Vladimir Sorin
First Published: in Kommunist. Ezenedel'nyi zurnal ekonomiki, politiki i obsenstvennosti. Organ Moskovskago Oblastnogo Byuro RKP (bol'sevikov) [The Communist. Weekly Magazine for Economics, Politics and Social Questions. Organ of the Moscow District Office of the RCP(B)], No. 4, June 1918.
Source: Internationalist Communist Tendency.
Online Version: Marxist Internet Archive 2021
HTML Markup: Zdravko Saveski
Everyone knows the reasons why the development of our revolution abroad halted and forced us to abandon the positions we occupied without a fight and begin a progressive retreat: the complexity of the international situation, the setback in the breakout of the revolution in Western Europe, the petty bourgeois customs and lifestyles of the majority of the population, the colossal disorganisation of the economy, etc.
However, this list omits to mention another factor that had an adverse influence on the development of the Russian Revolution: the conservatism of the soviet organisations themselves, a conservatism conditioned as much by the material (social) situation of the great army of soviet staff as by the original psychology that began to form in them in this situation.
To turn ourselves to the question at hand, we will attempt to approach the problem as would a sociologist working to analyse the origin and composition of this or that social group and to research its group interests and tendencies.
After destroying the old State apparatus and casting aside the functionaries who served it, the October Revolution had the working class come face to face with the need to create a new State machinery, adapted to the social regime change. A huge field opened itself up to active organisational work, and tens of thousands of people have been given the opportunity to use their gifts in their capacities in soviet organisations. Who composed this vast army of soviet staff that rushed into the various commissariats and commissions, directions and sections, bureaus and committees?
Obviously, the old experienced party militants made it a priority to enter them. However, if we wish to remain strictly realistic, we must recognise that only a small number of them are sufficiently active and tireless for the further development of the revolution and its growth. As for the majority of the members of the party, tired as they are from their long journeys in exile, from their exhausting clandestine activity, and from their lives as revolutionaries which are naturally fraught with danger, today, following the victory of the proletariat, they aspire to tranquil, peaceful activity in the course of constructing socialism. This group is inclined to consider their presence in the soviet organisations as the natural achievement and crowning of their previous work, and, in spite of themselves, they begin to adopt a hostile attitude and to feel a secret fear of all extreme measures, which have the potential to disturb their peace, which they took such pains to achieve.
Also now working in the soviet organisations is a layer of semi-intellectuals who, far from being erudite, were deprived of an outlet under the ancien régime, while today, thanks to the sabotage of specialised, trained staff, anyone possessing any knowledge, or even just the ability to count, read and write, has become a precious person to be clung to.
These semi-intellectuals (shop clerks, secretaries, petty functionaries, small employees, etc.), who could never have dreamed of having any sort of "career" under the ancien régime, have today "set out to become someone" thanks to the October Revolution. This has provoked an enormous rise in demand for technicians and specialists of all kinds. On the whole (we will not speak of specific people "who have convictions", nor even of small groups), they are of course interested in preserving the privilege that this situation affords them. A certain "weight", and a certain consideration in the eyes of their peers, decent treatment, a superior food ration and a multitude of small favours and priorities, all of this leads the middle soviet staff to hold onto their place, and they do not remain remotely predisposed to revolutionary boldness.
In the composition of the army of soviet employees, we must also include this shameless audience prepared to serve anyone at all under any regime whatsoever, and who, without the slightest internal conflict, "have infiltrated" the soviet government. Lastly, we also indicate the multitude of technicians and specialists of all kinds who feel no sympathy whatsoever for the soviet power and who have offered themselves at its service for the sole purpose of acquiring a lot of money, given that educated people are vital to the young Republic.
This group may well be the most reactionary; it is only their desire for a salary (and often also their penchant for embezzlement) that leads these members to offer their skills and their knowledge to the working class. The mere existence of the soviets terrifies them, and they are prepared to resign themselves to this if these organisations degenerate, adapting to the philistines and becoming acceptable to the broad layers of bourgeois democracy. Since the leading circles rely on, appreciate and cling to this group, the latter has the ability to exercise a certain pressure in the conservative and reactionary sense (as described above) on the policies of the soviets.
Such is the composition of this new social group we call the soviet staff. Given the general lack of culture, the backwardness of Russia and the paucity of its intellectual forces, this group could not be distinguished qualitatively from those layers or groups who are partly tired and unsure, besides the small nuclei of convicted, active, indefatigable staff who possess exceptional qualities.
Our analysis reveals that the soviet staff, interested on the whole in conserving their privileged positions and their purely professional interests, are prone to playing the role of a conservative social group. This has several consequences: a certain distrust of the working masses; a tendency to isolate themselves from them, to barricade themselves in; inclinations to evade party discipline (about which their provincial newspapers complain so much); a fear of shocks; insufficient interest in the workers; a penchant for compromise; and a tendency to manipulate soviet power, which they judge a threat to these petty bourgeois philistines who prove themselves slow in their paperwork, etc.
Far be it from us to claim that the soviet staff has already transformed into a new edition of the bureaucracy as irredeemably cut off from the masses as that of the higher levels of the German trade unions, for example. But it is incontrovertible that such a tendency exists. It goes without saying that this is not a question of any ill will of isolated individuals, nor one of any originality due to the Russian Revolution. Such a danger threatens any socialist revolution, since the capitalist regime has taken all measures possible to destroy at the root any mass initiative, as well as to accustom those masses to the idea that the administration of the State must be removed from them, and be carried out by specially trained individuals (i.e. functionaries). In any case, we must fight to prevent the October Revolution from being used to serve the interests of a relatively insignificant group, and there is but one way to prevent this: by training the vast working masses in social activity, facilitating and reinforcing workers' control over this staff whose duty is serving their needs, and suppressing all privileges favouring the staff of social organisations.
Ultimately, the party itself, which is somewhat better insured against decomposition, must reinforce its control over these fractions of the soviets, and make sure that the staff of social organisations are subordinate and accountable to it.
We have said several times that the power of the soviets, the workers' and peasants' deputies, is the main achievement of our revolution. This is certainly true, but we must not forget that the (communist) party is everywhere and always superior to the soviets. And this is completely understandable. Only the party defends the interests of the international proletariat. Therefore, the soviets are the representatives of labour democracy in general, whose interests, notably those of the petty bourgeois peasantry, do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the proletariat.
The left communists are the most ardent zealots of soviet power, but, naturally, only insofar as this power retains its proletarian orientation and does not degenerate in a petty bourgeois direction due to the reasons mentioned above.
Our comrades often stigmatise us, claiming that we will disorganise collective soviet work and that we will be the "left" enemies of the soviets. This is due to their lack of reflection. The true dictatorship of the proletarian soviets, with uncompromising policies and the refusal of all opportunist acts - these are the aspirations of the left communists.
We affirm that firm proletarian politics, on both the interior and the exterior fronts, can provoke terrible dangers and could even lead to our defeat. But we believe that in the interests of the international proletarian movement, it is preferable to lose at the hand of outside forces as a true proletarian power, than to survive by adapting to the circumstances, by eschewing communist principles and allowing the soviet power to degenerate until nothing of it remains but its external shell; the "mark" of the proletarian soviets, with their content having become thoroughly non-proletarian. This second path leads to decomposition, to the corruption of soviet power and to the dejection of the working masses in Russia as well as the West.
Vl. Sorin