Max Horkheimer 1931
Written: in German in 1931;
Source: Between Philosophy and Social Science. Selected Early Writings Max Horkheimer, MIT Press 1993, 425pp;
pp. 1-14 reproduced here;
Translated: by John Torpey;
Transcribed: by Andy Blunden 2006;
Proofed: and corrected by Chris, 2009.
Although social philosophy may be at the center of the broader interest in philosophy, its status is no better than that of most contemporary philosophical or fundamental intellectual efforts. No substantive conceptual configuration of social philosophy could assert a claim to general validity. In light of the current intellectual situation, in which traditional disciplinary boundaries have been called into question and will remain unclear for the foreseeable future, it does not appear timely to attempt to delineate conclusively the various areas of research. Nonetheless, the general conceptions that one connects with social philosophy can be put concisely. Its ultimate aim is the philosophical interpretation of the vicissitudes of human fate – the fate of humans not as mere individuals, however, but as members of a community. It is thus above all concerned with phenomena that can only be understood in the context of human social life: with the state, law, economy, religion – in short, with the entire material and intellectual culture of humanity.
Understood in this way, social philosophy grew into a decisive philosophical task in the course of the development of classical German idealism. The most compelling aspects of the Hegelian system are the supreme achievements of that type of social philosophy. This is not to say that philosophy before Hegel had not been concerned with matters of social philosophy; to the contrary, Kant’s major works contain philosophical theories concerning the knowledge of law, of art, and of religion. But this social philosophy was rooted in the philosophy of the isolated subject [Einzelpersonlichkeit]; those spheres of being were understood as projections [Entwürfe] of the autonomous person. Kant made the closed unity of the rational subject into the exclusive source of the constitutive principles of each cultural sphere; the essence and the organization of culture were to be made comprehensible solely on the basis of the dynamics of the individual, the fundamental modes of activity of the spontaneous ego. Even if the autonomous subject could hardly be equated with the empirical individual in Kant’s philosophy, one was nonetheless supposed to be able to investigate all possible culturally creative factors in the mind of each individual rational being. Overarching structures of being which could only belong to a supraindividual whole, which could only be discovered in the social totality, and to which we must subordinate ourselves, do not exist in this conception. To assert their existence would be considered dogmatic, and action oriented to them would be considered heteronomous. In the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Kant writes of the moral subject that a person “is subject to no laws other than those that it gives to itself (either alone or at least together with others).”
The idealist tradition linked with Kant elaborated the meshing of autonomous reason and empirical individuals. The tension between the finite human being and the self as infinite demand also emerges, of course, in Fichte’s first philosophy of the ego that posits itself in self-reflection. The eternal Ought, the insistence that we should be adequate to our human vocation [Bestimmung], originates in the depths of subjectivity. The medium of philosophy remains that of self-consciousness. But Hegel liberated this self-consciousness from the fetters of introspection and shifted the question of our essence – the question of the autonomous culture – creating subject – to the work of history, in which the subject gives itself objective form.
For Hegel, the structure of objective Spirit, which realizes in history the cultural substance of absolute Spirit – that is, art, religion, philosophy – no longer derives from the critical analysis of the subject, but rather from universal dialectical logic. Its course and its works originate not from the free decisions of the subject, but from the spirit of the dominant nations as they succeed each other in the struggles of history. The destiny of the particular is fulfilled in the fate of the universal; the essence or substantive form of the individual manifests itself not in its personal acts, but in the life of the whole to which it belongs. In its essential aspects, idealism thus became social philosophy with Hegel: the philosophical understanding of the collective whole in which we live – and which constitutes the foundation for the creations of absolute culture – is now also the insight into the meaning of our own existence according to its true value and content.
Let me consider this Hegelian perspective for a moment longer. The current situation of social philosophy can be understood in principle in terms of its dissolution, and of the impossibility of reconstructing it in thought without falling behind the current level of knowledge. Hegel left the realization of the purposes of reason to objective Spirit, and ultimately to World Spirit. The development of this Spirit represents itself in the conflict of “concrete ideas,” of “the minds of the nations”; from them, the world-historical realms emerge in necessary succession “as signs and ornaments of its grandeur.” This development takes place independently of whether the individuals in their historical activity know it or desire it; it follows its own law. Like the French Enlightenment and English liberalism, however, Hegel certainly considers the individual interests, drives, and passions of human beings to be real driving forces. Even the actions of great men are determined by their individual aims. “Initially these individuals satisfy their own needs; the aim of their actions is not that of satisfying others in any case.” Indeed, “they are the most far-sighted among their contemporaries; they know best what issues are involved, and whatever they do is right.” But nothing in history “has been accomplished without the active interest of those concerned in it.” To be sure, this rational law of development makes “cunning” use of the interests of great men as well as of the mass in order to realize itself. And just as Hegel explains previous history only indirectly on the basis of this law, and directly on the basis of the conflict of interests, so it is with the life process of contemporary society. He refers to the liberal economists Smith, Say, and Ricardo in his attempt to elaborate how the whole is maintained out of the “medley of arbitrariness” that emerges from individuals’ efforts to satisfy their needs. “In civil society,” according to the Philosophy of Right, “each member is his or her own end; everything else is nothing to them. But except in contact with others, they cannot attain the whole compass of their ends, and therefore these others are means to the end of the particular member.
A particular end, however, assumes the form of universality through this relation to other people, and it is attained in the simultaneous attainment of the welfare of others.” According to Hegel, the State can exist in this and no other way; it is directly conditioned by the conflict of social interests.
But although history and the State appear from without as evolving from the “medley of arbitrariness”; though the empirical historical researcher must descend into a chain of suffering and death, stupidity and baseness; though determinate being [Dasein] meets its demise under indescribable torments; and though history can be viewed, as Hegel put it, as the “altar on which the happiness of nations, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals are slaughtered,” philosophy raises us above the standpoint of the empirical observer. For “what is usually called reality,” as he tells us in the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is seen by philosophy as no more than an idle semblance which has no reality in and for itself. If we have the impression that the events of the past are totally calamitous and devoid of sense, we can find consolation, so to speak, in this awareness. But consolation is merely something received in compensation for a misfortune which ought never to have happened in the first place, and it belongs to the world of finite things. Philosophy, therefore, is not really a means of consolation. It is more than that, for it transfigures reality with all its apparent injustices and reconciles it with the rational; it shows that it is based upon the Idea itself, and that reason is fulfilled in it.”
This “transfiguration” [Verklärung] of which Hegel speaks thus occurs precisely by way of that doctrine according to which the true human essence does not exist in the mere interiority and in the actual fate of finite individuals, but is instead carried out in the life of nations and realized in the State. In the face of the notion that this substantive essence, the Idea, maintains itself in world history, the demise of the individual appears to be without philosophical significance. The philosopher can thus declare: “The particular is as a rule inadequate in relation to the universal, and individuals are sacrificed and abandoned as a result. The Idea pays the tribute which existence and the transient world exact, but it pays it through the passions of individuals rather than out of its own resources.” Only to the extent that the individual participates in the whole in which he lives – or rather, only insofar as the whole lives in the individual – does the individual acquire reality, for the life of the whole is the life of Spirit. The whole, in this sense is the State. The State “does not exist for the sake of the citizens; it might rather be said that the state is the end, and the citizens are its instruments.”
According to Hegel, the finite individual can attain a conceptual consciousness of its freedom in the State only through idealistic speculation. He saw the achievement of his philosophy – and thus of philosophy as a whole – in this mediating function. To him, that function is identical with the transfiguration of reality “with all its apparent injustices.” As the prestige of his system withered around the middle of the last century in Germany, the metaphysics of objective Spirit was replaced in an optimistic, individualistic society by the direct belief in the prestabilized harmony of individual interests. It appeared as though mediation between empirical existence and the consciousness of one’s freedom in the social whole no longer required a philosophy, but simply linear progress in positive science, technology, and industry. But as this belief was increasingly proven empty, a scorned metaphysics exacted its revenge. Abandoned by the philosophical conviction of having its true reality in the divine Idea intrinsic to the whole, the individual experienced the world as a “medley of arbitrariness” and itself as “the tribute which existence and the transient world exact.” A sober look at the individual and the other [Nächste] no longer revealed – beneath the surface of conflicting individual wills, in a constantly renewed scarcity, behind the everyday humiliation and the horror of history – the cunning of which Reason was said to avail itself. Hegel’s greatest adversary, Schopenhauer, lived to see the beginnings of the development indicated in his antihistorical, pessimistic, and well-meaning philosophy.
The conviction that individuals took part in the eternal life of Spirit by virtue of their membership in one of the self-regulating historical unities, the dialectic of which constitutes world history – this notion, which was supposed to save the individual from the infamous chain of becoming and fading away, disappeared along with objective idealism. The suffering and death of individuals threatened to appear in their naked senselessness – ultimate facts in an age that believed naively in facts. With the deepening of this contradiction in the principle of individualism – that is, between the unbroken progress of individual happiness within the given social framework, on the one hand, and the prospects of their real situation on the other – philosophy, and social philosophy in particular, was ever more urgently called to carry out anew the exalted role ascribed to it by Hegel, and social philosophy heeded this call.
From the cautious theory of Marburg neo-Kantianism that human beings are not mere individuals, but stand “in various pluralities ... in rank and file” and “first complete the circle of their being in the larger totality [Allheit],” to the contemporary philosophies according to which (as with Hegel) the meaning of human existence fulfills itself only in the supraindividual unities of history, whether these be class, state, or nation – from Hermann Cohen to Othmar Spann, philosophy in recent decades has brought forth the most variegated social-philosophical systems. The newer philosophical attempts to ground moral and legal philosophy anew, against positivism, are almost entirely at one in the effort to demonstrate – above the level of actual empirical events – the existence of a higher, autonomous realm of being, or at least a realm of value or normativity in which transitory human beings have a share, but which is itself not reducible to mundane events. Thus these, too, lead to a new philosophy of objective Spirit. If it can be said that Kelsen’s individualistic and relativistic theory of justice contains such elements, this is even more true of the formalistic value philosophy of the Southwest German school, and indeed of Adolf Reinach’s phenomenological theory that the essence of “legal forms” [Rechtsgebilde], such as property, promises, legal claims, etc., may be viewed as “objects” unto themselves. Scheler’s nonformal ethics of values, his theory of the givenness [An-sich-sein] of values, has recently found a conscious connection to the philosophy of objective Spirit in its most significant exponent, Nicolai Hartmann. Scheler himself had already adumbrated afresh the theory of “group, minds” [Volksgeister] before the appearance of Hartmann’s ethics.
All of these contemporary versions of social philosophy seem to share the effort to provide insight into a supraindividual sphere which is more essential, more meaningful, and more substantial than their own existence. They measure up well to the task of transfiguration laid out by Hegel. Thus in the only modern philosophical work that radically rejects any aspiration to being a social philosophy, and which discovers true Being exclusively within the individual’s inner self – namely, in Heidegger’s Being and Time – “care” [Sorge] stands at the center of attention. This philosophy of individual human existence is not, according to its simple content, transfigurative in Hegel’s sense. For this philosophy, on the contrary, human Being is only being unto death, mere finitude; it is a melancholy philosophy. If I may speak here in catchphrases, it could be maintained that social philosophy is confronted with the yearning for a new interpretation of a life trapped in its individual striving for happiness. It appears as part of those philosophical and religious efforts to submerge hopeless individual existence into the bosom or – to speak with Sombart – the “gilded background” [Goldgrund] of meaningful totalities.
In the face of this situation of social philosophy, however, ladies and gentlemen, we must be permitted to characterize its shortcomings. Contemporary social philosophy, as we have seen, is in the main polemically disposed toward positivism. If the latter sees only the particular, in the realm of society it sees only the individual and the relations between individuals; for positivism, everything is exhausted in mere facts [Tatsächlichkeiten]. These facts, demonstrable with the means of analytic science, are not questioned by philosophy. But philosophy sets them more or less constructively, more or less “philosophically” over against ideas, essences, totalities, independent spheres of objective Spirit, unities of meaning, “national characters,” etc., which it considers equally foundational – indeed, “more authentic” – elements of being. It takes the discovery of certain unprovable metaphysical preconditions in positivism as grounds for outdoing positivism in this regard. The Pareto school, for instance, must deny the existence of class, nation, and humanity due to its positivistic concept of reality. In contrast, the various viewpoints which maintain the existence of such entities appear simply as “another” world view, “another” metaphysics, or “another” consciousness, without any possibility of a valid resolution of the matter. One might say that several concepts of reality are involved. It would be possible to investigate the genesis of these different concepts, or to which kind of innate sensibility or social group they correspond; but one cannot be preferred to another on substantive grounds.
Now it is precisely in this dilemma of social philosophy – this inability to speak of its object, namely the cultural life of humanity, other than in ideological [weltanschaulich], sectarian, and confessional terms, the inclination to see in the social theories of Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Max Scheler differences in articles of faith rather than differences in true, false, or at least problematic theories – it is in this dilemma that we find the difficulty that must be overcome. Of course, the simultaneous existence and validity of various concepts of reality is an indication of the contemporary intellectual situation as a whole. But this variety is rooted in different areas of knowledge and spheres of life, not in one and the same object domain. Thus, for instance, the constitutive categories of philology and of physics may diverge today so greatly that it appears difficult to bring them under one hat. But within physics itself, indeed within the sciences of inorganic nature as a whole, no such tendency exists to develop irreconcilable concepts of reality; the opposite is the case. Here, the corrective is supplied by concrete research on the object.
One might be tempted to object that social philosophy is not an individual discipline, and that it is material sociology which must investigate the specific forms of sociation. This sort of sociology investigates the various concrete ways in which human beings live together, surveying all kinds of associations: from the family to economic groups and political associations to the state and humanity. Like political economy [Natlonalökonomie], such a sociology is capable of objective judgment, but it has nothing to say about the degree of reality or about the value of these phenomena. Such issues are rather matters for social philosophy, and in those fundamental questions with which it deals, there can be ultimate positions but no generally valid truths that are woven into broad and variegated investigations.
This view is rooted in a no longer tenable concept of philosophy. However one may draw the boundary between social philosophy and the specialized discipline of sociology – and I believe a great deal of arbitrariness would be unavoidable in any such attempt – one thing is certain. If social-philosophical thought concerning the relationship of individual and society, the meaning of culture, the foundation of the development of community, the overall structure of social life – in short, concerning the great and fundamental questions – is left behind as (so to speak) the dregs that remain in the reservoir of social-scientific problems after taking out those questions that can be advanced in concrete investigations, social philosophy may well perform social functions (such as that of transfiguring and mystifying reality), but its intellectual fruitfulness would have been forfeited. The relation between philosophical and corresponding specialized scientific disciplines cannot be conceived as though philosophy deals with the really decisive problems – in the process constructing theories beyond the reach of the empirical sciences, its own concepts of reality, and systems comprehending the totality – while on the other side empirical research carries out its long, boring, individual studies that split up into a thousand partial questions, culminating in a chaos of countless enclaves of specialists. This conception – according to which the individual researcher must view philosophy as a perhaps pleasant but scientifically fruitless enterprise (because not subject to experimental control), while philosophers, by contrast, are emancipated from the individual researcher because they think they cannot wait for the latter before announcing their wide-ranging conclusions – is currently being supplanted by the idea of a continuous, dialectical penetration and development of philosophical theory and specialized scientific praxis. The relations between natural philosophy and natural science, as a whole and within the individual natural sciences, offer good examples of this approach. Chaotic specialization will not be overcome by way of bad syntheses of specialized research results, just as unbiased empirical research will not come about by attempting to reduce its theoretical element to nothing. Rather, this situation can be overcome to the extent that philosophy – as a theoretical undertaking oriented to the general, the “essential” – is capable of giving particular studies animating impulses, and at the same time remains open enough to let itself be influenced and changed by these concrete studies.
The eradication of this difficulty in the situation of social philosophy thus appears to us to lie neither in a commitment to one of the more or less constructive interpretations of cultural life, nor in the arbitrary ordainment of a new meaning for society, the state, law, etc. Rather – and in this opinion I am certainly not alone – the question today is to organize investigations stimulated by contemporary philosophical problems in which philosophers, sociologists, economists, historians, and psychologists are brought together in permanent collaboration to undertake in common that which can be carried out individually in the laboratory in other fields. In short, the task is to do what all true researchers have always done: namely, to pursue their larger philosophical questions on the basis of the most precise scientific methods to revise and refine their questions in the course of their substantive work, and to develop new methods without losing sight of the larger context. With this approach, no yes-or-no answers arise to the philosophical questions. Instead, these questions themselves become integrated into the empirical research process; their answers lie in the advance of objective knowledge, which itself affects the form of the questions. In the study of society, no one individual is capable of adopting such an approach, both because of the volume of material and because of the variety of indispensable auxiliary sciences. Even Max Scheler, despite his gigantic efforts, came up short in this respect.
In this situation, it is appropriate that the chair in our university which is connected with the directorship of the Institute for Social Research is to be transformed into a chair in Social Philosophy, and reassigned to the Department of Philosophy. Carl Grünberg held the chair in conjunction with teaching responsibilities in a specific discipline, namely political economy [wirtschaftliche Statswissenschaft]. Given the novel, difficult, and weighty task of putting a large empirical research apparatus in the service of social-philosophical problems, I have been only too aware since being called to this chair of the immeasurable distance between this great scholar, whose name is accorded the highest respect and gratitude wherever research in his field is in progress, and the young, unknown man who is to succeed him. His long illness belongs among those senseless facts of individual life in the face of which philosophical transfiguration comes to naught. In accordance with his precisely determined interests, rooted in the tradition of the historical school of political economy, he himself worked primarily in the area of the history of the labor movement. Due to his comprehensive knowledge of the relevant literature throughout the entire world, it has been possible to collect, in addition to rich archival material, a unique specialized library of approximately 50,000 volumes – a library of which the students of our university and many scholars from both here and abroad make copious use. The series of Institute writings which he edited contains works which expert researchers of the most varied perspectives have recognized as uniformly outstanding scientific contributions.
If I now undertake to orient the work of the Institute toward new tasks after the lengthy illness of its director, I have the benefit not merely of the experience of his colleagues and of the collected literature, but also of the Institute charter which he inspired. According to that charter, the director named by the Minister is fully independent “in all respects, vis-à-vis the university administration as well as the sponsors,” and rather than a collegial administration there exists, as Grünberg liked to put it, a “dictatorship of the director.” It will thus be possible for me to make use of that which he created and, at least in narrow terms, together with his colleagues, to erect a dictatorship of planned work in place of the mere juxtaposition of philosophical construction and empirical research in social inquiry. As a philosopher in the sense of my teacher Hans Cornelius, I have heeded the call to lead this research institute mindful of this opportunity, which is equally important for philosophy and empirical research, and not in order to make the investigation of facts into an ancilla philosophiae.
But now many among you would like to know how these ideas can really be applied, how one is to conceive of their practical execution. Of course, I cannot go into that issue with the time available to me here in the necessary detail to give you an adequate idea of the work plans that the Institute has set for itself. In conclusion, however, I would like to give an example of the possible application of the above-outlined approach – and by no means an arbitrary example made up for this occasion, but rather one that brings the aforementioned methodological conviction to a head in a particular problem that will constitute a leading theme of the Institute’s collective work in the immediate future.
Not just within social philosophy in the narrower sense, but in sociology as well as in general philosophy, discussions concerning society have slowly but ever more clearly crystallized around one question which is not just of current relevance, but which is indeed the contemporary version of the oldest and most important set of philosophical problems: namely, the question of the connection between the economic life of society, the psychical development of individuals, and the changes in the realm of culture in the narrower sense (to which belong not only the so-called intellectual elements, such as science, art, and religion, but also law, customs, fashion, public opinion, sports, leisure activities, lifestyle, etc.). The project of investigating the relations between these three processes is nothing but a reformulationon the basis of the new problem constellation, consistent with the methods at our disposal and with the level of our knowledge – of the old question concerning the connection of particular existence and universal Reason, of reality and Idea, of life and Spirit.
To be sure, the tendency has been to reflect metaphysically on this theme (I would point to Scheler’s Sociology of Knowledge), or to proceed more or less dogmatically from some general thesis – that is, one usually takes up in a simplifying manner one of the theories that have arisen historically and then uses it to argue against all others, remaining dogmatically in the realm of the general. It can thus be asserted that economy and Spirit are different expressions of one and the same essence; this would be bad Spinozism. Or, alternatively, one maintains that ideas or “spiritual” contents break into history and determine the action of human beings. The ideas are primary, while material life, in contrast, is secondary or derivative; world and history are rooted in Spirit. This would be an abstractly and thus badly understood Hegel. Or one believes, contrariwise, that the economy as material being is the only true reality; the psyche of human beings, personality as well as law, art, and philosophy, are to be completely derived from the economy, or mere reflections of the economy. This would be an abstractly and thus badly understood Marx. Such notions naively presuppose an uncritical, obsolete, and highly problematic divorce between Spirit and reality which fails to synthesize them dialectically. Moreover, such assertions – to the extent that they are taken seriously in their abstractness – are fundamentally immune from all experimental control: everyone is equally likely always to be right. Such dogmatic convictions are generally spared the particular scientific difficulties of the problem because, consciously or unconsciously, they presuppose a complete correspondence between ideal and material processes, and neglect or even ignore the complicating role of the psychical links connecting them.
The matter is different if one puts the question more precisely: which connections can be demonstrated between the economic role of a specific social group in a specific era in specific countries, the transformation of the psychic structure of its individual members, and the ideas and institutions as a whole that influence them and that they created? Then the possibility of the introduction of real research work comes into view, and these are to be taken up in the Institute. Initially, we want to apply them to a particularly significant and salient social group, namely to the skilled craftspeople and white collar workers in Germany, and then subsequently to the same strata in the other highly developed European countries.
There remains just enough time to give you a brief, inadequate summary of the most important paths which the Institute’s permanent colleagues must pursue in order to acquire the empirical material with which to study the relationships involved. First, of course, is the evaluation of the published statistics, reports from organizations and political associations, the material of public agencies, etc. This process can only be carried out in tandem with the continuous analysis of the overall economic situation. Furthermore, we must undertake the sociological and psychological investigation of the press and of fiction, both because of the value of its findings concerning the situation of the examined groups itself, and because of the categorial structure of that literature, on the basis of which it has its effects on the group’s members. Of special importance then will be the development of the most varied methods of investigation. Among other things, survey research could be integrated into our investigations in various ways and could serve valuable purposes, so long as one bears in mind that inductive conclusions based exclusively on such research are premature. Survey research has two advantages for our objectives. First, it should provide an initial stimulus to research and keep it in constant connection to real life. Second, surveys can be used to verify insights gleaned from other studies, and thus to prevent errors. American social research has made great preliminary contributions to the design of survey questionnaires, which we hope to adopt and develop further for our own purposes. In addition, we will have to consult extensively with expert specialists. Where it is possible to pursue certain questions by way of hitherto unanalyzed findings of competent researchers, the latter must be approached wherever they may be found. For the most part, this will involve appropriating for scientific purposes the insights of men of affairs. It will be important, furthermore, to compile and evaluate documents not available in book form. A branch office of our Institute will be opened in Geneva in order to facilitate the scholarly evaluation of the sociologically important material contained in the rich archives of the International Labor Office. Mr. Thomas, the director of the ILO, greeted our plan with approval, and has most cordially promised his cooperation. In addition to all these means, of course, is the methodical study of already existing and new scholarly writings in the area of research.
Each of these methods alone is completely inadequate. But all of them together, in years of patient and extensive investigations, may be fruitful for the general problem if the permanent colleagues, in constant connection with the material, understand that their views must be developed not according to their own wishes, but rather according to the matters at hand, if they decisively reject all forms of transfiguration, and if we are successful in protecting the unified intention both from dogmatic rigidity and from sinking into empirical-technical minutiae.
To conclude, it has only been possible for me to describe the tasks of the Institute concerning collective research, upon which the main emphasis will be placed in the coming years. In addition to this, we envision the continuation of the independent research activities of individual colleagues in the areas of theoretical economics, economic history, and the history of the labor movement. The Institute will fulfill its concurrent teaching responsibility to the university by regularly offering lecture series, seminars, and individual lectures. These activities should supplement the educational mission of the university by introducing the university community to the work of the Institute, reporting on its current progress, and offering a curriculum consistent with the notion of philosophically oriented social research described above.
I have only been able to suggest these particular tasks. Yet it seems to me that even my brief report concerning the details may have undermined recollection of the essentials. This lecture has thus become symbolic of the peculiar difficulty of social philosophy – the difficulty concerning the interpenetration of general and particular, of theoretical design and individual experience. My exposition was undoubtedly inadequate in this respect – If I may nonetheless hope that you indulged me with your attention, I also ask of you your goodwill and your trust regarding the work itself. At the inauguration of the Institute, Carl Grünberg spoke of the fact that everyone is guided in their scholarly work by impulses deriving from their own world views. May the guiding impulse in this Institute be the indomitable will unswervingly to serve the truth!