JMC wrote:
What I take Smith to imply by Invisible Hand is another form of government. This form of government allows the market to regulate, or at least appear to regulate, itself. In other words, a government can rule/influence the economy indirectly without regulating an industry directly.
Hope this helps.
Does anyone want to tie this material into Hegel?
Yes.
There are several aspects of Hegelian thought and the dialectial method which can help us elucidate the relationship between government and the economy in general.
Any dialectical analysis must look at the historical patterns of development of both the government and the economy under discusssion. This analysis must be made with regard to the various classes, political factions, and competing interests which have a direct stake in the formulation of the specific policy under discussion. The public interest cannot be viewed purely in the abstract, but should be examined with attention paid to various factions and groups purport to represent the public interest.
Take the statement:
a government can rule/influence the economy indirectly without regulating an industry directly.
Is it not conceivable that both the government of a given society and its economy are regulated directly by a dominant class in that society? Can one speak accurately of the economy influencing a government or of a government influencing an economy without adding the dimension of class?
We take it for granted that private individuals have the right to own the means of production (land, equipment, and resources used for economic activity). Yet there may be other forms of economic organization which are more in accord with reason and justice. I am not speaking of Marxist-Leninist forms of social organization, or any other form which increases the power of the state. Hegel himself believed that one of the publishing firms which he worked for should not be owned and run by a private individual. A letter he wrote on this subject indicates his belief in a form of organization in which the producers own and control the publishing enterprise in which they work. He expresses the view that those who actually contribute to the company should decide how the company is run. He also puts forward the notion that those who try to run something, from some remote station, simply by virtue of the fact that they possess money, do not necessarily have any inherent moral capability or insight.
Hegel did not seriously question the rights of businessmen to own economic enterprises in any public forum, or in any of his public writings (He did not even seriously question the perogatives of the sovereign in his Philosophy of Right). But his dialectical method, his way of analyzing the social forms of his day, implies a further development. His letter on the publishing firm indicates profound distrust in the nature of the capitalist firm where it touched his own life. His entire ouvre expresses the view that the goals of history are justice and freedom.
Just as it is now commonplace to believe that a king has no right to own a country and control the destiny of his "subjects"; just as it is now accepted that no planation owner has a right to own slaves and control their destinies, so in future it may be commonly accepted that no private individual has the right to own economic enterprises and to control the lives of "his workers." I suggest this as a strong possibility.
After the election of 1931 in Spain, and the revolution which sprang up in 1936 (in response to Franco's fascist-led attempt to overturn the results of '31), syndicalism was implemented throughout much of Spain. This form of social organization (codified, in part by the elected national government) encouraged the formation of democratic cooperatives. Individuals were allowed to join cooperatives or work their own land privately. The private exploitation of labor was discouraged, while the right of laborers to own and control economic enterprises was championed. (This was utterly different from Leininist centrally planned economic activity, and from Stalininst collectivisation: the cooperatives were run from below, by elected representatives.)
How then, do I take the statement:
This (Smithian) form of government allows the market to regulate, or at least appear to regulate, itself.
In the 1770's, when the Wealth of Nations was written, Smith's observations were valid. Now the self-regulating market is almost entirely appearance.
But what does the phrase "self-regulating" market mean? For Smith it had a very specific meaning. In the post-Hegelian world, we have come to a realization. Material objects do not regulate themselves, nor does an inanimate, mindless "market" regulate itself. Every physical object which man has labored create and to alter is being put under the direction of Mind. It follows that Humankind is regulating objects with higher and higher degrees of conscious thought as time passes. Markets and economic processes are coming increasingly under various forms of regulation (So called "de-regulation" simply means that one group, rather than another has control over economic resources, land, and labor).
The main issue facing economists and philosophers is not simply whether governments should regulate the market. The issue is, in my view, whether or not, and to what degree, the working members of economic enterprises should have control over the fruits of their labor. The issue of markets, while not unimportant, is secondary.
Wei
From: andy-at-mira.net (Andy Blunden)
Wei, I can see the basis for seeing Hegel as the precursor of syndicalism, but there are also some real problems.
Like all 18-19th century political economy and 20th century "economics", I believe Hegel saw society (or at least the Heads of Households) as being made up of "economic agents" who may sell goods or services such as labour and may have more or less "family capital".
Consequently, while he rejected slavery, he did not see wage-labour as a form of oppression or exploitation, but rather the normal activity of owners of private property entering into a contract and exchanging things. However, I imagine Hegel would not be with you in saying that "The issue of markets, while not unimportant, is secondary", and I think your substitution of workers' cooperatives for the Family would not in fact have the transformative effect you hope for.
Andy Blunden
From: "Wei" <danieshalaquand-at-hotmail.com>
Andy B. said,
Wei, I can see the basis for seeing Hegel as the precursor of syndicalism, but there are also some real problems. Like all 18-19th century political economy and 20th century "economics", I believe Hegel saw society (or at least the Heads of Households) as being made up of "economic agents" who may sell goods or services such as labour and may have more or less "family capital".
I agree, for the most part.
Consequently, while he rejected slavery, he did not see wage-labour as a form of oppression or exploitation, but rather the normal activity of owners of private property entering into a contract and exchanging things.
I am not sure of your conclusion. I am trying to open up possibilies. Perhaps you could answer the following questions.
You also said:
However, I imagine Hegel would not be with you in saying that "The issue of markets, while not unimportant, is secondary"
Do you think that Hegel was more interested in markets than he was in human freedom, justice, the historical process, and the Idea? Perhaps you could indicate to me why you think Hegel would put "the issue of markets" near the top of his list as an object of philosophical inquiry? There is a great deal of Hegel I have not read. Maybe you could show me a passage where Hegel speaks of markets in relation to his overall philosphical goals.
In any case, I am not against "markets" as such. I am against the structuring of economic activity in such a way as to concentrate the ownership of 90 percent of a nation's total wealth in the hands of one percent of the population (as is currently the case).
You concluded by saying:
I think your substitution of workers' cooperatives for the Family would not in fact have the transformative effect you hope for.
What did I say to lead you to believe that I was arguing for such a substitution? I argued for the possibility of replacing privately owned economic enterprises (businesses, corporations) with cooperatively owned and run economic enterprises. I did not mention the family. The changes I recommend would not alter the family structure.
Example: At present, United Airlines is one of the largest worker owned businesses in the US. (Not a cooperative, technically, but workers have a larger stake than they do in most US companies). As far as I know, the only effect, direct or indirect, which such changes have had on families working at United Airlines has been to increase their incomes, enhance their benefits, and improve their overall security.
Cooperatives put the decision making power in the hands of the workers who work in a given economic enterprise. (Husbands and wives can structure their private lives, and do with their own personal property whatever they wish to do).
Would you be more likely to favor the idea of cooperatives if they were introduced as substitutes for companies (and not as substitutes for families)?
Regards,
Wei
From: andy-at-mira.net (Andy Blunden)
Thank you Wei for your patient and detailed response.
1. While Hegel may have expressed these views publicly, is it conceivable to you that his private remarks indicate deep uneasiness with the private ownership of that which makes economic activity possible? (I refer you to the letter in which Hegel expresses the notion that publishing companies should be owned and controlled by those who produce, and not by private entrepreneurs. You did not mention this in your post).
I didn't know really how to respond to your point about the private letter. I see no reason to doubt that he really believed what he wrote in the Philosophy of Right. There he is quite clear: "The idea of a pious or friendly and even a compulsory brotherhood of men holding their goods in common and rejecting the principle of private property may readily present itself to the disposition which mistakes the true nature of the freedom of mind and right and fails to apprehend it in its determinate moments." [PR 46n] "In property my will is the will of a person; but a person is a unit and so property becomes the personality of this unitary will. Since property is the means whereby I give my will an embodiment, property must also have the character of being 'this' or 'mine'. This is the important doctrine of the necessity of private property." [PR 46a]
2. If Hegel was, as you suggest, a staunch advocate of privately owned enterprises (for his own time), does his dialectical theory not imply the further development of any Concept, including the Concept of property? I take it as axiomatic that any Concept undergoes evolution and development. Do you agree? What manner of contradictions in your view inhere in the current notion of "property", and what developments do you forsee in that concept in the immediate or the more distant future? (I am distinguishing between the private ownership of personal goods for individual consumption, and the private ownership of goods which make economic activity possible: large amounts of capital, machinery, land for production, buildings used for production, etc.)
This is a perfectly fair point. In his day, there were only a few firms which totally transcended the scope of ordinary "private property" - The East India Company, Lloyds, perhaps. Marx makes the point that forms of property must change in relation to changes in the form of human labour and cooperation, and there is a lot in the "spirit of Hegel" in this idea. The fact that property has not changed in line with the development of such large scale cooperative labour is irrational. Maybe Hegel would be out on the hustings denouncing it? But it was Marx, not Hegel, who spotted this in the 1840s.
Do you think that Hegel was more interested in markets than he was in human freedom, justice, the historical process, and the Idea? Perhaps you could indicate to me why you think Hegel would put "the issue of markets" near the top of his list as an object of philosophical inquiry? There is a great deal of Hegel I have not read. Maybe you could show me a passage where Hegel speaks of markets in relation to his overall philosphical goals.
Well of course, the 'comparative' would be questionable in this connection, I agree. Hegel begins with "A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as Idea." [PR 41] - the sphere of abstract right, and of the "System of Needs" - i.e. the market and the economy generally - "The show of rationality thus produced in this sphere of finitude is the Understanding". But, "self-consciousness ... finds in the state, as its essence and the end-product of its activity, its substantive freedom." [PR 257] The market, and labour, is a middle term, but "The state is the actuality of concrete freedom".
In any case, I am not against "markets" as such. I am against the structuring of economic activity in such a way as to concentrate the ownership of 90 percent of a nation's total wealth in the hands of one percent of the populations (as is currently the case).
I am. Hmmm. This could lead us somewhere else. Hegel himself said: "The important question of how poverty is to be abolished is one of the most disturbing problems which agitate modern society." because he saw more clearly than anyone before him that the market necessarily produced poverty.
What did I say to lead you to believe that I was arguing for such a substitution? I argued for the possibility of replacing privately owned economic enterprises (businesses, corporations) with cooperatively owned and run economic enterprises. I did not mention the family. The changes I recommend would not alter the family structure.
Apologies Wei!!! A typical misleading Andy-abbreviation!!! And it's probably not worth me trying to explain what I meant, because on reflection, it was a weak point. Your proposal would be better charactised as promoting the role of Hegel's Corporation, which Hegel does say, plays the role of an extended family. The main point (and I think this may be a genuine point of difference between us) is that if the "economic agent" becomes a workers' cooperative rather than a privately-owned enterprise, I am contending that the market relations in which it participates will exert enormous forces and tend to push the co-op into behaving like a capitalist enterprise. But, I admit, that line of argument tends towards sectarianism. I fully support the struggle of workers to gain control of the enterprises they work in (An uphill struggle at the University of Melbourne, believe me!!) - only so long as this principle is not elevated to being an "Absolute".
Example: At present, United Airlines is one of the largest worker owned businesses in the US. (Not a cooperative, technically, but workers have a larger stake than they do in most US companies). As far as I know, the only effect, direct or indirect, which such changes have had on families working at United Airlines has been to increase their incomes, enhance their benefits, and improve their overall security.
Very good! I did not know this about United Airlines. As I said, I think there is a reasonable argument that the advocates of workers' cooperatives are indeed Hegel's "true inheritors". That doesn't make them inheritors of truth of course!!
Cooperatives put the decision making power in the hands of the workers who work in a given economic enterprise.
You see, it's arguable whether even the owner of a capitalist enterprise has genuine "decision-making power". They're caught up in a system, and many of them know that that system is ruining the evironment, improverishing people, generating wars, destroying public services ... but feel as powerless to do anything about it as we minions do! "While their consciousness is limited to these and they are absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind at work within them." [PR 344] {irony!} :)
Would you be more likely to favor the idea of cooperatives if they were introduced as substitutes for companies (and not as substitutes for families)?
Yes, I think I expressed a half-baked idea poorly. "Companies" didn't exist in Hegel's system though. "Companies" (I think) were family businesses. I don't think Hegel knew of enterprises such as United Airlines or Qantas.
Andy