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**Revolutionary option
in Morocco**

Introduction

The report that I am making public now dates back to three years ago. It is about the bloody events of last March and the political events that followed, which give the report a certain timeliness.

In May 1962, when I presented this report to the General Secretariat of the National Union of Popular Forces, I was beginning a first "voluntary" exile which kept me abroad for two years and which allowed me to meditate and formulate certain critical evaluations of our diverse past actions and on our future prospects, at the time that the second congress of our party was being held.

No political association of revolutionary vocation can live and become developed without making, from time to time, an over-all and dynamic analysis of the society in which it operates so as to integrate its daily practice into that society and to be able, to a certain extent, to foresee future events. This analysis of the whole was not a formal necessity but was required by the new push that we wanted to give to the struggle for national liberation, since pragmatism in politics is not only day to day policies, or struggle with the sole perspective of the simple exercise of power, but also the fact of acting from a fragmentary or static analysis of the situation.

In fact, when "a program" is called for at the top of the lungs, what is unconsciously being asked for is an over-all dynamic analysis. A program is not the measures taken as a whole that the party commits itself to adopt in the event of taking power, but rather the line of direction

that sketches the outline of the future by explaining the struggles and vicissitudes of the past.

When I wrote this report, which was only a party internal document, I asked myself, how can we prepare our militants to make them understand the present political tendencies and the future towards which they are leading our country if we do not explain to them the political significance of the conditions in which national independence was created and the errors that have kept the liberation movement from enjoying the fruits of its victory? How can they understand our previous hesitations if we never reveal to them the hard battles that we had to wage to achieve even the slightest reform? Only the objective explanation of our insufficiencies, of our past errors can allow them to prepare themselves for the struggles of the future.

Within the restrictions of this report, it is not a matter of writing the critical history of the whole Moroccan national movement and of drawing up a detailed balance of the first years of independence, but rather of using the study of concrete cases to try to understand, and make understood, why, in the recent past, misfortunes such as finding ourselves forced to defend a commitment that we had accepted only half way, of seeing how we were led to withdraw from national political leadership when we comprised the overwhelming majority of the country, and finally, of seeing how our slogans and platform were taken from us and distorted, kept us from being at all times the guides and mentors of our country. These were the facts that had to be investigated to find their objective and subjective causes and to draw from them conclusions able to throw light upon our future action.

Thus, this report written in 1962 is current because of the analysis it makes of the situation in Morocco and in Africa and because of the evaluations it contributes on the past action of our party. It is particularly current because of its exposition of our basic and long range tasks, of our revolutionary prospects.

The government thought they could maintain themselves in power through a policy of facile demagogy and a constant run of festivities and stillborn projects whose effect was mitigated by shows of force. The big bourgeoisie still

lulled itself with the results of an economic policy that boasted of being both liberal and efficacious. In some regions the peasants were neutralized by a supposed "national promotion" which was nothing but a new kind of charity workshop (*chantiers de charité*). Throughout all Africa the reactionary forces acted with notable results and provoked a reflux of the revolutionary tide, while the progressive countries, such as post-Evian Algeria and the UAR after the split with Syria, were faced with difficulties created by those same reactionary forces. This imperialist counteroffensive might have created the belief that stabilizing or reactionary solutions had some chance of success. Hence the optimism which reigned in the royal palace that made forget that the situation of the emerging countries is essentially changing and dynamic.

At present all of those factors have been turned upside down.

The government's projects and the policy of reactionary stabilization have failed. Those responsible, with their lack of insight, seek the causes of their failure all over except where they are really to be found: in the deep and constantly growing gulf between the Moroccan people and their rulers.

The national promotion has failed because it made absolutely no appeal to the rural population.

The economic policy has failed because it always attempted to serve neocolonialist interests and a state of privilege and exploitation.

The constitutional organization has become bankrupt because it had imposed, in December 1962, an arbitrary system of government which scorned popular aspirations and because it permitted, through the use of all possible tricks, the falsification of the nation's representatives in the 1963 elections.

The March 3, 1965 throne speech in Marrakech was a confession of total failure that adopted a tone of sad homily so as not to proceed to a severe self condemnation. Recognizing failure and attributing it to human nature and the march of the seasons was a strange way to conceive of one's own responsibilities. The people's anger had to explode on March 23 for the king to admit the seriousness of the evil but without denouncing its origin in his June 7 speech proclaiming the state of emergency.

The fact that this game exceeded the limits of prudence was what moved the people of the large cities, especially Casablanca, to hurl themselves into the streets to put an end to the regime and write in letters of blood the history of its failure and incapacity.

When elections are falsified, when freedom of assembly is refused, when the press is gagged, when the patriots who are spokesmen for the masses are persecuted, sentenced to death or prison or simply rubbed out, how can one be surprised —how could the head of state doubt it— that the people make use of more direct means to make themselves heard?

When the majority of the population is kept in misery and ignorance, and when, in addition, they see the door of hope closed before them, how can one be surprised that impatience becomes clothed in desperation?

The direct responsibility? It must be sought in the imposture which has served as the basis of Moroccan official policy since 1960.

The population is made to applaud by coercion or by reducing it to misery, and this forced applause is raised to the heights of a principle of government; but reality avenges itself upon all such illusions and the only true politics is the politics of truth.

Truth reveals itself suddenly. Let us hope, for the good of our people, that some are not too hasty in forgetting it...

The false representation of popular will is a supplementary obstacle on the road to progress and a supplement of energy which is lost.

A policy of restriction, which serves a privileged minority, cannot last in the era of democracy and socialism. Behind the policy of insignias is the present economic and political structure, which is in question. Democracy is not a slogan to be exhibited for the benefit of the tourists but a reality which must concretely open to all the possibilities of progress and culture. It needs a social organization capable of carrying out for itself deep-going structural reforms, and not a revision of the constitution made without the participation of the authentic representatives of the popular masses.

Since 1962, through a series of maneuvers on the part of the antipopular forces, the social base of the regime has retracted until it can really only count on feudal elements in the countryside acting through the local administration, the phoney parliament and the now omnipotent special services of the army and the police. Its true support, moreover, comes from abroad, from the imperialist and neocolonialist forces which, among others, have tried to divorce the regime even from the mercantile bourgeoisie in the provinces and from the progressive sister nations in other parts of the world.

Besides, the experiences of some anti-imperialist countries, especially Algeria and the UAR, have shown that the progressive and noncapitalist road is the only one able to save an underdeveloped country from humiliation and backwardness, and that, as if the foregoing were not sufficient, socialist construction does not affect in any way the relations of cooperation and exchange, on the basis of strict reciprocity, with advanced capitalist economies.

Thus, the situation, both inside and outside Morocco, is favorable to the progressive forces. The situation is infinitely more promising than in 1962, even though the political life and the structures of our party have been greatly harmed since July 1963.

What solution do we propose at the present juncture?

In 1962 we said that a compromise was possible on the basis of the democratization of public life, the application of an agrarian reform and real solidarity with Africa and the revolutionary Arab countries. These conditions —which must be commitments to be validated from day to day— are still valid today in spite of the aggravation of the initial political, economic, social and diplomatic situation during these three years of delays and errors.

The commitment to apply a thorough-going agrarian reform is to us the only means of weakening once and for all the feudal reaction by eliminating its traditional means of action, and of readjusting our relations with the neocolonialist powers. Thus it is not an abstract programmatic point —although no one would dare go back on it at present— it is in reality a group of economic, political, administrative and constitutional reforms which must be carried out and applied from day to day. This is the true

condition for a commitment with the resistance forces, the positive contents of which can only be verified by daily government practice.

In the same way, the democratization of public life means the search for those who really have political power so as to make them yield to the people's will and not to the hurried organization of new elections. In the present circumstances elections would only leave the same people in power behind the façade of a fictitious parliament. Such democratization requires a series of reforms, including municipal and communal reform, an objective which must be watched over with great firmness.

Finally, real and effective solidarity with the Arab and African countries will only be possible when these reforms cut the umbilical cord joining us to neocolonialism and eliminate the means of action which it still maintains within our country's state structure.

This would be the content of a transitory solution which is the installation of an authentic socialist regime.

Any other analysis would content itself with appearances and would present a supposed program and would pose false conditions, all of which would be in our detriment. We would once again find ourselves, and it would also be our own fault, in the static situation of around 1959, the consequences of which we were to feel in 1962. It would mean not putting to good advantage the opportunities offered us by the popular agitation of March 1965, to the great benefit of those who favor the most desperate solution. Such a solution would also be the most costly for our people, that is, brutal repression, violence without perspectives and arbitrary dictatorship.

There still remain the conditions to be created within the party itself to ensure the success of this stage of our revolution.

These conditions are more than ever the same ones dealt with in the 1962 Report and which the trials of the repression suffered by our people make even more imperative. Our organization's ideology must be deepened and its internal structures strengthened so as to make the UNFP the true instrument of the revolution.

It is necessary to stress here the ever larger role to be played by the students in the struggle for liberation and

construction, both as party members and in their mass organization, the National Union of Moroccan Students. If this role was already a brilliant one when the bloody events of March 1965 occurred, it has been growing stronger in the course of the past six years through student struggles and the resolutions of the successive congresses of the UNEM. Since the 1963 repression, they have been the only ones to defy the police and maintain the fighting spirit of the working masses.

After the explosion of popular anger in March 1965, in which fathers joined with their sons to affirm together the watchwords of our party, at the risk of hundreds of innocent lives, we have been more conscious than ever of the historic responsibilities of the UNFP. These responsibilities require of us a clear view of both short and long-range prospects, cohesion and discipline able to withstand any test and above all, special watchfulness towards the opportunistic elements that have slipped into our ranks and which have been unmasked since 1963.

We must not have any illusions as to the huge tasks awaiting us in order to carry out a vast work of education and organization among the popular masses. Our people's revolutionary potentialities must be transformed into effective forces able to sweep away the last final vestiges of colonial domination and exploitation of our country, able also of being mobilized to build a new society in conformity with our revolutionary options.

The important thing is to prepare ourselves to face all situations as they should be faced.

Our fundamental and immediate tasks

Allow me to remind you of the importance for the future of our country of this second congress of the UNFP; it will give our movement the possibility of emerging with a new organization and one of clearly defined prospects which will permit it to be at the height of its historic tasks. I propose here to offer you some remarks on the immediate and long-term tasks awaiting us and the means of carrying them out rapidly and completely.

The UNFP will take on full meaning as a revolutionary party starting with this congress. It is true that it had defined its aims since its birth in 1959. Fruit of the resistance and the Army of Liberation, of the city and rural working masses, of worker and student youth, it has committed itself to continue the battle of the National Liberation Movement in Morocco so as to give real contents to independence. It was necessary to recreate among the masses, through a series of militant actions, the faith and enthusiasm that had been blunted by the interplay of interests, the race for privileges among certain leaders and the labor of division and disorganization to which the imperialists and their agents devoted themselves from 1956 on. But our most urgent task was to prevent the masses from becoming disaffected, indifferent and stagnant, to remedy the skepticism that was slowly winning over the members and cadres of the national movement, in a word, to close off the road to the despair that began to take the place of the great hopes that were frustrated after independence.

A wisely orchestrated propaganda aimed at justifying the monopolization of powers by the royal palace, claimed

that the party system, as a means of political organization and economic reconstruction, had shown its impotence, after it had been given full opportunities. However, the fact is that the system never had the opportunity to function in normal conditions. Ideas, taken from the pseudoexperts on politics and misunderstood or with their real meaning distorted, on the need for an authoritarian regime to lift the backward countries from their underdevelopment, were defended daily in the press and on the radio.

Before this campaign tending to increase confusion among party members and demobilize the masses, the UNFP has had to show that the people could mobilize themselves without putting themselves under a shepherd's crook, as they had done at the time of the great crisis of 1952 to 1955.

This aim has been achieved to a great extent since Morocco today, although it is under a regime of repression and absolute power, maintains in the eyes of Africa its original prestige of being a country where the masses impose respect for their organizations and press and even make the government adopt its watchwords, although the later eventually then denaturalizes them.

We must admit, however, that we were unable to prevent the May 1960 coup d'état, which eliminated the last appearances of popular participation in power. But in a certain sense it has been the pressure of the masses which has compelled a regime based on arbitrariness and coercion to take off its mask and appear as it fundamentally is in reality.

This coup d'état has been positive in a certain sense since it has permitted a clarification of the political situation by confronting the forces of progress and those of reaction, the representatives of the future and those of the past. On one side the popular forces and on the other, those of feudalism, the residues of the traditional circles and of the dissolved political parties and the representatives of the business interests allied with imperialism.

But, to define properly our basic and immediate tasks, we must analyze the situation of the opposing forces in our country, following the rules of the strictest objectivity.

Our first duty is to make a precise analysis of the contents of the regime and the role that it plays at the present stage of Moroccan evolution. It is not enough to present a description of the exercise of power but rather an investigation must be made of the forces upon which it rests. However, it seems that thus far we have contented ourselves with a description of the exercise of power, which is characterized by great weakness, in order to save ourselves a profound political analysis. It is correct to say that at present Morocco has an autocratic regime, but this assertion is insufficient if at the same time it does not indicate upon what internal or external bases the regime rests.

Autocracy implies a certain independence in political options, but we are aware of a pure and simple coincidence between the policies of this regime and those of imperialism in our country. Thus, there is a need to make clear just what allows this regime to survive in spite of its weakness, its negligence and its contradictions.

It is unquestionable that the present regime is benefitted by different internal and external circumstances which must be brought to light. Very frequently, these favorable circumstances have been underestimated, just as internal debilities, while they are real and deep, have been overestimated.

It is this changing balance between unfavorable internal structural factors, unfavorable to the regime, and conjunctural internal and external factors that are favorable to it that it is necessary to pinpoint at all times in order to define adequate strategy and tactics.

This leads us to review the present conditions of the internal and external situation of our country.

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Analysis of the present situation

UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS IS OUR SECOND CONGRESS BEING HELD?

a. THE FOREIGN CONTEXT

The most important phenomenon is without any doubt the accelerated development of the liberation of the colonized peoples. Our horizons, as the party of a recently liberated country, have broadened considerably.

But it seems to me necessary to recall that a movement which is so great as to lead to the abolition of the colonial system cannot take the form of a rising tide that destroys with one fell sweep all that it comes upon, but rather it experiences advances and retreats, ebbs and flows. My personal opinion is that the year 1961-1962 is marked fundamentally by the aggressive return of imperialism to our continent.

1) *Neocolonialism in Africa*

With the sixties, we have entered a new phase of the history of Africa and its struggle for freedom and progress.

In less than two years, the majority of the countries of our continent have joined the small group of countries that had reconquered the right of national independence and participation in national life. The day that Africa in its totality will have completely made good its escape from direct domination can already be glimpsed, in spite of tragedies such as that of South Africa or the insane stubbornness of Portugal, which are condemned by history.

This fact is in itself unquestionably of capital importance because it already introduces a sure change in the international strategic and political balance. With the increase of the solidarity of the three continents, Africa, Asia and Latin America, and the joint action of all the progressive forces of the world, this change must upset the currents of international exchange and thus undermine the very base of imperialism.

The preventive flight of the European colonial powers through the system of granting formal independence is precisely the form of defense of imperialism known as neocolonialism.

It is a matter of policy that on the one hand concedes political independence and it necessarily creates fictitious states whose independence has no chance of becoming real, and on the other proposes a "cooperation" supposedly aimed at "prosperity" resting on an extra-African base.

There is really nothing new about this phenomenon. In essence, it was already the definition of imperialism. In practice, it was already the policy of the capitalism of the most highly evolved country in the world; but in Africa's relations with the European colonial powers, it is a new tendency by comparison with direct domination and exploitation, and colonization by settlement.

This line is not a simple choice in the foreign policy field; it is the expression of a profound change in the structures of western capitalism. Since the moment when, at the second world war, Western Europe, through the Marshall Plan and an ever greater interpenetration with the US economy, drew away from nineteenth century structures to become adjusted to US capitalism, it also became normal for it to adopt US type relations with the rest of the world: in a word, Western Europe must also have "its Latin America."

Of course this neocolonialist reinforcement is not more than a momentary pause which must in no way discourage

us nor prevent us from carrying out, together with the other progressive forces, our historic task: the wiping out of imperialism.

But the understanding of the neocolonialist situation, the careful study of the means it employs, the isolation of the elements which serve as its support in our country, requires a constant labor of ideological enlightenment and formation.

The Third Conference of the African Peoples, held in March 1961 in Cairo, had the merit of proceeding to this study, from which it extracted the following conclusions appearing in an already famous resolution on neocolonialism:

"When the recognition of national independence becomes inevitable, the imperialists connive to empty this independence of its content of true liberation, either by imposing one-sided economic, military and technical agreements, by installing governments favoring them as a result of prefabricated elections or by inventing the so-called constitutional formulas of multinational coexistence so as to disguise racial discrimination in favor of the white settlers.

"And when the maneuvers are not enough to frustrate the militancy and determination of the peoples' liberation movements, colonialism, in its death throes falls back on, behind neocolonialism legality or in favor of a guided United Nations intervention, either the balkanization of the new independent states, the systematic division of the alive political or labor forces and, in desperate cases such as in the Congo, it goes as far as conspiracy, to military and police repression, to force, assassination and physical elimination."

2) *The new circumstances of the Algerian problem*

It is certain that the long and courageous struggle of the Algerian people will by no means suffer a defeat in the present international situation and above all because of the firm determination of the Algerian people; but that struggle could have led to two solutions, given the relation of forces within the country: on one side the Algerian people and on the other, the foreign colony and the French army supported by the military organization of the West: one was in fact a temporary partition of the country, the other, the complete victory of the revolution and the withdrawal of all

French power from Algerian soil. Thus far, neither one has prevailed, although both are within the possibilities that the near future may place them on the order of the day.

The Evian agreements are a revolutionary compromise because it allows one sure benefit, the recognition of the independence of Algeria and because it does not close off any of the prospects of the revolution.

Even taking into account the pressure that will be exerted by the Algerian masses, encouraged by the Army of Liberation, which will help to shorten the delay, the emergence of a state and the political decolonization will take more than a little time, just as it will take time to turn a military apparatus into a political movement, as has also been the case in Cuba. During this period, neocolonialism could find a respite to become stronger.

The struggle for self-determination in Algeria, for the establishment of an Algerian revolutionary power, the struggle against the birth of a third force which would be the pillar of a neocolonialist implantation, maintaining the people united around their NLA (National Liberation Army) and their party, the NLF (National Liberation Front) is a long-range task which will require not only the maximum of energy, but which also demands of us unflinching solidarity and unconditional help.

The future of the Algerian revolution is not only an Algerian problem but it is also ours and the whole Arab Maghreb's problem.

It is likewise our duty to be without indulgence for our past errors and insufficiencies, so that our Algerian brothers, strengthened by their experience of eight years of war and by their cohesion and firmness may easily round the cape of political independence without falling into the traps set for us by imperialism and its allies and which it will set for them as well.

For this glance at the present international situation we have selected only the two main factors that can have direct repercussions on the struggle taking place among us, between the popular forces and the imperialist interests, namely the clash between neocolonialism and the National Liberation Movement in Africa and the taking of power by the NLF in Algeria. Both of those factors influence and will continue to influence the relation of forces in Morocco. The regime, which was implicated in the imperialist maneuvers in the Congo, has already tried to excuse itself by protests of good

faith in the Casablanca Conference and by a façade of alignment with the positions of the progressive African countries where the parties in power are the associates of the UNFP in the Conference of African Peoples and in the Organization for the Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa and Asia (OSPAA).

It is without any doubt the evolution of the situation in Algeria which will lead to a greater clarification of the nature of the forces present in Morocco, and it will be able to act favorably or unfavorably, according to whether the neocolonialist maneuvers succeed or fail in solving the problem of power in Algiers. Imperialism will have to strengthen its strategic points of support in the Maghreb as well as in the Middle East and in Africa and Asia in general, to the extent that its positions will find themselves threatened by the establishment of authentically popular and progressive regimes.

b. THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN MOROCCO

I have already said that the relatively positive result of the 1960 coup d'état has been to crystallize the two essential forces in Morocco. Objectively, there is no longer any role of arbiter or mediator for the Palace. The other supplementary forces such as certain figures, the residues of former political parties lacking popular content or which derive their strength from abroad, groups that take refuge in the self-glorification of their own past, groups of functionaries that want to give themselves the air of technocrats, are in reality no more than the shadow of real power itself; they exist only thanks to their collaboration with the regime and their utter abdication before it.

This is why foreign influence has slowly taken on more and more importance, and why, on the other hand, the results of a year and a half of government do not correspond—all to the contrary—to the speeches and congratulations that the regime accords to itself.

This regime has wanted to base its claim to legitimacy on the incapacity of the former system, that of the so-called party governments, in promoting a true policy of development in Morocco. Its only chance to save itself—if there is any at all—would be to bring about certain progress, no matter how modest, on the road to economic development.

What do we see?

Not one of the operations that make for so many radio broadcast statements is anything but the continuation of prospects begun by the previous government or propaganda devices that will soon meet with failure.

It is not enough for the regime to take over our watchwords, our ideas or at most the very lines of our program and to want to apply it without us and against us. It must also be able to do so.

The regime claims for itself all the projects, all the studies and even the achievements of the BEPI (Bureau d'Etudes et de Participations Industrielles; Office for Industrial Studies and Participation), which were prepared by our comrades when they were in the National Economy Ministry. Moreover, the regime often adulterates a project and makes it unsuitable for the guarantee of accelerated development, when it does not simply commit fraud and graft such as in the scandalous Safi case.

The Safi affair is of course not the only one, but rather, it is one among others, which has been followed from outside the country and unmasked in time.

1) *Balance of economic and social policy*

The regime's attempt to escape the problems of our countryside through the so-called *National Promotion* has only succeeded in becoming the laughingstock of the specialists in the organization of work of the peasant masses. No one mobilizes the masses without first gaining their confidence and giving them all the necessary means to control those in positions of responsibility; and they must realize that the operation is carried out by themselves in their own interest.

Economically, the National Promotion, whose name itself evokes all of the old ideas of charity and enlightened paternalism which have already seen their day, is nothing but a huge jobless-absorption workshop financed in good part by US wheat. Finally, the operation has taken on the aspect of a return to the "TOUIZA" formula (in the sense of a corvee for the caid's or the French protectorate controller's profit) for works that do not even have a sure economic yield.

The failure of this vast propaganda operation has been pointed out not only by ourselves and some foreign experts, but also by the very people that are in charge of it. Meetings follow upon meetings in an attempt to salvage as much as possible, but the only result is that a new explanation of this promotion is broadcast over the radio, as if it were necessary each time to delve into its birth and its definition once again.

But no index of this regime's failure is more revealing than its complete abandonment of all attempts at *planning* in Morocco. It began by taking over the five year plan prepared in 1959, after making sure that the plan had been divested of all revolutionary significance, especially in the agricultural sphere.

After a year and a half, it can be said that not even partial goals will be attained and that consequently, the entire plan is threatened. Naturally, they remember the strength of the phrase "five-year plan" and occasionally they mention it in certain speeches.

I will limit myself to just one example, that of *education*. The plan had drawn up the objectives to be attained for each year of the five-year period, that is, the number of classrooms to be built and of teachers to train. For the 1961-62 school year, it was only during the 1961 summer vacations that they realized that nothing had been done and that consequently the number of pupils to be enrolled in 1962 would not be attained, and that there would even be a lag in relation to demographic increase.

This so-called "Operation Schools" was launched just to achieve what was stipulated in the plan. But unless a similar operation is launched each year and is effectively carried out, which is not the case, since it is not possible to launch an "Operation Teachers," we will always fall short of the plan's goals.

Thus far on the quantitative aspect; as for the qualitative, it is better to say nothing. The consequence has been that this year Morocco has been obliged to ask France for 2 000 new teachers, including 1 200 primary teachers, which makes Morocco the country with the highest number of foreigners in its primary school system.

In reality even if the school goals had been reached, they would have lost their meaning because of the failure to achieve the economic objectives. What use would the

young graduates be if they cannot find work in an expanding economy?

The results of the regime's *economic policy* are visible to all, since they are reflected in price rises that hit especially the city workers and in an increasingly burdensome tax system that hits small tradesmen and craftsmen. The regime has been able to avoid a serious crisis thanks to the use of certain resources which it owes to the administration of the previous government, to indirect French aid (through the purchase of cereals and other products at a higher price than that of the French domestic market) and to US direct aid. It is possible that this year's excellent harvest might even give it time to breathe but continuing the present economic and financial administration can lead only to the same result, that is, a severe crisis in the foreign balance of payments.

Now, Mohamed Deuri, Economy Minister and member of the Istiqlal Party, has thrown himself headlong into calling for *investment*, in part to deal with the balance of payments crisis and in part to try to promote economic development. Not only does he offer full guarantees for profit remittances abroad, but he asks the French State to guarantee those French investors through a system of credits. Under the cover of a National Investment Fund, it also offers new advantages to foreign capitalism established in our country.

If this policy succeeds, which is highly unlikely, it would not lead to an accelerated and harmonious economic development for Morocco, but to the consolidation of a class of improductive middlemen, which would be a screen between neocolonialist exploitation and the Moroccan people and the number one enemy of a genuine nationalization of the economy.

This entire attempt to diminish the present failures does not and cannot have any future, because it is technically problematical and socially reactionary.

Thus, the present regime has no means of carrying out what it boasts of doing, even when it takes over our watchwords and our formulas, since it is unable to put them into practice. The source of all of its failures, something which it does not wish to understand although many experiences have confirmed it, is that the people remain outside of all these undertakings.

2) *The supports of the regime*

Because it cannot count upon the confidence of the popular masses and their voluntary adhesion, the regime is condemned to find itself at the mercy of the support reaching it from abroad and to rely within the country on elements which, to say the least, lack effectiveness. These elements are the high and middle administrative spheres, the police and the army.

First, as to the high and middle administrative spheres: their members are quite literally bought by privileges which are not even remotely related to their capacity and productivity. But the bad thing about this system is that the privileges are by definition limited in number, while the greed of certain men is unlimited. The real administration is not the small number of high officials, but the mass of petty functionaries. The latter see their situation worsen, both absolutely and relatively, and they see no reason for sacrificing themselves while their superiors make scandalous fortunes for themselves thanks to their positions.

Neglect, negligence, and very quickly graft, are the results of this system. Corruption is born unavoidably from the lack of control by the people. Our administration is at present inefficient and corrupt: speeches by those in responsible positions can do nothing to remedy this situation.

How can any results be achieved if the administrative organ is gangrenous?

Add to this situation the competition of the classes made up of the hangers-on of the regime for administrative posts, one after justice, the other the interior, a third the public and semi-public sector, and you will understand why this situation is beginning to be of concern even to those who are responsible for the system, their foreign allies and some of those who collaborate with them.

Both the army and the police are bodies whose recruitment comes unquestionably from the people. The soldiers and officers who were in the *goums* (armed contingent of thibesmen commanded by French officers. Tr. note) and the riflemen of the protectorate at the time of the establishment of the Royal Armed Forces, had for the most part joined the ranks of the Spanish or French armies, under the threat of oppression or unemployment. Among these men, as among the groups of the Army of Liberation

that were broken up and dissolved into the Royal Armed Forces in August 1956, we find the same aspirations as among their families who still live in the rural areas or in the *bidonvilles* (shanty towns).

This is a point which must always be kept in mind.

But light must be thrown upon another point here if we consider the army and the police as the main supports of the present regime: the latter has never allowed this army to have contact with the people and has always been opposed to any form of popular civilian service lending itself to the creation of that indispensable tie between the professional army and the people it is supposed to protect.

The royal palace's zealous care in keeping the army off limits has allowed the establishment of a kind of heavily armed feudalism threatened by all sorts of influences from without or hidden interests, without any possibility of controls or safeguards. In this way the present regime, through its blindly antipopular policies, risks the loss of the leadership of this instrument. The experience of the Congo has shown that certain RAF chiefs can carry out a policy contrary to that proclaimed by the regime.

Thus there exists the possibility that the pillar upon which the regime means to rest may not only get away from it, but even become a danger to its existence.

When we demanded the nationalization of the army, we were not referring to individuals; it was rather the present political function and direction, full of perils and uncertainties for the future of the whole nation, that we denounced.

These dangers are those of *neocolonialism*, to whose manifestations on the African continent in general we have referred. For Morocco the submission of the regime to neocolonialist maneuvers is guaranteed largely by the maintenance of the structures created by the protectorate and represented by land settlement by foreigners, who still exploit about one million hectares and by the hegemony of the foreign monopolies over the principal means of production, credit and trade. The regime finds itself at the mercy of the foreigner to a greater degree the more its weakness and incapacity compel it to beg for financial and technical aid. This aid will become an instrument to strengthen neocolonialist interests and those of its feudal defenders and allies and the comprador bourgeoisie.

3) *Social contradictions*

If in 1955, on the eve of political independence, the social contradictions were not as yet evident, by 1959 they had matured to the point of leading to a necessary change within the national government: the creation of the UNFP. This produced a corresponding transformation within the regime after 1960.

After independence, the agrarian and mercantile *big bourgeoisie*, together with a small sector connected with industry, tied its future more and more to the semifeudal structure inherited from the colonial system. Because of their quantitative and qualitative weaknesses and their fear of the workers' movement and the surge of the masses, they were, at the beginning, disposed to ally themselves with whatever was acceptable of foreign liberal capitalism, then in the process of conversion to a neocolonialist framework.

The present situation is characterized by the complete capitulation of Morocco's big bourgeoisie. The position of its spokesmen in constitutional matters is only a result of this capitulation. It is precisely in this sphere where the class interest of the bourgeoisie are very clear in relation to the neocolonialist and semifeudal forces, where we should not harbor any illusion as to their pretensions to independence.

True, this political capitulation is counterbalanced by a real economic advantage. Without doubt, trade, tariffs and fiscal policies have safeguarded and tended to foster the fundamental interests of this bourgeoisie, in both city and countryside.

But at the same time, this policy, if carried out to its logical conclusion, would present a dilemma:

- The bourgeoisie would really become enterprising and productive, and would therefore pose the question of national economic emancipation;
- The bourgeoisie would be limited to the same parasitic role as the semifeudal elements and hand over all privileges to the foreigners operating in Morocco.

In any case, this policy has already led to a differentiation of the big comprador bourgeoisie, allied to imperialism, from the small or medium national bourgeoisie. The latter see themselves steadily and inevitably impover-

ished because of the present economic policy analyzed in the first part of this report. The gap is widening between this numerous social sector and the minority, which is the only one to gain from an alliance with foreign colonizers and capital in the fields of industry, banking and agriculture. This is the reason why, strange as it seems at first glance, the big bourgeoisie is not even capable of assuming the positions that neocolonialism is willing to permit them.

In the present state of things it would be an error to believe that this bourgeoisie could be loyal to a democratic calling, just as it would be illusory to expect it to undertake the task of economic liberation.

It is here that the role of the *working class* appears in all its magnitude as the class responsible for the economic struggle.

In the degree that the present regime is the tutor of Morocco's big bourgeoisie and, at the same time, the manager of neocolonial interests and of the alliance of this bourgeoisie with neocolonial capitalism, all economic struggle will naturally take on a political shading. We have found this to be true during our participation in the government.

Now then, it is the present policy of the regime to arrange things in such a way that social agitation in favor of limited demands for the worker will not exceed certain limits, since the regime knows that this will necessarily lead the working class to the fundamental question, endangering the cornerstone of the State's economic and social structure. It appears to make concessions to the public sector; at least, it made many promises at the time of the post office and telegraph strike at the end of 1961. However, would it have made the same concessions, and even more, would it have behaved in the same manner if it had been dealing with the private sector?

It is in this context that we must examine and evaluate the certain lack of combativity of the trade Union leadership exhibited in recent months.

The regime fears that our working class, mobilized as the vanguard within the UNFP and organized by the Moroccan Labor Union, would become an instrument of economic emancipation and social revolution. The regime is directing its efforts towards separating the trade union movement from the national liberation movement, since its other divisionary attempts have failed.

There is also the *small and medium bourgeoisie*, urban and rural, which constitutes a large social sector: functionaries, professionals, artisans, businessmen and well-to-do peasants.

This bourgeoisie, which has played an important role in the national liberation movement, has become more and more aware of the continued existence of colonial and semifeudal structures since formal independence was won. Its bitterness grows each day because of the nefarious results of the regime's policy. Thus, it has recovered its militant spirit and sees the sole solution of its difficulties and the materialization of its aspirations in a policy of true liberation and in the establishment of a democratic regime, the only two guarantees for full economic, social and cultural development.

However, as is usual, this social sector tends to defend itself within the existing structural framework from whence is derived its unstable and ambiguous attitude as evidence by multiple experiences in the Third World. They always expect certain elements to solve their problems on an individual and personal level, ignoring collective or over-all measures. Even when they do organize on a professional basis, they tend to collaborate only with local authorities, without ever reaching the national level.

This sector, nevertheless, represents a valuable, potential revolutionary force, as indicated by its considerable contribution to the resistance movement from 1953 to 1955, and its mobilization during the strikes of 1959 and 1960, when it supported the demands of the workers and defended trade unionism. Moreover, thanks to this sector, we have obtained our electoral victories in the municipalities and districts.

However, it would be unjust and dangerous to ignore this force or try to minimize it, just as it would be fruitless to base our party's revolutionary action only in this sector.

On the other hand, the regime pretends that it is not politically interested in this sector, except in regard to religious or traditional themes; at the same time, it ignores the changes in attitude of the big bourgeoisie. Instead the regime concentrates all its attention on the *peasantry*.

In reality, this phenomenon is another feature of neocolonialist policy. Imperialism, which has learned valuable lessons from the Asian and the Cuban revolutions, advises

the regimes in its service not to take the urban sectors into too much account, but rather to try to soothe the discontent of the peasants and thus, divert them from revolution.

We will not return to study the real content of what has been called *national development*, which we have already examined in the first part of this report. It is only its political aspect that we wish to discuss here.

In truth, this operation has taken place within the series of events that have occurred since the protectorate, which pretended to solve the problems of the rural areas, without affecting land tenure. The protectorate could not touch the tenure system because it was the very basis of its existence; the governments after independence, even those in which we participate, have not been able to solve this basic problem.

Of course, this so-called *national development* is no more than a caricature of what the role of the peasant population in the struggle should be, but it could create illusions for a time.

It is for this reason that we cannot allow the regime to gain time, as is its aim. On the contrary, we must take advantage of the mobilization of these landless peasants to offer them more efficacious solutions than those tendered by the regime.

The characteristics of Moroccan society today may be summarized as follows:

- a big bourgeoisie that has abdicated its political aspirations and allied itself to semifeudal interests;
- a working class which is the prime revolutionary force and which must define clearly its trade union tasks and political aims;
- a discontented small and medium bourgeoisie, potentially revolutionary, but which hesitates to renew the struggle for its national liberation;
- a peasant mass of small landless *fellahs de khemmes** who need a clear vision of their tasks and a frame-

* *fellah* (from the Arabic, peasant) and *khemmes* (from the Arabic, fifth). Poor peasant who works the lands of the owner to whom he pays as rent the fifth part of the product of his labor. (Editor's Note).

work within which to organize their own actions in unity with the working class.

It is in this objective situation, of vague contours, that the regime is maintained. It is a regime characterized by a certain independent policy toward different social sectors, but also by an increasing submission to neocolonialism —all this against the backdrop of the gigantic international confrontation between imperialism and the forces of freedom and progress.

Self-criticism: Three fatal errors

Under these external and internal conditions, we find ourselves before many difficult tasks which we cannot ignore. But these new tasks also require new methods. Those of the past are not valid today.

In my opinion we committed three fundamental errors, which would be absolutely fatal if they were repeated under present conditions.

- a) The first was essentially our evaluation of the compromises we were compelled to make with the enemy.
- b) The second was that we carried on the struggle behind closed doors, without popular participation.
- c. The third was the vagueness of our ideological position; we did not clearly state who we were.

a. COMPROMISES WITH THE ENEMY

What has been our attitude on the first compromise, that of Aix-les-Bains?

We made it after a long struggle during which the revolutionary consciousness of our members was deepened and more precise demands became the order of the day. This struggle, broadly speaking, passed through three main stages:

1) The *first stage* during which the national movement, after the failure of the armed peasant insurrections, was characterized chiefly by the propaganda among the small bourgeoisie of the old traditional cities. The first qualitative and quantitative changes took place after World War II with the participation in the movement of masses of workers in the slum districts. The extraordinarily rapid development of the industrial sector resulted in the formation of masses of workers who, little by little, were won over to the nationalist ideology.

An outstanding fact is that frequently there is a tendency to measure this flow of new members only from a quantitative viewpoint. This neo-urban mass which already has initiated the worker-peasant alliance in the slum districts, seemed to be no more than a formidable body of pawns in the struggle against colonial power. The qualitative change of objectives and methods of struggle that should have ensued was, all too often, underestimated. This explains many of the events that followed. In fact there were two parallel movements and as the masses of workers became more and more conscious of their particular ideology, the national struggle received from them a decisive reinforcement, a great impulse.

2) The *second stage* of the struggle is not so much the beginning of terrorist activity in the cities, as it is the beginning of armed struggle. As experience has amply shown us, armed struggle can not survive without the active aid of the peasant population. This would mean that the peasants begin to be affected by the national liberation movement.

This phenomenon, well-understood and explained, has unparalleled revolutionary importance, since it poses two prime problems.

The first is the relationship between the struggle of the workers and the urban businessmen and artisans, on one hand, and the peasants in the countryside, on the other. It is generally known that the colonial exploitation of land by foreigners is based on the expropriation of land

which increases unemployment and underemployment in the countryside, and as a result, leads to the peasant exodus to the cities. These dispossessed peasants, who form the lumpen-proletariat of the cities, are the first to join the national struggle; but the source of their discontent, of their revolutionary strength, remains in the countryside. For this reason, when the peasants are won over to the national struggle, the circuit is closed, and the force accumulated on both revolutionary poles becomes irresistible. But at the same time the revolution gains in strength, it also acquires the means to deepen its ideology. Reflecting on the problems of these two fundamental sectors, urban and rural, the revolution can arrive at a clear understanding of the colonial exploitation system which, in turn, requires a clear understanding of the problems of the peasants and the workers and the factors that unite them. It is precisely the understanding of this alliance which is the essence of a revolutionary movement or program.

The second problem arising in this stage is the use of violence as a political instrument. Revolutionary struggle against a socio-economic system is, then, a combination of political and military action, a constant swinging of the pendulum between legality and illegality. Our country had already, in a large measure, entered this stage, and it was necessary then to comprehend the novelty and impact of this situation, and arrive at the conclusions that were within the experience of all militants.

3) Since the speed of political radicalization and the ideological crystallization that results from the former increased as the struggle advanced, our struggle entered a *third stage* which is the inclusion of the movement within the framework of a North African revolution. This was, in fact, a qualitative change. The means existed to go beyond the original objectives of the three countries, which ranged from the sentimental demand for the return of the sultan, to the creation of a national state, passing through the restoration of national sovereignty. Beyond these apparent differences, the sameness of colonial oppression in each country and the unity of the anticolonial struggle could then be perceived. The revolutionary importance of unity in the struggle is that it reveals the similarity that basically exists above and beyond the superficial differences due to the history of colonization, the political regime, and

the degree of intelligence of colonial officials. This unity of action should, in the long run, destroy many myths and illusions.

The compromise of Aix-les-Bains took place just at the moment when the role and objectives of the masses of urban workers reached a high-point in their development and when the necessity of their alliance with the peasants, together with the problem of violence, all in the ever broader anticolonial sense, were the order of the day.

It was at the end of this brief period of our national struggle that all kinds of phenomena developed and created great confusion, as has happened in other revolutions. As a result, Mohammed V, returned from exile, signed the Agreement of Celle-Saint-Cloud.

Doesn't this mean that the enemy, more experienced than we, understood the trend of events better and more rapidly?

Why didn't the National Liberation Movement, including us as its leaders, understand and explain to its militants, the chief reason, the essential problems, of colonial exploitation and consequently, the conditions for true liberation?

These and similar questions should be asked today.

History had given us all the means to carry out our work of elucidation which as revolutionaries we were obligated to do. Did we explain that this compromise with colonialism was indeed a compromise, that is, an agreement by which we won and lost at the same time?

As to the agreement, we should not concern ourselves with false problems such as: Could we have refused it? Why did France accept it? The only question that should concern us is to measure the impact of this agreement on the revolutionary drive of the national movement. No one can deny that the conjunction of both liberation movements, Algerian and Moroccan, and the situation that might have ensued, played a role in the sharp change of French policy; or similarly, that it was no accident that in the precise moment when the militants were beginning—only beginning—to see behind the symbol, the meaning of national struggle, the colonial powers suddenly grasped the emotional significance of the sultan's return. This is a coin-

idence which upon analysis gives a retrospective strength to colonial policies that we were far from suspecting.

Of course, the "machievellian" significance of this policy became clearly apparent only when the new political trend toward Black Africa was manifested; but already at the end of 1955, a feeling of bitterness had arisen among numerous militants, especially among the leaders of the resistance and the liberation army, a bitterness that really stemmed from the feeling that the revolution had been held back.

Did we take this bitterness into account, as was our duty, and explain the true meaning of the compromise of Aix-les-Bains, when the enemy's policy became as clear as day after the dramatic blow of the policy change ordered by El Glaoui?

On the contrary, we adopted the agreement completely and presented it as the complete defeat of French colonialism. We interpreted the liquidation of the royal council (*conseil du trône*) as a new capitulation of colonial power, when it was only a deceptive and wisely-calculated concession. We played into the colonialists' hands when we replaced the chief objective of the struggle which was dawning with more and more clarity in the spirits of the militants, with another aim understandable at first sight, but at the same time, more deceptive in the long run. The decision was not taken at that moment for debatable reasons, but the practical outcome has been that the political compromise was conceived and presented as a revolutionary pause. It was understood that during this pause the national movement, artificially inflated, would be reorganized to include sectors which had been outside its sphere of influence. All these measures, taken in good faith, but not conceived with a view to a global strategy, had negative results, and corrupted the national movement. This critical appraisal of the compromise of Aix-les-Bains, which was not made in 1956, should be made today so that our internal position on any type of compromise we might be called upon to make in the future, will be clear and definite. Compromises should be presented objectively, for their real worth, and never defended as total victories. They should never again obscure the revolutionary consciousness of our militants.

Compromises should never be prohibited, since everything depends on the relation of forces and the immediate and long-range objectives that one has in mind. However, the important thing is to make a compromise in full light of day, and to explain it fully to our militants.

The important thing is not to repeat the error of Aix-les-Bains, never to justify a compromise completely, and never to celebrate it as a total victory for opportunistic reasons or motives.

b. THE STRUGGLE BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

Must I remind you of all the battles we had to fight between 1956 and 1960 without the people knowing a thing about them? Everything occurred in the villas of the bonzes of the Istiqlal Party or within palace walls; nothing ever leaked out.

Some cadres know in detail how, since the beginning, we have defended within the Istiqlal the principle that all instruments of power, particularly the functionaries of the Ministry of Interior, the army, the police and the constabulary, should be under government orders, since without them no government could really exercise the power it is supposed to exercise. Nevertheless, every time we brought up the problem of "private domains" and every time the question was included on the agenda of a ministers' council, the next day we would be attacked in due form by the French colonialist press, under the following pretext: "The throne is being menaced!" which was, indeed, strange bearing in mind that these attacks came from those who three years earlier had really attempted to overthrow the throne.

However, all these continual battles during the first coalition governments, the governments of Ba'afrej and Ibrahim, have never been clearly explained to the public. We did not tell the people that all the means of applying our projects were being denied us. For this reason, today, certain elements still claim that we had full power from 1956 to 1960. The plain truth is that we did not have any power at all.

Let us now speak of economic reforms. Some of the people who are now in charge of these reforms and refer to them in their speeches, were, in their day, the most violent

enemies of these same reforms. How many battles did it cost our comrade Bouabid to establish in Morocco an Institute of Emission so that our currency would not be a satellite currency and to stop the drain of national capital? How much patience and pedagogical sense had to be displayed to obtain these ends during the four years spent in the Ministry of National Economy, from October 1956 to April 1960?

I shall have occasion later to mention, when speaking of economic realities, how these reforms failed to change the essence of colonial rule. For this reason it is necessary to explain that these reforms, minimal ones when compared to those that we still must carry out, were put into effect only after hard battles of which the people knew nothing.

Finally, when it came to choosing the type of ballot to be used in the district elections, we fought for the adoption of the "list" ballot,* the only one capable of converting the districts into instruments of economic and social reconstruction. The "experts" who were called in preferred the other type of ballot, the uninominal** or "soft" ballot, according to the palace's wishes. Eventually all political groups were consulted, even those that didn't deserve the name: five replied as we had; three were against, of which two were against the principle of the election itself. But this did not prevent the completely inadequate uninominal ballot from being adopted in order to help resurrect the nobles and feudal lords.

The people knew nothing of the details of this battle.

The same thing happened with other struggles waged within the Executive Committee and the Political Commission of the Istiqlal Party up to January 25, 1959. The inclination of certain leaders to compromise and even, at times, to participate in secret machinations against the liberation army, the resistance and the Moroccan Labor Union, was the object of bitter polemics, which, had they been made public at the time, would have saved a lot of time, illusions and sacrifices. These errors must not be repeated in the future and these past experiences should be

* *scrutin de liste*, —where the elector votes for all the deputies or senators of the department: 2, 3, 4, etc., as the case may be. (Translator's note.)

** *scrutin uninominal* —voting for one candidate only.

made known to our militants in order to destroy the still-existing myths and legends that could serve as a screen for neocolonialism?

c. WHO ARE WE?

For a long time we didn't want to say what our aim was. Because of the inadequately explained compromises, of the struggles fought in secret, we did not formulate a long-range plan. How many times had we heard the question: "Don't you have a program?" The question should not be posed in these terms, since anyone can write a program, as demonstrated by the blossoming of programs formulated by the regime or its political agents.

However, frequently, we failed to explain clearly what kind of economic, social and political organization we definitively wanted for our country.

Today, this situation must change. Since the political classification has already been made, we should define ourselves, so there can be no doubt, as a revolutionary alternative to the present reactionary and demagogic system. The best way to define ourselves will be, during the second Congress, to explain without ambiguity the immediate and long-term tasks awaiting us.

3

What are our tasks?

a. THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY

In regard to this problem we have had, in the past, attitudes that were not fully justified by the course of events. It is evident that after the compromise of Aix-les-Bains, the logical step for the national movement was to begin reforming the politico-administrative system, not only because this had been our original demand, before the question of the throne had been brought up in 1953, but also because this would have permitted the immediate fixing of responsibilities. Nevertheless, the tactic of the colonial regime had been to make it seem that the problem of Moroccan sovereignty could be reduced to the problem of Moroccan sovereign. Moroccan feudalism, inspired by this same regime, adopted the same line; such were the common interests of both imperialism and feudalism.

During the first two years of independence we participated in this Machiavelian game played by feudalism, which consisted of delaying as much as possible economic or administrative reforms, which should have followed the recognition of independence. However, once these reforms were carried out, the regime used them for its own ends to make the people forget the constitutional problem. Gov-

ernments were made and unmade without rhyme or reason. The parties, representative or not, real or fictitious, were placed on the same level. The justification was that, in view of the gigantic tasks facing the nation, the moment of democratization had not yet arrived. In addition, the regime adopted some of our theories on real democracy to support the claim that the constitutional problem was only a formal one and meant nothing in the context of existing economic and social realities. During this period, in the names of national interest and the unity symbolized by the king, the conservative forces which has strong allies at home and abroad, delayed carrying out the structural reforms which would have threatened their privileges. Feudalism grew stronger and stronger, finally taking the offensive at the end of 1958 with the artificially promoted rebellion of Rif, engendered with the complicity of the members of the chief of staff of the FAR, as had been the rebellion of Addi Ou Bihi in Tafilatet two years earlier.

On the other hand, we should admit that the so-called danger of a feudal offensive was used to pressure us into accepting an agreement with the king to muffle the constitutional problem. This agreement, imposed in certain measure by the circumstances, was more or less honored during the Ibrahim government, in which some of our party leaders took part. We should, of course, analyze the role of each participant.

However, the basic question is to comprehend the degree to which we were compelled to put our constitutional demands on ice, and to wait nearly two years for experience to show us that no true reform could take place within the context of absolutist power.

Of course, the destitution of the Ibrahim government taught us, finally, that any agreement with the conservatives, should be made on the basis of a precise and limited program; otherwise, the national progressive movement becomes a hostage and its very participation is taken as a justification by the reactionary forces.

Today we have taken a definite stand on the constitutional question but we should not correct one error with another. We should not think that the constitution is a magic wand that will solve all our problems. In my opinion, the constitution is valid only in the measure that it guarantees public liberties and allows them to be exercised under the control and sanction of power, and to the degree that

it counteracts foreign influence in our domestic affairs. What is important to us is the definition of powers and responsibilities before the people, the establishment of authentically popular institutions.

Now then, the constitutional problem is only one part of the problem of democracy, that is, of the increasing participation of the popular masses in government. This problem cannot be separated from the need to mobilize and organize the masses, which constitutes the most secure means of imposing this fundamental demand.

Neither can it be separated from the antimperialist struggle, since it is not enough to attack the autocratic regime politically. We should also weaken its allies economically, that is, the foreigners who colonize the land, the feudal elements and the mercantile and *comprador* bourgeoisie.

It is for this reason that we will not part with the regime only because of the constitutional problem which is no more than the framework of the problem. For us, it is one more way to organize the masses and to struggle against neocolonialism. What really defines us is our anti-imperialist position.

b. OUR ANTI-IMPERIALIST TASKS

1) *Both at home and abroad*

a) *Our tasks in the field of foreign policy* are clear: they follow the line of total solidarity with the international revolutionary movement—the national and anticolonial struggles—and is particularly based on the common struggle that we must carry on by the side of our Algerian brothers, the Arabs of the Middle East, and the Africans. It is not a question of hiding behind old slogans but of waging an action that reflects, in international relations, a global political alternative.

To illustrate our tasks in this field, it is enough to recall the difference between a serious anti-imperialist action, carried out by a revolutionary organization such as ours, and one that could be acted out apparently under the same slogan by the reactionary elements allied to imperialism, with the object of better camouflaging this alliance.

Frequently, a policy is reduced at any given moment to a slogan, which expresses in a word or phrase the prime objective of the struggle. However, save in exceptional cases, a phrase cannot be valid for much time when the situation is extremely fluid, as it necessarily is in an anti-imperialist struggle. Therefore in dealing with each particular problem we should clearly define the road to follow in the anti-imperialist battle and not content ourselves with brandishing a slogan whose content could very well be changed.

We can invoke two examples here: that of neutrality and that of Maghreb unity, Arab or African.

Neutrality has been a point of reference ever since Dulles tainted it with immorality, at that time when its only value was that of an alternative for the future. The anti-imperialist struggle was still geographically limited and timid in the economic sphere; therefore, the few countries that simply refused to align themselves with the western bloc were preparing the road to liberation for other peoples. But when the anti-imperialist struggle broadened, when the West drew its conclusions about the practice of neocolonialism, and showed itself ready to accept a superficial neutrality, the simple profession of a neutralist creed could no longer suffice. Only concrete stands on definite issues are important.

In order to better define this dynamism which we should adopt in the face of neutrality, I will cite the case of the Suez Canal incident in 1956. This was the first true breach made in the imperialist citadel of the Afro-Arab-group. Presidente Nasser confirmed on that occasion the real meaning of positive neutrality. Nevertheless, our National Liberation Movement, represented then by the Istiqlal, did not fully understand, at the leadership level, the historic importance of this event. Only some leaders of the so-called activist wing or the "left" who were driven by a revolutionary feeling of solidarity with the struggle in the Middle East, tried in the press or through the popular organizations to gain benefit from the imperialist defeat, to awaken popular consciousness as to the inadequacy of our government's policy, and the need to prepare for future battle. The speeches of Mohamed Bassi in the name of the resistance, on occasion of the anniversaries of August 20, 1956, 1957 and even 1958, which expressed

this sentiment, were considered extremist by the palace and by the representatives of the big bourgeoisie in the Executive Body of the Istiqlal.

It is true that the official policy of indifference toward the struggle of our Arab brothers in the Middle East was so obviously mistaken, not to say a collaboration with imperialism, that it produced within the Movement, long before the creation of the UNFP, a tendency toward the establishment of organic ties with other progressive Arab and anti-imperialist movements, obliging the palace to adopt a policy of *rapprochement* with the Middle East from 1959 on and to use it for its personal prestige. Proof of this are its successive declarations about the Cairo regime, which range from arrogant contempt to a certain mistrustful sympathy. Thus, the once terrifying slogan of neutrality became part of the official language, without it becoming a true anti-imperialist alternative.

The same thing happened with the slogan of unity.

Unity as an objective should be viewed from two points of fact: the already achieved unity of imperialism (that is, the unity of exploitation and slavery) and division, also a child of imperialism, which plagues our continent according to the appetites and conflicts of the capitalist monopolies. In other words, unity should be gained little by little during the course of difficult battles and not be considered as the sum total of already obtained results. It should be manifest first in a unity of action of the independent countries aimed at destroying the colonial system throughout the continent. It should be based on identical measures which allow the gradual coordination of economic policies and finally, make possible and desirable the establishment of common institutions.

On the other hand, imperialism understands perfectly well that by taking the African masses and their leaders by surprise, by choosing the opposite road, by accepting the formal idea of a continental or regional unity, it strengthens the status quo, that is, imperialist domination. This policy is so dangerous today that the first duty of revolutionary movements is to fight against this false concept which consolidates reactionary regimes and pardons them for their neocolonialist policies. Our duty is not to adopt this slogan, but to define exactly its content, which

should be judged objectively, beyond the fictitious groupings that today divide the African states. If we fail to clearly explain what kind of unity we want and by what means we intend to achieve it, we will run the risk of finding ourselves in embarrassing situations.

This is particularly true of the *Maghrebe Union*.

Are we going to let our enemies again use as a weapon against us an idea that concerns us only?

This unity is the order of the day, and no one can really oppose it, but if we subscribe to the watchword of unqualified unity only, we will be easing the task of the mystifiers who will exploit the situation to their benefit.

We should, at the same time, analyze this mystique of unity and reveal its difficulties. In opposition to the empty declarations which conceal undeniable sabotage, we should dedicate ourselves to obtaining concrete objectives, such as the sameness of organization, parallel politico-administrative structures, agreement of the objectives pursued by the economic policies of each state. These preliminary measures, decided upon and applied at the level of popular organizations, will open the road to genuine unity. From this spring-board it will not be difficult to show that the policy of the present government, which follows exactly the reverse of what we have just said, conceals behind resounding declarations, a competitive attitude and dangerous ulterior motives.

The watchword of North African unity will rapidly take the limelight, but we should not allow it to become an excuse. For this reason it is necessary to learn our lessons from past policies and explain to our militants the aims behind each slogan. This is the surest way to force the allies of imperialism to unmask themselves, or to join the side of the popular forces.

b) *The internal anti-imperialist struggle*. There is a clear dividing line between the popular forces of liberation and the reactionary elements allied to or supporting imperialism.

However, what do we mean when we speak of our anti-imperialist tasks within the country?

We simply mean to destroy foreign rule and dependency in the economic, financial and cultural fields. Here, I

would like to speak of a certain number of economic reforms that have not been fully understood. There is still a lot of ideological explaining to be done.

2) *Colonial structures*

These refer to the administrative, political and economic reforms resulting from recognition of Moroccan independence. Here, we should not underestimate the long struggle, the unceasing battles, that had to be fought for each reform; rather we should look at these reforms objectively. In what measure do they ensure national independence; in what measure do they endanger imperialist domination?

At times the hard battle that had to be waged to gain a custom or monetary reform, or an electoral law, made us forget that we were in a certain stage, a necessary one, indeed. However, more radical measures are required to reach our aim of total liberation. Our underestimation of the real meaning of the measures, obtained after a great struggle, is explained by our initial lack of perspective. From the very moment in which the revolutionary pause was considered a complete victory and the materialization of our main objective, the exercise of power became nothing else but the acceptance of the burden of colonial heritage. We absolutely failed to take into account the fact that revolutionary consciousness had deepened during the two years of struggle. On the other hand, this struggle has been considered, by the palace and certain leaders concurring with its viewpoint, as simply a more efficient method than political agitation to arrive at the same end. These elements held to the pre-1953 line of action, that is, that of reforms and a global application of a renewed protectorate agreement. Of course, the speeches were full of "real liberation," "true independence," "the battle against one's self," etc., but the political reality of which we were prisoners prevented us from making our words agree with what was being done in our name. From this moment, the logic of the colonial heritage, of the exercise of power within the framework of colonial structures, began to act. Now then, our political heritage poses a capital problem: colonial liberalism which today affects all Africa, but which was also confronting us, and whose causes we have not analyzed with sufficient clarity.

It is easy to demonstrate that during the colonial period two types of domination were used: one, based on pure violence and manifested in the entire structure of colonial power; the other, expressed through the simple workings of economic laws.

In reality, this distinction was marked by the social difference between the land colonizers and the industrial group. The latter realized that they had no need to resort to brute force, and that the capitalist system had penetrated colonial society sufficiently to make impossible a return to precapitalist autarchy. Even more, violence and the existence of land colonization itself were presented as an obstacle to capitalist development. For this reason, they were willing to accept the restoration of Moroccan sovereignty, knowing that the laws emanating from a national power and the guarantee that this power could provide would have a better chance of really being implemented. This is the explanation of the role played during the crisis of 1952-55 by the French industrial groups that financed the Casablanca daily *Maroc-Pressé* and complemented in Paris the pressure exercised by the military and the settler.

3) *Reforms and neocapitalism*

However, still more important than studying the role of French enterprises; their production was geared to is knowing how far they were willing to go with their reforms. These liberals, with their representatives in the administration as technical aides, lived, for the most part, in the large cities; their companies were frequently branches of liberal capitalism in the solution of the Moroccan problem broaden Morocco's domestic market. While they were able to show themselves, up to a certain point, in opposition to wage increases for the urban workers, the agrarian reforms, however, such as the elimination of the precapitalist sectors by making them part of the national market, could appear favorable to their interests, especially if these measures did not infringe upon the principle of private property. Similarly, in regard to tariff measures or others that curbed competition from the most powerful producers, they were capable of accepting all these measures up to a certain point, particularly because it permitted them to compensate

the wage rises with price hikes, without risking a drop in demand.

This same neocapitalism reacted very differently to the more radical policy in the field of economic liberation undertaken by our comrades in government in 1959. The creation of the instruments of this liberation, the promulgation of laws on the control of capital, the preparation of a five-year plan which included certain clearly anti-imperialist roads, all this was considered to be a threat to their capitalist and neocolonialist interests.

Those whose interests or privileges were most affected immediately understood the meaning of the new policy that started to be sketched out from 1959 on.

It was they who urged and inspired the then crown prince in his violent opposition to our participation in the government, considered necessary by his father Mohamed V.

Should we not, nevertheless, consider as victories the partial reforms carried out during our stay in power?

They were victories in the field of everyday political struggle, but not from the viewpoint of real liberation, since the enemy's skillful tactic was to take advantage of the political confusion to delay the most indispensable reforms arising from the recognition of national independence, even at the risk of plunging the country into ruin. The most minimal reform encountered so much opposition, we had to parry so many maneuvers, that when the reforms finally did come through we necessarily and naturally had to proclaim them as great popular victories. It was, therefore, quite normal for us, who waged an untiring battle every day, to celebrate the victories we had won after so much work. But our revolutionary duty was to show, at the same time, that in the long road to economic development, these reforms were no more than the tiniest of steps.

At the same time, we should have unmasked the duplicity of a regime that called itself national, but which did not cease to postpone the hour of our true liberation.

This evaluation is very necessary since the present regime has adopted this same reformist policy, with an evident lack of preparation or capacity. In a sense, it has eliminated all the revolutionary objectives from our old economic policy, leaving only the reformist side. This reformist aspect should be fully revealed, so that the regime cannot deceive us in the

future by means of, for example, an agricultural improvement policy which would leave territorial distribution untouched.

4) *Towards true liberation*

In order to attain our economic liberation, our antimperialist task is, first, to refuse to depict ourselves as the successors of colonial power, to refuse to restrict our policy to the economic norms and levels established under the protectorate. On the contrary, we should realize that a revolutionary event logically carries within it the possibility of a temporary retrocession in production, or a change in the system of remuneration and prices. Now, it is not a question of maneuvering among the foreign colonizers, the liberal industrials and the French government, which all saw fit to guarantee their diverse interests by their parsimoniously-granted participation.

It is necessary that we all clearly understand that parial reforms within the capitalist system can never really liberate us. Only a global anti-imperialist policy, both at home and abroad, will enable us to rise up to our tasks.

Before ending this chapter I want to say that we must not put all our antimperialist tasks on the same plane of importance. First, we should place two basic tasks about which there cannot be any discussions: an agrarian reform at home, and the creation of a united Arab Maghreb abroad, as a means of struggle against the implantation of neocolonialism. These tasks should hold first place in our minimum program.

c. REVOLUTIONARY PROSPECTS

I call revolutionary prospects the long-term conclusions that we can draw from our antifeudal, democratic and anti-imperialist tasks. I could also use the term "socialist vocation" if the danger of misinterpretation —of which I shall speak later— did not exist.

In the technical sense of the word, this means that all the attempts to develop the country within a liberal framework, as the regime is currently trying to do, although

without saying so openly, are inevitably doomed to failure. A multitude of experience has shown that the national bourgeoisie knows how to profit only from unequal development under the direction of imperialism.

True development can be achieved only through the real mobilization of all national resources and labor. But this is not a technical problem; it is, in the first place, a political one. It is not enough to distribute equally; an ideological preparation is required of such a nature that the objective will be recognized as both necessary and just. Outside of this, there is nothing but demagogical exploitation of the word *socialism*, as many examples in the world show us today.

I would like to speak in more detail about the need and meaning of the term *revolutionary prospects*.

Up to now, every time we spoke of a program we broke it down into subheadings, such as: agrarian reform, nationalization, planning. Now then, no one ever specified under what conditions these measures would be applied, nor at what precise moment, nor to what ends they were intended; after all, these are only details which should lead to a determined end. Thus, any group could use them since they were only abstract words.

In reality, a long-term program worthy of the name should respond to three essential conditions:

- a) It should offer proof that it constitutes an absolute necessity for the development of the entire nation.
- b) It should clearly define its aims.
- c) It should explain by what methods it will obtain these aims.

a) *A national development program* is not the sum of the interests of all social groups, and much less of one. Experience has shown that at times the interests of two groups, even if both are revolutionary, can be contradictory; for example, the limited interests of the working class as opposed to those of the peasants (a contradiction which the present regime sometimes uses, replacing land taxes by indirect taxes).

In the same way, the interests of the petty bourgeoisie could tend to lean towards a capitalist method of develop-

ment and thus stand in opposition to rational economic evolution, while this sector, at the same time, represents a certain revolutionary force. (The strikes of handicraft workers may have a very marked retarding protectionist aspect; likewise, small businessmen may oppose the creation of consumer cooperatives).

Only a global view of the needs of economic development can reconcile these different interests.

This idea is frequently expressed simply when it is said that the only urgent task is to struggle against underdevelopment. However, the role of a revolutionary party, which the UNFP should be, is to create an instrument capable of elaborating and applying the methods of combating underdevelopment.

b) *Defining aims* does not mean pasting a label on them: when the process of building the country leads to a search for methods to attain a balanced society, a highly productive one without exploitation, the practice of this policy could be qualified as socialist in a strict sense of the term. But the problem is not in wanting socialism in the abstract, but to begin to really build the bases for this type of social and economic system. The role of a revolutionary party now is not to look for a title, but to demonstrate the difference between itself and all pseudo-socialists that today fill the African continent with their drumbeating.

For this reason, it is absolutely necessary to fight against deviations and mystifications about socialism which as a false label, can conceal a semifascist regime, or a feudal state, or an imperialist creation.

For us, the content of scientific socialism is characterized by:

- the correct solution of the problem of power, that is, the establishment of political institutions which will permit the democratic control of the masses over the state apparatus, as well as the distribution of resources and the national product;
- an economic structure that will uproot the bases of imperialist domination, an ally of feudalism and the parasitical big bourgeoisie;

—a political and social institution that will organize and educate the masses with a view to the mobilization of all national resources needed for accumulation.

Just as in the case of African unity, we cannot go from feudal capitalism to socialism overnight, it is necessary to go through a long period of time during which the bases of a socialist society will be laid down.

c) As to *the methods*, while we are dealing here with a long process, we must explain that all economic alternatives of a revolutionary party, which are the points of its program, do not by themselves constitute socialism; they simply prepare the way. Planning, for example, is a rational means of choosing the points of impact of investments; nationalization in the agricultural, industrial, commercial and banking sectors —where it is possible and favorable— serves to increase national possibilities for investment.

It is in this context where the full importance of a revolutionary agrarian policy is shown, not only to destroy semifeudalist structures and colonial capital, but also as a means to create an internal market and permit national savings.

We should learn the appropriate lessons from neocolonialist policies, which while admitting, on a strictly technical-economic base, the need for an agrarian reform as the only foundation for accelerated development, at the same time, fear the methods to obtain it. Imperialism is opposed to this reform when it is undertaken revolutionarily, since it knows very well that such a reform would endanger its political positions in the measure that its natural allies and most solid supporters would be affected.

Therefore, in our revolutionary route in the field of methods, all policies not calling for the radical destruction of semifeudal structures and colonial capital, do nothing but play into the hands of neocolonialism, in spite of any pretensions of industrialization, planning or even socialism.

This revolutionary prospect has, therefore, a definite political value, not only because it permits us to define at each moment exactly who we are, but especially because of its ideological value, which gives a global approach all the reforms that must be carried out, and prevents them from becoming abstract and demagogic watchwords.

It is also this revolutionary prospect which permits a perfect cohesion between the cadres and the militants of our movement, in the sense that it gives them a scientific means of analyzing the political situation and the economic measures taken or proposed to confront it. It permits them to understand the content of each phase and to position it in an orderly whole. At all times, economic, fiscal, monetary and even foreign policies can be judged not in terms of the interests of this or that social sector, but in terms of accelerating or retarding national development.

d. REVOLUTIONARY PATH AND IMMEDIATE TASKS

In this way, the revolutionary prospect gives us a global vision, an over-all view, in space and time, in which to situate the measures that correspond to a given situation and which we have adopted as partial objectives in the long march toward our vital aims.

It is for this reason that our "program" cannot exist or be precise except through immediate projects which give it real content, just as every point of the immediate program must be viewed from a global sense and not become an end in itself.

But it is necessary to explain the relationship that should exist between a minimum program and the immediate objectives, on one hand, and the revolutionary prospect and long-term aims, on the other.

Objectively, there is a more or less long period between the attainment of political freedom and the starting point from which we can build the foundations for a truly revolutionary action. Unless the machinery of the colonial state is destroyed, as it was in Viet Nam, this waiting period is generally quite long.

This pause coincides exactly with the time required by popular experience to recognize that the independent and neocolonialist state in the socio-economic field is the true successor of the colonial state. But in order for this experience to be conclusive, it is necessary that the national state appear responsible, really come-of-age. Then, it cannot attribute its failures to foreign intrigues alone. In other words, it is necessary that the state show itself for what it is, a state of feudalism and the comprador bourgeoisie,

and for the ruling class to show that it cannot rule without foreign imperialism.

As long as the real practice of the masses has not unmasked the necessary and indissoluble alliance between the regime and imperialism, as long as the regime can maintain an appearance of independence, as long as the ruling classes can present democratic and national characteristics, criticism of the regime as a whole will necessarily be only verbal and demagogic.

In Morocco, as we have said before, the conditions of independence were such that the immediate application of a revolutionary policy was impossible. A phase of reformist liberation was necessary.

The logical result of this was that, politically, there were only two alternatives:

- to demonstrate that this process was transitory and necessary, that is, in no case was it an end in itself but, in the long run, only the construction of the bases on which we could later choose a revolutionary path;
- or, to simply criticize the way in which this reformist policy was being carried out, but without touching upon the global picture. This fragmentary, embryonic criticism, which does not dare go to the roots of the errors, is what we can call, when carried out fully, "His Majesty's Opposition."

But if an opposition founded on the criticism of methods is possible in a developed country, experience has shown that up to now it has been incapable of obtaining decisive results in an under-developed country, or in one passing through a temporary stage.

It is evident that when one sticks to pure tactics, without any strategic exits, either one's own policy gets stolen, or one appears in an opportunistic light.

The need for a revolutionary path is, then, more imperious than ever, but also evident is the need for a minimum program which can mobilize all energies around the UNFP.

Morocco's present situation calls for the closest unity among all revolutionary sectors of society. Their long-term

interests are not the same, but they can unite on the basis of a national program.

No revolutionary party, during the period of national and democratic struggle, can avoid having a minimum program that differs from long-term objectives and which, on the other hand, constitutes the condition of support for the present government and eventually, that of its participation in the same. The problem of a minimum program is thus connected to the country's rate of revolution. No one can predict exactly the forward and backward swings of the revolution.

What should the minimum program be, under present circumstances, keeping in mind the clear definition of our long-term strategy?

This program will necessarily be a compromise between the ends that we propose and the existing state of things and, at the same time, will permit us to advance toward these ends. It should, therefore, contain indispensable conditions without which any compromise is impossible, as well as catalytic elements, that is, those which prevent stagnation.

The indispensable condition for us is evidently *the solution of the democratic problem*.

The catalytic elements, in the present moment, can be summarized in the following three points:

- anti-imperialist solidarity,*
- real solidarity with Algeria,*
- finally, and especially, as a daily watchword and as part of the “democratization” of the country, the *agrarian reform.*

This program can serve as a framework for a compromise with other political organizations and with the regime; at the same time, it will serve us as a lever for the radical reconstitution of the regime, which cannot continue along the road traced out by this compromise without being compelled to change in meaning and contents.

Of course, nothing can guarantee that the compromise will be accepted by the other parties, or that they will be satisfied with adopting a program without accepting a share of the responsibilities. But, at least, each one will be put up against the wall and if one day they are compelled

to pact with us, they will know beforehand exactly what to propose to us, and what conditions we will accept, without there being any confusion.

Will this be a sign of weakness?

No, if, at the same time, we define the bases for the revolutionary path. If the latter does not exist, the program will appear as opportunistic. It is on this point where the two options, short and long-term, are intimately linked and reciprocally conditioned. What is important is not to lose sight of long-term objectives that have been definitively established.

The situation in Africa, in Algeria, and in Morocco itself, could make a compromise necessary for us and for the entire revolutionary movement. This is not dangerous when we combine both objectives, the long-term objective and the short-term one. To choose in this double sphere of strategy and tactics is to open the road to present and future action.

4

The instrument

I have tried to outline the basic tasks for which we should prepare ourselves in order to better respond to the aspirations of the Moroccan people.

How to realize these objectives is the most difficult and important question demanding clear answers.

a. THE PARTY AND THE PROBLEM OF CADRES

First of all, we should concern ourselves with the only instrument capable of converting our resolutions into reality; our party, the UNFP.

We stated, at the time of its creation, that it was not a party like others and, for this reason, our organization has caused great panic among those afraid of the popular aspirations we embody. Scarcely three months after our creation and at a moment when our comrades occupied half the ministerial posts, neocolonialism's repressive machinery began to grind against us with the object of decapitating the UNFP, eliminating important national and regional leaders from the political arena, either by resorting to judicial processes for imaginary crimes of *lèse-majesté* or supposed plots, or by adopting the methods used previously by Trujillo.

However, the UNFP has survived, it is alive and solid, ready to mobilize the Moroccan masses and to lead them along the road to liberation and progress.

Why is this? Simply because we are the heirs of Morocco's great tradition, because we feel ourselves the bearers of the message left by the heroes who sacrificed all, throughout our history, for the well-being of the Moroccan people, because we belong to that vast anticolonial revolutionary movement supported by all the democratic forces of the world.

Meanwhile, and in view of the opportunity presented to the Congress of clearly confirming our revolutionary guide-lines, it is our duty to make our party a truly revolutionary one.

Two problems are, therefore, posed: one concerning organization and the other, ideology.

In regard to *organization*, the proposals for modifying the statutes and internal by-laws now on the agenda of this Congress should be examined from the standpoint of our revolutionary path taking special care to define clearly the role of the militants in relation to the mass of sympathizers and to ensure, in the present phase, centralism and democracy within the party.

Because of this double problem the statute amendments refer to the participation of the base and central organs.

As to the participation of the base, the statutes should guarantee the effective participation of all militants in drawing up the UNFP's line of action and the control of different central and regional organs by the base.

In order to make this participation real and effective we should more systematically concern ourselves with the membership and progress of the base cells in the districts, villages and companies.

The same spirit characterizes the proposal for the ratification by this Congress of the election of the Secretary General by the National Administrative Commission, itself elected by the Congress, on one hand; and on the other hand, the creation of a new central body, to be called the Central Committee, and to be formed by the members of the National Administrative Commission and the delegates from the provincial federations elected by their admi-

nistrative commissions. The Central Committee will ensure cohesion, the unity of viewpoint and thought of all party chiefs on the central and provincial levels.

However, it is not enough to improve the statutes or to put into practice new methods or organization.

The party we want, firm in perspective and solid in organization, should be aware of the logical result of having chosen a revolutionary policy. For this reason, it should give special attention to intense *ideological* preparation, without which this policy will be relegated to the realm of wishful thinking and sentimental options.

This ideological preparation should be based on the study of the scientific laws of development of society, enriched by the experience of socialist and anti-imperialist revolutions. It should derive its strength from our own Arab-Muslim culture and from our eminently progressive and humane national patrimony.

The party cannot rise to the level of its tasks without a very careful formation of *cadres*. It is no use to complain of the lack of cadres, since it is possible to explain this shortage by ideological weakness itself. In any case, without battle-hardened cadres there can be no revolutionary road.

Meanwhile, we should not lose sight of the fact that the best school for cadres, the best training for a spirit of fight and sacrifice for the cause of the people, is the daily fulfillment of the most humble tasks by the militants. As a simple citizen, every militant should be capable of carrying out the tasks given him with a maximum of professional competence and conscientiousness: if he is a mechanic, doctor or nurse, he should be the best in his field; if he is an agricultural instructor or agronomist, he should prepare himself to be the pillar of the agrarian reform; if he is a professor or teacher, he should be at the vanguard of pedagogical methods. We should be the leaven of the modern, progressive and prosperous Morocco that will be built tomorrow.

The ideological and moral strengthening of the militants is carried out through the struggle among the people, be it in the party itself or in the mass organizations, in the factory, the mines, the university or in the countryside.

Therefore, we must define the role of our party in the nation so that the UNFP can truly be the vanguard of the national struggle and attract the maximum of revolutionary sectors of the Moroccan people.

b. THE PARTY IN THE NATION

The social content of our party emanates from our ideological choices, our revolutionary perspective and the analysis we make of the basic positions of different social sectors before the alternatives of total liberation, economic emancipation of our country and the building of a socialist society. For this reason we are by excellence the party of the working masses, of the peasants and revolutionary intellectuals. We are, then, the party of the Moroccan people, excluding the exploiting classes, land-owning, feudalism and the parasitic big bourgeoisie, allies and bulwarks of neocolonialism.

This definition in itself poses problems that we should solve if we want to stimulate popular action within our party, as well as in the mass organizations of each group: trade unions, organizations of workers, peasants, students, professionals, women and youth, etc.

The objectives of this action should be decided by each neighborhood cell, in the towns and work centers which should be permanent party schools for the militants.

Special attention must be given to our work in the countryside, to the establishment of organizations for the rural masses who have for a long time been convinced of the need for action. These organizations should complement the activities of our rural sections, thus covering the entire country.

Likewise, the work of the party among women should be strengthened by the creation of specific mass organizations, entrusted with attracting militants and deepening the formation of revolutionary consciousness among women, with a view to the building of a new Moroccan society.

Our cells in the student and youth organization should include among their tasks a more unified program of action within the Moroccan Youth Union, which has the important role of agitation and recruitment.

As to the tasks of the party as such in workers' circles, inside the companies, these are even more important in the measure that they ensure the interpenetration of the political struggle with the trade union struggle. Here we must not neglect any factor capable of influencing this interpenetration, whether it be the lack of ideological formation, or an erroneous interpretation of the existing situation, or internal factors, such as unemployment or underemployment, the regime's methods of blackmail and pressure, and finally, the structure of the unions themselves.

All these factors should be out in the open so that the problem of the always difficult relations between the trade unions and the revolutionary movements may be posed correctly. At the same time, we must realize the importance of the trade union struggle and the limited nature of this struggle when it is not expanded to include political-revolutionary demands.

We must always be alert before the regime's present policy in the trade union sector. This policy is part of a more general line adopted by neocolonialism on a continental scale in Africa with the aim of fomenting a reformist and apolitical trend in the trade unions and of separating the national political struggle from the limited economic struggle.

This phenomenon should be studied with insight, not only as it refers to ourselves, but as it refers to the entire continent. We must discuss the problems of the close relationship between the tasks appropriate to the trade unions and those appropriate to all social sectors. If we fail to do this, if these problems are not correctly focused or boldly solved without vacillation, the revolutionary forces—the working class—will necessarily run the risk of being detoured for a time from its natural direction.

Thus the need for a very clear line of conduct in regard to the party's relations with the mass organizations, by virtue of the driving force that the party represents and that corresponding to each specific organization within a structure of full autonomy.

The UNFP as an instrument of revolution must play the leading role in the struggle of all revolutionary social sectors.

This is the logical result of the definition of a revolutionary path, that, as we have said, should be presented

as a necessity for the entire nation. This means that only the party can set the political compass, draw up and determine lines of action for the country's whole revolutionary movement. In other mass organizations that have specific aims within the framework of their particular functions, our cadres and militants should see to ensuring the integration of their struggle in the joint plans drawn up by the party, the supreme political organ.

In this way we can guarantee ideological unity, dynamism, the unity of all popular forces which will enable us to advance with firm steps toward our objectives.

Conclusion

As we reach the end of this report we see that the prime tasks conditioning all others is consolidating our party's organization and deepening the ideology of our militants and cadres, in order to adapt this instrument to the revolutionary path we have described.

As we fulfill our tasks we will be able to overcome all difficulties and face the hard trials ahead if we always keep sight of the historic mission of our party which has deep roots in the glorious struggles of the Moroccan people against despotism and in favor of progress. We are not trying to enumerate the obligations that this fact imposes on us in regard to our people and to the world anti-colonial revolution; we mention it only with the aim of reiterating our certainty of success.

The genesis and development of our national liberation movement, whatever it may have been called throughout our history, have been marked by brilliant successes and, at the same time, hampered by many obstacles and dangers. Our very own existence and dynamism have always represented a fatal danger to our people's enemies, be they foreigners or local parasites living at the peoples' expense. And while our collective experience has allowed us to profit from the correct analysis of our peoples' situation and the conditions of their struggle, we have also committed errors and suffered failures, which, however, enrich our experience.

Ever since we have borne the significant name of the National Union of Popular Forces, we have managed to galvanize the dynamic forces of our country and to win over the major part of the progressive social sectors in

the struggle to safeguard the victories of the peoples and to materialize their deepest aspirations for liberation, progress, prosperity and peace.

The Second Congress should give to the party's revolutionary policy a definite content for the stages of struggle within a well-defined revolutionary perspective, such as the creation of conditions for close cooperation with the mass organizations whose aims should be incorporated with ours.

Nevertheless, always concerned with strengthening our party, already tempered by trials and sacrifices, and improving its methods of action, we should never forget that it is not the party itself we serve, but rather the mass of the Moroccan people of whom we are the vanguard, as we also are in first place in the ranks of the International Movement of Liberation and Progress.

It is also our sacred obligation to protect and strengthen the indestructible unity of the UNFP, the party's union with our people and unconditional solidarity with all peoples fighting for their dignity and rights.

This will be the secret of our strength and the basis of our future victories.

Rabat, May 1, 1962.