are, of course, also involved.

The Rockefeller group has an 8 per cent interest in Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. and thus a connection with the Union Minière. The Rockefellers also own a third of the share capital of the Filatures et Tissage Africains, a company formed in 1946 by two Belgian groups, the Union Cotonnière and the Soc. Gen. de Belgique. Rockefeller money plays its part in other companies as well.

Important to note as well is that the Rockefellers had a monopoly over the import of petroleum products into the Congo. For these purposes there was created in 1956 the company Esso Congo belge, renamed Esso Central Africa in 1960, a subsidiary of Esso Standard.

Indeed, we may go on in this vein to show how the big financial groups, rendered big by super-profits made in mining, tie-up also in Zambia, in Mozambique and in South-West Africa. We should not, however, forget to mention another American financier, Charles W. Engelhard, of Engelhard Industries Inc., adviser to American governments on African affairs, a prominent member of the South African club of mine-owners, director on the boards of among others: the Anglo-American Corp. of S. Africa, Kennecott Copper Corp., one of the two massive U.S. copper groups, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and the London-based Anglo-American Corp. subsidiary, Charter Consolidated.

One Albert M. Tuiele straddles many of these companies. These include Kennecott, Guggenheim, Forminière and the Companhia de Diamantes de Angola. So the story goes on.

Since our purpose however is to discover the true extent of the hold of monopoly capitalism over the Congo, we have to retrace our steps, now, back to the Union Minière. Thus we come to the sprawling giant, the Société Générale de Belgique.

Startling in its size and difficult to comprehend fully in one sweep, the Société Générale is Belgium's largest monopoly capitalist group. The Société Générale is, further, the real power in the economy of the Congo. One single fact demonstrates all this. It is this: when the Congo gained its independence, the Société Générale had effective dominion over 70 per cent of the economy of the country.

Joye and Lewin have written that:

> This control is exercised in various ways. Most often, it is effected through the specialised holding companies such as the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (C.C.C.I.) or the Compagnie du Katanga.

In certain cases this is achieved through the Comité Spécial du Katanga (C.S.K.); in others through Belgian subsidiaries of the Société Générale starting their own subsidiaries in the Congo.

Undoubtedly, the most important of these subsidiaries of the Soc. Gen. is the C.C.C.I. It was through the taking over of the Banque d'Outremer in 1928 that the Soc. Gen. seized control of the C.C.C.I. Whereas therefore it was in co-operation with the Soc. Gen. that the C.C.C.I. had founded the Union Minière in 1906, by 1928 the Soc. Gen. had established its undivided supremacy over the Union Minière.

Thus, as part of the empire of the Soc. Gen., the C.C.C.I. in 1961 had part-ownership in sixty companies in the Congo, and directly or indirectly controlled forty.

We shall not give the complete list of these companies, but will show the diversity of its interests.

The C.C.C.I. owns plantations concerned in the production of coffee, vegetable oils, sugar, live-stock, ground-nuts, cotton, rubber, etc. through such companies as the Compagnie Cotonnière Congolaise, the Exploitations Agricoles et Industrielles de la Biaro and the Entreprises Agricoles de la Busari au Lomain (S.A.B.). The S.A.B. alone has 20,000 hectares of land and in 1959 employed 152 'agents européens' and 11,600 Congolese workers.

The C.C.C.I. has mining interests, as in the Société Industrielle et Minière du Katanga, producing such minerals as tin and columbite. Other interests are in cement and other building materials and asbestos, and the building industry.

The company also controls, with some of its subsidiaries, the Compagnie Générale d'Automobiles et d'Aviation du Congo, concerned with motor vehicles, industrial motors, aviation engines, etc.

Important, of course, in the portfolio of the C.C.C.I. is the Compagnie du Katanga. This latter company is associated with the Comité Spécial du Katanga, a concession-granting body which ceded the land to U.M.H.K. and held its own portfolio in the U.M. Because of its connections with the U.M., the Compagnie du Katanga has from the early post-independence days featured in the movements and shifts concerning the control of the Union Minière, a matter we shall come to later.

The Soc. Gen. also has control over the railway system, controlled and directed by the Compagnie de Chemin de fer du Bas-Congo au

Katanga (B.C.K.). This, despite the fact that the system was built with public funds and was meant to be maintained 'in the public interest'. The B.C.K., thus absorbed into the Soc. Gen., employed 13,579 Congolese workers in 1959. (It was this company that ceded concessions to the Minière du Bècèka, a subsidiary of the Soc. Gen., and the largest world producer of industrial diamonds. The company has a minority interest in the Oppenheimer group, is connected with Forminière and the British company, Industrial Distributors Ltd., in which De Beers Consolidated of the Oppenheimer group has a 31.5 per cent holding.)

The Soc. Gen. controls the Banque du Congo, formerly the Banque du Congo Belge, the largest of the banks in the Congo. It is also involved with Petrofina in the petroleum industry in the Congo, through the company, Société des Petroles au Congo.

The directory, *Who Owns Whom* (Continental edition) 1962-63, lists the Soc. Gen. as having 109 affiliates and subsidiaries in the Congo, Belgium and elsewhere.

These include banking and insurance groups. Examples of these are the Banque Belge Ltd. (U.K.), the Banque de la Société Générale de la Belgique and three insurance companies, including the Royale Belge. The Société Générale has other finance houses outside Belgium including three in America, such as the Belgian-American Banking Corporation, New York.

It plays an important part in such establishments as the Banque Générale du Luxembourg, the Banque de l'Union Parisienne and the Banco Burnay (Lisbon), the latter with interests in the Angola Diamond Co. mentioned above.

The Société Générale is connected also with the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, this representing the most important French interests in the economy of the Congo.

In industry the Société Générale also plays a prominent part. This is in such diverse fields as the petroleum industry through the Société Belge de Recherches et d'Exploitations Pétrolières; metal processing and refining through the Hoboken works, already mentioned, sharing direction with its own subsidiary, the Union Minière, and its ally in the Union Minière, Tanganyika Concessions Ltd.; in the production of armaments at the Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre—producing the standard NATO rifle, the F.N. automatic, which is also standard equipment used against the popular forces in the Portuguese colonies and is in the arsenal of the South African army. Other industries that can be listed are electricity and tramways, transport and merchant shipping, cement, bricks, chemicals, textiles, paper, etc.

The Société Générale is tied up with the Diamant Boart companies of France and Italy and also the Diamond Development Co. Ltd. (U.K.), Industrial Distributors (1946) Ltd. (South Africa) and the Diamond Purchasing and Trading Co. Ltd. (South Africa)—in the latter companies are also involved the Oppenheimer interests. Industrial Distributors' connection with the diamond industry in the Congo has already been mentioned.

Important to note also is the Société Générale's fairly recent expansion into Canadian industrial finance. *Who Owns Whom* (op. cit.) lists at least ten of such Canadian companies. These include MacAllister Towing Ltd. (concerned, *inter alia*, with the production of agricultural equipment), Brockville Chemicals Ltd., Neelon Steel Ltd., Iroquois Glass Ltd., and Fastcut Bits Ltd. (diamonds) and the wholly-owned holding subsidiary Sogemines Development Co. Ltd., concerned in mining, oil and industry.

The Société Générale, of course, ties up in Belgium and other parts of the world with American and other representatives of finance capital, whether Morgan Guaranty of America, the Rothschilds, Lazard Brothers, Schroder, or the Rockefellers. Even the Oppenheimer group through the agency of P. J. Oppenheimer, executive director of Charter Consolidated Ltd., the London-based Anglo-American Corp. subsidiary, is represented on the Banque Belge Ltd., one of the largest financial arms of the Société Générale.

These then are the trusts that rule the Congo. Their size explains the tenacity with which they will try to hold on to the Congo. This not only because of their size but the fact that to them the Congo is a 'blue-chip' colony.

The following figures relate to average profits made by companies with significant investments in the Congo and those mainly operating in Belgium:

Year	*Belgian*	*Belgian-Congolese*
1955	8.19%	18.47%
1956	9.40%	20.16%
1957	9.49%	21.00%
1958	7.85%	15.10%

(Joye and Lewin, op. cit.)

Net average profits of the Société Générale in Belgium were between 8 and 9 per cent per annum in the years 1951 to 1957. On the other hand profits were oscillating between 19 and 21 per cent during the same years in the Congo.

(Joye: *Les Trusts en Belgique*. Brussels.)

The contribution of the Congo to the Belgian capitalists and the Belgian economy would require another article. This contribution would be measured in its effect on the Belgian balance of international payments; on the level of costs and prices throughout the Belgian economy; on rates of capital accumulation and Belgian recovery after the war and its continued growth since. The gains of the trusts (thus losses to the people of the Congo) are shown by the growth of Union Minière's capital. This amounted to 10 million Belgian francs in 1906. Within half a century the company's capital accumulated after dividends and taxes had been paid, i.e. from retained profits, amounting to 8 milliard. Between 1950 to 1959 the Union Minière made gross profits amounting to 31 milliard Belgian francs.

So it was that when the Belgian government conceded independence to the Congo, it had never meant that independence to be more than nominal.

What the Mobutu government did at the beginning of this year was an episode in a series that had started just before independence was granted. Most relevant for our present purposes is what happened to the Comité Spécial du Katanga (C.S.K.), shareholder in the Union Minière and the body that gave that company a concession.

The establishment of the various companies in the Congo showed to a rare degree the unity achieved between state and property in prosecuting their imperialist objectives in the Congo. The importance of this carries on today. The trusts make the money and the Belgian government acts as a police guard over the property of the trusts.

The C.S.K. was set up by Lèopold II, acting together in the 'royal programme' already mentioned with the arch-representative of the Belgian bourgeoisie, the Société Générale. Leopold reserved himself the right to appoint the majority of the members of the board of the C.S.K. In time, however, in effect the control of this charter parastatal company passed on to the trusts.

The right of the C.S.K. to appoint the chairman and other board members of the U.M.H.K. was not exercised. The voting power meant to be exercised for 'the public good' was used to benefit the trusts. To avoid paying profits to the C.S.K, when profits were in excess of 93 million francs, as was written into the statutes, the Union Minière set up subsidiary companies to which these profits were siphoned. On the other hand the colonial government retired its civil servants early, to be absorbed into the structures established by the trusts. The dictatorship of the trusts was complete. Joye and Lewin describe the C.S.K. as 'l'instrument docile de l'Union Minière'; the roles had been reversed. Even Forminiere was governed as if it was part of the Société

Générale despite the fact this combine, after a time, held only 5 per cent of the share capital of Forminière.

Given all these manoeuvres, the Belgian Congo

> still held a considerable portfolio of investments which, at the most moderate estimate, were valued at about 40 million francs. In addition it possessed various prerogatives, such as voting rights and the right to nominate representatives to administrative boards, in a whole series of enterprises in which it did not hold capital participations.
>
> (Nkrumah, op. cit.)

Among these companies, including the Banque Centrale du Congo Belge, the Comité National du Kivu, Compagnie des Chemin de Fer des Grands Lacs, Forminière, etc. there was, of course, the Comité Spécial du Katanga and hence the Union Minière.

On June 27th, 1960, three days before the Congo's independence, the Belgian government passed a decree dissolving the C.S.K. (On the 30th the Comité National du Kivu, another charter company, was also dissolved.) The new Congo government was left with a minority holding from what was the portfolio of the C.S.K., including its portfolio in the Union Minière. Part of the remaining assets passed on to the Compagnie du Katanga of the Société Générale and the rest were offered to other shareholders. The story could go on longer; essential to establish however, is that the Belgian capitalists and their state took all these measures to limit and diminish the authority over large portfolios which would have passed from the colonial government to the government of the independent Congo.

The engineering of the adventure of Tshombe's 'independent state of Katanga' was later to show that the Belgian bourgeoisie was not satisfied with the 'legal safeguards' it had built by dissolving the charter companies.

The same Tshombe of Katanga was to become Prime Minister of the Congo in 1964. In November of that year the next phase of the game over who controls the Union Minière started. M. Moise Tshombe published a decree transferring the entire portfolio of the old C.S.K. in Union Minière to the Congolese government, and without compensation. The decree increased the Congolese government's voting strength in the Union Minière from 20 to 36 per cent and reduced that of the Société Générale from 40 to below 29 per cent. Then ensued the negotiations, the consultation and the bargaining.

At the end of it all Tshombe came back from Brussels with 24 per cent of the voting rights in Union Minière. He also came back with a whole series of new arrangements. The Congo had now a national debt of $900 million; there were arrangements about financial bonds, old bonds, new bonds, bonds whose price had suddenly fallen, permitting the Belgian financiers to retain $450 million which should have gone back to the Congo; there were arrangements that Belgian property in the Congo should not be nationalised; arrangements and arrangements. To round it off, an arrangement to set up an Investment Bank to manage all portfolios of the government was reached; the Belgians were to control it.

When the farce was played out, the trusts stood up and applauded the arrangements. The rule of monopoly capitalism had not been dented; the discussions after all were not about consolidating the independence of the Congo. They were not about the need, even so much as the wish, to transform the social and economic conditions of the mass of the people of the Congo.

Then Tshombe engineered a crisis. He pretended to take revolutionary positions. Otherwise, how could he hope not to meet the resistance of the patriotic forces; he especially, as one who presided over the murder of Lumumba. The demagogy resulted in nothing, as it was never intended to. Even for Mobutu, the smokescreen soon blew away exposing the profits which the trusts continued to draw from the Congo and the power they still enjoyed.

Thus we enter the third and latest phase of the game. In the jostling for power, Tshombe was to become yet again a politician-in-exile.

In the period immediately preceding the military putsch, the revolutionary forces in the Congo had taken up arms in defence of the interests of the people which were being attacked by the imperialists helped by a neo-colonialist government, with its armed forces led by General Mobutu.

To 'justify' the putsch, the General also had to flex his muscles at the Union Minière. Thus it was that the order of January 1st was published, giving the Congo control over the Union Miniere.

The 'negotiations' surrounding the whole episode are, as seems all these discussions about portfolios and voting rights, full of confused strands.

When the Mobutu military government seized power, it promulgated a law nationalising all mineral rights in Kinshasa and requiring that concessions granted since 1960 should be renewed (the so-called Bakajika Law). It also passed a law requiring that companies operating in the Congo should locate their headquarters in Kinshasa.

It was over the latter of the two laws that part of the 'battle' between the Mobutu government on the one hand and the trusts and the Belgian government on the other, took place. The Mobutu government also demanded that the Union Minière, apart from transferring its headquarters to Kinshasa, should also pay about $85 million tax arrears, this amounting to the total sum of money in taxes calculated to have been paid by the company to the Tshombe regime in Katanga.

The replies of the Union Minière to the two demands are interesting for their uncompromising conceit and assuredness.

Concerning the transference of the headquarters, Union Minière replied that it would not move from Brussels as this would be depriving shareholders 'of a security which they consider to be indispensable'. (London *Financial Times*, 24-12-66.)

On the question of the tax arrears, the company said the claims were 'unfounded in substance and extravagant in amount. . . . As things stand . . . it is not Union Minière which owes money to the Congo but the reverse'. (*Financial Times*, 4-1-67.)

It was over the first issue, however, that negotiations continued. On refusal to change their headquarters, communicated to the world in the above-mentioned Note issued by the company on December 23rd, the Mobutu government set up its own company, to take over the interests of the Union Minière. The company was baptised the Société Congolaise des Minerais.

The new company was set up with capital amounting to $150 million (approximately). Of this share capital 55 per cent was to be held by the Kinshasa government, 15 per cent by Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. and the remaining 30 per cent was to be offered to other private interests.

On January 4th, Tanganyika Concessions published a 'Notice to members of the company' in which they repudiated any interest in the new company. The Notice reported that a message had been sent to it a few days earlier, 'through diplomatic channels' that 'all steps would be taken by the Congo government to guarantee the rights of Tanganyika Concessions Ltd.' As we know, of course, 'Tanks' is one of the large shareholders in the Union Minière.

'The directors (continued the Notice), deeply regret these events which they believe to be contrary to the interests of all concerned. They will continue with every means in their power to support the rights and interests of their shareholders in the present unfortunate situation.' (*Financial Times*, 4-1-67.)

One other detail in the story is that the Union Minière had agreed to a 50 per cent holding by the government of Kinshasa in a reconstructed Union Minière. The reconstruction would have been the splitting of the company into a Kinshasa-based and a Belgium-based section. This share would only cover the Kinshasa company. First the Kinshasa government, it appears, demanded a 51 per cent share. Later, this was reduced to 50 per cent together with an 18 per cent holding in the Belgian-based company. It was at the stage when the government of Kinshasa proceeded to demand that the bulk of 'the assets of the Belgian company be transferred to the Congo company' that negotiations broke down.

On the threatened take-over, the Union Minière declared that it would not in any case go into liquidation. It had 'the organisation and resources for a satisfactory continuation of its activity, which, if it is not in or connected with the Congo, will be in Belgium or perhaps elsewhere'. (*Financial Times*, 4-1-67.) Undoubtedly, the company was thinking of its considerable interests in Belgium and elsewhere built on the super-profits made in the Congo.

At some point it was reported that a consortium of companies had acceded to Mobutu's invitation to co-operate with him in running and financing the new company. Union Minière threatened legal action.

An interesting aspect of this legal action was the way it exposed yet again the intricacy of the ramifications of international finance capital. Kinshasa copper had for some time been shipped via the railway of the Companhia do Caminho de Ferro de Benguela. This railway, running through Angola to Lobito Bay, belongs to Tanganyika Concessions which owns 97 per cent of its capital. Thus the double interest of Tanganyika Concessions in the dispute.

The Mobutu government had threatened to take over all the interests of the Société Générale de Belgique if the tax arrears were not met by January 15th. When the day came, after two Cabinet meetings, the government in Kinshasa announced that these interests, the predominant factor in the economy of Kinshasa, would not after all be seized. That seems to have rounded off the issue of tax arrears.

Indeed, had the threat been carried through, it would have made nonsense of a statement made by M. Mungul Diaka, Kinshasa Ambassador to Brussels, to heads of Belgian-owned African companies on December 28th when the Ambassador said:

> The expropriation of Union Minière du Haut-Katanga is not nationalisation, and need cause no alarm to other investors in the Congo. (F.T., December 29th, 1966.)

Continuing the tradition of close co-operation between monopoly capitalism and state, the government of Belgium was involved throughout in these negotiations. The company also claimed that a number of agreements had been violated, including what was called the 'Spaak-Tshombe Convention', exposing more than anything else how the socialist, M. Paul-Henri Spaak had devised an agreement which to use the words of the Société Générale de Belgique in 1909 had been 'favourably received by the management of the company'.

The intervention of the American, Mr. Theodore Sorensen, one-time legal adviser to President Kennedy is also of interest. Sorensen, it was reported, was sent by Mobutu to put his representations to the trusts and the government in Belgium. Perhaps it was the American interests in Kinshasa that had persuaded Mobutu as to who his advisers should be.

Mobutu's attempts led him not only to American legal advisers. It was also reported that Italian mining companies had been approached, with the Italian-American group, Montecatini Edison mentioned by name. Reference was made also to 'other European mining groups'. Mr. Tasuichi Mima, president of the Japanese Nippon Mining Company admitted that his company's representatives were in Kinshasa 'negotiating . . . a copper concession with the government of J. Mobutu . . .' (*Financial Times*, 6-1-67). The consortium referred to earlier included the Banque Lambert, one of Belgium's big finance houses, the French Penarroya Mining, Roan Selection Trust, prominent in the Zambian copper-belt, and the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa.

Of this consortium, the *Financial Times* of February 16th this year reported:

> If this group should take a hand, it would be in line with Mr. Kaunda's statement of Zambia's willingness to help the Congo with the support of the Zambian copper mines.

So it would appear that by the 'Zambian copper mines' is meant the mining trusts of Southern Africa.

On February 18th, it was reported that agreement had been reached by the Kinshasa government and the Belgian trusts.

The Kinshasa company was renamed the Société Congolaise des Minerais (Gecomin). This company would take over the interests of the Union Minière. A contract was signed with the Société Générale des Minerais (de Belgique) (S.G.M.), a subsidiary of the Union Minière and the Société Générale de Belgique.

By this agreement the S.G.M. would provide the government of Kinshasa with various services, including management, the execution of Gecomin projects, refining and marketing over a period of five years. The S.G.M. would also look after the Union Minière's confidential documents relating to 'geological and sub-soil information and plans of the workings, pumping, electrical and other installations'. (These documents the *Financial Times* had reported (February 16th, 1967) had been 'a key point in the prolonged discussions between the new . . . company Gecomin and the Société Générale des Minerais'. During this time the documents 'which would take years to reconstitute' were held in Belgium.)

In principle the Kinshasa government agreed to paying compensation and entered into negotiations on this, as a separate issue. The Union Minière demanded $800 million.

The agreement, however, made no provision for the financing of the new company by the S.G.M. It is then to be assumed that the government of Kinshasa will offer 40 per cent of the shares to private interests, since it owns 60 per cent of the share capital of the new company.

On February 10th, it is important to note that the accounts of the Union Minière's subsidiaries were partially unblocked, reversing the step taken on February 1st, and their managers allowed to draw on them, with the authorisation of the Governor of Katanga.

With management, etc. still left in the hands of the parent company and with other companies, including the consortium of the Banque Lambert and others, refusing to be involved in the new company until the issue of compensation was settled, the government of Kinshasa set about appointing the new board anyway.

The chairman is M. Jean Baptiste Kibwe, described by the *Financial Times* of London on January 6th, 1967 as 'the Katangese expert on mining affairs'. This same Kibwe was Vice-President and Minister for Finance in Tshombe's 'independent state of Katanga'. Today he is supposed to preside over the dissolution of the empire of his erstwhile paymasters, while his chief, Tshombe has a death sentence hanging over him.

Perhaps the financiers were correct in making the following assessment, as reported in the *Financial Times* of February 9th:

> *As the political analysts of the London Metal Exchange now agree, President Mobutu's former need to pander to the left-wing extremists among his supporters has been tempered as they too, have come to realise the importance of the Congo's overseas earnings from copper.*

On February 20th, it was reported that copper shipments were likely to resume within that week. They would be carried by the Compagnie Maritime Belge, subsidiary of the Société Générale de Belgique. (A week earlier the Société Générale had disclosed annual net profit for 1966 at approximately $125 million. The statement did not indicate how much came from investments in the Congo. The dividend was the same as that of the previous year.)

Thus Mobutu has, like Tshombe, made his début, and, after much gesticulation, reached agreement with the trusts.

The lessons for Kinshasa and to Africa are ones that this journal has pointed out before. They call for vigilance in the face of manoeuvres that the imperialist forces are ceaselessly engaged in.

The revolution in the Congo cannot finally be carried through, and complete independence be won unless the revolutionary forces again assume the upper hand in the struggle against neo-colonialism.

A necessary part of the continuation of colonialism and White supremacy in Southern Africa is the integrity of finance capital in Kinshasa. The struggle, as has been shown, is not entered only by the trusts, but also by the governments of the imperialist countries. Considerations about the security of investments in this area certainly enter into decisions of foreign policy, not only in Brussels, but also in London, Paris and Washington.

If nothing else, France and Belgium are keenly interested in Kinshasa continuing to supply them with cheap copper. These are, in fact, the countries that take almost all the copper from Kinshasa.

Britain's interests are intimately involved with Tanganyika Concessions and its allies on the Zambian copper-belt. British mining capital in this area reaches from the Congo down to South Africa. These factors undoubtedly influenced the hostile stances taken by the governments of all three countries to genuine attempts to bring down the Tshombe government in Katanga. (See Conor Cruise O'Brien, op. cit.)

The case of the United States is interesting in this case because of its reported 'complete co-operation' with the United Nations' mission in the Congo. Undoubtedly, the U.S.A. also had an eye on its financial interests in the area. Apart from what has been said already, it is important to note that the prospect of independence seemed to open the eyes of American monopoly capital to the riches of the Congo. Thus in 1960 the Bank of America acquired a 20 per cent interest in the Société Congolaise de Banque, a subsidiary of the Lambert group. The Ford Motor Company created a subsidiary, Ford Motor (Congo); Union Carbide acquired a majority interest in the Société Minière du Lueshe. The Rockefeller group acquired an interest in the bauxite company, Bauxicongo, together with an 8 per cent holding in the C.C.C.I. in June 1960. Dillon Read & Co. and J. H. Whitney Co., both banking groups created an investment group, the American Eurafrican Fund.

An invasion on this scale in such a short time was a pointer to things to come. Thus it was safer for these companies in their long-term attempt to seize the leading positions here as they had done in Europe in the post-war period, to co-operate with the United Nations to the extent that a successful solution to the problem of an independent state of Katanga would strengthen their hand.

All these groups, then, reflected their different levels of development and entrenchment in Kinshasa. Certainly there were and are contradictions among themselves.

They will, however, continue to echo the sentiments expressed in this newspaper declamation:

> 'Of course, Congolese independence must be respected. But not any kind of independence! Not independence in anarchy! Not independence under the lead of the present Leopoldville government whose incapability is blatant and several members of which have behaved like primitive and imbecile savages, like vulgar scoundrels, or like creatures of communism . . .'
>
> (*La Libre Belgique*, July 12th, 1960.) (Quoted in *Five African States*: The Congo, Edouard, Ed. Gwendolen Carter. N.Y., 1963. Bustin.)

The epithets were not, of course, meant for President Joseph Mobutu or M. Jean Baptiste Kibwe. The savages were the patriotic government of the day, enjoying the support of the popular masses of the workers and peasants. Until these class interests unite to fight a principled and consistent struggle, led by their own vanguard party, the reign of the trusts will continue; so also will the subjugation of the masses of the people of the Congo and of Africa to the dictates of foreign monopoly capitalism.



50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

2. From February to October

TERENCE AFRICANUS

THE RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC revolution of February, as we have seen, put an end to the tsarist dictatorship. Almost overnight this cruel despotism which for centuries had held down the peoples of the enormous area of the Russian empire in slavery and backwardness was swept aside by the revolutionary masses. There was universal rejoicing in Russia and all over the world. The revolutionary and democratic organisations and trade unions emerged from underground, their leaders returned from prison and exile. The masses created their own revolutionary organs of power: the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

But there were warning voices in the midst of the rejoicing. The Bolshevik Party, the revolutionary wing of the Russian labour movement, warned that the policy of the Russian bourgeoisie, supported by the opportunist petit-bourgeois parties, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, would lead to disaster and the betrayal of the revolution. In March *Pravda*, the Bolshevik paper, declared that February was the first step only towards victory. 'Comrades, workers and soldiers', it called. 'Do not lay down your arms! Enlist more fighters in the new revolutionary militia squads. The revolution is not over.'

Far away in South Africa, David Ivon Jones, editor of the *International** wrote with astonishing foresight, in March 1917, that the February revolution was of a bourgeois character, but 'arriving when the night of capitalism is far spent', it could not be a simple repetition of previous revolutions, but would rapidly reach its culmination in a clash between the capitalists, seeking to continue the war and establish 'law and order' and the working class fighting for a socialist republic.

Above all there was the towering figure of Lenin, the brilliant Russian Marxist. He had already enriched scientific socialism more than any contemporary theoretician. His penetrating analysis *Imperialism—the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, developed Marxist theory in the period of modern monopoly capitalism; his profound works on the real character of the imperialist war were a guide to the revolutionary workers and oppressed peoples of the whole world. He was a bitter and relentless enemy of opportunism and revisionism, both in the Russian and the international working class movement.

From the very moment of his arrival back from exile, he threw himself passionately and single-mindedly into the task of mobilising the Party and the masses for the socialist revolution. He came to the Finland Station in Petrograd on Easter Day. The news of his arrival had preceded him, and a vast crowd of workers and soldiers had gathered on the square outside the station to greet the leader of the revolution. There was also an official delegation from the executive of the Petrograd Soviet, still at that time under right-wing leadership, headed by the Menshevik, Chkheidze, who made an official speech urging co-operation with the petty bourgeois parties.

Lenin's reply was to march out into the square, where he was hoisted on to an armoured car by workers and soldiers and made a fiery and historic speech ending with the slogan 'Long live the socialist revolution!' He immediately proceeded to unite and mobilise the Party, and thus eventually the masses, around the line of policy which has come to be known as 'the April Theses'.

THE APRIL THESES

Lenin argued convincingly that since the February revolution, Russia was in transition from the democratic revolution which (because of the insufficient class-consciousness and organisation of the working class)

* This journal was the organ of the International Socialist League which united with other Marxist organisations in July 1921 to form the Communist Party.

had placed power in the hands of the capitalists, to the second stage, in which capitalist power must be overthrown and replaced by the rule of the workers and poor peasants.

The immediate task was to fight against the imperialist war, which was bleeding Russia white. The only way to end Russian participation in the war was to overthrow capitalist rule and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat.

The slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat had been put forward by Marx and Engels to describe the form of state required to suppress capitalist resistance, end exploitation, achieve true democracy and build socialism. But Lenin did not merely repeat this slogan; he gave it concrete form in the conditions of Russia at that time. The masses had spontaneously created their own form of state power—the Soviets of workers and peasants—infinitely more democratic than any parliamentary republic. What was needed was not a bourgeois state, on Western lines, designed to stifle the political activity of the masses, but a Republic of Soviets. Thus the basic political slogan for the period was 'All power to the Soviets!'

But, in order to ensure that implementation of this slogan would really meet the needs of the masses for peace, bread and land, bring about a peaceful transition to workers' rule, and embark on the road to socialism, it was necessary to expose and defeat, within the Soviets themselves, the then predominant influence of the opportunist, petty bourgeois parties, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. For these Parties did not reflect the real interests of the masses. They supported the imperialist war, they opposed agrarian reform and workers' control of industry.

In view of the shameful betrayal of principles by all the main Social-Democratic parties, which had brought the very name into disrepute among revolutionary workers, Lenin proposed that the Party change its name from 'Social Democratic' to the Communist Party—as originally preferred by Marx and Engels themselves. He also proposed that initiative be taken to set up a new ('Third') International working class movement to replace the Second International which had collapsed at the onset of the war.

These proposals were accepted by the Party. An intensive campaign was begun to win the masses for the policy of the April Theses.

MASS SUPPORT FOR LENIN

This campaign met with an enthusiastic response among the masses of soldiers, workers and peasants. The country was facing an ever-deepening crisis, arising from the war. More than fifteen million men were in the army, draining the countryside of its labour force, and leading to an acute shortage of food. More and more the demand was raised for an end of the war and the transfer of power to the Soviets—and in the Soviets themselves pressure was building up for fresh elections in which the opportunist leaders were defeated and the Bolsheviks steadily gained strength.

By July, opposition to the war and the bourgeois policies of the Provisional Government had grown to the extent that the workers and soldiers were openly calling for insurrection and raising the slogan 'All power to the Soviets!' Huge demonstrations took place throughout Russia. The right-wing socialists and other heads of the government reacted sharply. Demonstrations were banned; an order was issued for Lenin's arrest and he was forced to live underground in disguise—later the Party sent him, for safety, to Finland, from where he was in daily contact with the Central Committee. A wave of terror spread through the country. The period of 'dual power' ended; the bourgeoisie alone ruled the country.

The Bolsheviks concluded that it was no longer possible to continue working, as before, for a peaceful transfer of power to the working class. A new stage had arrived in which it was necessary to meet violence with violence and to prepare for an armed uprising. Lenin foresaw that this would take place in September or October.

'It was astounding', wrote one of his colleagues, Ordjonikidze. 'We had just suffered a serious setback and here he was predicting a victorious outcome within a month or two'. It was a confidence based on a profound study and understanding of the situation in the country.

AN ATTEMPTED COUP

The reactionary forces in Russia, in collusion with the Allied imperialists (Britain, the U.S. and France) plotted to bring off a counter-revolutionary coup under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov. He began forming 'shock batallions' from among selected and privileged sections of the army. At the same time he ordered the disbandment of fifty-nine divisions (a third of the entire infantry) who were considered to be infected with revolutionary ideas.

A crucial part of the scheme was the intended surrender to the Germans of Petrograd—the capital and revolutionary centre of the country.

The Bolsheviks learnt about this conspiracy and exposed it to the masses. They organised Red Guards and armed workers' detachments against the counter-revolution. By August 30th the Bolshevik Party had amassed 60,000 armed men near Petrograd—more than Kornilov and his supporters could muster. The Kornilov affair aroused mass indignation and the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionary Party (whose leader Kerensky was now Prime Minister) were forced to denounce the coup and take a public stand against it. The plot failed and at the end of August Kornilov was arrested.

But the government's policies were obviously bringing the country to the brink of ruin and collapse. Between March and September coal output dropped by 23 per cent. Iron and steel production was a third below what it had been in 1913, before the war began. Inflation and unemployment were facing millions with starvation. In the months of September and October 1917, food prices rose by 340 per cent.

The country was spending fifty-eight million roubles a day on the war—yet even the soldiers in the trenches, as a result of corruption and mismanagement, were not receiving any food.

THE PEOPLE FIGHT BACK

A wave of strikes spread through the country. The peasants began to seize the land from the big estates of the landowners; in September and October there were 105 peasant uprisings in various parts of the country, and when the army was sent to suppress them the soldiers—mainly themselves peasants—sided with the masses.

At the front, the soldiers were electing Bolsheviks to their Soviets, arresting counter-revolutionary officers, fraternising with the German soldiers and demanding peace. Most of the army came over to the Bolsheviks, and so did almost all the sailors of the Baltic Fleet.

It was in these critical conditions that the Party leadership had to make preparations for an armed insurrection. Lenin was firmly opposed to an adventurist approach. A successful insurrection, he wrote, must rely 'not upon conspiracy, and not upon a party, but on the advanced class. It must rely on a revolutionary upsurge of the people. It must rely upon that *turning-point* in the history of the growing revolution when the activity of the advanced ranks of the people is at its height and when the vacillations in the ranks of the enemy and in the ranks of the weak, half-hearted and irresolute friends of the revolution are at their strongest.

'Never play with insurrection', he wrote. 'When beginning it, realise firmly that you must go all the way.

'Concentrate a great superiority of forces at the decisive point and at the decisive moment, otherwise the enemy, who has the advantage of better preparation and organisation, will destroy the insurgents.

'Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest determination, and by all means, without fail, take the offensive. The defensive is the death of every armed uprising.

'You must take the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when his forces are scattered.

'You must strive for daily successes, however small . . .. and at all costs retain moral superiority.'

THE GUNSHOT FROM THE AURORA

The bourgeois Provisional Government did not stand by idly while the Bolsheviks were preparing for insurrection. On the morning of October 24th (November 6th) it struck the first blow. It ordered raids on the Party press, in which the type was smashed up and the newspapers *Pravda* ('Truth') and *Soldat* ('Soldier') were confiscated. The government ordered the arrest of the Bolshevik leaders and the seizure of their headquarters at the Smolny Institute in Petrograd; at the same time the bridges leading to the workers' districts were cut off by troops. The Winter Palace, seat of the Provisional Government, was guarded by 2,000 counter-revolutionary shock troops. The same evening, Lenin wrote urgently to the Central Committee, that the long prepared plans must be put into action immediately. 'To delay the uprising would be fatal. . . . We must at all costs, this very evening, arrest the government, having first disarmed the officer cadets. . . . We must not wait! We may lose everything!'

The Revolutionary Military Committee acted. Orders were issued to all workers and revolutionary military forces. At 5 p.m. the workers' forces occupied the telegraph office, seized the many strategic bridges of Petrograd (a city standing on a number of islands) and took over the railway station.

By the morning of October 25th almost the entire city was in the hands of the revolutionaries, the Provisional Government having control only of the Winter Palace and its immediate vicinity. Kerensky fled; the remaining members of the government found themselves encircled and under siege in the Palace.

At 9.45 in the evening a blank shot was fired from the six-inch gun of the cruiser Aurora, at anchor in the city. This was the signal for the storming of the Winter Palace. The battle did not last long. At ten past two in the morning the ministers were arrested.

Power had passed out of the hands of the capitalists and landlords into those of the Soviets of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers in the most momentous revolution of all history.

There had been surprisingly little bloodshed. According to the *History of the October Revolution* (Moscow, 1966) 'in the assault on the Winter Palace, five sailors and one soldier were killed and several persons were lightly wounded.'

PEACE AND LAND

The first act of the new Soviet Government was to adopt Lenin's draft Decree on Peace, calling on all peoples and governments engaged in the war to start negotiations at once for the conclusion of a peace without annexations or indemnities. The next was a Decree on Land, providing for the distribution of land among the peasants and abolishing private ownership of land. A new Cabinet was appointed with Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

It was not to be smooth sailing for the young workers' socialist republic, the first in the world. The rival great powers, though still at war with one another, joined in invading the U.S.S.R. and in backing various counter-revolutionary forces, headed by such tsarist generals and admirals as Kolchak and Denikin, in the months and years that followed. The fight to maintain Soviet power proved immensely more costly in blood and sacrifice than the actual revolution.

At first there were not many people in the outside world who saw the true significance of the October Revolution. All the 'experts' and bourgeois commentators predicted that the Bolsheviks would not remain in power for more than a few weeks or months.

But all over the world the masses of the common people, and their far-sighted revolutionary leaders, rejoiced at the Russian revolution and saw it as a new dawn for the oppressed and exploited of the earth. They placed their hopes and their confidence in Lenin and his comrades. One of the most far-sighted was David Ivon Jones. He wrote in the *International* of November 1917, under the title *Dawn of the World*:

> **What we are witnessing is an unfolding of the world-wide Commonwealth of Labour, which if the oppressed of all lands only knew . . . would sweep them into transports of gladness. It is this high ecstasy which animates the Russian people today . . . Our task in South Africa is a great one. We must educate the people in the principles of the Russian Revolution. We have to prepare the workers against any attempt to mobilise them against their Russian comrades, and in preparing, spread the flames of the most glorious and most peaceful revolution of all time.**

That vision of Ivon Jones has indeed been triumphantly vindicated by history. During the past fifty years there has been no major event nor any corner of the world that has not been profoundly modified by the influence and consequences of the October Revolution. In our next issue we shall consider some of the main consequences of that 'most glorious revolution of all time' for the world, for our continent and our country.

AFRICA

Notes on Current Events

by SOL DUBULA

South Africa—a *détente* to save white supremacy

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ruling class is intensifying its efforts to gain footholds in other parts of Africa. In this way it hopes not only to obtain the normal economic advantages of imperialist exploitation but also to create client states whose political policy will be influenced by dependence on South African capital. Both the government and the official opposition press in South Africa make no secret of their growing confidence in this newly found white-anting technique in Africa.

Allister Sparks, the foreign editor of the Johannesburg *Rand Daily Mail*, writing in the March issue of *Africa Report* says:

> 'The magic key has been found: it is South Africa's economic strength and technical know-how. Protectorates and Bantustans aside, already trade is increasing with Malawi, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Kenya. Much of the political fire has disappeared out of black Africa: its leading ideologists have gone in a year of eight coups and a more conservative brand of military leader has taken over, intent upon the long hard business of economic development. This surely is South Africa's golden opportunity. We can be the economic power house of the continent. Why can we not like France, and starting from a base of neo-colonies, use our economic ability to extend our influence?'

Sparks attributes this line of thought to the more 'visionary Nationalists' and says that it is not without sophistication. He has a sufficient knowledge of the situation in Africa to make the point that it is going to be extremely difficult to sell apartheid. Therefore, he says, when he talks of a *détente* between white South Africa and black Africa he means not the acceptance of apartheid but the relaxation of 'tensions, to bring about a thaw in the cold war through improved mutual understanding. It begins at personal level through the discovery that the other fellow does not have horns and a forked tail: that individually he may be jolly decent. . . . I believe that the atmosphere in Africa is ready for such a *détente* . . . its leaders are a more sober and chastened lot. They are much more cautious today and one no longer hears of grandiose plans to send armies of liberation moving south. There is a hiatus and we should make use of it.'

Is Sparks saying anything more than this: if you get to know our Mr. Vorster you will discover that he is not really the devil incarnate? Behind the mask of evil pulses the heart of a man who will be ready to do business with anyone if only they are 'sober' enough to be willing to deal with a man and a government whose economy is based on one of the most ruthless forms of race exploitation that mankind has experienced.

Sparks writes from the point of view of an anguished Liberal who has (correctly enough) abandoned hope that the white electorate will ever voluntarily give up its privileges and who has therefore (incorrectly) concluded that there is no hope for radical change in South Africa. With an extraordinary naïveté he posits a *détente* between the racialist regime and black Africa as holding out the possibility of some evolution towards a more democratic South Africa—as if it were pure misunderstanding and not privilege and profit which was at the bottom of race rule. What he is really doing is serving those in South Africa who are working out new techniques to maintain white dominance in South Africa and to extend it further into other parts of Africa. The creation of client states dependent upon South Africa both politically and economically is one of the weapons in this armoury. Even men like Sparks, who have played some part in the past in exposing the wickedness of apartheid, have fallen for this new tactic of the white ruling class to the extent that he is even anxious that the liberals should fire the first shots 'Let those of us who are liberal South Africans not wait for others to move first', he says. 'If necessary let us take the initiative. Let us make use of our liberal talent and humanistic concern. Let us organise study tours and cultural exchanges. Let us explore all opportunities for establishing contact. Let us establish a volunteer peace corps that can begin by working in the Protectorates and then move on to Malawi, Kenya and Zambia.'

How tragic it is that well-meaning Liberals like Sparks should so easily become the instruments of Vorster and Co. At rock-bottom the reason for this lies in the white liberal's fear of people's power and basic change. After lamenting the fact that there is no hope of a liberal victory at the white polls, he goes on 'And if not, then what do you do, you and I who are liberal-minded? Become revolutionaries? Or conform? Or get out? Or just go on protesting whilst being plagued by a sense of guilt that we are trying to exonerate ourselves from the stigma of white supremacy whilst still enjoying its privileges'. Yes, Mr. Sparks, you have to become a revolutionary if you are really serious. Dress it up as you will, the services of able propagandists like you will be welcomed by those in our country who want to both aid and take advantage of the counter revolutionary activities in Africa by bringing about a *détente* between your master race government and black Africa. If ever independent Africa learns to coexist with the present regime in South Africa it will be a sad day indeed for our people and for the whole of mankind.

The South African imperialists are not waiting for the Liberal peace corps to blaze the trail. Daily, news trickles out of increasing economic infiltration by white capital into other parts of Africa. In Mauritania a company known as Charter Consolidated which is one of the major subsidiaries of the South African De Beers Consolidated has acquired 54 per cent of the shareholding of Sommima, a company which has been established to exploit the Akjoujt copper fields. Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, the South African financier, is chairman of both De Beers and the new group. (He is also chairman of the Diamond Corporation which controls Sierra Leone's diamond production.) The Mauritanian government will be Mr. Oppenheimer's partner in this venture by virtue of its minority 25 per cent shareholding in Charter Consolidated.

Recently the details have been published of the first trade agreement which has ever been signed between South Africa and an independent African state—Malawi. Radio Brazzaville described the agreement as a betrayal of the O.A.U.'s policy and the A.A.U.T.F. has said 'the trade pact is in fact an open defiance of the O.A.U. of which Malawi is a member and a betrayal of the struggle of the people of Africa for liberty and human dignity'. President Banda in justification said, amongst other things, that South Africa was here to stay and was the most powerful country in Africa industrially, economically, financially and the most powerful militarily. 'Isolation and expulsion from the O.A.U. does not worry me', he added.

The fact that any African state has to be dependent on imperialism is horrific enough. But it is so much more tragic when this dependence is on a state and a government which regards men like Banda and Chief Jonathan as 'boys' and which treats their compatriots within South Africa as a lower form of life. And it is with a government of this calibre that Chief Jonathan is, it seems with unconcern, putting in pawn the proud Lesotho people. After his last meeting with Vorster he said 'It is essential that we keep on good terms with South Africa, realising that the whole basis of our economy depends on South African goodwill'. The joint communiqué stated that the two Prime Ministers agreed that their countries should 'remain vigilant against the danger of international communism'.

Ghana—opposition to N.L.C.

One of the staunchest friends of Ghana's so-called National Liberation Council—*West Africa*—has been forced to concede that support for the N.L.C. is 'flinching' and that there is a 'present lack of confidence in the army' (May 20th, 1967). Of course the excuses pour out glibly. The N.L.C. members are heavily overburdened with work, they say, since they carry on with their army duties and at the same time take very seriously the supervision of the Ministries assigned to them.

The growing and widespread belief by the Ghanaian people that the new regime—despite its moral postures—is in the hands of many who are openly practising corruption in public life is, according to *West Africa*, not surprising because over a year after the 1966 coup very few people have been punished for the 'old regime's misdeeds'. No doubt there was a degree of corruption in Nkrumah's Ghana and this was recognised by the deliberate efforts made from time to time to eradicate this. But the absence of large-scale prosecutions, which we were all led by the N.L.C. to believe would follow the coup thick and fast, strongly suggests that like many other aspects of its anti-Nkrumah diatribe the N.L.C. has overreached itself. Again here, *West Africa* is forced to provide a clue. It could not but note that much of the evidence placed before the commissions investigating corruption 'seems to stem from personal vendettas'. But all praise is showered at the N.L.C. for its 'taming of the jungle of state enterprises' (for which read 'for handing over state economic institutions to private and foreign entrepreneurs'). It is also praised for achieving a foreign trade surplus at the cost, it is conceded, of massive unemployment.

The Convention Peoples Party comes closer to a true explanation of the growing unpopularity of this regime when it says in a recent ciruclar that 'Ghana since last year's coup has become a less happy and miserable place to live in'. In the fourteen months since the N.L.C. has been in power well over 200,000 people have been sacked from their jobs. The cost of living has risen and there is a short supply of staple foods. School fees have been reintroduced and schoolchildren have to pay for their textbooks. There has been a massive withdrawal of financial assistance to those studying overseas. Tribalism has been intensified. Judges have been sacked. Bribery is on the increase.

Lt. Arthur, one of the men executed for his part in the recent attempted coup against the N.L.C. stated in the course of his trial that he believed that the N.L.C. was amassing wealth and 'betraying the aims of the February 24th revolution'. It seems that Major General Sir Edward Spears whose company the Ashanti Goldfields regularly derives massive profits from its operations in Ghana was 'delighted' at the disgusting and barbaric manner in which the executions took place. According to his secretary, quoted in the *Morning Star*, this gentleman felt that it was a 'very good thing to execute them in public so that people would know that they had in fact been shot'. When the Major General was operating his enterprise under Nkrumah he went on record in praise of his 'vision and imagination'.

Zambia—a blue print

The last National Council meeting of the United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.) of Zambia had before it an interesting document entitled 'Humanism in Zambia'. The document was presented by President Kaunda and contained, in its own words, 'a blue print for Zambian socialism'. The President warned that reactionary forces from minority governments aim to destroy his party and create chaos in the country. The forces referred to are 'first . . . minority governments whose philosophy is based on fear, whose governments do not stem from all the people for fear of majority rule. Their aim is to destroy U.N.I.P. and its leadership so that chaos could follow and then they could claim Zambia to be another Bantustan'.

President Kaunda also exhorted the Party to strive 'relentlessly to establish a true socialist state in Zambia' and to be vigilant about the development of capitalist tendencies in the country. He also asked the party to work for the elimination of privileges and inequalities. Land must remain the property of the state and there must be neither ownership in perpetuity nor absentee landlordism. The document further referred to the need to continue to encourage private enterprise but within the framework of accepted government policy. Mining development is specifically mentioned as a category which should remain in private hands 'open to both foreign and local private investment'. The government should however participate in the iron and steel industries, fertiliser manufacturing, arms manufacturing and public institutions such as power and communications.

Without for one moment doubting the sincerity of President Kaunda's views on the Zambian road to socialisn, one is forced to wonder how easy it will be to make an effective start in the direction of socialism with the basic wealth of the country (mining) permanently in the control of private (and in the main foreign) hands.

Uganda—a new Constitution

In terms of a recent Bill the Ugandan National Assembly will constitute itself into a Constituent Assembly in order to adopt a new constitution. According to Mr. Binaisa, the Attorney General, this procedure for adopting a completely new constitution has precedents in India, Pakistan, Ghana (under Nkrumah), the Sudan and the former Tanganyika. Opposition to the move came from Mr. A. A. Latim, the leader of the opposition. He said that some people were not represented in the National Assembly because their representatives were no longer in the House. The Attorney General pointed out that those members who had refused to take the oath of allegiance to the interim constitution adopted after the failure of the Kabaka inspired coup, had been given every facility to return to the House. 'Whether they returned or not was entirely their problem, not that of the government.'

Congo—Kinshasa: referendum on future Constitution

A new draft constitution for the Congo has been announced by President Mobutu. It is being submitted to a popular referendum. In terms of this constitution, elections will be held in 1968 for the National Assembly which will have a life of five years. The existing House of Representatives and Senate are due to be dissolved as soon as the constitution has been approved. Between this date and the new elections President Mobutu will rule by decree.

The draft provides for a President who will be elected for a seven-year term under a system of direct universal suffrage of both men and women. The National Assembly will have 300 members and the President will be head of the Army and Police Force and will have powers to appoint members of his government, Provincial Governors and senior Civil Servants. In its provisions relating to the division of powers between the legislature and the executive the constitution appears to follow the pattern of Presidential regimes such as Tanzania's and Zambia's. But a distinctive provision relates to the question of political parties. The number of political parties or movements will be restricted to two and President Mobutu has already announced that he himself will lead a 'new revolutionary party'. He also emphasised that the freedom of each citizen to join any movement would remain guaranteed but that only 'constructive opposition would be allowed'. In the coming elections (1968) the voting would be for parties and not for individuals or regional candidates.

Somali Coast—more evidence of fraud

Since our last issue more facts have come to light adding proof to the contention that the March referendum was a patent fraud. In a 'White Paper' entitled 'The Infamous Referendum' the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to a voting district—Dikhil—where the majority voted 'Yes' to a continuation of French rule but where the number of votes cast exceeded the number of registered voters. Also, according to French figures, the population of those country areas from which more support for France was expected had since 1963 increased miraculously by about 40 per cent whereas the urban areas of Djibouti as well as the rural area of Ali Sabieh, both of which were known to be solidly anti-imperialist, had a population increase of only 4 per cent. Need more be said?

DEATH OF J. O. B. OMOTOSHO

Nigerian Marxist Leader

It is with deep sorrow that we have to announce the death of the Nigerian Marxist leader of workers and peasants—J. O. B. Omotosho who died instantaneously at the age of 48 in a motor accident on the Ibadan-Lagos road on Saturday, May 20th, 1967. His funeral was witnessed by innumerable farmers, workers and people's organisations on Saturday, May 27th, 1967, at Ipoti-Ekiti where he was the inspirer and organiser of a gigantic collective farm and development project because as he said, 'We must build our basis in the countryside'. And his programme of peasant organisation was just gathering momentum in the western region. . . .

J. O. B. Omotosho was an attorney by profession, always to be found defending poor peasants, workers and those under the attack of state forces. He was the advocate for Dr. Victor Allen and others against sedition and treason and was the attorney who saved the life of the Camerouns U.P.C. fighter—Celestine Bassong who would have been sent to a firing squad in the Camerouns Republic.

J. O. B. was, before his return to Nigeria, active in the Pan-African movement and in the anti-colonial struggle, in the West African Students Union and was associated with the then *Daily Worker*. In Nigeria he had for two decades been a principal financier of left and progressive causes and a philanthropist to many youths from pauperised homes anxious for an education.

J. O. B., as we fondly knew him, was the founder and first Editor of *Advance*, the Nigerian workers' newspaper. He was on the Editorial Board of *Nigerian Socialist*. He was President of the Nigerian Union of Democratic Journalists, legal adviser to many trade unions, to the Nigerian Tenants' Association and other people's organisations, and a member of the Nigerian Academy of Scientific and Technical Workers. His last paper before the bourgeois seminar of Law Teachers under the auspices of the Attorney-General was a brilliant piece on the *Marxist Attitude to Law in Developing Nations*.

J. O. B. is a tragic loss to the peoples and socialist movements whose place as theoretician and organiser-in-the-field will be hard to fill.

J. O. B. used to love your (or, rather, our) *African Communist* and valued the publications of the South African struggle you used to send him. Please convey our sorrow to all sections of the South African movement abroad.

Baba Oluwide.

Ibadan.

BOOK REVIEWS

New Light on Kenya

Jaramogi Oginga Odinga's Hard-Hitting Autobiography

AFRICA PLACED THE highest hopes on independent Kenya, whose independence had been won after such bitter struggles against British imperialism, backing up a substantial and powerful White settler minority, and which had seemingly attained a high degree of national unity under the leadership of the veteran militant Jomo Kenyatta. It was thought by African patriots that free Kenya was cast for a dynamic and crucial role in the struggle to unite East Africa, to eliminate imperialism and neo-colonialism, to help the freedom-fighters in the South and the Portuguese colonies, to make a powerful contribution towards African unity and socialism.

These high hopes have been sadly disappointed. It became increasingly clear that imperialist and reactionary tendencies were deeply entrenched, their influence running deep into the upper ranks of the ruling party, K.A.N.U. In theory and in practice K.A.N.U. moved more and more towards the capitalist road of development, though disguising this under demagogic and meaningless declarations of 'African Socialism', which reached their lowest point in the notorious government paper on this theme which, as was correctly pointed out at the time, was apparently drafted by someone who was neither an African nor a socialist (this surmise has now been confirmed by the revelation that it was drawn up by an American attached to Mr. Mboya's department!).

At the same time it was clear that a powerful conspiracy was at work to isolate and oust the most patriotic and militant government and K.A.N.U. leaders, focused particularly on the popular and dynamic personality of Vice-President Oginga Odinga, the man who had fought ceaselessly and boldly for Kenyatta's release on the eve of independence —when nearly all the present K.A.N.U. leaders were reluctant or scared to do so.

It was because of the uncompromising and determined stand of 'Jaramogi' ('Teacher') as he is called by his own people, against corruption and neo-colonialism, that the right-wing in K.A.N.U. and its foreign backers determined to oust him. Eventually he left K.A.N.U., the organisation he had toiled so arduously to establish and build, and with Bildad Kaggia, Denis Akuku, Achieng Oneko, Tom Okelo-Odongo and other stalwarts set up the Kenya People's Union to carry on the fight for the cause of the wananchi—the masses, who have been forgotten and abandoned by the entrenched K.A.N.U. leadership.

Now Odinga has raised the curtain on the inside story of the long and painful development of the Kenya liberation movement in his outspoken autobiography* newly published in London. This book is far more than a personal record—although the early chapters recounting his upbringing in a Luo village of Central Nyanza make fascinating reading. The author's life is inextricably bound up with the development of Kenya's fight for uhuru—independence and freedom—a fight which, as the title reveals, is still unfinished. By far the greater part of the book is devoted to the story, in broad outline, of that struggle.

Of course it is not intended as a complete history. As the author himself observes,

> We in Kenya have still to write our history of those years. For this the men who founded K.A.N.U. and other patriotic and political organisations, those who organised the trade unions and led the first strikes, who spent the Emergency years in the detention camps and, above all, the fighters in the forests, will have to combine.

Yet Odinga has already performed an invaluable service to those future historians and to the public of Kenya by presenting in this book the necessary perspective and framework in which that history will have to be told.

THE FIGHTERS IN THE FORESTS

One of the outstanding chapters in the book—'Peasants in Revolt'—puts the record straight on one of the great epics of Africa's freedom struggle, the so-called 'Mau Mau Rebellion'. Imperialist and white settler propaganda has created a picture of a rather primitive type of tribal

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**Not Yet Uhuru*, by Oginga Odinga, Heinemann, 35s.

revolt with little political or national consciousness. Odinga's version—though only in brief outline—goes far to correct this picture. He shows how, before it was crushed by British imperialist terror, the freedom forces numbering 30,000 held the enemy at bay for eighteen months, and set up a 'Kenya Parliament'—aiming to recruit all Kenyan tribes to the struggle—to 'plan an overall struggle that reflected not a narrow tribalism but the aim of a united, independent African Kenya. The Kenya Parliament and its army, writes Odinga,

> represented an all-Kenya nationalism with advanced and clearly-stated political aims . . . the Kenya Parliament was asked 'Why are you fighting? What must be done to get the freedom-fighters to come out of the forest peacefully with their arms?' The reply was: 'We are fighting for all land stolen from us by the Crown . . . The British Government must grant Kenya full independence under African leadership, and hand over all land previously alienated, for distribution to the landless.'

In truth, although Kenya has achieved independence, the stolen land has not yet been returned, and this is one of the principal stumbling blocks in the way of Kenya's progress today. As the price of independence, during the long drawn out negotiations, Britain insisted on cash compensation for white settlers which will cost the country £26 million—to be paid in Britain. Kenya is getting a poor return for this enormous burden of debt: instead of settling the landless masses on the land thus acquired and encouraging co-operative farms for them the K.A.N.U. leadership, with its orientation towards capitalist economic theories, is creating a new class of 'kulak'-type farmers both African and white. In fact it is startling indeed to read that 'of the total land transfers, more than half of the farms have been acquired by Europeans' . . . 'of the total land area sold to individual purchasers (excluding companies) 70 per cent was acquired by Europeans'.

Such incorrect policies by the K.A.N.U. leadership account for the bitter disappointment felt by the masses. On this and many other episodes of Kenya's development, Odinga speaks out in detail; the long drawn out negotiations with the British; the gradual erosion of K.A.N.U. principle by self-seeking leaders; the rising discontent among the people and the party membership; the sordid intrigues against the militants, in the course of which Odinga's friend, the Kenyan M.P. Pio Pinto was mysteriously assassinated and he himself steadily slandered and manoeuvred out of any real authority, although he held the position of Vice-President.

> In the Cabinet I was being excluded from decision-making, and at one and the same time my membership of the Cabinet was used to silence me and to hold the allegiance of my supporters . . . I was being held hostage in a Cabinet carrying out wrong policies and this was worrying me more deeply than anything in my political life.

HOW DID IT HAPPEN?

All this is carefully narrated by Mr. Odinga, documented with facts and details, proved beyond serious contention and told in a straightforward, modest manner which makes for compulsive reading and induces instant confidence.

Yet there are areas still unexplained in this book. How and why did it all happen? *Not Yet Uhuru* does show, in instance after instance how the former K.A.D.U. members who joined K.A.N.U. and instantly achieved high office, though they had, the day before been conniving with the British and the settlers to sabotage independence, have used their positions to undermine the former principles and policy. He shows how the right-wing group around Mboya, unscrupulously manipulated the K.A.N.U. machinery to stifle democracy and establish their hold over the organisation. In the end Odinga and the militants broke away to form the Kenya People's Union.

But what really was happening behind the scenes in K.A.N.U.? Mr. Odinga stresses such factors as the high salaries paid to M.P.s and Ministers. 'In six months an M.P. receives more money than the average peasant earns in a lifetime.' 'K.A.N.U.'s present overweighted government of Ministers and Junior Ministers earn between them something in the neighbourhood of a quarter of a million pounds sterling a year . . .' 'Gradually political control and business interests have begun to intertwine. Many have begun to use their positions in politics to entrench themselves as a propertied economic group. At one public meeting President Kenyatta put the seal on this process of corruption by answering the criticism of the devoted patriot Kaggia by asking him: 'What have *you* done for yourself?'

All these things ring true. And yet they do not fully explain the degeneration of K.A.N.U. from the once-militant shield of the oppressed to the stage where its best men have left it to go, perhaps for years, into the political wilderness, so soon after independence. At many sections of the book, the writer himself senses and speaks about the unseen machinations of imperialist, particularly British interests behind the scenes. Yet, one feels, perhaps he has not given these aspects sufficient weight; no doubt because even to him, as a leading man in the Government, they were closely hidden behind a curtain of C.I.A. and M.I.5 intrigue.

A corner of that curtain was lifted recently by the publication of the memoirs of the former U.S. ambassador, first in Conakry and then in Nairobi, William Attwood, under the title *The Blacks and the Reds*. This book reveals what an important part was played by the author in meddling in internal Kenyan affairs, and has caused an uproar in the country. The new U.S. representative, Ferguson, was forced to disown the book as 'a violation of ethics', and to make a public promise not to write about his activities 'for five years after I leave Kenya'. A K.A.N.U. M.P., Martin Shikuku said 'I don't say the ousting of Mr. Odinga was wrong, but if this could happen to him, with the assistance of foreign aid, it means that it can happen to any politician. If this goes on there is a danger of Kenya being governed by foreign powers'. K.A.N.U. itself reacted with a violent criticism of the U.S. (the first in years) including an attack on American policy in Vietnam. Attwood's book was banned in Kenya—K.P.U. publicity secretary Achieng Oneko commented acidly that it should rather be made widely available, so that Kenyans could read 'how a former leading foreign envoy became so close to the policy-makers in the K.A.N.U. government that he virtually ruled the country'.

Although it was not intended to do so, this book fully bears out the charges in Oginga Odinga's book of imperialist interference in the affairs of K.A.N.U. and of Kenya. *Not Yet Uhuru* is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand both the past and the present of Kenya; indeed it is a classical case history of the co-operation of foreign imperialist powers and indigenous reaction which lies at the heart of neo-colonialism.

A. LERUMO.

Malcolm X — A Cuban View*

***The Autobiography of Malcolm X.* Grove Press, New York**

SHOT TO DEATH in uptown Manhattan's Audubon Ballroom in early 1965, when he was not yet forty, Malcolm X did not live to see his **Autobiography** published. He never had any illusions about his personal safety. Months before, he had confessed to his collaborator, Alex Haley: "I do not expect to live long enough to read my book." The most dramatic part of the autobiography is the one dealing with the youth of Malcolm X, from his infancy in Omaha and Milwaukee until his adolescence in Detroit and Harlem ghettos. Before he was twenty, Malcolm had already learned what it meant to be a Negro in his country — North or South, it was always the same. "For me, Mississippi is anywhere from the Canadian border on down." His father murdered by the Ku Klux Klan, his mother an inmate of an insane asylum, his brothers and sisters scattered, he, whose boyhood dream had been to become a lawyer, had become a hoodlum, cocaine addict,

*This review is reprinted from GRANMA (Havana) numbers runner, a Harlem sharpie. This experience didn't go for nothing: "The most dangerous Negro in this country is the ghetto Negro. Sprung from the ghetto jungle, the Negro sharpie feels less respect for the white power structure than any other Negro in North America." But the ghetto Negro is a rebel without a cause. He does time in prison or drinks himself to death without ever having given voice to his protest. Malcolm was lucky. Sentenced to ten years for robbery, he met Elijah Muhammad, spiritual leader of the Black Muslims, who knew Malcolm's brother and wrote to Malcolm at prison. Through Muhammad, Malcolm learned not to expect anything from whites, to feel proud of his race and to think with his own head. Through Muhammad, any topic—including drugs—became an accusation against the "white devils" and a warning to his disciples. "Most Negro drug addicts use them to forget they are Negroes in a white man's country," said Muhammad, "but the truth is that when the Negro uses drugs, he does no more than help whites to prove that Negroes are trash." Malcolm, whose surname had been Little—a white man's name—emerged from prison with glasses (his eyesight was impaired from 10 hours of reading a day) and without a surname, as is the custom of Black Muslims. He was now Malcolm X.

MYTH OF DEMOCRACY

The following paradox was once formulated by Chesterton: The only persons capable of understanding all myths are those who believe in one of them. The principal myth in U.S. society is that of Equality. The U.S. citizen is imbued with the conviction that he lives in a society where all men are free and equal. There may be injustices, but the law guarantees all rights, including the right to vote every four years. That is Democracy.

One has to be born white to think this way in the United States. The Negro from the time he is old enough to talk, discovers that the myth is a hoax. Because of their flat noses, kinky hair and dark skin, 20 million citizens are humiliated and outcast. The entire rhetoric of U.S. democracy collapses in the face of this fact. Equality? Liberty? In this kind of society, there can be nothing sacred.

But dominant ideas spring from a dominant class, and it is not easy to destroy myths born of bloodshed, which respond to a deep aspiration of mankind. The U.S. Negro is a Negro, but he is also an American. He is caught in the double trap of discrimination and that myth of Democracy that in practice is revealed as a fraud. At one time, Malcolm X thought that there was no solution. "The young whites, and blacks, too, are the only hope that America has," he said once to Haley. "The rest of us have always been living a lie."

Around the middle of the 'fifties, this lie gave birth to two magnetic monsters: integration and civil rights. The white American, who had enjoyed the luxury of an easy conscience among 10 million besieged Negroes, was now told that these were not 20 million Negroes, but 20 million human beings. For purely humanitarian reasons, they must be accepted as equals and permitted to integrate into the Anglo-Saxon society. And the Negro would earn his rights little by little — through bloodshed in the South, voting in the North, demonstrating in Washington. Honest whites would come out in his favour. In Georgia, a Negro child would now sit at a desk in a white children's school; he would be protected by the National Guard. Paternalism and good will were the order of the day. The solution would work.

BLACK DYNAMITE

Malcolm X decided that now was the time to show his true face: an angry disgusted face—the true face of the U.S. Negro. Civil rights? "I can't turn around without hearing about some civil rights 'advance'! White people seem to think that the black man ought to be shouting 'Hallelujah!' Four hundred years the white man has had his foot-long knife in the black man's back—and now the white man starts to wiggle it out, maybe 6 inches! The black man's supposed to be grateful? Why, if the white man jerked the knife out, it's still going to leave a scar!" And, "How is the Negro going to obtain his civil rights if he doesn't win his human rights first?" Yes, perhaps the United States is a democracy, but only for the others. "Four hundred years of blood and sweat invested here, in this land, and the whites still want the Negro to beg for what any immigrant has the right to demand as soon as he sets foot in this country." And integration? Once when Haley was pouring some cream in his coffee, Malcolm X smiled mischievously and said, "That's the only kind of integration I like."

With expressions like these, Malcolm X opened the era of violence in the U.S. Negro movement. He was a Negro who didn't know his place, who was not afraid. When he pointed to the ghettos on a large map of the United States he warned that a match could causes them to explode at any moment. "There is black dynamite in Cleveland, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Los Angeles," he shouted. "Black rage is there, boiling." Very soon, terrible news appeared: "The Black Muslims have their shock troops, young people who have learned judo and karate, and practise shooting in secret places." A dark shudder ran up and down the spine of U.S. society. Liberals, democrats—unprejudiced people who supported civil rights and occasionally sat a Negro intellectual at their table—shook their heads in concern. Nothing would be gained by these provocations; one had to coexist peacefully, respect the legal methods. Malcolm X, who hates those hypocrites as much as the worst Alabama racists, furiously rejected their ideas. They had distorted the road. "Let the sincere whites go and preach passive resistance among the whites!"

A CASE FOR THE U.N.

Malcolm X was not a black ideologist. He did not take refuge in ancestral myths or in the nostalgic pride of a great Negro past. He was at the margins, but was, at the same time, a part of the complex mechanism that is 20th century society. He would not have been consoled with "Mother Africa!" or "Night is also black!" He moved within this world of vast communications networks and international tensions. He was convinced that one cannot isolate oneself. His statements to the press, speeches in universities and television interviews kept him on the go 24 hours a day. He knew what they wanted from him and refused to give in. Very soon, he was confirmed in his belief that the enemy was astute and treacherous: to utilise its mass media was to let himself be utilised. "But I don't care what points I made in the interviews; it practically never got printed in the way I said it. I was learning under fire how the press, when it wants to, can twist and slant. If I had said 'Mary had a little lamb,' what probably would have appeared was 'Malcolm X Lampoons Mary.' "

And no nostalgia over Africa. The prone and violated mother country was not for him. He conceived it was rather as a continent that would struggle for liberation and search for its road, a new force in world politics, one that the United States was openly wooing, despite the bombs exploding in the black men's churches back home, the dogs trained to attack women who only shout "NOW!" Africa—more than 30 votes in the United Nations, more than 4 centuries of discrimination and exploitation—not a mother, but an ally. "What the U.S. ruling class wants least," stressed Malcolm, "is for the Negro to begin to think in international terms." And that is precisely what he was about to do: affirm that the Negro problem is not just an internal affair of the United States, but "the most shameful case of oppression of an ethnic minority in the world." A case for the United Nations. And that is how he earned for himself a special dossier in the files of the U.S. State department. Shortly thereafter he would also have one in every Yankee embassy throughout Africa. On a trip through Africa he saw how members of the Peace Corps and U.S. diplomats worked on "winning over" the *natives*. "Believe what I say," he warned his African friends. "Don't trust these Mr. Charlies who come here giving you big smiles, when in our country they never smile at us."

FEET ON THE GROUND

Towards the end of 1963 Malcolm broke with Elijah Muhammad, who threatened to throw him out of the Muslims, alleging that the statement he made on Kennedy's death ("chickens come home to roost," a phrase that the journalists played up), had done the Black Muslims irreparable harm. The pretext deceived no one, for the truth of the matter was that the disciple had grown so big that he had overshadowed the master.

For several weeks Malcolm felt shaken. He had to rethink everything. At the beginning of 1964, he decided to make a pilgrimage to Mecca and also to tour Africa. It was the second turning point of his life. The first produced Malcolm X; this one would produce El-Hadj Malik El-Shabazz, a greying goatee and the suspicion that things were not as simple as he had once thought.

Despite his political awakening, Malcolm was still trapped in the mechanics of a U.S. racist society. The white-black antimony was a dramatic truth that perhaps would serve to shake up the well-to-do Negroes and Uncle Toms, and expose hypocrites and fakers; but when the time came to act, no concrete solution could be seen. It is unfortumate that Malcolm X's thinking was then moving in a tragic circle. He was unable to think in other than race terms. And the whites wanted it that way, and he knew it. "Look," he told Haley, "most whites, even those who admit that a black may be intelligent, believe that he is qualified only to think about the race issue. Most whites can't believe that blacks are in a position to contribute to other fields of thought and research. It would be mighty strange for a white to ask a black his opinion on world health or progress to date in the programme to land a man on the moon." But when he returned from Africa, a continent where the problem is infinitely more complex than simply whether one is or is not black, Malcolm had changed. He immediately began to see things from another point of view. He no longer felt that whites were racist by nature. He felt that "the political, economic and social environment of the United States automatically develops a racist mentality in whites". He no longer felt the white man was the devil incarnate. "The white man is not intrinsically evil. It is the racist U.S. society that makes him act evil. This society has developed and encouraged a mentality capable of bringing out man's most backward and base characteristics." From this, it is only a step to saying a basic change in the society itself is necessary. Malcolm had crossed the demarcation line between theology and history. The prophet's apprentice was beginning to think as a statesman. Here too, he differs from the Negro poets—in fact, from any poet. In the interview at Erfurt it is Napoleon, not Goethe, who says: "Politics is the future." Even before his trip to the African continent, Malcolm had come to understand this. How to change the fate of the U.S. Negro? The answer to this lay more than skin deep. Not only did the U.S. ruling class have white skin; it had money and the right to vote. The Negroes didn't have money, but if they joined forces at election time . . . Perhaps such an attitude was naïve (fighting on enemy territory with the enemy's weapon), but at least it would lead to action. For the first time, therefore, Malcolm issued a challenge that concretely involved the Negro masses and the white politicians.

"The Negroes let the white man play his favourite game of dividing them into Negro Democrats, Negro Republicans, Negro liberals and conservatives. But the weight of 10 million Negro votes could have a decisive effect on the scale of U.S. politics. Let me tell you something. If a Negro delegation approached the worst Negro-hater in Washington and announced: 'We represent ten million votes', that man would jump to his feet and say 'How do you do, gentlemen? Come in, come in, please.' "

However, for the new Malcolm, the interests of the U.S. Negro were part of a greater whole. "I believe in truth, come what may", he insisted in 1964. "I believe in justice, no matter whom it may affect. Above all, I am a human being, and as such I am for everything that helps mankind as a whole."

A LOOK AT THE PAST

On completing the *Autobiography*, Haley asked Malcolm to revise the manuscript. Years earlier, when Malcolm was still looking for converts in the streets of Harlem, a young white woman entered the Black Muslims' restaurant and anxiously asked what she could do to help. In silence Malcolm looked at the blond hair falling over her forehead; her green, somewhat apprehensive eyes; her pale, unpowdered face. 'Nothing,' he said, shaking his head. 'You can't do anything.' He read this anecdote sadly. 'Well, I've lived to regret that incident . . . I was a zombie then.' He reread the chapters in which he praised and attacked Muhammad; one in which he tried to prove that whites were devils, and another where he later saw them as victims of their environment; one in which the Black Muslims were honest men, and a later one where he denounced them as fanatics; the chapters about the setbacks and progress of the Negro movement. Some chapters had been written months apart. When he finished reading the manuscript, he slowly laid it down and turned to Haley. 'How can one write his autobiography,' he murmured, 'in such a changeable world as this?'

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A. J. LUTULI

A Great African Passes

THIS ISSUE OF *The African Communist* was already in the press when we learnt the sad news of the tragic death of the President of the African National Congress, Albert John Lutuli, killed on a railway bridge near Stanger, Natal, on Friday, July 21st, 1967. The passing of our beloved Chief, as he was known to all South African freedom fighters, is a heavy blow; a review of his great contribution to our people will be published in our next issue. The Editorial Board extends sincerest condolences to his family and all his colleagues.

The Central Committee of the South African Communist Party has sent the following message to the Secretary-General of the African National Congress:

It was with the deepest grief that we have learnt of the tragic accident which resulted in the death of the President-General of the African National Congress, Chief A. J. Lutuli.

Our Party has always esteemed most highly the role of Chief Lutuli as a great African and South African patriot and revolutionary, whose devotion and sincerity in the cause of the freedom of our country were beyond question and who enjoyed the respect and love of the working class and all in our country who believe in democracy, equality and human dignity. It is a tragedy for our people that he did not live to occupy the position for which he was so eminently qualified as the first Head of State of Free South Africa.

We convey our most sincere condolences to the African National Congress, and our pledge to strive with redoubled vigour and unity of purpose for the cause to which Albert Lutuli dedicated his life.