

THE REPORT
OF THE OAU CONCILIATION COMMISSION
ON ANGOLA



KAMPALA - UGANDA
OCTOBER, 1975.

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ANGOLA

PART I - PREAMBLE:

The terms of reference for the OAU Conciliation Commission were set-out in the 12th OAU Summit Resolution AHG/RES. 72(XII)

"The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, meeting in its Twelfth Ordinary Session from 28th July, to 1st August, 1975, in Kampala,

Having noted Resolution CM/Res.424(XXV) on the situation in Angola,

Having heard the Statements of the Representatives of the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA and of the Acting Prime Minister of the Transitional Government of Angola on the situation in this territory,

Deploing the bloody confrontations between the principal Liberation Movements and the non-respect by the signatories of the Agreement of Kinshasa, Mombasa, Alvor and Nakuru,

Convinced that it is the duty of OAU to seek, by every means, to restore peace, harmony and understanding in Angola, in particular, before the date of the proclamation of independence scheduled for November 11, 1975,

1. URGENTLY APPEALS to all Liberation Movements to lay-down their arms;
2. EARNESTLY REQUESTS Portugal to assume, without delay and in an impartial manner, its responsibilities in Angola;
3. DECIDES to send a Fact-Finding Commission of Enquiry, and conciliation to Angola immediately;

4. REQUESTS the Current Chairman of OAU, after consultation with Members of the Bureau, to appoint members of the Fact-Finding Commission of Enquiry and Conciliation;
5. REQUESTS the OAU Defence Commission, assisted by the OAU Secretary-General, following the report of the Commission of Enquiry, to consider the necessity of creating and despatching an OAU Peace Force to Angola and to submit its recommendations to the Council of Ministers.
6. CALLS UPON Liberation Movements, the Transitional Angolan Government, the Portuguese Government and neighbouring countries to cooperate with the OAU Fact-Finding Commission of Enquiry and Conciliation."

2. Immediately after the end of the 12th OAU Summit, President Amin, as Current Chairman of the OAU and in accordance with para 4 of the Resolution, appointed the following countries to serve in the Commission:

- | | |
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| 1. Uganda | (Chairman) |
| 2. Somalia | (Member) |
| 3. Niger | " |
| 4. Morocco | " |
| 5. Upper Volta | " |
| 6. Lesotho | " |
| 7. Ghana | " |
| 8. Burundi | " |
| 9. Algeria | " |
| 10. Kenya | " |

For reasons which have never been made clear, Kenya did not participate in the work of the Commission.

3. The composition of the Conciliation Commission as well as its terms of reference were communicated to the three Angolan Liberation Movements and to the Portuguese Authorities by the OAU Secretariat. No responses were received from the three parties until August 9, 1975, when only MPLA replied in the negative stating that due

CHAIRMAN'S REPLY TO ALGERIA'S STATEMENT ON THE
RECOMMENDATION NO.13 ON THE OAU CONCILIATION
COMMISSION ON ANGOLA

I thank you very much for your declaration and opinion to which, definitely Algeria as a sovereign country, is entitled.

2. I should like, on behalf of myself as Chairman, to say that when in Angola, I stressed time and again that the Commission had not gone to Angola to interfere in the internal affairs of Angola. I did not say that the Commission would not, therefore, make any recommendations that it deemed desirable. That in my opinion is relevant to the assignment given to the Commission. As I see it - and Uganda having subscribed to the majority view on this point - I have the following comment to make, not in any way challenging what Algeria has stated but in clarification of what I think is the interpretation behind the six out of nine countries taking the position they took.

3. Definitely, there was evidence of a possible U.D.I. in Angola. This is the position that was rightly taken by the six members of the Commission. I will cite as an example the question put to MPLA in proof of this; on being asked what they were going to do on the 11th November, 1975, should the present situation in Angola still pertain. The answer given was that MPLA has in the past assumed its national responsibility and that it will in accordance with that responsibility continue to assume its obligation to the Angolan public after the 11th November, 1975. This to me and to my delegation, and I must say to the majority of the delegations, appeared to indicate an intention on the part of MPLA to form a Government alone, especially as they declared that they no longer recognise the other two parties as Liberation Movements. It is on the basis of this assessment, coupled with the statement made by UNITA here - although that statement was retracted by UNITA in Nova Lisboa - that there was a possibility that Portugal

would give power to one party that was occupying Luanda, i.e. MPLA. UNITA stated that if that fear of theirs came to materialize, they too, would reserve the right to declare U.D.I. in the area they controlled.

4. I think it is, therefore, right that the Commission within its terms of reconciliation has to take into account all the facts that would jeopardise or otherwise endanger the unity or the reconciliation of the three parties. If U.D.I. is permitted in Angola, it will not only continue to perpetuate the civil disorder that is existing in that country but it will have a direct effect of dividing Africa at the ranks of OAU.

5. It is, therefore, in sincerity that I think the majority view here feels it duty-bound to make an observation in the way of recommendation - a straight recommendation - that U.D.I. in Angola should not be allowed or encouraged in Angola as it will cause division in the OAU as well as permit foreign interference in Angola. I should like to repeat that this is just a point of clarification not a challenge to the sovereign right of Algeria to make its reservation on matters it feels strongly about.

6. However, in the light of Algeria's reservations, I also will insist that this clarification which I have made, on behalf of the majority of the Members of the Commission, as part and parcel of the Report to be distributed to the OAU Member States.

October 24, 1975.

to the situation prevailing in Angola at the time, the MPLA Political Bureau would not advise that the Commission visits Angola then.

4. The events in Angola, according to international press, continued to go from bad to worse and the Current Chairman of the OAU rightly decided that Africa could not just sit idly-by when a matter such as the deteriorating situation in Angola was left to run away. He, accordingly, decided to call a meeting of the Commission members to meet in Kampala, a decision which he communicated to the three Angolan Liberation Movements. The Current Chairman also appealed to the three Liberation Movements that at least they should give Africa a chance to assist them in their inter-party discord in the spirit of the OAU Charter. He, accordingly, invited representatives of the three Liberation Movements to come to Kampala and meet the Commission. Upto then, the three parties had either replied in the negative on the proposal for the Commission to visit Angola or had not replied at all. Furthermore, the Current Chairman travelled to Kinshasa and then later to Brazzaville to enlist the assistance of his brother Heads of State of Zaire and Congo to prevail upon the leaders of the three Liberation Movements that it was their public duty not only to Angola but to the entire Africa that they cooperated with the OAU in the search for a peaceful solution to the Angolan problem. Following these efforts, the Commission met in Kampala on the 30th September, 1975, and were soon after joined by representatives of the three Liberation Movements.

PART II - PROGRESS OF WORK AND HEARINGS:

5. His Excellency President Field Marshal Idi Amin Dada, OAU Current Chairman, officially opened the first meeting of the Reconciliation Commission on Angola on 30th September, 1975.

6. In his historic speech, the President gave a brief background of the reasons leading to the setting-up of the Commission to reconcile the warring Liberation Movements in Angola, in preparation for independence on 11th November, 1975.

7. Among other things, the President stressed that whereas the Alvor Agreement had given hope to prospects for independence, the internecine fighting was frustrating this legitimate hope; that the independence date of 11th November, 1975, should be respected; that Angola's current crisis could not be resolved by military means and, therefore, appealed to the three Liberation Movements, FNLA, MPLA and UNITA to bury their petty and ideological differences for the sake of the greater interests of Angola.

8. President Amin also stressed that as administering power, Portugal remains fully responsible for maintaining law and order in Angola. It is, therefore, incumbent upon her to exercise her sovereign responsibility, especially at this crucial moment for measures she takes will reflect greatly on developments in Angola and will have a direct bearing on her future relations with independent Africa. The President condemned external interference and mercenary activities in Angola for complicating the situation further.

9. In reply to the Current Chairman's speech, the Head of the Lesotho Delegation stated that the Chairman's speech had fully expressed Africa's sentiments and great concern to the prevailing sad situation in Angola. He underlined the grave responsibility that had been entrusted to the Commission to reconcile the warring parties. South Africa, and other enemies of Africa were jubilant, he said, over the sad chapter in Angola's decolonisation. But for the Commission to succeed the parties must be willing to compromise in the spirit of give-and-take, he concluded.

10. In a closed session after the official opening, the OAU Current Chairman emphasized to the Commission the delicate nature of this assignment and the imperative need to respect the secret nature of the discussions, and

briefed the Commission on the many initiatives taken, including discussions with Presidents Mobutu of Zaire and Nguabi of the Congo, to ensure that the three Liberation Movements attend the meeting. He revealed to the Commission that Portugal was anxious to hand-over independence on the scheduled date of 11th November, 1975. Therefore, attempts to delay the independence date must at all costs be discouraged.

11. During its morning session on 1st October, 1975, the Commission elected its Bureau as follows:

Chairman	Uganda
1st Vice Chairman	Burundi
2nd Vice Chairman	Ghana
Rapporteur	Somalia.

12. The working hours were set for 1000 - 1300 hours and 1500 - 1900 hours.

13. In his remarks, the Chairman recalled the mandate of the Reconciliation Commission as spelt out in Resolution AHG/Res.72(XII) of the 12th OAU Summit, and further briefed the Commission on the various initiatives taken by President Amin of Uganda to convene the Commission's meeting. In his view, the major task of the Commission was to review the prevailing situation in Angola against the background of Portugal's determination to leave Angola on 11th November, 1975, and the growing external interference as exemplified by the reported presence of Portuguese and South African mercenaries in Angola.

14. The situation in Angola was deteriorating daily. As she reported to the United Nations Secretary-General, Portugal had suspended parts of the Alvor Agreement because the Liberation Movements themselves had constantly violated its terms.

15. Ambassador M. Djoudi, OAU Assistant Secretary-General, briefed the Commission on his visit to Portugal. He stressed the following points:-

- i) Concern about current political developments in Portugal itself which could adversely affect developments in Angola;
- ii) That Portugal (including the various parties) was committed to handing over power on 11th November, 1975. She wanted to leave immediately and in any case she did not have the military capability to hold out longer;
- iii) That Portugal appeared to be contemplating to solicit U.N. intervention. The OAU is opposed to U.N. intervention (Portugal shares this viewpoint officially and would like U.N. involvement limited to humanitarian assistance - food, medicines, repatriation, etc.).
- iv) That the political **crisis** in Angola was basically an internal problem for which initiative to solve rests with the Angolans themselves;
- v) South Africa invasions into Angola - the Portuguese made official protests but had no military capability to deal with the situation;
- vi) That in the final analysis responsibility for Angola rested on Portugal till 11th November, 1975;
- vii) That Portugal gave the pretext of the violations of the terms of the Alvor Agreement by the Liberation Movements for her suspension of the Agreement;
- viii) Portugal **appeared** to have no clear conception as to how to end the Angola crisis;
- ix) Portugal welcomed and appreciated OAU assistance and initiatives in finding a solution to the Angola crisis.

16. In the general discussion that followed, the Commission underscored the following points:

- i) that the mandate entrusted to the Commission was complex and urgent;
- ii) that the most pressing issue was to find ways and means of how best to prepare for the handover of the instruments of power to the Angolans.

- iii) that the warring Liberation Movements should respect the various agreements that have been signed.
- iv) call for an immediate cessation of hostilities;
- v) that active and frank participation of the three Liberation Movements, (FNLA, MPLA and UNITA) was vital for reaching any meaningful decisions;
- vi) that the interests of Angola should be placed above differences of parties or ideology.

17. In the afternoon session of 1st October, 1975, the Commission listened to the account given by the Portuguese Delegation on the state of affairs in Angola. The Portuguese saw the present OAU initiative as a last attempt to resolve the Angola crisis which was of concern to all independent Africa.

18. The Portuguese delegation gave a historical account of its genuine commitment to decolonisation in accordance with the various Agreements on Angola, especially the Alvor Agreement which provided for a Transitional Government and set 11th November, 1975, as the date for independence.

19. In justification of its suspension of parts of the Alvor Agreement, the Portuguese delegation cited as reasons for this course of action, violations of the Agreement by the Liberation Movements, growing insecurity and tension in the country, military confrontation among the Liberation Movements, partial paralysis of the administration, worsening economic situation, and general deterioration of the situation with breakdown of law and order. Under the Emergency Powers, the Portuguese High Commissioner was empowered to maintain general law and order in Angola.

20. The International Community was informed of these measures and according to the Portuguese, the United Nations gave its approval. The Portuguese delegation, however, emphasized that Portugal had no intention of internationalising the problem of Angola, but rather she was anxious to handover power in conformity with U.N. resolutions on decolonisation.

21. With the illustration of a map, the Portuguese delegation gave a rough account of the economic potential of Angola, the areas controlled by the respective Liberation Movements.

22. Following the brief, the Commission asked the Portuguese delegation a number of pertinent questions which in sum sought information on:

- a) Portugal's stand on the independence date of 11th November, 1975;
- b) what action Portugal contemplated taking in the event of failing to reconcile the three Liberation Movements before 11th November, 1975;
- c) how many Districts each Liberation Movement controlled;
- d) distribution of popular support among the three Liberation Movements;
- e) justification for Portugal's military withdrawal which was responsible for the present anarchy;
- f) sources of arms for the Liberation Movements.
- g) was it still possible to apply the Alvor Agreement?
- h) strength of Portuguese troops in Angola.

23. The Portuguese delegation was not able to satisfy the Commission in some of the questions. In summary, the replies to the questions at paragraph 22 were as follows:

- a) Portugal remained committed to give independence to Angola on 11th November, 1975;
- b) Portugal had no precise answer to this complex question, she was seeking assistance of the OAU to find a meaningful solution to the problem;
- c) FNLA - 2 Districts;
MPLA - 4 Districts;
UNITA - 2 Districts;
- d) Areaa under UNITA control comprised about 50% of Angola's total population;

MACUA
SYNDICATE

- e) Portugal had to reduce its army strength in Angola in conformity with the terms of the Alvor Agreement to phase-out its troops the last contingent of which must leave Angola by 26th February, 1976;
- f) Portuguese delegation evaded giving a categorical answer as to the sources of arms for the Liberation Movements and claimed that the only information they had on the source of supply was as given by the Liberation Movements themselves.
- g) The Alvor Agreement still applied as it was only partially suspended;
- h) The portuguese troops in Angola were 24,000.

24. The Portuguese delegation was requested to withdraw from the Chamber at 19:30 hours after which the meeting continued in closed session.

25. After consultations, it was agreed that the three Liberation Movements be heard separately on 2nd October, 1975, in alphabetical order, FNLA, MPLA and UNITA. It was also agreed that later, the three Liberation Movements be invited to a joint session during which time the Commission could put questions to them on the basis of their statements and any other relevant issues. It was stressed by the Commission that emphasis should be placed on areas of agreement and reconciliation rather than apportioning blame. At any rate, the Commission would ensure that the three Liberation Movements were not alienated any further one against the other.

26. The Commission stressed that during question time, the three Movements must be pressed to indicate whether or not they would welcome the Reconciliation Commission to visit Angola.

27. On 2nd October, 1975, the Commission listened to the submissions by FNLA, MPLA and UNITA as agreed the previous day.

FNLA STATEMENT:

28. The FNLA delegation expressed thanks to the OAU for its efforts at reconciling the three Angolan Liberation Movements and the establishment of an atmosphere of concord. In the view of the FNLA, the Commission's task would essentially be to find ways and means of ending the shameful fratricidal war imposed on Angola by forces external to Africa who want to impose foreign ideologies in order to carry out their expansionist ambitions.

29. Following the 25th April, 1974, coup d'etat in Portugal, the three Angolan Liberation Movements agreed at Mombasa in January, 1975, to negotiate independence together. The FNLA and UNITA welcomed having national elections. On the other hand, MPLA did not accept the principle. Thus, while the FNLA and UNITA hoped for a political solution, the MPLA was arming itself ostensibly to deal with reactionaries but in fact intending to declare U.D.I. In this, the MPLA received military assistance from the U.S.S.R.

30. The FNLA castigated the MPLA for the present crisis in Angola following the signing of the Alvor Agreement. According to the FNLA, the MPLA did not want the presence of the FNLA and UNITA in Luanda, thus making the operations of the Transitional Government very difficult. The MPLA started a systematic campaign against the Transitional Government, was responsible for strikes in all sectors of the economy, was responsible for the insecurity in Angola, particularly in Luanda, where they attacked houses of FNLA and UNITA, set fire to public buildings and installations.

31. According to the FNLA, the MPLA were assisted by the Soviet Union and the former Portuguese High Commissioner, Ross Cultinho, in the perpetration of these crimes. Moreover, vessels of Soviet satellite states discharged hundreds of tons of arms for MPLA not to mention professional agitators who posed as tourists or members of the Portuguese army and Soviet, East German, Cuban and Czechoslovakia technicians who infiltrated Angola to work for the MPLA. The FNLA accused Cultinho of contracting former Katangese mercenaries to fight alongside the MPLA.

32. Thus, under the mistaken impression that she was militarily strong, the MPLA started attacking the FNLA and UNITA in Luanda and elsewhere. But the struggle for power in Angola has been mainly between the FNLA and MPLA.

33. The MPLA's approach to politics smacked-of tribalism. The MPLA aimed at crushing not only FNLA and UNITA militants, but everybody not from Luanda. This forced some 40,000 Angolans from the North and 40,000 Angolans from the South to flee Luanda. The FNLA and UNITA warned the MPLA that she was plunging the country into chaos and appealed to the Transitional Government to take appropriate measures to redress the situation. Even the measures taken by the Transitional Government were consistently violated by the MPLA.

34. In May, 1975, the Portuguese High Commissioner requested the Liberation Movements to remove heavy arms out of Luanda. The FNLA and UNITA complied with the request whereas the MPLA on the contrary brought-in additional arms.

35. After the Nakuru Summit in June, 1975, attended by the leaders of the three Movements, FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, there was hope of an end to confrontation. Alas, one week after signature of the Nakuru Agreement, the MPLA forces used missiles and tanks against the FNLA and UNITA militants resulting in massacre of thousands of innocent civilians and the exodus of the FNLA and UNITA from Luanda as a provisional measure.

36. The military support the MPLA received from the U.S.S.R. had greatly worsened the Angola crisis. For instance, during the Liberation war against the Portuguese fascists, tanks were not used but these were now being used by the MPLA against fellow Angolans.

37. The UNITA displayed photographs of weapons allegedly used by MPLA.

38. The FNLA accused Portugal of planning to hand-over power in Angola in the hands of people who could defend her economic and cultural interest, that is, she wanted an Angola that was like present-day Portugal.

39. On the military situation, the FNLA stated that things were not what the MPLA would have wished. The FNLA even went further to state that the MPLA did not control a single district - they were largely confined to Luanda and the hinterland. In any case, the solution to Angola was political and not military.

40. The FNLA remained opposed to the fratricidal war in Angola. Hence its acceptance of a political solution. In view of the FNLA, the Nakuru Agreement of June, 1975, remained the most realistic agreement to resolve the Angola impasse. The FNLA remained committed to it and open to dialogue to seek any peaceful solution to the problem. There could be no better formula but for it to be implemented, it was imperative that the MPLA respected the terms.

41. The FNLA insisted that Portugal handover independence to the people of Angola on 11th November, 1975, as stipulated in the Alvor Agreement.

MPLA STATEMENT:

42. The MPLA thanked the OAU for its initiatives aimed at reconciling the three Angolan Liberation Movements. In its view, the Angola problem had now become a world problem and it was in this spirit that the MPLA welcomed the OAU initiative to contribute to efforts to find an emicable solution. In any case, the OAU had been actively involved in the fight to end Portuguese Colonialism in Angola. The solution to the Angola crisis must be realistic and not a repetition of old formulas that have not worked in the past.

43. The MPLA stated that it could not furnish a full political - military situation report because of the short notice given. The MPLA held FNLA in particular and to some extent UNITA as responsible for the war in Angola and for delaying the freedom of Africa which must, in fact, extend beyond Angola's Southern borders. The Angolan war