

MPLA
IN
BRAZZAVILLE



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Several events of last year, having as their pivot the recognition of a so-called "grae", forced MPLA to move its headquarters into Brazzaville.

There are two important facts to be emphasized here: the energy shown by the Movement towards adversity and the high faithfulness of our brothers at this side of the river toward the true meaning of African solidarity. Therefore, we are facing two equivalent attitudes because, if the one we proved indicates faithfulness to the fight we are devoted to with our soul and heart, faithfulness to our brothers who, dup in the bush or at an imposed contact of the towns are suffering horrors and humiliations from a condemned situation. Support that we find here is clear assurance that in this country values and human brotherhood are not stabbed at their back.

At this number of our bulletin, the first one published here, we hail H.E. the President Alphonse MASSAMBA-DEBAT and the magnificent people of this country to whom the Angolan people is brotherly grateful.

February



History is written with decisive action of a nation's life. Decisive action of a nation's life as achieved by the people in struggle.

February Fourth is a stepping-stone of ANGOLAN's History because it is a decisive action of the Angolan nation's life carried on by the Angolan people marching towards its national freedom.

During the 50's, when under nationalist pressure the colonialists began Africa's decolonization, the Angolan people agitate itself once again, convinced that its liberation hour had finally come.

Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Congo, and so forth became independent yet, Portugal kept itself deaf to the ANGOLAN PEOPLE'S demands and blind to History movement. While more than half of independent Africa marched towards liquidation of colonial remains, conquest of peace in freedom and of work in dignity, the ANGOLAN PEOPLE was more and more crushed under the paw of Portuguese colonial yoke.

But one PEOPLE'S march for just ideal can never be stopped!

And in the darkness of a hut or in the night of the path, NATIONALISM sprang and organized itself and was in action!

Hope and Faith in victory had been

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board again!

The oppressor's reaction was fast: demonstrations of force, virulent propaganda, arrestation of nationalists!

In North Africa the Algerians were forced to march towards independence with weapons in their hands. The Angolans found out that they also could not do other

Meanwhile, it was necessary to set free some of the leaders then jailed in Luanda and thus set fire to the Revolutionary.

FEBRUARY, 1961
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On the first days of February many journalists stopped in Angola hoping to see "Santa Maria" liner, as its assaulter had promised. Taking profit of those journalists' presence a precious one to explain the ANGO-LAN determination to the world, a group of nationalists under MPLA flag attacked Luanda prisons at the dawn of fourth February.

A glorious and martyred day. With weapons possessed at the moment and a too ambitious plan, those attacks failed and caused a cruel reaction from Portuguese colonialists.

February 4, 5 and 6 brought mourning to hundreds of Angolan families whose children and other relatives had been massacred by the oppressor's murdering weapons.

However, news of the uprising quickly reached the farthest village of our country and the PEOPLE understood the meaning of that message. We were forced to conquer freedom by force.

Once more, we should carry on the war of Angolan dignity.

And this small but meaningful flame spread, in February, fire in Angola jungle. The National Liberation war was launched!

The war of three years ago! And the nationalists engaged themselves on it proudly carry on the torchlightened on February 4 by MPLA militants' attack to Luanda prisons.

But fellows of February 4! International crooks are trying to use the torch which took you to glory, in order to light up a path of injustice, opportunism and curse. A gang of foreigners are royally satisfying their personal ambitions at the expenses of your blood and the blood from all patriots fallen while defending the ideals of our martyr country.

Rise up, patriot fallen on February 4, come and see what they are doing of your message! It is lowly distorted, scandalously profited by foreigners or dishonest nationals who, under it are increasing their own benefits.

Rise up, fallen patriot, and help your MPLA to go on steady, its head up, sure of final victory!

" ANGOLANS MUST UNITE AGAINST "
" PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM AND "
" IMPERIALISM! "
" *****

° A CONGRESS OF ALL ANGOLAN °
° NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS °
° MUST BE HELD! °
° *****

Lagos, 29 February, 1964

The Chairman of Committee of Mine,
The Members of the Committee.

Gentlemen,

The circumstances in which the Angolan struggle for liberty have developed, display certain factors which should be borne in mind. The Angolan nationalist forces are divided, and we can not disregard or deny action to any one of the political organisations now existing. The struggler for freedom must be the task of all nationalists and of the whole Angolan people.

This is why the M.P.L.A. (Peoples' Movement for the Liberation of Angola) is in complete accord with the principles of this Conference at Lagos, which seeks to unify the nationalist organisations of Angola. But we can not ignore the difficulties which have, in some African countries, beset the organisation which is the most representative of the people - the M.P.L.A. In some cases, the rejection has even taken the form of serious restriction.

Furthermore, no financial or material aid has been received by the M.P.L.A., either from the Liberation Committee or from sister countries which formerly assisted the M.P.L.A. and which now contribute to the Liberation found.

There is an attempt to smother and to destroy the M.P.L.A.. Events have already proved that the arguments put forward in support of having one single movement are outdated, as is proved in the documents which we have distributed to the Council of Foreign Ministers at Lagos.

This Conference has agreed on the necessity of uniting the Angolan parties, and this is why the M.P.L.A. requests the Liberation Committee:

- 1) - to recommend to Member States of the O.A.U., and particularly those countries bordering Angola, that respect the M.P.L.A. and grant it liberty of action;
- 2) - to grant to the M.P.L.A. a part of the funds given to the Angolan nationalist movements, in accordance with the request made at the first meeting of the Committee of Liberation in June, 1963 (Dar-es-Salaam).

We are sure that such measures will contribute to the establishment of African unity in that they will make a greater drive against Portuguese colonialism possible; at the same time they will lessen the emphasis on certain nationalist organisations which exclusively enjoy freedom of action and the assistance of the Committee of Liberation.

THE DELEGATION OF THE M.P.L.A.
AGostinho Neto. Chairman.

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+ VICTORY OR DEATH ! +
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CONFERENCE OF MPLA CADRES

Several times postponed in order to allow participation of militants abroad, finally from January 3 to 10, the MPLA Conference of all CADRES was held. It was wise to have it, since there are some special internal and external problems at the moment.

The fact that MPLA could overcome all kinds of difficulties brought in by its foes and carried on by aggression, sabotage, persecution and arrestation of its members and the fact that it was able to gather about 50 responsible people settled in several countries is by itself enough proof of its leaders' energy and determination and its militants' faithfulness and courage. Moreover, MPLA militants' capacity was clearly shown by the interest devoted to the study and solution of problems. Thus from the Conference came a firmness and seriousness of goals that deceive no one and are not emphasized enough.

All problems, including those of discipline and development of the fight, were faced with the same firmness and seriousness. Principles which protect the Movement from all harmful influences were adopted.

POPULAR RESISTANCE CONTINUES

In spite of the conspiracy built up against MPLA in order to move it from the armed fighting, our people continues to struggle heroically for our country liberation.

Nucleus of resistance from inside Angola sent us the following news through our carriers' network:

From January 1 to 8, there were several encounters between our guerilla men and the colonialist forces in the following regions: AMBRIZ, AMBRIZETE, DEMBOS, KITEXE VALE DO LOGE, ZALA MIKALA AND CABINDA.

Our nucleus of resistance blew up two lorries and three bridges. At the ambushes set up by our guerilla men, the enemy had important losses.

More than 50 Portuguese soldiers were knocked down. Among the dead, it was possible to identify captain ISIDORO GOMES COELHO and the sub-officials ALBERTO J. FERNANDES MACHADO, AGOSTINHO SOARES, MANUEL PROENÇA and J. DIAS.

M.P.L.A. ASKS FOR FREE ACTION !

.....
M.P.L.A. ASKS FOR TRANSIT FACILITIES TO ITS ARMS AND MEN THROUGH CONGO-LEO!
.....

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
OF ANGOLA

M.P.L.A.

B. P. 2353 Telephone 49-15

BRAZZAVILLE

Rep. of the CONGO

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P E T I T I O N

from

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF ANGOLA

to the

MEETING OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS of the O.U.A.

Lagos, February 24, 1964

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ON BEHALF OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE'S SACRED RIGHT TO BE MASTER OF ITS OWN DESTINY AND CHOOSE ITSELF THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE IT;

ACCORDING TO THE AFRICAN UNITY CHARTER AND ITS PRINCIPLES WHICH SAYS AT ARTICLE 3:

- 2 - No mingling into the internal affairs of the states;
- 4 - Peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration;

ACCORDING to the decision taken by the African Heads of States at Addis Ababa at the formation of the ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (O.U.A.) about pointnumber 1 of the agenda - DECOLONIZATION - and especially points 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 on:

- a) An urging invitation "to all liberation nationalist movements to coordinate their efforts by creating common fronts of action in order to reinforce the struggle efficiency and use wisely the coordinated aid which will be given to them";
- b) Creation of a "COORDINATING COMMITTEE" responsible for harmonizing the aid provided by the African States" for the liberation nationalist movements;
- c) Creation of a "SPECIAL FUND ... to provide the necessary material and financial aid to the several African movements of national liberation";
- d) Decision of "welcoming into the African independent states nationalists from the liberation movements in order to assure their training in all aspects...";
- e) Decision of "favoring in each state the handling of material aid";

ACCORDING to the resolution of the Coordinating Committee which met in Dar-es-

.../...

Salaam, June 25-July 4, 1963, after the recognition of the so-called Angolan government by Mr. Cyrille ADOULA's government, the Coordinating Committee appointed, for Angola and Guinea (Bissao), "special missions of goodwill, responsible for stimulating harmony and achieving unity among the several nationalist movements which have a common desire for freedom"...

ACCORDING to recommendations from the goodwill Mission on Angola and their influence upon the recommendations of the Coordinating Committee and the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of O.A.U. held in Dakar last August, 1963;

ACCORDING to the state of war between the Angolan people and Portuguese colonialism since February 4, 1961;

ACCORDING to the responsibilities taken toward the Angolan people by the People's Liberation Movement of Angola before, during and after the launching of the armed fight in Angola;

SINCE the aim of this responsibility is the conquering of independence for Angola and, therefore, it is necessary to have the Angolan people, the African States and all countries concerned with the Angolan question aware of the facts and rights at the MPLA side;

I

CONSIDERING, on one hand,

THAT the unilateral recognition by Léopoldville of the so-called Angolan government, on June 29, 1963, is in flagrant contradiction with the decisions taken by the African Heads of States on May 25, 1963, after a long and careful analysis of the Angolan question;

THAT the conclusions of the goodwill Mission and, therefore, the rushed decisions of the Coordinating Committee in Léopoldville in face of an accomplished fact of unilateral recognition, have questioned the decisions of the African Heads of States themselves;

THAT Mr. Cyrille ADOULA's government, through its frequent, excusing premises about transit of MPLA arms and concession of a training camp for MPLA soldiers, tried to asphyxiate on purpose MPLA military action before and after the above mentioned decisions from the African Heads of states. Evidently, its aim of presenting the Angolan National Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.) as the only active party in the armed fight does not correspond at all to reality in any aspect;

THAT the Coordinating Committee has given itself powers beyond those established at Addis Ababa by trying to set the strategy of the liberation struggle and by decreeing on the degree of representativity of such and such movement;

THAT the Coordinating Committee itself surprised and anxious at the unilateral decision of Mr. Cyrille ADOULA's government, during its first meeting in Dar-es-Salaam with representatives from the African nationalist movements quickly sent a goodwill Mission to Léopoldville charged with very limited reconciliation powers;

THAT because of Mr. Cyrille ADOULA's and his representatives's firm opposition to each effort to reconsider such a biased attitude toward MPLA (Mr. ADOULA himself warned the goodwill Mission members on this matter at the garden-party given at their arrival), the Goodwill Mission adopted a procedure very similar to one from a court - at which MPLA was supposed to play the roll of charged with one waders what crimes. At least, one can notice this attitude at the following points:

1. Adoption of a procedure and of a self-attribution of powers which, from the beginning forecast the failure of all reconciliation in profit of the organization sponsored by Mr. Cyrille ADOULA's government;
2. A free and long hearing (as it were fair) of the FNLA president;
3. Refusal of hearing the President of the Angola Democratic Liberation Front (F.D.L.A.) as such, pretending lack of time;
4. Hearing of a member expelled from MPLA;
5. Refusal of hearing the MPLA president as such, pretending a matter of procedure;
6. Confidential hearing of the Congolese government representatives;
7. Deliberation, conclusion and recommendations without any examination of the facts that were told;

THAT today it is stated that the goodwill Mission, in its recommendations, has gone too beyond its task of "stimulating harmony and achieving unity". At the contrary, it did no visible effort in this sense;

THAT the principles to be considered for an eventual choice of an organization to benefit of a SPECIAL FUND from the O.A.U., principles numbered by the chairman of the goodwill Mission at his opening speech, have been established by the Committee of Nine. Moreover, such a procedure is in contradiction with the principles of the O.A.U. Charter. Therefore, the Committee of Nine alone was enabled to choose, if necessary, one organization to benefit from such funds. Those principles were not intended for the use of the goodwill Mission which had not and could not have such powers because of its very nature;

THAT the refusal of hearing MPLA president when he presented himself as FDLA president was contrary to the aims of the Mission itself. Thus, it turned down the only possibility of an agreement by confronting the two present fronts and assuring the fact that the true reasons which prevent a unity of action are strange to Angolan nationalism and they are the responsibility neither of MPLA nor of FDLA. No procedure justifies such a refusal, especially after hearing a member expelled from MPLA;

THAT the formation of FDLA, prepared long time ago and achieved on July 7, 1963, three days after the end of the first meeting of the Committee of Nine, was according to the resolutions on unity of the nationalist movements;

THAT the roll of "court" that the goodwill Mission attributed to itself, was not even played with calm, impartiality and a non bureaucratic spirit of research required by such a delicate and important affair. The result was that the goodwill Mission drew its conclusions and based itself upon uncontrolled, deceiving statements not proved by the FNLA chief and upon biased declarations from Mr. Cyrille ADOULA's representatives (e.g., a false charge that MPLA has "contacts with the opposition group to the Congolese government" and that MPLA had set up an office in Stanleyville at the time of Mr. Antoine Gizenga. MPLA has never been in Stanleyville).

THAT MPLA, wherever it has been, never mingled itself into the internal affairs of its host states;

THAT the goodwill Mission, by giving itself the power to decree about the wethy

of such and such organization, underestimated the fact that MPLA has always suffered prejudices - its members have been arrested several times, its arms have been seized - the fact that MPLA military action has been systematically asphyxiated by Mr. ADOULA's government whose representatives, however, now question MPLA military action. Proof of such a suffocation is the repeated and useless steps taken by MPLA and by representatives from several African Heads of States toward Mr. ADOULA in order to have an authorization for transit of MPLA arms;

THAT the goodwill Mission only took into consideration the witness from the Central Government representatives and it was not concerned with knowing the authorized opinion of the provincial governments near the border such as, Kwango, Congo Central, Unité Kasayenne, Kataga and Kwilu, as well as from the Angolan masses settled along the CONGO-ADOULA border;

THAT a recommendation about the recognition of a government brings internal and external implications of such an order that it should not come from such a light, hasty and summary analysis like the one carried on at Kalina Palace by the goodwill Mission;

THAT the simple acceptance of conclusions from the goodwill Mission would bring the adoption of a new concept of "African legitimacy" in face of the concept of "international legitimacy" which would question the sound lawful bases upon which the African Organisation wants to build;

THAT no African planned or strategic action against Portugal and concerning Angola can consider the present reality of Angolan nationalism without both the MPLA and the FDLA playing a foreground roll;

II

On the other hand, CONSIDERING the fact

THAT repercussion on the conclusions and recommendations from the goodwill mission has already caused grave incidents on the Angolan question, such as:

1. Recognition by some African States, trusting seriously those recommendations, of a "government in exile" which, by its own nature, is not representative at all and it is incapable of carrying on until the end the struggle of the whole Angolan people;
2. Stagnation, rather retreat, of the Angolan liberation struggle since the conclusions of the goodwill Mission;
3. Disorder among the mass of freedom fighters and Angolan refugees, a disorder that has reached the heart of FNLA itself - there were several mutinies at the Kinkouzou camp which resulted in casualties and wounds and led to the control of the camp by the Congolese authorities of Léopoldville (see enclosed Documents)
4. Closing of MPLA and other Angolan parties offices in Léopoldville, imposed by the Congolese authorities, despite Mr. ADOULA's assurance, on the eve of his own unilateral recognition, that hospitality from the Congolese government would continue to be granted to the other Angolan nationalist organizations;
5. Closing down of the Angolan Volunteer Corps for Refugee Relief (CVAAR),

organization founded by MPLA and which, with an all-Angolan medical and nursing personnel, was the only Angolan organization present and efficient where the refugees are;

6. Numberless protests from the Congolese authorities along the border and thousands of refugees, against the abandon into which they have been thrown since the CVAAR was closed down;

THAT since the recommendations of the goodwill Mission, FNLA disguised into "government" has accomplished no striking achievement to dignify and make more efficient the Angolan liberation fight;

THAT FNLA has taken no steps toward the indispensable unity of action and it has not even answered the invitation concerning it from FDLA;

THEREFORE

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF ANGOLA

- i) REJECTS the conclusions of the goodwill Mission and therefore the recommendations of the Committee of Nine and those from the Conference of the Foreign Affairs Ministers held in Dakar, on the Angolan problem;
- ii) DECIDES to present the enclosed MEMORANDUM-REMINDER for a benevolent and careful analysis from the African Heads of States;
- iii) DEMANDS a revision of the Angolan question - revision which is in agreement with the sense of unity of Angolan nationalism - and the setting up of an Investigation Committee formed by the countries of the Committee of Nine and also representatives from Morocco, Ghana and Congo-Brazzaville (countries more directly concerned with the Angolan question). This Committee would be responsible for such a revision;
- iv) REQUESTS urgent measures so that MPLA may have, in all African countries and especially in those having a common border with Angola, the same facilities granted to any other organization fighting for Angola independence;
- v) REAFFIRMS the fact that lack of acceptance by MPLA of the goodwill Mission conclusions and recommendations sprung from them, do not lessen at all its enthusiastic adherence and unyielding trust in the Organization of African Unity which setting up is in agreement with the aspiration of the Africans, the Angolans and MPLA;
- vi) REAFFIRMS its gratitude toward the people of Congo-Léopoldville and the respect due to its authorities. The remarks written here are only MPLA legitimate right to oppose itself to the error being committed against the Angolans, heavy on its consequences upon Africa itself;
- vii) URGES the African countries to take up their responsibilities on the Angolan affair.

MPLA will take its.

Brazzaville, February 20, 1964

On behalf of
MPLA POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Agostinho NETO

ANSWER

TO THE DETRACTORS

The recognition of Holden Roberto's "government" by the Republic of Congo (Léopoldville) has inspired, in a certain press, a slandering campaign against the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) in which one guesses the concern to demobilize the MPLA from the task of Angola's national liberation.

Putting aside those papers on which either provocation - like Angola 63 (from "Le Monde Libertaire", number 96, of December, 1963) - or Sekou Mingué's premeditated fantasy - Angola la parole est à Holden Robert ("Jeune Afrique", number 148 of September 9-15, 1963) - represent their essential strength, we think that "Révolution Africaine" is committing a series of slandering and mistakes resulting from its schematization, lack of deepness and watching and mostly from the fact of basing itself in false premises.

Understanding of the problem of Angolan nationalism requires the knowledge of a certain number of historical, social and political factors related to the methods of Portuguese colonization.

It is exactly starting from those elements examined in the context of the "cold war" that one can "catch" the entire dimension of the problem of the Angolan political movements activity.

The errors of appreciation, analogies with other ways of fighting, shown on the article of August 3rd, 1963, under the title of "La Minute de Verité", has been possible because "Révolution Africaine" underestimated the above mentioned factors.

"Révolution Africaine" preferred to base its arguments in fictitious elements provided by the Conciliation Committee of Léopoldville - which working process caused the biggest reserves from our side - and in a very subjective version of the political iting rary of our Movement.

We regret the behaviour of "Révolution Africaine" because it had created in us the conviction of being a paper sincerely dedicated to the defense of our Continent interests.

In the particular case of "La Minute de Verité" it was not ever possible to recognize a clear difference between "R.A."s tone and that from us a well known press of anti-African activities.

But let see:

...../.....

THE CRYSTALLIZATION THE OF THE INSURRECTION

One needs not to be a military authority to conclude that the armed fighting in Angola, as it has been carried, has not the necessary conditions to cause heavy losses to the enemy.

It is essentially a spontaneous insurrection, confined to a part of the territory and which has practically exhausted its roll of international teller of the methods of Portuguese colonization.

The number of dead people and refugees goes beyond 500,000 more than 100,000 of which died from the enemy's military action.

The fratricidal action of some militants from the Angolan Peoples' Union "UPA", the enemy's homicide fury and the lack of military protection for the civilians are, among others, the elements that continue to determine the rural people's exodus and their progressive submission to the colonial authorities.

As it is, the insurrection did not succeed to encourage revolutionary demonstrations from the Angolans living in the towns.

A series of premeditated actions are carried on in order to prevent the dynamic forces from participating in the insurrection. A conspiracy to asfixiate the development of a rhythm-base for the increase of the armed fight in Angola was set-up.

There is the risk of draining one's energies without favoring our people's aspiration of national liberation.

The insurrection is now facing the following dilemma: either it becomes dynamic and thus prepares the conditions for a true independence of Angola, or it crystallizes itself, and becomes a triumph for the maneuver of liquidating the contents of our national liberation and the Congolisation of Angola.

In one side, the MPLA by the way it has defined its demands sanctioned by the National Conference held in December of 1962, by its care in the political-military training for its cadres by their number and quality and its non-aligned policy shows the need of giving more depth and rythm to the insurrection. On the other side, an instrument coalition acts shamelessly in the sense of crystallizing the insurrection for too clear reasons.

THE INSTRUMENTAL COALITION

Adoula and Holden Roberto have revealed themselves skillful in the rell of imperialist expansion agents in our Continent. The Congolese Prime Minister is the most dynamic element of the instrumental coalition against the African people's interests.

Through manoeuvres of amusement and direct action of their police and military forces against the MPLA militants, Cyrille Adoula wants to favour the cause of the imperialist powers over the riches of the African territories south of the Congo.

Liquidation of the Angolan democratic forces is, in fact, one of the aspects of the imperialist bail for his residence in the leadership of his own country.

It is in this sense that one can interpret the facilities provided to the UPA by the Congolese political leadership and the series of charges aiming at the halt of the MPLA political and military activities against the Portuguese colonial regime. When Adoula gives the movement led by Holden Roberto, a military camp in Thyville (Congolese town) and at the same time he launches repressive measures against the MPLA, he aim is to reinforce the continuity of his engagements with the imperialist powers settled in his own country.

It is in this sense that they arrest our militants, violate the privacy of their homes because they do not accept Holden Roberto's influence, forbid the publication of the newspaper "Unidade Angolana" (organ of the MPLA), the difficulties risen up to the movements of the MPLA guerrilleros, the closing down of our office and the CVAAR medical centers in the Congolese regions where most Angolan refugees are. Thus, the instrumental coalition Adoula-Holden Roberto wants to set up an unbalance in the relations of strength of the Angolan political movements, to help the installation in Angola of a strange power to the aspirations of national liberation shown by our people.

Their proposals of unity of the Angolan nationalist movements included that same fundament. The essential intention of those proposals aimed at the absorption and the loss of independence of the MPLA and consequently the weakening of the democratic forces of the Angolan movement of national liberation.

That was why Kamitatu, for having qualified of "carter1" the UPA-PDA gathering was forced to draw back in his arbitration of the Angolan problem and thus favour the point of view of MPLA unconditional surrender, shown by Holden Roberto during the meetings in Léopoldville.

The recognition of Holden's "government" is logical to the choices of Adoula's government, and in the sequence of its anti-Angolan activity.

Since he did not succeed in lining up the other African heads of states gathered in Addis-Abeba behind his proposals concerning the Angolan problem, Adoula decided to use the tactics of facto con sumado. Indeed, the Addis Abeba resolution mentioned the need of the countries bordering the African territories fighting for national independence should enable in their countries the passing of material aid for the nationalist movements. At the bottom, Addis Abeba showed, with such a resolution, to disapprove Adoula's policy toward Angola.

The recognition of Holden's "government" appears to consolidate Adoula's point of view rejected in Addis Abeba. With its blow, the Congolese government wants to drive away definitively the MPLA from Angola struggle for independence and to have Holden Roberto controlling exclusively the Angolan insurrection.

Thus the same power would get also all the necessary attributes to guarant the domination of Angola by the inspirers of the instrumental coalition policy.

Indeed, it serves of excellent pretext for the imperialist pressure over Portugal, it gives more possibilites for Holden Roberto to lead Angolan politics and it is quiet toward Adoula's regime set in the Congo. The aims of the imperialist expansion should be consolidated and reinforced that way.

How can one think that coalition Adoula-Holden may favour the national liberation of Angola in a different pattern from that of the Congo? Why Adoula should reveal himself more strict toward the contents of Angola's independence than that of his own country?

The fact of driving the MPLA away creates the best conditions for the hegemony in Angola of that bourgeoisie technically and politically pauper with natural vocation to serve imperialism mentioned by Fanon and which, for particular circumstances, has mostly developed itself among the Angolan emigration settled in the Congo.

Holden Roberto's special care of filling up his "ministries" with people from the Angolan emigration - who, moreover, make up the heavy majority of his movement supporters - reveals his concern of leaning himself in this group to face the specifically Angolan opinion.

PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM

Imperialism bases its aims of ruling our country in the nature of the Portuguese colonial policy.

Portugal has not the weight of France, England or Belgium to promote in her colonies a political evolution similar to the one reached by most countries in which the French, English and Belge colonizations were.

Portuguese colonialism has as its behind wheel an underdeveloped country of a little more than nine thousand inhabitants most of which is illiterate, without any industrial and financial capacity to assure an economic domination over its territories elevated to the situation of political independence.

Angola independence itself breaks the traditional ties of the Angolan economy with its colonizers.

Colonialism based on the "little white and" the agricultural companies directly connected with production cannot afford the elementary demands of the whole with a politically independent Angola.

But if these conditions would be enough to demonstrate the difficulties of reconversion of the Portuguese colonial policy in paters of assuming its economic influence as it was with most ex-French and English colonies, the fact of having promoted a policy of polycolonization in their African territories, place it in submission toward the imperialist powers.

Big concessions for the exploitation of mining riches in Angola to the international monopolies from the imperialist countries made the latter to advance to the first line of the pretenders of the Angolan raw material and market.

Portuguese fascism own situation of political and economic dependancy in relation to the imperialist bloc reinforces the concreteness of the forms of "filling of the empty" and of "collective colonialism".

Imperialism is just lacking to adapt the Angolan liberation movement to its own interests to assure the success of its ambitions in this part of the African continent.

It is precisely in this sense that the instrumental coalition has revealed itself skilful and capable of the mission set for it within the Angolan national liberation movement.

If "Révolution Africaine" had not underestimated these aspects of the Angolan problem, it had not, except for coherent reasons, fallen in the error and lack of depth on its article Angola "La Minute de Verité". -

COMMUNIQUE

(on the last manoeuvres of FNLA)

A communiqué from Mr. Holden Robert's FNLA says that it was accepted a request of adhesion from Mr. Viriato Cruz and a small group of individuals connected with him.

Such a communiqué forces MPLA to the following precisions:

1. The communiqué grants to Mr. Cruz and his group the quality of MPLA members. They can only be considered as such in an abusive way, because all its responsible people were expelled on July 6, 1963, because of grave faults committed against the Movement existence (see MPLA communiqué 91/63). Thus, Viriato Cruz' group represents no structured nationalist organization at all. Its existence is only individual one.

2. Adhesion to which the FNLA communiqué refers is the natural conclusion of an old collusion and the price previously set by provocations and violent acts carried on by these same individuals on July 7, 1963 aiming at the destruction of MPLA integrity.

3. FNLA achieves a new amusing manoeuvre by accepting adhesion of individual members with the label of representatives of a recognized body. Thus, FNLA pretends to confound the unity problem such as it is understood not only by the Angolan people, but by all well formed minds and international bodies, including AOU. It pretends to save the chaos in which FNLA founds itself, unable to develop the fighting inside the country, by honouring itself with the presence of an individual unfortunately dishonoured by his own opportunism and incoherence.

4. Unity cannot be imposed. It can only result from a wide confrontation among all nationalist organizations fighting Portuguese colonialism and all forms of neo-colonialism. Because of this and of the fact that the fight evolution continues to prove that a true and solid unity is essential for a rapid and real liberation of our country, MPLA has suggested the realization of a CONGRESS OF ALL-ANGOLAN NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS for study of the Angolan nationalism problems. This motto has already the support of all nationalist sectors.

5. FNLA imposition of its dogma of adhesion without discussion is unacceptable, since FNLA policy has never been made known, though its connections are quite obvious.

Brazzaville, April 23, 1964

THE STEERING COMMITTEE

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