Kai,
On the Hegel/Marx interface: I have been struggling to separate Marx from 'Marxism'. This tradition got the question wrong, as it did most other things. I would go even further than you, maybe, on the importance of reading what Hegel actually wrote, as I see him as summarising, not just his own time, but all the earlier ones, too! And when I say that Marx's critique of Hegel matters - for Hegel as well as for Marx, I have in mind a meaning of 'critique' which is close to Hegel's aufhebung.
I am at present trying to do something about the Philosophy of Right, and Marx's 1843 Critique. It seems to me that, precisely in those places where Marx and Hegel clash, that is where they come closest.
Best wishes,
Cyril
From: "Kai Froeb" <Froeb-at-csi.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 1999 13:29
I would go even further than you, maybe, on the importance of reading what Hegel actually wrote, as I see him as summarising, not just his own time, but all the earlier ones, too!
Yes, I agree with you here.
And when I say that Marx's critique of Hegel matters - for Hegel as well as for Marx, I have in mind a meaning of 'critique' which is close to Hegel's aufhebung.
That would mean an "expanding" of Hegel's system by Marx.
I see two different trends with Marx, were he could "expand" Hegel's system:
First, he made some studies especially in economics, history and sociology, were we might find that we should include him in the respective parts of the system, maybe even changing the system in order to include this where it is necessary. Similar to all other big theories which arose since Hegel's death.
Probably even more interesting is the second approach: as we all know, for Hegel, the biggest synthesis is in the absolute (all including) idea.
Many important trends after Hegel's death, Marx being one of the most influential of these, try to show that they have a principle which cannot meaningfully be sublated by the idea, which is contrary to the idea, opposed to the "idea", call it "life", "history", "classes", "unconscious" etc.
In some way, all of these are included in Hegel's system but the fresh air which Engels reported the young Hegelians felt when reading Feuerbach was because he showed them that in some sense these were also not included, something probably important was missing. So they threw away the system.
But it is very central to Hegelianism to include everything (an absolute/infinite which does not include the finite is itself limited, see the discussion of the infinite in the second part of Quality in Hegel's logic).
Also, it is very clear, that as long as we do theory, we think (and even when we "work", the supposed wider category of some Marxists, we also make a "plan", think, do theoretical work, otherwise it is not human work, as Marx once rightly admitted), we will always be within the Hegelian framework, which reflects perfectly theoretical work as theoretical work (one can also think of it as exposition of the unconsciousness or whatever, but then you look at it as something else, not from it's own perspective).
So in order to sublate all these theories, we will either make the "idea of the idea" include more (and as the idea mainly includes all others, is nothing without the system, it also means the same for the complete system).
Or in a process of a qualitative jump, these changes will lead to a new "idea of the idea", of the "end" of the system.
Also, while I see the importance for Marxists to include Marx in Hegel, I would not like to see the work of updating Hegel to be in any way limited to Marx. When you see the development of history, science, arts, philosophy, there is plenty to include.
That is also something good I find in Hegel that to my knowledge he alone gives us a frame work wide and flexible enough to include all in a system.
I am at present trying to do something about the Philosophy of Right, and Marx's 1843 Critique. It seems to me that, precisely in those places where Marx and Hegel clash, that is where they come closest.
That is an interesting Idea. I'd like to hear more of this sometime. May be I should also draw your attention at: http://www.gegenstandpunkt.com/english/state/toc.html
You will find a rewrite of Hegel's Philosophy of Right by a very unconventional former German "Marxist Group" (they called themselves "MG", today they are grouped around the magazine Gegenstandpunkt), which can't really be associated with any other Marxism, they criticise nearly every other ideas/political movements, usually with a mixture of Hegelian/Marxist/Frankfurt School arguments ( a mixture in a way that neither Marxists, nor Hegelians, nor Frankfurt School people agree with them).
They come from the '68 movement, and through some influence of the Frankfurt school they also looked at Hegel (well at least some parts of his work) and you can see some Hegelian roots in what they did.
As a Hegelian I have many objections and I'd rather like to see a rewrite of Hegel's Philosophy of Right to become a critique of this work. However, Marxists interested in Hegel's Philosophy of Right may be interested in looking at this work.
Kai
From: andy-at-mira.net (Andy Blunden)
Probably even more interesting is the second approach: as we all know, for Hegel, the biggest synthesis is in the absolute (all including) idea.
Kai, you take for granted that this concept of the Idea is not only legitimate, but can be extended ad infinitum. Anyone is free to construct any system they like, but surely the great achievement of Hegel is that he summed up the real movement of the human spirit up to his day. I think the history of the past 150 years allows us not only to simply add on more to the Idea, but in fact to see the limitations of this concept of truth.
I think these three aspects of the development of culture since Hegel's death demonstrate that as a great a concept as Hegel's Idea may be, it is necessary to go beyond it, and that does not mean simply absorbing more and more generalised conceptions under its heading ... quite apart from the need to reject the fact that people "are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind at work within them."
Andy Blunden
From: andy-at-mira.net (Andy Blunden)
After reading Hegel's Philosophy of Right, I can see that Hegel's Logic is really the logic of consensus decision-making (CDM). You can take this as an "example" or a "metaphor", but I actually take it a bit more than that.
This insight opens up an approach to criticising his Logic. Anyone who has worked in organisations will know that CDM has very specific limits. For example, CDM can arrive at truth only if there is a single unifying principle which unites everyone involved; as soon as a genuinely fundamental conflict appears, CDM is impossible. Likewise, when an organisation becomes too large and complex, CDM breaks down, even where there are no fundamental differences.
If one reflects on Hegel's place in European history, I believe that this observation sheds light on the significance of Hegel's philosophy.
Andy Blunden
From: "Kai Froeb" <Froeb-at-csi.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 1999 14:26
After reading Hegel's Philosophy of Right [Philosophy of Right], I can see that Hegel's Logic is really the logic of consensus decision-making (CDM).
Just out of curiosity: How comes, that you came to that insight not after reading Hegel's Logic but his Philosophy of Right?
What you mention here is an important trend in current German Hegel readings, especially influenced by or in Dialogue with the Habermas School, many influential Hegel readers like Theunissen ("Schein und Sein"), Hoesle ("Hegel's System", "Die Aufgabe der Philosophie[...]"), Honneth and others try to apply to Hegel's logic categories of "intersubjectivity" and "communication", "recognition". But these go far beyond what I can express here. Interesting stuff, but I don't know whether it's available in English.
For me, the most important of Hegel's discoveries, the heart of his system, is that the infinite does have to include the finite (that's also the reason why I feel so urgently the need of updating Hegel's system), so you can also find to some part your judgment in this: If it includes all what is valuable in all positions, people should agree, reach consensus on this, right?
But your objections are valid, I'll come to them a little later.
This insight opens up an approach to criticising his Logic.
My position so far is, to try to show that the critique does not (need to) apply to Hegel (or at least that we can deal with them, so it does not necessarily apply to my view of Hegel).
Anyone who has worked in organisations will know that CDM has very specific limits. For example, CDM can arrive at truth only if there is a single unifying principle which unites everyone involved; as soon as a genuinely fundamental conflict appears, CDM is impossible.
Agreed. As you are well aware, Marx also uses this in his historical/social/economic analysis, he sees between the classes fundamental conflicts (struggles), where the participants are so far away from each others, diametrical opposite, that they don't think or want to apply CDM, that these may not make sense for them.
This may show a practical limitation of CDM, but not of logic or scientific analysis.
What we will when looking scientifically at a conflict is to look for the common ground on which both parties argue (one can only argue on a common ground, say to fight on the possession of something both parties want to have) and possible misconceptions they may have, axioms etc, they might unconsciously have.
Such a usual misconception from traditional Marxist analysis is that the parties involved think that their struggle has to be resolved on the basis of the current society/economy/order.
So to find a struggle where CDM does not apply may be a sign that the basis for the struggle and that includes the participants and their goals/positions have to be changed (not necessarily to communism, but to something where these conflicts are solved).
CDM which does not allow such a wider analysis may be rightly the subject of some Frankfurt School criticism of being "hidden suppressive" or similar. But there is no magic behind this, people will simply continue to fight, as long as they don't get more clever when time goes by. Without problems, no need to think.
The way rationality rules the human world is in as much as people think and make thoughtful decisions.
Also, while Hegel tries to integrate every position, everything into his synthesis, he is sympathetic to the finite position in the sense that he recognises what is good in them and "sublates" them.
On the other hand, he could become very angry when confronted with a position who would resist sublation, would not want to be sublated, still insists in it's limited position after the theoretical solution is reached.
So Hegel fought against these other positions in his Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik (Yearbooks for scientific Critique/Criticism), he was well aware that some people do resist from being sublated. (He called this insisting the real meaning of "bad" opposed to "good").
We all know this from real life, when we have, for example, someone who does not want to argue, because he has made the experience that he is going to lose any fight on that ground due to his inexperience in expressing his thoughts.
But where does this lead us to, what consequences do we draw from this?
My suggestions:
Of course other ways are also possible, in fact, we all know that so far, most decisions/conflicts are handled after other principles.
But we may try to work towards a world were these principles are more according to reason.
Likewise, when an organisation becomes too large and complex, CDM breaks down, even where there are no fundamental differences.
I think an organisation must avoid both:
I've seen both. I think the middle way is to have a common basis bigger then usual. The best organisations work on religious principles, they share many values and ideas.
For our time, I think the best is an organisation based on Hegel's system, as it will give us both the stability and flexibility, and we will need only to do what we know is correct from the reasons we have for them, we are not forced to act against our belief/our mind.
We need a scientific approach, which allows that all results found can be stored and accumulated, and on the other hand, based on this we can take into account the critique of the various relativisms, to see that we don't fall in a trap of ethno-centric, unconscious, or otherwise bad habit (but we will only need to be open to every critique, taking an open attitude to differences, trying to avoid errors, but by examining the arguments, finding errors in them, not by saying in advance: this is influenced by class, gender, race or whatever).
If one reflects on Hegel's place in European history, I believe that this observation sheds light on the significance of Hegel's philosophy.
In what way?
Kai
From: "Kai Froeb" <Froeb-at-csi.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 1999 16:46:27
Kai, you take for granted that this concept of the Idea is not only legitimate, but can be extended ad infinitum.
What problem do you see?
May be it depends on what you understand by "concept of Idea". In my understanding it is the one which includes all. Our understanding of the absolute will change as we are going to discover more and more, including in it more and more concepts (as it happens all the time in science).
Anyone is free to construct any system they like, but surely the great achievement of Hegel is that he summed up the real movement of the human spirit up to his day.
A system is better then another if it explains/includes all of the other system plus more. So when Hegel includes/explains all the other explain/include and more, he is in that way superior.
Also, Hegel's system also includes much more as the current sciences as it also tries to explain what science is, what we do when we explain, examine the categories by which we think and judge etc.
Hegel also explains in his system what he does and why he does it.
So in that sense I find him relevant and I also want to expand him.
For other goals, other systems might be interesting as well.
I'm interested in other systems especially when they show a limitation of Hegel's system so that we can complete him.
I think the history of the past 150 years allows us not only to simply add on more to the Idea, but in fact to see the limitations of this concept of truth.
I agree with you that the past 150 years will not only be added to the system but also change the whole system (similar as Hegel not only added to Aristotle, Plato etc, but also changed them a lot in order to include all what is new).
It is okay to bring these new developments in, and I'd like to make this process as easy as possible, so I'll try to speak in as simple words as possible (my English is not that good anyway) and try to keep a friendly, open atmosphere, were anyone is invited to contribute, no need to be a Hegel expert or any such "power play".
But on the other hand, we will need to examine Hegel's System and what he says. For example, his system is deeply interrelated. You will always not only need to look at the part of the system were he discusses the subject itself, but in the other parts of the system also. These parts explain each other.
So for example, Marxists have often taken Hegel's critique of moral reasoning as Hegel's last word on ethic, but you have to take the whole picture, meaning, the whole objective spirit, the subjective spirit, arts and religion and especially the logic into account to get a complete picture.
In that case it clearly becomes available that Hegel does have some concepts to judge human behaviour, he has en ethic.
It seemed reasonable in his time that science would develop along the lines of the Unified Theory to which Physics, at least, aspired well into this century. The Unified Theory not only eludes physics, but seems no closer from any standpoint.
I don't get your point here?
What I see is that in science people do try to follow the same principle as I said (include as much as possible), not very surprising as Hegel explains the principles of good science (in a letter to his friend Niethammer, he writes that the universities are our (Protestant) churches).
I can't see anything bad in that concept. What's the problem?
I'm not that much into Physics to give the "Unified Theory" a fair treatment (that is one goal I'd like to attain, to involve here people from all kind of theoretic backgrounds so that such a fruitful dialogue can make more meaning, were we all do learn something new), but
So I'm open to either result.
However, it is clear that being scientists, we will try to find as much in common, as much system in all, so also in Nature, as we can.
The benign constitutional monarch had some basis in Hegel's Europe, and to this day, elements of this conception (minus the royal line of descent) are still to be found in the modern state.
The monarch is not important for our days. But despite Hegel making a big show out of the monarch in his lectures and his book, he is not the most central place in the Philosophy of Right, and logically the arguments Hegel brings don't need to apply for a monarchy but may also be applied for several other forms.
Always look at Hegel's arguments. He does not apply for more truth then by the arguments he gives. I suspect that he knew that when he argued for monarchy, his educated readers would notice that from the arguments he gave he was in no sense excluding anything else then monarchy.
Also, we always need to check an argumentation given in any place of the system with the other corresponding places of the system to see how good it fits and to see it's relevance.
The capitalist enterprise with its CEO at the top is now pretty much eclipsed. The Soviet Union and its satellites each with the Great Helmsmen are pretty much discredited.
So what?
The concept of the market as a "magic hand", or in Hegel's words: political economy as "thought working upon the endless mass of details which confront it at the outset and extracting there from the simple principles of the thing, the Understanding effective in the thing and directing it. It is to find reconciliation here to discover in the sphere of needs this show of rationality lying in the thing and effective there".
Hegel is always interested in what way sense, rationality is finding it's way in the world, how it is becoming real, expressing itself. So that's probably one reason why he was fascinated by the Scottish school of economy (which by the way, was organised to a good degree by the Indian tea company, which had people like Adam Smith and others on their pay roll).
But we also know from Rosenkranz (a close follower of Hegel, and his first biographer. He also discovered and made available the Nürnberg lectures of Hegel and wrote a book Aesthetic of the Ugly in Hegelian spirit), that Hegel wrote a descent critique of Ricardo (unfortunately it is no longer available). According to an article in Hegel-Studien, the Hegel family gave lot of Hegel's manuscripts to a paper mill after Hegel's death).
And we also know that Hegel was also a critic of the capitalist economy, that he saw it's production of poverty etc (the best place is his lecture on Philosophy of Right of 1818/19, published by Heinrich at Suhrkamp, where he goes into detail on this subject).
So Hegel sees both the need for some regulation within the capitalist society and he sees the need for the state as something above family and economy, only within the limitations of the state can such an economy make sense.
... cannot stand up today when the global economy exhibits behaviour which is definitively irrational.
When we examine the last paragraphs of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, before he comes to World History, he speaks of the relations of the different nations. We find again many concepts we found on the way through the system before, e.g. recognition, family, moral judgment, system of needs and the like.
So probably, when we would give a lecture on the system of relations between the states, in many aspects, we could re-use the Philosophy of Right, what we see there in respect of one person, we can see in similar (but also different - dialectic is a lot about seeing similarities in those things which look different and differences in the things which look similar) fashion in respect to states.
So what is needed is also something above them. This will probably be something different than it was in the inner right, as we are now one step above. Maybe it will be an association of states governed by the same principles, acting in tune due to the same economic interests (this will need another economy).
At least as long as this is not going to happen, we will have World History with war.
Hegel was very sceptical about any such a relation to be achieved among states or any kind of parodies in the real world.
You can achieve progress all the time, work for progress, but absolute freedom has it's reality in the absolute spirit (arts/religion/science-philosophy).
But you can try to make the world better, more rational. Similarly as you can try to achieve more and more truth.
I think these three aspects of the development of culture since Hegel's death demonstrate ...
As you see, I'm not convinced yet ...
... that as a great a concept as Hegel's Idea may be, ...
But so far, we have not really looked at Hegel, only spoken about his ideas the way we talk about someone in a TV show. We need to really look (= think) into him, to examine him. Then we will see by thinking him, how good or bad he is, what is good and what should be changed.
... it is necessary to go beyond it, ...
Sure.
... and that does not mean simply absorbing more and more generalised conceptions under its heading.
Well, but a concept like the Idea is not like a bag, an abstraction in which you can place anything without any consequences. That is not the way it works.
The absolute has to include all, and that means that it reflects all, so when it includes more/other ideas, it will change.
There is a big difference between an abstraction and a Hegelian "concept". In the ordinary abstraction, you leave out all the properties which the things which you want to place in your set, bag, don't have in common.
So the more things you place in your "bag", the fewer properties they have in common, it gets less and less rich. That's what people think of when they hear "abstract". But for Hegel, when you make a concept, you have to make it that way, that you concentrate in it all that is meaningful, like the seed of a plant.
E.g., you may define a chair the way you want, say something with 4 feet (like an elephant?) but the concept of a chair is probably to be a sitting furniture, so that you can get out of this concept as much as possible (e.g. you may get different chairs due to different situations in which you sit, etc).
The concept of all-including is in that way a problem, it seems to be something very abstract, where you can't get the world out of it.
So at the beginning of the system, Hegel defines it as the Logic, as everything which is ever subject to our thoughts, especially to systematic thought, science, will be a concept, described by categories, etc. (even when we argue against it we are within it as long as we argue and think).
And the absolute is simply the summary of the system, itself, so you get only a shadow of it when you look at the absolute without looking at the system.
Kai
From: andy-at-mira.net (Andy Blunden)
Kai, you raise a million questions and proposals, but let's just look at this one: should we "update" Hegel's system? Or do we need to re-establish what was and remains essential, and negate what is no longer tenable?
Connected to this, I believe, is understanding what happened a decade or so after Hegel's death, the "expurgation of Hegelianism", the circumstance which leads many people to regard Hegel as the closure or completion of a whole period of culture, and the question whether it is possible to be a "Hegelian" today at all.
That is a huge question, too.
You have quite correctly distinguished between "pouring things into a bag", and the genuine process of development: "The onward movement of the notion is no longer either a transition into, or a reflection on something else, but Development. For in the notion, the elements distinguished are without more ado at the same time declared to be identical with one another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a free being of the whole notion." [Shorter Logic §. 161]
I ask you, without telling the world how it ought to be, has science followed this course since 1831?
Andy
From: "Kai Froeb" <Froeb-at-csi.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 1999 12:09:27
Andy,
I'm on the way to the Hegel Congress in Stuttgart of the "Internationale Hegel Vereinigung" (lasting from today until Saturday), my train will start in 30 minutes, so I'll answer only very briefly.
... this one: should we "update" Hegel's system? Or do we need to re-establish what was and remains essential, and negate what is no longer tenable?
Without looking at the system, how can you decide/tell? My suggestion is that we look closely at the system. And my idea is to try to find as much meaningful as possible, in order not to overlook as much as has been done by most of the people who in advance knew that Hegel was "no longer tenable".
On the other hand, when the careful analysis shows lacks, problems, errors, I have no problems in changing even important parts. As Aristotle said: "I love Plato [Hegel], but even more I love truth".
... Connected to this, I believe, is understanding what happened a decade or so after Hegel's death, the "expurgation of Hegelianism", ...
Well, the Hegelian approach would be to look for something meaningful in the time after Hegel's death. That also means to find shortcomings in Hegel's conception/System which were expressed by the trends after Hegel.
... the circumstance which leads many people to regard Hegel as the closure or completion of a whole period of culture, ...
As always, an end of one period is the beginning of another. Hoesle has written a nice concept of this in his Wahrheit und Geschichte,
I'll write about this in a separate mail when I have more time.
... and the question whether it is possible to be a "Hegelian" today at all.
Sure it is. The question is what you mean, to be Hegelian. I think the most flexible and so durable concept of "Hegelianism" is that the infinite has to include all finite. So that, on the other hand, also explains why it is necessary for a Hegelian to update Hegel and that can very well mean to change him.
You have quite correctly distinguished between "pouring things into a bag", and the genuine process of development: "The onward movement of the notion is no longer either a transition into, or a reflection on something else, but Development. For in the notion, the elements distinguished are without more ado at the same time declared to be identical with one another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a free being of the whole notion." [Shorter Logic §. 161]
I've worked on this a lot. I can explain this concept in easier words so that it is easy to understand in a separate message. I doubt that many people understand it as it is written there above.
I ask you, without telling the world how it ought to be, has science followed this course since 1831?
And yes, it is the natural way how everyone thinks when he thinks, and so it is also the way science works (but scientists have come more and more come to a wrong picture of what they really do, what is the scientific in what they do. Looking at Hegel could offer them something). Look at what Hegel says at the beginning of the Encyclopaedia, where he compares logic/thinking with the science of nutrition/eating.
Kai