



Dr. Eduardo Mondlane

CONVERSATION WITH EDUARDO MONDLANE

In an interview with the editor of *Africa Report*, FRELIMO'S President speaks frankly of the strategy, tactics, ideology, and prospects of the revolution which began in Mozambique in September 1964

by Helen Kitchen

Kitchen: Every Africanist knows that you were an assistant professor of sociology at Syracuse University in New York before you returned to Africa to become leader of FRELIMO in 1962. Can you tell me how this came about?

Mondlane: I was born in 1920 in the Gaza district of southern Mozambique—the last child of my father's third and last wife. My father died when I was very young, and I was raised by my mother and elder brothers. In the beginning, I did not dream of having an education. Even though my father was a chief, no member of my family had ever gone to school. My brothers and I herded cattle, sheep, and goats. My mother decided, however, that I would be educated—and she was a very determined and persistent woman. In 1931, when I was 11, I entered the government school at Manjacaze, transferring two years later to a mission school nearer home.

The Calvinist missionaries became interested in me and arranged for me to go to Lourenço Marques in 1936 to work for my primary school certificate. This was the highest level open to an African in those days, and it seemed that I was already approaching an educational dead end. An opportunity then opened up for technical training, however, and I snatched at that straw. I completed a course in dry-land farming at an agricultural school, and perhaps more important, I learned English. After teaching dry farming for two years in the Manjacaze region, I managed to get a scholarship to attend secondary school in Northern Transvaal. In 1948, I entered Witwaters-

rand University in Johannesburg on another private scholarship. The bubble burst the next year, however, when my permit as a foreign student was lifted by the South African Government, and I was also arrested and interrogated by the Portuguese in connection with my efforts to organize a Mozambique student association.

The Portuguese authorities concluded that my "embryonic spirit of black nationalism" might be cured by sending me to a university in Portugal. In the end, however, I went to the University of Lisbon on a scholarship provided by the Phelps-Stokes Fund of New York—and was cured of nothing. Although we were under close surveillance and had our rooms searched from time to time, I became friends with African intellectuals from other Portuguese territories who are today well-known nationalist leaders, including Dr. Agostinho Neto and Mario Pinto de Andrade, who later became leaders of Angola's MPLA; Amílcar Cabral, now the secretary-general of PAIGC; and Marcelino dos Santos, now a member of FRELIMO'S Central Committee. After a year in Lisbon, I asked to have the scholarship transferred to an American university, and subsequently obtained my BA from Oberlin College in Ohio in 1953. My MA and my PhD are from Northwestern University, in sociology, and I spent another year at Harvard doing research in role conflict. From 1957 until 1961, I worked for the United Nations as a research officer on trust territories.

During those five years at the UN, I received many appeals from Mozambicans to take an active leadership role

in the nationalist movement. With Tanganyika's independence in 1961, I decided that the situation had changed completely and that independence for Mozambique might be possible in my lifetime. Now we had a base from which to operate. I resigned from the UN, took a teaching post at Syracuse, and prepared to return to Africa to enter actively into politics.

Kitchen: As I recall, there were at least three competitive Mozambique nationalist movements in 1961. Which one did you favor?

Mondlane: There were several groups, but the most important were the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO), and the União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI). I had been associated with UDENAMO, but I was by 1962 absolutely convinced that the first condition for success must be to unify the various movements into a united front, a single party.

Kitchen: And it was in this context that FRELIMO was established in 1962?

Mondlane: Yes. After months of negotiation, we convened a meeting of the parties in Dar es Salaam in mid-1962 and formally established the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique on June 25 of that year. The three existing parties were dissolved and FRELIMO was established on the basis of complete fusion into a single movement. The new liberation front had a unitary structure—that is, any Mozambican who wished to be associated with the movement had to com-

mit himself as an individual, not as part of a sub-group. We called a first party congress for September 1962 and managed to bring many influential and representative Africans out of Mozambique to help draw up the policy guidelines of the new movement.

Kitchen: What were the major policy lines agreed on at that first congress in Dar es Salaam?

Mondlane: There were three. First, we accepted it as a fact of life that Salazar's Portugal was unable to accept the idea of self-determination and that there was no prospect of negotiating political changes leading toward independence. We had to establish a clandestine political force within Mozambique to prepare the people for the very difficult task of liberating the country. Secondly, we decided to establish a clandestine military program. Thirdly, we agreed to establish an educational program that would emphasize leadership training.

Kitchen: Why were you so certain from the beginning that force would be necessary?

Mondlane: Portugal is controlled by a government which does not even accept the idea of democracy and individual freedom for the people of metropolitan Portugal. Consequently it is inconceivable that it would voluntarily accept the idea that colonial peoples like ourselves should have these rights, much less independence. Portugal cannot be compared with such colonial powers as France or Britain. The Salazar regime does not believe in frank, logical, and peaceful dialogue; it expects obedience. For this reason, we found it necessary to assume from the beginning that liberation would require the use of force.

Kitchen: Where did you first turn for assistance in training and equipping FRELIMO's military force?

Mondlane: At the September 1962 conference we discussed this problem at considerable length. At that time, the only African state that had had a successful military experience against a determined and well-armed colonial power was Algeria. It was logical, then, that we should turn to Algeria. We arranged to meet with President Ahmed Ben Bella to propose a program of preparation for our people. The Algerian Government received our request favorably, and the first group of freedom fighters was sent to Algeria within less than six months. Their training served as a basis for further training of Mozambicans in East Africa and later in Mozambique itself.

By September 1964, when we launched our first military action, we had a force of 250 well-trained and equipped young men.

Kitchen: Is FRELIMO's military arm still based on the Algerian model?

Mondlane: The Mozambican army is a guerrilla army in the most modern sense of this term. The original program was established with Algerian advice and training, and was thus shaped on the basis of the Algerian experience in fighting against the French Army. In three years of fighting, however, we have acquired experience of our own, plus ideas from reading widely on various techniques of guerrilla warfare, and from contacts with other liberation struggles elsewhere. Thus we have developed our own conception of the struggle and are slowly but definitely tailoring our techniques to the specific problems of Mozambique. Successful guerrilla warfare must be rooted in reality. In Mozambique, that means it must take into account the nature of our terrain, the kind of people the Portuguese are, and their proportion in the country.

Kitchen: You said that 250 FRELIMO troops launched the military phase of the revolution in September 1964. How many trained men do you now have in the field?

Mondlane: Within a year after the war began on September 25, 1964—which we now celebrate as national liberation day—we had more than 1,500 trained troops. In two years, we had more than 7,000. Now we have over 8,000 trained, well-equipped men and women.

Kitchen: Can some areas of Mozambique be said to be under FRELIMO control?

Mondlane: Our army is fighting in one-third of the country, and I would say that about one-fifth of the total area of Mozambique (with a population of almost a million out of the total population of 7 million) is under our virtual control.

Kitchen: Is military activity directed primarily against the Portuguese military or against the entire colonial presence in Mozambique?

Mondlane: We had to grapple with this question at our first congress. Given the imbalance of forces, we had to determine exactly whom to shoot in Mozambique. For reasons of morality, strategy, and economy, we had to choose the army first. So our men are trained in the techniques of fighting primarily the Portuguese Army, the police, the PIDE (the Portuguese political police), and all the bodies that are related to the military establishment, including spies. Secondly, we are concerned with certain administrative centers outside the army which support the army. Certain economic projects that support the Portuguese Army are also targets of our attack. But we do not regard economic projects as a primary target because the natural resources of Mozambique are our own, even though

they may be controlled by the Portuguese today. Exceptions must sometimes be made for military reasons, but we try to preserve the little economic development that has taken place in Mozambique when we can. This, I think, is as clear as I can make it.

Kitchen: There have been reports from time to time of FRELIMO "terrorist" attacks on Portuguese civilians and on pro-Portuguese Africans in Mozambique. Are these true?

Mondlane: We do not encourage attacks on civilians of any kind, be they black, white, colored, or Asian, so long as they are not armed to fight against us and are not cooperating with the Portuguese Army. The reason for our prohibition of attacks on civilians of all races is that we are not fighting against the Portuguese people as such. We are fighting the Portuguese Government and its colonial, exploitative, imperialist establishment in Mozambique. Any Portuguese whites or Asians or any people who are not traditional Mozambican people and who may wish to stay in Mozambique after we become free are welcome—even as members of FRELIMO.

Even church groups who are working in the bush are safe. We have had cases of Catholic bishops and priests moving about in complete safety in our area because we knew they were not serving in the Portuguese Army. In 1966, for example, a Catholic priest was sent by the Bishop of Portugal to a province in the area where we are fighting to search for some white families who had disappeared. The Portuguese had been spreading stories that our men had raped, killed, and eaten these white women and their children. In fact, we helped the priest go through our bases into Tanzania, where he found all the white people; we then gave him permission to return to Mozambique, where he is now working. FRELIMO militants had taken those white people out of the war area to safehaven when they asked to be removed, and helped the priest who was sent to find them. Surely this is conclusive proof that we do not harm anybody who is not our enemy, regardless of his race, religion or color.

Kitchen: Do your military forces encounter any suspicion or antipathy from Mozambicans when they seek to establish control in a given area?

Mondlane: We have little opportunity to find out because the Portuguese authorities define all black people in an area as guerrillas as soon as the area is affected by guerrilla action. They bombard and attack civilians, and the civilians very promptly abandon whatever feelings

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of ambivalence they may have had and want very much to be associated with the movement and live with our guerrillas. Our military actions are also becoming more and more effective in keeping the Portuguese administration completely out of contact with the masses of the African population.

We assume that our military control of these areas involves certain administrative responsibilities toward the population and we undertake to ensure the minimal requirements of normal life in the bush. These include drugs and medicines and bush clinics to distribute them. Schools for the children, especially in areas that already had missionaries, are also important in establishing confidence. Even in areas where the people had never had any formal education, schools are wanted; to these people "liberation" means having schools for their children. We also help the people in their agriculture and in marketing their products within the country. Now this, I think, is as much as I should say on this subject.

Kitchen: To what extent has FRELIMO created a "shadow government" for Mozambique?

Mondlane: FRELIMO'S structure is dictated by the necessities of the revolution. The main organizational body is the central committee, which has both administrative and legislative responsibilities. It is composed of 22 members, most of them also directors or executive secretaries of operational departments of the organization. The central department is the president's office, which consists of the president and vice-president and a secretary for the presidency as the responsible officers. All actions—political, military, and educational—are coordinated here. In listing the other departments, I do not mean to imply that the order of listing indicates their relative importance.

Certainly one of the most important departments is the one responsible for clandestine political work within Mozambique. The executive secretary in charge of this department is assisted by a committee of associate secretaries, one representing each province. They prepare for action everywhere—ahead of the army, with the army, and after the army. They are responsible for formulating political lines and transmitting them to local leaders. They establish cells everywhere in Mozambique and make sure that each cell knows what it must do and how its function fits into the party's strategy for the liberation of the whole country. A department of organization within Mozambique has the related task of preparing the people psychologically and politically for the long struggle that

we face. We do not make facile promises to people, for it is absolutely essential that they share with us the knowledge that liberation from Portuguese rule may take many years and many lives. Every area of Mozambique has a team working clandestinely to train leaders and to provide the kind of civic education that will enable each Mozambican to understand how he personally relates to FRELIMO'S overall strategy. Where the people organize themselves ahead of FRELIMO'S organizational team, the staff seeks to link the existing setup with FRELIMO, emphasizing orientation on the need for coordinating activities against an enemy as powerful as Portugal.

The department of defense, which reports directly to the president on a daily basis, recruits, trains, supplies, and provides political education for the youth who are the guerrillas. It also plans and directs military activities. The department of external affairs, staffed with an executive secretary and an associate and other personnel, is concerned with solidifying ties with all foreign countries and organizations that are friendly to the Mozambique liberation struggle. It formulates requests for help, circulates information, conveys all gifts from outside into the organization, represents FRELIMO in conferences abroad, and serves as the formal link between FRELIMO and CONCP, the organization that coordinates liberation movements in all the Portuguese colonies [see below].

The department of finance, which is also the treasury, collects all funds, prepares budgets, and, in collaboration with the president's office, supervises the disbursement of funds to every department. It is also responsible for planning the economic action programs that must be undertaken to assure the welfare of the people in the liberated areas of Mozambique.

The department of education is responsible for FRELIMO'S growing program of academic, political, and technical education. It maintains a number of schools within and outside Mozambique and coordinates all scholarship programs for our students abroad. It contacts foreign governments, friendly educational and philanthropic organizations, and other potential sources of scholarship assistance. It also screens and prepares students, transmits their qualifying documents, and arranges travel documents, clothing, and transportation as necessary. This department is also the liaison between FRELIMO and the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam, which is the main educational body within the Mozambique liberation struggle. A directorate of health, composed of a number of doctors and nurses, operates FRELIMO'S medical programs. It is responsible, in

cooperation with the Mozambique Institute, for training all the nurses who are required to go into Mozambique every year to help man our several clinics; it also supervises these clinics, solicits or buys the drugs and medicines required, and conveys these supplies where they are needed. A department of social welfare is primarily concerned with the feeding and clothing of refugees and displaced persons within Mozambique, and with soliciting help required to deal with these problems.

A department of information, located in our Dar es Salaam headquarters, collects and digests information on FRELIMO activities and issues weekly press statements; it also prepares documents and pamphlets for circulation abroad and publishes a monthly English-language magazine called *Mozambique Revolution*. Other pamphlets are prepared for use within Mozambique to keep the people informed and to explain the line of action required by the party. Radio news and announcements are beamed to listeners in Mozambique through friendly countries in Africa and elsewhere.

Kitchen: You have spoken frequently of FRELIMO policy decisions. How are these reached?

Mondlane: FRELIMO not only functions as an administrative body, but also as a democratic party. The central committee meets as a legislative body every six months, and these meetings may last from two days to a week to two weeks, depending on the issues involved. Each department reports on the work it has been carrying out, and there is a free discussion during which policy lines are established. It is in the central committee sessions that our problems are aired and the people's views are expressed through their representatives. A very forthright exchange of views takes place before policy decisions are reached by consensus.

Kitchen: A good many of our readers may know that the Mozambique Institute was founded by you and your wife Janet in Dar es Sa'aam. Just what does the Institute do, and to what extent is it independent of FRELIMO?

Mondlane: Portugal's education policy in its colonies has favored the education of the Portuguese, with the education of the black man left almost exclusively to the churches, especially the Catholic Church. This government-subsidized missionary education provides a very limited kind of instruction for Africans, and its primary aim is to convert us to Christianity and inculcate us with Portuguese culture. In preparing ourselves to be free, we had little difficulty in reaching agreement that we must give very high priority to the creation of opportunities for higher

education for our young people. Some efforts in this direction were underway even before the founding conference of FRELIMO in June 1962.

My wife Janet and I had noticed that there were many refugee students in Dar es Salaam who wanted to go abroad to take up higher education, but that no machinery existed through which they could be introduced to colleges and to governments or organizations that might give them scholarships. We knew that it would be very difficult to get private humanitarian organizations, especially in Western countries, to give direct support to a political organization and therefore we decided that it would be wiser to establish an independent, or somewhat independent, educational center for Mozambique students. My wife developed an outline of a program which she presented to various organizations in the United States and Western Europe, and in 1963 she got her first grant of almost \$100,000 from an American humanitarian organization. Starting with that, she built the present center in Dar es Salaam. The party, of course, is directly interested in this program because it is part of the general educational program for Mozambique. The department of education of FRELIMO cooperates closely with the Mozambique Institute.

The Institute has three functions: (1) It tries to fill the gap between the low level primary school training program that the mission schools give Mozambican Africans and the much more advanced primary program that prevails in English-speaking Africa. In Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea, primary schools end at standard four, while primary school ends at standard eight in East Africa. If a student from Mozambique is granted a scholarship for secondary education in East Africa, he can't take it unless he has the equivalent of standard eight. (2) It prepares students with the equivalent, or near equivalent, of secondary education to accept scholarships abroad, in any part of the world where scholarships are offered. When the Institute was conceived in 1962, we had barely 15 students in any institution higher than secondary school anywhere in the world. Now we have more than 150 students in universities and technical schools in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa. (3) It also provides as much technical training as possible to Mozambicans who are going back into the areas of Mozambique we control to do specific work that is much needed. There is a nurses' training program and a new program of teacher training, and we have plans for a general technical training program.

There are, of course, never enough funds. As I said before, an American

foundation gave the Institute its first grant, but political pressures on that foundation made it impossible for us to get further help from this source. Most of the funds now come from Europe, especially Scandinavia. Eastern European and Asian countries have also been helping, notably in giving educational equipment. Usually we have about 15 teachers—three from the United States at present, one from Scandinavia, one from Eastern Europe, one from India, four Portuguese Mozambicans, and the rest Africans.

Kitchen: You referred to CONCP and FRELIMO's relations with liberation movements in other Portuguese territories. Can you elaborate?

Mondlane: The activities of most, though not all, of the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies are coordinated by the Conference of Organizations Against Portuguese Colonialism. FRELIMO, MPLA of Angola, PAIGC of Guinea, and CLSTP of São Tomé and Príncipe established CONCP in 1962, and we had our second congress in 1965 just before the OAU conference held that year in Accra. The purpose of these meetings is to exchange ideas, strategies, and opinions. We are fighting against the same enemy in all four of these countries and it is only natural that we should have a coordinating body.

The CONCP has a directorate composed of the top leaders of the member movements. We are supposed to meet once every six months, but it is not always possible to do this because of the difficulties in communication. There is a secretariat in Rabat composed of officers representing each member movement, who exchange information on various problems relating to our common struggle—defense, foreign policy, political techniques, cultural affairs, education. But we are not one party or front. Each movement is independent of the others, has its own policy, and follows the needs and requirements of its own people. It may even be that we have different ideological lines. We don't know. We have never discussed ideology in these conferences. We are like a small OAU.

Kitchen: What is your policy toward the GRAE-MPLA split in Angola?

Mondlane: FRELIMO has never really taken a stand concerning the internal affairs of any country, including Angola. We work with MPLA rather than GRAE because we believe in the coordinating function of CONCP. GRAE has issued statements from Kinshasa against us, accusing us of being communists and various other things. We do not respond. We have never made a statement against Holden Roberto or the movement. We believe in unity, in common action. We are not cooperating with GRAE because its leadership doesn't wish to cooperate

with us. We work with MPLA because the MPLA people are very much interested in cooperation.

Kitchen: You said that Tanzania's achievement of independence gave FRELIMO a base from which to operate, that your military was initially trained by Algeria. To what extent have other African countries aided FRELIMO?

Mondlane: Support for our program of liberation—and by this I mean the whole range of political, military, and educational programs—now comes from every corner of the world. I can divide these sources of aid into three broad categories:

First, Africa. Most help for the political and military program comes from independent African states, either in the form of money or equipment obtained for us by the OAU's African Liberation Committee, or as individual offers of material and financial aid. The Liberation Committee designated FRELIMO as the only channel for OAU aid to Mozambique nationalism in 1963. African aid composes more than two-thirds of our total resources.

Second, we receive aid from Asian and socialist states, including India, the People's Republic of China, Indonesia, Japan, and the USSR. This aid includes both funds and equipment useful in the struggle.

Third, we also get aid from Western countries. This is mostly from churches and humanitarian pro-African committees, and is designated for our educational, refugee, and other humanitarian programs. The Mozambique Institute has received a great deal of financial support from Western countries and school equipment from Eastern Europe.

Kitchen: What do you most need in external aid that you are not getting?

Mondlane: Before I answer that question, I think it is necessary to make it clear that the main source of support for our struggle is our own people. It is important to say this because there are many people in America and elsewhere who think our success will depend primarily on the kind of support we get from outside. We believe very strongly that it is the political determination of the people and the clarity with which they see the necessity for their line of action that will make possible the liberation of our people, of our country. Everything else is supportive. Without the political determination of the Mozambicans and without an organization such as FRELIMO to structure the action, outside help would be of no use at all.

Having said that, I can answer the question in its proper context. There are several kinds of support that we very much need that we aren't getting. Above all, perhaps, we wish we had the outright political and diplomatic support of

the Western powers for our struggle. We do not have that. The United States, France, West Germany, Great Britain, and most of the NATO powers tacitly support the status quo in Portuguese-governed Africa. During the first three years of this decade, when John F. Kennedy was President, the United States went through a period of equivocation and seemed to be moving toward support for us. After the death of President Kennedy, the policy became equivocation without direction. More recently, US policy has become one of support for the status quo. Even Portugal acclaimed the vote of the US delegation in the General Assembly of the United Nations during the last session of 1966.

Everytime I go to the United States, I'm asked again and again whether FRELIMO is "pro-East" or "pro-West," "pro-communist" or "pro-capitalist." My answer as president of FRELIMO is that FRELIMO is pro-Mozambican, principally, primarily, and finally. But when we are fighting as we are, and our people see the West helping through NATO to train the Portuguese Army, even special training in guerrilla warfare; when they see French, German, and British weapons being used by the Portuguese; when they see the Western countries vote with Portugal in the UN, establish military bases in Portugal as West Germany is doing, and allow millions of dollars of private capital to be invested in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea, they can scarcely remain unaffected.

If the West has decided, for reasons of expediency, that it cannot part company with fascist Portugal, and to leave the Africans of southern Africa to fend for themselves, remember it's not our choice. It's yours. We will accept that. But don't be surprised later if we are not very friendly to you.

Let me make it clear that we do not believe that a change of attitude by the West in itself is going to help us win our struggle. We do think, however, that it may determine the length of time it may take for us to win. This is something the United States should consider very carefully. Portuguese colonial rule in Africa is an anachronism, and we will dispose of it—with or without outside help. The real issue is: What does the West expect of us when we win our victory if it continues its present policies?

Kitchen: What kind of country would you like independent Mozambique to be?

Mondlane: Independent Mozambique will be a democratic, modern, unitary, single-party state. Our model is the neighboring state of Tanzania, which has a challenging experiment under way. Our movement had a sound beginning within Tanzania, and we feel that we have a lot to learn here. As far as I'm concerned

personally, Tanzania is providing the kind of leadership that all of us south of the Sahara should want to know more about.

We can't tell exactly what form the governmental system is going to take, but we do know that we do not intend to be either a capitalist or communist, but rather a socialist state. This requires some explanation. First, it should be remembered that all our land and natural resources are now controlled by the Portuguese Government, which disposes of them as it wants, selling many of the concessions to private foreign companies. The African people are only instruments for production to benefit others. This must be corrected. The natural resources of the country—the land, the minerals, and everything that God has given this country—should belong to its people, not to foreigners. The people of Mozambique will be represented by their government, led by FRELIMO.

There is, of course, another reason we must think in terms of a socialist economy. Private ownership means private capital. Private capital means native people, local citizens of the country, possessing that capital. We Mozambicans have no capital, none whatsoever. We have no chance to inherit anything from Portugal, or to accumulate wealth on our own. So what do we do? We have to start with whatever is available. And what is available is the state. The state will have control of all natural resources, and the people will invest their energies in the activities of the state. Any private interest from anywhere in the world that might wish to participate will have to deal with the state, and the terms and conditions will be determined by negotiation.

Now the third point about which we feel very strongly is the freedom of men, of individual men. Under Portuguese rule, Mozambicans are little more than tools of private companies and the Portuguese Government—or perhaps of foreign interests in South Africa and Rhodesia. This the people resent and want to change. As they become free, therefore, they will demand to be listened to by the new government of Mozambique and they will want to have a say in determining what they want to do with themselves. In cooperation with the people, we will form a new economic system that will make them wish to participate in the construction of a new Mozambique, a new life. They want freedom, which means, translated into material terms, a better economy, better use of natural resources, better use of themselves, better use of the distributive system within the country and with foreign countries. The average man wants to earn at least enough money to live decently.

Kitchen: You have spoken frequently of

preparing the people for a long struggle. Can you now envisage any developments which could change this projection?

Mondlane: I didn't wish to initiate a discussion of Vietnam, but it is obvious to any simple-minded person that the struggle in Vietnam seems to overshadow every struggle everywhere in the world. In part, the American press, radio, and television are not covering us because they are preoccupied with Vietnam—either in favor of or against the war. The war in Vietnam also obscures the moral issue involved in the position of Portugal in Africa. As long as there is no peace in Vietnam, Portugal will never think of negotiating until she has been completely ruined in Africa. Well, if this is going to be, let it be. But if the question of Vietnam is resolved this year or next, then the issue of Portuguese control of large segments of Africa will come to the fore and will be discussed as the important international issue it is. In that event, an effort of the world powers on our behalf might have an effect, aside from what we ourselves are doing. The whole position of NATO must also be considered. NATO's unwillingness to upset Portugal is a factor in retarding the day when the liberation of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea will take place.

The positions of the United States and Western Europe on South Africa, Rhodesia, and South West Africa are also related. If the 14-member UN Ad Hoc Committee that has been established to deal with South West Africa fails to propose something radical and effective for the freedom of the people of South West Africa, if the British and the Americans continue to play games on Rhodesia, if the Africans are not able to start any action in Rhodesia, if the big companies in America and Britain and Western Europe continue to pour money into Portuguese banks and economic projects, and if Rhodesia and South Africa continue to get private investment in ever increasing amounts—then it will be more difficult for the people of the Portuguese colonies to gain their independence.

These are facts, these are realities. But we do not shrink, we do not waver, in the presence of all these obstacles. We have faith that we can move the people of Mozambique to involve themselves so completely in the military and political struggle that Portugal cannot hold out against our vastly greater numbers. If the Portuguese want a Dien Bien Phu, we are prepared to give it to them. We know that there will be suffering, and that there are no easy solutions for our people. Once we have established this fact, and this sense of purpose, in every man, woman, and child in Mozambique, we will have passed the most important test of a liberation movement.