PRESENT-DAY ETHNIC PROCESSES IN THE USSR

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Present-Day Ethnic Processes in the USSR has been written by the following group of authors, working at the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

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Introduction

The Soviet Union is the biggest multinational country in the world; in it live and work members of more than a hundred nationalities. Some of them had already taken shape as quite definite ethnic communities many centuries ago; others were finally formed in the years of Soviet government.

At the turn of the century the peoples of Czarist Russia were at various levels of development. Most of the peoples of European Russia (Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and others) had already reached the stage of national consolidation under capitalism; at the same time many of the peoples of Central Asia were still essentially in a setting of feudal relations. In Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan there were areas with a comparatively high level of capitalism. In the North Caucasus patriarchal-feudal relations predominated, although there were also already elements of capitalism there. The peoples of the Far North (Evenks, Chukchi, Nentsi) were mostly at the level of the patriarchal-clan system.

The social and economic backwardness of Czarist Russia, and the acuteness of the national situation in many of its areas, together with the diversity of the ethnic composition and mixed nature of the economy made the national question particularly important and complicated its solution. It was not fortuitous, therefore, that it occupied such prominent place in the revolutionary activity of the Communist Party. Under Lenin's leadership the Party succeeded in getting international unity of the Russian working class and the working people of all the other peoples of Russia and led them to victory in the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917, which abolished social and national oppression. Lenin developed the Communist Party's policy on the national question under the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism, and guided its implementation in the early years of Soviet government. The most important achievement of the policy of building national and state system was the creation of Soviet republics and their voluntary uniting in a single state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Given genuine national equality during the establishing of the socialist mode of production, under the Marxist-Leninist ideology, nations and nationalities of a capitalist type were transformed into socialist ones with an identical social and class structure. During the further transformation of public life and social affairs, and with the final victory of socialism, the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union drew closer and closer together. During the years of the building of socialism and communism in the USSR a historically new community arose, the Soviet people. It was formed on the basis of common ownership of the means of production, unity of economic, socio-political, and cultural affairs, the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and materialisation of the Communist ideals of the working class.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union's implementation of the basic principles of Lenin's national policy did not cancel the need constantly to take national factors into account in a comprehensive way, and carefully to settle relations between the peoples of the multinational Soviet country and to study them. National factors play a conspicuous role in the affairs of the Soviet Union, and will also do so in the foreseeable future, so that it is not by chance that such close attention is paid to analysing them in the programmatic documents of the CPSU and at Party congresses. In his address on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the joint jubilee session of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR, Leonid Brezhnev stressed:

> In a mature socialist society national relations continue to be a constantly developing reality which keeps posing new tasks and problems.[1]

Close attention to investigation of the various processes of national phenomena by philosophers, historians, ethnographers, linguists and other social scientists, is therefore quite justified.

This research grows in relevance as technological progress encourages more rapid socio-economic and cultural development, and radical changes in the lives of the peoples of the USSR.

National phenomena and processes take many and complex forms, and touch on wide-ranging questions of a state, legal, and economic nature through to those of psychological order. For this reason Soviet scientists in various spheres are engaged in examining different aspects of this group of problems.

In this respect the science of ethnography is expressed in the study of ethnic aspects of national phenomena, i.e. ethnic processes.

The concept 'ethnic' has become current in scientific usage

[1] L. I. Brezhnev. *Following Lenin's Course* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p. 76.

because of the fact that the terminology used in the study of national phenomena did not always consider their variety and was not always sufficiently precise. The cause of the latter is the previous, and sometimes present use of the term 'national' in somewhat inadequate meanings: e.g. in the case of processes occurring in stages it often corresponds to the term 'nation'; the term 'nationality' is also used in a wider sense, closer to the concept of 'people'. The term 'people' is itself used to denote various social groups (nation, national grouping, the working classes, etc.). The use of the term 'ethnos', in our opinion, avoids the lack of clarity of the term 'people', and expresses unambiguously everything which the concepts 'nation', 'national grouping' (*narodnost*), 'nationality' and 'tribe' have in common. It is this common factor, which implies the existence in each of the groups of people signified in these terms of a definite language, specific culture, life style and identity, that has come to be called 'ethnic', while the aggregates of people concerned are referred to as 'ethnoi'.

Ethnic processes, as an important and ever-present aspect of all forms of national processes, are primarily changes in the cultural features specific to ethnic (national) communities (including language), and in identity. The typology of these processes, and the characteristic features of the main conditions and factors of their development are examined in the first chapter. Not all aspects of this theme have been equally studied. There are at present a considerable number of works on the formation and development of national groupings and nations, and also on national relations in the USSR. The authors of these works, mostly philosophers and historians, examine the socio-economic, legal, and ideological aspects of Soviet national policy, the general patterns in the socio-economic development of the peoples of the USSR, and in the relations between them at the various stages of socialist construction, including the current one of developed socialism. National processes are likewise partially reflected in literary criticism. All too often, however, manifestations of national processes in everyday life (at work, in the home, etc.) are ignored, and consequently specific changes in these areas have not been sufficiently studied. There is, in addition, a need for a broader study of how the peoples of the USSR interact culturally, and how features common to all Soviet peoples take shape in both material and intellectual culture, i.e. in those spheres of inter-ethnic relations which play a prominent role in the emergence of the new historical community that is the Soviet people. Research of this nature will make it possible both to provide a factual and detailed analysis of ethnic phenomena and processes, and to obtain a multisided view of the basic patterns in their development.

These factors have motivated this attempt at a monographic study of modern ethnic processes in the USSR.

The general aims of the monograph, and the extent to which the problem has been studied largely dictated its structure. The work can conditionally be divided into three sections. The first, chapters one to six, examines research methodology, and describes the ethnic situation and ethnic processes in pre-revolutionary Russia, and the socio-economic, demographic, legal and natural conditions of and development factors in ethnic processes in the USSR. The second section examines various aspects of these processes, focussing on changes in material culture, language and intellectual life of the peoples in the USSR, and on ethnic processes in the family environment. An analysis of this kind is essential for a study in greater depth of the ethnic aspects of the national processes by which socialist nations form and develop, and subsequently converge. The concluding section of the book therefore describes the dynamics of ethnic changes, defines both general and specific features of the development of ethnic processes among individual peoples, and summarises the main results of the research conducted.

Sources of the most varied kind were used in the work. Among the most important are the census returns of 1897, 1926, 1939, 1959, 1970 and 1979. Of a similar, statistical, nature is the information obtained from the current population registration. Another group of sources was field and archive ethnographic material, including special ethno-sociological research; this material does not cover so much ground as the statistics but provides better and more ethnocultural information than the latter, revealing various aspects of ethnic processes. The third and most numerous group consisted of studies in this area: works on the formation and development of socialist nations, and on other aspects of national processes written by representatives of disciplines closely related to ethnography, and ethnographic works containing comprehensive descriptions of the culture and life style of the peoples of the USSR.

The authors are well aware that they have not explored every aspect of this theme, and that there are many gaps still to be filled in our knowledge of it; for this reason they were sometimes forced to confine themselves to a brief survey of a question, merely delineating the problems which must be left for future studies.

Chapter I

ETHNIC PROCESSES AS A SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION

The initial concept for a characterisation of ethnic processes is that of 'ethnos' (ethnic community). This term has now been used for some time in the Soviet literature (from about the turn of the century in the Russian literature), but its scientific comprehension and elaboration as a special concept for designating a special community of people has only been developed in fact in Soviet writing in recent decades.

The *ethnos* is a special, historically arising form of social grouping, a special form of people's collective existence. Such a community becomes established and develops in a natural sort of way; it does not depend on the will of the individual people forming it and is capable of a stable, centuries-long existence through self-reproduction.

Every ethnic community is moulded by the direct contacts of the people forming it; that is possible, as a rule, only when people live in proximity, i.e. in the same area and speak the same language. Community of language and community of territory thus operate above all as conditions for the shaping of an ethnos. Community of territory is aslo a very important condition for its self-reproduction, ensuring development of economic and other types of link between its parts; the natural conditions of this common territory affect the life of the people, being reflected in certain common features of their economic activity, culture, life, and psyche. But territorially separated groups of an ethnos may preserve their specific features for a long time in the field of culture, and their former self-awareness of community. So, while functioning as a *sine qua non* of the forming of an ethnos, integrity of territory is not a strictly necessary factor of preservation in the future of the common characteristics of all its parts.

An ethnos' links with language are very close, language is not only a condition of its formation but is frequently the outcome of its ethnogenesis, which is particularly marked when an ethnos is formed from population groups speaking different languages. Because

of this close link language usually functions as one of the most important objective properties of an ethnos, and also as a symbol of ethnic allegiance.

Language apart, specific elements of the material and spiritual culture of an ethnos are of the greatest importance for its stable functioning. These are primarily those components of its culture that are characterised by a traditional and stable nature, viz., customs, ceremonies, rites and rituals, folk art, religion, standards of behaviour, and so on. The culture unity of the members of an ethnos is inseparable, in turn, from the peculiarities of their psyche displayed, in particular, in the subtleties of their character, specific nature of their sense of values and tastes, and so on. An ethnos, it needs to be stressed in particular, is not simply a sum total of attributes but is a definite, integral formation in which various of its objective components may occupy the foreground. In some cases language plays the main role in this respect, in others features of the economy and way of life, and in others still characteristic features of behaviour, and so on.

At the same time an ethnos is by no means any group of people possessing a community of certain objective qualities.

An ethnos is only an aggregate of people which recognises itself as such, distinguishing itself from other similar communities. This consciousness of their group unity by the members of an ethnos is commonly called ethnic self-awareness or identity, an outward expression of which is its name for itself (ethnonym). The identity of an ethnos seems to focus ideas on the community of territory ('native land'), language ('native language'), and distinguishing features of culture and psyche, and also on the community of origin and history of the people composing it. This ethnic identity, moulded during ethnogenesis, functions later, in fact, not just as a most important determinant of ethnic connection (pushing even the attribute of native language into the background), but also as a force uniting members of the ethnos and distinguishing them ethnically from other ethnoi.

The ethnic territory may change considerably in the course of history, and some parts of the ethnos can split off from the main nucleus, the vocabulary of the language may alter, its morphological, syntactical, and other features (individual groups may, furthermore, change their language altogether), and the material and spiritual culture, and so on, may be greatly altered, yet if the people constituting the ethnos preserve characteristic common features and identity, the ethnos continues to exist as such. Consolidation of ethnic identity is usually combined with an aspiration of the ethnos for its own socio-territorial organisation (including statehood), which also ensures its stable existence and reservation of many of the elements mentioned above, above all territorial unity.

The self-reproduction of an ethnos is ensured by preferential marriage within it and through transmission to the new generation of the language, system of social and cultural values, traditions, etc. When the ethnos is formed from very heterogeneous racial groups their intermarriage and extensive cross-breeding encourage the genesis of a feeling of ethnic affinity in an essential way.

An ethnos (in the narrow sense of the term) may thus be defined as a stable aggregate of people, historically formed on a certain territory, possessing common, relatively stable features of language, culture, and psyche, and a consciousness of their unity and difference from other similar formations (identity), fixed in a name for themselves (ethnonym).

The very close link between ethnic phenomena and socio-economic ones (which they are ultimately due to) needs to be specially stressed. This link is especially important when the ethnos (as a whole or in greater part) becomes part of the same state. The special formations arising then usually have a socio-economic community as well as a territorial and political one. That is why such ethno-social formations' belonging to a certain socio-economic system is decisive for typing them. This factor also underlies classification of ethno-social communities in accordance with the historical stages accepted in the Soviet social sciences, under which three types of these communities are distinguished: tribes, characteristic of the primitive communal age; nationality, characteristic of the slavery and feudal eras; and nations, characteristic of the epoch of capitalism and socialism.

It is necessary at the same time to allow for the fact that being an element of the corresponding formation largely determines the features of the existence not only of compact ethnoi (possessing 'their own' statehood) but also of dispersed ones. It is therefore quite legitimate to speak, for example, in relation to the capitalist era, not only of a special socio-ethnic community but also of a. special, dispersed ethnic group with the appropriate capitalist parameters. So, unlike an ethnos in the narrow sense of the word as a community determined primarily by language, culture, and identity, the concrete forms of an ethnos' existence include socio-economic and political parameters.

The theme of our investigation makes it unnecessary to analyse the first type of ethno-social unit (of the primitive communal formation), i.e. the tribe, in detail. Let us simply note that its most characteristic feature was that its internal, clan-tribal structure was based based on the principle of blood relationship in which clan exogamy was combined with tribal endogamy. Tribes were, as a rule, relatively small in numbers, due primarily to the weak development of the productive forces. Tribal identity was mainly based on ideas of the direct community of descent of all the fellow-tribesmen from some,

generally mythical, ancestor; it was weakly linked with community of the language, whose dialects several related tribes usually spoke, and with an area, which changed during the tribes' migrations.

Of the last two types of socio-ethnic community, which are considered principal ones, i.e. nationality and nation, only the concept of the latter, now the most clearly expressed, has yet been adequately developed in the Soviet literature. The interval between the tribe and the nation in which the old tribal links no longer existed, yet new, national ones had not yet been established, was quite long historically speaking and very complex ethnically speaking. With the decay of the clan-tribal system the social structure of society grew more complicated, the blood-relation organisation gave way to a territorial one, and a division into classes, estates, etc., developed. The contours of ethnoi-nationalities were usually quite mobile in this period, and within the major ethnoi that were forming there were strong dialectal and cultural variations; ethnic identity was ambiguous and not always clear-cut, and often receded into the background or into a narrow territorial (fellow-countryman) identity, a feeling of belonging to 'one's' suzerain, and so on.

Designation of the principal ethnic units of pre-capitalist class societies by the word 'nationality' (Russian *narodnost*–nationality, ethnic national group) raised the question of the terminological demarcation of these units in relation to the slave-owning and feudal formations. The suggestions that appeared in this connection in literature to call the principal type of ethnic community in the era of slavery a *demos* did not come into scientific usage since another meaning (population) was already associated with it in ethnology. It is therefore usual to distinguish two subtypes of nationality (slave-owning and feudal). In addition, because of the refinement of the scientific concept of nation that made it possible to differentiate it more clearly typologically from other ethnoi of the capitalist and socialist formations, the term 'nationality' (*narodnost*) has been preserved in Soviet literature as well for those ethnic formations that are no longer defined by the socio-economic parameters of the slavery and feudal epochs but do not come under the concept of nation. The present authors adhere to the established Soviet practice of employing the term 'nationality' (*narodnost*) for the ethnoi of the Far North and Far Eastern borderlands of the USSR that are small in numbers and scattered over an extensive territory ('nationalities of the North'), and to certain ethnoi of the Caucasus that have not formed nations ('nationalities of Daghestan').

As for the term 'nation', it has been developed by Soviet scholars on the basis of the main indications contained in Lenin's works on the national question; the discussion of the definition of the concept 'nation' that developed in the mid-60s is important in this respect.

There have been two main historical roads in the formation of

nations as ethno-social communities: one on the basis of the comparatively early rise (still in the pre-capitalist stage) of a mono-ethnic state formations; the other during the development of an ethnos within a multinational state. Many of the major ethnoi of Western Europe arose, as we know, by the first path; the second was typical, in particular, of the development of most of the peoples of Russia.

The interconnection of ethnos and statehood became particularly important in the early stages of capitalism when it had its basis in the economy; hence a striving of the forming nations for their own state setting was typical of that time. In this connection, Lenin said the following:

> Throughout the world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked up with national movements. For the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and to its consolidation in literature eliminated. Therein is the economic foundation of national movements. Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity and unimpeded development of language are the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commerce on a scale commensurate with modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its various classes and, lastly, for the establishment of a close connection between the market and each and every proprietor, big or little, and between seller and buyer.
>
> Therefore, the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of *national states*, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied. The most profound economic factors drive towards this goal, and, therefore, for the whole of Western Europe, nay, for the entire civilised world, the national state is *typical* and normal for the capitalist period.[1]

Since this process coincided in the countries of Western Europe (where the formation of nations first began) with the rise and centralisation of states formed on territories with a population predominantly ethnically uniform, the term 'nation' itself acquired the political sense of people's belonging to one, 'national' state. The word also began to be used in this sense in other countries employing West European languages (English, French, etc.) or terms.

The definition of 'nation' adopted in the Soviet literature which treats a given community as ethno-social, starts from the decisive

[1] V. I. Lenin. The Right of Nations to Self-Determination. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), pp. 396-97.

role of economic factors in its formation; correspondingly pre-eminent significance is attached to the socio-economic parameters of the capitalist and socialist formations. Since these parameters, e.g., the existence of its own working class, intelligentsia, etc., are possible, as a rule, only within comparatively populous ethnoi, the term 'nation' is usually employed for large ethno-social communities.

In practice, however, special significance is often attached, when deciding whether an ethnos is a nation, to the existence of its own state. That is largely due to its being possible to preserve the socio-economic (or ultimately ethnic) integrity of a nation only when it comes within a single state. 'Its own' state is not, however, a necessary attribute of nation as an ethno-social community. There have been many instances in history of the existence of several nations within one state. It is hardly correct, therefore, to link the term 'nation' rigidly only with those peoples of the USSR that have statehood in the form of a Union or autonomous republic. It would also be an oversimplification to draw a strict quantitative line between nations and nationalities. It is necessary, when deciding this point, to allow for a whole set of socio-economic characteristics of an ethnic community, its numerical size, peculiarities of settlement, the intensity of its ethno-cultural links, and so on. At the same time it is inexact also to number all the members of the relevant ethnos living in various states in one nation (e.g. classing the Armenians of the USSR, Syria, Egypt, etc., as one 'nation').

As for the term 'nationality', it has long been used in Russian literature to designate all ethnic formations of developed class socio-economic formations. In addition, the term has been confirmed in census practice and other forms of population statistics to designate citizens belonging to a certain ethnic community.

The parts of an ethnos living in the territory of other states and constituting a minority of the population there, are sometimes called 'national' or 'ethnic minorities', but this term can be given nuances of national inequality, and therefore is not usually employed to characterise today's ethnic situation in the USSR; more often the term 'national group' is employed. Whenever the need arises to distinguish terminologically between certain territorially separated parts of the native ethnoi of the USSR within the country, it is convenient to use the terms 'ethno-areal' and 'ethno-dispersed' groups (depending on the degree of territorial dispersal), supplementing it when necessary by a numerical superscript.

It also needs to be remembered that many ethnoi, primarily big ones, were not in the not so distant past, and are still not monolithic as regards language and culture, and consist of ethnographic (or ethnic) groups. These last terms are used to designate the territorial parts of a nation or nationality that differ from each other in the specific local character of the spoken language, culture, and way of

life (a special dialect or manner of speech; peculiarities of material and spiritual culture; religious differences, etc.); these groups sometimes have their own name for themselves and, as it were, a dual identity (ethnic groups). These groups often trace their origin to tribal components (including those of another ethnoi) coming into the nationality or nation. They often arise through socio-religious differentiation of an ethnos, and also when the ethnic territory is very extensive and a migrating part of the ethnos find themselves in a different natural environment, or interact with different ethnoi, and so on. That is how, for example, the White Sea Pomors, and the Terek and Ural Cossacks, and certain other local groups of the Russian ethnos arose.

Apart from the internal segmentation of nationalities and nations, they often themselves form bigger complexes. One of these, formed on the basis of the linguistic and cultural affinity of peoples, are called ethno-linguistic groups; others, taking shape within multinational states, are conveniently called macro-ethnic (meta-ethnic) communities. One and the same group of people may thus be part at the same time of several ethnic communities of various levels. Russians, for example, themselves an ethno-social community and socialist nation, are at the same time part of a broader Slavonic complex. When we add to that the inner division of Russians into ethnographic groups, we are faced with a concrete, complex hierarchy of ethnic communities.

Passing to concepts directly linked with the investigation of ethnic processes, we distinguish first of all two main varieties based on features of the manifestation of these processes in the various spheres of an ethnos. One is expressed in the final analysis in a change of ethnic identity in people belonging to some one ethnos. These are ethno-transformational processes, since they are associated with passage from one ethnic state to another. The second variety consists of ethno-evolutionary processes expressed in changes of ethnos which, while being manifested in its various components, do not, however, directly involve a change of ethnic identity. Their principal objective content is a change in the specific cultural nature of the ethnic community.

While allowing for two forms of existence of ethnic phenomena, one of which is expressed in the ethnos in the narrow sense of the term, and the other in an ethno-social organism, it is important to differentiate between ethnic processes proper and ethno-social ones. The first include changes in the ethnic sphere and the second also various changes in the socio-economic and politico-ideological spheres of the lives of the people forming the ethnos. The main type of contemporary ethno-social process is national processes understood as changes concerning both the socio-economic and ethno-cultural components of nations and national groups.

When studying ethnic processes proper, two main types are differentiated: (a) separative, when a previously united people is divided into several independent ethnoi or parts of it separate off, forming independent ethnoi; and (b) unificatory, when previously ethnically heterogeneous units merge into a single ethnos. The dialectics of ethnic development are manifested here in almost every unifying process leading, true at a new level, to ethnic isolation of the ethnoi involved in it. Separative processes were particularly common in the primitive communal age and were caused by an excessive increase in the size of tribes or simply by the migration of some of them to distant parts. Unifying processes have been most typical of modern times and express a historically natural and progressive tendency to consolidate peoples.

Present-day unifying processes can be subdivided in turn into 'intra-national' and 'inter-national' ones.

The main type of intra-national process is ethnic consolidation. By that we understand the merging of several ethnic formations (of the ethnographic and ethnic type of group) related to one another by origin, language, and culture into a single whole. Here we must distinguish between the consolidation of nationalities from closely related tribes and ethnographic groups and the consolidation of nations from linguistically and culturally related nationalities, ethnographic groups, and other ethnic formations. Since related peoples usually trace their origin from a united ethno-linguistic community of the past, the development of processes of ethnic consolidation is often a sort of dialectical negation of processes of ethnic separation. The concept of national consolidation usually has a broader significance; it also includes consolidation of the social uniformity of a nation including its corresponding cultural parameters and other factors.

As for inter-national ethnic processes, they include ethnic assimilation and inter-ethnic integration. By ethnic (national) assimilation it is customary to understand the inclusion of small groups (or individual members) of one people in the composition of another, usually bigger or more developed community. There are, of course, two types of assimilation—forced, and natural; the latter (as Lenin pointed out) has a progressive significance, even under capitalism.[1] When using the term 'natural assimilation' to designate processes developing through the everyday and production contacts of various nationalities, we must remember their dual course: the bigger people assimilates ethnic minorities living among it, and these minorities in turn often aspire to merge ethnically (linguistically, culturally, etc.) with the population around them. The term 'ethnic dissolution'

[1] See: V. I. Lenin. Critical Remarks on the National Question. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 30-31.

can be applied to these processes.

By inter-ethnic (inter-national) integration (convergence) we mean the interaction of ethnic units (of the nationality or nation type) that are different in their linguistic and cultural parameters, usually within a state, which leads to the development of a certain cultural community between them.

In addition one must allow for the close interconnection of all three of these varieties of unifying ethnic processes. Ethnic consolidation, for example, often goes hand in hand with some degree of assimilation, and ethnic integration may become a stage on the way to ethnic consolidation. The least significant changes in ethnic qualities occur with inter-ethnic integration, the greatest with assimilation. While bearing in mind the mechanism on the whole of these similar processes we must note that corresponding changes by no means occur in the same way in the various spheres of the ethnos. They are most plastic, as a rule, in the area of everyday culture. The linguistic sphere alters much more considerably and sharply; initially bilingualism usually develops and only later a full change of language. But, as with ethnic changes in everyday culture and way of life, a change of language does not in itself yet signify passage to another ethnic state. That happens only with a change of ethnic identity, an outwardly sudden transition from one ethnonym to another.

Ethnic processes develop under the impact and influence of various factors. Some of these are due to the interaction of ethnoi (primarily in the linguistic and cultural area), others to extra-ethnic causes. The latter are primarily economic factors (as in general are all the development factors of ethnic processes).

The development of economic links under early capitalism is based on community of language and territory and becomes a powerful basis for the development of national consolidation processes. Under developed capitalism language and territorial boundaries can no longer contain the growing economic links, the economy breaks down the national framework, and encourages the development of assimilation and inter-national integration. At the same time the economy lays the foundation for rapid development of material and spiritual culture, and leads to radical changes in the culture of the broad masses. Under socialism the economy's effect is greatly intensified because of the deepening of inter-regional economic links, the abolition of class and national antagonisms, changes in class and social structure, and so on.

The territorial factor has an essential effect on ethnic processes; viz., change of an ethnos's former area of settlement; migration of separate groups to areas differing greatly in its natural conditions from the old ones. Migration of separate parts of an ethnos into another ethnic environment has a very considerable influence on mixing and blending.

The development of ethnic processes depends largely on the state and political unity of an ethnos. At the same time one must allow for the effect of constitutional and legal, political and ideological factors on them, which sometimes push the economic factors into the background because of their effect and even contradict them. In Czarist Russia, for example, the policy of oppressing the indigenous population of the southern and eastern peripheral areas prevented the development of national consolidation among them, while the bias toward Russification and the spreading of an ideology of ethnic and religious discord held back the economic and sociopolitical integration of ethnoi, heightened national sentiments, complicated the processes of natural assimilation, and so on.

In the Soviet Union confirmation of the full equality of all the peoples, and broad propaganda for internationalist ideas have facilitated ethnic contacts, the development of consolidation, integration, and natural assimilation. The system of national state organisation, primarily the founding of Union and autonomous republics, created favourable conditions for the socio-cultural development of previously backward ethnoi. An education system and press in the mother tongue, the teaching of national history, and so on, are of great importance in this respect.

Finally, we must speak of the demographic factor. Growth of the numbers of nationalities in an area and a corresponding increase in the density of the population, in themselves lead to an increase in contacts between people, and so affect ethnic processes. The features of the age and sex structure, size of families, and other demographic parameters are of no little importance in this respect.

As for the role of factors linked with inter-ethnic contacts, it largely depends on what is called the ethnic situation, a concept that includes all the features of the ethnoi's territorial intermingling. This interaction, one san say, largely depends on their front of contiguity.

The affinity of ethnoi as regards language and culture and way of life, which encourage direct contacts between people, have a direct bearing on the development of ethnic processes. Elements of culture and way of life that have been or continue to be linked with religious differences interfere with the development of such contacts. Consolidation processes develop predominantly among ethnoi that are closely related in language, culture, and way of life. Affinity of language and culture greatly facilitates the initial processes of assimilation, though their effect is relatively weak in the final stages. We would also note that certain elements of traditional culture and way of life, unlike linguistic assimilation (which is usually an inevitable stage of ethnic assimilation), may even be preserved after a change of ethnic identity, having lost their role as symbols of ethnic affiliation.

Psychological factors–feelings of sympathy or antipathy between

the members of the different ethnic communities, due to the historical features of the development of their relations; similarities or differences in their culture; and other elements—have a great effect on the evolution of ethnic contacts; a certain role may also be played by marked anthropological differences between the contacting ethnoi.

Among other factors affecting the development of ethnic processes, we must note difference in sense of value and principles, which can essentially affect ethnic transformation both directly and through the socio-economic basis.

An important factor, and at the same time a form of realisation of ethnic contacts is intermarriage. By transferring ethnic processes into the area of family relations, mixed marriages intensify ethnic contacts and usually promote the coming together of peoples. The offspring of mixed marriages themselves ultimately decide their ethnic attitude in one way or the other. In the USSR children usually choose between the ethnic allegiance of their parents, so breaking the ethnic line of one of them.

The mass ethnic contacts conditioning the evolution of ethnic processes can be divided into direct and indirect. Apart from ethnically mixed marriages, which are the most clearly expressed form of direct ethnic contacts, there are also everyday and production ones, and in part study relations. The indirect relations today primarily include contacts connected with the mass media (press, radio, etc.).

In characterising ethnic processes as a whole, we need to stress in particular that they, like ethnic communities themselves, are a hierarchical phenomenon. In other words, they are on various levels, as it were, and often, moreover, take various directions. Consequently one and the same group of people, belonging to one ethnos, is simultaneously within the sphere of its 'internal' evolution tending to consolidate it as an independent system, and in the area of processes tending to unite it with other ethnic formations.

In a certain sense these opposing trends permeate the whole ethnic history of mankind, but this type of mutual intermingling of ethno-social processes is particularly characteristic of capitalism. It is this that is brought out by Lenin's concept of the two trends in the national question.

> Developing capitalism (Lenin wrote) knows two historic tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the break-down of national barriers, the creation on the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc.
>
> Both tendencies are a universal law of capitalism. The former predominates in the beginning of its development, the

latter characterises a mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society.[1]

A propos of the second tendency, Lenin remarked that international convergence is primarily characteristic of multinational countries (e.g. Russia), since the different nations living in it are bound to one another by millions and billions of economic, legal, and social bonds. Contacts between the nations in such states are strengthened by the development of the economy which binds those living in them together, breaks down national barriers, and leads to territorial mixing of the various nationalities in towns and industrial areas.

In recent years the question has been repeatedly raised in Soviet literature of the historical context of the operation of the two trends in national processes described by Lenin. The erroneousness of mechanically transferring the patterns operating under capitalism to socialist society has been stressed, and it has been noted that nations are a socio-historical category. Their economic basis, i.e. their class structure and socio-historical aspirations, spiritual image, that is to say everything that characterises a given historical type of nation, is radically altered during the transition from capitalism to socialism. As for ethnic indications, under socialism they are preserved and developed in a transformed quality.

The impermissibility of mechanically transposing Lenin's remarks to socialism is particularly obvious when it is a matter of the first trend. As for the second, there is no doubt about the possibility of extending it to socialism, although the form it takes in the new conditions has inevitably undergone radical changes. The Programme of the CPSU, in stating that under socialism there will be a flowering of nations and a strengthening of their sovereignty, at the same time stressed that

> the development of nations does not proceed along lines of strengthening national strife, national narrow-mindedness and egoism, as it does under capitalism, but along lines of their association, fraternal mutual assistance and friendship.[2]

These trends are by no means displayed in the same way in the different spheres of social affairs, but their interconnection is discernible everywhere, in both socio-economic and specifically ethnic processes, the former usually, moreover, affecting the latter in a very direct way (especially ethnic identity), and it in turn may prove to have a pronounced feedback.

[1] V. I. Lenin. Critical Remarks on the National Question. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 27.

[2] *The Road to Communism* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1962), p. 559.

Chapter II

AN ETHNO-GEOGRAPHICAL OUTLINE OF THE USSR

Ethnic processes proper are social and in the final analysis have socio-economic causes. They take place, however, among people living in definite physical conditions, that affect people's economic activity, their material culture, and in a very significant way their spiritual culture, largely determining their specific economic and cultural features. Physical conditions essentially affect the peculiarities of settlement, so influencing the development of both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic contacts, and through them the course of ethnic processes. This influence is not determinant, and it alters historically with development of the production and economic basis. But it has obviously to be allowed for, especially for such a big country as the USSR with its variety of physical conditions.

The USSR occupies roughly a sixth of the inhabited surface of the earth (22 400 000 square kilometres) stretching more than 9 000 kilometres from west to east and more than 4 500 kilometres from north to south. The European part mainly occupies the East European Plain. Beyond the half-eroded ancient Ural Mountains the surface rises eastward in three gigantic stages, represented respectively by the West Siberian Depression, the Central Siberian Plateau, and the mountainous regions of the Far East. In Central Asia there is the quite extensive Turanian depression. Along the south of the country stretch mountain systems, the main ones being the Caucasus, Pamirs, Tian-Shan, and Sayans.

The climate varies from a cold Arctic one in the north to subtropical and desert climates in the south and from continental-maritime in the west to very continental in Siberia, and a monsoon climate on the Pacific coast, with a corresponding vertical zoning in mountainous areas. The zone of Arctic desert which occupies the large islands of the Arctic Ocean and the north of the Taimyr Peninsula, is uninhabited, save for rare wintering stations. Conditions are very harsh in the tundra which stretches in a wide belt along the northern and north-eastern coasts. A long, dark, severe winter is characteristic of

this zone, and a short cool summer, with continuous daylight, during which frosts are not uncommon.

Strong winds, frequent clouds, but little precipitation are also typical. Only the upper layers of the soil thaw in summer, and below them are layers of permafrost. The principal vegetation consists of mosses and lichens, stunted trees being rarely met, along river valleys.

There are great difficulties in the way of agriculture in this zone; the traditional economy of the small nationalities inhabiting it (Saami, Nentsi, Chukchi, and others) is based on reindeer herding, fishing, and hunting (in coastal areas the hunting of marine mammals).

The forest zone is much broader in area, and is characterised on the whole by a moderate climate, with a cold, quite long winter, and a warm summer. In the European part of the country this zone is divided into a coniferous (taiga) subzone in which podzol soils and marshlands predominate, and a deciduous subzone with more fertile grey soils. Between these two subzones there is a wide belt of mixed forests. The quantity of precipitation in this area is around 500 to 600 millimetres a year. The traditional economy of the population is a mixed one. In the subzone of coniferous forests hunting and forest industries predominate, with pockets of farming and cattle raising (mainly along rivers). In the deciduous subzone developed farming and stock-breeding predominate. In Siberia and the Far East taiga forests (bush) predominate. In the central areas of Siberia annual precipitation is lower, and only on the Pacific coast does it rise to between 500 and 900 mm a year. The whole eastern part of this forest zone occupies an area of permafrost; reindeer herding, hunting and fishing are common. Agriculture is poorly developed, and mainly only in southern areas.

In the European part of the country and in Western Siberia there is wooded steppe and steppe country south of the forest zone with fertile black earth (chernozem) and chestnut soils. The steppes also lie in the northern part of Kazakhstan. In the south of Eastern Siberia steppe areas are comparatively rare and not great in extent. Precipitation is less on the whole in the steppe zone than in the forest zone, and gets less from north to south and west to east. Droughts are frequent in the south-eastern steppe areas. This zone is most suitable for intensive agriculture and stock-breeding, and in the European part these industries are more developed on the whole than in the Asiatic part.

Further south lies an extensive area of semi-desert and desert zones occupying the major part of the Turanian and Caspian depressions. Their climate is characterised by a cold winter and very hot summer. The amount of precipitation in the deserts is less than 200 mm a year. The vegetation is poor and consists mainly of ephemeral and wormwood salsola associations. The traditional economy

is based on raising cattle. In the river valleys and foothills irrigated agriculture is developed.

The population of the USSR is the third biggest in the world after China and India. The first general census of the population of Russia in 1897 fixed its total at 125 700 000 (124 600 000 within the present Soviet frontiers); according to the 1926 Census there were 147 000 000 people in the USSR, in 1939–170 600 000 (within the present frontiers 190 700 000), in 1959–208 000 000, in 1970–241 700 000, and by the latest 1979 Census–262 400 000. World War I and the civil war had a very adverse effect on the population of the country; even greater losses were suffered in the 1941-45 war unleashed by the Hitlerites, the direct losses of which alone were more than 20 million. In recent years the general population growth rate has slowed markedly because of the fall in the birthrate among most of the peoples in the European part of the country.

Socio-economic development, and in the first place industrial development, was accompanied with a growth of urban population and a relative (and in some areas absolute) reduction of the rural population. The proportion of the urban population was 15 per cent according to the 1897 Census, 18 per cent in 1926, 33 per cent in 1939, 48 per cent in 1959, 56 per cent in 1970, and 62 per cent in 1979.

The bulk of the population is settled in the central and southern areas of the European part of the country, where there is also a considerable concentration of big cities. The rural population is densest in the Western Ukraine and the Dniester valley; settlement is also dense in areas of the Central Volga and North Caucasus, but on the whole the areas of high rural density, which roughly coincide with suitable for cultivation stepped zones, wooded steppe, and the deciduous forest zones, gradually contract as we go east, and density falls. The taiga zone, and especially the tundra of the European North is lightly settled, population being concentrated along the major rivers and roads; certain of the big industrial towns (e.g. Vorkuta) in fact have no rural environs. The weakly populated dry Caspian steppe and semi-desert, and the Alpine regions of the Caucasus, are weakly populated and used mainly for grazing.

In the Asian part of the country there are relatively densely populated areas stretching in a narrow wedge from the Central and Southern Urals to the Pacific Ocean along both sides of the Trans-Siberian Railway. This belt broadens a little in the black-earth foothills of the Altai and the Amur valley; the south of the Primorski (Maritime) Territory is also quite densely settled. In the rest of Siberia and the Far East the population gravitates to the big rivers, while the extensive taiga and tundra areas have no permanent settlements and are usually only visited by reindeer herders and hunters at certain periods of the year. The rare towns and settlements occurring

here are mainly connected with mining, the processing of minerals, and lumbering. On the Pacific coast fisheries also play an essential role.

In Central Asia the rural population is mainly concentrated in irrigated areas, along the big rivers and in small oases watered from these rivers or by small rivers flowing down from the mountains.

In the deserts and semi-deserts of Central Asia and the arid steppes of Kazakhstan there is a sparse cattle-raising population. The towns that exist there are mainly associated with mining. In Transcaucasia the density of the population is relatively high on the Black Sea coast and the valley of the Rioni River, areas of intensive horticulture and subtropical crops.

Ethno-linguistically the numerous peoples living within the USSR belong mainly to the Indo-European family (around 83 per cent of the total population), the Altai family (around 13 per cent), and the Caucasian and Ural families (roughly 2 per cent). Their numbers and distribution by language families and groups is shown in Table 1.

The biggest group in the Indo-European family is the Slavonic, which includes Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. The Russians who are the biggest people in the USSR (more than 53 per cent of the total population), took shape as an ethnos in the broad area of the Oka-Volga mesopotamia; Russian farmers, fishermen and fur traders, and soldiers spread north to the White Sea, south to the foothills of the Caucasus, and east to the Altai and the Primorski Territory.

The territorial spread of the Russians, whereby they came to live in different natural conditions and interact with linguistically and culturally different ethnoi, led to the rise of separate ethnographic groups of Russians (Pomors, Terek Cossacks, Ural Cossacks, etc.).

The Ukrainians, the second largest people in the USSR, constitute around 17 per cent of the population. They spread from their old ethnic territory, located in the north-western half of the present-day Ukraine, mainly south-eastward in the 17th and the 18th centuries, to the Black Sea steppe and the Kuban, constituting a majority of the rural population almost everywhere there. In the 19th century and early 20th there was a considerable migration of Ukrainians to the Volga valley, and North Kazakhstan and South Siberian steppes, but they did not form substantial, independent areas there and settled among Russians, being a minority of the population.

Byelorussians, who live north of the Ukrainians, preserved their compactness of settlement for a long time. Sizable groups have only resettled comparatively recently in Karelia and Kaliningrad Region. Of the other Slavonic people we would mention the Poles, who live mainly in the north-west of the Byelorussian SSR, the south of Lithuania and in the Western Ukraine, and the Bulgarians, who live in the south of the Ukraine and in Moldavia.

The Letto-Lithuanian peoples are closely related to the East Slavonic peoples in origin and culture. The Lithuanians and Letts

Table 1

The Peoples of the USSR by Language Families and Groups (in thousands, after the 1979 census)*

Indo-European Family	
Slavonic Group	
Russians	137 397.1
Ukrainians	32 347.4
Byelorussians	9 462.7
Poles	1 150.9
Bulgarians	361.1
Czechs	17.8
Slovaks	9.4
Letto-Lithuanian Group	
Lithuanians	2 850.9
Letts	1 439.0
Romance Group	
Moldavians	2 968.2
Romanians	128.8
Armenian Group	
Armenians	4 151.2
Iranian Group	
Tajiks	2 897.7
Ossetians	541.9
Kurds	115.9
Iranians (Persians)	31.3
Tats	22.4
Baluchi	19.0
German Group	
Germans	1 936.2
Greek Group	
Greeks	343.8
Indian Group	
Gypsies	209.1
Jews**	1 810.9
Caucasian Family	
Kartvelian Group	
Georgians	3570.5
Abkhazian-Adygei Group	
Kabardinians	321.7
Adygeis	108.7
Abkhazians	90.9
Circassians	46.5
Abazins	29.5
Nakh-Daghestan Group	
Chechens	612.7
Avars	396.3
Lezghins	323.8
Darghins	230.9
Ingushes	157.6
Laks	85.8
Tabasarans	55.2
Rutuls	12.1
Tsakhurs	11.1
Aguls	8.8
Urals Family	
Finno-Ugric Group	
Mordvins	1262.7
Estonians	1007.4
Udmurts	704.3
Mari	598.6
Komi (including Komi-Permyaks)	475.3 (153.4)
Hungarians	166.5
Karelians	146.1
Finns	84.8
Khanty	21.1
Vepses	8.3
Mansi	7.7
Saami (Lapps)	1.9
Izhors	0.78
Samodian Group	
Nentsi and Entsi	28.7
Selkups	4.3
Nganasans	0.95
Altaic Family	
Turkic Group	
Uzbeks	9 195.1
Tatars	5930.7
Kazakhs	5298.8
Azerbaijanians	4397.9
Chuvashes	1694.4
Turkmens	1525.3
Kirghiz	1452.2
Bashkirs	1371.4
Yakuts	328.0
Kara-Kalpaks	303.3
Kumyks	228.4
Uigurs	210.6
Gagauzes	173.2
Tuvinians	166.1
Karachais	131.1
Khakassians	70.8
Balkars	66.3
Altaians	60.0
Nogais	59.5

Shors	16.0
Dolgans	5.0
Karaims	3.3
Tofy	0.62
Mongolian Group	
Buryats	352.6
Kalmyks	144.6
Tungus-Manchu Group	
Evenks	25.1
Evens	12.0
Nanais	10.0
Ulchi	2.4
Udegeh	1.5
Orochi	1.1
Negidals	0.54
Chukotka-Kamchatka Family	
Chukchi	13.6
Koryaks	7.5
Itelmens	1.3
Peoples of Other Language Families and Isolated Languages	
Koreans	357.5
Dungans	38.6
Assyrians	24.3
Nivkhs	4.4
Eskimos	1.3
Kets	1.2
Yukaghirs	0.68
Aleuts	0.44

* Nationalities of fewer than 10 000 persons, the main body of which live outside the USSR (e.g. Albanians, Afghans, etc.), are not included in the table.

** In addition to the Jewish population speaking Indo-European languages (Russian, Ukrainian, Yiddish, etc.), certain small groups speaking languages of other families are included here.

(and also the Moldavians, a people of the Romance group) have been strongly influenced linguistically and culturally by the Slavs. They are all predominantly settled within their respective republics.

The peoples of the Iranian group of the Indo-European family include the Tajiks and the Pamir nationalities closely related to them (Shugnans, Rushans, etc.), and certain of the peoples of the Caucasus (Ossetians, Tats, Talyshi, and Kurds). The distribution of the Tajiks is very complicated, and sizable groups live intermingled with Uzbeks and other Central Asian peoples. The Armenians have a rather special place in the Indo-European family. A considerable part of them live outside Armenia in neighbouring Transcaucasian republics and other areas of the USSR.

Among the other nationalities of considerable size belonging to the Indo-European language family, we must mention the Germans, the bulk of them descendants of German colonists settled in Russia in the 18th and the 19th centuries. They mainly live in the south of Western Siberia and in Northern Kazakhstan, intermingled with Russians, Ukrainians, and other peoples. Most Jews are also included in this linguistic family; some of them consider Yiddish their mother tongue (related to German), but the bulk of them have adopted Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and other languages of the population around them. Jews are predominantly settled in the European part of the country. Georgian Jews, speaking Georgian, Mountain Jews speaking Tat, and Bukhara Jews, speaking Tajik, are distinguished. The Gypsies, ancient emigrants from Northern India, live in small groups predominantly in the south-west of the USSR.

The Turkic group is the most significant of the Altaic family,

and is the second largest language group in the USSR after the Slavonic. The area of settlement of these peoples stretches from the Black Sea and Middle Volga in the west to Chukotka in the east. The Volga Turkic peoples include the Chuvashes, Tatars, and Bashkirs. There are considerable groups of Tatars in Western Siberia and certain other areas who differ in origin from the Volga Tatars. The Nogais are related to the South Volga Astrakhan Tatars living to the east of them. In the foothills of the North Caucasus live the closely related Karachais and Balkars, and in the Caspian areas of Daghestan the Kumyks. The biggest Turkic-language people of Transcaucasia are the Azerbaijanians, who live mainly in the Caspian spurs of Caucasus ranges and on the Kura depression. In the south of Moldavia live Gagauzes whose language is close to Turkish.

More than half of all the Turkic-speaking population of the USSR live in Central Asia and Kazakhstan—Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Kara-Kalpaks, and groups of Uigurs. The settlement of the Kazakhs is very complex, in an area stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Altai Mountains, living mixed (especially in the north) with Russians, Ukrainians, and other nationalities. Ethnic settlement in Central Asia is very complex. Sparsely populated areas alternate with densely populated river valleys and chains of oases and comparatively uniform areas, nationally speaking, with motley ones. Small Turkic peoples live in the south of Western Siberia and in the Altai-Sayan region (Tuvins, Altaians, Khakassians, and Shors). Traces of an earlier division into ethnographic and tribal groups are preserved among these people and also among most of the indigenous peoples of Central Asia. To the north-west, at a considerable distance from the Turkic peoples of Southern Siberia, live the Yakuts between the lower reaches of the Enisei, Chukotka, and the middle reaches of the Aldan.

Two other groups of the Altaian family are the Mongolian and the Tungus. The first includes two widely separated peoples living intermingled with Russians: the Buryats to the west and east of Lake Baikal, and the Kalmyks, living along the right bank of the lower Volga. The second group includes the Evenks, who are scattered in small groups in the vast taiga areas of Siberia from the Enisei to the Sea of Okhotsk, and the closely related Evens, who live to the north-east of them, and also small peoples of the Amur Valley (Nanais, Ulchi, Orochi, and Udegeh).

The most numerous of the peoples of the Caucasian family are the Georgians, who belong to the Kartvelian group and live in Western Transcaucasia. The following ethnographic groups are distinguished among the Georgians: the Svans, Mingrelians, and Laz who still partly retain their own special languages in everyday life, and the Adzhars, who were subjected in the past to Turkish influences. The Adygei-Abkhazian group of this family includes the Kabardinians,

living in the North Caucasus, and the closely related Adygeis and Circassians, and also the Abkhazians living on the Black Sea coast. The Nakh-Daghestan group includes the Chechens and Ingushes and the nationalities of Daghestan (Avars, Lezghins, Darghins, Laks, Tabasarans, and another 20 small peoples living in inaccessible mountain valleys, and often concentrated in one or two settlements only).

The Ural family includes peoples of the Finno-Ugric language group. The peoples of the Finnish subgroup are settled separately, in the main, between the Baltic Sea and the Urals. In the west of this area live the Estonians, Karelians, and the small Vepse and Izhor peoples closely related to them. In the east live the Mordvins, Mari, Udmurts, and Komi. The Karelians, especially their southern groups, live territorially intermingled with Russians. Ethnic intermingling also distinguishes the settlement of the Finnish-language peoples of the Volga, especially the Mordvins. The Mordvins themselves are divided into two main groups, the Erzya and Moksha, each with its own language. The Komi are divided into the Komi proper (Komi-Zyryans) and the Komi-Permyaks. The Saami (Lapps) have a special place among the Finnish-language peoples; they are descendants of the oldest population of Northern Europe, and live in the USSR on the Kola Peninsula. The Ugric subgroup of this family includes two peoples, the Khanty and Mansi, related in origin, who live along the Middle and Lower Ob and its tributaries, most of them mixed with Russians. The Hungarians, groups of whom live in western areas of the Ukraine bordering on Hungary, are close relatives of these peoples. North and East of the Khanty and Mansi live separate peoples of the Samodian group (Nentsi, Entsi, Nganasans, and Selkups), small in numbers and scattered over an immense area.

The language of the Kets, a small people inhabiting the Middle Enisei, is not directly related to any other language in the world. On the eastern borderlands of the USSR live the so-called Palaeo-Asiatic peoples, the ancient inhabitants of those areas. They include the Chukchi, Koryaks, and Itelmens (Kamchadals) living in the north-east, whose languages have a certain affinity and are grouped in the Chukotka-Kamchatka family, and also the Yukaghirs living on the Koluma River, and the Nivkhs, living along the Lower Amur and on Sakhalin, and speaking isolated languages. In the far north-east of Chukotka live small groups of Eskimos, and on the Komandorskie Islands Aleuts, whose languages form a separate Eskimo-Aleut family.

The settlement of peoples in certain natural, physical conditions indirectly affected their specific economy, especially in the past, and often their culture, especially their material culture. Ethnic boundaries do not usually coincide with those of the economic-cultural types. These boundaries divide major ethnoi into parts, but unite small ones. Nevertheless we can note that the traditional

culture of the East Slavs, for example, and of most of the peoples of the Indo-European family is associated with cultivation of the soil, and of most of the Turkic-speaking peoples with herding cattle. The boundaries of economic-cultural types coincide much more often with natural topographical regions. Thus, reindeer herding is traditional in fact for all the peoples of the tundra zone: Nentsi, Nganasans, Dolgans, etc. (hunting wild reindeer for the Nganasans); while fishing is traditional for the peoples of the big rivers of the taiga zone (Khanty, Nanais, etc.).

The main areas of ethnic mixing arose where previously uninhabited or sparsely settled lands, in particular steppe regions used for nomadic grazing, have been brought under the plough. These areas include the Volga valley (especially the Trans-Volga area), North Caucasus, North Kazakhstan, the south of Siberia and the Far East, which were opened up for agriculture by Russians, Ukrainians, and other peoples. In many of these places the ethnic intermingling took place within new or growing settlements, which naturally encouraged language and cultural and everyday contacts.

Ethnic mixing took place in the forest zone mainly through the penetration of Russians into the previously sparsely settled areas of another ethnos, suitable for farming, and into places where minerals could be mined. In recent decades there has also been a certain strengthening of ethnic mixing in sparsely settled tundra and taiga areas, particularly in connection with the indigenous population's transition to a semi-settled way of life and the growing of populated localities. The harsh living conditions of these areas, however, still limit the influx of outside groups, and encourage the maintenance of many local traditions of culture and way of life.

The main localities of ethnic mixing and foci of ethnic processes in all natural zones are towns and industrial areas to which a population of another nationality flows.

Areal differences are also observed in the religious composition of the population. Most of the indigenous peoples of the European part of the country belonged in the past to the Christian Greek Orthodox Church, from which, in the seventeenth century, the Old Believers split off, Christians who rejected the Church reforms then carried out in Russia. The Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Moldavians, Finnish-speaking peoples of the Volga, Chuvashes, Gagauzes and some of the peoples of the Caucasus (Georgians, South Ossetians, and others), and Siberia (Yakuts, Western Buryats, etc.) were officially Orthodox. The Armenian Gregorian Church, predominant among Armenians, was close to the Orthodox Church. Some Western Ukrainians and Byelorussians, and Poles were Roman Catholics; the Lithuanians and some Letts were also Catholics. Most Letts and Estonians belonged to the Protestant (Lutheran) Church. Islam was widespread among the indigenous peoples of Central Asia and

Kazakhstan (Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, etc.), the Eastern and Northern Caucasus (Azerbaijanians, the peoples of Daghestan; Chechens, Ingushes, and others), the Tatars and Bashkirs. The Kalmyks and the Eastern Buryats practised Lamaism (a form of Buddhism). Most of the indigenous peoples of Siberia and the Far East were officially classed as Orthodox, but they preserved many elements of old beliefs, especially shamanism. In Soviet times the overwhelming part of the population has abandoned religion.

Anthropologically the majority of the population of the USSR belongs to the Europeoid race, represented by three main subdivisions. The peoples of the Baltic and the north-western groups of Russians belong to the northern branch (tall and fair-haired); most of the peoples of the Caucasus belong to the southern branch (short, dark-haired). Finally, most Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians belong to transitional forms. The indigenous peoples of Eastern Siberia and the Far East belong to the northern branch of the Mongoloid race. The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan have features transitional between the Europeoid and Mongoloid races, Europeoid features becoming less from west to east. They are most marked among Turkmens, and weakest among Kirghiz. The indigenous peoples of the north of the European part of the country and of Western Siberia (Nentsi, Khanty, etc.) belong to mixed Mongoloid-Europeoid types. In places where ethnoi belonging to strongly differentiated racial types have penetrated, the anthropological features may serve as a direct demarcation of the contiguous groups. As racially mixed marriage develops the significance of such anthropological differences naturally lessens.

Chapter III

ETHNIC COMMUNITIES AND PROCESSES IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

Many of the features of the present-day ethnic processes in the USSR are due to a considerable extent to the specific ethnic situation that had developed in pre-revolutionary Russia.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there was a uniting of the Russian lands around the Principality of Muscovy, an overcoming of feudal disunity, and the establishment of a centralised Russian state. Its territory then included the lands of the Principalities of Vladimir-Suzdal, Novgorod, Smolensk, Murom-Ryazan, and part of the Principality of Chernigov. In the 1470s the much stronger Russian state intensified its fight to throw off the Tatar-Mongol yoke, and finally freed itself from it in 1480. The ethnic structure of the state had already become more complicated. Apart from the non-Russian peoples brought into it with the joining of Novgorod and other lands (Finnish tribes—Karelians and the related Vepses, and others), the peoples of the central reaches of the Kama, the 'Yugor' and 'Vogul' principalities, became part of it in the 1470s and 1480s. The ethnic diversity of the population increased greatly in the sixteenth century after the entry of the peoples of the Middle and Lower Volga and the valley of the Ural River. In the middle of the seventeenth century (1654) the Ukraine was united with Russia. In the seventeenth century a host of the peoples of Eastern Siberia became part of the Russian state, and many peoples of the Caucasus were annexed. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the bounds of the European part of Russia were also expanded.

The entry of non-Russian peoples into the Russian state was historically of progressive significance for their future. The peoples of the backward areas found themselves in a powerful country in contact with peoples that had attained a higher socio-economic and cultural development. They were freed from aggressive invasion and threats of subjugation by neighbouring states, and from the perpetual internecine strife of their feudal nobility ruling them, which disrupted their economy and impoverished the working population.

A most progressive consequence of joining Russia was the drawing in of the peoples of the periphery into active struggle against the Czarist autocracy and social and national oppression, which was headed in the 19th century by the most revolutionary proletariat in the world, the Russian working class. This struggle developed in conditions of a growing revolutionary situation in Russia, which became the centre of the world revolutionary movement at the beginning of the 20th century.

At the turn of the century Russia was a large, multinational state. The census of 1897 provided ethno-statistical data for the first time for the whole territory of the Russian Empire. Ethnic membership was determined by 'mother tongue'. One of the editors of the census returns, the ethnologist S. K. Patkanov, compiled a list and classification (by language) of the 146 peoples in accordance with the number of languages and dialects appearing in the census (see Table 2).[1]

According to this census people speaking Indo-European languages (100 331 500) accounted for 79.9 per cent of the total population of the empire; to them must be added 5 063 200 Jews speaking Yiddish (which belongs to the Germanic group), and Iranian languages (Tajik and Tat) in Central Asia and Daghestan. With this correction the number of persons speaking Indo-European languages was 105 394 700, or 83.9 per cent.

Ural-Altaic languages were spoken by 17 669 100 persons, or 14.1 per cent. The other 2 per cent of the population were artificially put into two groups when the census returns were processed. One group ('Isolated by Language') contained 2 477 900 persons, viz., the 'Kartvelian peoples of Transcaucasia', the 'Mountain tribes of the Caucasus' (except Ossetians), and the 'Palaeo-Asiatic tribes of North-East Asia' (Chukchi, Kamchadals, Ghilyaks, etc.). The second group included 'Cultured peoples of the Far East of Asia' (Chinese, Koreans, Japanese), who numbered 86 000.

In the 1897 Census returns Russian ('Great Russian'), Ukrainian ('Little Russian') and Byelorussian ('White Russian') were shown as branches of the Russian language. The total number of people speaking them constituted 66.8 per cent of the population. Great Russians proper were more than 42 per cent of the inhabitants of the empire and occupying the greater part of the whole territory of the state in a compact mass, were the overwhelming majority of the population of European Russia (without the Vistula territory—80 per cent), the North Caucasus (76.7 per cent), and Siberia (80.01 per cent). In the other peripheral areas of the country the population

[1] Under dialects, it must be noted, the census returns included the languages of the majority of the non-Slavonic nationalities and certain other non-Russian ethnic groups.

Table 2

Language Distribution of the Population of the Russian Empire (in thousands)

Group and language	Numbers in Empire
Slavonic Languages	
Russian	
Great Russian	55 667.5
Little Russian	22 380.6
Byelorussian	5885.5
Total	83 933.6
Polish	7931.3
Other Slavonic Languages including:	224.9
Czech	50.4
Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian	1.8
Bulgarian	172.7
Lithuanian-Lettish Dialects	
Lithuanian	1210.5
Zhmudian	448.0
Lettish	1435.9
Romance Languages	
Moldavian and Romanian	1121.7
French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese	21.3
Germanic Languages	
German	1790.5
Other Germanic Languages	
Swedish, Norwegian and Danish, Dutch, English	23.2
Jewish	5063.2
Kartvelian Dialects	
Georgian	824.0
Imeretian	273.2
Mingrelian	239.6
Svanetian	15.7

Group and language	Numbers in Empire
Other Indo-European Languages and Dialects	
Greek	186.9
Albanian	0.9
Armenian	1173.1
Persian	31.7
Tajik	350.4
Talyshian	35.3
Tat	95.1
Kurdish	99.9
Ossetian	171.7
Indian	0.3
Gypsy	44.6
Afghan	0.5
Dialects of Caucasian Highlanders	
Circassian Dialects	
Kabardinian	98.6
Circassian	46.3
Abkhazian	72.1
Chechen Dialects	
Chechen	226.5
Ingush	47.4
Kistin	0.4
Lezghin Dialects	
Avar-Andian	212.7
Darghin	130.2
Kyurin	159.2
Udinian	7.1
Kazi-Kumyk and other Lezghin dialects	90.9
Unallocated Lezghin	0.4
Finnish Dialects	
Finnish	143.1
Votyak	421.0
Karelian	208.1
Izhor	13.8
Chud	25.8
Estonian	1002.7
Lapp	1.8
Zyryan	153.6
Permyak	104.7
Mordvin	1023.8

Group and language	Numbers in Empire
Cheremissian	375.4
Vogul	7.6
Ostiak	19.7
Hungarian	1.0
Turkish-Tatar Dialects	
Tatar	3737.6
Bashkir	1321.4
Meshcheriak	53.8
Teptyarian	117.7
Chuvash	843.8
Karachai	27.2
Kumyk	83.4
Nogai	64.1
Turkish	208.8
Karapapakh	29.9
Turkmenian	281.4
Kirghiz-Kaisak	4084.1
Kara-Kirghiz	201.7
Kipchak	7.6
Kara-Kalpak	104.3
Sart	968.7
Uzbek	726.5
Taranchin	56.5
Kashgar	14.9
Unallocated Turkic dialects	440.4
Yakut	225.4
Mongol-Buryat Dialects	
Kalmyk	190.6
Buryat	288.7
Mongolian	0.8
Dialects of Other Northern Tribes	
Samoyed	15.9
Tungus	66.3
Manchu	3.4
Chukchi	11.8
Koryak	6.1
Kamchadal	4.0
Yukaghir	0.9
Chuvan	0.5
Eskimo	1.1
Ghilyak	5.2
Aini	1.5
Aleutian	0.6
Enisei-Ostiak	1.0
Languages of the Cultured Peoples of the Far East	
Chinese	57.4
Korean	26.0
Japanese	2.6
Other Languages and Dialects	
Arab	1.7
Aisor (Syro-Chaldean)	5.3
Persons without a mother tongue	5.1
Total	125 640

Table 3

Geographical Distribution of the Population of the Russian Empire by Language (per cent)

Territory	Languages				
	Indo-European	Uralo-Altaian	Isolated	Far Eastern civilised	Others
European Russia	91.21	8.79	0.00	0.00	0.00
Vistula provinces	99.86	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00
Caucasus	53.26	20.48	26.25	0.00	0.01
Siberia	82.38	15.78	0.63	1.21	0.00
Central Asia	14.09	85.68	0.01	0.21	0.01

was predominantly non-Russian, constituting 93.3 per cent in the Vistula provinces, 94.6 per cent in Transcaucasia, and 91.1 per cent in Central Asia.

In European Russia the territories between the lower reaches of the Don, Volga, and Terek, inhabited by Kalmyks, various Turkic tribes, Chechens, and Ossetians, were classed as 'alien' areas.[1] In Siberia the whole of the north was considered a 'purely non-Russian area'. Central Asia, where a compact Russian population could only be encountered on the northern fringe of the steppe regions, was similarly classed.

Information on the national composition and numbers of peoples is of paramount importance for the study of ethnic processes. The inadequate ethnographic study of Russia, however, and the instability of the ethnonyms, along with certain organisational mistakes, caused errors in the statistics of the 1897 Census on the ethnic structure of the population.

Some of the serious mistakes in the ethnostatistics of the 1897 Census were revealed by Soviet demographers when they compared the returns of the latter with the returns of the 1926 All-Union Census—the first full census of the population of the USSR. These errors included the following: many ethnographic groups and small nationalities were not counted when the census returns were processed (e.g. in Daghestan); mistakes were made in naming peoples (e.g. Azerbaijanians were recorded as Tatars; Kazakhs and Kirghiz were recorded in many areas under the common name 'Kirghiz', and so on); the method of accounting for ethnic affiliation was solely by mother tongue.

The impossibility of sorting out nationalities and tribes into complex groupings by language led to gross generalisations and substantial mistakes when the returns were being processed, in particular as regards the many groups of Turkic-language groups. By drawing on supplementary information (about religion, place of habitation, etc.) the pre-revolutionary statisticians were still able to single out certain peoples from the general Turkic mass. The rest of the Turkic population they lumped together in two groups: one, numbering around 440 000 persons associated with the Turkestan area, and labelled 'unallocated Turks' included (in addition to indigenous Central Asian Turkic peoples) groups of Tatars, Azerbaijanians, Uigurs, and others living there. The second huge mixed group, numbering 37 million, was labelled 'Turko-Tatar', speaking 'Tatar dialects'. It included a whole conglomerate of nationalities and tribes that the statisticians were unable to distinguish simply by language. Soviet statisticians were able to establish that this 'mixed' group

[1] The term *inorodets* (a person of alien race) was used in the broad sense of non-Russian for the whole non-Slavonic population of Russia.

included wholly or partly the Tatars, Nagaibaks, Kryashens, Azerbaijanians, Karapapakhs, Gagauzes, Kachins, and others.

In fact there were considerably more than 146 ethnic communities and languages appearing in the 1897 Census in Russia at the end of the 19th century. The much better taken census of 1926 counted more than 190 ethnic units and around 150 languages, although the territory of Russia was roughly a million square kilometres less than in 1897.

In spite, however, of such essential shortcomings, the general census of 1897 made it possible for the first time to compile a map of the linguistic structure, and to a considerable extent of the national structure, of the population of the Russian Empire. Its returns were widely used in economic and historical work (including ethnological), and in state administration both before the October Revolution of 1917 and in the early Soviet years (especially for purposes of national formation).

Another very important condition for distinguishing ethnic processes, in addition to population and territorial distribution is the historically established level of socio-economic evolution of contiguous peoples.

A characteristic feature of pre-revolutionary Russia was the unevenness of socio-economic development. On its immense territory there were areas with a developed capitalist economy, a high density of population, and a considerable urban population, combined with extensive areas where hunting and fishing, food gathering, and primitive agriculture, nomadic and semi-nomadic herding predominated.

In 1914 three of the 50 provinces of European Russia had a density of population higher than 90 per square kilometre, while in 15 it varied between 60 and 90. As for Asiatic Russia the number of inhabitants in several regions of present-day Kazakhstan was not more than two per square kilometre (according to the 1900 figures), and in the Trans-Caspian region of Turkestan the density was less than one per square kilometre. In the Far North, several areas of Yakutia, and the Far East there was one person per hundreds of square kilometres.

The contrast was even greater in respect of the rural and urban populations. Large-scale capitalist industry with a high concentration of production was centred in a few industrial areas—the North-West (St. Petersburg and the Baltic), the Central Region, the South (the Donbass, Krivoi Rog, and Baku). The industry of the Urals was at a lower economic level. In areas like Lithuania, Byelorussia, and the Russian provinces bordering on them, the European North, the Volga valley, the Caucasus, and a considerable part of Transcaucasia small-scale capitalist production predominated.

Capitalism, dominating the economy, was penetrating deeper and deeper into agriculture. A capitalist system of market farming al-

ready predominated at the end of the nineteenth century in the landowners' farms of the Western provinces (in the Baltic, Right-Bank Ukraine, and Western Byelorussia).

On the whole there were different levels of agriculture in the Russian Empire, varying from mature, highly developed capitalist farming of the Prussian type to a patriarchal-feudal semi-nomadic farming. In some areas (especially in the distant fringes) the penetration of commodity-money and capitalist relations into agriculture was still only beginning.

The unevenness of socio-economic development caused a great variety of forms of social system among the peoples of pre-revolutionary Russia and a correspondingly wide range in their levels of ethnic development—from tribes to established capitalist nations. The types of ethnic community built up in pre-revolutionary Russia altered when essential changes took place in the economy and social system of a people over a long period of forming part of the Russian state.

Various types of tribal ethnic communities can be traced in pre-revolutionary Russia.

(a) Old 'archaic' tribes of the primitive communal type, a long surviving form of ethnic community, had already disappeared in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries even in such remote areas as the Far North.

(b) The late 'patriarchal-feudal tribes' of the feudal and capitalist epoch existed, in contrast to the 'primordial', in the environment of established nationalities rather than as part of primitive, amorphous ethno-linguistic communities, and were preserved as relicts of ancient and mediaeval components of their ethnogenesis.

Needless to say these relict tribes no longer, in the conditions established in Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries, corresponded in either their social essence or as an ethnic community to the ancient form of a tribe of the primitive communal system. The development of property inequality and a class stratification had brought about the disintegration of the latter. The clan-tribal organisation was often preserved and utilised by Czarism for administrative purposes, but the survivals of the tribal system were intricately interwoven with feudal relations, and sometimes with capitalist ones. The primitive clan community had already by this time given way everywhere to a rural community with economic and territorial ties.

Tribal ethnic communities of this transformed relict type, sometimes with still strong and stable survivals of the ancient tribe and traces of ethnologically specific features in their culture, existed in pre-revolutionary Russia within the structure of many of the predominantly nomadic and semi-nomadic Turkic herdsmen nationalities of Kazakhstan and Central Asia (among the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Kara-Kalpaks, etc.), Caucasus (some Azerbaijanians and Nogais), the Urals

area (among the Bashkirs), etc.

They had a very complex ramified genealogy confirming their common ancestry and serving as a substitute for the disappearing real blood relationship between the clan groups composing them. The genealogies also often included the names of outside ethnic groups that had merged into the expanding tribe. The clan groups of such a tribe still preserved survivals of exogamy. In some cases there were even traces of a dual division. Late tribes had their own traditional name for themselves (apart from the name of the nationality they formed part of) and a dual ethnic identity (awareness of belonging both to their tribe and their nationality), and sometimes preserved their own dialect as well.

In the environment of the nationalities they were in a state of gradual erosion.

Under the stadial-historical classification of ethnoi, the type of ethnic community that developed in feudal times is generally called a nationality. In pre-revolutionary Russia most ethnic communities, especially in the backward border regions, were at the nationality stage. A formed nationality was characterised by certain socio-economic features: viz., a community of territory, class and estate differentiation, and so on. The ethnic attributes proper—community of language, specific culture and way of life, and ethnic identity—had already been moulded in the course of their ethnogenesis, but they all usually differed as regards their incomplete development characteristic of the ethnic communities of pre-capitalist times. The languages of nationalities, for example, abounded in dialects, their culture in local variants, and their ethnic identity was of dual character, combining the name of the nationality with the names of local groups (fellow-countrymen) or tribes (especially among nomads) and sometimes masked by religious identity, especially when a group of a people lived among a population of another religion.

A further development of consolidation of nationalities was blocked by the closed character peculiar to communities of the feudal epoch, associated with the predominance of a natural economy, the lack of means of transport and lines of communication, and intensified in Russian conditions by survivals of serfdom. All those points were reasons for the low mobility of the population, feebleness of economic and cultural contacts, which were sometimes limited to a small geographical area or to the confines of a feudal estate or manor, even to a neighbouring community.

In the conditions of national oppression and inequality of Czarist Russia all the nationalities, even when compactly distributed and quite numerous lacked their own statehood.

Several varieties of nationality can be provisionally distinguished in the vast diversity of ethnic variants in pre-revolutionary Russia, depending on the historical level of their ethnic development:

(a) ethnic communities transitional between tribes and the nationality type; (b) nationalities in the process of formation whose ethnogenesis was still not completed; (c) developed, established nationalities with the main features inherent in an ethnic community of the feudal type; (d) nationalities that had become more or less part of capitalism and been drawn into its orbit, reaching a stage close to consolidation as a nation but still remaining at the nationality level because of a number of factors.

An example of ethnic communities transitional to the nationality type is the various elements forming the Georgian people and tracing their ancestry to ancient tribes, viz., Kartlians, Kakhetians, Mtiuls, Hevsurs, Pshavs, Tushins, Imeretians, Rachins, Gurians, Adzhars, etc. Subsequently they became ethnographic groups of the Georgian nation, but in the 18th and 19th centuries still preserved peculiarities of culture and way of life.

The Mordvins can be taken as an example of a nationality not yet consolidated in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Their ethnic development has been studied in detail by V. I. Kozlov. The two major groups, possibly tribal in origin, into which the Mordvins were divided, i.e. the Erzya and Moksha, had differences of language and culture, but not profound ones; before their joining Russia they were inherently a territorial community. Consolidation was delayed and held back by political circumstances: in the Middle Ages by the raids of neighbours (Khazars and Bulgars), later by the Mongol conquest. After joining Russia (in the 16th century) the main obstacle to consolidation became the policy of Czarism. The migrations of the Mordvins caused by oppression and confiscation of their lands, and the inflow of a Russian population entailed major changes in the character of settlement, a breaking up into separate groups, and loss of the links built up between them. The Mordvin ethnic groups (Erzya and Moksha) and their languages thus did not merge.

Another example of the same level of ethnic development is provided by the Mari (then called Cheremissi) in the 19th and early 20th centuries. As with the Mordvins, two languages took shape among them, disseminated among various territorial groups.

Ethnologists consider such nationalities as the Yakuts, Buryats, Tuvins, and so on in Siberia, the Kirghiz, Turkmens, and Kara-Kalpaks in Central Asia, the Bashkirs, Chuvashes, Udmurts, etc., in the Urals foothills and Volga valley, and also most of the nationalities of the North Caucasus, as fully formed in the pre-revolutionary period. Some of them had already taken shape in mediaeval times, and their names, and specific features of their way of life and culture are referred to in many historical sources; others became consolidated after becoming part of the Russian state, in a later period.

A peculiarity of many of the nationalities of Russia was the dissemination of patriarchal-clan survivals preserved among

them throughout the feudal period and under capitalism. It was seemingly due to this fact that there were comparatively big nationalities in the population of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries, quite developed socio-economically, but at the same time along with typical feudal regional groups including clan-tribal subdivisions, that did not disrupt their ethnic unity. There were 46 'tribes' among the Bashkirs, consisting of 128 'clans'; 12 tribes and more than 120 large 'clan' groups among the Kara-Kalpaks, 39 'tribes' among the Kirghiz, and so on. In many cases the dissolving of these tribes within the structure of the consolidating nationality was delayed by the policy of Czarism, expressed in the administrative system of the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples, based on the principle of clan-tribal division.

In the Caucasian region the Ossetians were an example of the last variety of nationality undergoing national consolidation. Among the main peoples of Central Asia the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Kazakhs were furthest along the road of national formation at the beginning of the 20th century. In spite of the fact that they had still been only weakly drawn into the orbit of capitalist influence on the whole, and notwithstanding the burden of patriarchal survivals and archaic features in their ethnic structure, sizable strata of a national capitalist class, proletariat, and intelligentsia had already appeared among them, and a national liberation movement was being born. National development was also manifested in the forming of literary languages and culture.

The existence of internal subdivisions that it is accepted to call ethnographic or ethnic groups is characteristic of nationalities. These groups, which existed under feudalism were very stable and were often preserved even in nations, but were not typical of them. The isolation features of ethnographic groups gradually disappeared as consolidation intensified under capitalism. Many ethnographic groups had a special name for themselves and identity; they usually also differed in certain specific features of language (dialect, speech), material culture (features of economy, housing, dress, etc.), and social or intellectual life.

Ethnographic groups can be divided into several categories according to their genesis, viz., genetic, local, etc. Among the nationalities of the feudal epoch they were often the descendants of ancient and mediaeval ethnic communities that had not wholly lost their peculiarities during consolidation.

We can take as a genetic ethnographic group, for example, the Setu among Estonians, descendants of the old Chud-Estonian population that lived in the Pskov area.

A typical example of the local ethnographic groups formed among Russians through adaptation to the natural and geographical environment, is the Pomors living on the coasts of the White and

Barents Seas, descendants of various groups of Russian settlers. They were long known for the skill in navigation and famed as experienced fishermen, sealers, and whalers.

Some ethnographic groups arose through assimilation by a large nationality or nation. A typical example is the Russian Meshchera on the Middle Oka with its big differences from Russians in speech, dress, and housing. The Meshchera rose through the assimilation of an aboriginal Finnish population by Slavs.

An example of the formation of ethnic groups through the effect of a factor like religious persuasion is the Kryashens–Tatars who long ago adopted the Orthodox religion.

Finally, an important factor influencing the origin of a number of ethnographic groups was their special legal and social functions connected with government policy, in particular membership of the military estate. The various groups of Cossacks (Don, Ural, Kuban, Terek) belong to this category; they differed distinctly from the peasants in a number of privileges, and greater economic independence, special administration, connected with military service on the frontiers of the Russian state.

A special name and real ethnic identity distinguish ethnographic groups from the broader, major territorial (regional) groups, that are often called ethno-territorial. They can be remarked in the composition of every nationality and nation (e.g. North Russians, Central Russians, and South Russians). Such a group is normally connected with the existence of an historically established peculiarity of parts of the same ethnos located in different geographical regions. Their names are arbitrary and given to them by scholars. In fact they are not special ethnic communities but subdivisions of a cultural and territorial type.

With the general slowing of consolidation in the conditions of pre-revolutionary Russia the isolation or exclusiveness of ethnographic groups was quite stable. Weak economic and cultural links, and the traditional character of their way of life furthered the preservation of most of them.

While the forming of nationalities (their ethnogenesis) has engaged the attention of ethnologists in recent years, and much work has been devoted to it, problems of the forming of national communities in the pre-revolutionary period in Russia have been less developed.

In wide, multilingual Russia, with its comparatively slow rates of socio-economic development, even the Great Russian, 'sovereign' nation took quite long to form; the process became clearly defined in the 17th century and was completed in the middle of the 19th century with the development of industrial capitalism. The other nations of Russia were in less favourable conditions and formed more slowly. The autocracy put obstacles in the way of the development of their state independence, culture, language, and litera-

ture in their mother tongue, and limited their political and civil rights. Their formation often went hand in hand with a struggle for national equality and development of the mother tongue and national culture.

Several objective conditions, however, that built up in Russia, eased the course of national development. They were the drawing of peoples into the stream of the country's capitalist development, the disruption of the feudal foundations of the economy and social system, acquaintance with the cultural life of Russia, the growing influence of progressive ideas in the advanced circles of Russian society that opposed Czarism and the policy of national oppression, the involvement of the proletariat of the oppressed nations in the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat, etc.

It is the settled opinion of ethnologists that the nations formed in the main before the Revolution included, in addition to the Russians, the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Letts, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Volga Tatars in the European part of Russia, the Armenians, Georgians, and Azerbaijanians in Transcaucasia, and several others. All had the inherent socio-economic parameters determining a nation as an ethno-social community of the capitalist epoch. Such ethnic attributes proper as degree of 'national maturity' of the language, culture, ethnic identity, etc., are also an essential criterion for investigating the degree of consolidation of a nation.

The forming of a system of writing, literary languages, culture, and art began among many of the nations in antiquity or the early Middle Ages. Armenian alphabet was formed in the fourth century A.D.; Armenian literature is one of the oldest in the USSR. Georgian is also one of the oldest written languages; its first memorial (Church literature) dates from the fifth century A.D. After Georgia's joining Russia, its cultural life continued to develop in spite of the many limitations imposed by the autocracy in the field of education, the press, etc. The second half of the nineteenth century was the period of the creativity of the classics of Georgian literature (Ilya Chavchavadze, Akaky Tsereteli). In Armenia such major figures of the national culture as the writers P. Proshyan, A. Shirvanzade, the poet O. Tumanyan, the composer Komitas, and others, wrote their works at this same time.

The late nineteenth century and early twentieth was the period when the national norms of the Azerbaijanian language, developing on the basis of the classical works of mediaeval Azerbaijanian literature in the course of the centuries were formed. The founder of Azerbaijanian national literature and dramaturgy was the eminent writer-democrat and enlightener Mirza Fatali Akhundov, a follower of the revolutionary democratic ideas of Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and Dobrolyubov.

The culture of the Estonians, Letts, and Lithuanians had just such

a definite, already established national image. While two dialects –northern and southern–existed in the Estonian press in the middle of the 19th century, by the turn of the century a single Estonian literary language had taken shape through the influence of the progressive national intelligentsia. Lettish literature grew and first Lettish newspapers were published at the same time in connection with the bourgeois-liberal Young Lett movement that opposed the policy of Germanising Lettish culture pursued by the German barons. At the end of the 19th century and in the early 20th century the Lettish writers J. Rainis and A. Upits were developing a Lettish revolutionary poetry and drama soaked with liberating ideas and a spirit of struggle for the freedom of the Lettish people. Lithuanian national culture–language, literature, science, music, etc.–was at the same high level.

The Tatar bourgeois nation had a rather different look. Unlike most of the other Turkic-speaking Muslim peoples of the Volga, Central Asia, Altai, and North Caucasus, more backward socio-economically, the Volga Tatars already had a quite well developed mercantile and industrial capitalist class and national proletariat at the end of the 19th century and early 20th.

A democratic educational movement rose among the Tatar intellectuals that posed the aim of raising the national culture, developing the Tatar language and its literature, secular education, and drawing closer to progressive Russian culture. Representatives of this trend were Kayum Nasyrov, the Tatar enlightener, writer, and scholar of the end of the nineteenth century and the talented poet Gabdulla Tukai. Under their influence Arabic began to be replaced in literary works by Tatar (preserving the Arabic system of writing), and the reactionary ideology of Pan-Islamism was overcome.

Finally there were so-called 'national groups' in pre-revolutionary Russia that were part of bigger ethnic groups living abroad. These groups arose in Russia at various periods in connection with settlement from other states due to various historical causes and as a consequence of the expansion of the Russian state's frontiers.

These national groups included, for example, Uigurs and Dungans in Russia's Central Asian possessions, who in 1870s-80s had emigrated in whole villages from Eastern Turkestan in connection with the suppression of the people's uprising there. Groups of German settlers from Western Europe lived in various parts of European and Asiatic Russia; such German colonists coming from various parts of Germany, for example, lived in the Samara and Saratov provinces (more than 400 000).

The ethnic fate and ethnographic specific features of the national groups of both western and eastern origin, depended on their numbers, length of settlement, the historical reasons for their settlement in Russia, and the attitude of government circles toward them.

Apart from the ethno-demographic situation and socio-economic preconditions of the ethnic processes in pre-revolutionary Russia, one must take into account the strong influence on them of socio-political and legal factors directly linked with the Czarist autocracy's national policy. Czarism had established in multinational Russia a system of inequality and discrimination against non-Russian peoples, prevented the free development of national languages, of the press, and other forms of cultural life, and put obstacles of all kinds in the way of the peoples' aspirations for free national development, which had sharpened national contradictions, and led to outbreaks of the national liberation movement and fight for equality.

At the same time, in connection with the growth of capitalism in Russia a strengthening of economic ties and intercourse between the nationalities, partial integration, a development of bilingualism, and gradual breaking down of national barriers in culture and life were typical at the turn of the century.

In this list of the forms of national oppression of non-Russian nationalities practised by Czarism we shall dwell only on ones that had a bearing on ethnic processes or affected the development of ethnic contacts. Primarily they include factors affecting the substantial migration of population.

On the Volga and in the Urals, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, and other borderlands, there was wide seizure of the lands of the indigenous population and its transfer to the state, land proprietors, and monasteries, which were the main centres for the spread of Orthodoxy among the 'natives'. This policy caused a migration of the local population that sometimes adopted a mass character. Before the abolition of serfdom (1861) there was a mass flight of the population in the Volga and the Urals areas from feudal dependence, sometimes to remote, out-of-the-way places. As a result of the migration of Mordvins to 'free lands', for instance, and the flight of landless peasants from estates, sizable pockets of this nationality were formed in neighbouring Volga areas. At the same time there was migration to Siberia and other parts of Asiatic Russia.

Confiscation of the lands of Altai people and transfer of the lands of the Altai to 'His Majesty's Cabinet' was very characteristic of the land seizures of the Altai Spiritual Mission. By the end of the 19th century the best irrigated lands of Turkmenia had also been annexed by the Czar's family—a 'Murgab Royal Estate' was established in the Murgab Oasis. In the 17th and 18th centuries there were distant migrations of peoples in Siberia, where the population were obliged to deliver furs to the government (*yasak* or tithes), from their traditional habitat so as to escape the burden of this obligation and to hide from the administration.

Land seizures, exorbitant exactions, and so on led to many

peoples' losing their territorial integrity, to dispersed settlement, disruption of established ethnic connections, and an eroding of existing and forming ethnic communities. Groups separated by forced migration from the main body of their ethnic community fell into another ethnic environment which usually led to their gradual assimilation. Dismemberment of the ethnic territory (which is an important condition for the forming of nationalities and nations and creates the natural basis for ethnic, cultural, and economic consolidation), had a negative effect on the consolidation process.

Ethnologists call the settlement of Siberia an epic unexampled in the world history of the migration of peoples. Russian explorers (Cossacks, prospectors, the military) starting their movement beyond the Urals at the end of the 16th century, reached the shores of the Pacific Ocean within 50 years. In the following centuries there was an active settling of Siberia.

Russians became the predominant part of the population of Siberia from the early 19th century. This was due to the rapid opening up of unsettled lands, the development of arable farming, handicrafts, cottage industries, and mining, led to a general rise in the productive power of the area, and had a positive effect on the life of the indigenous population. Under the influence of close contacts with the Russian inhabitants new working habits were introduced into the primitive economy of many of the peoples of Siberia: cereal-farming and hay-making began to develop among them, tackle for fishing, hunting, and trapping was improved, and the centuries-old stagnation and sluggishness of their way of life was broken.

The exiling of revolutionary opponents of Czarism to Siberia also played a great progressive role in the lives of the indigenous peoples.

In the second half of the 19th century and early twentieth a mass migration of peasants to the periphery developed, caused by the development of capitalist relations in the countryside, social differentiation of the peasantry, growth of landlessness, poverty, and hunger. Czarism did not hinder the migration, considering it a means of averting peasant unrest in the central provinces of Russia. Government bodies were set up (a settlement administration, local settlement commissions) whose job it was to fix the migrants up with land. On the other hand, Czarism figured that Russian settlements in the territory of the indigenous inhabitants would act as a support for the local Czarist administration.

In Central Asia and Kazakhstan, however, and in the North Caucasus and other national borderlands the social composition of the settlers was varied, and only a few of them could serve as a support for Czarism. Most of the peasant settlers belonged to middle strata or the poor who were fleeing from the central provinces in search of bread and work.

The role of migration as a factor influencing ethnic processes was twofold. It undoubtedly held back ethnic consolidation, disrupting and reducing the traditional ethnic territories of the indigenous population. At the same time in all areas settled by Russians, Ukrainians, and other peasants, contacts with them helped the local inhabitants master new, more advanced methods of farming, farm implements, and many cultural habits and skills; in cattle-raising areas the tendency for nomads to settle down was intensified. Linguistic and everyday contacts, which led to mixed marriages and facilitated a coming together of the settlers and the local peoples, were of great importance.

A powerful instrument of the Czarist government in implementing its policy in the outlands of the empire was the administrative system, which did not take account of ethnic boundaries or territories.

Disruption of the integrity of ethnic territories greatly delayed the ethnic consolidation of nationalities. For example, unity of the ethnic territory of the Komi-Zyryans was never recognised. Administratively the lands where they were settled were divided between three provinces and five uyezds. This patchwork system, strictly observed for centuries, reinforced the estrangement of big territorial groups of the Komi people. In Central Asia the boundaries drawn between Turkestan and the vassal Bukhara and Khiva khanates separated and divided the ethnic territory of the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, and Kirghiz.

In the Far North Czarism for a long time artificially retained 'administrative clans' and 'native communities' registered back in the 18th century for fiscal purposes. So Russified Yukaghirs, Evens, and Koryaks continued to be counted as special native communities, which delayed the forming of a new ethnic identity among this Russian-speaking population. Many of the administrative units that existed before the Revolution ('tribal' administrations, 'administrative clans') originated from former tribal subdivisions. On the whole this system preserved a clan-tribal terminology and appearance of self-government but the 'tribes' or 'clans' were purely administrative units and the administrations or boards were organs of the Czarist administration. The picture was the same among the 'nomadic natives' (Khakassians, Buryats, etc.).

Maintenance of the 'tribal' principle in certain areas, as the basis for governing nomads and semi-nomads, did not of course encourage a progressive ethnic development of the nationalities with survivals of clan-tribal division, but on the contrary preserved an exclusiveness and clan-tribal ethnic consciousness among them.

The autocracy's policy was governed by the principle of national inequality. The forms of national oppression were varied and extended to both the most backward peoples of the remote borderlands and

comparatively developed nations. The autocracy put obstacles in the way of the development of the languages and cultures of the non-Russian peoples, and a system of legal limitations was built up. Not only was national and religious hostility maintained between peoples but often artificially inflamed.

The policy of great power chauvinism and limitation of the rights of the non-Russian peoples, and maintenance of national discord were a factor that had a negative effect on ethnic contacts, fostering mutual estrangement, and antagonism in relations between the various peoples.

This reactionary policy, however, by no means always achieved its aim. Several historical factors of a socio-economic and cultural nature already mentioned, which were specific to Russia, above all the influence of the progressive and democratic character of its advanced social thought, contradicted Czarism's policy and was a real obstacle to propagation of the national antagonism carried on by reaction.

The reactionary character of the national policy of Czarism in Russia was quite clearly displayed in the forced conversion of many non-Russian peoples to the Orthodox religion. Religious affiliation played an extremely great role in pre-revolutionary Russia and was strongly reflected in national relationships and ethnic processes. The distribution of the population of the empire by religion at the end of the nineteenth century is shown in Table 4, based on the returns of the 1897 Census.

As a result of Christianisation the Christians of Orthodox persuasion, who constituted 69.4 per cent of the population when the census was taken, included all the Finno-Ugric tribes of the Volga, Urals, and Trans-Ural area, and also the Karelians to a considerable extent and a small part of the Estonians. Among the northern tribes, some of the Tunguses and Samoyeds were counted as Orthodox, and also some of the Palaeo-Asiatic peoples (Kamchadals, Yukaghirs, Chuvans, Aleuts, and some Koryaks). But it was said of these groups, which had adopted Christianity, that their Christianity in many cases was so mixed with pagan beliefs and rituals that such Christians could scarcely be distinguished from shamanist pagans. Among the groups less receptive of Orthodoxy were numbered 'Turkish-Tatar tribes' among whom 10 per cent were Christians (Yakuts, Chuvashes, and Gagauzes), 'Mongol-Buryat tribes' –12.5 per cent (Buryats), and Caucasian highlanders (5.2 per cent).

Monasteries, spiritual missions, and institutions in various regions of the country carried on missionary work. In Kazan there was a Central Baptised Tatar School, and also other institutions whose activity was concentrated mainly on Christianising the peoples of the Volga. Forced Christianisation did not, however, always yield the desired results. Almost all the peoples of Siberia, with the exception

Table 4

The Population of the Russian Empire by Religion

Religion	Numbers (in thousands)	Per cent	By areas (per cent)				
			European Russia	Vistula provinces	Caucasus	Siberia	Central Asia
Orthodox & Uniates	87 123.6	69.40	81.70	6.50	49.40	85.80	8.30
Old Believers and Orthodox dissenters	2204.6	1.80	1.90	0.10	1.50	4.20	0.80
Armenian Gregorians	1179.2	0.90	0.10	0.00	12.10	0.01	0.10
Armenian Catholics	38.8	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.40	0.00	0.00
Roman Catholics	11 468.0	9.10	4.70	74.80	0.50	0.60	0.70
Lutherans	3572.7	2.80	3.30	4.40	0.60	0.30	0.10
Reformed Church	85.4	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.00
Baptists	38.1	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.00
Menonites	66.6	0.10	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01
Anglicans	4.2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other Christian denominations	3.9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Karaims	12.9	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Jews	5215.8	4.20	4.10	14.10	0.60	0.60	0.20
Mohammedans	13 907.0	11.10	3.80	0.10	34.50	2.20	90.30
Buddhists & Lamaists	433.9	0.30	0.20	0.00	0.20	4.30	0.02
Other non-Christians	285.3	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	2.10	0.00

of the eastern Buryats, among whom Lamaism was widespread, the Chukchi, some Koryaks, and certain others who remained outside the sphere of the Orthodox Church, were counted as Orthodox, but only formally, because they maintained their ancient religious ideas and cults.

Big nations (the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians) also suffered from Czarism's great power national policy. The censorship, guided by a circular of the Minister of Internal Affairs Valuyev (1863) and an edict of Alexander II of 1876, created obstacles to the development of literature in their languages. Before the 1905 Revolution there was not a single Ukrainian newspaper, for example, in the Dnieper valley part of present-day Ukraine.

The struggle to develop the Ukrainian language became a feature of the Ukrainian national movement.

The system of national oppression considered above stimulated growth of the liberation movement of the peoples of the periphery of Russia in many ways. In the early twentieth century this movement intensified. The peoples' struggle for freedom and equality and the right to national self-determination expressed one of the main trends in national development under capitalism. At the same time it drew closer to and merged more and more with the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat and peasantry against the autocracy led by the Communist Party and which resulted in victory of the 1917 Great October Socialist Revolution.

All these features of the ethnic situation existing in pre-revolutionary Russia caused the variety of ethnic processes going on in it. It is possible to distinguish a number of basic types of such processes in Russia in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth, above all of a consolidatory character, which had several variants.

While processes of consolidation and even of the forming of nationalities still predominated among the non-Russian peoples of Russia in the 18th and early 19th centuries, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries processes of the consolidation of bourgeois nations inherent in capitalism became the principal and leading ones. Around 80 per cent of the population came within the sphere of operation of these processes. This leading type of ethnic processes was characteristic above all of the Russians, the main bourgeois nation of Russia. The Russian nation, which had completed its formation by the 19th century, already constituted 45 per cent of the population in the middle of the century and in that connection had a broad, profound impact on the other peoples of the empire. The number of persons speaking Russian in the population of the country was greater than the number of Russians, which was a consequence not only of its privileged position of the state language but also of the growth of bilingualism. Natural assimilation, which occurred through direct contact between Russians and the other peoples and the free interaction of their languages and cultures, was a frequent phenomenon in pre-revolutionary Russia.

Consolidation of all the other bourgeois nations that did not have their own states (Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Letts, Lithuanians, Estonians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Volga Tatars, etc.) took place in unfavourable conditions. The government hindered the development of their literary national languages and suppressed a sense of national dignity. Czarism waged an uncompromising struggle against the liberation movement developing among them, resorting to brutal repression. All the same, the fight for equality, the national movements, and the support of progressive figures in Russian society

helped them to preserve, and in spite of all the obstacles to develop, their own national cultures.

Close to these national communities were the nationalities—Ossetians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and others—whom the October Revolution caught in the process of transition to become nations. All of them had been drawn to one degree or another into the orbit of capitalism and were in close economic and cultural contact with the central regions of the empire. A stratum of a national bourgeoisie and a national intelligentsia had developed among them. Some of these nationalities had had a more or less developed statehood, system of writing, and literature in the historical past. Their culture at the turn of the century was developing under the great influence of the Russian progressive intelligentsia. At the same time there was a considerable spread of nationalist ideas. The growth of national consciousness, national forms of culture, and of the national movement in Central Asia and Kazakhstan became particularly noticeable after the revolution of 1905-07. The forming of nations in the ethnic communities under consideration that began then was combined with continuing consolidation, i.e. dissolving of ethnic groups among them which gradually merged with the main body of the ethnos.

The second variant of consolidational processes differed from this in affecting nationalities that were at a lower level of ethnic maturity and had not yet taken the road of national development. A plethora of 'fellow-countrymen' and other separate groups was typical of them, and also a lack of close economic and cultural intercourse, marked differences in dialect, and unstable ethnic identity, and sometimes a 'dual' identity, and so on.

The consolidation of these nationalities took the line of an increase in common features. At the same time they frequently in the course of consolidation assimilated individual groups of other ethnoi and drew them into their ethnic environment. The Udmurts, for instance, gradually assimilated the separate ethnic group of Besermians, of Turkic (possibly Bulgarian) origin, who spoke Udmurt with a great admixture of Tatar words. A similar combining of various types of ethnic processes has been observed among some of the nationalities of Siberia.

A third variant of consolidational processes, the ethnographic, is the formation of nationalities from tribes and other ethnic groups, a process most characteristic of the Middle Ages, which took place in Russia in the 17th and 18th centuries, when certain nationalities took shape there from separate but related tribes, for example the Komi (Zyryans), certain mountain peoples of the North Caucasus and Daghestan, and some of the nationalities of Siberia.

The small nationalities of the Far North took shape last of all. The ethnogenesis of most of them was gradually completed only in Soviet times. The same can also be said of the Altaians and the Khakassians.

These variants can be considered consolidational in the main. At the same time the consolidating nations and nationalities frequently also assimilated separate groups of another ethnos. For the most part these were small peoples that had long been living in a foreign ethnic environment, or peoples 'eroded' by dismemberment of their ethnic territory and forced to migrate, but more often individual territorial groups of nations and nationalities that had long been cut off from the main body (including certain groups of the Russian population).

The degree of ethnic interaction, irrespective of whether it was due to the Czarist government's measures or came about through natural contacts, had several gradations and stages (gradual loss of such ethnic traits as traditional forms of farming and way of life, specific culture, language, ethnic identity, and so on).

The activeness and intensity of assimilation depended on many factors, viz., the character of settlement, economic ties, and historical, ethnographic, and ideological (e.g. religious) preconditions.

Examples of language assimilation of part of a previously whole people, subsequently broken up and scattered, are the Karatais and Tyuryukhans, local Mordvin groups. The Karatais who were settled among Tatars, adopted Tatar but continued to call themselves Mordvins. The Tyuryukhans, living in Nizhni Novgorod Province, became Russified and spoke Russian.

One could give many examples of natural assimilation begun and sometimes even completed at the beginning of this century of peoples of aboriginal origin and of settlers coming from neighbouring states. In Latvia, for instance, there was an ancient Finnish-speaking nationality, the Livs, with their own distinctive culture differing from Lettish, that gradually merged with the Letts. Some Livs, living along the River Salatsa, had already been assimilated by the Letts in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Ethnic assimilation went on also in Central Asia. The groups of Arabs long settled there adopted the Uzbek or Tajik of the population around them and some lost their native tongue. In spite of the Arabs' relative exclusiveness, their life over several centuries among the predominant population of Central Asia, their common historical fate, and the absence of religious differences led to their gradual merging with the Uzbeks and Tajiks, but the process had not yet been completed when Soviet government was established.

North-Eastern Siberia provides an example of active interaction between a Russian population and the aborigines of Siberia. According to researchers, links had been established there at the turn of the century between the separate ethnographic groups and Russian cultural influence intensified. The Kolyma River Yukaghirs, who had come into close contact with the settlements of the old Russian settlers, united and merged with them. On the lower reaches of the

Oleneka, Lena, and Yana rivers, for example, the small groups of old Russian settlers living among Yakuts had lost their distinctive features by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Long living together of old Russian settlers and Kamchadals and Itelmens in the valleys of Kamchatka so united both groups that the Kamchadals adopted Russian and Russian household and farming practices. The same thing happened with certain groups of settled Evens and Koryaks.

The processes of ethnic interaction greatly interested progressive people in pre-revolutionary Russia. The Marxist press paid great attention to this subject, and we owe to V. I. Lenin the theoretical treatment of the problems of ethnic assimilation and clear demarcation of the concepts of natural and forced assimilation, and also study of the wiping out of national differences and internationalisation that is 'the capitalism's world-historical tendency'.[1]

We have come to the problem of the trend in the development of nations that in Lenin's definition 'characterises a mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society'. Its peculiarities are the following:

> ... the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the break-down of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc.[2]

This trend also found expression in the processes of inter-ethnic uniting or integration that had begun to develop in pre-revolutionary Russia, for which such points as bilingualism and a reciprocal influencing of the cultures of the ethnoi in contact with one another were characteristic. Bilingualism is an important element in ethnic processes entailing a change in one of the basic attributes of ethnoi and facilitating their interaction. Bilingualism with ethnic drawing together is not accompanied with loss of the mother tongue and its replacement by another language, which would be the initial step in the process of linguistic assimilation.

It is natural that in Russia at the turn of the century bilingualism primarily took the form of a combination of the mother tongue of an ethnos with Russian. The 1926 Census provides an idea of the extent to which bilingualism had developed among the various peoples in pre-revolutionary Russia. The returns indicated 6 400 000 persons of non-Russian nationality who gave Russian as their mother tongue.

It can be assumed that the number of bilingual persons was many times more, for the transition to Russian was obviously the result

[1] V. I. Lenin. Critical Remarks on the National Question. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 28.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

of a long, previous period of bilingualism.

There are even fewer facts for judging how widespread bilingualism was in which the second language was that of a neighbouring ethnos other than Russian. But we know that in the North Caucasus mastery of a second or several languages apart from the mother tongue was vitally necessary because of the ethnic fractionalism of the population. This was due to several causes, mainly of an economic character, and in particular the broad commercial and economic contacts between the mountain and the lowlands of the area. The commercial centres were located on the lowlands, and the highlanders came there to trade and for work. In the winter they drove their herds to lowland pastures. As has been observed the peoples of the mountainous areas in Daghestan were multilingual, speaking the languages of the population of other ethnic origin. Generally a Turkic language (Azerbaijanian, Kumyk, or Nogai) performed the function of language of inter-ethnic communication and intercourse.

The spread of Russian as a second language only began in the North Caucasus in the second half of the nineteenth century, initially among the Kabardinians, Ossetians, Chechens, and Ingushes, from 1880 among the Kumyks in the lowlands of Daghestan. Further growth of this process was linked mainly with the development of the towns of Vladikavkaz, Ekaterinodar, and Stavropol, which altered the economic orientation of the North Caucasian peoples and led to the spread of Russian as a second language.

Lenin, while counterposing the free, natural spread of Russian to the government policy of 'Russification', wrote that the requirements of economic exchange will always compel the nationalities living in one state to study the language of the majority.[1]

The process of ethnic convergence was inseparable from all those progressive phenomena that caused in the life of the peoples of the national periphery their joining Russia and inclusion in a powerful, centralised, capitalistically developing state, and from changes taking place spontaneously irrespective of, and often in spite of, the policy of Czarism.

The economic stimuli of convergence were the growth of industry and towns, of commerce and transport routes, and migration, which all affected the development of contacts between the various ethnoi and promoted the breakdown of national barriers and prejudices. Convergence took place not only in the central, most economically developed provinces of the empire but also in the outlying areas. The annexation of Central Asia, for example, had an objectively progressive significance, primarily because of the development of capitalist relations that broke up its backward, conservative economy and way of life. Annexation by Russia led to an intensification

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

of agriculture, the development of cotton-growing, the founding of the first industrial enterprises, the building of railways, and the development of mining. Study of Central Asia, discovery of its natural resources, and study of the indigenous population and its history, ethnic structure, and languages, was linked with that. But the main point about the inclusion of the peoples of Central Asia in the Russian Empire, and the determinant point for evaluating it, was that they came into communication with the Russian people, and the Russian working class. The initial forming of a working class among the local nationalities was a characteristic of that period not only of the densely populated areas of old settled life and agriculture in Turkestan but also of the nomadic grazing areas.

There were the same elements of the historically objective progressiveness of annexation by Russia in the other peripheral areas of the empire–in the North Caucasus, and Siberia. The peoples of Siberia were also drawn into the economic development of Russia, and of its Siberian provinces and regions. They sold furs, cattle, the products of cattle-raising, fish, and cereals; knowing the area well they worked as guides in the forest areas in the search for minerals. The peoples of the national periphery of the empire fought Czarism together with the Russian peasantry and proletariat, joining peasant uprisings and the revolutionary struggle.

In addition to these economic and social prerequisites of the convergence of the peoples of Russia there were also other factors promoting it, including essential difference in the relations between the masses of the people of Russia and its national outskirts from the relations between the metropolitan countries and colonies in the West. The main difference was the Russian people's centuries-long direct contact with the indigenous population of the outskirts. I. A. Halfin, a Soviet scientist in this field, says the following in this connection:

> The inhabitants of India did not meet common people from England, i.e. workers or peasants.... No Englishman happened to work as a farm hand or unskilled worker in colonies. The English authorities would not have permitted it out of fear of discrediting 'the white rule' and the whole system of the British colonial sway.

The position was different in Russia where the Russian peasantry and working class, like the non-Russian peoples, suffered from the heavy oppression of Czarism. Impoverished peasants from the central provinces settled in the outlying areas as well as military administrators, soldiers, civil servants, merchants, and various fortune hunters; Russian settlers worked on the railways, and in factories and mines, along with local workers. In Turkestan there were often cases when poor settlers worked with the local poor and share-croppers for local landowners and were employed in the enterprises of local

industrial capitalists. Friendship between the Russian people and local population was forged through joint work, mutual understanding was broadened, and the fighting alliance was cemented that was displayed with such force in the years of revolutionary struggle against Czarism.

The activity of political exiles, revolutionary democrats and progressive intellectuals sympathising with them, also was very important in bringing the local peoples closer to the Russian people. A whole galaxy of enlighteners among the peoples of Central Asia—people's teachers, writers, and poets like Ahmed Donish, Mukimi, Furkat, Zavki—was acquainted with Russian literature; the scholar and teacher Abai Kunanbaev translated Pushkin's verse novel *Eugene Onegin* into Kazakh. Chokan Valikhanov, a champion of close relations of his native Kazakh people with Russians and their highly developed culture, held profoundly progressive views.

Beginning with A. N. Radishchev and the Decembrists, much was done to spread education among the indigenous population by the political exiles in Siberia. Among them were people who learned the languages of the Yakuts and other peoples, who helped them set up free, people's libraries and museums in Yakutsk, Semipalatinsk, and what were called 'free schools', in which the teachers were Russians, Yakuts, Altaians, and Buryats. Scholars arising among the peoples of Siberia—the talented Turkic scholar, ethnographer, and folklore specialist, the Khakassian N. F. Katanov, and the Buryat teacher and ethnographer M. N. Khangalov, and others—were pupils of Russian teachers.

In such conditions the mutual influencing of Russians and the indigenous peoples in the spheres of farming, everyday life, and culture became more and more marked. The extensive publicistic and ethnographic literature of the turn of the century contained much information on this process. One special study said, for instance, of the Yakuts:

> The Yakuts, under the Russian influence, have developed a quite extensive agriculture, have greatly developed their cattle, have begun to make hay, have adopted new kinds of clothing from the Russians, and in the western part of the region have begun to build Russian-style cabins.... Literacy in Russian is rapidly becoming established, and the number of Yakut pupils in teaching establishments in Yakutsk is now almost half the total number of pupils. There are now Yakuts in the region who have even received higher education.

By virtue of this social contact the influence of Russian and Ukrainian peasant settlers on the economic organisation, material culture, and way of life of the Kazakh, Kirghiz, and other populations around them in Turkestan and the Steppe territory was great. In particular it showed in the borrowing of agricultural experience

and a settled type of dwelling with a passage from nomadic cattle-herding to a settled way of life.

The process of ethnic convergence did not always involve a Russian population but also occurred among other ethnoi. We have already cited as evidence of this the drawing together of cultures and development of bilingualism.

It is very important to note another phenomenon characteristic of this type of ethnic process, viz., the mutual influencing of both the ethnoi in contact with one another. The Russian population was everywhere affected by neighbouring peoples, especially in remote areas where it had long been settled. That applies, for example, to the Cossacks settled in the Caucasus in the 16th to 18th centuries, and even more to the Russian settlers, who borrowed the techniques of irrigated farming, steppe cattle-rearing, etc., from the population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In Siberia Russians borrowed certain forms of clothing from the local inhabitants, food and ways of preparing it.

Information on the spread of mixed marriages with the Russian population in certain areas of Russia presents special interest. From mixed marriages with the non-Russian population many Siberians have to some extent acquired non-Russian ways, especially in the Turukhan territory, localities in the Altai, the Minusinsk uyezd, the Irkutsk Province, and in Trans-Baikal and Yakutia regions. From marriages of Russians with Buryats dark, black-haired, black-eyed offspring are obtained, sometimes with pleasant, regular facial features; these Russians are known as 'Karyms'. In Western Siberia Russians with a non-Russian appearance are called 'Kalmykies'.

The extensive, varied material collected by pre-revolutionary ethnologists indicates a steady spread of an ethnic drawing together among most of the peoples of Russia on the eve of the October 1917 Revolution that cannot be identified with either consolidation or assimilation. Its distinguishing feature was a gradual breaking down of national barriers.

The tendency toward a drawing together with other nations under capitalism, however, differs radically from this kind of ethnic process under socialism, and their historical sequence is relative. Under capitalism both trends of national development were sharply and irreconcilably opposed. The contradiction between them only disappears in socialist society along with an essential change in their substance.

Chapter IV

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS OF THE USSR AND ETHNIC PROCESSES

Ethnic processes, like other social processes, are due in the long run to objective causes associated with the development of material production and changes in the economic basis. At the same time they are strongly affected by superstructural factors, which include laws regulating the mutual relations between the peoples living in a multinational state, and the forms of the internal (administrative and territorial) structure of the state in which they live.

The Great October Socialist Revolution, by overthrowing the rule of landowners and capitalists, opened a new era in the history of humanity. It was a historical day, the 25th of October (the 7th of November, New Style) 1917, when the 2nd All-Russia Congress of Soviets—in the appeal 'To Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants' proclaimed that Soviet power would 'guarantee all the nations inhabiting Russia the genuine right to self-determination'.[1]

The Soviet Government based its actions on Lenin's principles for dealing with the national question and a policy of complete elimination of the previous national inequality, and of peoples' comprehensive economic, cultural, and political development. On 2 (15) November 1917 the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, signed by Lenin was promulgated, which condemned the policy of oppressing nations and inflaming hostility between them. This document counterposed to that a policy of the voluntary union of the peoples of Russia. The Declaration did not envisage the concrete constitutional form of this alliance and granted the peoples the right to freely decide the issue of the form of their national state existence.

The Declaration included the following main points: (a) the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; (b) their right to free self-determination up to and including secession and the formation

[1] See V. I. Lenin. Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. *Collected Works*, Vol. 26 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972), p. 247.

of an independent state; (c) the abolition of all national and national-religious privileges and limitations of any kind; (d) free development of the national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting Russia.

Almost immediately after this Declaration, and as it were developing certain of its points, the Soviet Government published an appeal to all the working Muslims of Russia and the East, which recognised the national and religious rights of the Muslim peoples and called on them to support the socialist revolution. As implementation of its national policy, i.e. the overcoming of the economic, political, and cultural backwardness of many peoples, national, territorial demarcation, etc., involved a host of complicated matters, the government set up a special ministry, the People's Commissariat for Nationality Matters. The internal divisions of this body were based for practical purposes on corresponding commissariats and sections set up under regional, provincial, and uyezd councils (Soviets) and their executive committees.

The elimination of the former economic, social, and cultural backwardness of many peoples took decades; it took place primarily within corresponding national state formations in which conditions particularly favourable for accelerated development of the indigenous peoples were created. The national construction was itself a real embodiment of the right of peoples to self-determination already adopted as the main point in the Bolshevik Party's programme long before the October Revolution.

While upholding the right of peoples to self-determination including political secession, Communists did not, however, call for such separation. On the contrary, Lenin pointed out that a big state is much more preferable economically and in other respects than small ones. There were no real contradictions whatsoever between the Russian people and the other peoples of Russia; the Russian working people had also suffered oppression by autocracy and had been exploited by landlords and capitalists, which determined the community of aims of all the peoples of Russia in the fight against Czarism. After the overthrow of the autocracy in 1917, during the preparation for the socialist revolution, Lenin wrote that the working masses of the previously oppressed peoples, once liberated from capitalist yoke, would strive with all their might for an alliance and merging with the big, advanced socialist nations.[1]

History has completely confirmed this forecast of Lenin's. The right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination was put into practice and expressed in the founding of Soviet socialist republics and autonomous regions, and uniting of national and territorial formations into federations.

[1] See V. I. Lenin. The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed-Up. *Collected Works*, Vol. 22 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964), pp. 338-39.

The course of this process of national demarcation and inter-nation unification was complicated and difficult, especially in the first Soviet years. The peoples of the USSR were at different levels of socio-economic and cultural development, and differed sharply in numbers and distribution, so that it was not easy to find the appropriate form of statehood for each of them. The building of a national system was greatly complicated by the vagaries of national orientation of many groups of the population due in particular to the incompleteness of the processes of ethnic consolidation. There were no reliable data on the national affiliation of the population; so that it was not fortuitous that the first Soviet census, which included a question on nationality, was carried out in 1920. We must also note the close territorial intermingling of many nationalities, which complicated national demarcation–there proved to be considerable groups (sometimes numerically predominant) of other nationalities within many national formations. These enclaves were often also determined by the interests of economic development of the national republics and regions being formed.

The special difficulties of national demarcation in the early Soviet years were due to the fact that almost all the national territories had been the arena of civil war, had been under the control of white-guards, local bourgeois nationalists, or foreign interventionists. In some cases, as for instance in Byelorussia occupied by the Germans, this led to temporary suppression of the already formed national republics, in other cases, and more frequently, to signs of national separatism, the rise of governments that strove, by inspiring nationalist moods among certain sections of the local population, for an 'independent' existence.

The Communist Party had to wage a resolute struggle against local nationalists for the restoration of Soviet power and earlier organic links with other parts of the country. The strengthening of these ties ruled out great power trends. In one of his last works, 'The Question of Nationalities or "Autonomisation"', written at the end of 1922, Lenin pointed out the need, in particular, for an extremely careful approach in dealing with the national question, and condemned formal, bureaucratic, high-handed methods in the implementing of national policy, especially in regard to small, previously oppressed nationalities.[1] The setting up of administrations composed of members of the indigenous population in national republics and regions served to avoid such mistakes.

The course of the building of a national state system can be divided, conditionally, into three main stages. The first covered the period from 1917 to 1922 and was completed with the founding

[1] See V. I. Lenin. The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'. *Collected Works*, Vol. 36 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), pp. 605-11.

of the USSR. The second stage covered from 1923 to 1936 and was completed by the fixing of the preceding changes in the Constitution of the USSR adopted then. The third stage is still in progress; the new Constitution, adopted in 1977, confirmed the constitutional system already established.

The building of the national, constitutional system developed in the national regions of European Russia rather earlier than in other parts of the country. Old Russia had become the Russian Soviet Republic as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In January 1918 it was already established at the 3rd All-Russia Congress of Soviets that 'the Soviet Russian Republic is founded on the basis of free nations as a federation of Soviet national republics'.

In the middle of December 1917, in the complicated situation created by the seizure of power in Kiev and the majority of Ukrainian provinces by the bourgeois nationalist Central Council (Rada), the lst All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets in Kharkov proclaimed the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic as a federated constituent of the Russian Republic. About the same time the Soviet Latvian Republic arose, followed by the creation of the Lithuanian, Estonian, and Byelorussian Republics.

In February 1918 the process of national, constitutional development was interrupted by German occupation in all these western republics and was only resumed at the end of 1918. In November 1918, for example, a Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukraine was formed, which decided in January 1919 to rename this republic the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In December 1918 the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed, and at the beginning of January 1919 the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. At the end of January 1919 it was decided to unite these two republics, which was formally done at the end of February. At the end of November 1918 the Estonian (Estland) Soviet Republic was formed, or as it was then called 'Labour Commune', and in December 1918 the Soviet Republic of Latvia.

All these republics established close friendly relations with the Russian Federation, but their existence was shortlived. The Ukraine was seized by Denikin's forces, and then its Western part by White Poles. In the middle of 1919 White Polish troops occupied almost the whole of Byelorussia and co-operated with German troops to restore the power of capitalists and landowners in Lithuania. The Latvian and Estonian Soviet Republics fell under the pressure of whiteguards, Germans, and the local bourgeois nationalists. Soviet power was restored in the Ukraine and Byelorussia in 1920 but their western regions fell to Poland. Capitalist governments were established in all the Baltic republics.

In Transcaucasia, where a national state demarcation of Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanians took place, bourgeois nationalists

relying on the direct military support of foreign imperialists held power for nearly three years. Only in April 1920 was the founding of the Azerbaijan SSR proclaimed as a result of a revolutionary uprising in Baku. In November 1920 the Armenian SSR was founded, and in February 1921 the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. After the Soviet government's victory new, friendly ties began to be forged between the peoples of Transcaucasia. In December 1922 the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was formed.

The government of the Russian Federation recognised the independence of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Transcaucasian Republics and established relations with them on an equal basis, by concluding bilateral treaties. The end of the civil war and fight against foreign intervention, and the change in the military, political, social, and economic situation necessitated changes as well in the relations between the Soviet republics and a strengthening of their alliances.

The building of a national state system proceeded from 1917 to 1922 both within these Soviet Socialist Republics and beyond them.

One of the first and biggest members of the Russian Federation was the Turkestan Autonomous Republic founded in April 1918 within the borders of the old Turkestan Territory, and embracing in the main part of the ethnic territories of the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Tajiks. In August 1920 a decree was issued on the creation of the Kirghiz (in fact Kazakh) ASSR. In April 1920, as a result of a successful revolutionary uprising in Khiva the Khan's rule was overthrown and the Khoresm People's Soviet Republic was formed; in October 1920 the Emir of Bukhara was overthrown and the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic was formed. The government of the RSFSR recognised these two republics as sovereign states and actively helped them militarily and economically.

In January 1918 the creation of a Soviet Terek Region was proclaimed in the North Caucasus in the struggle against local bourgeois nationalists, whiteguards, and foreign imperialists; within it lived Kabardinians, Ingushes, Chechens, and other peoples. In 1920, after the expulsion of the counter-revolutionaries, the building of a national state system in the North Caucasus was resumed. In the end of 1920 the Kalmyk Autonomous Region arose. In January 1921 a decree was issued on the formation of the Daghestan ASSR and Gorskaya (Mountain) ASSR; the latter included the following national areas: Karachai, Kabardin, Balkar, North Ossetian, Ingush, Chechen, and Sunzhen, which were later successively divided into independent units. In September 1921 the Kabardinian Autonomous Region was formed (converted in January 1922 into the Kabardin-Balkar Autonomous Region), and also the Karachai-Circassian Autonomous Region; in November 1922 the Chechen Autonomous Region was formed, and a little later, in July, the Circassian (Adygei)

Autonomous Region was separated out from the Kuban-Black Sea Region.

The building of a national state system in the ethnically motley areas of the Volga and the Urals proceeded rapidly. The first autonomous unit here was to have been the Tatar-Bashkir Autonomous Republic; the decision to form it was taken in March 1918, but practical implementation was postponed because of the civil war. In October 1918 the Labour Commune of the Volga Germans was formed. In March 1919 a decree was published on the formation of the Bashkir ASSR, and in May 1920 of the Tatar ASSR; in June 1920 formation of the Autonomous Chuvash Region was decreed, and in November of the same year of Votyak (Udmurt) and Mari Autonomous Regions. In August 1921 followed a decree on the formation of a Komi Autonomous Region.

After the Crimea was freed, a Crimean ASSR was formed in 1921. In June 1920 a decree was published on the formation of the Autonomous Karelian Labour Commune. In January 1922 a Buryat Autonomous Region was formed and in February of the same year the Yakut ASSR and in June an Oirat Autonomous Region. At the end of 1920 national areas of the small peoples of the Far North and the Far East of the RSFSR began to be formed (Nentsi, Khanty-Mansi, etc.).

In March 1921, the Abkhazian ASSR was formed which later became part of the Georgian SSR; in June 1921 the Adzhar ASSR and South Ossetian Autonomous Region were created in the Georgian SSR.

The uniting of all the Soviet republics in a federal state took place in 1922. The lst All-Union Congress of Soviets, which opened on 30 December 1922, resolved to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to draft the first Constitution of the USSR, reflecting its structure as a multinational state founded on the friendship and equality of peoples.

The founding of the USSR, which was a triumph of Lenin's national policy, was an event of world historical importance, that had immense progressive significance for the life of all the peoples of the country. It provided the conditions for a further extension of their co-operation, for the organisation of permanent, all-round assistance to the economically and culturally backward nationalities from the other peoples (above all from the Russian people).

Building of the national state system continued after the founding of the USSR. The most significant event of the following years was the formation of republics in Central Asia. In October 1923 the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic was converted into a Socialist Soviet Republic and declared its wish to join the USSR; in September 1924 the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic did the same.

The ethnic boundaries of all the republics of Central Asia diverged

greatly then from the administrative ones, so that the issue of a national-territorial demarcation arose. In October 1924 Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics were formed from the regions of the Turkestan ASSR and Bukhara and Khorezm republics inhabited by Uzbeks and Turkmens, and a Tajik ASSR, forming part of the Uzbek SSR, from the regions of Turkestan and Bukhara inhabited by Tajiks. The areas of Turkestan inhabited by Kazakhs were joined to the Kazakh ASSR, while areas inhabited by Kirghiz were formed into a Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Region within the RSFSR. In January 1925 a Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region formed then was included in the Tajik ASSR. In May of the same year a Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Region was formed in the Kazakh ASSR, while the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Region was renamed Kirghiz. In February 1926 it was converted into the Kirghiz ASSR. In March 1932 the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Region was converted into an ASSR within the Uzbek SSR. In June 1929 the Tajik ASSR became an independent federal republic and constituent member of the USSR.

Considerable changes were also made in the structure of the Russian Federation, the biggest republic of the USSR. In July 1923 the Karelian Labour Commune was converted into the Karelian ASSR, and in May of the same year the Buryat Autonomous Region into the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR. In July 1924 the Gorskaya ASSR was dissolved, and North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions formed from its territory. In addition to the already existing Circassian Autonomous Region a Circassian Autonomous Region was formed within the Stavropol Territory in April 1928. The creation of an autonomous unit for the Mordvins, one of the biggest of the Volga peoples, was complicated by their marked territorial intermingling with other peoples. Only in June 1928 was a Mordovian National Area formed within the Central Volga Region; in January 1930 this area was converted into an Autonomous Region, and subsequently, in December 1934, into an ASSR. At the same time the Udmurt (Votyak) Autonomous Region was converted into the Udmurt ASSR. The Kalmyk Autonomous Region was converted in October 1935 into an ASSR. A Khakassian Autonomous Region was formed in Siberia in October 1930 within the Krasnoyarsk Territory, and in May 1934 a Jewish Autonomous Region in Khabarovsk Territory.

Certain changes were also made in other republics. In February 1923 a Nakhichevan Autonomous Region was formed in the Azerbaijan SSR, and in July the Autonomous Region of the Karabakh Highlands. In February 1924 the Nakhichevan Autonomous Region was converted into an ASSR. In February 1924 the Byelorussian SSR was enlarged, its area being almost doubled by the inclusion of neighbouring regions of the RSFSR inhabited mainly by Byelo-

russians. In October of the same year a Moldavian ASSR was formed within the Ukrainian SSR.

Finally, in 1936, the Kazakh and Kirghiz ASSRs were converted into Union republics and the Transcaucasian Federation was dissolved, the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republics becoming direct members of the USSR.

The further development after 1922 of other forms of national-territorial institutions, in particular of national areas, must be noted. National areas were usually set up for the comparatively small, underdeveloped nationalities of the Far North. For national groups living among other peoples national districts and national Soviets were created.

The transition from one form of national-territorial unit to another, and above all the conversion of autonomous regions into autonomous republics, and of autonomous republics into Union ones, reflected the successful development of the peoples of the USSR and the upsurge of their economy and culture. The changes made in the affairs of Soviet society were legislatively consolidated in the Constitution of the USSR adopted on 5 December 1936 by the 8th Extraordinary Congress of Soviets. The Constitution consolidated the great achievements of Lenin's national policy implemented in the forming and flourishing of the statehood of socialist nations. It fixed the new structure of the USSR formed of 11 Union republics (the RSFSR, the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijan, Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics) and 20 autonomous republics (including 15 within the Russian Federation).

The status of the various national formations was distinguished more clearly than before in the 1936 Constitution; the sovereign Union republics and the autonomous republics were defined as a form of national statehood, autonomous regions and national areas as administrative and territorial units distinguished from ordinary ones in that their administrative apparatus was adapted to the national features of the indigenous population inhabiting them.

In speaking about the particularly favourable situation for the development of a nationality within its republic or region, i.e. for the retention and development of its language and consolidation of its identity, etc., we must note the leading role in this respect of the various nationally specialised institutions, especially in the field of education and culture and the system of the social sciences. Among the nationally oriented measures carried out by these institutions, we must single out first of all the predominant use of the mother tongue in school teaching and in the press, radio, and other mass media, the support for and development of mass and professional national art (song-and-dance groups, a national opera and ballet, and so on), encouragement of traditional crafts, the writing and study

of the history of the people concerned and its republic, the writing of works devoted to national heroes, and the celebration of their anniversaries, and so on.

The national territorial reforms and changes of intra-state status of separate nationalities after the adoption of the Constitution were largely connected with the complex military and political events of 1939-45. Without dwelling on certain temporary changes (e.g. the conversion of the Karelian ASSR into a Karelian-Finnish SSR and back to the Karelian ASSR, the dissolvement and later the revival of certain North Caucasian autonomous republics, etc.), let us note the main ones.

In October 1939 the age-old dream of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples was realised: the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, liberated by the Red Army, were united with the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR. In June 1940 the North Bukovina and in June 1945 the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine joined the Ukrainian SSR. In 1940 the Letts, Lithuanians, and Estonians joined the family of Soviet peoples, forming three Baltic Soviet Republics. The same year the Moldavian SSR was formed from the Moldavian ASSR and Bessarabia. In October 1944 the Tuva Republic joined the USSR; an autonomous region was formed on its territory, which was later converted into an ASSR.

At the present time there are eight autonomous regions and ten areas in the USSR, in addition to the 15 Union republics and 20 autonomous republics named above.[1] Their boundaries usually embrace the main areas of settlement of the peoples concerned.

Because of the peculiarities of the distribution of the peoples of the USSR, however, separate groups of them found themselves to be living outside the national republics, regions, and areas created. Around 83 per cent of all Russians, for instance, live in the RSFSR. More than 86 per cent of all the Ukrainians in the USSR live in the Ukrainian SSR; sizeable groups live in the RSFSR (mainly in the North Caucasus and in the adjacent regions of the south of the European part of the RSFSR, and also in the Urals and the south of Western Siberia), in Kazakhstan (in the Tselinny Territory), and in

[1] The autonomous regions include the following: within the RSFSR, the Adygei (Krasnodar Territory), Gorno-Altai (Altai Territory), Jewish (Khabarovsk Territory), Karachai-Circassian (Stavropol Territory), Khakass (Krasnoyarsk Territory); the South Ossetian (in the Georgian SSR), the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, inhabited mainly by Armenians (in the Azerbaijan SSR), and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in the Tajik SSR, in which Pamir nationalities live. The autonomous areas include the following: the Aginsk and Buryat (Chita Region), Komi-Permyak (Perm Region), Koryak (Kamchatka Region), Nenets (Archangel Region), Taimyr or Dolgan-Nenets (Krasnoyarsk Territory), Ust-Ordyn Buryat (Irkutsk Region), Khanty-Mansi (Tyumen Region), Chukotka (Magadan Region), Evenk (Krasnoyarsk Territory), and Yamal-Nenets (Tyumen Region).

Table 5

Proportion of Peoples Living in Their Own Union or Autonomous Republic (as a percentage of the total population of the USSR)

Nationality	1926	1939	1959	1970	1979
Russians	93.4	90.7	85.8	83.5	82.6
Ukrainians	73.5	83.1	86.3	86.6	86.2
Byelorussians	84.8	87.5	82.5	80.5	80.0
Lithuanians	–	–	92.5	94.1	95.1
Letts	–	–	92.7	93.8	93.4
Estonians	–	–	90.3	91.9	93.0
Moldavians	61.8	65.7	85.2	85.4	85.1
Georgians	98.1	96.6	96.6	96.5	96.1
Armenians	47.4	49.3	55.7	62.0	65.6
Azerbaijanians	84.3	82.2	84.9	86.2	86.0
Kazakhs	93.6	75.1	77.2	78.5	80.7
Uzbeks	84.5	84.2	83.8	84.1	84.8
Turkmens	82.7	91.3	92.2	92.9	93.2
Tajiks	63.0	71.9	75.2	76.3	77.2
Kirghiz	86.7	85.3	86.4	88.5	88.5
Tatars	39.9	33.0	27.1	25.9	26.5
Bashkirs	87.7	79.6	75.2	72.0	68.2
Chuvashes	59.8	56.7	52.4	50.5	50.7
Mordvins	–	27.8	27.9	28.9	30.3
Mari	57.9	56.7	55.4	49.9	49.3
Udmurts	78.5	79.2	76.4	68.8	67.2
Komi	50.9	54.8	56.9	58.1	58.9
Karelians	40.6	43.0	51.1	57.5	58.7
Kalmyks	81.1	79.8	61.2	80.2	83.4
Buryats	90.5	51.8	53.7	56.8	58.7
Yakuts	98.0	96.4	95.3	96.6	95.7
Daghestan peoples	....	....	78.0	77.7	76.5
Kabardinians	87.5	82.0	93.5	94.6	94.4
Balkars	99.7	95.6	80.4	85.0	90.0
Ossetians	47.1	46.7	52.2	55.1	55.2
Chechens	92.3	90.3	58.3	83.0	80.9
Ingushes	94.3	91.0	45.6	72.1	78.3
Abkhazians	98.1	95.2	93.6	92.8	....
Kara-Kalpaks	–	85.4	90.4	92.2	....
Tuvinians	–	–	97.9	97.0	97.5

Note. For peoples with several national-territorial formations (e.g. Armenians—the Armenian SSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region; the Buryats—Buryat ASSR, Aginsk and Ust-Ordyn Autonomous Areas), only the main republic is considered since the ethnic conditions outside it are substantially different.

areas of Moldavia bordering on the Ukraine. Other territorially dispersed peoples that have their own Union republics include the Kazakhs, many of whom live in regions of the RSFSR and Uzbekistan bordering on the Kazakh SSR, the Tajiks, a quarter of whom live in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics, and the Armenians, around 65 per cent of whom live in Armenia, and the rest mainly in the neighbouring republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia, and in certain parts of the RSFSR (see Table 5).

The peoples that have their own autonomous republics are usually distinguished by even greater territorial dispersion. This is particularly characteristic of the Volga peoples many of whom have long been settled in other areas of the country. On an average only a little more than half of the Mari, Chuvashes, and Udmurts live within their autonomous republics. Only a little more than 30 per cent of the total Mordvin population of the country live within the Mordovian ASSR, and 26,5 per cent of the Tatars within Tataria. The remaining groups of Mordvins and Tatars live in neighbouring regions and Volga autonomous republics, in the south of Western Siberia, and other areas of the USSR.

Roughly the same picture is seen among peoples with their own autonomous regions or areas. Most of these national-territorial units contain more than half of the people concerned, but there are exceptions. Only 13 per cent of the Evenks, for example, who are scattered over the boundless spaces of the East Siberian taiga, live within the Evenk Autonomous Area.

Another feature of the territorial distribution of peoples in the USSR is that the various national-territorial formations have themselves, as a rule, a complex national structure of the population. Only three peoples—the biggest nation, the Russians, the Armenians, and the Byelorussians—constitute more than 80 per cent of the population of their Union republics (see Table 6). In all the other Union republics the percentage of the indigenous populations is much lower today. The Kazakhs, for example, are a third of the population of the Kazakh SSR, and are fewer in numbers than the Russians. Big groups of Russians live in the Ukraine (mainly in the Donbass and Black Sea areas), in Kazakhstan (predominantly in the Tselinny Territory and the eastern regions), in Uzbekistan, and other Union republics. Russians form a considerable percentage in almost all the autonomous republics, regions, and areas of the RSFSR. In only two autonomous republics, the Nakhichevan and Chuvash, does the indigenous population form a majority; in all the rest it constitutes either a relative majority or is less in numbers than the other peoples. This is most marked with the Karelians, who form only around 12 per cent of the population of their republic, and for the Abkhazians, who are fewer in numbers in their republic than three other peoples, Georgians, Russians, and Armenians. Similar

relationships are typical of certain autonomous regions and areas as well.

During the Soviet years substantial changes have taken place in settlement of the peoples of the USSR and ethnic composition of national territorial units. In many cases they led to increasing the motley character of national composition in republics and regions and to a larger intermingling of nationalities. Table 6 presents a picture of these changes within Union and autonomous republics.

The national, constitutional structure of the USSR on the whole remains unchanged. In his report on the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev noted that 'the basic features of the federative structure of the USSR have fully justified themselves, so that there is no need to introduce any changes of principle into the forms of the Soviet socialist federation'.[1]

The boundaries of the national formations in the USSR are to some extent conventional; they do not in themselves prevent migration or resettlement within the national territory of another people, and such territorial mixing of nationalities leads inevitably to the development of ethnic processes.

Table 6

National Composition of Republics
(by 1979 status with contemporaneous boundaries)

Republic	Census	Total population (in thousands)	Indigenous population (%)	Russians (%)	Others (%)
RSFSR	1926	93 280	77.8	77.8	22.2
	1939	108 264	83.4	83.4	16.6
	1959	117 534	83.3	83.3	16.7
	1970	130 079	82.8	82.8	17.2
	1979	137 551	82.6	82.6	17.4
Ukrainian SSR	1926	28 446	80.6	9.2	10.2
	1939	31 785	73.5	12.9	13.6
	1959	41 869	76.8	16.9	6.3
	1970	47 126	74.9	19.4	5.7
	1979	49 755	73.6	21.1	5.3
Byelorussian SSR	1926	4983	80.6	7.7	11.7
	1939	5569	82.9	6.5	10.6
	1959	8055	81.1	8.2	10.7
	1970	9002	81.0	10.4	8.6
	1979	9560	79.4	11.9	8.7
Lithuanian SSR	1959	2711	79.3	8.5	12.2

[1] *Pravda*, 5 June 1977.

Republic	Census	Total population (in thousands)	Indigenous population (%)	Russians (%)	Others (%)
	1970	3128	80.1	8.6	11.3
	1979	3398	80.0	8.9	11.1
Latvian SSR	1959	2094	62.0	26.6	11.4
	1970	2364	56.8	29.3	13.4
	1979	2521	53.7	32.8	13.5
Estonian SSR	1959	1197	74.6	20.1	5.3
	1970	1356	68.2	24.7	7.1
	1979	1466	64.7	27.9	7.4
Moldavian SSR	1926	572	30.1	8.5	61.4
	1939	599	28.5	10.2	61.3
	1959	2884	65.4	10.2	24.4
	1970	3569	64.6	11.6	23.8
	1979	3947	63.9	12.8	23.3
Georgian SSR	1926	2667	67.0	3.6	29.4
	1939	3540	61.4	8.7	30.0
	1959	4044	64.3	10.1	25.5
	1970	4686	66.8	8.5	24.7
	1979	5015	68.8	7.4	23.8
Armenian SSR	1926	881	84.4	2.2	13.4
	1939	1282	82.8	4.0	13.2
	1959	1763	88.0	3.2	8.8
	1970	2492	88.6	2.7	8.7
	1979	3031	89.7	2.3	8.0
Azerbaijan SSR	1926	2315	62.1	9.5	28.4
	1939	3205	58.4	16.5	25.1
	1959	3698	67.5	13.6	18.9
	1970	5117	73.8	10.0	16.2
	1979	6028	78.1	7.9	14.0
Kazakh SSR	1926	6503	57.1	19.7	23.2
	1939	6094	38.2	40.3	21.5
	1959	9310	30.0	42.7	27.3
	1970	13 008	32.6	42.4	25.0
	1979	14 684	36.0	40.8	23.2
Uzbek SSR	1926	4446	74.2	21.6	4.2
	1939	6271	64.4	11.5	24.1
	1959	8106	62.2	13.5	24.3
	1970	11 799	65.5	12.5	22.8
	1979	15 391	68.7	10.8	20.5
Turkmen SSR	1926	900	70.2	8.2	21.6
	1939	1252	59.2	18.6	22.2
	1959	1516	60.9	17.3	21.8
	1970	2159	65.6	14.5	19.9
	1979	2752	68.4	12.6	19.0
Tajik SSR	1926	827	74.6	0.7	24.7
	1939	1484	59.6	9.1	31.3
	1959	1980	53.1	13.3	33.6
	1970	2900	56.2	11.9	31.9
	1979	3801	58.8	10.4	30.8
Kirghiz SSR	1926	993	66.6	11.7	21.7

Republic	Census	Total population (in thousands)	Indigenous population (%)	Russians (%)	Others (%)
	1939	1458	51.7	20.8	27.5
	1959	2066	40.5	30.2	29.3
	1970	2933	43.8	29.2	27.3
	1979	3529	47.9	25.9	24.2
	Autonomous Republics of the RSFSR				
Bashkir ASSR	1926	2695	23.7	39.8	36.5
	1939	3159	21.2	40.6	38.2
	1959	3340	22.1	42.4	35.5
	1970	3818	23.4	40.5	36.1
	1979	3844	24.3	40.3	35.4
Buryat ASSR	1926	491	43.8	52.7	5.5
	1939	546	21.3	72.0	6.7
	1959	673	20.2	74.6	5.2
	1970	812	22.0	73.5	4.5
	1979	899	23.0	72.0	5.0
Daghestan ASSR	1926	788	....	12.5	....
(Daghestan nationalities)	1939	930	76.3	14.3	9.4
	1959	1 062	69.3	20.1	10.6
	1970	1429	74.3	14.7	11.0
	1979	1628	77.8	11.6	10.6
Kabardin-Balkar	1926	204	76.3	7.5	16.2
ASSR (Kabardinians	1939	359	53.7	35.9	10.4
and Balkars)	1959	420	53.4	38.7	7.9
	1970	588	53.7	37.2	9.1
	1979	666	54.5	35.1	10.4
Kalmyk ASSR	1926	142	75.6	10.7	13.7
	1939	221	48.6	45.7	5.7
	1959	185	35.1	55.9	9.0
	1970	268	41.1	45.8	13.1
	1979	294	41.5	42.6	15.9
Karelian ASSR	1926	270	37.4	57.1	5.5
	1939	469	23.2	63.2	15.6
	1959	651	13.1	63.4	25.5
	1970	713	11.8	68.1	20.1
	1979	732	11.1	71.3	17.6
Komi ASSR	1926	207	92.2	6.6	1.2
	1939	319	72.5	22.0	5.5
	1959	815	30.1	48.6	21.3
	1970	965	28.6	53.1	18.3
	1979	1110	25.3	56.7	18.0
Mari ASSR	1926	482	51.4	43.6	5.0
	1939	580	47.2	46.1	6.7
	1959	648	43.1	47.8	9.1
	1970	685	43.7	46.9	9.4
	1979	704	43.5	47.3	9.8
Mordovian ASSR	1939	1188	34.1	60.5	5.4
	1959	1000	35.7	59.1	5.2
	1970	1029	35.4	58.9	5.7
	1979	990	34.2	59.7	6.1

Republic	Census	Total population (in thousands)	Indigenous population (%)	Russians (%)	Others (%)
North Ossetian ASSR	1926	152	84.2	6.6	9.2
	1939	329	50.3	37.2	12.5
	1959	451	47.8	39.6	12.6
	1970	553	48.7	36.6	14.7
	1979	592	50.5	33.9	15.6
Tatar ASSR	1926	2594	44.9	43.1	12.0
	1939	2915	48.8	42.9	8.3
	1959	2850	47.2	43.9	8.9
	1970	3131	49.1	42.4	8.5
	1979	3445	47.6	44.0	8.4
Tuva ASSR	1959	172	57.0	40.1	2.9
	1970	231	58.6	38.3	3.1
	1979	268	60.5	36.1	3.4
Udmurt ASSR	1926	756	52.3	45.3	4.4
	1939	1219	39.4	55.7	4.9
	1959	1337	35.6	56.8	7.6
	1970	1418	34.2	57.1	8.7
	1979	1492	32.1	58.3	9.6
Chechen-Ingush ASSR	1926	385	93.8	2.6	3.6
(Chechens and Ingushes)	1939	697	64.8	28.8	6.4
	1959	1710	41.1	49.0	9.9
	1970	1064	58.5	34.5	7.0
	1979	1156	64.5	29.0	6.5
Chuvash ASSR	1926	894	74.6	20.0	5.4
	1939	1077	72.2	22.4	5.4
	1959	1098	70.2	24.0	5.8
	1970	1224	70.0	24.5	5.5
	1979	1299	68.3	26.0	5.7
Yakut ASSR	1926	289	81.6	10.4	8.0
	1939	413	56.5	35.5	8.0
	1959	487	46.4	44.2	9.4
	1970	664	43.0	47.3	9.7
	1979	856	36.8	50.4	12.8
Autonomous Republics in the Georgian SSR					
Abkhazian ASSR	1926	201	27.8	6.2	66.0
	1939	312	18.0	19.3	62.7
	1959	405	15.1	21.4	63.5
	1970	487	15.9	19.1	65.0
	1979	505	....	....	....
Adzhar ASSR*	1926	132	53.7	7.7	38.6
	1939	200	63.7	15.2	21.1
	1959	245	72.8	13.4	13.8
	1970	310	76.5	11.5	12.0
	1979	354	....	....	....
Autonomous Republic of the Azerbaijanian SSR					
Nakhichevan ASSR	1926	105	84.3	1.8	13.9
	1939	127	85.6	2.0	12.4
	1959	141	90.2	2.2	7.6

Republic	Census	Total population (in thousands)	Indigenous population (%)	Russians (%)	Others (%)
	1970	202	93.8	1.9	4.3
	1979	239	....	....	....
Autonomous Republic of the Uzbek SSR					
Kara-Kalpak ASSR	1939	470	33.8	5.3	60.9
	1959	510	30.6	4.5	64.9
	1970	702	31.0	3.6	65.4
	1979	904	....	....	....

* In the 1939 and subsequent censuses the Adzhars declared themselves Georgians.

Chapter V

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF ETHNIC PROCESSES IN THE USSR

The building of socialism has been one of the most important factors influencing the ethnic processes taking place in the USSR.

One of the main objectives set by the Communist Party and Soviet Government immediately after the October Revolution was that of overcoming as soon as possible the substantial differences in levels of economic development of the national areas, because without that it would be impossible to ensure actual equality of the nations.

During the early years after the Revolution the country as a whole was characterised by the backwardness and mixed economy inherited from Czarist Russia. Lenin wrote then:

> Take a close look at the actual economic relations in Russia. We find at least five different economic systems, or structures, which, from bottom to top, are: first, the patriarchal economy, when the peasant farms produce only for their own needs, or are in a nomadic or semi-nomadic state, and we happen to have a number of these; second, small-commodity production, when goods are sold on the market; third, capitalist production, the emergence of capitalists, small private capital; fourth, state capitalism, and fifth, socialism.[1]

The northern hunters and reindeer herders (Nentsi, Evenks, Kets, Chukchi), nomadic and semi-nomadic herdsmen (Kalmyks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Altaians, Buryats, and others) living on the vast steppelands between the Volga and Southern Siberia, mountain peoples of the Caucasus, and other nationalities were the most backward socio-economically. The resolution of the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the national question reads in part:

[1] V. I. Lenin. Report on the Tax in Kind Delivered at a Meeting of Secretaries and Responsible Representatives of R.C.P.(B.) Cells of Moscow and Moscow Gubernia. *Collected Works*, Vol. 32 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965), pp. 295-96.

If the Ukraine, Byelorussia, part of Azerbaijan, and Armenia, which have passed through a period of industrial capitalism to one degree or another, are excluded from the 65 millions of the non-Russian population, there remain some 30 millions of predominantly Turkic people (Turkestan, the greater part of Azerbaijan, Daghestan, the mountain peoples, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz, and others) who have not yet reached capitalist development, have no industrial proletariat of their own, or almost none, either preserving in most cases a cattle-raising economy and a patriarchal, tribal way of life (Kirghizia, Bashkiria, the North Caucasus) or having still not got much beyond a semi-patriarchal, semi-feudal way of life (Azerbaijan, the Crimea, etc.), but have already been drawn into the common stream of Soviet development.

Lenin's national policy envisaged the transition of the backward nations of Russia's outlying areas from patriarchal-tribal, patriarchal-feudal, and weakly developed capitalist relations to socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development, abolition of their economic backwardness, and the establishing of *de facto* national equality.

From the very start the Soviet Government took a whole series of measures to overcome the consequences of Czarist Russia's policy toward the backward nations of its peripheral national areas. Even during the civil war, and immediately after, the Russian proletariat and working people of the Russian Federation, although themselves suffering untold economic difficulties and privations, were playing the main role in giving the national areas economic aid. In the famine year of 1921, for instance, the RSFSR set aside 5 500 000 roubles to supply Byelorussian enterprises with raw materials and equipment, and sent some 144 000 kgs of grain and other foodstuffs to the Byelorussian working people. The Ukraine and the peoples of Central Asia and Transcaucasia also received considerable economic aid in those years.

But it was not until the end of the civil war and completion of the reconstruction period that major steps could be taken to overcome the past backwardness of the national republics and eliminate the considerable differences in their economic development.

The uniting of all the Soviet republics in a single union, and the founding of a single, multinational, socialist state in 1922 were of immense value for coping with this important task. Socialist federalism ensured a truly firm alliance of equal nations throughout the Soviet state and provided optimum conditions for their development, for building a socialist society, and for dealing with the more difficult, deeper problem of ensuring actual equality among nations.

The founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made it possible to pool all the available means and resources of the republics and to use them in a planned way, under the direction of

the all-Union state, not only for the speediest economic, social, and cultural development of each republic but also to overcome their economic inequality. The economy of the country became a single organic whole developing according to a single plan, on the basis of which an appropriate division of labour was established between the union republics and also common norms for the planned, proportional development of a socialist economy in the USSR.

There were still very great difficulties in the way of levelling up the economic development of the Union republics in the early years after the founding of the USSR. The country was only beginning to recover from the state of postwar ruin and famine, and the economy of its outlying national areas was still predominantly agrarian. The bulk of the labour force (86.7 per cent) was engaged in agriculture, according to the 1926 Census, while the percentage was even higher in certain republics. Only 10.6 per cent of the total labour force was employed outside agriculture in Turkmenia, for example, 6.4 per cent in Kazakhstan, and 6.2 per cent in Kirghizia. In most republics, moreover, far more people were engaged in craft and cottage industries than were working in factories (with the exception of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Azerbaijan).

The aid given by the most important industrial areas to the backward ones was characteristic of the whole process of socialist reconstruction of the national economy. The huge investments in the industry of the previously backward republics were provided not so much from their own resources as from the federal budget through a territorial redistribution of the national income. It was thanks to the advanced, more industrialised parts of the country that the industry and whole economy of Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and the Caucasus were rapidly developed in the period from the 1920s through the 1940s, and that the gap between them and the more developed areas was closed. The aid given to the national periphery after the USSR was formed, as Leonid Brezhnev has pointed out,

> was rendered to them within the framework of an all-Union economic policy. Suffice it to say that for many years the budget expenditures of a number of the Union Republics were covered mainly by subsidies from the all-Union budget. For instance, in 1924 and 1925 only a little over 10 per cent of the revenues in the budget of the Turkmen Republic was contributed by that republic itself. Even a large republic such as the Ukraine at that time covered under 40 per cent of its budget expenditures from its own resources.
>
> For many years the population in the Republics and regions facing the gravest material hardships was fully or partially exempted from agricultural and civic taxes. At the same time, the purchasing prices of farm produce were set at a level designed to promote the economic develop-

ment of the once backward regions.[1]

While striving to bring up the growth rates of the industrially most backward republics, the Soviet Government could not disregard the economic effectiveness of investment in the industry of the country's various regions when allocating financial resources. While aiming at the speediest possible growth during the early period of industrialisation, it had to make the major investments primarily in industries of all-Union importance, i.e. in the industrial areas of the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. The Ukraine, for instance, absorbed 18.6 per cent of the total investment in Soviet industry to the end of the 1920s, and 20.6 per cent between 1929 and 1932. The share of Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics increased between 1933 and 1940.

The larger investment in the industry of Azerbaijan, compared, for instance, with Georgia and Armenia, from 1920s through 1940s cannot be regarded as privileged treatment, since development of its oil industry (in which most of the investment was made then) promoted industrial development of all other areas of the USSR, Georgia and Armenia included.

Similarly the capital investments in the industry of the Ukraine and RSFSR at that time were important for raising the economy of the whole Soviet Union as well as of these republics. The superiority of the USSR's single, planned economy, possible only under a socialist system of production, told here.

When drafting five-year plans, the Communist Party and Soviet Government consistently pursued a line of accelerated economic growth of the national republics. The guidelines of the 15th Congress of the All-Russia Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1927 for the first five-year economic development plan stipulated that 'the five-year plan must pay special attention to raising the economy and culture of the backward national periphery and backward areas, proceeding from the need for a gradual elimination of their economic and cultural backwardness, and providing accordingly for faster rates for their economic and cultural development, and co-ordinating the needs and requirements of those regions with those of the Union'. Successful industrialisation of the whole country was immensely important for the building of socialism in the USSR.

Socialist industrialisation of the Union republics was aimed at overcoming their past economic backwardness and one-sided economic development. A major goal was to close the substantial gap that had been formed in the national areas before the Revolution between industries making means of production and those producing consumer goods.

The development of a diversified industrial structure better

[1] L. I. Brezhnev. *Following Lenin's Course*, pp. 64-65.

meeting the needs of the local population made it possible to stop the shipping of a number of industrial items to the Union republics from the centre and other distant parts of the country. A rational distribution of various industries facilitated maximum use of local raw material resources and a more even distribution of heavy, light, and food industries, which promoted Union republics' comprehensive economic development.

The following figures illustrate the huge expansion of industrial production in the formerly backward national republics. Between 1922 and 1972 industrial production grew by a factor of 513 in Tajikistan, by a factor of 527 in Armenia, by 136 in Turkmenia, 239 in Uzbekistan, 601 in Kazakhstan, and 412 in Kirghizia.

At the same time, given planned division of labour and specialisation and co-operation of production, there was no need to develop all sectors of the economy to the same level in every republic, the more so that some of them had neither the necessary natural resources nor economic conditions for it.

Economic zoning, which had begun in the 1920s in connection with the national formation, also played an important role in developing the productive powers of all the republics.

A working class grew among the indigenous population during industrialisation. It was very important that this growth was not only numerical but also qualitative, the moulding of a working class having only begun in fact in some of the national regions in the years of industrialisation. Most of the workers got occupational training in their national republic, under the guidance of skilled specialists directly at factories and construction sites. At the same time hundreds and thousands of members of the formerly backward nations were trained as engineers, technicians, and skilled workers at the educational establishments of the central regions, in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities, so as later to take an active part in the industrialisation of their republics.

The formation of a national working class was a major factor in the ethnic processes in the USSR. It was also a very important point that the quantitative and qualitative development of a working class among the indigenous population, linked by close social and production ties with workers of other nationalities, did double service (a) by encouraging national development *per se* and (b) by promoting friendship of all the Soviet peoples.

A working class was formed in most of the republics during the development of industry not as a nationally uniform entity but as a multinational one. This was because industrialisation called not only for heavy investment from the Union budget, supplies of various equipment, and the development of transport and communications, but also for the sending of skilled workers, engineers, technicians, and other specialists to the new construction sites. These workers

and experts were mainly Russians, Ukrainians, and members of other nationalities that were relatively more developed economically, who helped the population of the periphery to develop their economies and culture.

When individual industrial projects were completed in the republics, many of the workers, engineers, and technicians who had come from more developed parts of the country remained to work in them and became permanent inhabitants of areas that were foreign to them. The national composition of the population in the new industrial centres of the Union republics became more mixed.

The multinational character of the working class in several of the republics is also a substantial factor in the ethnic processes taking place in them. The joint labour of workers of different nationalities united by social and production ties strengthened an international spirit and encouraged close contacts between the working class in all the republics.

The number of workers employed in the large-scale industry of the republics rose rapidly in the course of industrialisation. Important steps were taken to train skilled workers from among the indigenous population. Prior to industrialisation most of the workers in Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics had been engaged in small-scale, technically very backward industries; after it the bulk of the working class in them was engaged in large-scale industry based on advanced technology.

The industrialisation of the republics helped draw women into industry, which was particularly important for the women of the Soviet East, where survivals of the patriarchal-feudal way of life held back their emancipation. Considerable progress was made in this respect. Thus, in the period from 1922 through 1971 the number of women employed in the national economy in Turkmenia, for instance, rose from 4 000 to 200 000 (from 12 to 40 per cent of the total number of employees), from 17 000 to 538 000 in Azerbaijan (from 14 to 41 per cent), from 800 to 238 000 in Tajikistan (from 5 to 38 per cent), and from 2 000 to 388 000 in Kirghizia (from 11 to 48 per cent).

The numbers of employed in the industries of the Union republics is steadily growing (see Table 7).

Along with the socio-economic development and industrialisation of the republics, old cities were rapidly rebuilt and expanded, and many new industrial centres arose. Their growth and the strengthening of country folk's various economic and cultural ties with the towns promoted urbanisation of the republics.

The agrarian reforms that began after the Revolution and were completed by mass collectivisation, were of the greatest importance for the building of socialism in the USSR. Collectivisation put the

Table 7

Numbers of Employees in the Industry of Union Republics (in thousands)

Republic	1926	1940	1965	1971	1975
RSFSR	2000	9025	18 082	20 403	21 433
Ukraine	750	2613.6	5 047	6 143	6 602
Byelorussia	61	394	781	1 070	1 193
Uzbekistan	22	181	492	598	697
Kazakhstan	23	178	849	1 075	1 161
Georgia	22	130	330	388	402
Azerbaijan	58	139	281	309	342
Lithuania	–	57	313	424	458
Moldavia	1.9	22.8	185	272	320
Latvia	–	113.6	347	400	405
Kirghizia	2.4	36	150	212	240
Tajikistan	1.5	31	104.5	134	153
Armenia	8	44	199	282	314
Turkmenia	5	41	80	93	102
Estonia	–	73	207	227	232

peasantry on the road of common, socialist farming and created the basis for an upsurge of farming, so backward in Czarist Russia. The socialist reforms in agriculture played an important role in the ethnic processes in the Soviet Union.

The agrarian reforms in the republics of the Soviet East had several specific features. The lands there, belonging to the Czar's family, officials, and the biggest feudal landowners, and to industrial and commercial firms, had already been confiscated during the Revolution and civil war. Socio-economic measures, like the land and water reform of 1921-22, were carried out after the civil war, and lands once taken away from the indigenous population were returned to them, while national inequality in land tenure was abolished.

Subsequently (in 1925-28) agrarian reforms had an anti-feudal bias, and to some extent an anti-capitalist one (e.g. the elimination of some of the kulak farms). These reforms differed in the various regions. In Central Asia and Daghestan they primarily concerned land and water relations. In Kazakhstan, Kalmykia, and other areas with a nomadic or semi-nomadic population major reforms were introduced in stock-raising. In Siberia land reforms predominated. In the Far North work was carried out to grant the indigenous population hunting grounds, pastures, and other lands.

The agrarian reforms played an important role in preparing the transition of the peoples of the Soviet East from predominantly pre-capitalist forms of social organisation and life to socialism, bypassing capitalist relations.

Collectivisation was decisive in the socialist transformation of agriculture. Although peasant farms had already been united in co-operatives in the early Soviet years, small peasant holdings (over 25 million) continued to dominate in the mid-1920s. The 15th Party Congress, proceeding from Lenin's co-operative plan, charted a course for comprehensive development of collectivisation. Propaganda for the pooling of peasant holdings and organising of collective farms began.

The mass collectivisation movement that began late in 192[illegible] led to 61.5 per cent of holdings being united by the middle of 193[illegible]

Collectivisation proceeded comparatively rapidly in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, and some national areas in the North Caucasus, as well as in the central parts of the country. It proceeded rather differently, however, among the nomadic and semi-nomadic herdsmen of the steppes and mountain steppe, and in the Far North.

At the beginning of a mass collectivisation a considerable part of the Nogais, Kalmyks, Bashkirs, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Altaians, Buryats, and also Evenks and some other peoples of the North continued to lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life in the North Caucasus, Southern Volga region, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Siberia. Many of these peoples still retained pre-capitalist forms of social organisation in the early 1920s. The plenum of the Central Committee of the Party held in November 1929 specifically stressed in its resolution the peculiarities and great complexity of the conditions under which socialist reconstruction of agriculture was taking place in certain national regions and republics where the development of collectivisation and building of state farms was linked with the elimination of survivals of feudal-tribal organisation.

Mass collectivisation began later among most of the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples than among the settled farming population, in 1930. It proceeded simultaneously with mass settling of the nomads and semi-nomads. The government gave much help to the people in national areas adopting a settled life to build settlements, organise land tenure, and build houses, farm buildings, etc.

While most of the nomads taking to a settled life in the past had been forced to it by impoverishment and loss of cattle, and had often had to put down roots in an ethnically alien environment, settling down under collectivisation was a consequence not of break-up of stock-raising or hunting but of a fundamental reorganisation converting them to diversified, modern, collective-farm production.

Despite certain difficulties, the overwhelming majority of nomads and semi-nomads had settled down by 1935, and within the next few years the transition to a settled way of life was virtually completed.

When collective farms were organised among this section of the population it was necessary to take their traditional tribal principle

into account when settling them. A collective farm and the inhabitants of a collective-farm settlement consequently represented one or two tribal groups. That was historically justified in a way, but there were attempts to organise the farms exclusively on the basis of clans or tribes. They were found to be mistaken and harmful to building of the farms. As collectivisation proceeded earlier social relations, tribal ones included, were broken up and replaced by new, socialist socio-economic links.

Mass collectivisation began in 1932-33 among the peoples of the North and proceeded more slowly; by 1940, however, it embraced most households. At first the simplest forms of collective farm were set up, often on the basis of traditional production associations of herdsmen, hunters, etc.

New opportunities for the development of a socialist economy and culture among the former nomads arose as a result of the transition to a settled way of life, and substantial ethno-cultural changes took place. Close new ethno-cultural relations developed among the former nomads, previously isolated territorially and economically, and now united by the single, socialist economy of a collective-farm and communal life. Collective-farm settlements became important centres of their national consolidation.

Some of the work force previously engaged almost exclusively in stock-raising was gradually released through the adoption of a settled life, better organisation of farm work, and mechanisation. Tens of thousands of former nomads consequently moved to cities and began to work in industry, which was of great socio-economic significance, and had a substantial impact on ethnic processes.

The successful implementation of Lenin's co-operative plan in national areas was of immense significance in eliminating their economic, social, and cultural backwardness. Collectivisation led to the abolition of a mixed economy in agriculture and victory of the socialist mode of production in the countryside. All the social foundations of the old way of life, which were particularly tenacious in the village, were shattered. The prosperity of the working peasantry, who constituted the bulk of the population of the national republics, rose steadily as a result of collectivisation.

The foundations of a socialist economy had been laid in the USSR in the early 1930s, and in the second half of that decade socialist society had been built in the main. The victory of socialism was registered in the 1936 Constitution. The nations and nationalities of the USSR became socialist ones as a result of the building of socialism not only as regards constitutional status but also in their socio-economic parameters.

Industrialisation and collectivisation and the triumph of socialist relations of production in all sectors of the economy enabled the Communist Party of the USSR to pose the objective of completing

the building of socialist society, which the peoples of the USSR began to do in the late 1930s. Their constructive efforts, however, were thwarted by Hitler Germany's perfidious attack in 1941.

Not only were there important changes in the Soviet economy during the war connected with its mobilisation for the war effort but also substantial ethnic and demographic shifts. Hundreds of enterprises were evacuated from the frontline areas to the east (from July to November 1941 alone 1360 big works were relocated), and great masses of the civilian population. The workers, engineers, and technicians who were evacuated with their works were only 30 to 40 per cent of their work force as a rule; the rest had to be recruited mainly from the local people (mostly women, pensioners, and adolescents).

The evacuation and resiting of industries, institutions, farms, higher schools, etc., set millions of people in motion. Most of those evacuated from the west settled in the Volga valley, the Urals, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and other regions. The eastern areas became more multinational, which led to an increase in contacts between nationalities in both urban communities and in villages.

The fact that 143 nationalities fought heroically side by side on the various fronts strengthened ties between them and friendship of the peoples was sealed by the blood shed together in the fight against the common enemy. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union, for example, was conferred during the war on 7998 Russians, 2021 Ukrainians, 299 Byelorussians, 161 Tatars, 107 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 90 Georgians, 89 Armenians, 67 Uzbeks, 63 Mordvins, 45 Chuvashes, 44 Azerbaijanians, 38 Bashkirs, etc.

The Hitlerites had counted on the friendship of the peoples of the USSR being weak and on inability of the multinational Soviet state to withstand the strain of war. The Soviet people's Great Patriotic War (1941-45) proved the fallacy of the German fascist ideologists' calculations and demonstrated to the whole world the indestructible friendship and monolithic solidarity of the peoples of the USSR.

The war inflicted enormous damage, particularly in the republics temporarily occupied by the invaders. Around 40 per cent of the Soviet population had lived in them before the war. Over 20 million people perished, while tens of thousands of communities and cities were wrecked and pillaged. The war, however, only slowed down the further development of socialist society in the USSR and did not stop it.

The country healed its war wounds and continued to develop its socialist economy rapidly in the postwar years, making new progress in this respect. Between 1951 and 1972, for instance, the national income rose by 480 per cent, while that of Great Britain rose by only 70 per cent, that of the USA doubled, of France and Italy

trebled, and of West Germany rose by 250 per cent.

The Soviet people's achievements and international changes made for the final victory of socialism in the USSR. Socio-economic progress after the war led to the consolidation of a developed socialist society. As Leonid Brezhnev put it in his speech on the occasion of the centenary of Lenin's birth:

> for the first time in the history of world civilisation, socialism has scored a full and final victory, a developed socialist society has been built and the conditions have been created for the successful construction of communism.[1]

A socialist way of life has become established among the Soviet people. Developed socialism means a high degree of maturity of the whole system of socialist relations, which are gradually evolving into communist ones. This has been reflected in the new 1977 Constitution of the USSR.

The Soviet people, members of all the nations and nationalities of the country, are building the material and technical basis of communism, using the advances of modern science and engineering. This calls for further comprehensive development of the economies of the Union republics and of the country as a whole. Each nation and nationality is not only contributing to the socio-economic development of the USSR by augmenting the people's common property of developed socialist society but is also cementing friendship of the peoples.

The development of a single Soviet socialist economy on a scientific, planned basis, and of a single national economic system that unites the economies of all the Union republics into a single whole, is particularly important for ethnic processes, being a major factor in the further rapprochement of all the country's nations and nationalities.

The laws of the development of socialism condition strengthening of the economic ties between Soviet republics. They operate simultaneously in both the economy of the country as a whole and in each individual republic, but their specific manifestations vary under the influence of republics' specialisation, viz., the availability of natural resources, historically established social division of labour and other factors.

Rational distribution of the productive forces is an important part of the general programme of building the socialist economy in the USSR and for the economic drawing together of the socialist nations. A new territorial division of labour has evolved between the republics and individual regions on the basis of a rational distribution of the productive forces, above all of industry.

[1] L. I. Brezhnev. *Lenin's Cause Lives On and Triumphs* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970), p. 30.

The evening out of economic development levels of the Union republics continued after the war. The industry of Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldavia, Latvia, Kirghizia, Armenia, and Estonia developed faster than the average for the USSR. Under capitalist governments Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were artificially held back in industrial development and became agricultural appendages of the major West European capitalist countries. It has only been since the war that the Baltic republics have been able to achieve economic revival on the basis of socialist industrialisation.

Soviet society, by meeting the targets of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75), as the 25th Congress of the CPSU pointed out, made significant new progress towards building communism. Its economic potential has almost doubled in the past ten years. Under the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-80) economic ties between the Union republics within the single USSR economy were further expanded, the effectiveness of the territorial division of labour increased, the contribution of each republic and region to the common cause enhanced, and the republics' economic development levelled up further.

The national regions of Czarist Russia, once raw material appendages of the central areas, have become major regions with a developed large-scale industry, their own power, mining, and manufacturing industries, and modern transport. A planned division of labour and co-operation and specialisation of industry have led to the development of intensive economic relations between the Union republics. Byelorussia, for example, supplies other republics with machine tools, motor vehicles, tractors, computers, radio sets, glass, fertilisers, consumer goods, farm produce, and so on. At the same time it receives a variety of industrial and agricultural products from the RSFSR, the Baltic republics, Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and Kazakhstan. These links and other factors are an important condition for consolidating friendship of the Soviet peoples and the drawing together of the separate nations.

The individual republics' economies, while being components of the Soviet economy, are at the same time the basis of their own national development. The moulding of socialist relations of production and the overcoming of their past mixed economies, economic development, and a stable community of economic interests in the separate republics were the basis of national consolidation of their indigenous populations.

The industrial and agricultural specialisation of the separate regions of the national republics, conditioned primarily by their natural resources, promoted the development of intra-republican links. The development of railways, road transport, and airlines, and the building of highways helped draw the most remote, isolated areas of the republics into their common economic affairs and made

intra-republican economic, cultural, and other ties possible within these nations.

The building of collective farms, which broke down the isolation of the small peasant households, united them in big production units. The resulting concentration of population and the peasants' increasing contacts with the city on a sound economic basis were also of paramount importance as regards national consolidation of the big and small Soviet peoples alike.

The statistics and the findings of sociological studies also testify both to a considerable increase in the mobility of the population in the republics and various contacts between the urban and rural population, and also to a continuing process of urbanisation that has had a big impact on the peculiarities of ethnic processes in the republics.

The social and territorial division of labour is a major factor in consolidating economic contacts within and between the Soviet nations. Both types are being systematically and harmoniously developed under socialism complementing each other, and strengthening both the general unity of the USSR's economy and a certain specialisation and balance of the economies of its constituent units, which is not an end in itself since the part is subordinated to the whole. Ethnically, economic contacts lead, on the one hand, to internal consolidation of the nations and nationalities and, on the other hand, to inter-ethnic integration.

On the whole the socio-economic development of the peoples of the USSR has been a major factor in the moulding of a new historical community, the Soviet people.

Chapter VI

CHANGES IN THE SETTLEMENT AND URBANISATION OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR AS CONDITIONS OF AND FACTORS IN ETHNIC PROCESSES

The development of ethnic processes is largely determined by features of the territorial location of the interacting ethnic groups, i.e. by the peculiarities of their settlement, which operates in this case not simply as an ethnic characteristic but also as a factor of the ethnic processes.

An important component of the characteristic description of ethnic processes is an analysis of their territorial development, with the identification of the areas and populated centres where they are proceeding particularly rapidly, the more so that they proceed more intensively among the urban population than among the rural population due to a number of causes, including the special features of the settlement of ethnic groups in towns.

The special features of the settlement of peoples include first of all the character of the main ethnic territory, which may be compact as among the Byelorussians and Turkmens, or scattered, as among the Mordvins and Buryats. The relationship between this ethnic territory and the territory of the corresponding administrative, national unit, is also of major importance. They may coincide quite neatly, as, for example, with the Udmurts and Chukchi, coincide largely, and finally coincide partially, as with the Evenks and Tatars. The total number of people of a given nationality, and the percentage of them living outside their republic, must be taken into account. We must also consider how far they are territorially isolated and how they are mixed with other peoples both in the towns (disperse settlement of nationalities, or settlement by streets or quarters, or by districts of the town, etc.), and in rural localities (dispersed settlement of nationalities in villages of another nationality, settlement by streets or by quarters, by separate villages and groups of villages of a comparatively uniform ethnic complexion, etc.).

The type of settlement of an area is most important, whether it is settled (not nomadic), compact, linked with farming, or scattered and fluid, linked with nomadic stock-raising or hunting. The Even

hunters and reindeer herdsmen, who are scattered in small groups over an immense area of the wooded tundra zone of the Far East, are roughly the same in number as the Rutul farmers and stockbreeders who live comparatively compactly in an area of Daghestan (the Evens have also preserved a relative integrity of ethnic territory), but typologically these two peoples, like the ethnic processes taking place among them, differ strongly. The territorial dispersion of the Evens, we must note in particular, together with their small numbers and low density, has held back their ethnic consolidation, and is still retarding it.

The typological series compiled conformable to the USSR to study ethnic processes can be represented as follows:

—Russians, the biggest people in the USSR, who compactly inhabit a considerable part of its area and constitute a substantial part of the population of most autonomous and Union republics (which enhances their role in the process of inter-nation convergence);

—large peoples with a compact ethnic territory constituting the overwhelming majority of the population in the towns and villages of their republics (Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, etc.), though separate groups of these nationalities live outside their republics mixed among other peoples;

—large peoples concentrated mainly within their republics, but living considerably intermingled with other peoples (Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.);

—large peoples, some of whom are settled comparatively compactly within their republics but of whom a sizeable part live outside the republic, highly mixed with other peoples (Armenians, Chuvashes, etc.);

—peoples constituting a minority within their republics (especially among the urban population) and strongly intermingled with other peoples, with small groups living outside the republic (Kazakhs, Kara-Kalpaks, Bashkirs, etc.);

—peoples, part of whom live in their republics, but the bulk outside, much mixed with other peoples (Tatars, Mordvins, etc.);

—small, compactly settled peoples with their own national formation (Circassians), or without such (Abazins, Rutuls, etc.);

—small, territorially scattered peoples, weakly intermingled with other peoples (Chukchi, Koryaks, etc.);

—small, territorially scattered peoples living very intermingled with other peoples (Yukaghirs, Kets, Itelmens, etc.);

—nationalities living in different regions of the country and constituting a majority of the population in only a few populated centres (Germans, Poles, Bulgarians, etc.), and nationalities distinguished by their dispersed settlement in various places in the country (Jews, Gypsies, Assyrians, etc.).

These main types of settlement are already formed but continue

to undergo change mainly because of the migrations of groups of people of different ethnic affiliation. Through migration people are torn from their native, accustomed environment and often come to be not only in quite different natural conditions but also in another linguistic and cultural ethnic environment, keeping up only a sporadic intercourse with previously close people. Migrants settling in a new place of residence adapt to the new environment socially and culturally, learn the language of the environment, if they had not known it before, or had not known it well, gradually abandon their former customs and habits, and finally, dissolve ethnically into the environment, and assimilate to it, if not in the first generation, then in the next generations. Such assimilation is also furthered by the sex/age composition of the migrants.

There are almost no statistics on migrations of nationalities in the USSR, so that a survey of changes in the settlement of peoples has to be based mainly on a comparative analysis of the returns of the censuses of 1926, 1959, 1970, and 1979. It is particularly difficult to analyse the period from 1926 to 1959 both because of its length and because it was greatly complicated as regards migration due to the war years.

Some of the migrants of 1941-45 were people evacuated to the east from western areas; altogether there were 25 million (3 500 000 from the Ukraine, 1 500 000 from Byelorussia, and so on). A considerable number settled in the autonomous republics of the Volga area, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. In the first months of the war alone, for instance, more than 700 000 persons were sent to the Uzbek SSR, 600 000 to Kazakhstan, and so on. The evacuees, in their new places of residence, often in another ethnic environment, were influenced by the latter both culturally and linguistically while at the same time exerting an influence on it. Some remained there permanently, contracted mixed marriages which promoted ethnic processes.

The migrations connected with army service during the war were even more extensive. They involved millions of men, and probably hundreds of thousands of women, and had a great effect on ethnic processes. Many servicemen, who had previously not been outside their birthplaces, turned out to be in various parts of the country and even abroad, fighting side by side with the other nationalities of the country against the common enemy. Service in the army widened their outlook, broke down old traditions, encouraged the dropping of religious and other prejudices. Because the main language of communication in the army was Russian, army service promoted mastery of Russian by people who had not previously known it. Ex-soldiers and officers, returning home, took an active part in civilian life, furthered the spread and consolidation of internationalism and the development of ethnic integration.

As for the relationship between the distribution of a people and the boundaries of the respective national republic, the proportion of a number of peoples, and primarily Russians, living outside their republic, is growing gradually, due above all to the considerable migration of Russians from the RSFSR to other republics. Whereas 93.4 per cent of the Russian population of the USSR lived in the RSFSR in 1926, in 1979 the proportion was 82.6 per cent; in the period between these censuses the number of Russians in the RSFSR rose by roughly 60 per cent (from 72 600 000 to 113 600 000), and in the other republics by 370 per cent (from 5 100 000 to 23 900 000). Taking the average rates of growth of the Russian population, this means that some 15 million Russians migrated from the RSFSR to other republics.

The main reason for this considerable migration of Russians was the need to recruit cadres for rapidly developing sectors of the economies of the republics, and above all of industry, because the training of local personnel did not usually keep pace with the rates of economic development. Only in a few cases (mainly in Kazakhstan) was the influx of Russian settlers substantially connected with the developing of fertile lands.

The inflow of Russians to the various other Union republics was far from uniform. A steady increase in the number of Russians is typical of the Ukraine, Moldavia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirghizia. Kazakhstan is most indicative in this respect, the numbers of Russians growing there from 1 300 000 in 1926 to six million in 1979. In Byelorussia and the Baltic republics there was a permanent influx of Russians only after the war. In Azerbaijan and Georgia there was a reduction in the number of Russians from 1939 and 1959 respectively. In Armenia and Turkmenia the inflow of Russians in 1939-50 practically ceased and was only renewed after 1959.

The picture of Russian migration into the autonomous republics of the RSFSR was quite complex. There was a comparatively steady growth in the numbers of Russians, due without doubt to the inflow of new groups of settlers, in the previously sparsely settled northern and eastern autonomous republics (Karelia, the Komi ASSR, Yakutia, etc.). The Russian population in the Komi ASSR, for example, rose from 13 700 in 1926 to 630 000 in 1979. There was also an inflow of Russians into the autonomous republics of the Northern Caucasus, especially into the Kabardin-Balkar and North Ossetian ASSRs. The picture in the autonomous republics of the Volga area is more variegated; in some (Udmurtia and Chuvashia) the proportion of the Russian population rose, due to inflow; in other (the Tatar ASSR and Mordovian ASSR) there was a certain outflow of Russians, especially in 1939-59.

There was also a considerable migration of Ukrainians and Byelo-

russians from their republics, but its scale is quite difficult to determine from the census returns because there were major territorial changes in both these republics in 1939-45, on the one hand, while Ukrainians and Byelorussians are usually in active contact with Russians in the new places, on the other hand, and merge with them. It is this merging that explains, for example, the marked drop in the number of Ukrainians living outside the Ukrainian SSR from 8 800 000 in 1926 to 4 800 000 in 1939. During the last decade the proportion of Ukrainians living outside the republic has increased slightly. The number of Byelorussians outside their republic fell insignificantly between 1926 and 1939, but in the following years their numbers rose from 660 000 in 1939 to 1 762 000 in 1970, mainly as a result of migration, but had again fallen to 1 484 000 in 1979.

As for other peoples in the various Union republics, there has been a relative (and sometimes absolute) reduction of their groups outside their republics, especially in recent decades, because the reduction through assimilation among them (and sometimes also because of a lowering of natural growth) has not always been covered by an influx of new migrants. This reduction was most marked of all among Armenians between 1926 and 1979, the percentage of them living outside the Armenian SSR falling from 52.6 per cent in 1926 to 34.4 per cent in 1979 (with an absolute growth in numbers from 800 000 to 1 400 000). Only the Georgians and Uzbeks are exceptions; their proportions outside their republics have been almost unchanged since 1939.

Considerable migration from their republics is characteristic of many of the peoples of the autonomous republics of the RSFSR. The number of Tatars living in the Tatar ASSR rose after 1926 from 1 200 000 to 1 500 000, while the numbers outside it increased from 1 800 000 to 4 400 000 (which was around 60 per cent and about 74 per cent of all the Tatars in the country). At least a third of this growth came from migration of Tatars from the Tatar ASSR. This migration naturally led (and in the immediate future must lead) to a strengthening of the interaction of the migrants with other ethnic groups. A certain rise in the proportion of peoples living in their own republics (typical mainly of the Karelians, Mordvins, and Komi) is connected with the fact that their natural assimilation is proceeding more intensively outside their republics.

The uneven involvement of the various peoples in migration and their different rates of natural growth, and in certain cases a substantial change in the boundaries of their republics, have affected the national composition of the population of the republics of the USSR. In the RSFSR and all the Union republics of the European part of the USSR (except Byelorussia) there has been a reduction, at least since 1959, in the proportion of the basic nationality. In all the Transcaucasian republics there has been an increase in the propor-

tion of the basic nationality since 1939, mainly owing to natural growth of the indigenous population. There has also been an increase in the proportion of the basic nationality in all the republics of Central Asia since 1959, where inter-republican migration is not great, and the continuing, in most cases, influx of other nationalities, in particular of Russians, is offset by the high natural increase of the indigenous population.

Even in Kazakhstan, where because of the massive inflow of groups of other nationalities the percentage of Kazakhs fell from 57.1 in 1926 to 30.0 in 1959, it had, for the reasons given, risen again to 36.0 by 1979, the percentage of Kazakhs concentrated in the Kazakh SSR growing from 77.2 in 1959 to 80.7 in 1979.

In some of the autonomous republics of the RSFSR (the Tatar, Bashkir, and others) the indigenous population has, for various reasons, recently somewhat grown as a percentage of the total population, the major reasons being fewer migrations compared to the Russians, and a greater natural growth in the native population. In other republics (as Mordovia and Chuvashia) the population has hardly changed in terms of ethnic composition, while in some republics there has been a fall in the percentage of the basic nationality. In the Karelian and Yakut autonomous republics, for instance, the proportion of Karels and Yakuts in their republics has fallen constantly from 1926 to 1979 (from 37.4 to 11.1 per cent and from 81.6 to 36.8 per cent respectively). While in Yakutia the population has included a greater ethnic mix, and only from 1970 have there been fewer Yakuts than Russians, in Karelia the proportion of Russians has been growing since the republic was established. Similar processes are occurring in many autonomous regions and areas.

There is, on the whole, a considerable amount of migration in the USSR. In 1967 alone approximately 10 million people changed their place of residence (populated centres), and that figure should be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 if we include unregistered and temporary moves. Of the above figure, 5.5 million people moved from one town or city to another, 3.1 million from the countryside to town or city, and 1.5 million from town and city to the countryside. These migration processes are thus linked with industrialisation and urbanisation (in this case with the growth of towns).

According to the first general census in Russia in 1897, 15 per cent of the total population (within the current borders of the USSR) lived in towns and cities, and by the start of World War I that figure had risen to 18 per cent. By 1917 there had evidently been another increase, but the civil war and economic problems greatly slowed down urbanisation, and in some regions even caused people to migrate from towns to rural areas. The urban population began to grow steadily again only after 1923, and by 1926 it had already reached the 1913 level. Industrialisation was accompanied by

growing urbanisation, which was also promoted by collectivisation and the mechanisation of agriculture. The urban population was counted by the 1939 Census as being 32 per cent of the total population. By 1959, 48 per cent of the country's population lived in towns and cities, by the beginning of 1970 that figure was 56 per cent, and 62 per cent in 1979.

The rates of urbanisation in each of the major national territories of the USSR are shown in Table 8.

In 1913, when the general level of urbanisation was rather low, percentages of urban populations varied widely: from 38 per cent in Latvia to 9 per cent in Tajikistan. From 1913 to 1939 the urban population grew most markedly in Turkmenia and Armenia, where previously there had been little urbanisation; in the republics with greater urban development, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan, the rates of growth in the urban population were lower than the country's average.

From 1939 to 1959 the growth in the urban population was on the whole more even than from 1913 to 1939. Urban development proceeded comparatively slowly in the Ukraine and Georgia, where the proportion of the urban population had been comparatively high by 1939; in Moldavia, less urbanised than the other Union republics, the urban population grew only from 13 to 22 per cent. Urbanisation proceeded most rapidly in the Tajik SSR, where the urban population almost doubled; there was also a large increase in the urban population in Latvia (by 21 per cent) and the RSFSR (by 19 per cent).

Table 8

Proportion of Urban Population in USSR Republics (per cent)

	1913	1939	1959	1965	1970	1975	1979
The USSR as a whole	18	32	48	53	56	60	62
Republics:							
RSFSR	17	33	52	58	62	67	69
Ukraine	20	34	46	51	55	59	61
Byelorussia	14	21	31	38	43	51	55
Lithuania	13	23	39	44	50	56	61
Latvia	38	35	56	61	62	65	68
Estonia	19	34	56	62	65	68	70
Moldavia	13	13	22	26	32	36	39
Georgia	26	30	42	47	48	50	52
Armenia	10	29	50	55	59	63	66
Azerbaijan	24	36	48	50	50	51	53
Kazakhstan	10	28	44	47	50	53	54
Uzbekistan	24	23	33	36	37	38	41
Turkmenia	11	33	46	49	48	49	48
Tajikistan	9	17	33	35	37	38	35
Kirghizia	12	19	34	38	37	38	39

After 1959 growth rates of urban populations decreased somewhat, this being accompanied by a sharp accentuation of the differences in the urbanisation rates of the various national republics. These were rapid in the Russian Federation and almost all the other republics in the European part of the USSR. In all these republics, except Moldavia, there was a fall in the rural population in absolute as well as relative terms, of 6.8 million in the RSFSR and 1.3 million in the Ukraine from 1959 to 1970. By contrast, in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics there was a considerably reduced growth in the urban population. It grew by only 5 per cent from 1959 to 1979 in Azerbaijan, in Kirghizia and Turkmenia there was virtually no change, and lately it even fell in Tajikistan, where the rural population (because of the high birthrate) grew somewhat faster than the urban. In Uzbekistan the percentage of urban residents increased by eight per cent from 1959 to 1979.

It is beyond the scope of this work to examine all the reasons behind the differences in urbanisation in the national republics. We will note only that a significant role was played by natural conditions, such as the presence or absence of economic minerals on the basis of which local industry could be developed, the presence of fertile lands suitable for the development of agriculture, and also the forms of agriculture practised in a specific region, providing peasants with higher or lower incomes, etc. Ethnic factors, such as language, culture, customs, and others, were also of importance. Before examining these ethnic factors, we shall look briefly at the national aspects of urbanisation.

Urbanisation, examined territorially, in terms of the Union republics, looks very different from the ethnic picture, as the populations of many of the republics were of complex ethnic composition, and various nationalities participated to differing degrees in the urbanisation process. The 1926 Census indicates that in almost all the republics the percentage of the urban population was higher than that of the urban residents among the basic nationality. In 1926 only 1.4 per cent of all Kirghiz and 1.5 per cent of all Turkmens lived in towns or cities, while at the same time the urban population as a percentage of the total was 12 in Kirghizia and 11 in Turkmenia. The reason for this is that a large part, sometimes the vast majority, of urban dwellers in most of the republics, were of other nationalities, usually Russians. We should note in passing that there was a very low percentage of urban residents among nationalities with their own autonomous republics: in 1926 it was 0.8 among the Mari, 1.0 among the Buryats, and 1.2 among the Udmurts. Among these nationalities the Tatars were unusual in having a high urban population of 14.4 per cent. In 1926 both the Armenians (35.4 per cent) and the Russians had high proportions of urban residents among them (see Table 9).

Table 9

The Percentage of Urban Residents among the Nationalities of the USSR

	1926			1959			1970			1979
	Total	in their native republic	outside their republic	Total	in their native republic	outside republic	Total	in their native republic	outside republic	Total
Russians	21.3	19.6	45.3	57.6	54.9	74.3	68.1	65.6	80.2	74.4
Ukrainians	10.5	10.9	9.4	39.2	36.7	55.2	48.5	45.8	65.8	55.6
Byelorussians	10.3	17.7	21.6	32.4	25.5	65.5	43.7	37.1	71.1	54.7
Letts	–	–	–	47.4	46.7	57.3	52.7	51.7	68.3	58.0
Lithuanians	–	–	–	35.0	33.0	53.5	46.4	45.9	59.6	57.3
Estonians	–	–	–	47.0	46.9	48.9	55.1	54.7	59.0	59.1
Moldavians	(4.9)	(3.6)	(7.0)	12.9	9.6	32.2	20.4	17.2	39.0	26.8
Georgians	16.9	16.0	64.1	36.1	34.8	71.8	44.0	42.7	77.8	49.1
Armenians	35.4	20.1	49.3	56.3	46.0	69.2	64.8	62.7	68.2	69.7
Azerbaijanian	15.8	17.0	8.9	34.7	36.4	26.3	39.7	41.3	29.6	44.5
Kazakhs	2.2	2.1	3.4	24.1	24.2	23.5	26.7	26.3	28.2	31.4
Uzbeks	18.6	18.3	20.4	21.8	20.2	30.5	24.9	23.0	35.0	29.2
Turkmens	1.5	1.6	1.2	25.4	26.3	14.6	31.0	31.7	21.3	32.3
Tajiks	15.2	4.8	33.3	20.6	19.5	23.7	26.0	25.5	27.5	28.1
Kirghiz	1.4	0.8	5.3	10.8	10.9	9.7	14.6	14.5	15.6	19.6
Tatars	14.4	5.6	19.5	47.1	29.5	53.8	55.0	38.6	60.8	62.8
Bashkirs	2.1	1.8	4.6	19.6	13.6	37.2	26.6	19.7	44.2	36.8
Mordvins	2.2	–	–	29.1	6.1	38.0	29.1	22.7	35.8	47.4
Chuvashes	1.8	0.6	3.1	19.7	12.2	27.8	36.1	17.2	43.7	38.8
Mari	0.8	0.5	1.3	11.7	7.4	17.0	20.5	14.6	26.4	31.2
Udmurts	1.2	0.8	2.8	22.2	18.5	34.2	32.1	28.0	41.1	41.6
Chechens	1.0	0.2	8.8	22.3	9.1	40.7	21.8	17.8	21.1	25.3

We should also note that in terms of national composition, urban populations were more complex than rural populations.

This feature of urban populations was indeed noted by Lenin:

> Towns ... play an *extremely important* economic role under capitalism, and everywhere, in Poland, in Lithuania, in the Ukraine, in Great Russia, and elsewhere, the towns are marked by mixed populations.[1]

This view is supported by the Soviet population censuses, especially where cities, including the capitals of the national republics, are concerned. In some cases towns and cities not only had a more varied population, but it was also ethnically different from the rural population in the surrounding areas.

The national composition in towns and cities differed widely from that in rural areas in many autonomous republics in the RSFSR, in Central Asia, and in other areas of the country. In the Bashkir ASSR, the Bashkirs made up 1.7 per cent of the urban and 34.0 per cent of the rural population (Russians 69.6 and 32.0 respectively); in the Chuvash ASSR, the Chuvashes made up 8.4 per cent of the urban and 84 per cent of the rural population (Russians 88.4 and 8.9 respectively). In the Kirghiz ASSR in 1926 the Kirghiz made up 4.6 per cent of the population in towns, and 75 per cent of that in rural areas (Russians 37.2 and 8.2, Uzbeks 42.7 and 6.7 respectively). In most cities the indigenous nationality of a republic made up a relatively small portion of the residents, and although with time that portion has gradually increased, it has not yet caught up in some cases.

The reasons for the comparative ethnic uniformity of rural populations have not yet been seriously studied, although such a study would greatly help to delineate the ethnogeographic specifics of the urbanisation process. The most important of these reasons is the direct link binding rural residents to the land as the focal point of their work, their economic activity. This leads to the emergence and growth of territorial and neighbourly bonds created by a natural community of interests in land utilisation, joint ownership of some kinds of land, etc. These bonds are reinforced usually by traditions of mutual assistance. This impedes the acceptance into the rural environment of groups of other nationalities, who may be viewed by the local peasants as aliens little deserving of trust. Where there are distinct linguistic, cultural, life style, and religious differences between the local and the immigrant population in countries where the national question has not been solved and the ruling classes play on national feelings, such mistrust develops easily into enmity and sometimes open hostility. For this reason, in Czarist Russia migrants

[1] V. I. Lenin. Critical Remarks on the National Question. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 50.

to rural districts belonging to other nationalities tried, as a rule, to found their own settlements.

These traditions of ethnic isolation are fairly long-lived. Even in Soviet times, when the main aspects of the national question had been solved, migrants to newly developed areas founded more or less ethnically uniform settlements, or streets within settlements.

The assimilation of groups of other nationalities into towns is facilitated by weakened neighbourly ties, traditions of mutual economic assistance, and other elements characteristic of rural life. Another important factor in this process is the greater gravitation into towns and cities of the liberated work force, which becomes more marked as there is less agricultural land available and urban industry continues to expand. In many cases the forces of 'attraction' and 'repulsion' are ethnically selective and have a greater effect on some national groups than on others.

The reasons for the multinational population of some cities in the USSR, primarily the capitals of the Union republics, and for the flow of Russians and other culturally close ethnic groups into towns and cities in the national regions of the USSR are very varied. Among the most important of these is undoubtedly the rapid economic development in national regions when the indigenous population does not have sufficient personnel trained in 'urban' occupations and professions, and the number of new personnel trained cannot keep pace with economic development. There are other reasons, which were particularly important in the pre-revolutionary period.

Many towns and cities in national districts in the south and east of the country grew up as strongholds for the borders of the Russian state, which had been expanding since the 15th century, and as administrative centres, while from the very founding of the towns military and administrative as well as trading and craft functions were carried out primarily by Russians. The influx into these towns of local non-Russians and other peoples was often hampered by direct administrative ban or difficulties in incorporating them into the urban estates. Often the indigenous residents themselves were reluctant to change their traditional way of life, particularly if their culture and life style differed greatly from the Russian urban way of life, and originated exclusively from their agricultural background.

Urbanisation was particularly slow among nomadic stock-raising peoples, who had never come into contact with urban life (Kazakhs, Kirghiz, some Bashkirs, etc.). On the whole the transition of these peoples to a settled way of life began only after the Revolution, and even then they moved slowly into towns. In some cases religion, evidently, was also a factor.

After the Revolution urbanisation proceeded in new socio-economic conditions, when the Leninist national policy was being

implemented, this proclaiming the equality of all the country's peoples and making it possible for previously backward peoples to catch up with the more developed nations. This process was, however, inevitably influenced by the general regularities which had previously governed the shaping of the urban population's national composition, the more so as many cities in national regions grew and developed largely as Russian cities.

In the new conditions, too, urbanisation was characterised by a flow of Russians and groups with similar cultures into many cities in the territories of other nationalities. This flow, as we have already noted, was governed by the economic development needs of national regions and facilitated by the fact that new urban arrivals found themselves in a familiar native environment and part of the majority population. Yet this same circumstance discouraged the non-Russian population from moving into towns, especially if their language and culture was very different from the Russian. Language was a particular barrier in the way of the settling of other national groups, as to adapt to urban life they needed a good working knowledge of Russian as the basic language of communication among nationalities, and the basic language of science and technology and most of the skilled jobs which created normal social and occupational mobility among the urban population.

This language barrier to urbanisation, a barrier which existed in some national regions, could be overcome mainly by the mass spread of bilingualism, which was naturally a lengthy process. The other alternative was to increase the functions of the national languages, and gradually replace Russian with them, but that would have required even more time, and, in addition, conditions were not always conducive. It would take a similarly long time to overcome the cultural and psychological barriers in the way of urbanisation. These blocked the transition from a rural to an urban way of life, from seasonal agricultural labour to daily work in industry. So the main industrial, scientific, and technological personnel in many towns in the national republics were for a long time mostly Russians and from other ethnic groups whose language and level of urban culture were similar to those of the Russians. Urbanisation among some local nationalities was relatively slow, and they made up a sizeable proportion of the urban population employed in the service industry and also in administration and education.

At the time of the 1926 Census the percentage of urban residents among Russians living in the RSFSR was considerably lower than among Russians living outside the republic (19.6 and 45.3 per cent respectively). The lowest percentage of Russians among the urban populations of the national regions was in Armenia, where, prior to the Revolution, industry had been very weak; here, also, the Russians had one of their lowest percentages among the entire popula-

Table 10

The Percentage of Nationalities Among the Entire Population and in the Towns for Each Republic as of 1926 (within the borders then existing)

Republic	Main indigenous nationality		Russians	
	among the entire population	among the urban population	among the entire population	among the urban population
RSFSR*	77.8	84.9	77.8	84.0
Ukrainian SSR**	80.6	47.4	9.2	25.0
Byelorussian SSR	80.6	39.3	7.7	15.6
Moldavian ASSR	30.1	7.6	8.5	23.3
Georgian SSR	67.0	48.2	3.6	11.8
Armenian SSR	84.4	89.3	2.2	3.2
Azerbaijan SSR	62.1	37.6	9.5	27.0
Kazakh ASSR	57.1	14.4	19.7	52.6
Uzbek SSR***	74.2	57.0	5.4	19.2
Turkmen SSR	70.2	7.0	8.2	46.4
Tajik ASSR	74.6	73.6	0.7	9.9
Kirghiz ASSR	66.6	4.6	11.7	37.2

* Without the Kazakh ASSR and the Kirghiz ASSR
** Without the Moldavian ASSR
*** Without the Tajik ASSR

tion. The highest percentage of Russians among the urban population was in Kazakhstan, although their total number was comparatively small (less than 20 per cent of the total population in the republic), and in Turkmenia (see Table 10). In Byelorussia and the Ukraine Jews formed a large part of the urban population (40.2 and 22.6 per cent respectively). In Moldavia and Kazakhstan the same was true of Ukrainians (36.9 and 5.9 per cent), in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenia of the Armenians (25.2, 15.9, and 9.7 per cent), and in Tajikistan and Kirghizia of the Uzbeks (10 and 42.7 per cent). With the exception of the Ukrainians, who migrated mainly to rural areas, the above nationalities had a higher percentage among urban residents than among the total population of the respective republics.

On the whole in 1926 in a given republic, with the exception of the RSFSR and the Armenian SSR, the proportion of the main indigenous nationality was higher among the whole population than among the urban residents. This difference was particularly great in Turkmenia and Kirghizia, where the Turkmens and Kirghiz were numerically predominant among the rural population, and made up only 5-7 per cent of the total urban population, i.e. less than Russians, Uzbeks and other nationalities. Georgians and

Table 11

The Urban Population Percentage for Union Republics and Nationalities for 1959 and 1970

Republic	Main indigenous nationality				Russians			
	among the total population		among the urban population		among the total population		among the urban population	
	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970
RSFSR	83.3	82.8	87.2	87.2	83.3	82.8	87.2	87.2
Ukrainian SSR	76.8	74.9	61.5	62.8	16.9	19.4	29.9	30.0
Byelorussian SSR	81.1	81.0	67.0	69.4	8.2	10.4	19.4	28.4
Lithuanian SSR	79.3	80.1	69.1	73.2	8.5	8.6	17.0	14.4
Latvian SSR	62.0	56.8	51.6	47.0	26.6	29.8	34.4	47.3
Estonian SSR	74.6	68.2	61.9	57.3	20.1	24.7	30.8	33.9
Moldavian SSR	65.4	64.6	28.2	35.0	10.2	11.6	30.4	28.8
Georgian SSR	64.3	66.8	52.9	59.8	10.1	8.5	18.8	14.7
Armenian SSR	88.0	88.6	91.9	93.3	3.2	2.7	4.5	3.8
Azerbaijan SSR	67.4	73.8	51.3	60.8	13.6	10.0	24.8	18.3
Kazakh SSR	30.0	32.6	16.7	17.1	42.7	42.4	57.6	58.4
Uzbek SSR	62.2	65.5	37.2	41.2	13.5	12.5	33.4	30.4
Turkmen SSR	60.9	65.6	34.7	43.3	17.3	14.5	35.4	29.0
Kirghiz SSR	40.5	43.8	13.2	17.0	30.2	29.2	51.8	51.4
Tajik SSR	53.2	56.2	31.8	38.6	13.3	11.9	35.3	30.0

Armenians showed the greatest tendency to settle in towns outside their own republics, and Turkmens the least. Among Ukrainians, the percentage of the native urban population was higher within the Ukraine than without.

Between 1926 and 1959, when the urban population grew considerably, there were some fundamental changes in its national composition caused by the influx into towns and cities of non-Russians, particularly of the indigenous nationalities of any given region. In the Ukraine and Byelorussia there was at the same time not just a relative but an absolute reduction in the towns of some groups of other nationalities. As a result of this process, which had begun even before 1939, and also because of the reunification of some western Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands and the migrations during and after the war in both these republics, by 1959 the main indigenous nationalities were in an absolute majority in the towns and cities (see Table 11). The local indigenous population in Georgia and Azerbaijan also moved into towns and cities, but in fewer numbers.

In Armenia the proportion of the indigenous population continued to grow both among the rural and urban populations. In recent decades urbanisation has been rapid because of an influx of Armenians

from the rural districts of the republic and of Armenians returning from abroad (about 100 000), who mostly settled in towns and cities.

Among the peoples examined in this chapter, the percentage of urban residents grew most markedly among the Ukrainians—from 10.9 to 39.2 per cent. This trend was particularly strong among Ukrainians living outside the Ukraine, where the percentage grew from 9.4 to 55.2 per cent. There was also greater urbanisation among Byelorussians, Georgians, and Armenians living outside their republics.

In the Baltic republics, which became part of the USSR in 1940, the urban population had its own specific compositional features. After the war, particularly in Latvia, the number of Russians living in towns and cities increased considerably, although in 1959 most of the urban residents in all the republics came, as formerly, from the main indigenous nationalities. We should note that the Lithuanians, who were on the whole the less urbanised among the Baltic peoples, had a higher percentage of urban residents in their own republic than the Letts or Estonians had in theirs. In 1959 still very few Moldavians lived in towns and cities both within Moldavia and throughout the country, and in Moldavia most of the urban residents were of other nationalities.

In Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics more Kazakhs, Turkmens, and Kirghiz, formerly backward in this respect, moved into towns, while fewer Uzbeks and Tajiks did so. The percentage of urban residents rose most steeply among the Turkmens—from 1.5 to 25.4 per cent, but neither the Turkmens nor any of the above nationalities were in a numerical majority among the urban population of their republics in 1959. The Uzbeks and the Tajiks, who had a somewhat greater proportion of urban residents, in this period, and especially from 1926 to 1939, moved only in small numbers into towns and cities. Most of the new arrivals in the rapidly growing towns of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were of other nationalities. The proportion of Uzbeks among the urban residents of their republic therefore fell from 57 to 37.2 per cent, and of the Tajiks in their republic from 73.6 to 31.8 per cent, while the proportion of Russians increased considerably (see tables 10 and 11).

On the whole, the numbers of Russians living in towns and cities in the RSFSR and in other republics increased much more rapidly than their total numbers. While from 1926 to 1970 the general number of Russians outside the RSFSR grew from 5.1 to 21.3 million, in the towns this figure rose from 2.3 to 17 million.

Many of the trends noted above continued from 1959 to 1979. This is especially true of the urban populations in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics, which continue to grow largely because of an influx of other ethnic groups, mostly Russians, not of the indigenous nationalities. Only very slowly does the indigenous

population in the Central Asian republics migrate into the towns and industrial areas of other parts of the USSR. Generally speaking, the relative intensity of the migrations of the indigenous populations of the Union republics to the districts, towns and cities of Siberia, where there is a largely Russian population, is higher, the closer the language, life style, and culture of the migrants to the language, life style, and culture of the Russians. In this respect Byelorussians and Ukrainians have obvious advantages over such peoples as the Kirghiz and Tajiks, and they provide both in absolute and relative terms more migrants to Siberia, although their ethnic territories are much further away.

From 1959 to 1979 the percentage of urban residents grew most markedly among Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and other fairly urbanised peoples. The most urbanised peoples in the USSR remain the Russians and Armenians, the percentage of urban residents being particularly high among Russians outside the RSFSR. Of the nationalities with their own Union republics, in 1979 the Kirghiz had the lowest percentage of urban residents (19.6 per cent), and of the peoples living in autonomous republics, the Tuvinians (22 per cent). The number of urban residents rose sharply among the peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Soviet Far East who were previously unacquainted with urban life; in 1979 the proportion of urban residents among them was on average 17 per cent, lowest of all for the Dolgans (13 per cent) and highest for the Nivkhs (33 per cent).

In the Union republics the number of Russians among the urban population rose considerably in Byelorussia, Latvia, and Estonia; in the RSFSR and the Ukraine it remained static, and fell in all the remaining republics, largely because of increased numbers of the indigenous nationalities in towns and cities.

If we analyse migrants in terms of their sex and age, normally the most mobile people are the young or middle-aged, prevalently male; where large distances are concerned, the numbers of migrants that are single prevail over those with families. In Magadan Region, for instance, according to the 1959 census, there were almost twice as many men as women in the 20-29 age group in the countryside, and one-and-a-half times as many in the towns (in the European part of the RSFSR in this age group men were in a slight majority in the rural areas, and women in a slight majority in towns and cities). When single migrants settle in a new place they often marry into other nationalities, which cannot but affect ethnic processes.

The sex ratio in various national groups of urban residents is also indicative of specific features of the national composition of the urban population, although it is unusual to find major divergences here. In 1926 the percentage of males among the urban population in all the nationalities looked at was somewhat above the average for the corresponding nationality; the most marked fluctuations of the

sex ratio were among people who had only recently begun to move into towns and cities. Among the Moldavian urban population men made up approximately 57 per cent (less than 50 per cent in rural areas), and among the Kazakhs 58.5 and 52.5 per cent respectively, etc. Only among Russians and Uzbeks was the percentage of males in towns somewhat below the average, although for both peoples a high level of men in towns was the rule outside their respective republics. In 1959 the percentage sex ratio in towns and cities for Russians was the same as the national average, although in the RSFSR and most other republics there was a lower percentage of males in towns, and only in Kazakhstan was it much higher. Most of the other nationalities had an above average proportion of men in towns and cities, both throughout the country and within their republics. Only among Estonians and Letts was the percentage somewhat lower than average.

In conclusion we should stress the direct dependence of the development of linguistic and hence ethnic processes on specific aspects of the population spread among the peoples of the USSR.

Linguistic processes are examined in another chapter. Here we shall only note that linguistic assimilation is stronger among population groups living outside their national republics. According to the 1970 population census 90.1 per cent of Byelorussians living in Byelorussia declared their native language to be Byelorussian, and the figure was 40.9 per cent for Byelorussians living outside the republic.

In rural areas linguistic assimilation is slower, as a rule, than in towns and cities. In 1970 93.8 per cent of Byelorussians in rural areas and 63.4 per cent of Byelorussians in towns and cities claimed their native language as Byelorussian, and among the Chuvashes the same figures were 94.5 and 68 per cent. The reason for this is the more conservative way of life of the rural population which tends to be less mobile, and also the more uniform composition of the populated areas in the countryside. Towns, especially when they are large, such as industrial, commercial, administrative or cultural centres, often attract groups of different nationalities from the farthest regions of the country. These groups, as they go about their ordinary lives, working and studying, help ferment ethnic processes in towns and cities.

Chapter VII

ETHNIC PROCESSES AS REFLECTED IN THE MATERIAL CULTURE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR

Before the Great October Socialist Revolution the material culture of the peoples of Russia was extremely diverse, the reasons for this being varied geographical environment (from tundra to desert and subtropical), specific household and cultural types, the complex national composition of the population, disparities in the socio-economic development of the population, variation in life styles, and specific features of historical development. Some aspects of life style were also determined by religious differences.

Socialist industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation caused deep and varied changes in the traditional life styles of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, primarily affecting production. Specific ethnic features were already being muted in industry long before the Revolution, and from 1920 to 1940, after modern technology came into use, specific ethnic features began to disappear rapidly in agriculture as well.

Increased material prosperity had a revolutionising influence on life style both in towns and cities and in the countryside. The departure from archaic and primitive forms of material culture, which had been widespread in Czarist Russia, became more rapid.

The advance to a powerful economy made it possible to implement the vast programme for improving the standard of living of the entire population of the Soviet Union.

The standardisation and unification of material culture, and changes in life style brought about by technological progress led to specific ethnic features in the everyday life of Soviet nations becoming ever more muted.

1. Settlements and Dwellings

Before the Revolution the peoples of Russia lived in settlements of the most varied kind, due to factors of agriculture, natural conditions, and tradition. Most of the population (82 per cent) lived in rural areas. In the European part of Russia rural settlements grew up

largely by lakes and rivers and along postal routes. In the middle and southern wooded steppe and steppe zones of the European part people lived in large settlements, evenly spaced over the territory, the houses laid out along streets or in rows. In the small villages, a chapel, and in the large villages a church and market place normally were in the centre. There was usually a common granary on the outskirts. This kind of settlement was typical for most of the peoples of European Russia: Russians, Ukrainians, the Volga peoples and Byelorussians. In the North the Russians, Karelians, and some of the Volga peoples lived in a different, 'cluster', kind of settlement. Villages lay close together in small groups ('clusters') which were separated from each other by a large uninhabited area. The houses usually huddled together, without any rigid plan.

In some regions in the west of the Ukraine, the RSFSR and the Baltic republics (present territory), the *khutor* was a common form of settlement. It could be a large village, a small village, or consist of just one farm, depending on land ownership and land tenure forms, and on the type of farming practised.

Most of the stock-raising peoples of Russia, right up to the Revolution, lived in separate winter (usually where food for the livestock had been laid in) and summer (light summer structures) settlements. The winter settlements consisted of *pisé* dwellings and buildings for the animals (Uzbeks, north Turkmens, south Kirghiz, and Kazakhs), or *yurtas*, i.e. conically shaped tents of poles covered with skins or felt (north Kirghiz, Kalmyks, some Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kara-Kalpaks and Kazakhs), put up in groups a considerable distance from each other. In each group of *yurtas* lived mostly relatives. In spring some, or even all of the *yurtas*, were moved to the pastures.

The peoples of the North and North-East, who kept large herds of reindeer (the Koryaks, Nentsi and Chukchi) also lived a nomadic life. Their camps, consisting of three or four *yarangas*[1] where relatives lived, were moved along a fixed route whenever the state of the grazing required. When they adopted a settled way of life in those districts where they came into close contact with Russians (e.g. the Koryak fishermen from the Gizhigin district), their settlements consisted of log cottages built on the Russian model, and were like the Russians', apart from the absence of clearly delineated streets.

The settlements of the peoples of the Caucasus and the settled peoples of Central Asia were largely unplanned. The structures were built higgledy-piggledy, often leaning one against the other. The large settlements were divided into blocks of irregular shapes, sometimes separated from each other by gateways. The streets were often so narrow that one could stretch out a hand and touch the houses on

[1] Circular tents with a conical top of poles covered with reindeer skins.

the other side, and such streets were found in many industrial settlements.

The layout of the settlements depended on local relief. Mountain peoples, it being almost impossible to find a flat area of land, built their settlements in the form of an amphitheatre (the Avars, Darghins, and Yagnobs). The houses were so close to one another that the roofs of the lower houses served as yards for the upper row.

For defence purposes the villages in some districts of Central Asia were surrounded by high walls (the Khorezm Uzbeks and Turkmens), while in the mountainous districts of the Caucasus battle towers were built (the Svans, Khevsurs, Ingushes, Avars, etc.).

Most rural settlements were inhabited by one nationality only, even if several nationalities lived in the district. Only the migrant settlements, many of which grew up at the end of the last and beginning of this century in the sparsely populated areas of Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, and also in the south of the Ukraine, North Caucasus and Moldavia, were exceptions. People from 10-15 different nationalities would often live in one village, although people from the same area always tried to live beside one another.

Many peoples of Central Asia lived in *auls* inhabited by just one family group (Turkmens, semi-nomadic Uzbeks, Kara-Kalpaks, Kirghiz and Kazakhs). In the large settlements inhabited by different groups of relatives, each of them lived in a separate quarter (Tajiks from the mountains and Darghins). This feature influenced the planning of Central Asian towns. In Bukhara, for example, settled mostly by Tajiks, although situated on territory conquered by the Uzbeks who maintained tribal divisions, different tribes as well as different peoples established themselves in their own quarters. Each quarter had a mosque and public water reservoir. A group of quarters made up a quarter community, which had its own graveyard. Migrants from the European area of Russia (Ukrainians, Russians, Germans, Tatars, Armenians, and others) lived together in a special part of the town.

Towns were arranged in such a way in other areas, too. In Rostov-on-Don, for instance, there were Russian and Armenian quarters; in Tbilisi there were no division on Georgian and Armenian quarters, but there was a special one for Muslim Azerbaijanians. The population spread in the Caucasus was also dictated by religious adherence.

Social inequality, which was particularly apparent in towns and cities, also affected settlement structure: the aristocratic quarters and quarters for people of average means were surrounded by the slums of the poor.

The great economic, cultural and social changes after the October Revolution inevitably affected the distribution principle, and partic-

ularly the outlook of new settlements. Towns, settlements and even whole districts began to be settled by many peoples of the USSR (Komsomolsk-on-Amur, the virgin lands of Kazakhstan, the Altai region, etc.). Communications between local groups and peoples, between towns and countryside, between the outlying areas and the centre became more numerous and frequent. State housing construction developed rapidly, particularly after the end of the 1940s, and new ways of planning materialised, these often reflecting national custom and tradition.

Linear street planning is now common everywhere. New quarters, wherever they are, are built with the most modern town-planning techniques, where blocks of flats alternate with green areas, squares, and public buildings. Traditional building materials and methods give towns a national appearance. In Yerevan tufa, the traditional building material, has been used in blocks of standard design. In Frunze, Ashkhabad, Alma-Ata and Dushanbe many buildings and ensembles are designed using local ornamental traditions. In Tashkent and Dushanbe decorative features are murals and alabaster carving. Georgian architects use national architectural traditions in designing modern blocks of flats: through ventilation, deep sections, and long, wide balconies shading the flat and loggias. These, combined with typically Georgian open grille work, give the buildings a national appearance. Architects from the Baltic republics have done much recognised and successful work.

The geography and types of rural settlement have changed considerably. In the 1920s and the early 1930s old settlements were smartened up and provided with services. Ten years later, after total collectivisation and the settling down of peoples who had previously led a nomadic or semi-nomadic life, the rural settlements of these peoples underwent fundamental changes.

In the European part of the Soviet Union, under the influence of the new collectivised agriculture and new way of life, some kinds of settlement (the *khutors* and small cluster settlements, for instance) began to disappear; other kinds, such as large villages, began to develop. Most of the new settlements were built according to a plan which took account of local features.

The destruction caused in the Great Patriotic War necessitated a lot of new building, not just mere restoration, both in town and countryside. New large, well-equipped settlements grew up in Karelia, Byelorussia, the Baltic republics, the Ukraine and the North Caucasus in place of the big and small settlements which had been destroyed. They were planned according to the modern standards prevailing throughout the country: they consisted of squares housing administrative and cultural establishments, and a residential area with apartment buildings arranged in blocks. Some peoples preserved traditional planning features. In Byelorussia, for instance, houses

are usually put with butt-ends onto the street. In the Ukraine and Moldavia they are usually enclosed with a garden by a fence.

A distinctive feature of modern agricultural and hunting settlements is the delineation of the cultural and administrative centre, and the isolation of the production area from the residential district. This feature is found in new construction areas among all the peoples of the USSR, and is particularly apparent in new settlement areas, especially in the virgin lands of Siberia and Kazakhstan.

The settlements of the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of the USSR whose transition to a settled way of life began back before the Revolution have changed radically. After the Revolution this process became more rapid: by 1928 25.5 per cent of Kazakhs were leading a settled way of life. This process became widespread at the start of the 1930s with collectivisation, and was completed at the same time as the latter. By 1935 most of the Kazakhs were leading a settled way of life, and by 1940 this applied to the Kirghiz, too.

In some regions and districts (in Kirghizia and north Kazakhstan, for instance) it was not particularly difficult to establish these settlements. They were sited largely in areas settled already by former nomads or the rural Russian population. In the sandy steppes of Turkmenia, Kara-Kalpakia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan system of land tenure had to be established and irrigation provided before these settlements could be formed. Interestingly, groups of relatives, and ethnic groups in multinational settlements always tried to build their houses either next to or opposite each other.

The nomadic peoples of the north-east of the country began to adopt a settled way of life in 1929-32. Lacking any traditions of this way of life, they built their first settlements on the model of those of the local settled inhabitants: Russians, Itelmens and Russified Koryaks, who had earlier adopted the Russian type of settlement and dwelling. A major role in this process was played by the cultural centres, which included cultural, educational and economic departments, which were to help the nomadic peoples in adopting a settled way of life and to teach them cultural and economic skills which they would need.

Those Siberian peoples who continue to make their living by stock-raising have two kinds of settlement—old and new. Grazing large herds requires constant moving about, and teams of herdsmen live in temporary settlements of the old kind, while their families live in large, modern, permanent settlements. These latter originally grew up near schools and shops, and were not completely permanent. Later permanent bases appeared, and eventually, large central estates of the collective farms.

By the start of the 1950s many peoples of Northern Siberia and the Far East, who had lived on individual farms or in small settle-

ments tens and even hundreds of kilometres from each other, were moving into large settlements.

These settlements, in their planning and the services provided (water, communications, green areas, etc.), are proof of the disappearance of the gap between the rural settlements of settled and formerly nomadic peoples. Built using industrial methods, and provided with all facilities, they are often superior to the settlements of peoples who have long led a settled way of life. The new settlements hardly differ from large industrial ones.

The dwelling is the most permanent part of material culture. Buildings erected recently stand sometimes side by side with those built tens and even hundreds of years ago. Before the Revolution most residences in Russia (in rural areas and partly in towns and cities) were built according to the rules of national architecture, where ethnic traditions were preserved, handed down from generation to generation, from builder to builder.

Most of the dwellings in large towns, and only a few in medium and small towns, were built according to architectural design. In professional architecture, which had its own laws of development, with changing styles prevailing in certain periods over large areas, ethnic traditions made their appearance only in indirect form.

The work of architects, as representatives of a specific ethnos with its own architectural traditions, was to a certain extent governed by these traditions. In its turn, urban architecture influenced national rural architecture. At present all urban and some rural dwellings are designed by professional architects.

Before the Revolution the peoples of the USSR lived in traditional dwellings of extremely varied kinds (different in form, building material, construction, height, planning), the functions of the sections also being very diverse (division into sections fulfilling certain household and everyday needs, reflected in the interior). As the type of dwelling depended on economic conditions and geographical environment, it varied not only in different, but even in identical ethnic environments. The rural Russian population, from the White to the Black Sea and from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean, lived in dwellings of various kinds: in the north of the European part of the USSR Russians lived in large houses raised above ground level with a yard on two levels, and farm buildings under one or several attached roofs. Russians in the southern provinces lived in small ground-level cottages with an enclosed uncovered yard, which housed the farm buildings. Social status also provided a great contrast in dwellings: rich Russian peasants lived in spacious, sometimes two-storey mansions, while the poor peasants lived in low, usually two-roomed cottages which were often no more than a wooden framework.

Nevertheless the dwellings of the Russian people had some common traditional features: the material (wood) and the log struc-

ture, which were common to other peoples, too, the internal planning and heating (the Russian stove), the connection of the house with the farm buildings, the construction of the roof, and the architectural design (proportions, carving, etc.), which distinguished the Russians from other peoples, even those with similar languages and cultures.

Russian migrants, when moving to a new area, built traditional Russian dwellings where at all possible. Wood was the building material for Russians wherever they were. Even when they moved to unforested areas they tried to build log houses. Migrants to the steppes of South Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and also of the Kuban brought wood from the Urals over many hundreds of kilometres. The Russian migrants on the Don built their homes from floated timber. Only when they had lived there for many years, and been directly influenced by the Ukrainians, a people culturally very similar to them, did they exchange wood for clay.

The internal design of the heated dwelling area for Russian houses was very rigid, the front corner always being diagonally opposite the stove. Other neighbouring peoples also shared this feature: the Karelians, Mari, Mordvin Erzya, the peoples of Latgalia and Eastern Lithuania, the Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Moldavians. The Baltic republics are a good example of several peoples sharing the same kind of dwelling.

In some cases, as a result of ethno-cultural links, such planning spills over beyond the settlement area of a given people, in others it does not extend throughout their territory. In the latter case either a common kind of planning develops, or the traditions of the neighbouring ethnographic group or people are adopted, this process being easier, the more similar the cultures of those peoples. This usually applies also to ethnic groups living within the settlement area of another people.

Dwellings in multinational districts before the Revolution were particularly varied. In the North Caucasus, for example, the Adygeis and Kabardinians lived in one-storey homes of wattle covered with clay, thatched with straw or reeds; the Balkars lived in one-storey stone houses, while the Ossetians, Chechens and Ingushes lived in two- and three-storey structures with a flat earth roof; the Karachais and Balkars of the Baksan Ravine lived in log homes with a wooden roof.

The dwellings of peoples living in similar natural conditions and leading a similar way of life, had many common features, especially where structure, construction and planning are concerned. Dry stone walls and roofs, with a broad cornice resting on poles, were common not only in the Caucasus, but also further to the east and in Central Asia.

Some common features in farmstead and dwelling planning were

of religious origin, especially if there were religious taboos. Muslim peoples (Adygeis, Kabardinians, Azerbaijanians) lived in houses with a windowless wall facing the street. The rooms lay in a row, each with a separate entrance door from the yard, while the houses of some peoples (the Adygeis, for example) had two doors, so that the woman might leave without encountering the man entering. Uzbek farmsteads took the form of an enclosed complex: all th dwelling and farm structures faced the street and neighbouring farm with windowless walls. Internally the farmstead was divided into two sections, separated by a *pisé* wall: the outer, man's part, where guests were received, and the inner, woman's part, where the family actually lived.

The transportable dwellings of the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Siberia were very varied. Many of those who had for centuries reared livestock (the Kirghiz, for instance) lived in *yurtas*, not only in *ails* but also in permanent settlements. The poor had small *yurtas* covered with torn strips of felt, while the rich lived in spacious *yurtas* thickly bound with white felt and decorated with ribbons and carving on the doors.

The differences in *yurta* construction were largely in the dome part, which had a traditional form, not just among different peoples, but also among different tribes. There were some variations in the mechanism and design of the hinged door, and in the means by which the felt was attached to the body of the *yurta.* The *yurta* was covered with different materials: with bark and reindeer skins in Siberia, and with felt and mats in Central Asia.

The most common transportable dwelling among the hunting and reindeer herding peoples of the North and Siberia (the Samodian peoples, North Yakuts, Yukaghirs and Kets) was a light, conical tent of poles covered with branches, grass or straw, suitable for use in wooded tundra. Despite its primitive nature, it was well adapted to the northern climate, and snow-drifts never formed around it. Its construction differed from people to people, each having its own way of joining the poles to the body, of attaching the covering, hanging the pot above the fire and of fastening the door.

The socialist changes after the Revolution and the increased prosperity of all the peoples of the Soviet Union led to improved housing and influenced the forms of rural dwelling. Many peoples, especially those who had previously led a nomadic way of life and partially preserved elements of self-sufficient farming abandoned the primitive transportable dwellings and the homes which resembled dug-outs.

New features, such as a number of rooms, improved lighting and ventilation, and more space due to fewer storage and farming rooms, became common among all peoples of the USSR.

The areas where traditional planning and heating methods are

still used are gradually growing smaller. Intra-national contacts are bringing a certain element of unity into these features. Southern Russian dwellings have been raised above ground level, while the northern Russian dwelling now has a lower cellar. The Russian stove no longer exists everywhere. Where it is still installed, it is smaller, and usually sited in a separate kitchen or in the centre of the house. In the countryside and sometimes in towns, there is general use of cheap modern materials and also long-lasting, fire-resistant materials such as brick, slag concrete, and for the roofs—iron, slate or tiles, while traditional Russian log walls are still in use.

Traditional building skills, handed down from generation to generation, have been enriched and added to by new techniques. The laying of walls in brick and stone houses has improved, as have the methods of covering; homes are now built on stable brick or wooden foundations. The new houses have more and larger windows, which also include small ventilation windows, and often have large glassed-in corridors and terraces, which increase the functional space of the house. Almost all rural homes have gas stoves, refrigerators, running water and hot-water heating.

The unification of material culture, of dwellings in particular, applies not just to Russians, but to many large peoples who until recently lived in local ethnographic groups preserving their own way of life.

In Central Asia, as in the Caucasus, historical, cultural and local traditions are gradually disappearing, and there is greater cultural exchange within and between nations, and this affects dwellings. This process is particularly apparent in Uzbekistan, where the dwellings tended to have specific local features, as in Bukhara and Ferghana. Over recent decades this process of unification has been so accelerated by the urban culture common throughout the Soviet Union, that now there is only one type of Uzbek national dwelling, which in form is very similar to the urban dwelling. The house forms a rough square, as opposed to the traditional narrow rectangle, with foundations of burnt brick or other water-resistant material, painted floors and other innovations, all originating in the town. The windows facing onto the street, not into the courtyard, and the absence of the division into the outer and inner courtyards show that the old religious taboos have lost their relevance.

Most peoples adopted a settled way of life gradually, and at first they used two kinds of dwellings, which still coexist today, although in smaller numbers. The Kara-Kalpaks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz often use *yurtas* in the summer, along with their well-equipped winter homes of traditional or urban type. *Yurtas* are also used by shepherds away on distant pastures. At present the individual rural dwelling of the peoples of North-East Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Kazakhs and Kirghiz) is of a special type, the result of

the influence of Russian and Ukrainian cultures. The peoples of the south-west republics (Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens) modelled their dwellings on the traditional forms used by those of them already leading a settled life, and so they preserve a number of local features. Over the last decade, with the use of standard design in rural dwellings, too, they are becoming more and more like urban houses.

In Siberia there is growing convergence between the indigenous population and Russians, and this affects dwelling types. Cultural and life style differences here are also gradually disappearing. Everywhere the traditional dwellings are being replaced by modern log houses, which only occasionally preserve some traditional details.

The picture is much the same in the Far North, where the traditional *yarangas* and grass-covered tents are only to be found occasionally among hunters, while most peoples live in log houses of the Russian type, both in permanent settlements, and in temporary hunters' camps.

We should note that throughout the ethno-cultural regions looked at, the most common form of rural dwelling remains the individual farmstead, with a living area of three or four rooms and a hall. This type of dwelling forms 80 per cent of all rural dwellings.

The new homes constructed in rural areas are designed to harmonise with the type of agriculture practised, and to be provided with an urban standard of facilities, and so they are often in the form of multiflat and multistorey blocks.

Interior design, especially in rural dwellings, reflects ethnic traditions and cultural links between peoples. They are less apparent in urban homes because of industrialisation and standard residential urban construction. Recent decades have seen greater manufacture of paint and wallpaper, furniture, carpets and various household appliances contributing to the uniform appearance of the interiors of town homes, although in some ethno-cultural regions such as the Caucasus and Central Asia they retain some traditional features.

Since the Revolution rural home interiors have gone through several stages. In the 1920s and the start of the 1930s they changed slowly, mostly within the traditional pattern. In the latter half of the 1930s and the early 1940s (after collectivisation and settlement of nomads) they changed much more rapidly tending towards internationalisation. This process became particularly intensive after the mid-1940s, and yet rural home interiors still retain many traditional features.

Before the Revolution the interiors of the homes of the eastern Slavonic peoples were uniform throughout the areas where they lived. The furniture was usually immovable and was part of the general design of the log house, and purely functional. Only the richest people in suburb settlements had wooden beds, sofas and

chairs, designed by local craftsmen in imitation of urban styles. This uniformity was enlivened by original ornamentation, among local groups as well as separate peoples. Some Ukrainian groups whitewashed and painted the white walls and stoves of their cottages, and decorated them with patterned ceramics or various home embroidered fabrics.

In Soviet times these immovable constructions have been replaced by movable furniture more rapidly, especially since the number of rooms in a home has increased. At first movable furniture was installed in the living area, and then in the bedroom. Even now some local Russian groups living in outlying areas such as the European North, Eastern Kazakhstan and in the Altai only rarely employ immovable constructions, and then only because they have survived in old houses. Until the end of the 1930s rural residents tended to use locally produced furniture; over the last twenty years both Soviet and imported factory-manufactured furniture has become widely used.

At the same time ethnic features are still apparent in interiors. In the kitchen they influence both the equipment and the planning, and in other rooms they take the form of traditional decorative elements. Over the last decade, as the intelligentsia has formed a more distinct stratum in the countryside, there has been a rebirth of interest in, and increase in the amount of, traditional decorative items. In Novgorod Region, for instance, these are tablecloths, serviettes and other items decorated with cross-stitch, in Ryazan Region, hand-woven carpets and tablecloths, in Tambov Region, carpets, in the Urals, painted trays, and everywhere people use fabrics decorated in the national style. Some local Russian groups, in the south-west of Odessa Region for instance, still decorate their homes with hand-woven towels, carpets and tablecloths, woven even by young women. In their work they use motifs borrowed from the surrounding Ukrainians, Moldavians and Bulgarians, as well as Russian patterns. All Russian groups living in outlying areas decorate their homes with the crafts of other peoples: Russians living in the North Caucasus and Central Asia have Caucasian and Central Asian carpets, the Russians of Siberia use fur carpets and decorative Buryat pockets, while Russians in Lithuania and Estonia have ornamental Baltic fabrics and ceramics. This mixture of ethnic styles is particularly common among the urban population.

The interiors of the homes of most of the peoples of the European part of the Soviet Union (Byelorussians, Karels, Komi, Mordvins, and others) are very similar to that described above. The change from immovable to movable furniture occurs earlier among some peoples (the Baltic peoples and Ukrainians) and later among others (the Volga peoples); the kitchen is the last place in the home to change, and even now retains some traditional elements.

The guest chamber is now used as a general-purpose room and for festive meals. Here you find features common throughout the USSR and Europe.

In regions where the population is mixed, cultures interact particularly strongly. Russians, for instance, have influenced the home interiors of the Volga peoples, and themselves borrowed some of their features: those living near the Chuvashes have adopted some motifs from Chuvash polychrome painting, while those living among the Tatars widely use the traditional Tatar brightly-coloured calico bedspreads.

Cultures act upon each other the more strongly, the longer they are in contact. In the migrant settlements of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, where the population originates from various areas of the Ukraine, Russia and Byelorussia, those peoples have adopted common ways of decorating their homes: there is both architectural carving, which comes from the Russians and Byelorussians, and wall painting from the Ukrainians.

The Kazakhs and Kirghiz, in the modern homes, use some decorative methods borrowed from the Russians and Ukrainians. In keeping with their national traditions, however, the focal point is the walls, and not the stove (as it is with the migrants). The lower half of the walls is painted in patterns, resembling those of the old friezes in the *yurtas*.

There was almost no furniture in the Tajik home: kitchen utensils were kept in niches in the walls near the hearth, while bedclothes were piled in niches in the front, usually the south, wall. At night these were laid out in fixed order on pieces of felt and mats which covered part of the floor. During the day the family ate here, sitting around a tablecloth on special padded mattresses and cushions.

The furniture consisted of just a small table over the heating hole, a small cupboard for crockery and a chest for bread. Each member of the family tied his clothes into a bundle which were also stored in a pile. This arrangement was also common among other Central Asian settled peoples: Uigurs, Dungans, and Southern Kirghiz, who were strongly influenced by Tajik and Uzbek cultures.

Traditional elements of interior design now exist mainly in the kitchen and guest rooms, while modern furniture stands in the other rooms. The kitchen still has niches and shelves for utensils, while in the guest room the bedclothes are piled in a heap.

The colour range in the homes of various peoples is also very wide, and the motifs used in carpets, felt carpets, embroidery and other decorations are also extremely diverse with filigree embroidery and patchwork items very popular among the Tajiks and Uzbeks, leather work among the Kirghiz, drawings, usually of flowers, and white curtains with traditional embroidery (depicting a phoenix admiring flowers, or fish near a lotus flower) among the Dungans, while

embroidered curtains, edgings and fur carpets are common among the Kirghiz. The rooms of recently married couples are particularly richly adorned.

In the multinational districts of Central Asia, in the Kulyab Valley for instance, inhabited by Tajiks, Uzbeks, Baluchi and Arabs, a uniform interior combining elements of the traditional cultures of all those people is gradually evolving.

There are some common features to be observed in the way the interiors of peoples who have only recently adopted a settled way of life evolve. The habit of living almost without furniture was for a long time carried over into permanent homes. From the *yurta*, were transferred the shelves for utensils, chest and low table for eating, and they were placed almost exactly where they had been in the *yurta*, so habitual was that way of life. Decorations were also transferred. The Lokai Uzbeks from Tajikistan hung and placed around the walls of their new *pisé* homes decorative bags and sacks for storing utensils and other objects in approximately the same places as they had hung in the *yurta*.

Now bought furniture and other modern elements are making their appearance in rural interiors. Yet, because of tradition, there is still little furniture, and great use is made of the floor space. It is therefore important that it should be clean, and shoes are taken off upon entering, or exchanged for slippers.

Similar processes have been taking place among the peoples of the North and Siberia, especially, among former nomads, where furniture is concerned.

Both recently nomadic and settled peoples retain the traditional decoration of the home. Yakuts hang their walls with fabrics, carpets of reindeer skins and saddle-cloths embroidered with beads. Felt carpets, leather bags and attractively decorated leather utensils are common among the Altaians, while we find fur items among the Chukchi and Eskimos, and boxes and other objects of birch bark among the Khanty and Mansi.

The changes in the USSR in population distribution, settlements, and dwellings and their interiors reflect the fundamental processes within socialist society: the convergence of everyday rural and urban life, the interaction and mutual enrichment of the cultures of different peoples.

On the whole the development of settlements and dwellings shows clearly defined trends towards the internationalisation of everyday life and the convergence of the material foundations of the way of life of the peoples of the USSR. These processes are expedited by general industrialisation, the development of the mass media and other aspects of technological progress.

Traditional dwellings in their planning and construction are steadily converging with each other and with individual urban dwell-

ings, as a result of the general residential construction industry.

Ethnic traditions are mainly apparent in home interiors, although even here there have been major changes. Sharp differences in interior between different social groups have already disappeared, and urban and rural interiors are becoming more alike.

Cultural interaction also influences internal planning and functions: town-planning features are becoming widespread in the countryside, while some features of rural homes are being adopted in urban life. In both urban and rural dwellings there is a trend towards increased numbers of rooms, each with a specific function: kitchen, bedroom, nursery, etc., and the use in everyday life of formerly ceremonial rooms (guest room), so that the load on each room is more evenly spread.

2. Clothing

The history of a whole people and of its individual groups leaves its mark on the clothes they wear. In addition, clothing always shows a people's artistic taste. For these reasons clothing is an important cultural area in which ethnic processes are reflected.

Before the Revolution national clothing was very varied, despite the development of capitalist relations, which helped to mute national and local features in dress.

The general urban European fashions predominated in the towns of European Russia (including the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic states) and Siberia. Only some sections of the urban population wore national costume, and then in altered form. Urban workers, for instance, wore the long, full Russian shirt with the collar fastening at the side (*kosovorotka*), long boots, light, tight-fitting coat (*poddyovka*), and peaked cap. Some of these items (such as the long shirt worn with a belt outside the trousers) was also worn by members of the intelligentsia with democratic beliefs who wanted to stress their links with the people. In the Baltic states the national costume was worn for festive occasions and holidays.

In the 19th and early 20th centuries the traditional Russian forms of dress were retained mainly among the peasantry. Almost everywhere men traditionally wore the long, full shirt and narrow trousers of white canvas, or coarse, thick linen or cotton. There were two types of female dress: one southern, one northern. In the north a sleeveless dress buttoning in front (*sarafan*) was worn over a blouse, while in the south they wore a blouse with a homespun checked, or more rarely striped, skirt. Male and female outer clothing was similar, consisting of various kinds of caftans or long, flowing robes, given different names in different areas. Just before the Revolution traditional costume was still worn mainly in the South, and also in parts of the North and in Siberia.

In the Ukraine traditional forms of dress were also mainly found in rural districts and among ethnographic groups. There was a great variety of national costume among Western Ukrainians: Gutsuls, Lemks, Boiks, and others living in the mountainous districts, where contact with others was limited. It was also a result of the population fragmentation caused by the old feudal system, of semi-subsistence farming and other factors.

In the east of the European part of Russia, among the peoples of the Urals and the Volga area, traditional dress was worn by the rural (and part of the urban) population, which lived in compact groups, or formed ethnographic groups cut off from the main bulk of their people, surrounded by other nations. This depended on the level of economic development, social relations and the degree of isolation of a given group. An important factor was the national awareness of a people, which survived despite the Russifying policy of the autocracy.

Local traditional costume was common among most of the Northern and Siberian peoples untouched by capitalism, although it was nevertheless subject to change in the form of Russian urban styles.

In Central Asia and the Caucasus, where patriarchal and feudal relations still exerted a strong influence and where capitalism was poorly developed, traditional dress was commonly worn in towns as well as in the countryside.

At that time class differences were very apparent in traditional dress. Among the Kabardinians, Adygeis, Ossetians and other peoples of the North Caucasus, for instance, where there was a strong feudal hierarchy, there was a special aristocratic costume. The female costume in noble families was richly trimmed with gold thread and lace, and the women also wore a tall pointed headdress with gold and silver trimmings, high-heeled shoes and long, decorative sleeves.

In Eastern Georgia the men of the upper classes wore long black dress (*kaba*), and the peasants wore short belted camisoles (*chokha*). In Abkhazia the Circassian coat (long, narrow and collarless) was a privilege of princes and nobility, while the peasants wore shorter caftans without cartridge pockets.

The same was true in Central Asia and Siberia. The Buryat feudal lords, their wives and families wore expensive materials, usually brocade robes (*terlig*) or fur-lined coats (*degel*), trimmed with otter or beaver fur and gold and silver coins. Only a few women in the countryside wore the complete set of gold ornaments.

Among peoples with developed capitalist relations, the ruling classes had adopted European dress. Russians completed this transition in the 18th century. In the 19th and early 20th centuries there was no one form of peasant dress, due to the lack of uniformity in social and ethnic relations.

Religious adherence also influenced national costumes.

It is noteworthy that Muslim women in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan observed the custom of covering their faces with *paranja* (net veil) mostly in towns, and only occasionally in rural areas.

The Revolution brought major changes in clothing both in town and countryside, especially for men and young people. Russian urban dress became much more widespread. In the 1920s there was a movement against harmful outdated aspects of dress and elements connected with superstition or which were designed to stress women's subservient position. Much was done to abolish the yashmak in Central Asia and among the Muslims of the Caucasus, and to uncover the faces and heads of married women, which was formerly forbidden among many peoples. An example of departure from unhygienic forms of clothing is the abolishing of the female *chegedek*[1] among the Altaians (the *sigedek* among the Khakassians), which was worn by a married woman until it was threadbare and which had become a symbol of women's dependence and subservience.

Although archaic forms were being abolished, there was at the same time a renaissance of interest in national costume as part of national culture. The wearing of the national costume stressed the idea of the free development of nations and nationalities and their equal participation in state life. In the 1920s, for example, it was common for delegates, especially women of various national republics, to congresses and conferences and deputies to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies to wear national costume at meetings. This tradition is still partially observed today.

National identity and the development of ideas of internationalism gave rise to new forms of national dress, evolved on the basis of tradition and which then spread beyond the areas of the people who had designed it. As a result of this return to national forms, some secondary, in relation to the traditional, forms appeared, which acquired a national meaning or were at least thought of as national: the long, full Russian shirt made of factory-woven material with a high embroidered collar and breast, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian shirts with embroidered open collars. The Russian and Byelorussian shirts were worn outside the trousers, while the Ukrainian shirt inside. In the 1920s there was a spread of women's embroidered blouses with wide sleeves, based on the traditional Ukrainian women's shirt. These urban fashions spread to the countryside, where they were popular for a long time.

From the 1920s the Central Asian embroidered skull-cap (*tyubeteika*) became popular among men, women and children of all the

[1] The *chegedek* was a long, sleeveless robe opening down the front, worn by a woman after marriage when in the presence of her father-in-law or her husband's elder brother.

peoples of the USSR. At first it was brought from the Central Asian republics, and later locally produced. Somewhat later the North Caucasian *kubanka*, a flat, round astrakhan or sheepskin hat with a cap-band widening towards the top was adopted by other peoples.

Subsequently, and continuing today, national cultures have influenced each other ever more strongly, and there has been steady urbanisation and unification of life styles, processes affecting all the Soviet peoples.

In some national districts common urban or Soviet dress (the latter taking European forms but with some minor individual features) has spread through the influence of migrants of other nationalities: Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars and others. Depending on where those forms originated, they contain details specific to a given people.

The Volga and Kama regions are multinational. As mentioned above, in the 1920s most of the peoples there retained the archaic forms of their national costume. After the Revolution, not only did modern urban forms become widespread, replacing the old, but traditional costume was revised in different ways by each people.

By the 1950s the Udmurts from the southern and central districts had replaced the former wide dress of Tatar cut with its flounce, with the typical urban dress, to which they also attached a flounce. In the northern districts the basic female attire was a straight-cut dress, like a tunic shirt. The woollen cloth waistcoat replaced the sleeveless camisole.

Among the Chuvashes, as with other Volga peoples, male attire acquired general urban features. Among the rural population a new woman's costume evolved on the basis of the traditional one. Now it consists of a shirt dress, trousers, apron, headscarf and leather or rubber footwear, using dress elements from various ethnographic (and formerly tribal) groups of Chuvashes very different from each other. Yet although this attire is common to all Chuvash women, each group has some distinctive features and its own colour range.

The Tatar national costume influenced the costumes of many of the Volga peoples (Udmurts, Mordvins-Moksha, Chuvashes, and others) and those of Central Asia. Yet it in turn has been influenced by the clothes worn by the Central Asian peoples and by Russian clothing. At present urban forms predominate both in towns and in the countryside, although some characteristic features are retained in the headdress, the tying of headscarves, footwear, etc. Tatar embroidery and multicoloured patterned footwear have become very popular. Soft boots with fur on the outside or heeled boots and slippers have spread outside thé Tatar ASSR.

The Caucasus is one of the most multinational areas of the Soviet Union. In Soviet times in the Northern Caucasus and in Daghestan large nationalities and small territorial tribal groups have tended to

amalgamate, and this has affected clothing.

From the end of the 1920s the custom by which mountain women had no winter clothing, thus restricting women to the home and the close family circle, was abolished.

The female shirt dress began to approximate to urban styles. Factory-produced headscarves and shawls, tied in traditional fashion, began to be used. In the 1930s, and this is still true today, Caucasian peoples made use of expensive materials in their national dress: natural and artificial silk, light and dark velvet. The extensive use of silk both here and in Central Asia was a revival of ancient tradition, and became possible only with increased urban and rural prosperity. This interest in national costume caused special workshops and factories manufacturing national costume to open in some areas of the Northern Caucasus.

From the 1950s onwards clothing changed rapidly as industrial production became available in the mountain villages of the Caucasus, as well as in the towns. Rural attire became more like urban dress, but some characteristic details, original ways of wearing the clothes, and predilection for a certain colour range added individuality. In mountain settlements, the Ossetian men, like many other Caucasian peoples, wear a *papakha* (tall, usually astrakhan hat) or felt hat, soft boots, and sometimes the Caucasian shirt. The *papakha* of 'Asian' astrakhan or sheepskin (often with a cloth lining) is as widespread in the Caucasus as the *tyubeteika* in Central Asia. There are traditional forms of footwear: multicoloured, knitted, patterned socks (sometimes with a leather sole sewn on as in Azerbaijan), decorative felt boots (as worn by the Avars and Darghins), leather slippers, etc.

Research into the modern dress of the Caucasian peoples has found that the elder generation, mostly women, tend to retain more of the traditional forms, as do people involved in livestock-farming, working in specific natural conditions. These forms include the felt coat (which is both worn and used as a bed by shepherds), sheepskin cloaks for men and women (either sleeveless or with mock sleeves), the *papakha*, hood, Caucasian belt and dagger, soft cloth or leather footwear, while women wear tunic-like dresses, wide trousers. headbands, etc.

National costume is also worn for festive occasions and weddings. In the 1950s the men still wore Circassian coats for horse racing, but now it is in use only by choirs and dance ensembles.

Most Georgians now wear urban-style clothes, and differences are disappearing between the attire of different groups, as are archaic forms, although some traditional elements are still found, especially among the mountain peoples. The Khevsur women, for instance, wear their national costume on special holidays. It is not the archaic costume which they wore until the 1940s, but a modern one, only

very generally resembling the traditional one.

Dress has also changed radically in Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the peoples have adopted urban-style clothes, although this process is not uniform. In some areas (in Aparana, Zangezur and Nagorny Karabakh) elderly Armenian women still wear clothes which in their cut and colouring are very traditional. The younger women wear modern urban clothes. Silver belts for women and ornaments of coins are still common.

The humiliating yashmak has been completely abandoned by the Azerbaijanian women. They, and Armenian and Kurdish women have also almost stopped wearing the scarf which covered their mouths and the whole lower part of their faces (this custom originated not so much in Islam as in older beliefs).

In the Baltic republics national costume is worn only by a few elderly people in some areas—in the south-west of Lithuania, Latvia, in Eastern Estonia and in Pskov Region.

Modern rural attire is very similar to that in towns, and is either bought ready-made or sewn from factory-produced material, yet it nevertheless has some distinctive features. It reflects the strong links of the Baltic peoples with each other and with neighbouring peoples such as the Russians and Byelorussians.

From the 1940s knitted goods from the Baltic republics have been commonly used by all the peoples of the Soviet Union, especially in its European part. These include mittens, gloves, jackets and jumpers with unusual patterns. Also widely found are various items of amber jewelry, especially brooches and clasps, using the traditional Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian fibulas in new designs. Estonian leather goods with a stamped design (handbags, purses, etc.) are extremely popular. Lithuanian patterned belts have served as models for men's ties, which are worn in other republics, too.

In Central Asia and Kazakhstan, with the ethnic consolidation of nations, types of dress common to each of them have evolved.

Ordinary urban attire has been more adopted in towns and large settlements than in the countryside. Factory-produced suits are widely worn by men, although even in towns they still wear outer gowns over them and a *tyubeteika.*

There are specific features in the clothing of urban, particularly elderly women, too. In rural areas they dress very much as in towns. Local differences are mainly apparent in colour and fabric design. The outer gowns worn both by men and women in summer and winter differ both in fabric and in design details. Women's headdresses also vary according to area.

In the Ferghana Valley, one of Uzbekistan's most multinational districts, the clothing of the various peoples is rapidly converging: it is usually of the Uzbek and Tajik type, or greatly influenced by

them. The attire of the Kirghiz, Uigurs, and Dungans of the valley is exactly the same as that worn by the Uzbeks and Tajiks.

Some aspects of the Uzbek costume (the Uzbek dress with its short yoke and the *tyubeteika*) have been adopted not only in regions where Uzbeks live, but also outside the Central Asian republics.

In the past the Kazan Tatars greatly influenced Uzbek clothing, especially in towns. This process continued after the Revolution, and combined with Russian influence, again mostly in urban areas. But contacts with the rural Russian and Ukrainian population in Central Asia also results in mutual influence: in some villages, for example, the Ukrainian shirt is worn.

The Turkmen male costume evolved using urban forms and elements of the costume of the Tekin-Turkmens. It consists of a shirt, either traditional or of urban cut, trousers and an outer gown. They wear a tall sheepskin hat, a *telpek*, with long curls of fur.

The female costume is more colourful, with a tunic-like shirt dress, trousers (*balak*), all kinds of outer gowns, and the *kemzor*, a garment opening down the front, gathered at the waist, with sleeves and a collar with lapels. The *kemzor*, which is common in the north-west of the republic, was adopted by the Turkmens in the 1930s who had borrowed it from the neighbouring Kazakhs, Kara-Kalpaks and Uzbeks, who in their turn borrowed it from the Tatars. The predominant colour is red in all its shades, particularly crimson. A headdress made of two square scarves, popular in Soviet times, is gradually replacing all the other forms.

Certain trends in the Tajik costume are making their appearance as a result of increased influence between groups of Tajiks and between other peoples. Improved contacts between the plains and mountains (especially as people from the mountains move down to the newly irrigated lands), is also affecting clothing. The Uzbek *kurtai* dress and the sleeveless *kamzulcha*, common in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, *kamzul*, a camisole kind of dress made of plush and gathered at the waist, have spread from the lowlands to the mountains. There is also a Russian influence as the common urban kinds of attire become generally accepted.

There is greater Russian influence on the clothing of the Kazakhs (and among some of the Northern Kirghiz), than in that of the neighbouring peoples, Uzbeks, Turkmens and others, a result of earlier and more intense cultural links between the Kazakhs and Russians.

As the people of Central Asia abandoned their Islamic beliefs, so they rejected the forms of clothing engendered by them. Now *paranjas* are worn by women only at weddings and funerals. The mantle which served much the same purpose as the *paranja* has also gone out of use.

In the past Muslims could not wear some forms of clothing, especially headgear with a peak. Now peaked caps are commonly worn. Particular forms of clothes or hair style dictated by religious beliefs are now rarely found.

In other multinational areas, Siberia and the Far North, the former territorial and tribal features in clothing are disappearing faster in some districts than in others.

The convergence of the formerly isolated Khakass ethnographic groups is reflected in their clothing, which has become largely uniform throughout Khakassia. Tribal affiliation can no longer be detected through a person's attire. The urban population in Khakassia dresses in much the same way as people in towns and cities all over the Soviet Union, although in rural areas there are some distinctive dress features. The men wear either a Russian or Ukrainian shirt, or more rarely the Khakass *kiogenek*, and trousers, Russian boots, which the Khakassians sew themselves, or factory-produced shoes. They also wear local footwear of leather and fur, the *maimakh*, sometimes decoratively embroidered. They have an outer garment, *tereton*, rather like the Russian sheepskin coat, and for travelling they put the Siberian fur coat (with fur on both sides) over the top of it.

For festive occasions the women wear a shirt dress of modern material. For weddings they wear a sheepskin coat of traditional shape, sometimes covered with fabric, trimmed with fur and embroidery in many colours.

The clothes traditionally worn by the Nentsi (the largest people of the Samodian group) are well suited to the local climate, and are still in use today in the form of outer clothing, now that they have accepted fabric underwear and dresses. There is the *malitsa* of reindeer fur and the summer *panitsa* of cloth of various colours. The Nenets winter coats of reindeer fur are worn widely by the local Russians and Komi.

The peoples of the extreme North-East have very much retained their traditional clothing. The Chukchi hunters wear a thick reindeer fur *kukhlyanka*, long fur trousers, short boots and a fur hat. In some districts the women have exchanged their thick Chukchi clothing for the Even open kaftan with a bodice, trousers, and knee-length reindeer fur boots. In the tundra fur suits are often sewn for young children. The Koryak reindeer breeders also wear their traditional fur clothing in the winter. Modern town clothes are worn largely at home, and only in the summer.

The above bears witness to the muting of specific dress features among the peoples of the North and Siberia. The most functional traditional forms are adopted outside the areas where they evolved, surviving mostly as winter attire for hunters.

No longer in the USSR are there the many local variations in

dress which were so common before and immediately after the Revolution. Soviet times have fundamentally changed clothing habits, and archaic forms of national dress have disappeared. Some peoples have reworked traditional forms to produce a modern national costume, which is generally composed of some traditional and some modern urban elements.

In socialist society, where there is no class antagonism, national costume is a reflection of the national awareness of the freely developing small and large peoples and nations of the Soviet Union. The specific features of national costume reflect affiliation to an ethnic community, while the common Soviet elements in it, often predominating, show that the community is no longer isolated and is a part of the united multinational Soviet nation.

Peoples among whom the traditional costume long ago vanished see it as an expression of their ethnic origins. It is worn only by members of dance, choral and musical ensembles.

The national costume is worn on particularly festive occasions, at festivals, arts competitions, etc. Throughout the Baltic republics, for example, it is customary to wear national costume for public holidays, especially singing festivals which are held regularly in all the republics. The costumes are based on the traditional ones, but often are generalised representations.

Modern national dress is socially uniform: distinct class differences in it disappeared with the removal of the exploiting classes and the abolition of class privileges.

The only social differences in attire are those between that of urban dwellers (industrial workers, office workers, and intellectuals) and the rural population (collective and state farm workers).

The rural intelligentsia and office staff are closest of all to urban dwellers in their dress. On the whole townsfolk wear fashions common throughout Europe; these change faster and reflect to a greater extent the international links of the more ethnically mixed urban population than the fashions in most rural districts. Over the Soviet period urban and rural clothing has converged throughout the USSR. The influence of the town, of industrial workers and the intelligentsia (and of the rural intelligentsia and students in higher education) is very strong, but it does not work just one way. The town also borrows some details from rural clothing, such as the Russian, Ukrainian and Gutsul shirts. In towns and cities we note the popularity of brightly-coloured headscarves, worn tied under the chin in Russian peasant fashion, and knitted headscarves, including the famous Penza and Orenburg downy scarves.

We no longer see specific features of dress characterising women as unmarried or married, widowed, etc., which states were previously reflected in dress, hair-style, headdress or adornments. Differences in style according to age still exist, and are becoming more pro-

nounced, national features being retained largely among middle-aged and elderly people; young people aspire to modern international styles.

Attire is obviously linked with traditions in life style, especially with family events, customs and holidays.

Forms of clothing, developed over the centuries and adapted to certain forms of activity and natural conditions, continue to be used.

There is now a tendency for specific features confined to nationalities to be replaced by those common throughout historical and ethnographic, and also natural and economic zones.

On the whole modern dress reflects the growing ethnic convergence of the peoples of the USSR.

3. Diet

Diet is one of the most important aspects of material culture and is directly linked with the socio-economic life of a society, is defined by it and at the same time retains the forms and traditions of a nationality. The processes of consolidation and integration, the way in which common eating habits spread can be determined by a study of the kind of food eaten by a people, the composition of the products and dishes consumed, the ways of preparing and order of consuming food, food preferences and food bans, and particular features of the diet (annual and daily).

After the Revolution dietary structure and organisation changed radically. Improved communication within and between nationalities, and the lifting of religious and habitual conventions and bans had a marked effect on the food of various peoples.

New features began to appear in the eating habits of the peoples of the USSR, as in other aspects of everyday life, soon after the establishment of Soviet power, but for a long time eating habits were affected by the problems and scarcities current throughout the country. Until the early 1930s most of the rural population continued to eat what it grew itself, only rarely buying groceries. So the food any people ate was marked by zonal and seasonal characteristics. As formerly, in towns food was bought on the market and in shops, not grown on private land; here, public catering began to play an important role.

As socialist industry became established, and as the collective-farm system grew stronger and developed, and workers' prosperity improved, eating habits gradually became stable. Everywhere the amount of food eaten increased, and its quality and energy content improved. The better work of the food industry, regular supplies of food to towns, the growing number of shops in rural areas, and the growing quantity of processed food products in collective farm families helped to provide more varied food, and enabled some

peoples to add new elements to their diet.

One of the most important changes in eating habits was the eradication of the differences in consumption level among various social groups. This was largely the result of the establishment of socio-economic bases of everyday life common to all citizens. Another major factor was the growing socialisation in satisfying the food needs of the urban and rural populations, the implementation of a single management and planning system, customary in the socialist state. Now most people's diets consist of products provided by the centralised state trading network. Public catering in all its forms plays a major role, and has a strong influence on domestic life. Changes in the quality of diet are linked with the growing material prosperity of the working people, their improved life style, and the availability of household appliances. The wide range of food products, and improvements in processing and freezing increase variety and help to spread many forms of food previously little known or unknown in some districts. The use of gas and electric cookers has also brought about major changes in the preparation and composition of food.

New dietary elements appear mostly in towns and cities, but there are also major changes in the countryside, especially as town and coutryside converge. At present there is a marked trend towards uniformity in feeding habits, the disappearance of zonal peculiarities, and the convergence of rural and urban diets. This trend is contained, however, within the national diet of a given people or ethno-cultural region. Traditions are particularly persistent among the rural population.

Specific national features in diet are most apparent in the existence of traditional dishes and the traditional structure of food, in choice of product bought, in traditional serving sequence of food, be it everyday meals or special occasions, and some forms of ritual food, in serving habits, etc.

The persistence of tradition can be seen in the methods of baking and forms of bread. Russians from the north of the European part of the RSFSR, Byelorussians, and the peoples of the Baltic republics and the Upper Volga prefer sourdough rye bread baked in the hearth or the oven, and eat less sourdough wheaten bread; Ukrainians and Russians from the central Black-Earth zone eat various kinds of leavened wheaten bread. In the North Caucasus the bread takes the form of unleavened flat cakes of wheaten flour; the peoples of Transcaucasia eat the *lavash*, *shota* and *gomiji*, flat breads, sometimes decorated (Armenians and Azerbaijanians), different in shape, thickness and sometimes flour, and also unleavened flat cakes, or thick *kasha* (rather like porridge, but made out of various cereals) of maize (*gomi*), which the Georgians and Azerbaijanians sometimes use instead of bread. The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan

(Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Uigurs, Turkmens and others) eat both leavened (*pan*) and unleavened flat cakes, while shepherds eat leavened bread (*chorek, vari*), baked in ashes or hot sand (Turkmens and Baluchi). Various kinds of bread coexist in areas of mixed population. Only among a few peoples do lengthy contacts cause some forms of bread to be replaced by others. Ukrainian cooking has influenced the Moldavians to abandon their maize bread for wheaten bread, while Circassians and Kabardinians eat Russian bread instead of thick *kasha* with every meal.

The most persistent national traits in the eating habits of the peoples of the USSR are those connected with natural and farming conditions, economy, and with traditional tastes and conceptions. The processes by which national diets develop, change and are enriched as a result of ever growing ethnic contact and the development of many other forms of communication in ethno-cultural regions are very distinctive.

The peoples of the European part of the USSR, with a long history of agriculture, have much in common in their diets, although area specialisation was bound to affect their structure. Vegetables and cereals predominate, while comparatively fewer meat and dairy products are eaten. In the past there was limited consumption of meat, milk and butter by both rural and urban populations even in areas which concentrated on stock-raising (in the Baltic areas, for example). The part played by meat and dairy products in diets has grown considerably in the European part of the USSR, although its traditional distinguishing feature continues to be flour and cereal dishes. Potatoes formed the basis of diets from the mid-1800s. *Kasha* of various kinds and potatoes are served as individual dishes and as accompaniments, and most soups contain flour and starch. Bread and other baked products such as pies and biscuits are also important. Kvass, made from rye bread, is a traditional drink, as is beer. Among Russians the commonest form of meat is beef, and among the Baltic peoples, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, pork. Fish is also a part of the diet.

Peoples with long traditions of stock-raising (Kalmyks, Bashkirs, some Tatars and Gagauzes, for instance) eat a great deal of meat and milk products, often in combination with flour dishes.

The common features in the eating habits of the peoples of the European part of the USSR evolved from their farming community and long ethnic contact. Everyday contact between Russians and other peoples also enriched the diet of the former. Russians in contact with Ukrainians have long eaten borsch, pork fat, and curd and dumplings (*vareniki*); the Russians of the Volga have adopted some dishes from the Tatar and Bashkir cuisines (*belyashi*—minced meat in baked dough, *pelmeni*—seasoned minced meat wrapped in dough, *kaimak*—cream from heated milk, *airan*—sour milk) and from

the Mari (curd cake with hempseed).

In Soviet times the general trend has been for the range of dishes in the diet of all the peoples of the European part of the RSFSR to expand. Now it includes formerly unknown or little known dishes of various grains (including rice), bought bakery goods, meat, fish, vegetables, including such dishes borrowed from the Caucasus and Central Asia as *shashlyk* (kabob) and pilaf. All peoples now eat a great deal of various vegetables and fruit, which until recently was common only among the Moldavians, Ukrainians, and some Byelorussians. National dishes which took a long time to prepare have been simplified or replaced with appropriate bought products. Homemade fancy cakes are often replaced by goods from bakeries. The traditional Ukrainian dumplings and the homemade noodles of the Volga peoples have largely been exchanged for macaroni and bought noodles. Some very simple dishes (jelly made from oats or peas, common among the Eastern Slavonic peoples) have disappeared from ordinary use as expectations grow, but are sometimes still found on ritual occasions.

All these changes facilitate even greater convergence in diet among the peoples of this region, although differences still exist. Peoples living in similar natural conditions and practising similar types of farming, depending on ethnic traditions, prepare the same dishes from different products and different dishes from the same products. One of the most ancient forms of flour dish, pancakes, are very popular among many peoples, who prepare them from different kinds of flour. The Mordvins use millet flour, while Russians use mostly buckwheat or wheaten flour, sometimes oat flour, and Byelorussians use potatoes; in Lithuania pancakes are made from potatoes, and pea, buckwheat and barley flour.

The structure of the diet in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan was different, although cereals and vegetables still formed its basis. While the peoples of the European part of the USSR ate mostly hot meals, and breakfast and lunch were their largest meals, the peoples of Central Asia ate more substantially in the evenings, as soon as the heat of the day subsided. In the morning and during the day they ate small quantities of dried or fresh fruit (among farmers), and flat cakes with sour milk, or tea as from the 1930s. Among some peoples it has become customary to eat hot food during the day only over the last decades. In Uzbekistan, for instance, this is a result of the development of public catering and Russian influence.

In Soviet times the diet of the peoples of Central Asia has improved immeasurably. The regular spring famines are now a thing of the past. Cereals such as *jugara* and millet have been replaced by wheat. The former acute differences in the diet of urban and rural residents, of settled farmers and stock-raisers, have begun to disappear.

The long settled peoples now eat more meat, while former stock-raisers eat more flour, vegetables and fruit dishes. In Tajikistan peoples and ethnographic groups who were until recently nomadic, have started to eat dishes formerly eaten only by the settled population: pelmeni (*barak*), pasties and pies (*samsa, bechak*), etc. Pilaf (*osh*), the traditional festive dish among the settled peoples, has begun to replace the festive dishes of the nomads. Pilaf has also spread to other recently nomadic peoples such as the Kirghiz (especially in the south of the republic, where rice is grown).

Meat and dairy products play a large part in the diet of many Caucasian peoples and among those of Central Asia. Sour milk products and mutton predominate, while horse meat is eaten by some Central Asian peoples. Pork, which Muslims are forbidden to eat, is now eaten in Central Asia, mostly in the form of prepared bought products.

Many of the dishes common in Central Asia (pilaf, noodles, consommés and biscuits) are found in traditional Caucasian cooking, though with ethnic differences. Some Caucasian peoples make their pilaf sweet with raisins or cherry-plum and eat it with sour milk or *smetana* (sour cream). The Azerbaijanians, who make a great number of different pilafs, usually prepare it in two pans. The rice they often colour with saffron, and they add cherry-plum and other fruits to meat pilaf.

Armenian and Azerbaijanian cuisines are noted for the addition of fruits and herbs to meat dishes, using quince, cherry-plum, dried apricots, pomegranates, caraway seed, nuts, dill, onion, garlic, mint, coriander leaves, parsley, etc.

In addition to the above inclusion of fruits in dishes, Caucasian cuisine has many hot and spicy relishes made with garlic and onion. Its specificity consists in the constant use of sheep's cheese, chicken, and bean, and maize dishes, and also in the ways of meat cooking and storing: it is smoked in wild nettle leaves, and roasted on a spit.

There are many different ways of preparing the favourite national dishes: hot chicken and mutton *shashlyk*. Georgians cook chicken with a lot of spices and serve it cold (*satsivi*) and hot (*chakhokhbili*), the Abkhazians pour eggs and the juice of unripe grapes over it (*chygyrtma*), the Laks also add eggs to chicken, while the Adygeis cook chicken as a sauce (*chetshchyps*). The Laks roast *shashlyk* with onion, and the Darghins with tomatoes, while the Armenians alternate meat with onion, tomatoes, aubergines and capsicums. In addition to *shashlyk* in Azerbaijanian cuisine there are many forms of minced meat cooked on a skewer (*lyulya*-kabob, *tova*-kabob, and others) which shows the persistence of this traditional form of meat preparation.

Russian culture has had a strong influence on Northern Caucasian

cuisine. Russian bread is widely eaten, as are potatoes among some peoples (Kabardinians, Balkars, and others), and beef is the favourite meat. Some national Caucasian dishes such as *shashlyk, chakhokhbili* and *kharcho* (mutton soup) are in their turn popular among many peoples of the USSR.

Socialist construction brought about striking changes in the diet of the peoples of the North. In the tundra people ate mainly meat, fat, and only small amounts of fish and vegetables. Not all peoples used bought products, and if they did so, only rarely. These were usually brick-tea and some groceries: flour, sugar and vegetable oil.

A specific feature of the Siberian diet was the custom of eating food raw, caused no doubt by the lack of vitamins. Not only berries, herbs, roots and the young shoots of plants were eaten raw, but also fish and meat. Many peoples, such as the Orochi, ate *tala* of freshly-caught fish, or *stroganina.* Raw elk or manchurian deer marrow and liver, and salmon backs and raw heads were considered delicacies.

Russians who moved to Siberia retained their traditional flour diet, although in districts where hunting was common, their food began to include new elements. In the Far North this was reindeer meat, and bone fat and liver were eaten raw. In other districts Russians ate *stroganina* made of frozen fish, and drank slab tea as well as ordinary tea, sometimes copying the Altaians and Mongols and making tea soup with the addition of flour.

In its turn Russian national cuisine influenced that of the Siberian peoples. They began to eat bread, make butter in the Russian way, and use potatoes and vegetables, some vegetable dishes becoming a permanent part of their diet.

The eating habits of the Siberian peoples are, naturally, very different now. Many traditional forms of food, in the past known only to some peoples, are now widespread. The modern diet consists not only of local products from the taiga and sea, but also of a fair amount of products transported from other areas or now locally manufactured. The former local character of food is no longer in evidence. Now bread, other flour products, vegetables and dairy products are of considerable importance; many peoples now eat meat formerly unknown to them (beef and pork), honey, eggs (also rare in the past), and fruit. Some products such as bread, flour, grains, and sugar were adopted readily and rapidly, while others such as salt are popular only with a few peoples. The use of the Russian-type stove (instead of the hearth) means that most food is boiled, and sometimes fried.

All peoples now eat meat and fish soups (formerly unknown to many), fried and stewed meat, fish and vegetables. The spread of catering, as in boarding schools, and fishing and reindeer-herding brigades, has greatly facilitated the acceptance of these dishes and

the habit of regular eating.

The formation of a common diet among the peoples of Siberia proceeds at varying rates. In Southern Siberia it has been rapid. The Khakassian diet retains almost no traces of their recent nomadic way of life. Their domestic diet hardly differs from that of the Russians living in the villages and towns of the area. Only occasionally does one find *airan* (sour milk) prepared in the traditional way, and homemade black pudding (*kan*).

The diet of the Tuvinians, whose way of life has not changed much, naturally retains more traditional features, especially in the use of dairy products. In the summer, as once among the Altaians and Khakassians, the most common food is sour milk (*khaitpak*, the Altaian *chegen* and Khakassian *airan*), used as a drink or in other dishes, cheese (*kurut*), dried curds (*archy*), and dried reindeer milk, which like *archy* is added to tea. Only boiled meat is eaten, as formerly, and fish is boiled or roasted on a spit.

The peoples of Northern Siberia and the Far East, whose diet consisted mostly of meat and fish, have expanded it to include flour, dairy and vegetable products.

The modern diet in the USSR is a rather stable component of one's cultural heritage, although social and economic changes have had a very definite effect upon it. Property and class distinctions have disappeared, and eating habits are less dependent on zone and season. Methods of preparing food and the pattern of consumption are becoming more alike.

For the majority of peoples, the socio-economic factor has influenced the quantity of food consumed most. Among peoples with once rather primitive economies, the dietary structure itself is changing.

The principal difference between former stock-raisers and farmers is gradually disappearing, as the former increase the amount of fruit and vegetables eaten, and the latter increase the amount of meat.

State retail services and public catering are eliminating the differences between diets in urban and rural areas, and between regional diets.

Cultural contacts are also enriching the diet. Whenever there is a great difference in the dietary pattern of the peoples in contact, the influence is mutual, affecting the components of the diet. Wherever Russians settle, the diet of the indigenous peoples begins to include baked items and vegetable dishes, while Russians adopt local fish and meat dishes.

When the diets of the peoples in contact are similar, many national dishes are adopted throughout the region, and sometimes subsequently throughout the entire country.

Nevertheless, the dietary structure of most peoples of the USSR retains the traditional features, not only within the main dispersion

area, but among small communities living among other nationalities and even within individual families.

The diet retains more traditional features than other material components of one's culture, which means it can be used to trace the ethnic origin of a population and reciprocal cultural influences.

Food terminology can help in establishing the ethnic origins of a given form and reveal the contribution of any one nation to the diet of the region, area or country as a whole.

These cultural changes occurring in Soviet times indicate the development of general Soviet forms, determined by the common social, economic and cultural development of the peoples of the country. At the same time traditional forms persist, although they have been subject to historical changes and ethnic interaction in many ethno-cultural regions.

The level of material culture among different peoples is not identical: among the older nations the equalisation process goes on as specific features of material culture disappear among small local groups who for various reasons had retained them; with the young nations and nationalities, ethnographic divergences are being eliminated. The growth of uniformity in different material spheres of culture depends on the extent of that sphere's link with technological progress, on natural and economic factors, and on how closely that particular aspect is linked to ethnic consciousness.

Regional cultural community grows as local particularities disappear. In the country's major historical and cultural regions, the increasingly uniform in life style affects both related and non-related peoples living in the same natural and economic conditions.

Chapter VIII

ETHNO-LINGUISTIC PROCESSES

Any examination of ethno-linguistic processes as an important part of ethnic processes must consider, first, the presence of some kind of independent structure in each language; second, the many social functions of a language as a form of communication in any given sphere of human activity; and, third, the realisation (use) of language in speech behaviour.

These three aspects can be expanded as follows. There is the structural aspect reflecting changes in the vocabulary, phonetics, morphology, syntax and other elements of a language. There is the functional aspect; the development of the social functions of a language related to all possible spheres of human intercourse. And then there is the behavioural aspect, speech behaviour being an inalienable part of human social activity. Languages differ sharply in their forms of existence,, social significance and communicative load, in the length of their literary traditions, and the extent to which the national culture, which they express and preserve, is developed. Consequently, ethno-linguistic processes can be broadly considered as processes of development and change in the structure and social functions of a given language, and as processes of change in the types and forms of speech behaviour.

The communicative functions of a language correspond to the many spheres of human intercourse, which may be education, science, literature, the arts, the media, correspondence, recording, public, political, cultural and enlightening activities, sports, leisure, etc.

1. Development of Social Functions of Languages in Schools and Publishing

Prior to the October Revolution, the ethno-linguistic situation in the Russian empire was extremely varied. Many peoples were almost entirely illiterate. They had no written language, while the spoken language consisted of dialects. These features combined with other objective factors to accentuate linguistic territorial and social differences, and prevent ethnic consolidation.

The processes affecting the Russian language and those of certain other more developed nations with an old written language, were not identical to those occurring in languages that did not possess written expression. Social differentiation under capitalism did not facilitate the evolution of common national written or spoken forms of these languages.

Linguistic interaction before the Revolution consisted primarily of words of one language making their way into the vocabulary of another—usually related to the adoption of certain cultural elements—material or spiritual. Czarism attempted to restrict the development of the languages of the non-Russian peoples: Russian was made the state language, and its social functions were expanded at the expense of the languages of other peoples.

Before the Revolution there were no secular schools of higher education for the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Children from the privileged social strata primarily studied in the few secondary schools.

Immediately after the Revolution, despite the country's extremely difficult situation, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government adopted the policy of promoting the functions of the languages of the peoples of the USSR, especially in education.

National state formation played an important role in the functional development of languages, with the result that linguistic communities divided by administrative borders were united within republics, regions and national areas.

The state's language policy created the foundation for three processes. First, it expedited the development of formerly functionally backward languages. Second, it helped to expand linguistic contact and interaction. And third, it facilitated the further linguistic consolidation of ethnic communities on a new socialist basis.

As of the mid-1920s the social functions of the non-Russian languages began to develop particularly strongly in the school system. From 1924 in the autonomous republics and regions in the RSFSR the number of non-Russian language schools increased far more rapidly than did Russian schools. One reason for this was that prior to the Revolution, the need for schools among the Russian population was met to a far greater extent than among the Tatars, Mari, Chuvashes, and others.

In the second half of the 1920s the number of schools in the Tatar ASSR changed as follows (in per cent):

Schools according to language of instruction	1925/26	1927/28
Russian	49.6	37.4
Tatar	34.8	54.0

By the end of the 1920s, some non-Russian peoples had acquired higher as well as primary schools. However, the increase in the number of seven-year and secondary schools, which many non-Russian peoples did not have at all before the Revolution, was slow, although more rapid than the increase in the number of schools in which Russian was the language of instruction.

The subsequent spread of the languages of the peoples of the USSR through the school system was greatly facilitated by staffing non-Russian schools with native teachers as of the second half of the 1920s. Training of teaching personnel for non-Russian schools and revision of textbooks were crucial for the transition to instruction in the national languages at the beginning of the 1930s.

By the end of the 1920s, primary school instruction in the RSFSR was conducted in 60 languages. But it was usually confined to the initial forms among those peoples with qualified teachers and textbooks. There was still no single generally accepted curriculum for the schools of nationalities.

At the outset of the 1930s the functions of the national languages were growing at different rates in the autonomous republics, the Far North and the Far East.

In the mid-1930s the two dialectical ethno-linguistic processes could be singled out. While the social functions of the languages of the many nationalities were expanding in several spheres, including education, there was also a growing necessity for a language of internation communication. Now that the non-Russian peoples had full equal rights, and had raised their cultural and educational level, there was a greater impetus to learn Russian.

The functional development of the national languages, especially among peoples which had grouped in their Union or autonomous republics, made it possible to improve the teaching of Russian as well, which began to be conducted through the prism of the specific features of the pupils' native language. The development of the national languages as languages of instruction facilitated the spread of Russian, which from the mid-1940s became a rapid process, and particularly so in the period of developed socialism.

By the end of the 1930s the indigenous peoples in the Union republics had instruction in their native language. The situation with Byelorussian and Ukrainian is very indicative, because their social functions had been abruptly curtailed by the assimilation policy of Czarism. In the 1938/39 school year, almost all children in these republics were taught in their native language.

Since that time, the situation in the Union republics has changed little. In the 1960s and early 1970s the language of instruction in schools in most of the Union republics was, as before, not only the language of the indigenous nationality or Russian, but also the languages of other national groups living in the Union republic. In the

Ukraine, for instance, there were schools where teaching was done in Moldavian, Hungarian and Polish; in Uzbekistan–Tajik, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kara-Kalpak and Kirghiz; in Kazakhstan–Korean, Tajik, Uzbek, and Uigur; in Georgia–Abkhazian, Azerbaijanian, Armenian and Ossetian; in Azerbaijan–Armenian and Georgian; in Kirghizia–Tajik and Uzbek; in Tajikistan–Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirghiz and Kazakh; in Armenia–Azerbaijanian; and in Turkmenia–Kazakh and Uzbek.

At the same time there have been changes in the social function of the languages of the indigenous populations of the Union republics and in their interaction with Russian in the school system. Between 1965 and 1972 in most of the Union republics, there was an increase in the number of pupils both in schools where teaching was in the language of the indigenous nationality, and in schools where teaching was done in Russian.

There were less significant changes in the ratio of the functional load of the languages of the indigenous nationalities of the Union republics and that of Russian. The percentage of pupils in the Union republics being taught in the language of their nationality in the 1972/73 school year was the same as in the 1965/66 school year, or had changed very slightly (within one per cent) in Georgia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Latvia, Armenia and Estonia. In the Ukraine and Byelorussia the proportion of pupils taught in their native language dropped slightly (between three and nine per cent), while in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan it rose (between four and ten per cent).

These figures show that there have been no fundamental changes in the correlation of the social functions of the indigenous languages of the Union republics with those of Russian as the language of inter-nation communication in secondary education. The growing percentage of those being schooled in their native language in the Central Asian republics can be attributed to the rapid natural growth of the indigenous population.

In schools in autonomous republics, the processes of functional linguistic interaction have been somewhat different.

Between the latter half of the 1940s and the mid-1960s, the general tendency was the predominant growth in the number of pupils taught in Russian. In the Chechen-Ingush, Daghestan and Komi ASSRs the number of those studying in Russian in the 1967/68 school year was greater than in the 1938/39 school year by 8, 12 and 17 times respectively; in the Chuvash, North Ossetian and Kabardin-Balkar ASSRs by 3.5 to 4 times. In most other autonomous republics it doubled.

The growing number of pupils taught in Russian in the autonomous republics substantially altered the functional interaction between the languages of the indigenous nationalities and Russian. This

is particularly indicated in the relative patterns in the number of pupils being taught in the languages. While there was a general reduction in the percentage of those taught in their native language, the percentage of those taught in Russian at the outset of the 1970s was far greater than at the end of the 1930s. This process was more intensive in the Komi, Chechen-Ingush, Daghestan, North Ossetian, Kabardin-Balkar and Kalmyk republics. By end of the 1960s the ratio of pupils taught in their own languages to those taught in Russian in these republics had stabilised, and at the beginning of the 1970s, in some of them there was a slight growth in the percentage of pupils being taught in the indigenous languages (in Tuvinian, Bashkir, Yakut, Buryat and Tatar, for instance).

The national languages are an integral component of the entire Soviet state educational system, which provides a uniform level of education in Russian-language and non-Russian-language schools of all types.

In 1972 there were 55 languages used for teaching in Soviet schools and in the RSFSR—the Union republic with the most multinational composition—47 languages of the peoples of the USSR were used in teaching or taught as subjects in their own right.

Pupils taught in their native language also study Russian as the lingua franca. Given the current information explosion a poor knowledge of Russian means difficulties in mastering science and technology.

In the Kabardin-Balkar, Kalmyk, North Ossetian and Chechen-Ingush ASSRs and the Adygei and Karachai-Circassian Autonomous Regions, all children of the indigenous nationalities are now taught in Russian. At the same time the children of the indigenous nationalities in certain Union and autonomous republics and autonomous regions, and also in the autonomous areas of the North, are instructed in their own language in preparatory classes for youngsters of 6 to 7. No matter how many years youngsters have been taught in their own language, or have studied it as a school subject, they study Russian (as a subject or as the language of teaching) in all schools in the RSFSR throughout their school life. In the multinational autonomous republics and regions, where ethno-linguistic contacts are frequent, there are now mixed schools where teaching is done in several languages.

We can distinguish several stages in the development and interaction of the social functions of the languages of the peoples of the USSR in the school system.

The outset—from the initial years of Soviet power to the late 1920s—was the time when the fundamental principles of the functional interaction of languages in schools were evolved. The basis of the operation of schools where instruction was done in the native language was established, and primary schools were the main focus

for the expansion of the social functions of the languages of the non-Russian peoples.

The second period (from the late 1920s to the end of the 1930s) witnessed the qualitative reorganisation and improvement in the structure of non-Russian-language schools, with an increase in the proportion of seven-year and secondary schools. In the national republics there was a relative reduction of schools where Russian was the language of instruction with the appearance of new schools where teaching was in the indigenous language. Primary school teaching was almost entirely in the languages of the nationalities.

The third period (1940 to the mid-1950s) was the time when instruction in the native language reached its peak. But with the rising cultural standards of all the peoples, a knowledge of their native language alone was no longer enough—this provided the necessary stimulus for the development of bilingualism. This process was very evident at the end of the 1950s and outset of the 1960s, particularly in the autonomous republics and regions where the indigenous peoples would usually send their children to Russian secondary schools. It became obvious in this new ethno-linguistic situation that there would be no purpose in increasing the functional load of the languages of the small Siberian nationalities. And although in many instances (in certain Union republics) the percentage of children studying their mother tongue rose somewhat, over the past decade Russian has been on the increase as the language of school instruction in most Union republics. Where this is so the indigenous language is studied as a special subject.

The development of the social functions of the languages of the peoples of the USSR in book publishing can be seen in the growth in the number of books published in these languages. This process is linked to the free development of the national languages and their increased functional load.

In publishing before the 1940s, two interconnected trends in the development of the social functions of the languages of the Soviet peoples could be seen. First, there was the increase in these functions and the growth in the absolute number of books published in the languages, and their increased proportion in national book production.

Second there was the increased percentage of original works among the books published in the national languages. From folklore, literature and primary school textbooks, there was progress to a more specialised form of book production: scientific, technical, industrial, medical, etc.

At the same time, despite the unprecedentedly rapid growth in the functional load, the languages of the small peoples that did not have a written form did not catch up with those languages with a long literary tradition. As Russian spread as the lingua franca, many

Table 12

Books in the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR in Terms of Total Book Production

Years	Book production according to language of publication			
	In Russian	In the languages of the peoples of the USSR	In foreign languages	In the languages of the peoples of the USSR in absolute figures
Number of titles (in per cent)				In printer's sheets (in millions)
1946-50	73.9	25.4	1.7	4.7
1951-55	70.3	27.3	2.4	6.9
1956-60	72.2	25.3	2.5	7.9
1961-65	74.3	22.6	3.1	9.3
1966-70	76.0	20.3	3.7	11.1
Per edition (in per cent)				Edition (in millions)
1946-50	78.9	18.5	2.6	575.0
1951-55	79.5	17.4	3.1	797.5
1956-60	81.5	15.7	2.8	892.9
1961-65	80.5	15.5	3.9	958.7
1966-70	79.1	17.0	3.9	1101.0

small peoples realised in the late 1930s that it was not essential to translate specialised dictionaries, university textbooks, scientific literature, etc., into their languages. It was obviously not expedient to publish books on atomic energy, aviation or machine-tool engineering in the languages of the northern nationalities or other small peoples. In other words, there could be no equal ratio of the functional loads of languages in publishing among communities with different levels of ethnic development.

Moreover, when there were multinational contacts, even among certain equally developed nations there was not the same need for the functions of the mother tongue and the lingua franca. An analysis of national book production leads to the conclusion that the first trend mentioned—the expansion of the social functions of the native languages of the peoples of the USSR—was dominant in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

From the mid-1950s on the percentage of titles published in the languages of the USSR (except Russian) has declined although the total number of copies and quantity of material has grown steadily (see Table 12).

There are certain specific features involving the functional development of the literary languages of the Union and autonomous republics in publishing. The number of titles and the size of editions of books and pamphlets published in the languages of the indigenous

peoples of the Union republics (language group A) rose (1950s-70s). However, there was a slight drop in the number of titles published in the languages of the indigenous nationalities in the autonomous republics (language group B), although there were larger editions of fiction in those languages. In these republics there was an overall increase in total book production. A tabulation of the number of editions in both the language groups A and B shows differences between languages within each linguistic group, but less pronounced as those between the groups.

The number of books published in the languages of the small peoples of the North (Nenets, Evenk, and others) has been dropping as of the mid-1940s. Many objective factors operate on this group of languages, the most important being the real needs of the peoples who actually speak these languages. In the building of socialism these small peoples found it easier to promote their national culture via a more developed language. Love for one's mother tongue does not prevent other peoples from using Russian to develop their art and culture. The Chukchi Yu. Rytkheu, the Mansi Yu. Shestalov, the Nivkh Vladimir Sangi, the Nanai G. Khodger, and many others have written in both their mother tongue and Russian.

If 1940 is chosen as a point of departure, the publication of books in Russian (per number of titles) has increased steadily, albeit somewhat unevenly; at the same time, book production in most of the other group A languages, which reached its peak in 1960, began to decline over the 1960s, primarily in reference to translated literature. The exceptions were Estonian, Moldavian and Kazakh, where book printing reached a record high in 1965 and 1970.

By 1970 there was an increase in book publication in number of copies among all the languages of group A. In Moldavian, Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian and Kirghiz the increase in the total book production was greater than the increase in the total issue of books in Russian (both in number of copies and in number of titles).

A feature of the present period of building developed socialism is the constant increase in book publication in Russian, the language serving the common interests of all peoples of the USSR. The other languages of group A satisfy primarily internal requirements. The Russian language must furnish a means of communication both within and between nationalities. While not countering one form of communication against another, it should be pointed out that inter-nation contacts are currently of great social significance. The more developed a nation, the richer its culture and the higher its educational level and other factors of cultural growth, the greater its necessity of making contact with progressive culture of other nations.

The disparate growth rates of book publishing in the languages of the nationalities and in Russian have altered the ratio of book production between the two categories.

At the same time, the social functions of the literary languages of the USSR have expanded not so much in breadth as in depth. By expansion in breadth we mean the increase in the total number of books published, whether original material or translations. By expansion in depth we mean the creation of original works in the national language and the expansion of the subject matter of the published material.

Since the mid-1940s, the social functions of the indigenous literary languages of the Union republics have tended to deepen rather than to expand. Over a 15-year period (1956-70) the growth in original literature always exceeded that of works translated into any of the group A languages. By 1970, the increase in original book production was far greater than the increase in translated material in all the indigenous languages of the Union republics.

The growing amount of original literature was very important in the equalisation in terms of quality of printed matter appearing in the languages of group A. Figures indicate that there was a particularly rapid growth of original literature among those languages whose written traditions were founded in Soviet times, or which had been extremely weak prior to the Revolution (Kirghiz, Kazakh and Tajik), and among those whose functional development had been artificially curtailed by various historical circumstances (Lithuanian, Latvian, Moldavian and Estonian). While in the 1920s and part of the subsequent decade the lion's share of book production was translations from other languages, primarily Russian, in the 1960s and 1970s the gap was closed, and book production of the peoples of the Union republics began to consist chiefly of original works.

In the mid-1940s and early 1950s the percentage of original works in the book production of the nationalities was far lower than that of translated material. This was true of all languages of the indigenous populations of the Union republics, except for Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian, which had deepened their social functions in book publishing earlier than the others. Original works did not exceed one-third of the total book production in the languages of the Central Asian peoples: Kazakh, Turkmen and Kirghiz for which a written form was evolved only in Soviet times; and Uzbek and Tajik, which are languages with an old written form. The percentage of original works in Moldavian was particularly low, showing the direct link between the deepening functions of a language in book publishing and the general social and economic development of that people, which is reflected in its transformation into a socialist nation. Specific historical conditions caused this process to be somewhat different in Moldavia from that among the other socialist nations of the USSR. It is only recently that deepening the social functions of the language ceased to be an acute issue for those literary languages spoken by people of a once backward culture.

There can be no question of the enforced 'Russification' of the non-Russian peoples, the fading away of the languages of the nationalities, the decline in their culture, or drop in the number of intellectuals of which the ideologues of anti-communism keep on accusing the Soviet Union. The flimsiness of these implications was repeatedly exposed in Soviet writings on the basis of factual data. There has been a steady deepening of the social functions of the languages of nationalities in the printing industry, and a growth in the percentage of original works in the total production of literature by nationalities. The greater functional load of a literary language as a result of its intensive development in publishing, correlates with the development of the internal structure of the language: its lexical resources, etc.

At different stages in the development of a literary language the relationship between the proportion of original and translated works is not the same. It is determined by the social order, the real needs of the people, and by their linguistic knowledge. The Soviet reader now has better education and is often bilingual, and will become more so in the future.

Scientists and people in the arts, no matter what their nationality, are aware of this. It is important now to compare original and translated works not only in terms of quantity, but also in terms of quality. A good working knowledge of Russian among the non-Russian peoples allows them to compare works by their own writers with those of other peoples.

Publishing reflects the interests of each nation, each people and their specific culture, and the interests of Soviet society as a whole. For a genuine correlation of the language of publishing in each Union and autonomous republic, there obviously has to be a comprehensive examination of ideological, political, historical, cultural, economic and other factors. However, a quantitative analysis of book production reveals the principal trend, which is that of a rapid increase in books published in Russian that are of equal interest to all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

2. Interaction of the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR and Development of Bilingualism

In addition to the structural and functional development of the languages of the peoples of the USSR, ethno-linguistic processes are also characterised by the interaction of languages in the speech behaviour of different nationalities. This interaction in its turn largely depends on non-linguistic factors. Departmental statistics are usually not adequate for studying this aspect of ethno-linguistic processes, and socio-linguistic research cannot provide information on speech behaviour in the past. For this reason, census returns are very impor-

tant. Although they cannot provide patterns of actual speech behaviour, they do make possible a partial comparison of the social functions of one language with those of another.

The division of social functions between languages in any ethnolinguistic region had its own specific features conditioned by many reasons: 1) socio-economic conditions; 2) the numerical relationship between peoples speaking different languages in the given region; 3) the 'spatial' (geographic) distribution of these peoples, and the degree of compactness of settlement; 4) 'time' factors—the chronological duration of ethno-linguistic contacts; and 5) ethno-linguistic factors, primarily the genealogical relationship between the languages and peoples in contact.

Immediately after the Revolution there was a varying degree of mastery of a second language and the spread of bilingualism among the peoples of the USSR. Among those who subsequently established Union and autonomous republics, the greatest proportion of those knowing Russian and calling it their mother tongue was to be found among the Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Mordvins, Karelians, Chuvashes, Udmurts, and Mari. The highest percentage among the rural population was also to be found among them (Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Mordvins and Karelians). The lowest proportion of those with a knowledge of Russian was to be found among the urban Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Azerbaijanians, Balkars and others. In the rural districts of these outlying areas of Russia there was an extremely poor knowledge of Russian, and the transition to it was rare. Only for two of 830 000 rural Tajiks, and for 39 of 3.2 million Uzbeks Russian became a native language. This is because identical factors do not necessarily produce the same effect on ethno-linguistic processes among different peoples.

Key to introducing Russian to Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Mordvins, Karelians, Chuvashes, Udmurts and Mari was obviously the length of their ethno-cultural and ethno-linguistic contacts with Russians, as well as their areas of settlement. The similarity of Ukrainian and Byelorussian to Russian, does not provide an explanation, since among the Karelians, Mordvins, Udmurts and Mari, peoples of the Finno-Ugric linguistic group, and Chuvashes (Turkic language) there was an equally high number of people speaking Russian as there was among the peoples of the Slavonic linguistic group. More people spoke the language of another nationality if they were living among them, and were cut off from their own ethnos.

During the building of socialism the mother tongue of most nations living in the rural areas of their republics revealed relative stability. Compared with 1926, in 1959 there was a growth in the number of rural residents who called the language of their nationality their mother tongue only among the Byelorussians (13.6 per cent.), the Azerbaijanians (5.8 per cent), the Georgians

(3.4 per cent), and Ukrainians (2.1 per cent).

There were no significant changes among the remaining ethnoi. Most rural Armenians, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Tajiks and Uzbeks said that language of their nationality was their mother tongue. The proportion of peoples among the above nations who ceased to speak their native tongue, and spoke only the language of another nationality, was never above one per cent. Among Kazakhs in Kazakhstan villages, the proportion of those claiming Kazakh as their mother tongue dropped by 0.4 per cent, and with an even smaller drop among the Kirghiz, Armenians and Uzbeks. The creation of state structures by the nationalities and ethnic consolidation helped the native languages to persist within the autonomous republics as well.

A comparison of census returns shows that the indigenous nationalities of autonomous republics more quickly started to use a language of another nationality than those peoples with their own Union republic. One reason is that for most of them (except Tatars) a written form evolved only in Soviet times. Initially, when there were no schools functioning in the languages of these nationalities and they had no literature translated into their native tongues, it was only through Russian that they could familiarise themselves with the science and culture of others. In its turn, the functional development of the languages of non-Russian peoples organised into their own autonomous republics in the RSFSR in school instruction and publishing opened the way to introduction of those peoples to Russian. So, bilingualism developed among these peoples in the years of building socialism, and led to the exchange of language (see Table 13).

In the 32 years from 1926 to 1959 the number of non-Russians calling Russian their mother tongue rose by 3.7 million (from 6.5 to 10.2 million); over the next 11 years (1959 to 1970) by 2.8 million, and between 1970 and 1979 by 3.3 million–showing the mounting intensity of this process. Even so, there was little change in the relationship between nationality and mother tongue. The proportion of those considering the language of their nationality to be their mother tongue remained high. Among peoples with their own Union republics it was 95 per cent (the Armenians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Moldavians excepted), while among peoples in autonomous republics and regions, the figure was 85 per cent (lower only among Bashkirs, Karelians, Mordvins, Udmurts, Komi and Khakassians). Among some peoples without a corresponding national autonomous republic or region, the proportion of people calling the language of their nationality their mother tongue was below 50 per cent. Throughout the country as a whole, 93.1 per cent of the population in 1979 said that the language of their nationality was their mother tongue. Leaving out the Russians, among whom just over 200 000 speak a language other than their mother tongue (usually Ukrainian), 87.1 per cent of other peoples consider the language of their nation-

Table 13

Persons Calling the Language of Their Nationality Their Mother Tongue (per cent)

People	1926	1959	1970	1979
Total population of the USSR	94.2	94.3	93.9	93.1
Peoples with their own Union republics:				
Russians	99.7	99.8	99.8	99.5
Ukrainians	87.1	87.7	85.7	82.8
Uzbeks	99.1	98.4	98.6	98.5
Byelorussians	71.9	84.2	80.6	74.2
Kazakhs	99.6	98.4	98.0	97.5
Azerbaijanians	93.8	97.6	98.2	97.9
Armenians	92.4	89.9	91.4	90.7
Georgians	96.5	98.6	98.4	98.3
Moldavians	92.3	95.2	95.0	93.2
Lithuanians	46.9	97.8	97.9	97.9
Tajiks	98.3	98.1	98.5	97.8
Turkmens	97.3	98.9	98.9	98.7
Kirghiz	99.0	98.7	98.8	97.9
Letts	79.0	95.1	95.2	95.0
Estonians	99.4	95.2	95.5	95.3
Peoples with autonomous republics or other forms of national statehood:				
Tatars	98.9	92.1	89.2	85.5
Jews	71.9	21.5	17.7	14.2
Chuvashes	98.7	90.8	86.9	81.7
Peoples of Daghestan	96.7	96.2	96.5	95.9
Mordvins	94.0	78.1	77.8	72.6
Bashkirs	53.8	61.9	66.2	67.0
Udmurts	98.9	89.1	82.6	76.5
Chechens	99.7	98.8	98.7	98.6
Mari	99.3	95.1	91.2	86.7
Ossetians	97.9	89.1	88.6	88.2
Komi and Komi-Permyaks	96.5	88.7	83.7	76.5
Buryats	98.1	94.9	92.6	90.2
Yakuts	99.7	97.6	96.3	95.3
Kabardinians	99.3	97.9	98.0	97.9
Kara-Kalpaks	87.6	95.0	96.0	95.9
Ingushes	99.5	97.9	97.4	97.4
Peoples of Siberia, the North and the Far East	78.4	75.9	67.4	61.8
Karelians	95.5	71.3	63.0	55.6
Tuvinians	–	99.1	98.7	98.8
Kalmyks	99.3	91.0	91.7	91.3
Karachais	99.6	96.8	98.1	97.7
Adygeis	98.4	96.8	96.5	95.7
Abkhazians	84.2	95.0	95.9	94.3
Khakassians	87.8	86.0	88.7	80.9
Balkars	99.6	97.0	97.2	96.9
Altaians	80.0	88.5	87.2	86.4
Circassians	98.4	89.7	92.0	91.4

ality to be their mother tongue.

A comparison of the census returns of 1926, 1959, 1970 and 1979 shows that people adopt the language of another nationality more rapidly in urban communities than in rural.

In 1959, the greatest nationality language divergence among groups living within and beyond their own republics were among Byelorussians, Letts, Estonians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians and Moldavians; the smallest were among the peoples of Central Asia and the Azerbaijanians. From 1959 to 1979 there was a slight growth in the nationality-language divergence within and outside their republic among all the peoples in the Union republics (except the Byelorussians, Moldavians and Kirghiz).

This indicates the great influence of the ethnic environment on the progress and direction of ethno-linguistic processes. This trend is fairly universal, and is apparent even among Russians, whose language in most areas of the USSR is the lingua franca.

The extent of linguistic exchange revealed by the census returns provides only a very general picture. It does not tell us how well the second language was spoken, nor about the division of labour between the two languages in different linguistic environments.

Technological progress and improved social relations under developed socialism have resulted in the real need for the best inter-lingual relations possible. More rapid development rates are dependent on how rapidly and efficiently useful experience can be communicated by one people to the others. This communication is only possible through bilingualism.

Of course, not all peoples have the same conditions for learning a second language, nor do they have the same knowledge of it, nor do they use it to the same extent, nor do they have the same need for it. Ethno-sociological research has, moreover, shown that within a people there are major differences between urban and rural residents, between the sexes and generations, between different social and occupational groups as regards the extent of bilingualism, its forms, the spheres in which it is used, and also its socio-ethnic consequences.

The development of bilingualism is linked with the drive of non-Russian peoples to learn Russian as the language of inter-nation communication. The impetus for this drive is created by the demands of modern life. The CPSU Programme states:

> The voluntary study of Russian in addition to the native language is of positive significance, since it facilitates reciprocal exchanges of experience and access of every nation and nationality to the cultural gains of all the other peoples of the USSR, and to world culture.[1]

The 1970 Census recorded that 11.6 per cent of the non-Russian

[1] *The Road to Communism*, p. 562.

population declared Russian to be their mother tongue, and in addition 17.3 per cent of the USSR's total population indicated Russian as a fluently spoken second language. The actual scope of bilingualism, if we include a comparatively poor knowledge of Russian, is much wider than that recorded by the 1970 Census, according to the research conducted by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnography in Moldavia.

The 1970 Census returns showed 33.8 per cent of Moldavians living in their republic (including 62.5 per cent of urban and 27.8 per cent of rural residents) as having a good knowledge of Russian. The research revealed that the percentage of the Moldavian urban population aged 18 and over with a good grasp of Russian is 94 per cent. Of this group 29 per cent said that they thought in Russian, another 37 per cent said that although they thought in Moldavian they spoke fluent Russian, 22 per cent spoke Russian with some difficulty, and only seven per cent had great difficulty in speaking Russian.

Russian is also more widespread among the rural population than shown by the 1970 Census. Even among the group who spoke Moldavian with greater fluency, a fair proportion knew Russian to differing degrees.

Bilingualism in this multinational society has arisen primarily because of the need for people speaking different languages to communicate.

The following are among the most important reasons for the turn to Russian: 1) the relatively wide settlement of Russians in large numbers among other peoples, thus facilitating frequent contact; 2) the rich nature of the Russian language and literature; 3) the broad functional spread of Russian culture, its greater development, and the multifunctionality of Russian in its expression of that culture; 4) the relative proximity of pronunciation and written form in Russian; 5) the proximity of the colloquial spoken and literary written language.

Bilingualism in Soviet society usually involves a language of a nationality and Russian. This trend has become particularly apparent in recent years. From 1970 to 1979 the number of non-Russians speaking fluent Russian as a second language grew by almost 20 million from 41.9 to 61.3 million. While in 1970 approximately half (48.7 per cent) of the total non-Russian population spoke fluent Russian, that figure was almost two-thirds (62.2 per cent) in 1979.

It is worthy of note that the proportion of people with a fluent grasp of Russian is, as a rule, smaller among the indigenous populations of Union republics than among peoples with a different state structure. Russian is the second language for over half the population among 16 out of 20 of the indigenous peoples of the autonomous republics in the RSFSR, among 10 of the 14 indigenous populations of the autonomous regions and areas, and also among most of

the other peoples without a separate state structure.

The spread of Russian as the lingua franca in no way constricts the development of other forms of bilingualism and multilingualism, when the second language is not Russian.

Among most of the small peoples, especially among those without an independent state structure, there is widespread bilingualism, both Russian and other USSR languages being the second language. For example, 25.4 per cent of Kurds speak fluent Russian, and another 36.2 per cent speak other USSR languages; the same figures for Gypsies are 59.1 and 10.0 per cent, and 12.2 and 43.5 per cent for the Tsakhurs.

The knowledge of a second non-Russian language is also common among the indigenous nationalities of the Union and autonomous republics: in 1979 four million Russians spoke a non-Russian language fluently as second language. The last census returns recorded that among rural Tajiks, for instance, more people spoke a non-Russian language rather than Russian as a second language – 11.9 and 9.5 per cent respectively.

The extent of bilingualism among the indigenous population of the Union republics tends to be more even than among other peoples (see Table 14).

In 1970 the difference between the Uzbeks and Byelorussians, who were at opposite ends of the scale as regards knowledge of Russian as a second language (14.5 and 49 per cent respectively), was 34.5 per cent. In 1979 the Estonians had replaced the Uzbeks at the lowest end of the scale, and the difference was reduced to 32.8 per cent. There was thus a trend to uniformity in the proportion of people speaking fluent Russian as a second language in the Union republics.

That proportion also grew at a fairly even rate in the Union republics. Among Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Moldavians, Letts, Azerbaijanians, Ukrainians, Tajiks and Lithuanians the proportion of people speaking fluent Russian grew by from 10.0 to 16.2 per cent. The proportion of Georgians, Byelorussians and Armenians grew somewhat less, by from 5.4 to 8.5 per cent. In the case of the Byelorussians the low increase can be explained by the fact that already in 1970 approximately half of them had a fluent grasp of Russian, and another 19 per cent declared it their mother tongue.

In the autonomous republics of the RSFSR the difference between the Kalmyks and Tuvinians, which in 1970 was 42.2 per cent, (81.1 and 38.9 per cent respectively), was reduced in 1979 to 28.5 per cent (between the Kalmyks and Yakuts it was 84.1 and 55.6 per cent). The major trend therefore was the equalisation of Union and autonomous republics in terms of their knowledge of Russian. We also note that in linguistic terms the small peoples were more dependent than the large nations on various non-linguistic conditions.

Table 14

Bilingualism in the USSR According to the 1970 and 1979 Census Returns (per cent)

People	Fluent knowledge of Russian		People	Fluent knowledge of Russian	
	1970	1979		1970	1979
Peoples forming Union Republics			Peoples of Siberia, the North and the Far East	52.5	54.0
Russians	–	–	Karelians	59.1	51.3
Ukrainians	36.3	49.8	Tuvinians	38.9	59.2
Uzbeks	14.5	49.3	Kalmyks	81.1	84.1
Byelorussians	49.0	57.0	Karachais	67.6	75.5
Kazakhs	41.8	52.3	Adygeis	67.9	76.7
Azerbaijanians	16.6	29.5	Abkhazians	59.2	73.3
Armenians	30.1	38.6	Khakassians	65.5	68.3
Georgians	21.3	26.7	Balkars	17.5	77.4
Moldavians	36.1	47.4	Altaians	54.9	68.7
Lithuanians	35.9	52.1	Circassians	70.0	69.6
Tajiks	15.4	29.6			
Turkmens	15.4	25.4			
Kirghiz	19.1	29.4	Peoples not forming autonomous unit		
Letts	45.2	56.7			
Estonians	29.0	24.2			
Peoples forming different autonomous units			Poles	37.0	44.7
			Koreans	50.3	47.7
			Bulgarians	58.8	58.2
			Greeks	53.0	59.1
Tatars	62.5	68.9	Gypsies	53.0	59.1
Jews	16.0*	13.7	Uigurs	35.6	52.1
Chuvashes	58.4	64.8	Hungarians	25.8	34.2
Peoples of Daghestan	41.7		Gagauzes	63.3	68.0
			Romanians	28.5	48.4
Mordvins	65.7	65.5	Kurds	19.9	25.4
Bashkirs	63.3	64.9	Finns	47.0	39.9
Udmurts	63.3	64.4	Dungans	48.0	62.8
Chechens	66.7	76.0	Abazins	69.5	75.4
Mari	62.4	69.9	Assyrians	46.2	41.7
Ossetians	58.6	64.9	Tats	57.7	61.3
Komi	64.8	64.4	Shors	59.8	52.6
Buryats	66.7	71.9	Eskimos	50.5	53.7
Yakuts	41.7	55.6	Aleuts	18.8	15.0
Kabardinians	71.4	76.7	Germans	59.6	51.7
Kara-Kalpaks	10.4	45.1			
Ingushes	71.2	79.6			

* In addition to this, 78.2 per cent named Russian as their mother tongue.

Ethno-linguistic processes, and particularly the varying degrees of knowledge of Russian among non-Russian peoples, are acted upon in different ways by socio-economic factors, among which the most important are the form of economic activity, occupation, material prosperity, education and urbanisation. Each of these factors is characterised by their indirect influence (mediated by other factors), which is more or less pronounced in differing situations and sometimes fluctuates dramatically according to the complex, total effect of other factors.

When we examine the effect of the level of education on the knowledge of Russian as a second language, we find conditions conducive to learning Russian as the lingua franca in most parts of the Union and autonomous republics. If we compare the proportion of people with secondary and higher education with those speaking fluent Russian in the Union republics, we conclude that knowledge of Russian improves as the educational level grows.

Statistics show the complex nature of this influence: in some Union republics the proportion of persons speaking fluent Russian or thinking of it as their native tongue is higher (Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Lithuanians, Letts and Moldavians) than the proportion of people with higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education. Among other peoples (Estonians and Armenians) the figures more or less correspond.

Among some peoples, on the contrary, the proportion of the population with a knowledge of Russian is lower than that with secondary and higher education: by 31.1 per cent among the Georgians, by 26.8 per cent among the Turkmens, by 26.2 per cent among the Uzbeks, by 24.5 per cent among the Azerbaijanians, and by 20.6 per cent among the Kirghiz.

The link between education and bilingualism is complemented by urbanisation, and the growth in the urban population. In all the Union republics the proportion of the urban population with a fluent knowledge of Russian or considering it their mother tongue was significantly above the corresponding proportion of the rural population (Table 15).

The influence of urbanisation, however, must not be exaggerated. In some republics, even among urban residents, especially elderly people and those with unskilled jobs, there are some who do not speak Russian, or do so very poorly.

But urbanisation, like education, creates more opportunities for people to study Russian, and thereby helps to establish it as the lingua franca and expands its functions.

By analysing census returns on the extent of bilingualism in various age groups we can, firstly, reconstruct in retrospect the main trends of bilingualism and, secondly, make some forecasts for the future (see Table 16).

Table 15

Bilingualism and the Level of Education (as a percentage of the total for the USSR)

Nationality	In towns and cities			In the countryside		
	Education (higher or secondary)	Russian considered mother tongue and spoken fluently	Russian spoken fluently but not considered mother tongue	Education (higher or secondary)	Russian considered mother tongue and spoken fluently	Russian spoken fluently but not considered mother tongue
Ukrainians	65.5	70.9	46.9	33.8	31.4	26.3
Byelorussians	62.6	85.1	48.9	28.2	54.6	49.0
Uzbeks	49.7	36.4	34.5	38.4	7.9	7.8
Kazakhs	51.3	61.1	57.4	34.1	37.8	36.1
Georgians	73.4	40.0	37.2	45.7	9.0	8.8
Azerbaijanians	33.0	34.9	31.9	34.8	6.7	6.5
Lithuanians	52.0	54.1	51.6	21.2	22.8	22.1
Moldavians	54.0	76.6	60.7	29.2	31.0	29.8
Letts	59.9	57.9	51.4	36.8	40.6	32.2
Kirghiz	60.6	54.9	53.1	36.3	13.4	13.3
Tajiks	46.4	33.4	32.3	36.4	9.6	9.5
Armenians	59.1	48.6	37.6	37.7	17.6	16.4
Turkmens	48.8	35.4	32.0	40.4	8.0	7.9
Estonians	58.2	42.7	36.7	31.4	22.0	19.6

As one might expect, there is little bilingualism among children under ten among almost all peoples. Only the Kazakhs, as they live more interspersed with Russians in rural areas, and Byelorussians are exceptions. There is also a very simple explanation for the low level of bilingualism among those aged over 60 (i.e. born before the Revolution) among the Central Asian peoples and Azerbaijanians. Before the Revolution these peoples were almost totally illiterate, had a low percentage of urban residents, a low mobility, and settled in compact ethnic blocks (even the large towns in these areas were made up of people of one nationality, or different nationalities living in separate quarters and having little contact with one another).

The influence of school (secondary and some higher establishments) on bilingualism is apparent in the 11-19 age group. The proportion of bilingual speakers is more than five times that in the preceding age group, and although it is not the highest group, it nevertheless involves almost half of the age group among the non-Russian peoples of the Union republics. The next age group (20-29), which is influenced not only by school but also by other factors, has the highest proportion of bilingual speakers in Union republics.

In the autonomous republics and regions, where bilingualism be-

Table 16

Bilingualism in Various Age Groups for Peoples Forming Union Republics (per cent)

People	Age						
	under age 10	11-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Russians	0.9	4.2	4.8	3.6	3.46	2.9	1.9
Ukrainians	10.2	57.8	69.4	57.1	48.4	35.4	22.9
Byelorussians	18.0	75.6	80.1	71.8	66.3	53.6	35.1
Uzbeks	4.4	23.2	39.9	31.1	26.6	18.3	8.3
Kazakhs	19.7	62.6	74.6	67.0	58.7	39.7	19.7
Georgians	3.7	17.1	34.8	32.0	30.4	26.0	15.9
Azerbaijanians	4.8	20.6	38.7	30.9	31.6	23.3	10.4
Lithuanians	4.2	39.8	72.2	58.4	43.1	28.2	23.6
Moldavians	7.5	43.8	67.6	59.6	45.0	32.4	29.8
Letts	9.6	49.0	75.3	68.5	52.6	40.0	41.1
Kirghiz	6.3	32.8	52.1	37.6	30.7	17.8	6.8
Tajiks	6.0	35.3	53.1	48.4	44.7	35.0	27.3
Armenians	9.3	30.7	56.0	51.7	52.5	46.0	33.6
Turkmens	3.5	20.6	37.2	29.7	25.0	14.8	5.4
Estonians	3.4	25.2	59.9	46.5	28.5	17.7	23.6
Peoples forming autonomous republics or regions	30.7	75.3	82.8	80.4	77.0	63.8	49.0
National average	6.8	24.9	30.9	26.5	22.6	17.4	13.0

gan to spread earlier and involved more of the population (this being connected with lengthy mixed settlement with Russians and other peoples and widespread school instruction in two languages), the maximum proportion of bilingual speakers is found among older people. This is particularly true of the peoples who are in close ethnic contact with Russians or who have a high proportion of people whose mother tongue is Russian. The highest percentage of bilingual speakers among the Karelians, Mordvins, Komi and Komi-Permyaks, Udmurts, Kalmyks and some other peoples is in the 30-39, and even the 40-49 age group.

The national average for bilingual speakers in the 11-19 age group is approximately equal to their number in the 30-49 age group, and is higher than the average for all age groups. This is accounted for by the spread of bilingualism and the fact that now school education alone provides as much chance of learning a second language as all the factors together did two or three decades ago.

The spread of bilingualism is due not only to secondary school, but also to higher education, and general inter-nation contact at work and in the army; for this reason we see a sharp rise in the number of bilingual speakers from the 11-19 to the 20-29 age group. This applies completely only to the Union republics. In autonomous re-

publics and regions, as we have noted above, the highest proportion of bilingual speakers is found in the older age groups.

Two crucial parts of ethno-linguistic processes, fluent knowledge of another language and the passage to that language, are closely interlinked. Peoples who have a high proportion of persons who have switched to another language, also have a higher percentage of persons who know a second language in addition to their mother tongue. Both these indices are comparatively low among peoples forming Union republics, and higher among other peoples.

Knowledge of a language of another nationality does not always lead to its adoption as mother tongue. The recognition of a language of another nationality as mother tongue is a sign that a major psychological barrier has been overcome; this barrier usually arises when a person exchanges one of the determinants of his ethnos. This extreme aspect of bilingualism is by no means obligatory.

Linguistic development in Soviet multinational society gives rise to new problems. As the mother tongues of the peoples of the USSR develop, so Russian becomes more widespread with growing influence on all aspects of life. This is the basis for the development of bilingualism, which is an important part of working towards the goal of communism.

The growing role of Russian in the accelerating development and convergence of nations and nationalities in the Soviet Union is in the interests of all the peoples, and is a process for which history has paved the ground. It cannot be artificially forced, nor restrained, as that would contradict the main linguistic trend in developed socialist society. Leonid Brezhnev, in greetings sent to the conference on Russian as the language of friendship and co-operation between the peoples of the USSR, held in Tashkent in May 1979, said:

> Under developed socialism, when our country's economy has developed into a single national complex, when the new historic community—the Soviet people has emerged, the role of Russian as the language of inter-nation communication in communist construction is objectively growing.[1]

Bilingualism involving Russian and a language of a nationality, in the new historical community of people, differs typologically from the varieties of bilingualism, where the second language is the mediating language. The former kind of bilingualism is based on the equal rights of both languages, the foundation of which is laid in the Constitution. The linguistic policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state aims to provide the conditions most conducive to developing the languages of nationalities, spreading Russian, and creating on this basis bilingualism involving Russian and a language of a nationality. This kind of bilingualism evolves not only by means of personal contact

[1] *Pravda*, May 23, 1979.

with speakers of the second language, but also through the education system. This kind of bilingualism is spreading, developing from an individual, to groups, to the whole country.

Unlike many mediating languages, which constitute some kinds of bilingualism in the narrow, conversational form, bilingualism involving Russian and a language of a nationality develops also on the basis of literary languages; the latter kind of bilingualism encourages, rather than retards, the development of national cultures. Unlike a mediating language, Russian, as part of the bilingual process, is at once an important factor, means and result of the convergence of nations and nationalities in the USSR, the internationalisation of culture and everyday life, and intellectual progress.

In conclusion we should stress that one of the most important properties of ethno-linguistic processes under developed socialism is the continued in-depth improvement in the knowledge of the second language and the increased geographical spread of bilingualism. This is facilitated by the very nature of socialism and by urbanisation and industrialisation during the scientific and technological revolution.

The emergence and development of the Soviet people, a new historical community, has given rise to the spread of Russian as the fundamental means of inter-nation communication and as a crucial factor in all communications between all the nations and nationalities of the USSR and in their accelerated development and convergence.

3. Naming Processes Among the Peoples of the USSR

Ethnic and ethno-linguistic processes among the peoples of the Soviet Union are also reflected in names. There are two main trends in the changes in this sphere: in the names used and in the structure of the name model.

The changes occurring in the name stock are the most apparent. Many peoples now use names which were previously found only among one people. Among most peoples names of Russian usage are common: Sergei, Andrei, Yuri, Vladimir, Irina, Elena, Svetlana, Marina. Russians have, in their turn, adopted some names from other peoples, particularly the Ukrainian Oksana.

Many peoples have started to use foreign names: Arthur, Albert, Edouard, Elmira, Jeanne, Angelique, and others. In 1970 among Tatars in Kazan Albert was the third most popular name, and Edouard the fifth; among Kabardinian families in Nalchik in the same year, Arthur was the fifth, Albert the seventh, and Edouard the eighth most popular name. Elmira is a common name among the Bashkirs and Kirghiz, and is being adopted by the Azerbaijanians; in 1967 it

was the fourth most popular name given to new-born girls among Tatars in Kazan and Kazakhs in Chimkent in 1969.

There has been a rapid disappearance of names with obvious religious connotations. In the past among Muslim peoples the commonest names were those which included the particles *abd* meaning 'slave' (of Allah), *din* meaning 'religion', and *ulla* meaning 'Allah'; now these names survive only rarely. Perjorative names are also disappearing.

One of the most typical features of modern naming processes is the reduced scatter of names. Russians now have a very small name stock, in which the ten most frequent names cover 80 per cent of all new-born boys and girls. If we exclude names found only once, then there are about 40-50 male names, and slightly more female names in use. There is a trend towards smaller name stocks among other peoples, too, particularly in towns and cities. In the decades prior to the Revolution the ten most common names covered 12 per cent of Tatars in Kazan, while in 1967 that figure was 53 per cent, and in rural areas 24 per cent; in 1969 among the Kirghiz it was 32 per cent in Frunze and 25 per cent in rural areas, and in 1965 among Uzbeks it was. 25 per cent in Samarkand and 12 per cent in the countryside.

Trends in Russian naming have helped other peoples to use the same name, differentiated in form, for both sexes. This process is almost complete among the Tatars and Bashkirs and the Kirghiz in Frunze; it has made considerable progress among the Azerbaijanians in Baku, while it is weaker in country areas in Azerbaijan and Kirghizia. The process has barely begun among Turkmens and the peoples of Daghestan.

A new type of name stock has emerged in the families of mixed marriages. Here we find the greatest number of 'unusual' names. The reason may be neutrality as regards the name stock of both the nationalities in the family. There is, however, another stronger reason. By choosing an unusual name husband and wife take a stand against the past with which the old names are connected in people's minds (independent of their ethnological significance). Mixed nationality marriages, in choosing names, try to break with the old (although they do not always find better names). In these families we often find names not drawn from the national stock of either parent. The choice of name may also be influenced by the numerical predominance of a nationality in the given area.

The names chosen for children in these mixed marriages, like the marriages themselves, are a reflection of the new relations emerging between the peoples of the Soviet Union. The choice of name in these families shows the depth and extent of changes in awareness and life style, and the difficulties and contradictions encountered in these processes.

A stage (or variation) in this integration process is the spread of two names: the most varied peoples sometimes use two name systems concurrently, the former and the new. Among the Yakuts, for example, the Russian (full) name is often accompanied by the traditional Yakut name. The same is true among Evenks, Udmurts, Koreans in Central Asia, and many other peoples.

The integration processes in the customs connected with the choice and bestowal of a name (who chooses the name and how, who gives it and how, etc.) are less well researched, but no less important.

Changes in the name stocks of the peoples of the USSR are accompanied by equally important changes in the structure of the name model: the emergence of patronymics and surnames among those peoples who did not have them formerly.

Over the centuries some peoples developed a system of patronymics. In the Turkic languages the patronymic took the form of the father's name plus the word *ogly* for a son, or *kyz* for a daughter; Iranian languages added the word *zade*, meaning child or descendant, to the father's name; the Perm languages (Udmurt, Komi) used the suffix *n'*, and the Letts the name of the father in the genitive case; the Russians used the suffixes *-ovich* (*-ich*) for males, and *-ovna* (*-inichna*) for females. However, among most peoples patronymics were not permanent, daily and compulsory parts of name systems (even when passports were introduced). Only with the introduction of the Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR on Marriage and the Family in 1968 did patronymics become compulsory for everyone.

Among some peoples who have only recently adopted patronymics, these are still used only for official purposes, or by certain circles; others make wider use of them.

Before the Revolution many peoples did not use surnames, for example, the small peoples of the Siberian North and Far East; even among larger peoples like the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkmens, and Azerbaijanians surnames were only just coming into use. Neither had they been completely adopted by some of the peoples of the European part of the country (Udmurts and Komi). It took an historically short time, several decades, for the use of surnames to spread throughout the country. The 1968 Fundamentals of Legislation on Marriage and the Family made it legally obligatory for each person to have a three-part name. Now surnames are widely used among those peoples who did not have them earlier, not only in towns and cities, but also in rural areas, although with differing intensity in various social stata.

Chapter IX

INTELLECTUAL CULTURE AND ETHNIC PROCESSES

Intellectual culture, in many ways defining ethnic awareness, is itself subject to strong and direct influence from it. A given ritual may be performed by tradition, but it can also be of a demonstrative nature, if it stresses the ethnic affiliation of the participants, and marks them out in the environment of another ethnos. We have long known that encirclement by another ethnos, especially in a situation involving conflict, leads to the conservation of traditional forms of both intellectual and material culture. The former, in fact, tends to reflect more intensified ethnic awareness.

Ethnic awareness is not only a result of, it is also one of the factors acting on ethnic processes (their direction, rate, content, etc.) where intellectual culture is concerned. The perception of aspects of material culture as ethnically differentiating can transform them into symbols, when they acquire the function of manifesting ethnic awareness. Forms of intellectual culture are, as a rule, more conducive than forms of material culture to the emergence of concurrent forms, almost 'equal' in historical and cultural terms. The choice of forms provides the basis for ethnic differences in culture, where peoples who have roughly the same level of development are concerned.

It is a distinctive feature of intellectual culture that most of its forms are closely linked with language. This is particularly important as language is one of the most persistent ethnic determinants, which are least rigidly defined by socio-economic factors. On the other hand, language (primarily in its vocabulary) reflects a people's history, the nature and intensity of its links with its neighbours, the degree of its internal unity (the presence or absence of a literary language, its relationship with dialects, etc.), social differentiation (presence or absence of 'social dialects', of the relation between the literary language and local dialects), the degree of cultural development (the extent of the language's social functions); i.e. language reflects

the ethnic culture of a nation at a given stage in its development.

Intellectual culture is constantly influenced by all relevant factors, which at a given stage in a people's history acquire an ethnic character or significance. While many aspects of material culture are common throughout the country, or at least throughout large historic and ethnographic regions, many aspects of intellectual culture, despite active exchange in this sphere, and although they become common throughout many nations, retain their capacity to preserve a national form and be transformed into more expressive national variations. This is particularly true of forms of intellectual culture connected with language (folklore, literature, theatre, cinema, the modern press, education system, etc.) or a people's aesthetic traditions—fine arts (especially ornamental), dance and music, for example. The process is not so marked in forms which use language, but have no internal link with it, and can therefore be easily transferred into another linguistic system. For this reason, concurrently with the modern global cultural exchange, the growing uniformity of historically developed forms and increasing intensity of inter-ethnic links in intellectual culture, we also find the development of a general Soviet culture in national forms. In addition to the mastery of new forms, parallel (similar) and typologically close forms develop.

The close link between intellectual culture and language is occasioned by the emergence of bilingualism and multilingualism.

Bilingualism in the intellectual culture of a given ethnos as a social community means the existence of a situation where separate functional and structural elements or whole spheres of one system of intellectual culture are simultaneously served by different (at least two) languages. Inter-ethnic relations (or the processes of ethnic influence) are thereby carried into an ethnos' culture, and transformed into elements of a people's ethnic structure.

A study of ethnic processes must also take account of the specific cultural dualism which is the result of the social division of labour in intellectual production and the singling of certain forms of intellectual culture out of everyday life. By this we mean the concurrency of everyday and professional forms of culture (folk knowledge and science, folklore and literature, folk art and professional art, religious beliefs and theology, everyday rituals and the church, etc.). This situation is commonly present in the intellectual culture of most of the peoples of the world, and gives rise to the urgent question of mutual functional links between everyday and professional layers. Their relationship characterises the structure of the intellectual culture of each ethnic community, its ethnic character, and plays an important role in the internal life of the ethnos, and in inter-ethnic links and relations, i.e. in ethnic processes.

1. The Main Types of Intellectual Culture Among the Peoples of Pre-Revolutionary Russia

Intellectual culture both reflects a people's socio-economic life and is a result of the interpretation of social contradictions and provides the stimulus to break or change them, i.e. overtakes reality (philosophical and political conceptions, for example). At the same time the most archaic and outdated elements are concentrated in one form or another in intellectual culture (in ordinary awareness, rituals, religious beliefs, outdated elements of folklore, etc.).

It therefore comes as no surprise to find that there were many varied forms of intellectual culture in Russia before the Revolution. The culture of most of the peoples was non-uniform in the social sense. Indeed, Lenin wrote about the two cultures in each national culture.[1] Distinctions of a social and class nature were accentuated by differences in cultural levels. There were thus diametrically opposed trends in intellectual culture. At one extreme, there was science, literature, arts, progressive social thought and political theory, the latter being the result of interpretation of the historical processes in the period of imperialism and the proletarian revolutions. This theory, Leninism, was vastly important in developing philosophical, social and economic thought and socio-political practice in many countries. At the other extreme there was not only the reactionary ideology of official government circles and the corresponding philosophical and political theories, but also archaic forms of ideology surviving from the early stages of human development, such as the shamanist ideology and rituals in Siberia, matriarchal echoes in the ethnic tales of the Northern Caucasus, and the totemic conceptions of the peoples of the Far North, etc.

Various combinations of these contradictory features gave rise to the types of intellectual culture to be found among the peoples of Russia before the Revolution.

A categorisation of the main types of intellectual culture before the Revolution must necessarily examine not only the general structure of intellectual culture, but also the degree and nature of the acceptance of aspects of professional culture into everyday life, i.e. the functional relations of everyday and professional forms in terms of 'consumption' as well as in that of 'production'. At the same time the role of professional forms of intellectual culture was in the past limited by the illiteracy of the most numerous social strata of an ethnos, the concentration of professional culture in towns and cities, its elitism, and other factors.

The above criteria serve as a basis for outlining the following main types of intellectual culture among the peoples of Russia at

[1] V. I. Lenin. Critical Remarks on the National Question, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 32.

the turn of the century.

1. Archaic, syncretic cultures were common among peoples at the earliest stages of development at the time of the Revolution (nomadic or semi-nomadic reindeer-herding, hunting or fishing peoples). There was no differentiation between the functions of its separate forms (folk knowledge, beliefs, folklore, rituals, folk art), no written language, professional culture or awareness of authorship rights. This applies to most of the small peoples of Siberia.

2. The peoples in the north of the European part of the USSR and some of the Volga peoples, whose economy was based mainly on agriculture (combined with fishing and hunting in the North), maintained active economic and cultural links with neighbouring peoples, especially the Russians (the Karelians also with the Finns, and the Volga peoples with the Tatars, etc.), which led to relatively strong bilingualism (mostly among men) and partial use of the written form of another language (Russian, Arabic). Some of them even attempted to establish their own written language. The early attempts to do so were associated with the church, an example being the ancient Komi written language devised by Stefani Permski on the basis of Russian in the 14th century, while later attempts had secular aims, witness the experiments of the Karelian Miron Smirnov at the turn of this century, which had no major historical and cultural impact because they remained inaccessible to the bulk of the people. At the beginning of the century we find the first important literary experiments among Buryat, Yakut, Mari, Mordvin, Komi and Chuvash educators, writers and researchers into the local area. Compilations of folklore by the Russian and local scientists (the most remarkable being the Mordvin M. Evsevyev) were published.

3. Some peoples of the North Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia (the Buryats, for example) and the Volga (the Tatars, for instance) had written languages based on a foreign script (Old Mongol, Arabic), with comparatively restricted use (religious, scientific writings of a traditional nature, etc.). Other peoples in the same regions attempted to create their own written languages on the basis of Russian (the Ossetians, for instance), or by modifying the Arab or Persian alphabets. These attempts coincided with the work of the first educators and the first, sometimes brilliant, literary experiments (Kosta Khetagurov of the Ossetians, for example), and the first of historical and local studies (in the mother tongue, Russian, or another language). Within this group of peoples the cultural structure differed widely, especially in the 18th and 19th centuries by the rates of development ranging from the Turkmens (who in the 18th-20th centuries had a written language based on the Persian script, but with restricted function) or the Kazakhs, whose literary language evolved not long before the Revolution, to the Buryats and Kalmyks, who abandoned the Old Mongol written and literary language only in Soviet times.

4. A characteristic feature of some peoples, mostly in the northwest of the European part of Russia (Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians and Finns), was their bilingualism, usually involving the mother tongue of the nationality and Russian, but also taking the following forms: Finnish and Swedish, Estonian and German, Latvian and German, Lithuanian and Polish, etc.). Other typical qualities were their active use of a foreign literary language, with many functions as nowadays, and the beginnings of their own literary languages, national science and art in the 18th and 19th centuries, the work to set up national schools, and the rapid development of folklore studies, ethnography, history, and other humanitarian disciplines.

5. A specific cultural situation existed among peoples with a long (sometimes even ancient) tradition of their own written and literary languages (Armenians and Georgians), and old literature (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Azerbaijanians, etc.) on the basis of their own or a borrowed script.

Among most of these peoples, in the 18th and 19th centuries and the first years of this century, the progressive members of the intelligentsia tried to give their national cultures a different structure. These cultures were very mediaeval or semi-mediaeval, developing very slowly, lagging acutely behind the needs of the new age (the gap between the traditional written language and dialects in use, its specific functions connected with incomplete secularisation, limited and traditional genre structure of literature and the arts, etc.). Their written languages were gradually becoming more democratic, and their functions expanding.

6. The peoples with a very old written language, either in the form of a language similar to their own or their own literary language from which unevenly developing, independent literary languages branched out, formed a special group. In the 19th and 20th centuries these peoples as a rule devised a new literary language, coinciding closely with colloquial speech (Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Moldavians, Bashkirs, etc.), the principles of a new national art, literature, and (especially among the Ukrainians) science.

7. Russian culture in the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries stood on its own.

By the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries many professional forms of Russian culture were well established, but their traditions were largely mediaeval.

In the 18th and 19th centuries Russian culture was receptive to and reworked the achievements of world culture, influencing it at the same time.

By the mid-1700s Russian scientists, writers, artists and architects were of the same standard as their counterparts in Western Europe. By the mid-1800s Russian science, literature, and art were universally acknowledged. The Russian people and the revolutionary move-

ment were making a major contribution to world culture in the mid-1800s and early 1900s.

The development of Russian professional culture was influenced by the convergence of that culture with the cultures of other peoples of Russia, especially with the related Eastern Slavonic peoples, Ukrainians and Byelorussians. The ethnic proximity of these three peoples was conducive to their constant and productive mutual influence, and joint efforts in developing social thought, science, literature, drama, music and painting. Some of the people behind Russian national culture were Ivan Fedorov, the first printer, and his comrade the Byelorussian Piotr Mstislavets, also a printer, and his famous contemporary Georgi Skorina. The Kiev-Mogilev Academy, which played a major part in developing early Russian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian education, is linked with the names of the Byelorussian Simeon Polotsky, the Ukrainian Feofan Prokopovich and the Russian Stefan Yavorsky. In the 18th and 19th centuries, as subsequently, many Ukrainian and Byelorussian scientists lived, worked and published their material in St. Petersburg and Moscow, while Russian scientists did the same in Kiev, Kharkov and Minsk. A great many Russian writers, starting with Nikolai Gogol, were Ukrainian by birth. The Ukrainian writers Taras Shevchenko, E. Grebenka, G. Kvitka-Osnovianenko and Marko Vovchok wrote both in Ukrainian and Russian. K. Kalinovsky, a Byelorussian revolutionary democrat, and Yanko Kupala and Yakub Kolas, classics of Byelorussian literature, were closely linked with the Russian social movement and Russian literature of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The social aspect of intellectual culture before the Revolution was also complex. While it was comparatively uniform among the more backward peoples, despite the varying degrees of social and property differentiation of tribal leaders, there was sharp social differentiation among the more developed nations.

In the late 1800s and early 1900s Russia was an advanced country in terms of science, literature and arts, while at the same time retaining many folklore traditions, and developed folk crafts and trades which had their roots way back in the past. For most peoples of Russia their traditional folk art was not only their heritage, but also a living part of their everyday life.

The advanced scientific and technical thought in old Russia could not make a great impact on the life of the people, for the most part semi-literate or illiterate. St. Petersburg. Moscow and few other cities, on a level with the great cities of Europe, coexisted with dozens of towns which had not changed from the Middle Ages (Samarkand and Bukhara, for instance), with towns which were more like villages, and with the merchant towns along the Volga. The towns and cities of Russia were surrounded by thousands of villages, where primitive work tools, homespun clothes, archaic agricultural and

stock-raising rituals were still retained, traditional cosmogonic and anthropological conceptions were still current, and natural materialist views tangled up with Christian, Islamic, pre-Christian, pre-Islamic, and other views. In the tundra of the Extreme North, the Lower Volga steppes, the mountainous areas of the Altai, Tien Shan and Pamirs, and in the deserts of Central Asia and Kazakhstan whole peoples or ethnic groups led a traditional nomadic or semi-nomadic life which retarded their cultural development. They had differing degrees of contact with the settled population, but in any case these did little to help the nomads adopt more progressive cultural forms.

Religion also took many forms in pre-revolutionary Russia: Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Lamaism, Judaism, and many varieties of archaic religions among the Northern and Siberian peoples. Although ethnic and religious borders rarely coincided completely, ethnic and religious affiliations influenced each other fairly strongly. In Russia before the Revolution the oppression was felt in the systematic restriction and limiting of science, literature and the arts in the outlying areas of nationalities, and their treatment as 'aliens' was reinforced by the Orthodox Church.

Religious differences were one of the causes and forms of national division and enmity, often culminating in armed and bloody clashes in Czarist Russia.

They also did a great deal to prevent mixed marriages, which in turn hindered the consolidation of ethnic groups into larger blocs.

The variety in the intellectual culture of different groups of the peoples of Czarist Russia, the existence of linguistic, religious, everyday and ritual barriers restricted inter-ethnic cultural exchange even where professional culture was concerned. Contacts and interaction were even more limited in everyday life and traditional forms of culture. However, although limited, they existed, and increased at different rates in various forms, depending on the ethnic situation in various given historical periods and historical and ethnic areas.

In the decades before the Revolution there was a growth in economic links, and an increase in the role played by the revolutionary movement and progressive social thought, literature and the arts, although they were again limited by the language barrier, especially where peoples from different linguistic families were concerned. Other hindering factors were marked religious differences, racial and national prejudices, hostile political relations as a result of the national and Russification policies of the Czarist government, and, of course, the differing levels of development between nations, national groupings, and ethnographic groups.

Many of the small Northern and Siberian peoples, and some of the Central Asian and North Caucasian peoples lacked both modern forms of professional culture, and an awareness of a need for them. The work of individual educators had little social impact. The educa-

tion system was not merely incomplete: it was unevenly distributed among the peoples of Czarist Russia. Most Muslim peoples had religious schools (the *mektabeh* and *medresseh*), where instruction was in a foreign, either Arabic or Persian, language, and largely religious. The education system among the Christian or Christianised peoples was also limited, especially in rural areas (elementary classes), and instruction in non-Russian regions was largely in Russian (the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Karelia, etc.), and other languages hardly used in everyday life among those peoples (e.g. in Polish in some districts of Lithuania). Various class and partially national restrictions barred some nationalities and women from secondary and higher education.

It is noteworthy that the teaching in the schools of those days and the conducting of religious rituals in languages not in everyday use hindered the spread of bilingualism in everyday and cultural life, which could have facilitated the cultural convergence of peoples, as only a narrow strata of each people had the command of a second language (the few intellectuals, local administrators, clergy, etc.). Relative religious and regional unity was to be found among the upper classes, which were closed social circles. Among the lower social strata everyday contacts were largely confined to those with related or neighbouring peoples. In areas of various ethnic contacts or interspersed settlement bilingualism for everyday purposes existed, and this to some extent promoted cultural exchange (this was, however, limited).

This process was greatly assisted in the late 1800s and early 1900s by migrations, particularly the continuing Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian migrations to Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. In other cases this was the result of the emergence in national districts of industrial and trading centres important throughout Russia (Baku, Riga, Odessa, Donbass, Krivoi Rog, etc.). Mixed marriages, which were also a factor in developing mutual cultural contacts, which included the intellectual sphere, and bringing those contacts into family circle, were fairly common in areas where different peoples with the same religion came into contact (e.g. where Russians lived among Karelians, Komi, Mordvins, etc.), and in areas where young men formed the bulk of the migrants (the Trans-Baikal area, the Far East). In the decades before the Revolution there was a great number of migrations by the Eastern Slavs, and they (mostly from the lower social strata), as a rule brought bilingualism in everyday usage into national districts, being themselves in a minority. The only exceptions were the multinational districts with a majority Russian population (the Volga area, for instance).

As a rule bilingualism in these cases only functioned in everyday relations in family and ritual spheres, only occasionally touching on some aspects of folklore. The lengthy economic and cultural con-

tacts between the Russians and Karelians and a certain proportion of ethnically mixed marriages promoted folkloric exchange between them, although of quite a peculiar nature. The existence of epic songs among the Karelians and Russians (the *runa* and *bylina*), with marginal, mostly male, bilingualism, led to some Karelians (e.g. T. Turuyev) and some Russian reciters (e.g. M. Korguyev) knowing and performing the epic songs of the neighbouring people. Yet we cannot talk of general mutual influence between the epics, as they continued to stay at different stages, largely alien one to the other. On the other hand there was lively exchange in the field of fairy stories of recent origin, legends, proverbs, sayings, lyrical songs, some forms of ritual folklore (e.g. wedding songs), songs of literary origin, and in the last pre-revolutionary decades, workers' and revolutionary songs. In many cases (especially where songs of recent origin were concerned) the Karelians were the receptive people.

The growth of capitalist relations in Russia in the late 1800s and early 1900s led on the whole to a decrease in national isolation, and the disappearance of mediaeval forms of intellectual culture, surviving from feudal times. Yet even the most developed nations (Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Tatars, etc.) had a largely rural population, and retained a great many elements of feudalism, which in the sphere of intellectual culture were reflected mainly in the illiteracy of the vast majority of the people, class and even estate differentiation in cultural forms, and the influence of the church and clergy in the education system.

While on the whole in Russia culture lagged behind socio-economic development, starting from the late 1800s, progressive forms of intellectual culture (the natural sciences, social and political theories, philosophy, political economy, history, ethnography, literature and the arts) developed rapidly among some peoples, and conflict grew between progressive scientific and social thought and the social, economic and political structure in the country, including the administrative and the education systems, which did not work in the interests of the developing nations and nationalities, and slowed down their cultural and ethnic development.

A very typical feature in both the culture and politics of pre-revolutionary Russia, and in the cultural relations of the peoples in the country, was the conflict between progressive Russian professional culture in all its diversity and the government and its official ideology. This culture was thus seen by the progressive members of other peoples of Russia as particularly dynamic.

At the turn of the century traditions of folklore and ritual, traditional folk knowledge, crafts, and the arts seemed doomed to disappear. They were being distorted by capitalist relations, the growing influence of the market, the superficial acceptance of modernist styles, etc. The absence of any immediate prospect of developing modern

artistic forms in some cases was seen by some intellectuals from the nationalities as a tragic loss of ethnic identity. In Czarist Russia it was impossible to envisage teaching people about science, literature and the arts, developing state protection of monuments, or preserving the traditional crafts and the folklore heritage of nationalities.

2. The Emergence of More Equal Cultural Development Among the Peoples of the USSR

Intellectual culture has made great advances under the Soviet government, an important part of these being the emergence of more equal levels of cultural development among the peoples of the USSR, which had a tremendous impact on inter-ethnic relations.

Even now, of course, for historical reasons, there continue to be differences in the level of the cultural development of peoples, both in the resources and facilities available, and in the intellectual development of the peoples themselves. This can be gauged by education, and the workers' cultural interests, factors indicating the consumption of and familiarity with cultural values, and active participation in creation of modern forms of intellectual culture.

Cultural conditions in the republics, the cultural environment in which most of a given people received ethnic development, were of importance in improving the cultural level of the peoples. All nations and nationalities naturally have access to the culture of other republics, especially in the field of higher education. An important aspect of social development for some peoples was the training of staff in long established cultural centres outside their national territories. Yet the dominant influence on the ethno-cultural development of a people is the environment in which the bulk of a nation or nationality live.

Changes in the level of cultural development were a natural result of socio-economic processes as well as of the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. Industrialisation, urbanisation, and changes in the social structure among ethnoi made it possible to improve their cultural life. But, as we know, the culture of the masses acts upon these processes, and for this reason the state, whose interests lie in rapid economic growth, is careful to ensure cultural growth among the population. At the same time purely utilitarian objectives were never dominant in socialist cultural policy. The growth in the cultural level of the entire population, of all nationalities, was one of the conditions necessary to build socialism and create the Soviet way of life.

The prevalence of any given aspect of Soviet cultural policy was determined by the various opportunities which arose, and the specific economic and political tasks at each stage in Soviet history.

In the first years of Soviet power cultural policy was dictated by

the need to make the professional forms of intellectual culture democratic, to educate the masses politically, and guarantee the rights declared by the Revolution. In the field of education schools with instruction in the language of the nationality were established, social restrictions were abolished, and new teachers were gradually trained. The school was separated from the church, and new curricula were instituted.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state, having proclaimed the equal rights of nations, set themselves the task of eliminating the actual inequality which existed between peoples in terms of culture. A new Soviet press was established, whose aim was to educate people politically and culturally. The People's Commissariat for Nationality Matters (*Narkomnats*) alone was publishing 60 newspapers in the languages of nationalities by 1920. At this time the state took the crucial step of providing cultural services free. School fees were abolished, and students in higher and specialised secondary educational establishments and special workers' courses received grants. Entrance to theatres and museums was free, and newspapers were also circulated free of charge among the workers. There were workers' clubs, rooms provided with cultural and political reading material in places of work, mobile libraries, trains and ships dispensing political information. Cultural and educational sections for the nationalities were set up under the auspices of *Narkomnats* to manage education in non-Russian areas.

The most urgent task was to eliminate illiteracy among the population and promote primary education. In October of 1918 the People's Commissariat for Education passed a decree on schools for national minorities, which declared that all nationalities had the right to instruction in their mother tongue in a single school system. Compulsory study of the language spoken by the majority was introduced to develop class solidarity and facilitate contacts in the schools of nationalities.

While education was generally in a poor state, and the vast masses had no access to professional cultural values, the levels of the cultural development of peoples were very different. In Georgia, for instance, 22 per cent of the population were illiterate, while in Turkestan that figure was 98 per cent among the indigenous nationalities. There were only 14 secondary schools (complete and incomplete) for Armenians in Armenia, while the Tajiks, Turkmens, and Kirghiz had no schools at all with instruction in their mother tongue. The northern peoples had no conception whatsoever of what schools or literacy were.

The growth in the number of schools and pupils in the formerly most backward regions, even immediately after the Revolution, was particularly rapid. By 1920, the number of Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen and Kirghiz children studying in primary schools in the Turkestan

territory was 16 times greater than in 1915. Here too there were seven teachers' training colleges, two schools and 37 courses for teachers. Text-books for schools of nationalities began to be produced.

These first steps paved the way for improving the cultural development of all the peoples.

In the 1920s the greatest strides forward in education, establishing schools and literary courses were made in areas where there had previously existed comparatively good level of cultural development. The existence of facilities and text-books, and also at least a minimum of teaching staff made it possible, within certain limits of course, to immediately expand the education system.

While in the Ukraine in 1925 most children of school age were receiving primary education, in the 1927/28 school year only 20 per cent of school age children attended school in Kazakhstan. In Muslim areas, where before the Revolution the children of the indigenous nationalities studied almost exclusively in religious schools, the system of primary education had to be completely rebuilt, and dozens of national groupings had to establish their own written language before instruction in it could be organised.

It became possible to make major progress in changing the cultural environment only in the late 1920s and in the 1930s.

Economic reconstruction needed increased numbers of industrial personnel with a general education, and qualified specialists. Industrialisation therefore necessarily entailed educating workers and training staff with secondary and higher education. Economic progress made it possible to allocate the necessary funds for expanding the material basis of culture. The 1930s were the years that saw the establishment of most of the schools, clubs, theatres, museums, higher educational establishments. and the printing industry in the republics.

The 16th Congress of the Communist Party (1930) adopted a decision to make primary education compulsory for all by law. This was achieved within different time limits in different republics. By 1932/33 in Armenia 98.5 per cent of all children attended primary school, and by 1933/34 general seven-year education was practically introduced in the towns and cities. By 1933/34 98 per cent of the children in Georgia were attending primary school, and by the end of 1934 Azerbaijan had compulsory primary education.

It was more difficult to introduce education for all in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, particularly in rural regions, and especially for girls. 98 per cent of children attended school in Kazakhstan only in 1940, and this was achieved in Turkmenia even later, in the 1949/50 school year. Providing the small peoples of the North with school education presented particular problems, and this was also true for peoples who had only just abandoned a nomadic way of life or lived in inaccessible mountain regions. In the early 1930s in the Evenk

Autonomous Area, set up then, there were only three schools. There were 22 more by the mid-1930s.

The absolute majority of the population acquired literacy in the 1930s. This process was slower in Central Asia, among the Northern peoples, and the small peoples of Siberia and the Altai, although success here was still considerable. The 1939 Census returns showed a 90 per cent literacy rate among those aged from nine to 49 in the Ukraine and Georgia; this rate was 80-84 per cent in Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and approximately 80 per cent in Kirghizia, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan.

The late 1920s and the 1930s saw the establishment of most of the higher and some of the secondary specialised educational establishments, which are still in operation today. By the 1940/41 school year, there were 173 higher educational establishments in the Ukraine, 25 in Byelorussia, 32 in Uzbekistan, 19 in Kazakhstan, 15 in Azerbaijan, 6 in Kighizia, 9 in Tajikistan, and 5 in Turkmenia. The number of higher educational establishments in the autonomous republics and regions of the RSFSR grew in 1929-32 from 10 to 50. Not all autonomous republics and national regions, however, had higher educational establishments (there were none in the Kalmyk ASSR and the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Region, for instance), and the young members of the indigenous populations here, and of other republics and areas with their own higher educational establishments, went to study in Moscow, Leningrad, Kazan, and other old centres of learning.

The Russian Federation and the Ukraine trained the greatest number of specialists. Not only did students come here from other republics; in addition some of the Russians and Ukrainians trained were sent to other republics, national regions and areas. Georgia had the greatest number of students per 1000 inhabitants in higher educational establishments in the 1928/29 school year, and by the 1938/39 school year in specialised secondary schools as well. By 1940 Armenia had the second largest proportion of students of the Union republics, and Azerbaijan had an above average proportion of students. As most of the students trained in these republics remained to work there (only the Armenians being somewhat of an exception), the need for qualified personnel there was fairly quickly met.

The growth in the number of national personnel, and also of specialists arriving from other areas, permitted the Union republics to set up their own facilites for research work. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was opened in 1919, and the Byelorussian in 1929. Branches of the USSR Academy of Sciences were opened in the 1930s in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. The Georgian Academy of Sciences was founded in 1941. Research institutes began to operate before the war in the Bashkir, Buryat-Mongolian, Daghestan, Mari and other

autonomous republics.

The rise in the level of education and the possibility of maintaining a constant increase in the number of intellectuals among the nationalities made it possible for all peoples to develop their professional culture.

The early 1920s saw the establishment of the printing industry in most of the Union and autonomous republics. Periodicals began to be published in large numbers from the end of the 1920s and in the 1930s. Improved literacy and education, the growth in the number of printing presses, and publishing in the republics in the languages of the indigenous populations promoted newspapers, magazines and books as part of people's everyday lives. In the 1930s the Union and most of the autonomous republics established their own publishing houses. Yet, despite the increased ease in obtaining cultural information, its accessibility to the population in different areas of the country still varied (see Table 17).

The Ukraine, Transcaucasian republics and Kazakhstan had the greatest number of cultural and educational establishments in proportion to their population. Tajikistan, Byelorussia and Uzbekistan had considerably fewer clubs and libraries. Neither was the situation uniform among the republics that became part of the USSR before

Table 17

Availability of Libraries, Books, Clubs and Locally Published Newspapers in the Republics in 1940-41

Union Republics	Number			
	Public libraries per 10 000 people	Books and periodicals in public libraries per 100 people	Clubs per 10 000 people	Single newspaper editions per capita
Ukraine	5.5	88	6.2	1.7
Byelorussia	4.7	56	4.3	1.2
Uzbekistan	2.7	38	4.3	1.4
Kazakhstan	6.4	80	8.7	1.6
Georgia	4.4	48	4.1	2.0
Azerbaijan	4.3	80	5.1	1.9
Lithuania	0.6	20	0.3	1.0
Moldavia	1.0	47	1.4	0.2
Latvia	0.9	43	0.4	2.1
Kirghizia	4.0	49	3.9	1.3
Tajikistan	2.7	32	3.4	1.9
Armenia	7.1	54	7.0	1.8
Turkmenia	5.7	95	6.0	2.0
Estonia	8.5	93	4.3	1.8
USSR	5.0	62	6.2	2.0

the Great Patriotic War. While in Estonia it was good, Lithuania, Moldavia and Latvia lagged behind the other Union republics. In the RSFSR, the sitaution varied in its central districts and in its autonomous republics and regions.

In the central districts of the RSFSR there was one club for more than 1500 inhabitants, for just over 1000 in the Komi, Chuvash, Udmurt and Buryat-Mongolian ASSRs, and even for less than 1000 in Yakutia. In these republics, however, the population distribution varied, and it was natural that in districts with a more scattered population cultural facilities should improve less rapidly. Urbanised peoples had a greater advantage, as towns and cities could provide them with more opportunities.

Museums and theatres were on the whole features of urban culture, and were to be found no farther out than suburban areas.

In many of the republics most museums and theatres were established in the 1930s. From 1928 to 1941 the number of museums grew from 6 to 26 in Kazakhstan, from 2 to 22 in Azerbaijan, from 4 to 11 in Armenia and from 13 to 38 in Georgia. In the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Uzbekistan most of the museums had been opened in the 1920s, although even here the number of museums grew by a third in the 1930s.

In the 1930s professional theatre was allocated greater finances and the necessary facilites. Most of the theatres functioning now in the republics were opened then. From 1928 to 1941 the number of theatres grew from 10 to 20 in Byelorussia, from 6 to 45 in Uzbekistan, from 4 to 40 in Kazakhstan, from 13 to 48 in Georgia, from 8 to 31 in Azerbaijan, from 1 to 18 in Kirghizia, from 1 to 23 in Tajikistan, from 6 to 27 in Armenia, and from 2 to 14 in Turkmenia. The Moscow Opera and Ballet House, the Spendiarov Theatre in Erevan, the Aini Opera and Ballet House in Tajikistan, the Kazakh Opera and Ballet House, and others, were opened in this period.

The increase in the number of theatres not only promoted the development of this form of professional culture among peoples, but also encouraged expressions of national awareness through this form of art, new for many peoples.

The opening of museums of the arts, history, the Revolution, and local history also influenced ethno-cultural processes by promoting the recognition of the place and role of national traditions in human culture, and of a person's affinity with the destiny of the people to which he belongs.

Radios became widespread in the 1930s, and in the towns and cities of all the republics there was one in almost every home. Cinema developed in urban areas, and began to move out into the countryside. Newspapers were a major source of information. All these factors were important not only for the political education of the masses, but also for spreading general moral, ethical and value stan-

dards, common habits and customs. This promoted the convergence of people of different nationalities, the evolution of similar conceptions and views, and, finally, common features in intellectual culture.

The achievements of socialist construction, including those in the area of culture, contributed to the defeat of Hitler's army by the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

It took the duration of an entire five-year period after the war to restore cultural and recreational facilities built before the war. There was a sharp increase in the allocations earmarked for culture in the 1950s. Expenditure on education in the republics almost doubled, and in some of them more than doubled.

At that time compulsory seven- and ten-year education in the towns and cities was introduced. In the early 1950s in Georgia and the Ukraine the proportion of students in the fifth to seventh and eighth-tenth forms exceeded 40 per cent; in the 1955/56 school year the pupils in the fifth to tenth forms made up over half of all the school pupils in most of the republics. The process was slower in Central Asia, because of the difficulties of establishing schools in rural areas, and of bringing girls into secondary schools.

Rapid progress was made by those republics who became part of the Soviet Union later than the majority. Seven-year education for all existed in Latvia by 1951-52. In Estonia, where, as in Latvia, there had previously been compulsory six-year education, the main aim was to improve schools in the rural areas. In Lithuania and Moldavia seven-year education for all was introduced in the 1950s.

Considerable progress was also made in training highly qualified specialists. The number of higher educational establishments hardly changed (except in the Baltic republics), but student admittance increased in the majority of republics. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, the training of highly qualified personnel made considerable headway in the Central Asian republics.

While from the 1950/51 to 1958/59 school years enrolment in higher educational establishments increased by 21 per cent in Azerbaijan, 25 per cent in Armenia, and 45 per cent in Georgia (and here we must bear in mind that these republics trained the greatest number of specialists in previous years), the number of students in higher educational establishments more than douhled in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenia and Kazakhstan.

The training system was restructured at the same time. In the Central Asian republics old faculties and departments were expanded or new ones set up, their aim being to train specialists in technical fields. These republics established their own facilities for training production personnel. Higher education expanded more rapidly than the national average in Lithuania, Moldavia and Byelorussia, where there had been relatively few students before the 1950s.

These processes were the result of changes in the economic devel-

opment of the republics. In the 1950s and the early 1960s the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldavia and Byelorussia maintained rapid industrial development, and production capacity increased greatly. The need for qualified staff was particularly urgent here. At the same time agriculture featured prominently in these republics' economies, and this period also saw major changes in agriculture, with greater mechanisation and provision of specialists. Thus economic development triggered off cultural changes. As a result over the 1950s opportunities in higher education, and the general cultural growth among various nationalities became more uniform.

In the 1960s and the early 1970s enrolment in higher educational establishments and specialised secondary schools more than doubled in almost all the republics. The improvement in general standards of school education did much to achieve equal opportunities for all nationalities in specialised education. Although the number of students grew in all republics, there were still differences in those figures. In 1959/60 the coefficient of deviation between the republican figures and the mean figures for the entire USSR was 23.3 per cent, and 21.9 per cent in 1969/70. National representation in the student body changed markedly (see Table 18).

An analysis of Table 18 must take account of the fact that members of each nationality have the right to higher education outside their own republic (and this is reflected in the table). Another factor, however, is of greater importance. In the early 1960s the relative number of students among the total population in the republics was higher than among the indigenous nationality (by 1000). By 1970 the number of students among the indigenous populations of the Union republics exceeded by 1000 that among the republics' total population. This trend continued throughout the 1970s.

As the level of culture grew among the working people, they required greater improvements in the cultural and recreational facilities. The state controlled the rate at which cultural establishments were built in order to gradually bring conditions in different areas up to the same level.

In most of the republics in the 1958/59 school year there were approximately two schools for every 1000 of people under age 20, and 3-4 schools in Byelorussia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, the RSFSR, Estonia and Georgia. As most of the population in Georgia and Estonia was urban, conditions here particularly favoured school education.

From the early 1960s the total number of schools in the USSR decreased, as a result of many primary and seven-year secondary schools closing with the introduction of compulsory eight-year education, and the subsequent switch to compulsory ten-year secondary education. The number of secondary schools both throughout the Soviet Union and in the republics rose constantly, especially in Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Azerbaijan.

Table 18

Changes in Specialised Training in the Union Republics and Nationalities of the Union Republics

Republics and their indigenous nationalities	Number of higher education students per 1000 of population in the school years			
	1959/60		1969/70	
	among total population of republic	among indigenous nationality	among total population of republic	among indigenous nationality
RSFSR	12		20	
Russians		7		21
Ukraine	9		17	
Ukrainians		5		15
Byelorussia	7		15	
Byelorussians		4		14
Uzbekistan	11		19	
Uzbeks		5		16
Kazakhstan	7		15	
Kazakhs		6		19
Georgia	12		19	
Georgians		9		27
Azerbaijan	8		19	
Azerbaijanians		6		20
Lithuania	9		18	
Lithuanians		7		18
Moldavia	7		13	
Moldavians		3		11
Latvia	9		17	
Letts		7		16
Kirghizia	8		16	
Kirghiz		7		17
Tajikistan	9		15	
Tajiks		5		13
Armenia	11		21	
Armenians		7		22
Turkmenia	8.5		13	
Turkmens		6		15
Estonia	10		17	
Estonians		7.6		18

After the war there was a considerable increase in the network of clubs. In 1940 the provisions of clubs had varied drastically in the republics. The RSFSR had approximately 7 clubs for every 10 000, and Kazakhstan 9. At the same time in Lithuania and Latvia, this figure was very much lower: 0.2 and 0.5 respectively[1]. By the start of

[1] There were 1-2 clubs (2 in Moldavia and Tajikistan, 1-1.3 in Usbekistan, Kazakhstan and Georgia) in the early 1970s in urban areas for 10 000 residents, in rural areas there were 13 in the RSFSR, 10 in the Ukraine and Estonia, and about 4 in Tajikistan and Turkmenia.

the 1960s there were no such marked divergences, and Lithuania had the greatest proportion of clubs: 8 for 10 000 people. The coefficient of variation for this figure was only 18 per cent, while in 1940 it had been 53.5 per cent.

In the late 1960s and the 1970s the main variations were in the number of clubs available in rural areas in the republics. New clubs were therefore opened mostly in those areas in the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Central Asian republics and Moldavia.

Of importance in this sphere is the number of libraries, and the size of the book stock. By the mid-1970s there were approximately 6-8 libraries per 10 000 inhabitants in Lithuhania, Georgia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, and 4-5 in the other republics. In this respect the provision of libraries was fairly uniform in both town and countryside[1].

The amount of books and periodicals in libraries per 100 people grew in all the Union republics, particularly in the Baltic republics and in those republics which had not been so culturally developed in the past—Moldavia and the Central Asian republics. As a result the coefficient of variation in the stock of books and magazines in public libraries between the republics fell from 42 per cent in 1940 to 28 per cent in 1958.

In the 1960s and 1970s there was uneven growth in the number of library books; if, however, we exclude Estonia (768 books per 100 persons) and Latvia (600 books per 100 persons), then the book-population ratio in the other republics was more even than it had been previously.

In the 1970s in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia the number of books and periodicals per 100 persons was roughly equal in town and countryside. In Estonia, the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Latvia the book-population ratio was greater in the countryside than in town. This situation arose because of population distribution features in the countryside (more libraries per person).

The number of film projectors has also grown over the last few decades. In the mid-1950s there were 2 film projectors per 10 000 inhabitants in most of the republics, and only in the RSFSR and Byelorussia the figure was 3 and roughly 3 respectively. Over the 1960s the number of film projectors increased to a greater degree in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Kazakhstan, Latvia and Lithuania, particularly in rural areas.

In the mid-1970s there were 6-7 cinemas per 10 000 residents in

[1] In September of 1959 the CPSU Central Committee issued a special decree on improving library facilities and book stock and their provision with qualified staff. The central committees of the communist parties of the Union republics were offerred to consider amalgamating small libraries sited close to one another. This is the reason for the fall in the number of libraries in the early 1960s.

the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan, 5 in Latvia, Lithuania and Moldavia, and 3-4 in the remaining republics.

And finally two more indicative sets of figures in the mass media: radio and TV sets and the press. For the country as a whole in the mid-1960s there was more than one radio or TV set for each family (1.5-1.6 sets in Kirghizia, Turkmenia and Tajikistan, and approximately 2 sets in the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Armenia and Estonia).

By the mid-1950s there were already no major differences between republics in the number of copies of local newspapers per family, although it was slightly above the average for the country in the Baltic republics and the RSFSR. In the former this was probably due to the large proportion of urban residents. Public opinion poll shows that for a considerable part of the urban population the newspaper is a major source of information and papers are read more widely in towns and cities than in the countryside. On average there are now four periodicals and magazines for each family.

Radio, newspapers, the cinema, and, in recent years, television have become the commonest means whereby people gain information and aesthetic pleasure. There are no major differences in access to them among the inhabitants of different republics. Theatres, exhibitions, and concerts are still more accessible to urban residents, especially if they live in large cultural centres. In addition, the need to visit the theatre and read books is dictated not only by education and current cultural environment, but also to a considerable extent

Table 19

Theatre and Cinema Attendance in Union Republics

Union Republic	Number of visits				
	Average film viewings per person			To theatres per 1000 persons	
	1950	1960	1974	1960	1974
RSFSR	7	19	20	484	537
Ukraine	6	16	17	334	359
Byelorussia	4	12	14	311	311
Uzbekistan	4	9	12	335	284
Kazakhstan	6	17	21	2531	268
Georgia	4	12	12	702	612
Azerbaijan	5	10	10	320	268
Lithuania	3	13	15	471	424
Moldavia	3	10	17	294	342
Latvia	6	17	15	1000	960
Kirghizia	5	13	13	595	424
Tajikistan	5	10	11	220	353
Armenia	4	9	10	622	648
Turkmenia	5	14	14	405	286
Estonia	7	19	15	914	1000
USSR	6	17	18	436	458

by the traditional customs of a people. These forms of culture retain greater specifically republican features than the cinema, for example (see Table 19).

The differences between republics are less marked in terms of the spread of modern cultural habits in identical social groups than in terms of the level of culture of the population as a whole. Urban residents of different nationalities have more common cultural interests than do rural residents. The level of culture of the rural residents in different republics differs more markedly.

The changes in cultural facilities and cultural level indicate the establishment in the republics of a relatively identical cultural environment. There are, of course, still qualitative variations in the cultural facilities available in town and countryside, and consequently, in the everyday life of those republics with a high proportion of urban residents and those with a majority of rural dwellers. The fairly even distribution, however, of the mass media, especially radio, television and the cinema, promotes common cultural needs, interests and norms of behaviour among all the peoples.

The process of the convergence of the level of cultural development facilitates greater cultural contacts between ethnic communities and mutual influence, and consequently, helps to create an intellectual culture common to all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

3. Culture and Processes of Ethnic Consolidation Among the Peoples of the USSR

All of the peoples of the USSR, regardless of the differences in their level of development in 1917, were drawn into the process of extremely rapid cultural development that began after the October Revolution. Even for the most advanced peoples this process was not merely evolutionary; it involved a reorganisation both of the internal structure of culture and of the entire network of inter-ethnic relations within the Soviet Union. Taken as a whole this process represented a cultural revolution, which took place, however, at different rates and in varying manners among the diverse peoples of the USSR.

The cultural revolution in the USSR was a planned, long-range process in which a modern culture, socialist in its content, functions, and structure, was formed—a culture destined to preserve, transform, renew, and put into use the progressive traditions and achievements of the individual ethnic communities. Provisions were made not only for the broadening but also for the deepening of culture, that is, for infusing it into the fabric of everyday life among the people. The cultural content was rooted in the achievements of the Soviet people under socialism, in the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, and in the

ideology of proletarian internationalism; it was on this same basis that it spread and developed.

In its ethnic aspect this complex process was directed by two basic and interconnected tendencies: continuing development and the converging of socialist nations. In the realm of culture these two tendencies were marked by certain characteristic traits.

In the Soviet period the cultures of the peoples of the USSR, which were socially differentiated and more or less isolated locally, have come to be internally homogeneous, retaining only certain variations related to traditional ways of life and to regional, social-professional, and age distinctions.

In those nations already formed at the beginning of the twentieth century, differences in culture were primarily social, rather than local. And this was not only a matter of social differences in the forms under which culture functioned. The coexistence of capitalist relations with survivals from feudalism, for example, left its peculiar imprint on the overall structure of the culture of Russians. Despite the relatively early unification of the whole Russian people (with the exception of small compact Russian groups beyond the bounds of the basic ethnic territory) in a single state, which furthered the evolution of shared features in material and particularly in spiritual culture, the lengthy feudal period and presence of numerous feudal survivals during the development of capitalist relations helped preserve local variations and regional differences in folk poetry and art and in archaic calendar and family rituals (especially in marriage customs).[1]

Professional forms of culture, however, especially those that arose at a comparatively late time, took shape under the influence of national consolidation and capitalist relations. But professional forms within the national culture were to a great degree concentrated in the largest cities; this gave them a distinctive, 'oasis' character. Thus the democratisation of literature, art, and science in the decades after the Revolution was accompanied by a significant restructuring of its geography; the cultural growth of the two old Russian capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg, being paralleled by the development of numerous regional cities that became important centres of science, literature, and art.

The further consolidation of the Russian nation in the Soviet period has found expression both in the greater social homogeneity of culture and in the fading away of local differences. On the whole this process has taken place not through the merger or converging of

[1] Preservation of local variants was also promoted by the large extent of the ethnic territory occupied by the Russian people, by differences in natural and socio-economic conditions, and by contacts between certain groups of Russians and ethnic communities with highly diverse traditions and levels of development.

regional dialects and local forms of folklore, folk art, customs, etc. (although such phenomena are occasionally observed in regions where different local groups intermingle, for example at construction sites of all-Union significance), but primarily through the further spread of the all-Russian literary language, through education in schools, and through the inculcation in daily life of the oral forms of literary speech and the formation of temporary and highly unstable elements of literary/dialect bilingualism within the Russian language.

The repertoire of songs has become more uniform in the various areas inhabited by Russians; this is due not only to the continuing elaboration of an all-national folklore, which began as far back as the formation of the Russian state, but also, indeed chiefly, to the universal spread of songs written by professional composers and lyricists, and also partly to the secondary diffusion of traditional songs after they are performed by well-known choirs (the Red Banner Soviet Army Song and Dance Ensemble, the Voronezh, Ural, Siberian, and Arkhangelsk folk choirs, etc.).

The functions of traditional cultural forms in everyday life (folklore, rituals, artistic crafts, and the like) become more circumscribed with the demographic restructuring of the Russian nation, which involves a growing preponderance of the urban population and the relocation of significant numbers of rural residents to the cities, where (particularly in the large cities) there is comparative uniformity of oral speech, of everyday forms of culture, and of the extent of contact with professional forms of culture.

This process has passed through its own history, its own stages. In the 1920s and 1930s the liquidation of illiteracy among the masses and the development of a cultural and educational network (clubs, libraries, cinemas) and above all of a system of mass education held the place of primary importance. In the 1950s and 1960s the educational system grew further (the change to universal and obligatory eight-year schooling, the development of pre-school institutions, etc.) but at the same time modern media for mass communication (the press, radio, cinema, and television) played an essential role. There has likewise been a perceptible change in the interrelations between the traditional sphere of folk culture and that of culture practised by professionals (between folklore and literature, between folk art and professional art). In the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries Russian literature and Russian art (music, the fine arts, and theatre) developed in the surrounding presence of an archaic but living tradition. The main repository of this tradition was the peasantry, which constituted the absolute majority of the nation and was at the same time a socially, politically, and culturally oppressed class. The transformations that gave rise to modern culture brought with them a gradual circumscription of traditional forms in everyday life, leading to a state of affairs in which the traditions of folklore and folk art,

which have not yet become totally obsolete in daily life, are more and more perceived in a generalised and somewhat symbolic way, especially when combined with forms of culture practised by professionals (the use of folklore and the traditions of folk art in literature, in the work of professional composers and performing musicians, in painting and book illustrating, in performances by folk song-and-dance ensembles, and so on). The development of this aesthetic interpretation of folk traditions is linked, on the one hand, with their ethnic value, with attempts to use them in a generalised form to create national flavour and to emphasise ethnic continuity and the importance of historically understood traditions; on the other hand, it is linked with a desire not to lose, in the course of modern cultural transformations, the artistic treasures and experience amassed by the people.

The rise of this attitude towards traditional folk art and folklore, like the use of certain elements from traditional ceremonies, marks a turning towards the whole of the ethnic tradition, as perceived in general, rather than towards local traditions; it bears witness to a further maturation of the inner social and cultural homogeneity of the modern culture of the Russian ethnos as a whole.

Approximately the same processes took place, at different rates, in the cultures of other nations that had undergone a period of capitalist development before the Revolution. Quite naturally, these processes were influenced by the history of each particular nation and by concrete ethno-cultural situations that arose at various stages in the history of particular regions of the USSR.

The growth of Ukrainian culture, for example, was complicated by the obstacles placed in the path of development of the Ukrainian language and of some forms of Ukrainian art (e.g., the theatre) by conditions in Czarist Russia. It should also be remembered that the Ukrainian literary language, up to the time when the whole Ukrainian people was reunited in a single Soviet state, existed in three varieties: eastern Ukrainian in those regions that were part of Russia; western Ukrainian in the territory held by Austria-Hungary, and later by Poland; and Trans-Carpathian Ukrainian in areas that were likewise part of Austria-Hungary, and later of Czechoslovakia. A certain role in the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation was also played by the development of atheism and the abandoning of religious rituals (which were somewhat different among Orthodox and Uniate Ukrainian) from the daily life of most of the population.

The Eastern and Central Ukraine, which had already brought forth a broad-based Ukrainian socialist culture at the time the western regions were reunited with them, had a special importance in the working out of a homogeneous culture by the various groups of the Ukrainian people.

Similar processes took place, albeit more slowly, in Byelorussia,

despite its greater ethnic homogeneity. The temporary partition of Byelorussia and the obstacles placed in the way of the development of Byelorussian culture in the western regions seized in the 1920s and 1930s by bourgeois Poland brought to a diverging in the professional culture of the Byelorussians; furthermore, it was only in the last decades before the Revolution that Byelorussian culture had begun to assume all-national forms (primarily in literature and some humanistic disciplines such as folklore, ethnography, and linguistics). It should also be kept in view that Western Byelorussia had the greatest concentration of Catholics, whose daily life differed somewhat from that of Orthodox Byelorussians in the eastern regions. These differences appeared most clearly in traditional ceremonies, the way of family life, language, and so on.

The ethnic consolidation of the Estonians and Letts bears the imprint of a national oppression that lasted many centuries. The ruling classes in the Ost-See provinces spoke a foreign language—German—and were bearers of an alien culture. The first books in Lettish and Estonian appeared relatively early—in the sixteenth century; the development of the literary languages, however, began only later. Nothing but religious works was printed in Lettish and Estonian during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the language of these books was archaic and replete with Germanisms: the ruling classes, which included the clergy, knew the language of the indigenous peoples poorly. Although the Lutheran church conducted services and published literature in the language of its parishioners, and required that they learn to read and write before receiving confirmation, the greater part of the peasantry was, at that time, illiterate. 'Secular' literature intended for peasants—farmer's almanacs, moralising tales, and the like—appeared only in the 18th century. Distinctions among ethno-geographic subregions due to historical causes were firmly rooted in the territory inhabited by the Estonians and Letts.

The ethnic consolidation of the Lithuanian people took a different course. The Union of Lublin (1569) had long tied Lithuania with Poland and the Catholic West and encouraged Polonisation among the ruling classes. The development of the Lithuanian literary language was held back by the feudal aristocracy. The Catholic church used only Latin, which also had a deleterious effect on Lithuanian letters. The repressive measures enforced by the Czarist government after the uprising of 1863 affected the growth of the Lithuanian literary language as well: printing in the Latin alphabet was forbidden; in practice this meant a ban on Lithuanian literature. This prohibition remained in force until the beginning of the twentieth century. Meanwhile newspapers and books in Lithuanian printed abroad were smuggled into the country and 'underground schools' were established in villages to teach children their native language.

In the mid-19th century the national cultures of Latvia and Estonia began to develop rapidly and unified literary languages started to take shape. An interest in national culture, folklore, and language awoke. During the years of the bourgeois republics in the Baltic country the growth of national cultures unfolded in the midst of an unceasing battle between progressive and reactionary tendencies. The abolition of national oppression in its old forms in the new national states and teaching in the native language in schools and institutions of higher learning promoted the development of national cultures; the growth of the press and the rise of radio broadcasting furthered the spread of unified national languages. Meanwhile the reigning bourgeoisie carried on a systematic nationalistic propaganda campaign in an attempt to build an artificial barrier between the cultural development of these peoples and the cultural life of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

In 1940 Soviet power was restored in the Baltic republics, and they became part of the Soviet Union; the bourgeois nations there became socialist nations. The culture of the Baltic peoples underwent an accelerated, 'frontal' development after the Great Patriotic War: its ideological content was restructured; active use was made of folk traditions in literature and art; the role of professional culture in the people's everyday life grew very rapidly. The cultural level of the population rose, and active efforts were made to include the broad masses of the working people in public life; and as a result there was a significant reduction of local distinctions in the everyday forms of culture.

The progressive weakening of traditions involving religious ceremonies and rites also played a part in the ethnic consolidation of each of the Baltic nations. This was especially true of the Letts, many of whom in the past professed Catholicism or Orthodoxy, although the majority were Lutherans. The Estonians were also divided between Lutheranism and Orthodoxy.

A significant factor in the formation of the socialist culture of the Moldavians was the reuniting with the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Bessarabia, which was seized in the 1920s by bourgeois Rumania. Here, as in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, the process of ethno-cultural consolidation had two sides: first, the converging of local groups and the elaboration of social homogeneity both in everyday and in professional forms of culture; second, the converging and merger of the two historically formed branches, the two variants within the structure of the national culture.

Among the peoples of the Caucasus, who possessed an olden tradition of writing and ancient literatures, a simultaneous bilateral process has unfolded. First, forms of professional culture have been secularised and modernised; stagnant mediaevalism and elitism have been completely surmounted, and modern culture is flourishing in

all its forms and branches. Second, the culture of ethnic and local groups has been consolidated. In the Soviet period, as a general background to this complex process, elementary and higher education have become ever more widespread, and the broad masses have been introduced to the treasures of their national professional culture.

Cultural consolidation in Georgia and Armenia was made a good deal easier by the formation of new literary languages there before the October Revolution. True, the Armenian literary language of today has two variants—an eastern and a western—as a result of the long separation of the two parts of the Armenian people (since the sixteenth century the western part of Armenia had been under the sway of Turkey, the eastern part under Persia). The differences between the two variants, however, are insignificant.

The writing system and literary language of Azerbaijan travelled a complex path of development. Before the Revolution writing was done in the Arabic alphabet, while literature was pursued in two coexisting languages—Turkic and modern Persian. The population was divided into numerous polyglotic groups speaking different languages; the principal vehicle of intercommunication was a common everyday language—Turkic; it was known to practically the entire male population. The spread of this common language has in the Soviet period received an important additional stimulus in the creation of an all-national literature in the Azerbaijanian language and of a writing system based first on the Latin alphabet, then on the Russian. The secularisation of the system of education and the development of all forms of modern Azerbaijanian socialist culture were of particular importance in promoting the consolidation and democratisation of culture.

Similar processes had a different course among the major nations of Central Asia, many of which had olden writing traditions based on their own languages or a foreign one. The old Tajik written language, for example, was formed in the early Middle Ages. In the ninth and tenth centuries Farsi, the language shared by the Persians and Tajiks in that period, gave birth to one of the world's richest literatures. The dialects of Tajikistan gradually drew apart from those of Persia; this separation was complete by the sixteenth century. Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the Tajik literary language retained the old vocabulary and grammatical forms. It was used in the narrow circle of the social elite, but was almost inaccessible to the people. The same course of development can be seen in the formation of the old Uzbek (Chagatai) literary language on the basis of Turkic languages of the eleventh to fifteenth centuries.

The task of democratising the old written languages, bringing them closer to the spoken languages, and freeing them from archaic Arabisms was undertaken in the first years of Soviet power. It represented one of the chief conditions for the free development and ex-

tensive diffusion of national languages and literatures and an essential factor in national consolidation; only on this foundation could national forms of art and science be built. A closely related undertaking was the replacement of the complex writing system used by the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan; based on the Arabic alphabet, it was alien to the linguistic structure of their languages, and thus hindered the spread of literacy among the masses and the development of a popular press. A graphic system based on the Latin alphabet—and later on the Russian—was adopted in its stead.

Another characteristic of the formation of new written literary languages in Central Asia and Kazakhstan was the need to overcome the historically conditioned differentiation of the spoken languages into a great number of territorial—or tribal, in the case of several Turkic-language peoples—dialects and subdialects.

All of these factors were connected with the historical path taken by the formation of literary languages in Central Asia. Other inheritances from the pre-revolutionary past also influenced linguistic consolidation during the first years of Soviet power. At the beginning of the 1920s the peoples of this region had a smaller scientific and artistic intelligentsia than, for example, the Georgians or Armenians; their ties with European culture (including Russian culture) were weaker; the secularisation of many cultural forms had only begun; and the scope of writing in the native languages was comparatively narrow.

To a greater or lesser extent the cultural development of all other peoples in the USSR with an olden writing tradition had a similar character. The Tatars of the Volga region, for example, had a literary language with a long tradition, and their progressive intelligentsia had many fruitful contacts with their Russian counterparts; but the Muslim clergy used their influence to obstruct the restructuring of the national culture. Thus the secularisation of culture and the development of a system for education in the Tatar literary language was of special importance for their ethnic consolidation.

Other peoples possessed written traditions based wholly or in part on a foreign language, but by 1917 were ready (to a greater or lesser degree) to create a truly native written tradition. Further progress in this task took place at an accelerated pace; the formation of literary languages and the advent of popular education (usually bilingual) laid the foundations for the development of all forms of modern culture. These peoples created their written and literary languages against the background of the unfolding cultural revolution and the introduction of the popular masses to their newly created national written language and, at the same time, to the Russian written language (or to that of some other major national group—e.g., to Georgian among the Abkhazians).

It is characteristic that in these republics (for example, in Kirghi-

zia, Kara-Kalpakia, Karelia, Komi, and Udmurtia) the first newspapers, magazines, the first publishing houses, and institutions for cultural education usually became the organisers of the scientific and literary forces. The role of culture in the ethnic consolidation of these peoples is obvious: the press, the schools, books, and (later) radio were powerful instruments for diffusing linguistic norms—which were not usually worked out in oral speech—throughout the nation, and for forming and spreading a new lexicon and scientific terminology. It is worthy of note that writing and literary culture among these peoples not only skipped over the manuscript period that all ethnic communities with olden written traditions went through, but also, from the very beginning, had a democratic character and were accessible to every member of the ethnos.

In cases where a number of relatively small peoples speaking independent or relatively independent languages were united in a single republic (a striking example is Daghestan) cultural development was multilingual—and not only on the everyday level, but also on professional level. Daghestan, for example, has seven literary languages: Avar, Darghin, Kumyk, Lak, Lesghin, Tabasaran, and Tat. They all function in close contact, but cannot merge: their traditional bases are dissimilar. Nonetheless the literatures of Daghestan, despite their diverse languages and individual traits, constitute a whole with interacting parts.

The individual literatures of Daghestan play an important role in ethnic processes within the republic and characteristic of it. Thus the Avar literary language has an essential function in the consolidation of that people, who only recently spoke a large number of significantly differing dialects and subdialects forming two groups—a northern and a southern. In addition, the Avar literary language is used by thirteen related and small Andodidoi peoples living in Daghestan.

Similar multilingual situations have arisen in other areas of the Northern Caucasus. In Karachai-Circassia, for example, books and newspapers are printed in Kabardinian (Circassian), Karachai, Abazin, and Nogai; in Kabardin-Balkaria printing is in Kabardinian and Balkar. In each of the North Caucasian republics radio broadcasts are heard in the languages of the indigenous peoples and in Russian.

Among the peoples of Siberia and the Far North who had no written language or professional forms of culture before the Revolution national self-determination, the creation of autonomous regions and areas, and the unceasing help that the other fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union (first and foremost the Russian people) continue to lend them have all given a powerful impetus to the development of culture. As a rule the elaboration of a writing system and norms for the literary language and the preparation of the first books and textbooks were carried out by Russian scholars or representatives of other major nations. The national intelligentsia, made up of teachers,

writers, actors, and scholars, arose gradually. Their education was bilingual (in their national language and in Russian), and they studied both in their native districts and in large Russian cities (an example is the Institute of Northern Peoples, now the Faculty of Northern Peoples at the Alexander Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad).

Special emphasis should be given to the part played by professional forms of culture, the development of a system for popular education, and the press (including the periodical press) in elaborating an ethnic consciousness and consolidating the culture of peoples and ethnic groups scattered over a wide area and interspersed one among another. Thus the growth of the Koryak written language, of schools, and printed media, and also various congresses and conferences, have helped the different groups of that people, which are spread over a comparatively small territory but have little contact with, or knowledge of, one another, in forming a common ethnic consciousness. Various groups of the Volga, or Tver Karelians (Kalinin region), and of the Olonets Karelians and their dialect groups, have become aware of their common origins and culture in the Soviet period through the influence of the schools and the press; the same is true of small groups of Veps scattered through Karelia and the Vologda and Leningrad regions, of different groups among the Saami, Nentsi, and so on.

Professional forms of culture are important for ethnic consolidation of culture not only in themselves but also for their penetration into daily life, for the influence they exert on the general state of common ethnic consciousness. It is for this reason that in parallel with the spread of modern forms of professional culture the network of schools and cultural education institutions developed, illiteracy was liquidated, and the technical capabilites of the mass media grew. All this helped to introduce the achievements of social thinking, science, literature, and art into the fabric of everyday life among the people, and consequently to eliminate little by little the local isolation of individual groups among each people as well as to promote the uniformity and simultaneity of ethno-cultural processes.

The organisation of amateur performing groups–which stand between everyday art and art as practised by professionals–is of particular importance in ethnic consolidation. Moving any phenomenon from ordinary life onto the stage of a club or cultural centre is accompanied by certain changes, or at least by adaptation to the new conditions of performance (the stage, differentiation into performers and audience, a fixed time for performance, the presence of separate 'numbers' within a 'program,' etc.). These conditions are more or less uniform for all regions of the country (for all regions inhabited by a given ethnos), or at least create approximately the same opportunity to take artistic phenomena that originated in everyday life out of the local milieu and life situation that gave birth to them.

New types of amateur activites in the creative arts arise out of

amateur performances, and these also are more or less evenly distributed over the whole territory occupied by an ethnic community. And finally, amateur performances lead to mastery of the artistry of professionals by amateur groups—choral groups, drama circles, and the like.

There can be no doubt, then, that the various forms of culture play a role in the ethnic consolidation of peoples and in the formation and development of ethnic consciousness, and that ethnic processes in turn influence the character and structure of culture.

4. Some Characteristic Features in the Process of Cultural Rapprochement Among the Peoples of the USSR

In the realm of culture the ideological and political unity of the peoples of the USSR has found expression in a great variety of forms: in the diffusion of Marxism as the scientific basis for the world-view of Soviet citizens of all nationalities; in the development and strengthening of proletarian internationalism and of Soviet patriotism (which includes consciousness of the common historic fate of the peoples of the USSR and of their common responsibility for it); in the development and strengthening of revolutionary traditions and socialist norms of behavior in public life, which prevail throughout the USSR; and in the establishment and development, in all spheres of Soviet literature and art, of socialist realism—the artistic method providing the most adequate expression of reality in the light of the common socialist ideal. And so, in parallel with scientific theory and common philosophical and political ideas, unity is also evolving in the domain of everyday consciousness, which at the same time retains a certain ethnic individuality.

Rapprochement in intellectual culture among the different ethnic communitites that make up the Soviet Union is a general feature of the evolution of socialist society. This process, however, was marked by distinct characteristics at various stages in the development of the peoples of the USSR. Moreover, in addition to the universal rapprochement arising from political and ideological unification and the emergence of the common features of the Soviet way of life, other characteristic trends can be observed: regional rapprochement; the rapprochement of peoples that are related, but not neighbours; and finally, rapprochement among peoples that found themselves in the 1920s at more or less the same stage of development.

At first cultural rapprochement progressed at a slower rate than did socio-economic rapprochement; this was due to the limitations placed on the linguistic and cultural development of some nations by the frameworks of their ethnic groupings and to differences in the level of elaboration of those cultural forms that are tied up with language.

In the first years after the October Revolution those peoples who had possessed archaic, pre-literate cultures were as yet unable to assimilate the achievements of more advanced nations in science, arts, and literature—for this a certain amount of cultural progress was required. Thus it was that the first readers intended for the small nationalities of the North, and the first literary anthologies, which were published in the early 1930s, were usually made up of folkloric tales and autobiographical accounts, together with specially selected translations—very often adaptations of the fairy-tales of Pushkin or Tolstoy's stories for common folks, or excerpts from stories and novellas with a more complex literary structure. It was only later, in the 1940s through the 1960s, that extensive work began in translation into the languages of the small nationalities of the North.

But it was in the very first decades of Soviet power that the groundwork was laid for the elimination of this cultural gap (both through the means of written language and through professional culture as a whole), that small nationalities received written languages, and that the first national cultural figures emerged.

Peoples whose languages had only recently come to be fixed also had to go through a period of accelerated development that was of great import for them. The emergence of modern cultural forms—the system of mass education, research institutions, theatres and cinemas, radio and television broadcasting, the press, book publishing, professional performances, etc.—went hand in hand with the creation of cultural traditions and achievements equivalent to the forms of modern cultural life among the more advanced peoples of the Soviet Union. Newly literate nations were faced with the task of travelling, in two or three decades, the same path that peoples with ancient written traditions had taken centuries to cover. The conditions that arose in this period favoured the development of bilingualism and of extensive translation activity, which speeded up both the evolution of modern forms of culture and the process of rapprochement in the realm of intellectual culture. For newly literate peoples this meant a drawing nearer to Russian culture or to the cultures of related peoples.

As they evolved a common ideology, evened out their development, and cast aside the constraining mediaeval forms and traditions, peoples with old writing systems (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Tatars) have tended to draw closer both to each other and to the cultures of other nations (the East Slavs and Baltic peoples). In the case of former Islamic peoples, this was largely a result of the collapse of religious obstacles and restrictions, and of cultural secularisation. Without exaggerating this can be called a path of mutual acquaintance (which in pre-revolutionary time was relatively restricted) for subsequent spiritual affinity.

As for the East Slavs and Baltic peoples (from the time they

joined the USSR), this path was typified by growing affinity with other peoples in the course of democratisation and the evolution of modern culture.

In the past, the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian cultures developed and mutually enriched and supplemented each other. In Soviet time, the three closely related nations have created largely interconnected and integrated cultural structures that are particularly evident in science and technology, higher education, music, painting, and so on. In literature, the theatre, and choral singing, i.e. forms closely related with language, the mechanism of communication and greater affinity is rather complex and not as close. Russian readers are able to read books by Ukrainian and Byelorussian authors primarily in the form of translations; however, Byelorussian and, particularly, Ukrainian songs are very popular among Russians, albeit the latter only understand but do not write them. Yet, in this sphere, too, the growing affinity is evident.

Hence, the emergence and development of various types and forms of growing affinity, their intensity and scope, and their cultural significance and nature were, on the one hand, directly dependent on the ethno-cultural situation characteristic of each Soviet nation by the early 1920s and, on the other, on their specific cultural standards and on how quickly those standards evened out.

In the initial decades following October Revolution, the process of growing affinity between Russian culture and that of the other Soviet peoples also had specific features. It was particularly important in the first two decades to expand people's knowledge about the past and present of the Soviet nations. The theme of other nationalities was a major topic, and was prominent in the works of Fadeyev, Lugovskoy, Ivanov, Pavlenko, Tikhonov, Semushkin and many others in Russian literature, or in those of Glier and Prokofiev in Russian music, or again in Russian painting, plays, etc., the Russian Soviet literature and Soviet art thereby developed traditions which had formed in the 19th and early 20th centuries, e.g. the Caucasian themes in the works of Pushkin, Lermontov and Tolstoy; the Siberian themes in Korolenko and Chekhov; and the Central Asian motif in stories by Dal, Leskov, Prishvin and others.

Thousands of Russian scientists, physicians, engineers, teachers, artists and writers were directly involved in culturally developing the national republics and regions and in organising schools, higher educational establishments, the press, scientific institutions, theatres and music schools. They also helped train national personnel in all specialities. Of course, this also had a certain impact on Russian culture, since these contacts helped to enrich it, stimulated the ability to understand and depict the life of other nations and to accustom themselves to different national environments, and all this ultimately internationalised Russian culture. True enough, this process to some

measure involved the cultures of all or, at least, most of the Soviet peoples; however, within the framework of Russian culture, it was very prominent. This feature of Russian Soviet literature was very accurately noted by Iohannes Beher, a noted 20th-century German poet. He wrote that Soviet authors were able to adapt to the human images and problems of other nations as well as they were to those of their own people.

As the national literatures, art and science developed and matured, the publication of translations of literature, pamphlets and scientific material, the appearance of national works in the repertoire of Russian theatres and orchestras, of artists in Soviet national exhibitions and of scientists in joint projects began playing an increasingly greater role. By the early 1940s, the influence of Russian culture on other national cultures of the USSR had also become a process of growing interaction and mutual influence.

It is absolutely correct to speak of a common socialist content in the spiritual fabric of culture, a content which also reflects the common ideology and common historical destiny of the peoples of the USSR during the Soviet period of development; however, concrete ways of developing its expressive forms have been complex and multifaceted.

Like material culture, spiritual culture includes phenomena which as a whole could conventionally be described as increasing regional affinity, i.e. the growing affinity of ethnic communities belonging to one of the historico-ethnographic regions of the USSR. Yet, in spiritual culture, the development of ethnic traditions into regional traditions has distinctive features. In effect, this process is associated more with traditions and common features of development than with common economic and geographic features of the area, or with the common features of economic specialisation. Examples are the common 'oriental' features in the modern music of certain Central Asian and Caucasian peoples; the common features in the handicrafts or literature of the Baltic peoples, the common features in modern Tatar, Bashkir and Kazakh poetry, or in the poetry of some North Caucasian peoples, the common traditions in the modern Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian theatre, etc. However, in certain regions, this affinity has been achieved under the influence of a particularly large and developed nation.

At the same time, the spiritual culture of related peoples living in different regions and with no common frontier is also drawing closer together on an increasing scale. A renewed understanding of their common origins and the similar contemporary practice of genetically related traditions promote greater affinity between these peoples' modern forms of spiritual culture.

Behind this growing affinity in literature, the theatre, amateur arts, education, and the humanities generally is usually an active ac-

quaintance with the publications of the related nation, through the organised exchange of experience, and so on; on the other hand, broader affinity in everyday life is usually a consequence of similar ethno-cultural situations and of similar factors of current development. Examples are the common features in the modern literature and theatre of the Komi, Udmurts and Mordvins, Yakuts and Buryats; among kindred Central Asian nations and others.

Finally, one may speak of individual cases of growing affinity of cultural content and forms based on common path of socio-economic and cultural development. For example, unique common features have evolved in the spiritual culture of the small nationalities of the North even though these peoples do not share a common origin, language or territory.

Closely related peoples are drawing closer regionally and culturally against a background of common Soviet processes which supplement growing local affinity.

The above trends far from exhaust the essence of the modern process of growing affinity in the spiritual culture of the Soviet nations. Today, the process is primarily characterised by the evolution of what can be called a Soviet national fabric of spiritual culture. This fabric is not simply the sum total of related cultures, but involves integration and interpermeation.

To begin with, those forms of spiritual culture connected with language are far more ideologically definitive than instrumental music, the fine arts, ballet, etc. Hence, they play a particularly large role in forming and spreading socialist ideology and closely relevant natural and historical knowledge and views and in diversified exchanges of cultural values which the socialist nations and nationalities have evolved.

One might think that in servicing the diverse spheres of the spiritual culture of each Soviet people, the functioning of the languages of the peoples of the USSR would have created almost totally insurmountable communication barriers. But, in their existing relationships and the means they have developed, these languages provide an opportunity for the adequate transmission and adequate reception of the contextual aspect of a given spiritual culture during its interethnic circulation. Or, to be more precise, they ensure either adequate transmission when language-serviced extra-aesthetic forms of spiritual culture are involved, or provide opportunities for creating parallel (and ultimately equivalent) national-language forms of creative activity.

The distinguishing of the cultural-language aspect of spiritual culture is to some extent conventional, since language, which is simultaneously a form of practical consciousness and a means of communication, is in one way or another connected with many other aspects of spiritual culture. Moreover, it is related to all existing means of

realising the traditions and forms of material culture and social organisation.

Not only the Russian language itself, but Russian culture as a whole and, in broader terms, that entire part of the common Soviet culture which functions in Russian, plays a special role in the development of the spiritual culture of the peoples of the USSR. The development of national-Russian bilingualism opens up the possibility for all to acquaint themselves not only with Russian culture, but with that of other nations of the Union as well, even in conditions when there are no direct everyday contacts. Historical circumstances (unification within the Russian state; the Russian people's outstanding role in the revolutionary movement, as well as in the socialist revolution and in building communism; their extensive and diversified aid to all the Soviet peoples, etc.) led to Russian culture and language emerging as the universal media of inter-ethnic communication in the USSR.

Of course, this does not mean that Russian culture has lost its originality. One feature of its major significance as a national culture is its distinctive ability to uniquely absorb the cultural achievements of other nations.

The main issue which arises in connection with the ethnic aspect of the contemporary development of the spiritual culture of the peoples of the USSR is assessing the measure and relationship of functional and parallel bilingualism or, in other words, in determining how and to what extent various forms of spiritual culture are serviced by the first or second language, or by both together.

The relationship between functional and parallel, individual and mass (collective), and receptive (passive) and productive bilingualism differs in different spheres of spiritual culture. It also differs in urban and rural area and in nationally homogeneous and heterogeneous districts. However, on the whole, parallel bilingualism is more widespread in the republics with developed national systems of spiritual culture, where the indigenous population is territorially compact, and where most of the people speak one of the non-Slavonic languages. Functional bilingualism is particularly strong among peoples whose national system of contemporary spiritual culture is less developed (for example, those united in autonomous republics, regions, and districts, or those which do not have statehood), and with those settled either less compactly (such as the Mordvins, Tatars, Karelians, etc.) or who speak a Slavonic language.

The transition to cultural bilingualism, i.e. to active cultural value via the medium of not only their own, but another well-known language does not at all indicate weakened national consciousness. In certain instances, bilingualism is accompanied by even greater national consciousness.

While national-Russian bilingualism once developed usually in

mixed or so-called marginal districts, i.e. in districts of ethnic contacts or ethnic boundaries, and generally involved either contacts in everyday life or was a natural feature of a relatively narrow strata of local executives and intellectuals, today it is a general phenomenon developing primarily under the influence of the existing system of education, professional and social activity, increased population mobility, growth of urban communities and the greater urbanisation of everyday life, the joint participation of various ethnic groups in inter-republican construction projects, as well as under the influence of the press, radio, TV, the cinema, and the arts. Like in spoken language, a feature of modern bilingualism in folklore is the more realised and differentiated use of languages than previously; it is also characterised by the gradual rejection of mixed forms and by the spread of bilingualism on the basis of standard Russian instead.

Modern indirect ethno-cultural ties via the press, radio, the cinema and TV play an important role in spreading standard forms of Russian speech. Generally speaking, extra-contactual forms of inter-ethnic ties and interactions in spiritual culture are becoming more and more significant than direct contacts and everyday relationships.

As a matter of fact, the extensive development of bilingualism has led to a situation in which many forms of modern spiritual culture manifested via the Russian language cannot be unambiguously identified as Russian, i.e. as those created exclusively in a Russian ethnic medium, since its character is becoming more or less synthetic and reflects the traditions, historical and social experience of not only the Russian people, but of many other Soviet nations as well.

In literature, this process is characterised by many different mutually supplementing forms. First, it is reflected in works by Russian authors on national themes depicting the life of other Soviet nationalities. Second, it can be seen in Russian translations of books by national writers, books that have merged with the single stream of Russian-language literature. And, finally, it is reflected in the works in the Russian language by writers of different ethnic identity. This is in itself a very notable development showing the increasingly greater cultural affinity of the peoples of the USSR. Examples are the Abkhazian Georgy Gulia and Fasil Iskander of mixed Iranian-Abkhazian parentage; poets such as the Kazakh Oljas Suleimenov, the Lak Efendi Kapiev, the Finns Raiono Takkala and Oleg Mishin; writers like Bagritsky, Babel, Erenburg and Svetlov who were all of Jewish origin; the Gipsy Khaustov; the Pole Yu. Olesha, etc. Some authors such as the Kirghiz Chinghiz Aitmatov, the Ukrainian Platon Voronko, the Chukchi Yuri Rytkheu, the Karelian Antti Timonen, and the Azerbaijanian Chinghiz Guseinov write in both their mother tongue and in Russian. These writers have introduced themes, subjects, images, stylistic traditions and unique temperament into Russian-language literature which bring to mind either their ethnic origin or the

locality they were born or brought up in.

In science, this process is developing as intensely, if not more so, as in literature. Many Soviet nationalities are represented in every all-union scientific or cultural institution which publishes in Russian, while the teaching staff at schools of higher education in most of the union republics are equally multinational. For example, in 1961, there were 344 Turkmens, 320 Russians, 45 Tatars, 31 Armenians, 31 Jews, 30 Ukrainians, 23 Azerbaijanians, and 13 Uzbeks teaching at higher school in Turkmenia.

The ethnic composition of the people in culture, the arts and science in various Soviet republics is dependent not only on the local population composition, but on the ties with other republics, primarily with the Russian Federation. At the same time, as forms of spiritual culture particularly closely associated with language developed, there was an increasingly greater tendency for more people of the indigenous population to be involved in them. Yet the personnel of local Russian-language press and radio, of local Russian theatres, of Russian schools and institute and university branches, and of many scientific institutions and forms of art not associated with language (music, painting, sculpture, etc.) is essentially multinational.

When we say that the Soviet nations and their cultures have equal rights, and grow and mutually influence each other and draw closer together by developing in the same direction and exchanging their achievements and values, this is not saying that we identify the new and principal cultural events resulting from the socialist development of the Soviet nations within the framework of a single socialist state which evolved in specific social, historical, political, economic, and ethno-cultural conditions.

This new and principal aspect is the creation in a developed socialist society of a single and uniform system, a common Soviet culture. The current process involves the gradual transformation of this culture into a phenomenon which is synthetic, a phenomenon reflecting the life of all Soviet nations and nationalities and serving their demands, interests and requirements along with the various forms of national culture characteristic of each Soviet people.

One result of the spread of bilingualism in the system of common Soviet culture has been the formation of an extensive Russian-based layer. Naturally, this layer far from embraces the entire language sphere of the common Soviet culture, since it is served not only by Russian, but by the other languages of the peoples of the USSR as well. Furthermore, some aspects of the common Soviet culture have no linguistic form at all. In other words, the layer of the common Soviet culture that functions in the Russian language is considerably smaller than the cultural fabric as a whole. Yet, it would be incorrect to fully identify it with Russian culture, since it is considerably broader as it has in a sense absorbed the cultural achievements of all the

Soviet nations. For this reason, attempts by 'Sovietologists' to say that the major role of Russian language in cultural integration in the USSR is 'Russification' are groundless, especially as the spread of the Russian language in certain spheres of culture is accompanied by the development of national forms of culture in others.

In the Soviet republics, mass bilingualism develops when national culture flourishes. However, this does not mean that certain contradictions and occasionally complex situations will never arise; however, on the whole, that is how things are. Bilingualism is instrumental in drawing different cultures closer together, not in supplanting forms that one nation has historically evolved by alien ethnic forms. Closer affinity implies not only the parallel emergence and development of ethnic versions of common Soviet forms, but also the integration of the spiritual culture of individual peoples into one single system whose individual components are functionally interrelated.

The spiritual culture of the Soviet nations, even of those which have extensively developed its modern forms, embraces three organically interrelated component forms that develop on the basis of national languages and are served simultaneously both by the national languages and the Russian language, as well as by monolingual Russian forms. It is the relationship between these three components which primarily characterises the contemporary ethno-cultural aspect of the spiritual culture of each Soviet nation. Depending on their relationship, these three components also reflect the mechanism instrumental in linking the spiritual culture of each ethnic community both with those of other Soviet nations and with the common Soviet culture.

So it appears possible to construct an ethnic typology of the modern spiritual culture of the Soviet peoples, establishing it by the relationship between the forms developing on the basis of national languages, the simultaneously developing bilingual forms (national-Russian and Russian-national forms) and the forms developing on the basis of Russian.

These principal types basically coincide with the concepts underlying the political-administrative system of the USSR. And this should not come as any surprise, since that system is based on the same factors—ethno-linguistic characteristics, the extent of national consolidation, the degree of development of modern cultural forms, number of inhabitants and population density, and level of development. In addition, the Soviet political-administrative system has already existed for decades and is bound to have a retroactive effect on the cultural and linguistic development of the Soviet nations.

In the union republics, all forms of spiritual culture are highly developed and closely related to the national languages. At the same time, they are characterised by growing parallel bilingualism in culture, e.g. the publication of books in the national and Russian lan-

guages; bilingual radio broadcasts, and theatres staging plays in the national and in the Russian languages; even so, the real relationship between parallel language forms differs. This is seen, for example, in the ratio of Russian and national branches at higher and secondary school, and the languages used for publishing works of fiction as well as in the field of technology, the natural sciences, sociology and politics, and the humanities. Cultural forms connected with the national languages have developed primarily in the Union republics.

Taken together, the autonomous Soviet republics and regions are a rather patchwork affair; however, on the whole, the development of monolingual national forms of culture has not been as great, while the development of parallel and functionally bilingual and monolingual Russian forms has been noticeably greater.

The common Soviet system of spiritual culture is not just the sum total of the cultures of individual ethnic communities which autonomously develop in similar socialist conditions so that they drew closer together because of this fact and also bacause of increasing contacts. What is really happening is that they are fusing into a single system, with solidly interlinked components. The Russian language is one of the key links in this system, not only serving Russian culture, but functioning as an increasingly expanding medium between Soviet nations and nationalities.

Chapter X

THE FAMILY: MICRO-MEDIUM OF ETHNIC PROCESSES

1. General Trends in Ethnic and Social Development of Marital and Family Relations

The family is a phasic development engendered by social and cultural progress. As a social nucleus, the family is part of the principal systems of relations and associations, viz., the socio-economic, the state, the legal, the ethnic and other systems. Relations within the family and with other social institutions are governed by the regularities inherent in those systems. The family plays an important role in socialising the individual, in forming principal characteristics of personality. As a component of a specific ethnic group, the family actively takes part in socialising the young people and forming their national identity.

Under the endogamy characteristic of ethnoi, the family plays a major part in their reproduction. At the same time, mixed marriages create families which themselves are micro-media of integration and natural assimilation, and these marriages play a very significant role in internationalising Soviet life. And there are more and more mixed marriages every year in the USSR.

When studying the effects of ethnic processes on family life, it has to be acknowledged that, in the past, every historical and cultural sphere involving peoples of the same socio-ethnic formation and religion developed common foundations of marital-family relationships. In addition, the dependence of these relations on the level of socio-economic development and on denomination has given rise to the same or similar forms of family and marriage among unrelated peoples with no direct contacts and living in different historical and cultural areas.

Observed similarities of marital and family relations do not exclude the fact of ethnic specifics inherent in a given people or group of related peoples. The family is still the carrier of peculiar ethnic traits, including certain features of family customs such as etiquette, ceremonies, relationships between family members, etc. At the same time, families of all nationalities have common elements characteristic of the Soviet people as a whole.

Soviet legislation has reflected the establishment and develop-

ment of marital and family relations at different periods of the country's history and has had a major effect on those relations. In 1968, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Foundations of the Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics on Marriage and Family. In 1969, the Union republics endorsed marriage and family codes which took into consideration the cultural and living conditions of each republic. Like all the above legislation, the Constitution of the USSR emphasises that one of the tasks of the Soviet state is to further consolidate the family.

In the course of socio-economic and cultural changes in the USSR, conditions have been created for young people to meet and mix, and to choose their future spouse irrespective of nationality and social and material status. Abolition of private property and the fact that women were granted the same rights as men have to work and wages and to participation in social life were instrumental in freeing marriage and relations within the family from economic pressure. Attempts to force people to marry is punishable by law, which protects the rights of both spouses.

For most peoples of the Soviet Union, the freedom to choose a mate is characterised by differing effects of the territorial factor on contacts between urban and rural young people. In rural settlements, where neighbourly and kindred relations are stronger, young men and women know each other from childhood. With the exception of residents of suburban villages, who work in nearby towns, and students, rural youth normally work where they live. It may therefore be said that, in rural areas, contacts among young men and women are promoted as much by the fact that they not only work together, but live in the same small community.

In urban communitites, however, the territorial factor is slightly less significant in establishing contacts. In daily life, urban youth closely come together most often at work, or at school. This is primarily due to their common interests. So it is not surprising that urban marriages are frequent among people of similar professions or those working together, or among students attending the same school.

However, irrespective of where they live and work, young people, both rural and urban, meet and make friends during holidays and recreation time. To some extent, this is why there are many marriages between people of different professions and even between residents of different towns and rural settlements.

Pre-marriage contacts between young people differ in areas with different historical and cultural roots. For instance, in the European part of the USSR, many nationalities mix more freely than in other regions of the country and tend to show signs of love, friendship and affection more outwardly. The etiquette of courtship permits a display of tender feelings in front of relatives and acquaint-

ances, and even in front of strangers in public places and in the street.

In other areas, such as the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia, the etiquette of courtship makes local people behave with more restraint. This is to some extent due to the influence of traditions with roots in archaic forms of social organisation, such as the patriarchal segregation of the sexes and the subsequently stemming need to conceal true relationships and intentions. Among Islamic peoples, some codes of behaviour for young people originated in ancient times under the influence of religious taboos. For example, in rural areas in Central Asia, young men and women even today still stay somewhat aloof from each other during holiday carnivals, and recreation, such as at cinemas, clubs, etc. However, in no way do young people today associate this survival of the old custom with religion.

In the Caucasus, especially in rural areas, young people in love try not to display their feelings in front of others. Open courting without subsequent marriage is regarded as an insult to the young woman by many members of the older generation. At the same time, however, the fiancée's parents try to create suitable conditions in the home for the young man to come and see her there. Having become affiancéed, the young man comes to see her in the evenings accompanied by friends.

The ethno-regional specifics of pre-marriage relations among young people, particularly the etiquette of wooing, manifest themselves more apparently in rural areas than in large cities and towns.

In the USSR, the regularities in the development of new marital and family relationships appear in changes of minimum, predominant and average marriageable age, which were not at all the same in the past, not only depending on given historical-cultural region, but among the individual peoples in each region. A general trend in the course of integration of the Soviet people has been the equalisation of the marital age, involving a gradual rise in some areas, e.g., the Volga region, Siberia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Caucasus, and a decline in others such as the Baltic republics.

In the USSR, most marriages (two-thirds) are between people slightly differing in age or of the same age. Marriages involving maximum age differences, when the husband is twenty or more years older than the wife, are rare.

A common trend in marital and family relations among all peoples of the Soviet Union is that the young couples themselves now decide the question of marriage. It would be too much to suggest that in the past, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were no love-matches. In rural areas, where young people mixed at sit-round gatherings, at soirées, outdoor fêtes and fairs, and where neither customs nor religion segregated

them on weekdays or holidays, contacts were easily made. This was true, for instance, of many peoples in European Russia and Siberia. However, the situation was different among peoples of Islamic denomination, as the laws of Islam segregated young people by sex. Yet, there were love-matches among them, as well, albeit there were almost invariably big obstacles to overcome, occasionally the necessity of fleeing from home, and violating social convention. In cases when the young couple's desire to marry coincided with their parents' plans, love led to marriage without any hindrance.

Love-matches were more frequent among urban working youth than among young people in rural areas, and even though, in workers' families, young people listened to their parents' advice, they nevertheless often married out of choice. Being highly cultured, progressive intellectuals frequently married for love alone.

Among the nobility, the bourgeoisie and other propertied classes, marriages were largely decided on the basis of narrow-minded social and even estate considerations. Economic convenience was often the determining factor, and among the bourgeoisie, particularly the merchants, it was the desire to become related to eminent noble families. Yet, this did not exclude the possibility of love-matches.

Speaking of love-matches, it should be noted that the concept of 'love' itself changed along with the social system and improved educational and cultural levels, but these changes were not the same in all social groups.

The ethno-psychological traits of future spouses and varying opinions on what marriage partner is best are questions of great interest. In this respect, some peoples or national groups have certain dominant, stable assessment criteria. For example, the peoples of the Caucasus regard accentuated pride, restraint, modesty and respect for one's elders as positive traits in the character and behaviour of a fiancée; the future bridegroom must possess the same qualities, should not openly display his feelings in front of strangers, and should be generally regarded as audacious and manly. Formerly established concepts of a people or group of peoples about ideal betrothed couples still affect the choice of partners somewhat, particularly if the young man and girl are of different nationality. Naturally, this does not mean that individuality, temperament and psychological traits do not play their role in that choice. What is actually meant here is only that certain assessment criteria which originated in the course of ethnic and cultural integration of peoples from given historico-cultural regions under the influence of the same social, legal and other factors essentially predominate.

At the same time, psychological orientations connected with marriage gradually tend to standardise in different ethnic regions. Both

parents and the young people themselves see ideal partners in individuals who already have a speciality or will acquire one in the near future. Specialised secondary and higher education are greatly appreciated, not only because they provide a good income at a given moment, but because they are a component of prestige and hopes for the future.

When deciding to marry, every young man or woman, either consciously or subconsciously, regards his or her partner as potentially capable of helping him or her in life, of supporting him or her on the way to achieving certain objectives, which, in effect, express his or her priority values; such objectives may be to receive an education, achieve success in work, raise children, improve living standards, etc. The concept of this kind of ideal partner is a factor in the choice of future spouse.

Another factor is the parents' example, either positive or negative. When positive, the young man or girl often subconsciously looks for a partner resembling his or her father or mother; when negative, they act contrariwise.

Some people strive for homogamy, i.e. for a partner with similar psychological and social traits; while others want heterogamy, i.e. a partner with different psychological and social features. It seems that people of different temperament and psychological make-up marry as frequently as those with similar. In a favourable life situation, they quite often tend to complement each other, and even disagreements that arise do not always lead to painful conflicts. In family life, apart from physical disparity, anomalies and extremely 'hostile' expressions of different psychological traits, intellectual non-harmony and strongly opposite priority values, i.e. social factors, albeit interrelated with psychological, occasionally from the very outset, but as a rule subsequently, may lead to incompatibility.

In the USSR, the possibility of marrying is determined by a single norm of law and ethics. Survivals and other forms of tribal exogamy, formerly practised among the peoples of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia and prohibiting, for instance, marriages between people of same village communities, and between adopted and foster brothers and sisters, have largely disappeared. Levirate and sororate no longer exist. Differences in parents' material standing, or the fact that they may belong to different social groups, now have no marked influence on marriages in general.

In most cases, the parents know beforehand of their son's or daughter's intentions to marry and are acquainted with the future partner, even if they do not live in the same town or village. And today, as well, the parents raise objections to the marriage when they dislike the future partner; however, unlike in the past, the last word is with the intended.

Common interests and intellectual affinity are considered major

conditions of a happy marriage. This is what is to be expected and usually exists between people of the same social group and cultural level. It appears that precisely because of this, there are many socially homogeneous marriages, including between people of the same profession, in addition to socially heterogeneous marriages. Common professional interests help young people to come closer together. When they work in a specific sector of the economy, i.e. at similar plants, factories or institutions, or in medicine, science and the arts, this quite often determines the sphere of everyday intercourse in line with their professional interests, and makes it possible for the intendeds to meet every day. At the same time, there is a trend for young people from different social groups to come closer together and attain the same cultural level through modern education at schools, secondary technical schools and schools of higher education, by attending people's universities of culture, by participating in amateur arts groups, etc.

Socially heterogeneous marriages are quite frequent in rural areas, where young people live in the community or neighbourhood and work in the same settlement, collective or state farm. The agronomist and the dairy worker, the collective farmer and the nurse, the machine-operator and the teacher, as well as other social combinations in marriage are quite common. In urban communities, socially mixed marriages are most widespread among young people working at large factories. At the factory or plant, young men and women from different social groups and professions, for instance, engineers, technicians, designers, skilled and auxiliary workers mix closely on the job, during recreation and in public life, and this helps them to come closer together so that different variants of conjugal unions are possible. At present, there is little difference in the frequency of socially heterogeneous marriages with regard to nationality and historico-cultural regions.

Marriage is the foundation of the future family. As Frederick Engels pointed out, the principal forms of marriage and family correspond to the principal stages of human development.[1] Being a micro-component of the social structure, the family reflects the socio-economic relations prevailing in society. The relationships between the family members, the family structure, and its place in the social system depend either directly or indirectly on the social-economic formation.

In the USSR, the socialist economic system, legislation, social changes and the cultural revolution have created for all the peoples a common basis for the emergence, formation and stabilisation of

[1] F. Engels. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. In: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976).

the new Soviet family. The common trends in the development of the family are, for one thing, indicative of the current integration of the country's multinational population.

It is characteristic that the socio-economic differences among Soviet families, primarily the differences among urban and rural families, are relatively uniform for all the peoples of the USSR. The urban family's economy is of a consumer type and is concerned solely with its everyday life needs involving servicing of and self-servicing by its members. Its income is derived from the work performed by its members at factories and state institutions. The material basis of the urban family is formed from its common property and the respective individual (primarily monetary) property of each of the adult members. The families of workers and office employees at state farms, and of rural intellectuals (provided none work on collective farms) closely resemble the urban family, even though in the countryside they (as a family) fulfil certain productive functions, e.g., growing of vegetables on personal plots, poultry-raising, etc. The material basis of a collective farmer's family comes principally from wages received at the collective farm. However, when the rural family owns a personal plot, it partially retains the significance of a social productive nucleus, and differs substantially from the urban family.

The family structure depends on the number and relationships of its constituent generations, on their direct and lateral blood ties. Simple two-generation families, which retain close ties with direct relatives who live separately, are most frequent in the USSR. An ordinary small family is not a new form; to some extent or other, it existed among many peoples in Russia back in the 19th and early 20th centuries as did the complex enlarged (undivided) family of man and wife, their children and either both or one of their parents. Today, three-generation families are also quite frequent, particularly among rural residents, although less frequent than two-generation families. The 1970 Census tabulations showed that 79.5% of the total number of families (58.7 million) included families of one married couple (46.7 million). Of these, 35.7 million had children, 11 million were childless; 37.3 million (79.9%) lived without relatives, and 9.4 million (20.1%) with relatives. Of the above-mentioned 58.7 million, 3.7% of the families comprised two or more married couples, and 14.9% had no married couples, i.e. included a single parent with children, with relatives or without such.

In Central Asia, the Caucasus and Siberia (e.g. among the Khanty and Mansi) there are still surviving forms of the large patriarchal family where married sons live with their parents. In Central Asia, among the Kirghiz for instance, the continued existence of such families is due to certain conveniences created through life together in raising cattle and growing crops. In such families, some members work in

distant pastures, while their children stay with the members who are occupied in field teams and live permanently in the rural settlement. With Kazakh families, sometimes two married brothers and their married sons live together, and separate after they build a second house. In Daghestan, there are also families with two married brothers living together; one of them works in the town or elsewhere, while the other looks after the other's wife and children in the *aul*.

Many peoples from the European historical-cultural zone regard living together with the husband's or wife's parents as temporary, until they either receive separate living quarters or begin a home of their own.

Often, the fact that the young couple want to live apart from their parents is due to their desire to free themselves of certain old customs, of the need to observe traditional etiquette. This desire is especially obvious in mixed families, where the national customs and etiquette of one of the spouse's parents is alien to the other and requires adjustment.

Public attitudes to the desire of young couples to live apart from their parents differ somewhat according to historico-cultural regions. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, for instance, this desire is often condemned by elderly people, but not by Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Moldavians, the peoples of the Baltics and most of the peoples living near the Volga, especially not by urban residents, since to maintain an urban home does not require overstrenuous physical effort. In all historico-cultural regions, the negative attitudes among rural residents to married children leaving the parental home is more frequent than among urban. This is both because of the strength of blood ties and of the existing direct influence of relatives and neighbours, and also of the fact that elderly people find it difficult to look after their personal plots, which bring them part of their income.

Speaking more generally, the difference in the occurrence of survival of family forms and in the attitudes to young couples leaving their parents to start their own home, is due to the fact that, in the pre-revolutionary past, the family had attained varying developmental stages in specific historico-cultural regions and among individual peoples.

The number of members in the family and the birthrate are major factors in determining family structure. According to 1959 statistics, the average family in the USSR had 3.7 persons (3.5 for the urban population and 3.9 for rural). The 1970 Census showed these figures to be 3.7, 3.5 and 4 respectively. Yet, despite this relatively stable index for the average family size in the USSR as a whole, the 1970 Census revealed that the size of the average family increased in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and some of the autono-

mous republics of the RSFSR. The cause was the relatively high birthrates in these areas and lower mortality throughout the country, particularly child mortality; another cause was that enlarged three-generation families divided less frequently there than in other Union republics, and the continued existence of survival forms of the large patriarchal family.

The size of the family (relationships of quantitative indices) is not only dependent on the number of children, but to a certain measure on its internal structure and external ties, both kindred and social (socialisation of young people, connections with school, and so on). Relationships between members of the family form differently depending on whether there are many, few or no children, and women enjoy varying opportunities for working and activity in public life during different age periods.

It can be assumed that the desire to have many or few children reflects a specific value-oriented attitude held by individual social groups of a given people, and is part of a general system of values towards which the family is oriented. The causes of this may be very different.

Large families are characteristic of the peoples of Central Asia, where families with four or five children are not rare, and where families with even more than eight children can be found. In the Caucasus, large families are also common among many nationalities. They are frequent among the indigenous population of Siberia and the Extreme North as well. On the other side, small families with one to three children are characteristic of many peoples of the European zone. For instance, among Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians, families with five-six members comprise only 20 per cent of the total (in addition, one should bear in mind that these families also include those where three generations live together). Moldavians and the peoples of the Volga area have a slightly greater number of children. For example, the average Tatar family has three, while Russians living in Tataria two.

Our ethno-demographic and sociological observations were confirmed by the 1970 Census figures on children of mothers according to nationality. According to the statistics, in the USSR one thousand mothers had an average of 1,958 children. Mothers from Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, partly the Volga area, Siberia and the Extreme North had more children than the average mother in the USSR, and those from the Baltic republics, the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Byelorussia fewer. In 1972, the national birthrate index began levelling out at the expense of lower indices in areas where it used to be especially high, e.g., in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, and a rising birthrate in some other areas where it used to be low, such as certain regions of the RSFSR.

At the present stage of ethnic development, for all peoples of

the USSR there is a difference in the number of children in urban and rural families; as a rule, the latter have more. Intellectuals have fewer children than families from other social groups, especially if the wife holds a high public post.

Soviet sociologists, like A. G. Kharchev and S. I. Golod, traced a dependence between the percentage of working women and the 1969 birthrate, and concluded that in Union republics where there are more working women, fewer children are born per 1,000 people. Demographers such as N. Tauber, also regard the female employment rate as a major factor affecting their function as mothers. Other factors are the family's material well-being (income, available floor space, etc.), the age of women marrying, etc.

Current ethnic processes are reflected in family customs and festivals. These may be specific for each of the peoples or groups of peoples (ethnically close to or remote from one another) inhabiting a given cultural region or area (the Baltic region, for instance), and for peoples living far from each other and essentially different in origin. In the first instance, the specific element in a given custom or festive ritual relates to the ethnic features in the culture of a single people, and in the second, it characterises the culture of peoples inhabiting a definite zone or region, and appears among related peoples as an ethnic feature in a broader sense; in the third instance, common features may be the result of indirect mutual cultural influences, but more often they are a phasic phenomenon which the peoples in question have retained since their origin at the same stage of socio-economic development. The social and cultural integration of the peoples of the USSR has led to a certain similarity of family customs and rituals, and to the gradual disappearance of numerous survivals. At the same time, it has resulted in the appearance and further spread of country-wide traditions in family celebrations and festive ceremonies.

In the USSR, ethnic processes are reflected in the system of relationships between family members. The following three forms of relationships are characteristic of the complete small family: between spouses, between parents and children, and between children of same and different sex and age. If the small family is incomplete, some of these forms of intra-family relationships do not exist; if both or one of the parents of either the man or wife lives with them, intra-family relationships become more complex. Relations between remotely related family members develop in various ways; they also do in cases when not all of them are related by blood. This is partially due to the traditional approach to kinship in general among different peoples.

The function of the family is to maintain society's biological continuity, i.e. the bearing and raising of children; to socialise the young, i.e. to transmit to the children the cultural legacy, to de-

velop a specific choice of priorities, foster ethics, aesthetic perception and national self-awareness, help them attain a definite social status; to organise the home; to satisfy the requirements of a lengthy intimate life and emotions; and to provide mutual support in achieving the goals of life. With modern industrialisation and urbanisation upping the tempo of life, the family also fulfils the function of a psychological haven and, to some extent, the function of an organiser of recreation.

In the USSR, these social functions are based on legal and economic equality of the adult family members, irrespective of sex and age. In a socialist society, everything is done to resolve the problem of the 'two roles' that women play in life: one in the home and the other at her place of work. In F. Engels' view the emancipation of women presupposes as its first preliminary condition the return of all women to the sphere of social production.[1] In this connection, it is significant that in the Soviet Union 84 per cent of all gainfully employed women work in socialised production. So do almost all able-bodied women in the rural areas. The number of women employed as physicians, nurses and teachers equals or even surpasses that of men.

For one thing, women have attained genuine equality through overcoming their former cultural backwardness and secluded family life, both of which varied in different ethno-social media. Today, this problem has been resolved in the USSR in general. Another issue is the freeing of women from the burdens of domestic responsibilities by uniformly distributing these among family members and by constantly expanding and improving public services. Overcoming the contradiction between women's activity at work and in public life and her role in the household is a major factor in achieving social integration in the USSR.

Sociological studies show that women have less free time than men, especially in the first year after childbirth. In some families, the wife spends from two to three times more of her time on household responsibilities than the husband. However, in young urban families, the trend is for the spouses to give equal time to household duties.

In rural areas, where the family still fulfils certain productive functions, the division of labour by sex and age remains, in which the man does quite a bit of the traditional male work and less frequently turns to so-called female chores than in urban areas. In the rural areas of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, and some Volga regions, the husbands do not often help their wives look after small children, as this contradicts the family convention that has evolved over many stages of family development.

[1] F. Engels. *Op. cit.*, p. 247.

Despite the still telling traditional division into male and female domestic labour the general trend is nevertheless towards equally distributing household duties between the spouses, and this is a major characteristic of the optimum marriage model in a socialist society.

The fact that adult family members are economically independent (those employed members are in fact independent and those attending school or higher education potentially independent) creates the foundations of equality in deciding important family affairs. Quite often, this involves the young members of the family having a major influence on the way of life and habits of their parents, on deciding to buy fashionable furniture and clothes not only for themselves, but for the parents, in how free time is to be spent, and so on. In many families, this influence of the young members is explained by their higher educational and cultural levels, and by the fact that they are more in tune with current fashion. In this connection, the status of the daughter-in-law in three-generation families is very exemplary. When she is more educated than the husband's parents, they almost invariably listen to her counsel.

The genuine equality of spouses manifests itself clearly during critical situations in certain families, when the question of divorce is on the agenda. What is particularly notable is that among many peoples in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Volga region, women are free to be decision-makers. Formerly, among the Muslims of those regions, males were alone able to end a marriage, and all women could do was obey the custom. A lengthy ideological struggle was needed to eliminate traditional concepts supporting inequality. The religious factor in the preservation of the family faded with the growth of atheism and gradual overcoming of religious prejudices.

Family relations are being democratised throughout the USSR. It is specifically stated in the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that 'family relations will be freed once and for all from material considerations and will be based solely on mutual love and friendship'.[1] At present, the democratisation of family relations, a process common to all Soviet people, still differs according to specific ethno-cultural zone, social group, and family forms.

To distinguish the specific type of family, it is extremely important to decide who is the formal and actual head, and what extent of authority the representatives of different generations enjoy (husband, wife, father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, etc.). The first type of family is the one where the head, most often the oldest male (father, husband, or grandfather in undivided families) and less frequently the oldest female (mother, wife, or grandmother), retains personal authority; this authority is

[1] *The Road to Communism*, pp. 511-12.

usually based on personal prestige and life experience, and to a certain degree spreads to all the members of the family. The second type of family is characterised by formal recognition of the husband (or father), less frequently of the wife (or mother), as head, although all the adult members retain full equality. The third type of families include those where the husband and wife equally share rights and duties. If there are adult single children in these families, the latter normally take part in discussing and deciding all important family affairs, but with the parents' opinions. There is also a fourth type of family, which resembles the types two and three. In these families, the members hesitate about determining the head.

In many families where the husband is the acknowledged head, the wife keeps the money; in other words, the roles of head and treasurer do not reside in the same person. In families where the woman is recognised as head, she is also in charge of the family budget. However, all big expenditures are usually made with the consent of all the adult members of the family. Quite often, each of them retains something of his or her earnings for their personal needs.

A general trend in the development of intra-family relations in all the Soviet republics is the decreasing number of authoritarian families and increasing number of those where the equality of parents, adult children and all the other relatives is in fact recognised. This trend is more apparent in urban families than in rural. In collective-farm families, it is readily apparent who is the head. He is usually also the juridically responsible person, and the personal plot is registered in his name. In complete families, the able-bodied senior male is usually the head. However, just as in urban families, it is increasingly frequent to find representatives of the younger generation, who are more educated and earn more than their elders, becoming heads of rural families. In three-generation families, the head is not infrequently the married son, and less frequently the married or widowed daughter living with both or one of their parents. There are cases when the widowed daughter-in-law heads the family if the deceased husband's parents are old, and she is the family's principal supporter.

There are certain ethno-regional differences in the determination of the head of the family and the nature of intra-family relation and kindred ties. They are revealed in family etiquette, which to some extent reflects these relations and ties. The largest number of families headed either by the wife or both spouses are found in the European part of the USSR, where the percentage of working women is very high. However, there also one can see a non-uniform distribution of these families among different peoples. For example, among Tatars, women (not widows or divorcees) head families somewhat less often than among Russians, Ukrainians or Byelorussians. The etiquette of Tatar families has elements underlining the pre-

stige of the male as the head of the family. According to tradition, the wife must show particular respect towards her husband, especially in front of guests, the daughter-in-law towards her parents-in-law, etc. Traditional etiquette is followed more in rural families than in urban. However, in the latter, this does not at all mean that women are looked down upon, or that the younger working members of the family are subordinate to the elders. The wife often keeps the family money and plans the daily budget; the young members of the family, though they do listen their elders' words, make their own decisions in critical questions, even if the decision is counter to parents' convictions.

In Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and many other families of European peoples in the USSR, husband-wife relations are not determined by any strict rules of etiquette. True, there are commonly accepted rules for the spouses to address each other using second person singular, and to call the husband 'father' or 'master', and the wife 'mother' or 'housewife'. When leaving the house together, the spouses walk alongside each other, and they do not keep apart either in the street, in public, or when out visiting.

Natural circumstances force the mother to be the prime guardian of infants. But in European families, as the child grows up, the father looks after him along with the mother and bears joint responsibility for his upbringing. Very often, the grandmother (the mother of one of the spouses) provides them with a great deal of help. When talking to their children, in front of strangers, the parents are quick to show their tender affection, love and care, and neither the father nor the mother displays different attitudes towards the children, be it a son or a daughter. Because of certain early specific interests and needs, the son often applies to his father, and the daughter to her mother. Both father and mother take part in socialising their children, particularly in their upbringing and providing them with the knowledge and experience they need for achieving the desired social status. Irrespective of who the head of the family may be the authority of each of the parents is determined by their individual qualities, personal example and life experience.

In big cities, kindred ties between European families are restricted to the father's and mother's closest relatives, usually not beyond cousins. In small townships, and especially in rural areas, where people live either in the same or neighbouring settlements, and working at the same or neighbouring collective and state farms, kindred ties are closer.

Among the peoples of Siberia, the senior male is preferentially regarded as head of the family. The women will usually head the family only if she is a widow and has minors to support. Family etiquette stipulates that one's elders be treated with respect, and involves a number of rules linked to former customs. The authority of old peo-

ple is very great, and kindred mutual aid and the custom of staying with relatives are widespread.

In Siberian families a great deal in division of labour between men and women is rationally based and connected with economic specifics of hunting regions; thus, it will apparently persist in the near future. Even so, part of the heavy work previously regarded as female, (such as procuring fire wood, etc., among the Entsi and Nentsi) is now increasingly done by males.

Marital and family relations among the peoples of the Caucasus have a great deal in common and are very particular. In most urban and rural families, the elder male is always the head. Only when there are no elder males does the oldest female head the family. A new development in family relations in the Caucasus is that even in three-generation families, the widowed daughter-in-law becomes the head if she is the sole supporter of the family. In similar situations, the son or daughter of parents who live with them, or the son-in-law living in his wife's parents' home, may also head the family. Someone of the younger generation becomes the head of the family when his elders are still alive in instances when he is more educated and occupies a high official or social position. Yet, even in families headed by young or middle-aged people the authority of the old folk is high; their counsel is usually heeded when deciding important family affairs, and they influence the family's way of life and even the preservation of certain old customs. All customs are usually observed in three-generation rural families. Young families which separated from their parents either do not observe many of the old customs at all, or observe them only when the old folks come to visit.

There are positive aspects of the modern traditional customs which have their roots in the large family of bygone days; for example, there are the rules of etiquette according to which the old folks are duly respected by standing when they enter the home and by seating them in the place of honour and waiting on them. Respect for elders is clearly apparent when looking at respective generations: children show respect for their parents and all older relatives; young people for middle-aged and elderly members of the family; and elderly people for anyone older. There is respect not only for the father and older male relatives, but for the mother, mother-in-law, and older women, in general. To say anything rude to a mother is considered shameful, and members of the family who do so are condemned not only by relatives, but by acquaintances as well. The influence of the social medium on family behaviour is probably more significant among the Caucasian people than among many of the peoples living in the European part of the USSR.

Today, household duties in Caucasian families are distributed more evenly than previously, although the division into female and

male work persists. However, where before the father could not take the child in his arms in front of relatives and strangers, could not caress him or display love for him, today young fathers not only take their children in their arms, but help their wives look after them, and even take them to school. In addition, the father takes part in the upbringing of not only his sons, but daughters as well.

In Caucasian families where the parents are either young or middle-aged, both are gradually spending more and more of their recreation time together. Husbands go with their wives to the cinema, the theatre, clubs, meetings and for walks outdoors with their children. Only some old people are opposed to such things.

Kindred ties within families in the Caucasus are very extensive. It is interesting that even today Caucasian people regard as members of the family not only children living with their parents, but those who live apart, even those with families of their own. This appears to be a survival of the kindred ties which existed in large patriarchal families. In modern life, kindred ties can be seen in material support and mutual assistance among relatives, in participation in family celebrations, in funeral ceremonies and wakes. When a relative, by modern standards regarded as a very far one, arrives for a visit, he is given all possible attention. When a young man or woman comes from the countryside to study in a town, he or she often settles in a relative's home enjoying the care and protection of their elders and is treated like member of the family.

In Central Asia and Kazakhstan, marital and family relations have a great deal in common with Caucasian customs. Elements of family structure integration characteristic of the Soviet people as a whole coexist with local traditional rules of family etiquette plus certain survivals with their origins in the times when the large patriarchal family and its earlier forms were prevalent. Today, also in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, there is a clear note of male supremacy in the majority of families. In enlarged three-generation families, even if the senior male is well on in years, he is still formally recognised as the head, although the actual head is his son. A woman is normally considered as head of the family only when she is a widow. In rural settlements, the head of the family receives all the money and products earned by its members at the collective farm, even if he has married sons. The money is usually kept by the housewife; however, she is not in charge of it, except for what is intended for everyday purchases. All the working members of the family, including the junior daughter-in-law, whose status was once particularly distressing, take part in planning family expenses. The economic independence of the working women and young people in the family creates a foundation of equality for all members, especially in urban areas, and of the integrity in deciding one's personal destiny. On mutual agreement, all members of the family, pri-

marily the younger, can spend part of what they earn on personal needs.

Although the household duties are still primarily the woman's domain, the situation has somewhat changed. In undivided three-generation families, the oldest female, normally the mother-in-law, cooks and looks after the children aided by her daughters-in-law and adult daughters. Laundering and cleaning are the duty of the daughter-in-law. In separate families, all this is done by the wife. In rural families, the males ensure that all the household facilities are in order; they clean and repair them, procure feed for cattle and fuel for the home. They are assisted by the boys, while the women usually get the girls to help. In many families, especially in those living apart from their parents, the husband does all the work formerly considered woman's. Children are fussed over until they are five or six, and then taught to work. The authority of the parents is so great that children seldom talk back. Yet, in personal affairs, modern adult children increasingly often act as they see fit, despite the protests of older relatives. On the other hand, parents themselves have come to take into consideration their adult children's opinions.

Respect for the old folk is always emphasised in Central Asian families, which also retain the custom of the wife addressing her husband and his relatives with a great deal of respect. Various taboos are being swept away; however, they still occasionally bring to mind the former unequal status of women and younger members of the family.

In Central Asia and Kazakhstan, family ties are as strong as in the Caucasus. Relatives often visit each other. In urban areas, young men and women studying at schools and colleges quite often live at relatives' homes like members of the family. Relatives also provide material support for those who marry, and assist at funerals and wakes. According to ancient custom, even today some peoples such as the Turkmens, regard kinship by the paternal line to be closer than by the maternal line; with other nations such as the Kazakhs, the opposite is true.

2. Mixed Marriages and Their Role in Ethnic Processes

In social micro-nuclei like the family, ethnic processes are especially active in cases when the nuclei emerged through marriages between people of different nationalities. The number of such marriages in itself is a substantial indicator that nations are becoming closer ethnically.

Mixed marriages are most common in zones with mixed populations. In the USSR, these can be said to be the many cities and towns, including major industrial centres and their suburbs, e.g., Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Kazan, and others; border regions

of national communities (so-called ethnic frontier regions); regions of alien national pockets in the areas of compact settlement of a given people, such as the Russian settlements in the Ukraine, Polish settlements in Lithuania and Byelorussia, etc.

Mixed marriages are a form of relationship between different nationalities. Once a mixed family is established, the trend in the ethnic development of that micro-social group is revealed primarily in the language the spouses and their children use to communicate with each other (quite often the families are bilingual) and in their cultural and everyday life. Ethnically, the result of a mixed marriage becomes clear when children who attain majority decide the nationality they will belong to. In most cases, this choice reflects the national identity, or rather the establishment of the national identity of the country's new adult citizen.

In Czsarist Russia, mixed marriages were rare for different economic, historical, political and other reasons. There also were religious taboos: the Orthodox Church, Islam and Judaism prevented marriages between their adherents, and those of different faiths. Religious taboos supported and nourished national prejudices, not infrequently based on different family customs. In addition, the policy of the Czarist government was to instigate national strife to distract the working people from the class struggle for liberation from capitalist exploitation.

Under national oppression and certain discrepancies in the life tenor at the time, it was very difficult for someone to hurdle the religious barriers and make a mixed marriage. However, such things still happened. In the European part of Russia, mixed marriages were more frequent in urban communities than in villages. They were relatively frequent among Orthodox Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, whose culture was similar. These people also married Poles, but normally Catholic Byelorussians were involved, since the Roman Catholic Church did not prevent them from doing so.

In the rural regions of the Ukraine, marriages among Ukrainians and Russian settlers were few despite their common denomination and similar cultures. One of the many reasons was that Russians settled in the Ukraine primarily in separate villages or groups of villages which maintained close ties. However, there was usually no antagonism between Ukrainians and Russians.

Marital ties were more intensive in the ethnic border regions between the Ukraine and Russia, e.g., in the Kursk, Voronezh and other provinces. The same was observed in Ukrainian-Byelorussian and Russian-Byelorussian ethnic border regions.

Formerly, people from Ukrainian ethnic groups and inhabitants of Hungarian, Slovak and German villages in the Trans-Carpathian region did not intermarry, especially when the village consisted of one nationality. Mixed families, such as Ukrainian-German ones were

very rare. In the Baltic region, there were no religious impediments to marriages between Lithuanians and Poles, since both were of Roman Catholic faith; however, they were handicapped by nationa' alienation and even antagonism resulting from social and political factors. Language differences also had their effect. In the Baltic region, Russian Old Believers considered a marriage with a person of another nationality to bring disgrace to the family, even if the partner was converted to the old Orthodox faith. Among the Baltic peoples, marriages with Russians were also condemned, and the situation changed little during the existence of bourgeois republics between 1918 and 1940, when the ideologists of the ruling elite preached nationalist ideas which divided the population by nationality. For example, in Lithuania, marriages with non-Lithuanians in rural areas in 1932-1936 did not exceed 0.9 per cent, and in urban districts were about 2.3 to 3 per cent. The fact that alien national groups in rural areas of the Baltic region continued to settle in isolated villages and later in compact farm communities, which formed the basic marriage medium for these groups, continued to have a restraining effect on mixed marriages.

In the Volga area in European Russia, marriages between Russians, Tatars and other 'aliens' were unusual. At the same time, in Kazan, for instance, one could occasionally see among the Russian population descendants of Tatars, who had become Russianised and converted to Christianity; they were to be seen especially frequently among urban intellectuals. Yet, most Tatars in Kazan settled in the suburban districts and usually did not mix with Russians. The sphere of intercourse between Tatar and Russian young people was restricted by Muslim and Christian taboos, as well as by different living conditions.

There was a complex web of mixed marriages in the Extreme North of European Russia and in Siberia, where there were marriages between Dolgans and Yakuts, between Evenks, Yakuts and Russians, between Yukaghirs, Evenks and Russians, etc. These mixed marriages were to a certain extent due to the tribal exogamy of a given people during its settlement at great distances from each other. Marriages were quite frequent among peoples of the same denomination, especially if they had similar cultures, for example among Komi-Permyaks and Komi-Zyryans.

In Kazakhstan, there were mixed marriages between Kazakhs and Tatars. The clergy did not condemn them, as they involved people of the same faith, i.e. Muslims. Children born to a Kazakh father and a Tatar mother were considered Kazakhs, and those born to a Tatar father and a Kazakh mother half-Kazakhs, since they did not belong to any paternal tribe. Children subsequently born to a half-Kazakh father and a Kazakh mother were considered half-Kazakhs, whereas those born to a Kazakh father and a half-Kazakh mother were con-

sidered Kazakhs. The half-Kazakh ethnic group was also swollen by children from mixed marriages of Uzbeks and Uigurs with Kazakh women.

Marriages between Turkmens and people of other nationalities were extremely rare. Not only were the Turkmen people as a whole endogamic, but their tribal groups were as well, and this prevented them from consolidating.

A feature of Central Asian towns was segregated communities of the indigenous nationality and the other residents, which helped retain different life conditions. In Tashkent, for instance, the Uzbeks lived primarily in the so-called 'old town', and the Russians, Ukrainians and others in the 'new town'. The family life of the Uzbeks and the 'new town' residents was different. The two groups had different religions, and though their cultural ties were rather strong, they seldom intermarried.

In other towns and rural settlements of Uzbekistan, Uzbeks were allowed to marry only Muslims. There were often occasions when Uzbek man married Kirghiz and Tajik women; however, Uzbek women married Kirghiz and Tajiks less frequently.

In the Caucasus, marriages were preferentially within national group. Mixed marriages, if they did occur, were primarily between people of the same faith. There were marriages between Georgian and Russian and Armenian and Russian nobility, and in Abkhazia, mixed marriages were sometimes arranged for political purposes—Abkhazian princes and noblemen sought to strengthen their ties with the Adygeis and Mingrelians through marriage. Irrespective of these considerations, Georgian peasants did marry Armenians in those locations where the two nationalities settled together in Georgia, and Mingrelian women married Abkhazian men, especially in South Abkhazia. Abkhazians were not averse the marrying off their daughters to Mingrelians, since the life and status of women in Mingrelian families were better than in Abkhazian. But, at the same time, the Abkhazians considered a Mingrelian son-in-law to be insufficiently conversant about Abkhazian etiquette and tradition, in those years, this was considered a serious drawback.

In the flatland regions of Southern Ossetia and in Georgia, there had long been mixed marriages between Christian Ossetians and Georgians. Muslim Ossetians became related to the Ingushes by marrying their daughters to them. The Ossetian nobility married Kabardinian princesses and daughters of Balkar and Circassian noblemen.

Even in the pre-revolutionary period Kabardinians married Russian, Kalmyk and Balkar women. Following the early 1800s, marriages with Russian men, especially prisoners of war, became increasingly frequent. During the Caucasus War the Cossacks married women prisoners from the Caucasian highlands. In Cossack villages in the Kuban region with their ethnically same diverse population, mixed

marriages were quite common.

These facts indicate that in pre-revolutionary Russia mixed marriages were more frequent in towns than in rural communities, which were usually inhabited by one nationality. There were some mixed marriages in ethnic border regions, where cultural ties were especially strong. Mixed marriages were more frequent between people of kindred nations, with closely related language and culture. Alien national pockets in the predominant medium of the indigenous inhabitants of various regions were quite consistently endogamic, despite the assimilation policies stemming from national inequality. In many instances, religious taboos had a restraining effect on potential mixed marriages. Quite often, religious strife nourished national prejudices. As well, when people of different nationality had direct contacts and mixed, differences in living conditions and family structure still prevented them from marrying.

In the USSR, the development of national relations aimed at bringing the Soviet peoples increasingly closer together is to some extent reflected in the growing number of mixed marriages, which can be essentially attributed to the expanding opportunities for contacts between different nationalities. The result is the considerable percentage of Soviet families with spouses of different nationality. In 1959 these families constituted 10.2 per cent of the total, while in 1970 the figure rose to almost 14 per cent. According to Union republics, the percentage of mixed marriages is highest in Lithuania, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, reaching 18-20.6 per cent in 1970 compared to 14-15 per cent in 1959; at the same time, the percentage of mixed marriages in Armenia is only 3.7 per cent. In all the Union republics, the number of mixed marriages is considerably higher in towns than in rural settlements, the highest percentage (30-40 per cent) being in urban localities in Moldavia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia. In Lithuanian towns, the percentage of mixed marriages is 25.4 per cent, which is close to the previous figure. The percentage of mixed marriages in the cities of the Central Asian Soviet republics has sharply increased, reaching 20-23.7 per cent in 1970 compared to 14-17 per cent in 1959. In 1970 over 17 per cent of Soviet urban families were of mixed nationality (in 1959, the figure was 15 per cent).

Latvia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Moldavia are the four Union republics with a noticeably greater number (10-17 per cent) of mixed marriages in rural areas than in the other republics, with Azerbaijan and Armenia having the lowest (2-2.6 per cent).

Ethnic integration in many autonomous republics, regions and districts has reached high percentages in rural as well as in urban areas. For instance, in the Karelian and Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, mixed marriages constitute over 30 per cent of the total; and there are more mixed marriages in rural regions of

Karelia than in urban. In the Jewish Autonomous Region, the number of rural mixed marriages is approximately the same or even exceeds that in urban; this is also true of Koryak, Nenets, Khanty-Mansi, Chukchi and other autonomous districts.

Marriages between people of the indigenous nationality and Russians are widespread in the Union republics. For example, in Latvia and Estonia, over 32 per cent of the total number of mixed marriages fall into this category, while the corresponding figures for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are 40, 24-26, and 24-26 per cent, respectively, and for Turkmenia 11 per cent. In all the Union republics a large percentage of mixed families involve representatives of the indigenous nationalities. In Latvia and Estonia, this category embraces over 50 per cent of the total number of mixed marriages, in Lithuania—up to 60 per cent, and in Armenia and Azerbaijan from 50 to 60 per cent, while the corresponding percentage in Georgia is approximately the same. In the Central Asian republics of Tajikistan and Turkmenia, this category constitutes 30-40 per cent of mixed marriages. Marriages between Russians and other (non-indigenous) nationalities are also very conspicuous. In some republics with multinational populations, there are many families in which one of the spouses comes from a non-indigenous but ethnically very close nationality.

Mixed marriages are most frequent in three zones of ethnic contacts. The first zone includes the periphery of a national settlement, i.e. the ethnic boundary, while the second embraces large towns, new construction sites, and virgin lands; in some cities, like Kazan, Ashkhabad and Vilnius, there are fewer people of the indigenous population in a given ethnic district than that of other nationalities. The third zone embraces districts populated by other nationalities; these pockets violate the compactness of any one ethnos.

In the Ukraine, this zone includes districts with either separate Russian villages, mixed Russian-Ukrainian communities, or a group of these settlements.

Mixed marriages are most common in villages where Russians and Ukrainians live together. In large Ukrainian villages, populated exclusively either by Russians or Ukrainians, marriages are usually between people of the same nationality. The fact of how specific nationalities are settled still continues to play a role. In rural areas, the largest number of mixed marriages are among intellectuals. Beyond the Ukraine, mixed Russian-Ukrainian marriages in rural area are still frequent in the Kuban region. In the Trans-Carpathian district where Hungarians, Slovaks and Germans live, there are more and more mixed marriages.

In the communities of and beyond the Ukraine, the increasingly large number of mixed Russian-Ukrainian marriages appears to be a feature of the current ethnic processes in the USSR. Over the past

20-25 years, the number of Russian-Ukrainian marriages (both when the husband is Russian and the wife Ukrainian, and vice versa) in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Ashkhabad and other cities has not only equaled the theoretically probable rate, but in sole years has even exceeded it. As a matter of fact, in these marriages, nationality is normally not even thought about. It is characteristic that in both variants of Ukrainian-Polish marriages, the real frequency in Kiev exceeds the theoretical, while in Minsk and Vilnius it is slightly lower. As for mononational marriages among Russians, Ukrainians and Poles (like among many other peoples), the frequency in urban areas is generally higher than that theoretically assumed. With Ukrainians, for instance, this is very distinct in Kiev.

Mixed marriages have become common in rural areas of Byelorussia with pockets of Polish, Lithuanian and Russian communities, and it is characteristic of not only the Byelorussian ethnic massif itself, but of the ethnical boundary zone as well. In Minsk, marriages between Byelorussian males and Russian females are less frequent than would be theoretically probable; in Moscow and Leningrad they match or almost match the assumed, while in Vilnius they generally exceed the theoretical percentage. With marriages between Russian males and Byelorussian females, the real and theoretical figures either coincide or tend to increasingly do so. In Minsk and Leningrad, both variants of Ukrainian-Byelorussian marriages are either as frequent or slightly more frequent than the theoretical; in Vilnius, the rate is generally higher. In cities such as Minsk, Vilnius and Moscow, the national affiliation does not affect Byelorussian-Polish marriages. In each of the two variants of mixed marriages, as well as with non-mixed marriages, we compared the observed frequency with the theoretical probability of marriages not involving different nationality. The real frequency of marriage combinations almost invariably differs to some extent from the theoretical. A comparison between the two makes it possible to distinguish a specific trend in the development in the marital sphere. For instance, if for a number of years the real frequency of a specific type of mixed marriage approaches the theoretical, this indicates that less importance is being placed on nationality when marrying. In the rural areas of the Baltic region there have been more and more marriages between the Baltic peoples and Russians, Tatars and Karaims, and also between Lithuanians and Letts in the past few decades. The number of marriages between Lithuanians and Poles is gradually rising as well. Yet, in the Baltic republics like in other areas of the USSR, when alien groups settle in individual villages and groups of villages or hamlets mononational marriages within these settlements or groups of settlements nevertheless prevail.

In the Baltic republics, mononational Lithuanian, Russian and Polish marriages in Vilnius, Lett and Russian marriages in Riga, and Es-

tonian and Russian marriages in Tallinn greatly exceed the theoretically probable percentage. The tendency of the real figure to draw closer to the theoretical is somewhat more noticeable in marriages between Lithuanians and Russians than between Letts and Estonians, on the one hand, and Russians, on the other. Thus, all the marriage variants between Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians and Russians and people of other nationalities are influenced by the nationality factor. In urban areas it was also necessary to overcome religious taboos, the language barrier and survivals of certain prejudices before mixed marriages gradually spread. The influence of specific features in the family life of the Baltic peoples and the local Russian population and very different customs, which might at first seem imperceptible, are still felt even today. It is therefore not surprising that nationality is almost irrelevant in Lett-Lithuanian marriages (in Riga and Vilnius) since the languages and family life of the two are far more similar than is the Russian to either of them.

The influence of ethno-cultural affinity on mixed marriages can also be seen in other regions of the country such as the Volga region, where Tatar-Bashkir, Bashkir-Chuvash, Mordvin-Tatar and other mixed marriages are frequent in ethnic boundary zones and in regions with mixed settlements. There are also marriages involving a Russian spouse. Like everywhere, in the Volga region mixed marriages are more frequent in urban areas than in rural. However, mononational marriages are still the rule in most Volga towns, even when a given nationality is represented by a large group.

This reveals that in both urban and rural areas, the negative influence of the national factor on mixed marriages, including those between Tatars and Russians, is still high. This is ostensibly because of differences in way of life and language and also because of the prejudice often felt by the older generation against marriages between people of different nationality and religion. Yet, here also, the national factor has lost its former significance.

The fact that Tatars have learned to speak Russian and work alongside Russians in towns, as well as the current situation where Russians have settled in former Tatar districts of towns and Tatars in districts where Russians once prevailed, has had a big influence in helping them draw closer and substantially change their attitudes towards mixed marriages; this especially concerns young people of marriageable age. The struggle against the vestiges of religious alienation and taboos was and has been very important in expanding relations between different ethnic groups.

The national attitudes of Tatars and Russians towards mixed marriages reflect the current internationalisation of their outlook.

Similar processes can be seen in the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. For instance, in the capital Cheboksary over an

eighteen-year period from 1949 to 1967, Chuvash and Russian mononational marriages constituted from 50 to 80 per cent of all marriages, the rest (from 20 to 50 per cent) being mixed; of these, 13-30 per cent were Russian-Chuvash marriages. In fact Russian-Chuvash marriages are more frequent than probable. The tendency of practice and theoretical probability converging can also be seen in Chuvash-Mordvin marriages. This shows that, when marrying, Russian males and Chuvash females and Chuvash males and Mordvin females attach no significance, or almost none, to the fact that they are of different nationality.

In the northern regions of the European part of the USSR, mixed marriages rather frequently occur between Karelians, on the one hand, and Russians (29.5 per cent of agricultural workers fall into this category), Finns, and Tatars on the other.

The increased mixing via marriage of the kindred Komi-Permyaks and Komi-Zyryans—a process which had already begun prior to the Revolution—is continuing at a high rate. Ugrian males (Khanty and Mansi) from the Ob River often marry Russians, Komi, Nentsi and people of other nationalities, and Nenets-Russian, Nenets-Komi (in the Big Land tundra and South Yamal), Nenets-Selkoup (the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area), and Nenets-Enets (the Taimyr Autonomous Area) marriages are equally frequent. The Nenets language, for instance, is used extensively among tundra Entsi as a result of intermarriage with Nenets people.

In the Evenk Autonomous Area, it is common to see mixed marriages between the indigenous population and Russians, Ukrainians and other nationalities in administrative centres and settlements, primarily among employees and workers whose way of life differs little no matter what the nationality. At the same time, however, marriages between Evenk farmers engaged in traditional occupations, and Russians, with whom they have no permanent contacts, are rare.

There are more and more marriage between Kurean Kets and other nationalities. In the extreme north-east of Siberia, mixed marriages indicate the current trend towards consolidation among the Koryaks and the existing tendency of the small group of Evenks to draw closer to and merge with them.

Marriages between Yakuts and Dolgans are becoming increasingly common in areas where the two nationalities intersect. In the Lower and Middle Amur basin, the tendency is for mononational Nanai marriages to fall off and for Nanai-Russian and other mixed marriages to correspondingly rise.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, 65 per cent of all the mixed marriages involving Nanais were with Russians. In these families, the children usually speak Russian; but they also know the language of their non-Russian parent.

In Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the number of mixed marriages increases as internationalist concepts become generally accepted and as people develop greater atheist convictions and get rid of religious taboos. There are marriages of indigenous males, primarily with Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian women, in all social groups, particularly among the intellectuals. By 1936, mixed marriages in Central Asia and Kazakhstan had already come to 12.9 per cent of the total. In every Central Asian republic, representatives of national minorities are more and more frequently making mixed marriages.

In the auls of Kazakhstan, Kazakhs are still marrying Tatars, Uzbeks, and Uigurs. Following the establishment of Soviet power in the region, most half-Kazakhs were classified as Kazakhs. With subsequent mixed marriages, families whose way of life was close to that of Tatars became Tatar, and those closer to Kazakhs were regarded as Kazakh. This was a result of the national self-determination of the second generation. Kazakhs also marry Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and people of other nationalities.

In areas of Kazakhstan with Ukrainian and Russian majorities, mixed marriages are most frequent between them. In the former virgin lands of Kazakhstan, where young people from all over the Soviet Union had originally settled, marital relations are essentially international in character.

Like everywhere in the USSR, mixed marriages largely influence the general process whereby various nationalities in Turkmenia draw closer. True enough, Turkmen women are still seldom married to males of other nationalities, but those of Agar and Doedji origin not infrequently marry Uzbeks. Kazakhs, Kara-Kalpaks and Uzbeks also intermarry.

Different types of mixed urban marriages in Turkmenia may be retraced in Ashkhabad, the republic's capital. As a matter of fact, mononational Russian (up to 60 per cent) and Turkmenian (25 per cent) marriages prevailed there from 1945 to 1967. Over those years, the discrepancy between the theoretical probability and actual frequency of Turkmen-Russian marriages remained almost the same and was rather high. However, whereas in 1947 not a single Turkmen woman married a Russian, starting from 1964 such marriages constitute 1 per cent of all the existing variants. At the same time, in some years the actual frequency slightly exceeded the theoretically probable Russian-Ukrainian, Russian-Jewish and Ukrainian-Jewish marriages. This was due both to complete absence of the language barrier and very similar family life. It should be noted that some everyday life traditions of those peoples are uncommon to Turkmens and vice versa. It appears that today, too, this, like difference in language, cannot but influence the choice of a spouse.

In Uzbekistan, the overcoming of religious survivals and national prejudices has resulted in a situation when even in rural areas Uzbeks

have begun to marry not only Tajiks, but Russians. In settlements long since populated by Gipsies-Lyuli (formerly of Muslim denomination) we come across both variants of Uzbek-Gipsy families, and again not infrequently among local intellectuals.

Like everywhere in the USSR, in the Caucasus the frequency of mixed marriages in rural districts is chiefly determined by objective possibilities for contacts among representatives of different peoples. The number of such marriages grows primarily in communities with mixed populations, but in mononational areas they are few.

In countryside communities in Armenia, mixed marriages where one of the spouses was Armenian amounted to 1.2 and 1.5 per cent in 1967 and 1969, respectively; on the other hand, in townships, the figures for those years were 4.4 and 5.2 per cent, respectively, of the total number of registered marriages. Today, there are cases in Armenia when Kurds marry Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijanian women, but Kurdish females normally do not enter into mixed marriages. As for the urban population of Armenia, it is noticeably predominated by Armenians; hence, mixed marriages are rare.

In Georgia, Georgian-Abkhasian, Georgian-Ossetian, Georgian-Armenian, and Georgian-Russian marriages take place both in urban and rural areas; however, Georgian, Abkhasian and other mononational marriages are prevalent.

The number of marriages between Ossetians and Imeretian Georgians is growing both in towns and villages; the same concerns marital ties between Ossetians and Ingushes. In Ossetian townships and rural communities, there are also families where the husband is Ossetian and the wife Russian.

Like the influence of the religious factor (with the older generation), that of the national factor shows less and less when people enter into marriage in Azerbaijan. In 1929, mononational marriages in urban communities there constituted 88 per cent, and mixed marriages 12 per cent. Of eighteen varieties of mixed marriages, in ten cases the wives were Russian. The most frequent marriages involved Azerbaijanian and Armenian males and Russian females. In 1940, mixed marriages amounted to 23.18 per cent; this figure involved 39 varieties, predominantly Russian-Ukrainian and Armenian and Azerbaijan males and Russian females. In 1951, mixed marriages constituted 23.05 per cent involving 54 varieties, mostly with Russian females. In 1961, the percentage of mixed marriages was already 27.6 per cent; this involved 100 variants, most frequently between Russian women and Azerbaijanians.

A comparison of the number of mixed marriages in the total number of marriages in the Northern Caucasus in 1963 affords the following picture:

In Karachayevo-Circassia, marriages between Circassians and Abazins apparently reflect their consolidation as a single nationality.

Nationality	Total number of mixed marriages in per cent	Including (per cent)		
		With representatives of Caucasian nationalities	with Russians and Ukrainians	with other nationalities
Adygei men	9.0	2.3	6.7	0.0
Adygei women	4.5	2.4	2.1	0.0
Circassian men	24.6	19.0	5.1	0.5
Circassian women	26.0	26.0	0.0	0.0
Karachai men	6.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
Karachai women	3.2	2.6	0.2	0.4
Ossetian men	7.8	1.3	6.2	0.3
Ossetian women	4.4	2.3	1.9	0.2

Circassian and Abazin men also marry Russian and Ukrainian women.

Complex ethnical interactions are characteristic of Daghestan, where, too, these processes are to some extent reflected in mixed marriages. In 1963, of the total of marriages in rural areas of Daghestan, 5.4 per cent were mixed marriages; of these 44.6 per cent were among representatives of the indigenous Daghestan nationalities, including 18 per cent with non-Daghestan peoples, and 37.2 per cent between Daghestanians and non-Daghestanians. In towns and workmen's settlements of the Daghestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 20.2 per cent of the total were mixed marriages; 32.5 per cent of all mixed marriages involved representatives of Daghestan's nationalities. In 1963, the total number of mixed marriages all over the republic was 10.5 per cent of the total; of these, 36.7 per cent involved various Daghestan nationalities, 26.2 per cent non-Daghestanians, and 36.8 per cent Daghestanians and non-Daghestanians. Mixed ethnic marriages, both on the whole and with regard to specific variants, are more conspicuous in townships than in rural communities. Yet, Daghestan women, both in towns and villages, enter into marriage with persons that do not belong to nationalities populating Daghestan less often than men.

In mixed families, the children's ethnic consciousness ultimately shows when they choose the nationality to which they wish to belong. It is, in fact, their national identity that usually reflects which of the spouses is ethnically predominant in the family. In the USSR, all citizens legally formalise their nationality when they attain the age of 16. Till then, it is determined by their parents. When it is difficult to make the choice, the child's nationality is determined by the mother's. However, the nationality put down in his or her birth certificate does not always coincide with the one he or she chooses later, since the forming of national identity is essentially a lengthy and complex process which depends on a number of factors; e.g.,

ethnical environment, degree of cultural affinity and duration of ethnic contacts between the nationalities concerned; the cultural and general order of things, traditions and language prevailing in the family; and so on.

In families which are ethnically uniform, but live in different ethnic media, young people make different decisions in determining their nationality. For instance, in Kiev and many other Ukrainian towns, teenagers from mixed Ukrainian-Russian families preferentially call themselves Ukrainians; however, beyond the Ukraine, they more frequently regard themselves as Russians.

The existing trend of increasingly frequent mixed marriages in the USSR also results in a growing number of children from mixed families. For instance, of 1000 babies born in Moldavia in 1959, 107.7 had parents of different nationality, and in 1965 this figure increased almost by 25 per cent. In the capitals of the Soviet Baltic republics, the number of sixteen-year-olds of mixed descent during 1963-68 was from 11 to 20 per cent of the total, the exact percentage being 20, 18 and 11.3 for Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn, respectively.

In Soviet autonomous republics, the percentage of children from mixed families is especially high in Karelia, where mixed marriages are very frequent not only in towns, but in rural districts. Every fourth family engaged in farming, and every second family occupied in the timber industry, are mixed.

Being of no small importance in reproducing the population of the whole of the USSR in one ethnical composition or another, mixed marriages positively influence trends through which various ethnic groups draw closer together and contacts between them become stronger. Under the existing mobility and urbanisation of the Soviet population, the general tendency for the number of mixed marriages to grow increases their significance in the general ethnic development of the USSR.

Chapter XI

ETHNIC PROCESSES AND POPULATION DYNAMICS IN THE USSR

The population of various nationalities residing in the USSR must also be taken into account among the factors that influence ethnical processes. In turn, ethnical processes *per se* not infrequently affect the population of ethnic groups.

For the USSR with its highly motley national composition, another important factor is the huge difference between the populations of some of the peoples inhabiting the country. The largest are the Russian and Ukrainian populations, which in 1970 equalled over two-thirds of the country's total population; besides the Russians and Ukrainians only ten nationalities numbered over 2 million, an overwhelming majority of other peoples being considerably less numerous, sixty of them with populations of less than 100 000. Now, whereas the Russian population exceeded the average by almost sixty times, the number of Yukaghirs was about 4 500 times less.

All these features are due to the fact that, over a considerable part of the USSR, historically natural enlargements (including consolidations) of ethnic communities began to develop relatively late; there are numerous regions where more or less formed small ethnic groups had no favourable conditions for further growth or for developing contacts with other larger ethnic groups, something that in different circumstances could have resulted in their involvement in processes of ethnic consolidation or assimilation. Almost all the small Soviet nationalities live either in heretofore scantily populated north-eastern taiga and tundra regions, or in hardly accessible mountainous areas in the south; on the other hand, the largest peoples populate the East European Plain and the ancient farming regions of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

When there are language and cultural contacts and the resulting ethnic transformations under national equality, major ethnic transitions generally tend towards the larger of the interacting communities to reduce the population of the smaller ethnic group.

The fact that in these conditions small nationalities continue to exist for a long time may be explained both by their isolated status

Table 20*

Population Dynamics in the USSR

Nation	1926, thous.	1939, thous.	1926-1939, per cent	1959, thous.	1939-1959, per cent	1970, thous.	1959-1970, per cent	1979, thous.	1970-1979, per cent
	Within respective years								
Total population	147 027.9	170 557.1 (190 677.9)	+15.7	208 826.7	(+9.5)**	241 720.1	+15.3	262 084.7	8.4
Russians	77 791.1	99 592.0**	+28.0	114 113.6	...	129 015.1	+13.0	137 397.1	6.5
Ukrainians	31 195.0	28 111.0**	−9.9	37 252.9	...	40 753.2	+9.4	42 347.4	3.9
Byelorussians	4 738.9	5 275.0**	+11.3	7 913.5	...	9 051.8	+14.4	11 462.7	4.5
Uzbeks	3 904.6	4 845.1	+24.1	6 015.4	+24.2	9 195.1	+52.8	12 456.0	35.5
Tatars	2 916.3	4 313.5	+47.9	4 967.7	+15.2	5 930.7	+19.4	6 317.5	6.5
Kazakhs	3 968.3	3 101.0	−21.9	3 621.6	+16.8	5 298.8	+46.3	6 556.4	23.7
Azerbaijanians	1 706.6	2 275.7	+33.3	2 939.7	+29.2	4 379.9	+49.0	5 477.3	25.0
Armenians	1 567.6	2 152.9	+37.3	2 786.9	+29.4	3 559.2	+27.7	4 151.2	16.6
Georgians	1 821.2	2 249.6	+23.5	2 692.0	+19.7	3 245.3	+20.5	3 570.5	10.0
Lithuanians	41.5	32.6**	−21.4	2 326.1	...	2 664.9	+14.6	2 850.9	7.0
Jews	2 600.9	3 028.5	+16.4	2 267.8	...	2 150.7	−5.2	1 810.9	−15.8
Moldavians	278.9	260.0**	−6.6	2 214.1	...	2 698.0	+21.8	2 968.2	10.0
Germans	1 238.5	1 427.0	+15.2	1 619.7	+13.5	1 846.3	+14.0	1 936.2	10.5
Chuvashes	1 117.4	1 369.6	+22.6	1 469.8	+7.3	1 694.4	+15.2	1 751.4	3.3
Letts	141.6	128.0**	−9.6	1 399.5	...	1 429.8	+2.2	1 439.0	0.6
Tajiks	978.8	1 229.2	+25.6	1 396.9	+13.6	2 135.9	+52.9	2 897.7	35.7
Poles	782.3	630.0**	−19.5	1 380.3	...	1 167.5	−15.5	1 151.0	−1.5
Mordvins	1 340.4	1 456.3	+8.4	1 285.1	−11.8	1 262.7	−1.7	1 191.8	−5.6
Turkmen	763.9	812.4	+6.3	1 001.6	+23.3	1 525.3	+52.2	2 027.9	33.0
Bashkirs	713.7	843.6	+18.2	989.0	+17.2	1 239.7	+25.4	1 371.5	10.6
Estonians	154.7	143.6	−7.2	988.6	...	1 007.4	1.9	1 019.0	1.2

Nation	Within respective years								
	1926, thous.	1939, thous.	1926-1939, per cent	1959, thous.	1939-1959, per cent	1970, thous.	1959-1970, per cent	1979, thous.	1970-1979, per cent
Kirghiz	762.7	884.6	+16.0	986.7	+9.5	1 452.2	+49.9	1 906.3	31.2
Udmurts	504.2	606.3	+20.2	624.8	+3.1	704.3	+12.7	713.6	1.0
Mari	482.2	481.6	+12.5	504.2	+4.7	598.6	+18.8	622.0	3.9
Komi and Komi-Permyaks	375.0	422.3	+12.0	430.9	+2.0	475.3	+10.2	477.5	0.4
Chechens	318.5	408.0	+28.1	418.8	+2.6	612.7	+46.4	755.8	23.3
Ossetians	272.2	355.0	+30.3	412.6	+16.3	488.0	+18.3	541.9	11.1
Bulgarians	111.2	113.0	+2.1	324.2	...	351.2	+8.3	361.9	2.8
Koreans	87.0	182.3	+109.5	313.7	+72.1	367.5	+14.0	388.9	8.8
Greeks	213.8	286.0	+34.1	309.3	+8.0	336.9	+9.0	343.8	2.1
Avars	158.8	253.0	+59.2	270.4	+7.0	396.3	+46.6	482.8	21.2
Buryats	237.5	225.0	−5.4	253.0	+12.6	314.7	+24.5	352.6	12.2
Yakuts	240.7	242.0	+0.6	236.7	−2.2	296.2	+25.1	328.0	10.7
Lezghins	134.5	221.0	+64.3	223.1	+1.0	323.8	+45.2	382.6	18.2
Kabardinians	139.9	164.0	+17.4	203.6	+24.0	279.9	+37.5	321.7	14.9
Kara-Kalpaks	146.3	186.0	+27.0	172.6	−7.1	236.0	+36.8	303.3	28.5
Karelians	248.1	253.0	+1.8	167.3	−33.8	146.1	−12.7	138.4	−5.3
Darghins	109.0	154.0	+41.1	158.1	+2.8	230.9	+46.1	287.3	24.4
Hungarians	5.5	...	...	154.7	...	166.5	+7.6	170.6	2.5
Kumyks	94.6	113.0	+19.0	135.0	+19.9	188.8	+39.8	228.4	21.0
Gypsies	61.2	88.0	+44.1	132.0	+49.6	175.3	+32.8	209.2	19.3
Gagauzes	0.8	...	...	123.8	...	156.6	+25.5	173.2	10.6
Kalmyks	132.0	134.4	+1.8	106.1	−21.1	137.2	+29.1	146.6	6.9
Ingushes	74.1	92.1	+24.3	106.0	+15.6	157.6	+48.7	186.2	18.1
Tuvinians	–	0.8	...	101.1	...	139.4	+39.3	166.1	19.2
Karachais	55.1	75.8	+39.8	79.6	+7.4	112.7	+38.4	131.1	16.3
Adygeis	65.3	88.0	+37.6	79.6	−9.6	99.9	+25.5	108.7	8.8

Nation	Within respective years								
	1926, thous.	1939, thous.	1926-1939, per cent	1959, thous.	1939-1959, per cent	1970, thous.	1959-1970, per cent	1979, thous.	1970-1979, per cent
Abkhazians	57.0	59.0	+3.5	65.4	+10.8	83.2	+27.2	90.9	9.3
Laks	40.4	56.0	+38.9	63.5	+13.2	85.8	+35.1	100.1	16.7
Khakassians	45.6	53.0	+15.8	56.8	+7.6	66.7	+17.4	70.8	6.1
Altaians	37.6	48.0	+27.4	45.3	−5.4	55.8	+23.2	60.0	7.5
Balkars	33.3	42.7	+28.2	42.4	−0.7	59.5	+40.3	66.3	11.4
Nogais	36.3	36.6	+0.8	38.6	+5.5	51.8	+34.2	59.5	14.9
Tabasarans	32.0	33.6	+5.0	34.7	+3.3	55.1	+58.8	75.2	36.5
Circassians	65.3	...	...	30.5	...	39.8	+30.5	46.5	16.8
Evenks	32.8	30.0	−9.5	24.7	−16.8	25.1	+1.6	27.5	9.6
Nentsi	18.8	25.0	+31.9	23.0	−7.3	28.7	+24.5	29.9	4.2
Abazins	13.8	15.0	+10.9	19.6	+28.1	25.4	+29.6	29.5	16.1
Khanty	17.7	18.5	+4.3	19.4	+4.9	21.1	+8.8	20.9	−0.9
Vepses	32.8	32.0	−3.4	16.4	−48.3	8.3	−49.6	8.1	−2.4
Shors	12.6	16.3	+29.4	15.3	−6.1	16.5	+7.8	16.0	−3.0
Chukchi	13.1	14.0	+6.1	11.7	−15.8	13.6	+16.2	14.0	2.9
Tats	28.7	...	...	11.5	...	17.1	+48.7	22.4	31.0

* Table 20 is based on the list of nations (nationalities) that was accepted when detailing the 1959 census materials. It does not include nationalities with populations below 100 000, which live chiefly outside the USSR, and indigenous peoples with populations less than 10 000. Nations included in combined groups, e.g. "Nationalities of Daghestan" and "Nationalities of the North", are listed in order of their total populations. Basic changes in the list of peoples contained in respective censuses are examined in the text.

** With additions, in accordance with calculations of the USSR Central Statistical Board, for western territories which become part of the USSR in 1939-45, the Russian population was 100 392 000; the Ukrainian 35 611 000; the Byelorussian 8 275 000; the Lithuanian 2 033 000; the Latvian 1 628 000; the Estonian 1 144 000; the Moldavian 2 060 000. The Jewish and Polish populations within the new borders were not established. In 1939, the total population of the USSR was 190 677 900; growth for 1959 is given in parentheses.

and other settling features that impede contacts between ethnic groups and by specific measures promoting stability of ethnic life in general and consciousness of members of small ethnic communities in particular.

Table 20, based on previous censuses materials, is indicative of considerable differences between the growth rates of various nationalities. The populations of peoples that have their own national republics and were not affected by changes in Soviet frontiers, of the Uzbeks for instance, increased 2.3 times from 1926 to 1970, whereas that of the Karelians decreased 1.7 times over the same period.

The population dynamics of various Soviet nationalities are chiefly dependent on the ratio between birthrate and mortality, and also on ethnical processes.

Another important factor involving migrations (in this case, external migrations) or changes in state-territorial frontiers (similar in influence to migrations) had a substantial effect on the population dynamics of only some peoples.

Published censuses and current statistics do not contain the birthrates and mortalities for respective national (ethnic) groups. The only available statistics is on natural mobility of the population in Soviet republics and autonomous regions, the major administrative-territorial units. These materials can provide sufficiently correct idea of the birthrate and mortality for a given nation only if the latter is settled almost entirely within a given Union or autonomous republic and (what is even more important) constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population in that area.

Lack of information on the birthrate may be partially compensated by data on the number of children in families of different nationalities.

Speaking of existing difficulties in determining the birthrate and mortality among the peoples of the USSR, one should note the substantial influence of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 on population dynamics. The losses suffered by various Soviet nations both in absolute and relative figures were undoubtedly different (this is apparent, for instance, from differences in decrease in the number of males of military age); however, the exact figures are unknown. No less scanty is the information on migrations of different nationalities. Hence, it is often difficult to decide whether or not variations in the national composition of a given republic or region are due to ethnical or migrational processes, and the extent of the concrete influence of the former or latter is also hard to judge if they acted simultaneously.

In analysing the population dynamics of Soviet peoples from 1926 to 1939 and ignoring certain individual cases, for instance the sharp increase in the number of Koreans due to arrival of new groups of settlers from abroad, it it noteworthy that Tatars and Armenians

Table 21

Natural Mobility Indices for Principal Nations of the European Part of the USSR in 1927 per 1,000 Inhabitants

Nation	Area	Birth rate	Mortality	Natural increase
Russians	European part of the USSR	44.7	22.8	21.9
	RSFSR	45.4	23.2	22.2
Ukrainians	European part of the USSR	41.3	17.8	23.5
	Ukrainian SSR	42.7	18.9	23.8
Byelorussians	European part of the USSR	43.3	15.8	27.5
	Byelorussian SSR	42.3	15.1	27.2
Jews	European part of the USSR	22.6	9.2	13.4
	RSFSR	18.3	9.3	9.0
	Ukrainian SSR	23.0	9.2	13.8
	Byelorussian SSR	26.4	9.1	17.3
Tatars	Tatar ASSR	53.1	24.5	28.6
Mordvins	European part of the USSR	48.3	24.5	23.8
Armenians	Armenian SSR	59.3	18.4	40.9
Azerbaijanians	Armenian SSR	58.0	14.6	43.4
Chuvashes	Chuvash ASSR	44.3	28.0	16.3
Bashkirs	Bashkir ASSR	39.7	14.5	25.2
Udmurts	Votyak Autonomous Region	56.2	41.3	14.9
Moldavians	Ukrainian SSR	45.4	19.4	26.0
Mari	Mari Autonomous Region	53.5	41.2	12.3
Komi-Zyryans	Komi Autonomous Region	47.2	34.5	12.7
Kalmyks	Kalmyk Autonomous Region	31.3	15.0	16.3
Karelians	Karelian ASSR	42.6	26.1	16.5
Gypsies	European part of RSFSR	36.5	15.4	21.1

had the highest growth percentage among nations that have their own republics. The natural increase in the Tatar population due to a higher birthrate was then slightly greater than among neighbouring nationalities in the Volga region (Table 21); however, the fact that it grew so significantly was chiefly because several Turkic-language groups, singled out by the 1926 Census as independent nationalities, were included. Among such groups with dual ethnic identity were the Mishari (243 000), Kryashens (101 000), Teptyars (27 000), Nagaibaks (11 000), and others. As for the increasingly high growth of the Armenian population, this was chiefly due to a high natural increment because of noticeably decreased mortality and continued very high birthrate.

In that period, the high increase in the percentage of Avars and Lezghins, both Daghestan nationalities, was due to the fact that the 1926 Census had assigned various small nationalities to those two ethnic groups; for example, Archins, Andians, Chamalins, Tsezes and other were classified as Avars. As was noted above, the list of ethnic groups in the 1939 Census was on the whole twice as short as that in the 1926 Census: in addition to the above-mentioned nationalities,

such large groups as the Kurama (50 000) and the Kypchaks (34 000) classified as Uzbeks, the Mingrelians (243 000), the Adzhars (71 000) and Svans (13 000) classified as Georgians, the Bessermyans (10 000) classified as Udmurts, and the Yagnobs and the nationalities inhabiting the Pamir (Vakhans, Shugnans, and others), who in 1926 totalled 40 000 and in 1939 were classified as Tajiks, were no longer listed in official statistics.

Further consolidation of ethnic groups to a certain extent also influenced changes in the population of some large nations. Some groups belonging to large and generally formed peoples were characterised by quite substantial ethnic transformation. Evidently, this very transformation, connected either with the changed census purposes or with actual processes of ethnic assimilation, resulted in a situation when the growth of the Russian population proved almost twice as high as the average figure for the USSR. Large groups of Ukrainians, whose total population had in 1926-39 decreased outside the Ukrainian SSR (chiefly in Northern Caucasus) by 4 million, had no doubt classified themselves as Russians, as did some other ethnic groups, for instance Lithuanians, Letts and Estonians residing in the RSFSR.

The period between the 1939 and 1959 Censuses included the 1941-45 war years, and was highly complex in population dynamics. The total population (within the new boundaries of the USSR) had then grown by only 9.5 per cent, this being due to the huge losses during the war. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 had most seriously affected the country's western regions, which were within the zone of hostilities and had been occupied by the nazis. The decrease in the population there was also substantially influenced by mass deportations of men and women for forced labour in Germany; many of them died, while others were not repatriated after the war and were classified as displaced persons. The huge losses among people of generative age also had an impact in the postwar years because they slowed down the generally rising birthrate. The war-caused migrations of some Ukrainians and Byelorussians to the east had probably resulted in somewhat intensified natural assimilation. As a result of all this, the total Ukrainian population (within the new boundaries) had grown by 1959 by only 4.6 per cent, and the number of Byelorussians was still below the prewar figure by 4.4 per cent.

From 1939 to 1959, the principal nations of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics and of Kazakhstan had grown by an average that considerably exceeded that for the USSR, for example Azerbaijanians and Armenians by 29 per cent, Uzbeks by 24 per cent, and Turkmens by 23 per cent.

The increase in the Armenian population was partly caused by the fact that after the war over 100 000 Armenians had immigrated from abroad (chiefly from the Mediterranean countries); the Azer-

Union republic	1940			1950		
	birth-rate	mortality	natural increase	birth-rate	mortality	natural increase
Average for the USSR	31.2	18.0	13.2	26.7	9.7	17.0
RSFSR	33.0	20.6	12.4	26.9	10.1	16.8
Ukrainian SSR	27.3	14.3	13.0	22.8	8.5	14.3
Byelorussian SSR	26.8	13.1	13.7	25.5	8.0	17.5
Moldavian SSR	26.6	16.9	9.7	38.9	11.2	27.7
Lithuanian SSR	23.0	13.0	10.0	23.6	12.0	11.6
Estonian SSR	16.1	17.0	−0.9	16.7	14.4	2.3
Latvian SSR	19.3	15.7	3.6	16.8	2.4	12.4
Azerbaijanian SSR	29.4	14.7	14.7	31.2	9.6	21.6
Georgian SSR	27.4	8.8	18.6	23.5	7.6	15.9
Armenian SSR	41.2	13.8	27.4	32.1	8.5	23.6
Kazakh SSR	41.1	21.6	19.5	37.6	11.7	25.9
Uzbek SSR	33.6	13.0	20.6	30.9	8.8	22.1
Kirghiz SSR	33.0	16.3	16.7	32.4	8.5	23.9
Tajik SSR	30.6	14.1	16.5	30.4	8.2	22.2
Turkmen SSR	36.9	19.5	17.4	38.2	10.2	28.0

baijan population had increased because the Talyshes, who in 1939 were registered as a separate nationality, were now classified as Azerbaijanians. Yet, the high growth rates of these and other peoples in the southern Soviet republics were chiefly due to a higher natural increase than that of the peoples of other Union republics.

In the postwar years, the population dynamics of the overwhelming majority of Soviet peoples was determined by specifics of their natural reproduction indices; hence, this factor should be examined in greater detail.

After the end of the civil war in Russia, when life began to normalise, demographic evolution in the USSR was primarily characterised by considerably and generally reduced mortality. From 1926 to 1960, the death rate had on the average declined more than three times, and in some national regions even by four and more times. This was due to the country's general economic and cultural development, to advances in medicine and improved health care, to better living standards, and to other factors. At the same time, under the effect of a more intricate complex of objective and subjective factors, the birthrate had also declined. Some of the responsible factors were the change in the age structure of the population, when the percentage of elderly people not involved in generation had increased; the disproportion between sexes due to sanguinary wars; late marriages on account of extended terms of general and specialised schooling; urbanisation; increasing migrations and social and vo-

Table 22

(average per annum for 1000 people)

1960			1970			1975		
birth-rate	morta-lity	natural increase	birth-rate	morta-lity	natural increase	birth-rate	morta-lity	natural increase
24.9	7.1	17.8	17.4	8.2	9.2	18.0	8.7	9.3
23.2	7.4	15.8	14.6	8.7	5.9	15.6	9.2	6.4
20.5	6.9	13.6	15.2	8.9	6.3	15.1	9.4	5.7
24.5	6.6	17.9	16.2	7.6	8.6	15.8	7.9	7.9
29.2	6.4	22.8	19.4	7.4	12.0	20.4	8.5	11.9
22.5	7.8	14.7	17.6	8.9	8.7	15.8	9.0	6.8
16.6	10.5	6.1	15.8	11.1	4.7	15.1	10.8	4.3
16.7	10.0	6.7	14.5	11.2	3.3	14.2	11.4	2.8
42.6	6.7	35.9	29.2	6.7	22.5	25.0	6.5	18.5
24.7	6.5	18.2	19.2	7.3	11.9	18.3	7.6	10.7
40.3	6.8	33.5	22.1	5.1	17.0	21.9	5.2	16.7
36.7	6.5	30.2	23.3	6.0	17.3	24.1	6.7	17.4
40.0	6.0	34.0	33.5	5.5	28.0	34.2	6.4	27.8
36.8	6.1	30.7	30.5	7.4	23.1	30.5	7.3	23.2
33.8	5.2	28.6	34.7	6.4	28.3	37.0	7.5	29.5
42.4	6.5	35.9	35.2	6.6	28.6	34.3	7.2	27.1

cational mobility; involvement of women in social production; and weakening of the large-family tradition. In the postwar years, the birthrate slightly increased; however, approximately since the late 1950s it again began to decline, to some extent because the newlyweds were from among the scanty contingents born during the war; as early as in the 1960s, this trend had resulted in reduced total growth rates (Table 22).

The birthrate indices for some of the Soviet peoples differ considerably from the average national figures. This is due to local ethnical reproduction specifics, which in turn are connected with different (especially in the past) social and economic development of their habitats; different rates and degrees of urbanisation; different economic and family life of the peoples; different relative and absolute losses during the 1941-45 war; and different participation of various peoples in internal migrations. Available evidence for Union republics is indicative of the ethnical specifics of the population growth, particularly concerning birthrates. For example, in 1955, when mortality figures were relatively close, fluctuating from 7 to 11 per cent, the birthrates in Turkmenia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Latvia, Estonia, and the Ukraine were 40.7, 38.0, 37.8, 16.4, 17.0, and 20.1 per cent respectively (see Table 22).

The actual difference between the birthrate of the indigenous southern peoples and that of the Baltic nations, for instance, was even greater, since a considerable number of inhabitants in Turkme-

nia were Russian, and their birthrate was low. The high birthrates characteristic of the peoples of the southern Soviet republics are definitely due to the widespread custom of early marraiges and the large-family tradition. In 1959, the percentage of married women from the 16-19 age group was 44.8 in Kirghizia, 38.4 in Tajikistan, and 32.3 in Uzbekistan; at the same time, it was 9.1 among Russians residing in the RSFSR, and less than 5.0 per cent among the indigenous nationalities of the Baltic republics (see Table 23). The stable early-marriage and large-family tradition among Azerbaijanians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kirghiz and Tajiks is undoubtedly associated with the formerly dominant Islamic tradition.

Both consolidation and natural assimilation (chiefly in towns and in regions with highly mixed populations) continued in between the

Table 23

Percentage of Married Women for Various Age Groups

Republic	Year	Indigenous nation		Russians		Ukrainians	
		16-19	20-29	16-19	20-29	16-19	20-29
RSFSR	1959	9.1	61.2	9.1	61.2	13.1	66.4
	1970	8.8	65.7	8.8	65.7	12.9	72.5
Ukrainian SSR	1959	9.6	58.4	10.1	63.4	9.6	58.4
	1970	10.9	70.5	9.9	66.5	10.9	70.5
Byelorussian SSR	1959	6.0	56.5	6.5	63.9	11.8	66.9
	1970	6.6	66.3	6.9	63.7	10.7	70.3
Uzbek SSR	1959	32.3	88.5	8.9	58.7	–	–
	1970	21.9	86.2	10.9	65.7	–	–
Kazakh SSR	1959	27.5	82.5	12.5	65.8	16.8	68.2
	1970	11.7	75.2	11.5	71.2	14.1	77.7
Georgian SSR	1959	10.7	58.7	12.5	57.9	–	–
	1970	13.5	63.9	14.8	65.4	–	–
Azerbaijan SSR	1959	27.2	75.2	10.0	60.4	–	–
	1970	17.9	72.3	8.9	60.5	–	–
Lithuanian SSR	1959	4.7	51.5	7.1	61.9	12.9	74.0
	1970	5.2	62.5	7.6	63.8	10.3	72.1
Moldavian SSR	1959	15.0	66.4	9.3	64.9	15.7	68.3
	1970	11.3	67.5	10.3	66.4	13.6	73.5
Latvian SSR	1959	4.5	50.4	7.3	62.5	12.7	68.3
	1970	5.9	61.2	8.3	63.1	11.6	71.6
Kirghiz SSR	1959	44.8	89.6	10.6	65.1	11.9	66.5
	1970	20.0	85.9	10.7	67.0	12.4	71.7
Tajik SSR	1959	38.4	89.8	8.6	59.4	9.9	59.7
	1970	25.2	90.4	10.2	63.9	13.3	66.9
Armenian SSR	1959	16.6	67.4	15.0	65.9	–	–
	1970	16.0	69.5	16.1	65.7	–	–
Turkmen SSR	1959	32.0	92.3	10.2	62.0	14.2	62.9
	1970	18.9	86.8	12.9	68.8	19.9	75.2
Estonian SSR	1959	4.2	52.1	8.1	65.7	13.1	72.1
	1970	4.8	52.9	8.0	65.7	14.6	74.3

1939 and 1959 Censuses. The increased growth (9.5 per cent) of the Russian population during 1939-59 compared with the average figure for the USSR partly due to the increase in the number of people who called themselves Russian. The same reason was also responsible for the reduced growth rate among many nationalities in the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, primarily for the slight decrease in the absolute Karelian and Mordvin populations. There are no grounds to maintain that the natural increase of the Mordvin population had been significantly lower than that of the Chuvashes, a neighbouring Volga nationality, or that the Mordvins had lost more people during the war. Consequently, the decrease in the number of Mordvins by 13.3 per cent and the growth of the Chuvash population by 7.3 per cent can be explained only by the fact that some Mordvin groups had merged with Russians. These processes also influenced the decrease in the number of Jews, even though it is hard to establish to what extent, inasmuch as the Jewish population had suffered big losses during the war.

Certain aspects of the ethnical processes in the USSR may be revealed by comparing the data on national affiliations and native language. It is noteworthy that available statistics on people that had changed their mother tongue are in good agreement with ethnical processes. For example, the percentage of Mordvins who indicated another language as their vernacular (more frequently Russian) had increased from 6 per cent in 1926 to 21.9 per cent in 1959 (during the same period, the percentage of similar Chuvashes had increased from 1.3 to only 9.2 per cent). The number of Karelians and Jews who had changed their native language grew even quicker, increasing from 4.5 to 28.7 per cent and from 28.1 to 78.5 per cent respectively. According to the 1959 Census, large groups of Udmurts (10.9 per cent) and Komi (11.3 per cent) also indicated languages of other nationalities as their mother tongues; the reduced growth rates of these two peoples indicate that language assimilation here was combined with ethnic assimilation. The only exception were the Bashkirs, one-third of whom had long ago been using the Tatar language; however, this had almost no effect on their ethnic identity.

Different birthrates among the peoples of the USSR showed in various indices relating to the number of children a woman of a given nationality had on the average, and also in different sizes of families. Table 24 shows that by the 1959 Census the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks had the largest families, and the Letts, Estonians and Ukrainians the smallest.

Differences in average family size are of major interest, since small families, being most mobile socially and territorially, create (other things being equal) more favourable conditions for ethnical processes than large families, whose existence is often attended by an old tenor of life and patriarchal traditions. According to the 1959

Table 24

Number of Children and Sizes of Families Among Soviet Nationalities

Nationality	Number of children aged 0-9 per 1000 women aged 20-40		Family size and share (per cent)				Average family size	
			2-3 members	9 and more members	2-3 members	9 and more members		
	1959	1970	1959		1970		1959	1970
Average for the USSR	900	–	52.0	1.0	51.2	1.5	3.7	3.7
Russians	863	731	55.1	0.6	56.9	0.3	3.6	3.4
Ukrainians	714	696	55.6	0.5	66.4	0.3	3.5	3.4
Byelorussians	836	834	52.0	0.6	51.0	0.3	3.7	3.6
Lithuanians	823	803	55.8	0.8	57.4	0.4	3.6	3.4
Letts	612	613	69.2	0.3	68.5	0.0	3.1	3.1
Estonians	638	642	71.8	0.3	68.7	0.0	3.0	3.1
Moldavians	1190	944	48.8	1.6	40.0	2.4	3.9	3.9
Georgians	905	940	43.1	1.5	39.5	1.0	4.0	4.0
Armenians	1240	1436	31.9	4.5	27.0	3.2	4.7	4.7
Azerbaijanians	1740	1746	31.0	5.5	23.0	11.3	4.8	5.6
Kazakhs	1896	1300	34.2	3.3	24.3	11.9	4.6	5.5
Uzbeks	1878	1968	28.4	6.2	19.5	15.3	5.0	5.9
Turkmens	1810	1958	28.4	6.8	20.1	17.0	5.0	6.0
Tajiks	1782	2075	25.6	8.1	18.3	15.9	5.2	6.0
Kirghiz	1886	1630	34.4	3.5	24.0	11.4	4.5	5.5

Census, Estonians and Letts had the smallest average size of families and the least number of large families. Contrariwise, the Tajiks and Turkmens had the largest average family size, and at the same time a reduced percentage of small families and an increased percentage of large families.

In analysing the population dynamics from 1959 to 1970, it should first of all be noted that during that period the birthrate had decreased in all the Union republics except Tajikistan. In the RSFSR, the 1960-75 birthrate had declined by almost 10 per cent (Table 22); like formerly in Latvia and Estonia, the current trend in the Russian Federation is to have small families. This is especially characteristic of the Russian population, and it is noteworthy that, for the first time during the periods examined, the Russians showed an increase below the average USSR index. The same trend is observed among Ukrainians, Letts and Estonians, and the fact that their increase proved much lower than that of the Russian population may ostensibly be ascribed to ethnic mergers with Russians by small national minorities living among them, for instance Jews,

Mordvins, and Karelians, who continued to decrease in number, and also Komi, Udmurts and some other nationalities whose increase was lower than the average.

The slightly greater increase in the number of Byelorussians was due to the fact that some of residents of Byelorussia who previously called themselves Poles had now merged with the former.

By 1970, the birthrate in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan had fallen; however, in the given period, the Azerbaijanians and Kazakhs, and also all the indigenous peoples of the Central Asian Republics, had retained high rates of natural increase. As a result, the Uzbeks, whose population in 1939 was 1.7 times or 3.5 million less than the number of Byelorussians residing within the new frontiers, had now overtaken them to rank the third largest nation in the country after the Russians and Ukrainians (Table 20):

From 1959 to 1970, the average family size with most nations became either smaller or stayed at about the same level; at the same time, the percentage of large families (nine and more people) declined, while that of small families increased (Table 24). The only exceptions were Azerbaijanians, Kazakhs and the peoples of Central Asia, who showed a trend to have larger families. At the same time, the Uzbeks, Turkmens and especially the Tajiks showed a substantially higher birthrate, this being indicative of their continued adherence to the large-family tradition. In Russian, Moldavian, Kazakh and Kirghiz families, the birthrate had noticeably declined.

The highly different birthrates and natural increase indices for the peoples of the USSR had largely caused non-uniform population dynamics in 1970-79 as well. Russians, Ukrainians and other peoples from Union and autonomous republics of the European part of the USSR gave an increase below the average national figure; the only exceptions were Moldavians, Bashkirs, and especially the peoples from the autonomous regions of Northern Caucasus who continued to have a rather high birthrate. The Karelian, Mordvin and Veps populations continued to decrease because some of their communities were assimilated by Russians. The Jewish population strongly decreased; however, in addition to assimilation, this was caused by emigration. The rate of increase of the Buryat, Yakut and other indigenous populations from the Asian part of the RSFSR was generally low. The growth rates of the peoples of the Transcaucasus, especially of Azerbaijanians, have noticeably declined; however, they remain higher than the average for the USSR. The indigenous peoples of Central Asia are still characterised by high rates of increase. The Uzbek population, which even before 1970 ranked third among Soviet nationalities, in 1979 significantly exceeded the Byelorussian population. If such (or even slightly reduced) growth rates continue, the Uzbek population may in the foreseeable future become almost as numerous as the Ukrainian population.

The 25th Congress of the CPSU called upon scientists to study complex population problems, primarily those caused by intense regional and ethnic differences in birthrates and natural increase. The reduced birthrate among Russians, Ukrainians and most of the other peoples from the European part of the country has already resulted in a situation when there is a shortage of manpower in many regions, in some of which (e.g. Novgorod and Pskov regions) even the total number of inhabitants was noted to have decreased over the 1959-70 period. At the same time, surplus hands are growing in number in many farming districts of Central Asia, this being a sign of relative overpopulation. The economic aspects of the population issue are interwoven with its national aspects: the non-uniform growth of the populations of various Soviet nationalities leads to substantial changes in some of the major parameters of the country's national structure.

In examining the correlation between ethno-demographic processes and population dynamics, one must also take into account that registering the figures that reflect the quantitative aspect of ethnical processes on the basis of census materials is in itself essentially conventional, since the exceedingly complex and changing picture of ethnic existence involving a multistage gamut of ethnic transformation is tantamount to compiling a pre-established list of ethnonyms, both when establishing a given ethnical affiliation in the questionnaires and when processing and publishing the final results. At times, it is highly difficult to reflect one's actual ethnic state. For instance, a Karelian or a Chuvash who had for a long time lived among Russians and had forgotten his former language and culture may be aware of the fact that he had already essentially lost his former ethnic identity; however, at the same time, he may still not regard himself as a 'real' Russian. There are undoubtedly many hundreds of thousands or, perhaps, millions of Soviet citizens who are in that ethnically transitional state; however, there are still neither adequate 'intermediate' names for expressing it, nor broader supra-national terms that could reflect this important aspect in the forming of a new historical community of individuals, the Soviet people.

Chapter XII

ETHNIC PROCESSES IN THE USSR: COMMON AND SPECIFIC FEATURES

There are many common features inherent in the current ethnic processes in the USSR, primarily because of their common socio-economic and socio-political foundation within the framework of a single socialist state. Ethnic processes reflect the principal tendencies in the national development of the peoples of the USSR—their increasing prosperity and rapprochement. At the same time, traditions, economy, settlement, culture and other factors have meant that the ethnic processes characteristic of the different Soviet peoples are different, and manifest themselves with varying degrees of intensity. So it is best to examine ethnic processes in the USSR in order to reveal their common and specific features. In this connection, the following three principal variants in which these processes manifest themselves may be established: 1) in nations that had formed before the Great October Socialist Revolution; 2) in nations that formed in Soviet times without going through the stage of mature capitalism; and 3) in the socialist nationalities.

In the first case are those processes characteristic of East Slavonic, Baltic and Transcaucasian nations, i.e. of 80 per cent of the population of the USSR; in the second, they involve primarily the eastern regions, i.e. about 18 per cent, and in the third, about 2 per cent. Naturally, this classification is rather conventional; however, distinctive features can be seen in each of the above categories.

Let us first look at the ethnic processes in nations which had formed in pre-revolutionary Russia, nations which emerged on the basis of large ethnic communities. During the development of capitalist relations and closer economic ties, ethnographic differences within these bourgeois nations were somewhat blurred. It should be pointed out that changes in ethnically homogeneous communities have unfortunately been studied to a far lesser extent than the processes which occur when ethnoi interact. However, there is evidence showing that the transformation of bourgeois nations into socialist nations and the strengthening of their unity parallel to the advances in the socialist economy and culture have also

influenced their ethnic aspect.

Even the fully formed nations are usually to some extent classified into ethnographic, dialectical and local groups or separate historico-cultural divisions, and they have within their own milieu certain incompletely assimilated ethnic groups.

In fact, every ethnic community has its own relatively stable intrinsic ethnic structure (by this term we understand an historically established entity of part or individual ethnographic and historico-cultural divisions, and their correlation and interconnection within given ethnic formations). An ethnic structure is essentially the product of constant ethnic changes.

During the years of Soviet government there have been profound changes in the ethnic structure of nations that formed in pre-revolutionary Russia. The emergence of a socialist economy, the redistribution of the population between urban and rural areas and the growth of economic and cultural ties within various nations and between the population majority and the formerly isolated peripheral ethnographic and local historico-cultural groups all helped overcome the certain degree of alienation among all the ethnic divisions and strengthen the awareness of ethnic unity in nations. The tendency of alien ethnic groups interspersed among the large nations to merge with the latter also became stronger.

The processes involving changes in ethnic structure and the strengthening of unity can be seen very distinctly among the Russians, the largest nation in the USSR, as well as among the linguistical and culturally related Ukrainians and Byelorussians. As the East Slavonic peoples constitute 73 per cent of the total population of the USSR; hence, the ethnic processes involve almost three-quarters of the country's population.

There have also been profound changes in the intra-ethnic structure of the Russian nation in the process of its transformation and development into a socialist nation.

The growth of socialist industry and urbanisation, the extensive mechanisation of agriculture, and more intense migration accelerated obliteration of ethnographic and dialectal differences. Over the past decades, the discrepancies between the southern and northern Russian ethnographic areas have rapidly disappeared. Not long ago, the houses and other buildings, farming implements, women's clothing, decorative features, family structure, wedding ceremonies, oral poetry, etc. of the Russian population of the Novgorod, Archangel, Olonets, Vologda and other northern and north-eastern gubernias had considerably differed from those of the Russian population of the Orel, Kursk, Voronezh and other southern gubernias. All these features were stable and passed on from generation to generation.

With changes in the distribution of productive forces, with the industrial development of new regions, with the disappearance of

elements of subsistence economies, and with changes in the nature of family life, the old differences in many of the cultural traditions of the large ethnographic and local groups of Russians were largely blurred. At the same time, the diversity of dialects, somewhat characteristic of remote areas populated by Russians also disappeared. For example, great social and economic changes, as well as the influx of Russians from the Central Black-Earth areas, resulted in a situation when the Kuban Cossacks were no longer isolated.

In the Soviet period, peripheral ethnographic Russian groups such as the Pomors (inhabitants of the White and Barents sea shores), the former Old Believers of the Central Urals and Southern Siberia, and people of the old Russian communities in Northern Yakutia (near the Kolyma and Indigirka rivers), Magadan Region (Markovo) and Kamchatka, began to merge with the majority of the Russian people.

It should be pointed out that statistics generally do not reflect consolidations of ethnic groups—these processes are revealed only by ethnographic observations.

Industrialisation and the fundamental restructuring of agriculture influenced the development of the Russian nation. Its current ethnic development is characterised not only by consolidation, but by enlargement, for dispersed ethnic groups close to the Russians in culture and language are being diffused among the latter. In the central areas of the Russian Federation, in the Urals, and in Western and Eastern Siberia, Ukrainians and Byelorussians have merged with the predominantly Russian population. This is indoubtedly facilitated by the close linguistic and cultural kinship of the three East Slavonic peoples.

It should be noted that recent migrants from the Ukraine and Byelorussia, and residents of the old Ukrainian and Byelorussian communities in the Russian Federation are also merging with the Russians. Kulunda, a vast area in Siberia, was once settled primarily by Ukrainians; according to the 1926 Census, they constituted about half of Kulunda's population; by 1959, the figure in some Kulunda districts had dropped to 20-25 per cent.

Studies in several Siberian towns revealed that the overwhelming majority of children born to Ukrainian-Russian couples identify themselves as Russians. Between 1926 and 1959, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population of Siberia dropped by 50 and 80 per cent respectively.

The Finno-Ugric Vod and Izhora nationalities and the Teryukhans—an ethnographic Mordvin group of Gorky Region—have largely merged with the Russians, as have the Estonians of Pskov and Leningrad regions.

Many of the Vepses in Leningrad and Vologda regions have also become part of the Russian nation. The respective 1926, 1959 and 1970 censuses showed the Veps population to have declined from

32 800 to 16 400 and 8 200.

Territorially dispersed ethnic communities are gradually diffusing among Russians especially in urban areas. As they know the Russian language well and are culturally close to the Russians, some groups of Mordvins with roots in the Volga area and now residing in the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East have rapidly become assimilated in their Russian environment.

It should be pointed out that considerably more people have merged with Russians ethnically and culturally than the censuses indicate. For example, many Mordvins, Ukrainians, Jews, and Armenians living in predominantly Russian urban areas have long since ceased to use their mother tongue and practise their traditional culture, and are related by many links (kindred, cultural and neighbourly) to the population around them. Many of these groups have a dual ethnic awareness. When asked about their national identity, they usually indicate their specific ethnic origin, but also indicate their close affinity with the Russians.

As the largest people numerically in the USSR the Russians have a tremendous influence on the economic and cultural development of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. In Soviet times, economic, cultural and general contacts between Russians and the peoples of the Volga area, Siberia, the Caucasus and Central Asia have expanded tremendously. The Russian settlement area has virtually remained unchanged even though between 1926 and 1959 many workers, technicians, engineers and specialists had moved from the Russian Federation to other Union republics to work in the developing branches of the economy. In 1926, 5 per cent of the total Russian population lived outside the Russian Federation; in 1959 this figure had risen to 14.2 per cent. However, once the Union republics had trained enough of their own skilled personnel, the influx of Russians slowed down, but had not ceased. In 1970, 16.5 per cent of all Russians lived outside the Russian Federation.

In most Union republics, the majority of Russians are urban residents. Studies in the Ukraine and Moldavia show that many of the Russian population have cultural and blood ties with the surrounding people and work in multinational collectives.

It is characteristic that 135 000 Russians in the Ukraine identified Ukrainian as their native language. A 1971 ethnological and sociological study in Moldavia showed that 52 per cent of urban Russian residents know Moldavian, and 7 per cent of them call it their mother tongue. About 60 per cent of the Russians residing in Kishinev and medium-size Moldavian towns have blood relationships with people of other nationalities. However, the old rural Russian communities, which appeared in Moldavia in the 17th and 18th centuries are developing in a somewhat different way.

In recent decades, the number of marriages between Russians and

people of other nationalities has increased in all the Union republics.

Thus, the development of the Russian socialist nation is taking place in a situation in which individual, formerly isolated Russian ethnographic groups have come closer together; at the same time, the small nationalities and dispersed ethnic groups are merging with the Russians. The result is that the Russians and the peoples of all the Union and autonomous republics come closer together.

Ukrainian ethnic development is indicative in many respects. The Ukrainian nation formed prior to the Revolution. During the years of Soviet government, with the abolition of the exploiting classes, the construction of a socialist economy and the general cultural advance, it became socially homogeneous. The further consolidation of the Ukrainian socialist nation has undoubtedly been promoted by growth of local national skilled personnel. In 1960, about 70 per cent of the republic's working class were Ukrainians. Industrialisation resulted in the extensive migration of Ukrainians inside the Ukraine. Over half the Ukrainian population is now urban, whereas in the pre-revolutionary period approximately 80 per cent of the population was rural.

Differences between Ukrainian territorial dialects have become less marked; this has been due to the growing social functions of the Ukrainian language, which was introduced in teaching at schools, in higher education, and in the press.

The internal ethnic structure of the Ukrainian nation has also changed. A noteworthy development was the accelerated disappearance of cultural and general differences among the people living in the principal central, southern, eastern and south-western ethnographic regions. Each of these major provinces formerly had its own specific clothing, diet and house-building styles. Rapid economic development and the overall improvement of material and cultural standards in the Ukraine helped to gradually level out these local features, although in some regions such as Polesye, many ethnographic particularities continue to persist because of specific natural conditions and distinctive social and economic development.

After the Western Ukrainian lands were reunited with the Ukraine in 1939, the general process of consolidation also began to involve the West Ukrainians, such as the Gutsuls, Lemks and Boiks. At present, these nationalities consider their distinctive cultural features to be local ethnographic rather than ethnic. Today, the different Ukrainian groups have a uniform socialist culture.

A feature of the Ukrainian districts with ethnically mixed populations is their language assimilation process. According to the 1970 Census, over 400 000 people of various nationalities identified Ukrainian as their native language. Other ethnic groups, such as the Bulgarians, have begun to draw closer to the Ukrainians increasingly quickly.

Most non-Ukrainian and non-Russian ethnic groups in the Ukraine are trilingual: they know Ukrainian, Russian and their own language. There are more and more marriages between people of these groups and Ukrainians; at the same time Russians are intensively mixing with Ukrainians in predominantly Russian communities surrounded by Ukrainian villages.

Inter-ethnic integration processes are very distinct in the Ukraine. The mutual influence and interaction of the Ukrainian and Moldavian cultures (265 000 Moldavians live in the Ukraine) have deepened and expanded. Under Soviet government, the Ukrainians' co-operation with Russians and the other peoples of the USSR in science, technology, literature and the arts has expanded tremendously, largely because of the role played by Russian, the language of communication among the Soviet nationalities. According to the 1970 Census, 36.3 per cent of all Ukrainians residing in the Ukraine spoke Russian fluently. But practice shows that many more Ukrainians than that have a workable knowledge of Russian.

Because of the socialist economic requirements of building new industries in the eastern areas of the USSR and developing the virgin lands, Ukrainian migration to other republics has increased. Over 5 000 000 Ukrainians now live outside the Ukraine. In the Russian Federation, Moldavia and Byelorussia, they comprise 2.6, 14 and 2 per cent respectively of the total population. This helps in drawing Ukrainians closer to the peoples from other cultural and historical regions of the USSR.

The ethnic unity of the Byelorussians has grown notably in Soviet times. The Byelorussian nation, which occupied a compact territory, was distinguished by its ethnic and cultural unity even before socialist changes were introduced, and this unity grew stronger once the exploiting classes were done away with and socialist statehood established; other factors instrumental in consolidating Byelorussian unity were economic growth and mass education. As a result, the people became increasingly conscious of their national identity, and local self-identification which was partially due to the fact that the Byelorussians had been carved up and belonged to various states, disappeared. The mass break with religion also undoubtedly heightened the consolidation of Byelorussian ethnic unity. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the majority of Byelorussians belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church, while those living in the western regions were Roman Catholics and Uniates. To some extent these differences helped divide Byelorussians, who occasionally regarded them as ethnic. For instance, there were relatively few marriages between Uniate and Orthodox Byelorussians. The reunification of the Western and Eastern Byelorussian lands in 1939 resulted in the intensive consolidation of the Byelorussian people and subsequently promoted the greater unity of the Byelorussian socialist nation.

Postwar industrial development in Byelorussia, the growth of the Byelorussian working class, increasing urbanisation and migration, both urban and rural, not only eliminated the former class differences in clothing and housing and the archaic forms of material culture, but caused local ethnographic traditions in everyday life to disappear as well. Today, former differences in the material culture of the Byelorussians from the Dnieper area and the south-western and north-eastern regions have almost vanished. The result is that Tatars, Jews, Gypsies and other nationalities living in the republic have drawn closer to the Byelorussians.

National culture is also increasingly drawing closer to the culture of other Soviet peoples, especially Russian and Ukrainian. Seventy-seven per cent of Byelorussians residing in the republic know at least some Russian. Most urban Byelorussians regard Byelorussian as their mother tongue, but use Russian in public life. Mixed marriages have also become frequent in Byelorussia.

In the course of industrialisation, Byelorussian workers, technicians and engineers were involved in the economic development of the country as a whole, and now 1 642 000 Byelorussians live outside the Byelorussian SSR.

The Moldavian socialist nation has also achieved a significant degree of ethnic unity in Soviet times. With the founding in 1924 of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic west of Dniester, agriculture was reorganised on a socialist basis and there was rapid industrial development in the districts compactly populated by Moldavians. At the same time, literacy became widespread (in 1897, 73.8 per cent of inhabitants of Bessarabia were illiterate). As a result, Soviet Moldavians not only broke out of their former isolation, but made significant cultural advances.

When in 1940 Bessarabia was reunited with the Soviet Union and the Moldavian SSR was proclaimed the way opened for unifying the Moldavian people. Moldavia's postwar progress was characterised by rapid industrial development featuring the construction of big engineering, electrotechnical and instrument-making enterprises and large power plants. As a result, not only did the Moldavian working class grow quantitatively, but the percentage of skilled labour in the overall work force increased greatly. Today, the figure is 30.9 per cent of the 20-24 age group. Urbanisation had a definite influence on the Moldavian socialist nation. Large rural-urban (in Kishinev, the republic's capital, about 58 per cent of all specialists with higher education and 30 per cent with secondary education are of rural origin) and urban-rural migration (where 22.1 per cent of all specialists with higher education and 20 per cent with secondary education are of urban origin) by Moldavians is indicative of the fact that Moldavia's indigenous population has become very mixed.

Moldavian migrations are also characterised by major movement

within their republic. Because of industrial development the population has to some extent concentrated in the central regions, which is leading to the disappearance of differences in the traditional cultures of the Moldavians east and west of the Dniester.

The greater unity of the Moldavian nation is being promoted by the growing functions of standard Moldavian, a language that can be used in all spheres of public life in Moldavia. The spread of standard Moldavian also helps overcome differences in the local dialect.

The cultural levels of the urban and rural population in Moldavia are gradually levelling out. The fact that the rural population is slightly less educated is explained by the low educational level of older rural residents.

The results of the 1971 ethnological and sociological studies in Moldavia showed that the entire Moldavian people, both urban and rural, indulge, although in varying degrees, in the cinema, TV, radio, and reading. All this is indicative of the intensive consolidation and further development of the Moldavian socialist nation.

At the same time, the Moldavians are drawing closer to the other nations and nationalities of the USSR. Contacts in Moldavia between people of various Soviet nationalities have increased greatly over the past decades; 80 per cent of the Moldavians and 96 per cent of Russians living in Moldavian towns, work in multinational collectives. As early as in 1967, there were people of 24 nationalities working at the Kishinev Tractor Plant. Many of Moldavia's large collective and state farms are also multinational. The above-mentioned 1971 ethnological and sociological study showed that in Kishinev 50 per cent of the Moldavians and 60 per cent of the Russians polled had close relatives married to people of other nationalities—the figure in medium-size towns was 57 per cent for Moldavians and Russians.

Russian, the language of communication for all Soviet peoples, is now used extensively among Moldavians: the 1970 Census showed that 36 per cent of the Moldavians were fluent in Russian. In fact, however, the percentage of Moldavians with an adequate knowledge of Russian is far higher than the census indicates. Knowledge of Russian gives Moldavians access to the rich culture of the Russian and other fraternal peoples of the USSR. Translations into Russian of works by Moldavian authors have also become the legacy of all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Thus, the development of the Moldavian nation also distinctly reveals two interrelated trends—that of internal ethnic consolidation and of general Soviet integration.

Complex ethnic processes are taking place in Transcaucasia. The feudal heritage, specific natural and geographical conditions and other factors have resulted in the Tanscaucasian nations being ethnically less consolidated than the East Slavonic nations. The profound

changes brought about by the Great October Socialist Revolution, the acquisition of national statehood, the overcoming of economic backwardness and the abolition of the exploiting classes helped consolidate the ethnic unity of the Transcaucasian nations; ethnographic particularities of some local divisions have been gradually disappearing and the large nations, small nationalities and ethnic groups of related origin are drawing closer together.

As the Georgian socialist nation further consolidates ethnographic differences between local Georgian groups are disappearing: the ethnic group forming the nucleus of the Georgian nation and the mountaineers are continuing to draw closer together.

The Kartvel peoples are also becoming more and more integrated, and the Georgians are absorbing the Mingrelians, Svans and Lazes, the vast majority of whom know Georgian. However, in their daily life, they use the Mingrelian, Svan and Laz languages. These sections of the Georgian population combine bilingualism with a 'two-level' ethnic self-awareness. Most Mingrelians, Svans and Lazes identify themselves as Georgians, but at the same time still consider themselves to belong to those formerly alienated groups which are now part of the Georgian nation.

Small peoples of other language groups, such as the Tsova-Tushins, are also being integrated with the Georgians. And some South Ossetians living in Georgia outside their autonomous region have been coming closer to the Georgians.

The development of the Armenian socialist nation has also witnessed the further consolidation of certain ethnic and local groups of the Armenian people and the elimination of differences in dialect. A distinctive feature in the current ethnic development of the Armenian nation is that nearly 100 000 repatriates, primarily from the Mediterranean countries, returned after World War II. In recent decades, the Armenian population of the USSR has considerably increased; however, fewer Armenians now live outside the Armenian SSR because those who once lived elsewhere in the Soviet Union have returned to Armenia.

Consolidation trends are also characteristic of the ethnic development of the Azerbaijan socialist nation. Formerly alienated ethnic groups such as the Airums, who live along the frontier with Armenia, and the Padars and Shakhsevens, former nomads who settled in the southern steppe regions of Azerbaijan, are merging with the majority of the Azerbaijanians; the cultural and general features which formerly distinguished them from Azerbaijanians are now disappearing. The Iranian-lingual Tats and Talyshes are also increasingly integrating with Azerbaijanians; all Talyshes, incidentally know Azerbaijanian and receive their schooling in that language. However, they still retain certain specifics in clothing, housing and family customs. The Lezghins, Avars and Tsakhurs residing in Azerbaijan are also drawing

closer to the Azerbaijanians, although they still retain their national awareness, language and culture.

The ethnic development of the Transcaucasian nations cannot be reduced to the mere strengthening of their internal unity; there are also the increasingly diverse relations among the nations living in Transcaucasia and their expanding links with all the other peoples of the USSR. More intense contacts promote cultural exchanges, internationalisation in daily life, and the gradual dying off of archaic kinds of traditional customs.

The expansion of economic and cultural contacts has led to a considerable spread of bilingualism: in the 1970 Census, 30.1 per cent of the Armenians, 21.3 per cent of the Georgians and 16.1 per cent of Azerbaijanians indicated that they spoke Russian fluently. Because of the national homogeneity characteristic of each Transcaucasian Union republic, marriages within a single nation are more frequent than otherwise, but the growing contacts between ethnic groups have led to an increasing number of mixed marriages, both between people of the Transcaucasian nations themselves and between them and Russians. A comprehensive ethnological and sociological study in Georgia showed that over 45 per cent of rural residents and 60-70 per cent of the intellectuals polled had relatives of other nationalities.

Socialist reforms promoted the further consolidation of the internal unity of the Lettish, Estonian and Lithuanian nations which had evolved in the second half of the 19th century.

Before 1940, i.e. when Latvia was still capitalist, the people of the large historico-cultural regions of Vidzeme, Zemgale, Kurzeme and Latgale retained their specific dialects and specific features of everyday life and traditional culture. Once Soviet government was restored in 1940, urbanisation spread rapidly in Latvia as a result of the rapid growth of socialist industry. The organisation of co-operative farming and the replacement of isolated farmsteads by collective and state farm communities did away with the former isolation of Letts in their everyday life. Their traditional material culture became modified and modernised. Specific ethnographic features that previously characterised the four large Lettish regions disappeared. Standard Lettish which spread through compulsory universal secondary education, and the rapid development of the press, help eliminate dialects. This leads to rapid disappearance of former cultural differences between certain local Lettish divisions. And the Livs, a small Finnic group, are finally assimilated by the Letts.

Relations between Letts and the old Russian and Byelorussian communities in Eastern Latvia have changed. The sphere of communication between these formerly isolated groups, which strictly retained their own customs, and the Letts has broadened. Common economic and social activity has led to frequent mixed marriages.

The ethnic development of the Lithuanian people since Soviet government was restored in the Baltic republics was fairy similar to that of the Letts. Ethnographic differences between the Lithuanians of the Aukštaitija, Žemaitija and Zanemanja regions were rapidly eliminated in Soviet times. Now formerly alienated groups of old rural Russian and Byelorussian communities, as well as local Karaimes are getting closer to the Lithuanians.

The Estonians are ethnically the most homogeneous of the Soviet Baltic nations. Standard Estonian is now solidly established throughout the republic, and is causing the last remaining differences in dialect to disappear. Fairly recently, the so-called Setu, a small ethnographic group in South-East Estonia, differed from the Estonian majority, as their daily life and culture retained distinctive features which reflected considerable Russian influence. But the Setu are gradually becoming less alienated. At the same time, the cultural specifics of the Estonian population of former historico-cultural subregions (Northern, Southern, Western and Insular) are gradually disappearing.

In the Soviet period, the ethnic development of the Estonian people has been characterised by erasure of social differences in clothing and housing. Estonian literature and the Estonian theatre have achieved considerable success. All this strengthens the unity of the Estonian socialist nation. At the same time, the Estonians' economic and cultural ties with their closest neighbours, the Letts and Russians, as well as with other fraternal Soviet peoples, are becoming stronger. This is expressed in the mutual enrichment and mutual penetration of cultures, and in the exchange of specialists and skilled workers.

In the Baltic Union republics, many of the indigenous people (from 29 per cent in Estonia to 45 per cent in Latvia), speak fluent Russian, as well as their mother tongue. In the recent decades mixed marriages among Lithuanians, Letts and Estonians have been increasingly frequent.

Thus, the internal ethnic structure of bourgeois nations changes as they become socialist nations. The local isolation and ethnic alienation of peripheral groups are being overcome, dialectal differences erased, and the local ethnic narrowness disappearing; in other words, it is a profound process of consolidation. Scattered ethnic groups and national minorities are dissolved within large nations. At the same time, the socialist nations become increasingly closer in all areas of life.

Within nations which formed in Soviet times ethnic processes have been of a somewhat different nature. The ending of all forms of national oppression by the Great October Socialist Revolution, the creation of national statehood, the rapid rates of economic development in formerly backward peripheral areas, socialist industria-

lisation and the restructuring of agriculture, and the cultural revolution opened the way for the peoples inhabiting the outlying areas of the former Russian Empire to evolve into nations. Although those peoples had to one extent or another been involved in the all-Russia market system, they still had not been touched by industrial capitalism. Up till the October Socialist Revolution, their mode of life was either feudal or semi-feudal, and retained much of the tribal heritage. For this reason, their ethnic unity was weak.

National development in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Eastern Siberia, the Northern Caucasus and in parts of the Volga area was also considerably accelerated by socialist changes, which naturally led to fundamental ethnical changes. There are many specific features in the consolidation process within the Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, Kirghiz and Kazakh socialist nations. These nations formed on the basis of nationalities which had emerged long ago, but because of specific historical conditions possessed highly complex ethnic structures, in some cases encumbered by vestiges of tribal division.

For instance, the Uzbeks began to evolve into a nation prior to the October Socialist Revolution. However, the Turks, Kipchaks and Kuramas, three ethnographic groups which numbered from 20 000 to 60 000 people, spoke Uzbek and did not essentially differ from the Uzbek majority, they were to some extent alienated and had specific features in their everyday life and culture, as well as their own tribal self-identification. Some Uzbek groups called themselves by the name of the locality where they lived. Others, such as the Naimans, Mangyts, Kongrats, etc., retained tribal divisions and tribal self-identification. After separate Union republics were established in 1924-25 in Central Asia, the process of national consolidation of certain Uzbek ethnographic groups close in origin became increasingly strong. During socialist construction, in which stronger economic ties were formed, the irrigation system was rebuilt, and overall living standards were improved, progressive cultural elements that some ethnographic groups had developed began to evolve into common national features. The spread of the Uzbek standard language once vernacular schooling had been introduced for children and the spread of common cultural features led to the intensive integration of those Uzbek-speaking groups with the Uzbek majority; as a result, they became solidly aware of their Uzbek identity. Non-Uzbek-speaking Arabs and Fergana Uigurs living among the Uzbeks, as well as the scattered Kara-Kalpak groups living outside their autonomous republic, were also integrating with the Uzbeks.

There were also significant ethnic changes in other Central Asian republics as the socialist nations formed.

The Turkmens travelled a complex road of ethnic development in Soviet years. In the 1920s, the division into tribal groups like the Tekins, Yomuds, Saryks, Ersaris, Chaudors, and Goklens, and the smal-

ler Nukhurlis, Etas and others still prevailed. In turn, tribes were split into even smaller divisions which totalled several hundred. Often some tribes were hostile to each other because of claims to pasture land and water sources. Ethnic parcellation influenced Turkmen national consciousness. Each tribal group regarded itself alone as genuine Turkmens. Tribal differences could be seen in female clothing, housing, carpet-weaving, etc.

The creation of national states following the Revolution, the abolition of common law, and the organisation of co-operatives inflicted a crushing blow on the archaic tribal structure.

In the new economic conditions, once tribal division had lost its former significance, the overall cultural level had risen, and nomad cattle-raisers had settled down, tribal divisions faded away. Many of the progressive cultural elements of some larger tribes became national.

As they overcame tribal alienation, the broad masses of Turkmens became firmly conscious of their national identity. This was promoted by industrialisation and by the growth of towns. The small groups of Kurds, Uigurs, Baluchis and Jemshids who adopted the Turkmen language and culture drew closer to and merged with the Turkmens.

There have been major ethnic changes over the past decades in Tajikistan as well. Only recently, the Tajiks were distinctly subdivided into mountaineers and plainsmen. As far as their economy and everyday life was concerned, the latter were close to the Uzbeks; they were also the most numerous. The several hundred thousand mountain Tajiks had a different kind of economy, specific archaic forms of material culture, archaic elements in their social system. The spread of literacy, overall cultural progress brought about by industrialisation and the restructuring of agriculture drew the two groups closer together.

Formerly alienated lingual ethnographic groups, such as the Yagnobs, the small Pamir nationalities (the Yazgulems, Rushans, Bajuis, Khufs, Shugnans, Ishkashims, and Vakhans), began to merge with Tajiks at an increasingly rapid pace.

The Tajik language and Tajik material culture began to spread among the Yagnobs and the small Pamir nationalities. In the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, Tajik is used at schools, for radio broadcasts and local newspapers, and is one of the official languages generally. The Pamir languages (Shugnan, Rushan, Yazgulem, and Ishkashim) have become 'domestic', and are now used only in daily life. The gradual affiliation with the Tajiks can be seen in the national consciousness of the Pamir population, which has assumed a dual character: they regard themselves as Tajiks, but indicate their own specific language as their mother tongue.

The abolition of the feudal economic system resulted in closer

ties between separate local groups of Tajik plainsmen as well. Territorial, economic and political communities slowed down the consolidation of local groups. The Tajiks called themselves according to the areas of settlement (Garm, Kulyab, Ghissar, Bukhara, etc.) and the ties between them were extremely weak. Before the Revolution, trade in kind was practised in some regions. But, as Tajikistan developed into an industrial and agrarian republic, as standard Tajik developed, modern Tajik began to take over from local dialects.

National minorities in Tajikistan also make an important contribution to the republic's cultural and economic development. Work brings them into closer contact with the Tajiks. The Tajik-speaking Bukhara Jews, Baluchis and some Central Asian Arabs are gradually integrating with the Tajiks.

Kirghiz ethnic development has been very distinctive. The Kirghiz were once ethnically subdivided into the southern group (including the Fergana Valley and the Pamirs), the northern group (the Tien-Shan and the Chu and Talas river valleys) and the north-western group (Chatkaya), while the Kirghiz language comprised four groups of dialects. The Kirghiz people's ethnical character was also influenced by economic isolation and tribal alienation.

The formation of the Kirghiz SSR and the organisation of farming co-operatives, which put an end to nomad and semi-nomad cattle-raising radically changed the life of the Kirghiz people. The emergence of collective- and state-farm villages and the growth of urban centres, as well as large migration, helped eliminate prior ethnographic differences in the culture of certain local Kirghiz groups. Tribal divisions ceased to exist, since they lost any real significance in both economic and social life. The development of standard Kirghiz, its introduction as a language of teaching, and its use in publishing accelerated the erasure of differences between the northern and southern groups of dialects.

Ethnically, the development of the Kazakhs was much the same as that of the peoples of Central Asia. The Kazakh people, who occupied a vast territory with diverse physico-geographic conditions, were distinguished by cultural homogeneity. The Kazakh language was also a single language. Yet, the prevalence of subsistence economy, the alienation of the villages, and the division into tribal groups sapped the Kazakhs' ethnic unity.

As national statehood was being created, along with industrialisation and the organisation of farming co-operatives, tribal divisions were eliminated, and the unity of the Kazakhs as a socialist nation strengthened. Once it became a standard language, spoken Kazakh evolved into a common national tongue. Kazakh is a language of instruction, and is used at primary, secondary and higher school. The formation of the Kazakh SSR, the overall rise in cultural standards, and the formation of common features in Kazakh culture streng-

thened their national consciousness.

The creation of Soviet national statehood in Central Asia and Kazakhstan abolished the causes of many national contradictions and strengthened friendship among the peoples of that vast region. There are large Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar communities in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and large Russian, Ukrainian and Uzbek communities in Kirghizia, Tajikistan and Turkmenia. According to the 1970 Census, 41 per cent of the indigenous population of Kazakhstan are fluent in Russian; the respective figures for Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan are 19, 16, 15 and 13 per cent.

Somewhat similar, although specific, ethnic processes developed among some peoples of Eastern and Southern Siberia as they evolved into socialist nations. Three relatively small socialist nations—the Buryats, Yakuts and Tuvinians—have evolved in Soviet times in that sparsely-populated land. Like the peoples of Central Asia, the peoples of Siberia did not experience industrial capitalism. In Buryatia and Yakutia, economic and cultural ties between individual regions were extremely weak. Furthermore, the local and ethnographic tribal Yakut and Buryat divisions were very alienated.

The abolition of all forms of national oppression by the October Revolution brought the peoples of Siberia into the modern era. Generous aid by the more developed peoples of the USSR enabled them to restructure their economy and culture. Socialist industrialisation, the restructuring of agriculture, and cultural progress resulted in vast and complex ethnic changes among the peoples of Siberia. At the time the socialist changes began, the Buryat language was broken down into several dialects (Khorin, Selenga, Tsongal, Tupkin, etc.) which differed in vocabulary and phonetics. The Mongol writing system, based on vertical graphemes, catered to the Lamaist cult and was difficult for the people to grasp.

The elaboration in the 1920s of a Buryat writing system initially on the basis of the Latin alphabet and then on the Russian alphabet, and the creation, on the basis of the Khorin dialect, of a standard Buryat language resembling the spoken language, were major events which had a great impact on the consolidation of Buryat unity. The subsequent introduction of Buryat as the language of teaching, the publication of newspapers and books in it, and its use in broadcasting helped to erase the differences in dialect. The socialist restructuring of agriculture and the organisation of large farming co-operatives enabled nomad Buryats to settle down. The consistent expansion of cultivated areas, the development of virgin lands, and the changeover in some regions from primitive cattle-raising to the stall-camp system, as well as extensive industrial development in the republic, helped to raise the material standards of the Buryats. All this, plus the emergence of large Buryat settlements attracting people from small villages, undermined the archaic tribal structure. The division

into exogamic groups, which the Czarist government artificially preserved for fiscal purposes, no longer had any significance in the new economic and social conditions. Along with the Buryats' gaining Soviet national autonomy, the development of their national literature and the emergence of professional arts, theatre and music, this helped strengthen Buryat national consciousness. It should be pointed out that large groups of Buryats live outside their autonomous republic in the Aginsk Buryat Autonomous Area in the Chita Region and in the Ust-Ordynsky Buryat Autonomous Area in Irkutsk Region, and all three groups maintain close cultural ties.

Ethnically, the consolidation of the Buryat nation is expressed not only in certain ethnic groups overcoming their former alienation, but also in the integration with Buryats of the so-called Tungus horsemen, who adopted the Buryat language long ago. According to the 1959 Census the majority of Tungus horsemen identified themselves as Buryats. Overall, the unity of the Buryat ethnos has strengthened in Soviet times, while the Buryats have developed increasingly closer ties with other Soviet nations. Of the 178 000 Buryats living in the Buryat ASSR, 95.6 per cent have indicated Buryat as their native tongue; at the same time, 64.9 per cent of them speak Russian fluently. A sociological survey revealed that 10 per cent of Buryat children are bilingual from infancy. So although Buryat is widely used in everyday life, it is Russian that is mainly used in the social and cultural spheres, especially in the towns.

The Yakuts have travelled a long path of ethnic development during the Soviet period. Yakutia changed from a backward outlying region of Czarist Russia to become in Soviet times a republic with a developed mining industry and large-scale agricultural production. The departure from semi-nomad life and primitive subsistence economy, the organisation of scattered farmsteads and small villages into large communities, and the overcoming of alienated domestic life have destroyed the tribal forms of national consciousness and the very division into tribes. Young people usually have no idea of what tribe their parents belonged to and exogamic taboos no longer exist.

Former ethnographic differences between the central Yakuts (inhabiting the Lena-Amga interfluvial area) and those from the Vilyui, Verkhoyansk, Kolyma and Olekma areas have been overcome during socialist construction. The northern reindeer-breeding Yakuts, whose mode of life was more like that of the nomad Evenks than it was of the semi-nomad cattle-raising Yakuts, are rapidly drawing closer to the Yakut majority and losing their distinctive ethnographic features.

Some Yakut-speaking Evenks and Evens who live among a predominantly Yakut environment are drawing closer to and partially merging with Yakuts. Facilitating the ethnic consolidation of the Yakut nation is the fact that the Yakut language has no dialects.

Once the Yakut writing system was elaborated in 1922, instruction in the vernacular could be introduced not only in primary, but in incomplete secondary schools as well. Language unity accelerated the formation of Yakut literature and the Yakut theatre. The Yakuts now have a comprehensively developed culture, which is the common legacy of the small Yakut nation.

The Yakuts' ties with their neighbours are also becoming closer. A socio-linguistic survey showed that the majority (98 per cent) of the Yakuts had adopted Yakut their native language. However, when they communicate with people of other nationalities, they usually use Russian; the use of the vernacular then drops to 0.9 per cent.

The Tuvinians are also going through a process of consolidation.

Essentially similar consolidative processes are taking place in the Northern Caucasus as socialist nations are evolving. The establishment of autonomous areas, the socialist restructuring of the economy of the indigenous population, and urbanisation have accelerated the ethnic development of the peoples of the region. The indigenous people were not affected by industrial capitalism: the long-standing feudal traditions had resulted in the great alienation of individual ethnographic divisions. During socialist construction, this alienation was overcome, the ethnic development of the Ossetians being exemplary in this respect. In Soviet time, alienated local groups, the so-called Ossetian societies, were consolidated within the framework of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The two principal Ossetian ethnic divisions—the Digors (in the western part of the republic) and the Irons (eastern)—also drew closer together. Standard Ossetian, which is developing on the basis of the Ironian dialect, has now become prevalent. The introduction of modern culture into daily Ossetian life, the abandonment of archaic fortified settlements, and the loosening adherence to religion (most Ossetians professed Christianity; some Islam) has promoted ethnic consolidation. The development of many peoples in the Northern Caucasus, such as the Kabardinians, Balkars, Karachais, Chechens and Ingushes, is indicative of the ethnic processes that take place during the formation of socialist nationalities.

Ethnic processes among some peoples of the Volga area are similar to the consolidative processes characteristic of ethnic groups whom industrial capitalism did not touch.

Because of the hodgepodge ethnic settlement the Volga peoples had long been isolated, and the economic and cultural ties between certain local and ethnographic groups of Mordvins, Mari, Udmurts and Chuvashes with Russians, and between Bashkirs and Tatars, were more stable than those among their own peoples.

Consequently, development in the Volga area of capitalist relations helped more to erase local specifics and draw the indigenous peoples of the Volga area closer to the Russians than it did to create

their own economy and culture.

In Soviet times, the abolition of exploiting classes and the creation of national statehood served as strong stimuli for the evolution of socialist nations in the Volga area. National cultures are rapidly developing and socialist nations are evolving within the Volga autonomies. At the same time, these factors somewhat complicated the consolidation of the Volga nations.

Under Soviet government, the systematic development of virgin lands and mineral resources in the Volga-Kama basin and the building of industry and roads attracted a new influx of migrants to the region from central Russia; the indigenous population also became more mobile. All this intensified the age-old processes of ethnic interaction.

For example, the development and consolidation of the Mordvin socialist nation can be seen within the Mordovian ASSR. Economic development, the Mordvin people's overcoming of their former backwardness and the founding of the Mordovian ASSR resulted in closer cultural relations between the Moksha and Erzya, the two Mordvin ethnic divisions, although it did not lead to the merger of the Mordvin languages. The Moksha and Erzya standard languages have evolved, which are approximately as closely related as Russian and Ukrainian. Both are used for teaching in junior grades. Books are also published in these languages. Mordvin national culture, including various forms of arts, is also developing.

Similar features can be observed in the ethnic development of the Mari, Udmurts, and Chuvashes. In certain areas of this historical and cultural region, ethnic assimilation occurred along with the consolidative processes.

Thus, in 1959, only 28 per cent of the country's Mordvins lived within the Mordovian ASSR, where they constituted 35 per cent of the population. Almost 22 per cent of the Mordvins (2.6 per cent in the autonomous republic) had ceased to use their language. Despite the high natural growth rates in their principal areas of settlement the number of Mordvins fell by 11 per cent between 1939 and 1959, as a result of mixed marriages and the loss of their sense of national identity as Mordvins by some groups. The 1970 Census showed that the Mordvin population had further decreased, albeit insignificantly (by 1.7 per cent).

The modern ethnic development of the Tatars also has distinctive features. The Tatars who had settled in the Volga area before the October Socialist Revolution had formed a bourgeois nation, which during its development into a socialist nation became considerably more united. (According to the 1970 Census, there were 1 536 000 Tatars in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.) The Tatar-speaking population of the Volga area was subdivided into several groups with a sense of dual ethnic identity. The western part

of the Volga area was inhabited by Mishari Tatars; the Kazan Tatars included the Kryashens; and the Nagaibak Tatars lived in Bashkiria (the latter two groups were converted to Orthodox Christianity, and this had an impact on their national consciousness).

The development of Tatar socialist culture and a standard language based on the Kazan dialect resulted in a merger of Tatar dialects. The 1939 Census revealed that the Mishars, Kryashens and Nagaibaks had a common Tatar national consciousness.

Outside the Tatar ASSR, the Tatars are drawing closer to other peoples. For example, in Central Asia 11 000 Tatars have indicated Uzbek as their native language, and in Kazakhstan, 8 000 Tatars call Kazakh their native language. Over 7 per cent of all Tatars consider Russian to be their native language. More and more Tatars are marrying Russians and people of other nationalities. However, it should be taken into consideration that censuses classify many Turkic ethnic groups as Tatars, despite the fact that many of them differ from the Kazan Tatars in origin, culture and customs. These groups of Tatars, mainly the Siberian and Astrakhan Tatars, are developing as separate ethnic communities. For example, the West Siberian Tatars (approximately 300 000 in all) retain their specific lingual and cultural features. Yet they do not form a compactly united ethnic mass in any area, and live in individual groups surrounded by Russians. As a result, closer relations and ultimate merging with Russians has become the principal trend in their ethnic development.

Generally speaking, the ethnic processes within socialist nations which formed in Soviet times manifest themselves in the accelerated development of national languages, in the obliteration of differences in dialect, in the spread of professional forms of national culture, in the profound changes in their ethnic fabric, in the elimination of the vestiges of tribal organisation and in the overcoming of the alienation of certain ethnographic and local groups, and the supplanting of tribal or local awareness by national consciousness. Some nationalities and national minorities have merged with the national majority.

Ethnic processes in communities which have evolved into socialist nationalities are distinguished by distinctive traits and profound changes both in the ethnic features themselves and in ethnic awareness.

Before the October Socialist Revolution, there were relatively small ethnic communities comprising several alienated tribes and ethnographic and local groups barely linked with each other in certain outlying regions of the country, primarily in the remote northern taiga and tundra zones hard to reach, and southern mountain and desert areas.

The consolidative processes taking place in certain mountain regions of the Northern Caucasus are important for characterising the

ethnic processes that occur when socialist nationalities evolve. In the course of the socialist restructuring of the political, economic and cultural life of the mountain peoples, ethnic alienation is being overcome through eliminating their isolation.

These tendencies show most distinctly in Daghestan, an Autonomous Republic with over thirty nationalities. The consolidation of the socialist economy and the extensive measures to raise the cultural standards of the indigenous population resulted primarily in a situation in which the alienation of local dialect groups within certain nationalities began to disappear rapidly.

One example is the Laks, a relatively large people in Daghestan. According to the 1970 Census, they numbered 72 000. Industrial development in the areas where they lived caused a large migration from the mountains to the plains; the subsequent expansion of Lak villages blurred the ethnographic differences between local groups, as well as the tribal division and the patriarchal tribal heritage. A single standard language formed on the basis of the Kumukh dialect is now taking over from the Vitskhin, Vikhlin, Ashtikulin and Balkar dialects of the Lak language. All this strengthens common Lak consciousness; the Laks are now developing as a separate socialist nationality.

Equally characteristic is the consolidation of certain groups of related nationalities in Daghestan. The formation of the Avar socialist nationality (396 000), the largest nationality in Daghestan, also deserves mention. In Soviet times, linguists created an Avar writing system, and Avar literature was also born. This meant that children in the junior grades of Avar schools could be taught in their native language. The continuing consolidation of the territorial and economic ties between individual areas of Daghestan has accelerated the integration with the Avars of 13 neighbouring nationalities from the Ando-Cesian group, numbering between several thousand and several hundred. These groups now extensively use the Avar language, which is also a language of teaching; however, in everyday life, they speak their own language, and this has a definite imprint on their national consciousness.

Related nationalities are also consolidating around the Darghins, the second largest people in Daghestan (in 1970, there were 231 000 Darghins in the USSR, 208 000 of them in the autonomous republic itself). Small neighbouring peoples are gradually merging with the Darghins as well. The Kaitags and Kubachins (14 500 and 2 300 respectively, according to the 1926 Census), who have close territorial, lingual and cultural ties with the Darghins, now use the Darghin standard language. Their own linguistic features have gradually disappeared, and the name Darghin now stands for the Kaitags and Kubachins as well. The Kaitags and Kubachins themselves now regard the names Kaitag and Kubachin as local, and by 1959, as the census of

that year showed, had already identified themselves as Darghins.

There is increasingly closer cultural affinity in Daghestan among nationalities of the Lezghin language group. However, the fact that their languages are quite different slows down their merger into a single community, and the Lezghins, Tabasarans, Aguls, Rutuls and Tsakhurs are developing as separate nationalities.

A Daghestan cultural community is also gradually forming in the republic. It should be pointed out that inter-ethnic integration intensified sharply in Daghestan during the Soviet period as backwardness was overcome, as the people were involved in the economic life of the Russian Federation, and as cultural contacts with Russians and other peoples of the USSR expanded. This is vividly seen in the language sphere: 55 per cent of the Laks, 41 per cent of the Darghins and 39 per cent of the Avars speak fluent Russian, and for some Russian has become their mother tongue.

Large socialist nationalities are also forming within other North Caucasian autonomous units. For example, the creation of the Karachayevo-Circassian Autonomous Region, uniting related nationalities has led to a certain consolidation of the Trans-Kuban Kabardinians and some of the Adygei population; the two groups now have a common ethnic name, Circassian. This process was essentially based on the development of a common economy and socialist culture.

The ethnic development of small nationalities in the Extreme North and the Soviet Far East, namely the Chukchis, Koryaks, Evenks, and Nentsi, was to a certain extent similar to the consolidation processes in Daghestan.

Naturally, each of those peoples has its own specific features of modern ethnic development; however, there are also many common characteristics. For instance, socialist restructuring of Koryak (7 500 in 1970) economy and life has resulted in the overcoming of the once relative isolation of the areas where they lived from the rest of the country, and also in the greater affinity of the two principal Koryak groups—the nomad reindeer breeders and the settled coastal sea animal hunters and fishermen. Each group had its own cultural specifics and ethnic awareness. The nomad reindeer breeders called themselves Chavchyv, while the coastal inhabitants called themselves Nymylan, or, according to where they lived, Parenians, Apukinians, etc. The nomad reindeer breeders had their own dialect of the Koryak language. The language of the coastal Koryaks included eight dialects, which in turn consisted of subdialects. The phonetic differences between Koryak dialects were so great that the Chavchyv-speaking nomads were barely able to understand their settled compatriots. Although there were close contacts between the reindeer-breeding and coastal Koryaks, they seldom intermarried, and were unaware of their unity.

The socialist restructuring of the Koryak economy and life and

the creation of the Koryak Autonomous Area resulted in a certain degree of consolidation of the alienated Koryak groups. The organisation in the 1920s and 1930s of state fishery enterprises revolutionised the life of the coastal Koryaks and enabled them to restructure their traditional, highly primitive mode of production. Extensive involvement in fishing led to the coastal Koryaks gradually settling around fishery centres.

The coastal Koryaks began to concentrate in relatively large settlements in the 1930s, and this continued throughout the entire decade, resulting in local groups mixing and drawing closer together. The creation of a writing system based on the Chavchyv dialect of the reindeer-breeding Koryaks, the appearance of text-books, the elimination of illiteracy among adults, as well as schools, courses and radio broadcasts in the Koryak language helped raise the people's cultural standards and expand their outlook; it also helped overcome the alienation of the coastal and nomad Koryaks.

The nomad and coastal Koryaks drew closer together primarily after World War II, when Koryak collective farms were consolidated and the fishing and reindeer-breeding industries had merged. A common economy and communal life in settlements led to gradual disappearance of differences between the settled and nomad groups, although certain cultural discrepancies still remain. The fact that Koryaks from different dialect groups formed large settlements did not result in merger of dialects; the minority usually adapted itself to the dialect of the majority, while only the minor dialects disappeared. There were more and more mixed marriages between coastal and former nomad Koryaks, as well as cultural contacts between individual Koryak groups. As a result, a Koryak national awareness began to prevail over local forms of group consciousness. Current Koryak ethnic development is not simply a process of internal consolidation. In recent decades, small interspersed Even groups began to increasingly integrate with the Koryaks. After the socialist restructuring of occupations had taken place, the Kamchatka Evens developed closer relationships with Koryaks, and changed from hunting to the more lucrative raising of reindeer that the Koryaks engaged in; they also adopted the Koryak national attire as their work dress. Marriages between Evens and Koryaks became more frequent.

The Koryaks are rapidly establishing closer relationships with the newly arrived Russian population, which has come to constitute a considerable percentage even in the remotest villages of the district. Most Koryaks are bilingual, and in the past decades have adopted many Russian cultural and general traditions.

Similar consolidative processes are characteristic of the Chukchi, Evenks, Khanty, Mansi, and Nentsi, although in the past they were as divided as the Koryaks.

To some extent, the same consolidative processes are also occur-

ring among small nationalities of the North which number only several hundred. As they are very small and have solid cultural and economic ties with their neighbours, these nationalities have shown no prevailing trends towards consolidation. An example is the ethnic development of the Komandorskie Islands Aleuts, who in 1959 numbered 400.

Consolidation of socialist nationalities is characteristic not only of the small, but also of the larger ethnic communities in Siberia, such as the Altaians and Khakassians. Their ethnic development reveals features inherent in both the socialist nations of Eastern Siberia and the small ethnic groups of the Extreme North.

Prior to the October Socialist Revolution, the indigenous population of Gorny (Mountainous) Altai consisted of very loosely linked tribes and territorial groups, which did not have any common ethnonym or ethnic consciousness. The collective term 'Altaians' was used primarily in the scientific writings. The cattle-breeding southern Altaians and the northern taiga tribes had different languages and cultures. In turn, the Altaian tribes were broken up into exogamic clans.

. Alienated Altaian groups began to establish closer relations in 1922 when the Gorny Altai was granted autonomy and its former cultural backwardness was overcome. As national consciousness grew, the common ethnonym 'Altaian' was established and replaced tribal self-identification. The Altaian literary language, which was based on southern dialects, also helped strengthen the ethnic and lingual unity of the Altaians.

Economic restructuring and profound changes in everyday life helped to iron out the ethnic differences between individual tribes. The Altaians have now consolidated into a single nationality, whose culture combines valuable traditional elements, the long experience of work, and common Soviet forms of culture.

In Soviet times, the Kachins, Koibals, Sagaitsi, Beltirs and Kyzyltsi—five Turkic-speaking and formerly alienated groups in the Minusinsk basin—have also formed a single Khakassian nationality.

The ethnic development of individual Greek, Hungarian, German, Korean and other groups, whose national majority live outside the USSR, is to a certain extent similar to that of the Soviet socialist nationalities.

The specific ethnic transformations linked to the emergence or internal consolidation of socialist nationalities have taken a broad variety of forms. Without going into details (this is not the purpose of this work), we will only note that, in certain instances, they involve the overcoming of tribal differences and, in other, the establishment of closer relations and unity among small ethnic groups, or their merging with neighbouring nationalities. As nationalities form, their languages drastically change and local and tribal

awareness gradually disappears.

Generally speaking, the subject matter of this chapter again confirms that the ethnic changes that have been taking place in the USSR since the Great October Socialist Revolution are a complex phenomenon as it is and have distinctive features for each individual nationality. However, two principal trends can be singled out—one is the evolution of nationalities and the consolidation of the socialist nations, while the other is the intensive inter-ethnic integration which embraces all the ethnic communities of the USSR.

Conclusion

Over the years of Soviet power enormous changes have taken place in every field of life in the USSR. And the subsequent effect on national (ethno-social) processes, including their ethnic aspects, has been very substantial.

The elimination of national inequality, the fundamental political, social, economic and cultural changes brought about by the Great October Socialist Revolution and the subsequent building of socialism led to the rapid development of all ethnic communities in the USSR and accelerated ethno-social processes. A major consequence of these changes was the transformation of bourgeois nations and nationalities into socialist nations and nationalities, and the evolution of the totally new socialist nations and nationalities.

In Czarist Russia national development was extremely uneven. The early 20th century witnessed the emergence of bourgeois nations in the economically developed regions, while new nationalities were forming out of related tribal and ethnic groups in mountain, desert, tundra and taiga regions. By the eve of the October Revolution, these processes had in some cases been quite extensive, while in others they were just beginning. The specific features of the country's ethno-cultural development were also reflected in the historico-ethnographic division, that had occurred during its preceding historical development. A more or less integral East European region with a predominantly Orthodox population was flanked in the south-east by Muslim territories, and in the west and north-west by Catholic and Lutheran areas: each had its prevalent language and writing systems, and cultural traditions and the way of life. In Siberia, the East Slavonic culture came into contact with the archaic culture of the peoples of the North and with Lamaist traditions. A feature of each of these historico-ethnographic regions was the specific historical phenomenon of gradually growing contacts with other regions, including the East European. However, colonial oppression and the chauvinist and nationalist aspirations of the ruling classes restricted natural development and cultural interaction between different ethnic and historico-ethnographic communities.

The national and, at the same time, the ethnic development of the peoples of Czarist Russia was expressed in the two natural trends revealed by Lenin, trends that after the October Socialist Revolution, having undergone cardinal changes, manifested themselves in the flourishing of nations and closer relations between them.

Prior to the October Revolution, industrial capitalism had not developed to any great extent among many peoples in Czarist Russia; they were at a stage whose prevailing feature, as Lenin said, was the initial trend of national development characterised by the awakening of national life and national movements, by the struggle against national oppression, and by the formation of national states. In the new socio-political conditions that were created after the establishment of Soviet government, this trend, which had been artificially constrained by Russian Czarism, began to develop especially strongly, although with essential changes. Because of gloomy heritage of national relations a particularly sensitive approach to the interests of many nations was required, and all necessary conditions had to be provided for implementing Lenin's instructions that only great consideration for the interests of the different nations would eliminate the grounds for conflicts and mutual distrust. This principle was implemented through the creation of various forms of national statehood, in the spread of writing systems and education in the vernacular and in the evolution of a body of intellectuals and workers of each nation.

At the same time, since the first years of Soviet government, rapid national development has been accompanied by the increasingly growing tendency of the nations to draw closer together, and the organic correlation of these two tendencies has been manifest in all spheres of ethno-social development, from the economy to culture and mentality.

Soviet national statehood, which emerged as a result of the awakening of the creative activity and political consciousness of the people, was a powerful instrument in eliminating economic, social and cultural inequality of the peoples. In Soviet times, the Leninist national policy ensured the general economic progress of all ethnic communities. The struggle to eliminate the tremendous discrepancies in the economic development of the Soviet peoples, a very grim heritage from Czarist times, was launched immediately after the USSR was established, and by the eve of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 this inequality had already been eliminated through industrialisation and the organisation of collective farms in agriculture, and also thanks to the aid which the more developed nations provided to the formerly backward peoples. Public ownership of the means of production, a planned economy, and a single economic policy made it possible to harmoniously co-ordinate the economic growth in all the Union republics with the overall economic development of the

country. A centralised national economy provides the possibilities for satisfying equally the requirements of the entire population, and this meets the interests of all Soviet nations and nationalities. Science-based division of labour between republics and regions, co-operation, and mutual supply of products between them have resulted in stable economic ties among the Soviet socialist nations and have transformed the country into a single economic organism.

The practical realisation of the objective proclaimed in the Programme of the CPSU—to create the material and technical basis of communism—requires the co-ordinated efforts of all Union republics, and more intensive production specialisation and co-operation. For this reason, co-operation between the Soviet nations is expanding. All the Soviet nations and nationalities are contributing to the creation of new industrial centres, the utilisation of natural resources, the development of virgin lands, the reclaiming of the deserts and to research.

In Soviet times, there have been substantial changes in the social structure of nations and nationalities. Decisive in this aspect was the elimination of exploiting classes, and the emergence of a working class and intelligentsia among formerly underdeveloped peoples. A uniform social structure formed as socialism was built in the republics. Those nations and nationalities which before the October Revolution were in the capitalist stage, as well as those among which the patriarchal-tribal, feudal and semi-feudal systems prevailed, have developed socialist relations of a new type without private property and without exploitation of man by man. The presence of a working class, collective-farm peasantry and intelligentsia became characteristic of the social structure of all the Soviet peoples. Under developed socialism, the proportional outlines of the main social groups are becoming closer and closer in different republics. Today, each nation is represented by workers of both mass and skilled professions; collective farmers, including machine operators; and large professional groups of intellectuals, including artists, administrators, engineers, technicians, and scientists.

The natural social and economic integration of the peoples of the USSR is closely associated with their political integration within the framework of a single federal state which represents the organic harmony, and not simply a conglomerate of national-administrative units. The Programme of the CPSU points out that as socialist construction continues, the boundaries between the Union republics continue to lose their former significance. These fundamental changes signify that the national question, as inherited by the socialist state from the past epoch, has been resolved completely, finally and irrevocably.

Socio-economic and socio-political changes in the USSR have re-

sulted in a new historical community, the Soviet people, which is in fact an extremely complex, multifaceted phenomenon reflecting the unique unity of people of many national groups. The basic conditions for the forming of this community were the Great October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of the USSR. The community formed via a process which became especially intensive after socialist production relations had become dominant.

The community of Soviet people is founded on the unbreakable alliance of the working class, peasantry and intellectuals with the leading role played by the working class, and on the friendship of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR.

Ethnic changes are organically associated with continuing prosperity and the growing affinity of ethno-social communities (nations and nationalities) in the socio-economic and socio-political spheres. These changes are primarily evident in culture.

From the very initial years of Soviet government, the culture of the peoples of the USSR, especially among the formerly backward and oppressed peoples of the outlying regions, began to develop very rapidly. This was seen primarily in the elimination of illiteracy and semi-illiteracy by teaching people in their native language, in creating writing systems for peoples which did not have them, in stimulating national arts, and in generally extending the use of national languages to the mass media and other spheres of life. Major advances in education were made after the war. The educational level of the younger urban generations and, to a great extent, of the rural population is now virtually uniform for all Soviet nations.

The flourishing of national cultures of the Soviet peoples, along with the formation of national states and socio-economic development, was instrumental in promoting ethnic consolidation processes, which could be seen both in the emergence of certain essentially new and relatively large ethnic communities (Altaians, Khakassians, and others) and, even more frequently, in the greater internal consolidation of already formed ethnoi (Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, etc.) thanks to the elimination of discrepancies between their component ethnographic groups. There were also instances of ethnic groups, close in origin, language and culture to the already formed ethnoi, integrating with them, such as the Mishari with the Tatars, the Kuramas with the Uzbeks, etc.

As a result, new and relatively large peoples formed in the USSR and the country's patchwork ethnic structure became less complex. However, it should be understood that the time of most active ethnic consolidation has passed. A point worth noting is that the list of nationalities indicated by the 1970 Census was almost identical to that of the 1959 Census.

Just as in all multinational countries, in the USSR ethnic consolidation is accompanied by assimilation, which is one form of ethnic

development. A major feature of assimilation in the USSR is its natural character. As might be expected, assimilation shows most distinctly in ethnically mixed marriages: the children choose the nationality of one of their parents and thus cut short the ethnic line of the other. In Soviet times, mixed marriages have become increasingly frequent because of dying away of national prejudices and collapse of religious barriers, and also because of the greater mixing of nationalities, particularly in rapidly growing towns. However, ethnic assimilation processes affect a relatively small portion of the Soviet population, primarily the territorially scattered groups living outside the principal territory of their ethnos, and most frequently outside their national republics.

In a socialist multinational country, the principal sphere of interaction of ethnic communities is not assimilation, but what is called inter-ethnic integration, manifested primarily in closer cultural affinity.

Socio-economic and ideological and political integration of the nations and nationalities within the framework of a single socialist state has created the foundation for this closer cultural affinity.

Once the exploiting classes were eliminated and the socialist relations consolidated, single Marxist-Leninist ideology became a key factor in integrating the intellectual life of the Soviet nationalities. Realisation of the fact that the interests of the working people and of the exploiters are diametrically opposed and that working people must unite in the struggle for their rights helped establish an internationalist ideology among the peoples of the USSR, and this resulted in their moral and political unity.

The internationalist unity of the Soviet people displayed itself with particular force in the general upsurge of patriotism during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. The multinational Soviet people rose as one man to defend their native land and the new social system, and through their heroism on the battlefield and mighty endeavours on the home front expressed their devotion to their socialist land and to the ideals of proletarian internationalism.

Co-operation among Soviet nations and extensive exchanges of personnel create a social and moral atmosphere which promotes quicker and deeper assimilation of internationalist ideas.

Large population migrations leading to gradually increasing territorial mixing of the peoples of the USSR, have been very important in drawing various ethnic groups closer together. There are people of many nationalities living in all the Union republics. The population of most urban centres has an especially complex national composition, and the large cities have become centres of intensive ethnic contacts.

Ethnic migration is very active within historico-cultural regions and between neighbouring peoples with a common cultural heritage.

However, the process of ethnic dispersal, i.e. of migration of most of the large nations beyond their original ethnic ranges, is not restricted to these regions, but to a varying extent involves other regions of the USSR as well.

The processes of drawing peoples closer together ethnically in various spheres of culture have not at all been the same. They have had a particularly strong impact on the material culture of the Soviet peoples, as material culture is a sphere where fundamental changes have occurred in Soviet years. The most striking feature of these changes has been the departure from the archaic, primitive conditions of material culture widespread before the October Revolution. Outdated traditional artifacts have been replaced by modern standardised industrial products. Differences in clothing and footwear are also gradually disappearing. Urbanisation involves increasing spread of uniform Soviet 'urban' types of material culture reflecting the growing requirements of the people.

Modern rural dwellings are being designed to correspond to natural conditions in the many regions of the country and to supplant archaic and primitive homes that do not meet modern health requirements. The ethnic features which have been retained are present more in the interior than in the design of the home.

Of all forms of material culture, the diet is the most persisting. However, even here the contacting ethnoi are expanding their range of dishes. Some traditional elements of material culture which were evolved by one or several nations of a given geographic region, are becoming widespread throughout the Soviet Union.

As the Soviet economy grows and modern types of housing and manufactured consumer goods (TV, radio sets, etc.) are being introduced, the life of the Soviet peoples is gradually becoming standardised. About 60 per cent of the Soviet population live in towns where, as far as material culture is concerned, ethnic features have already largely disappeared. Life in rural areas is becoming increasingly modern as well. On the whole, the restructuring of material culture as a result of scientific and technological progress and the spread of standardised products, has led to situation when ethnical features are primarily revealed in language and intellectual culture.

Ethno-lingual changes are a major aspect of current ethnic processes in the USSR. The creation in Soviet times of writing systems and literature for many peoples which had either no writing system of their own or had developed one only recently, as well as the growing social functions of the languages of those peoples, have also promoted ethnic consolidation. The development of literary languages and their use in education and by the mass media have in many instances eliminated the many dialects and have helped end the alienation of certain ethnic groups.

However, in the multinational USSR, linguistic development has

not only been restricted to languages with no writing system acquiring one, or to the expanding social functions of the national languages. The building of socialism, economic necessity and the growth of urban centres where people speaking different languages came to live increased the need of a language which would serve as a medium of communication for all Soviet nations. Russian, the language of the largest ethnic community of the Soviet Union, became that medium. The growth of bilingualism, primarily through the spread of Russian, facilitates co-operation among the Soviet peoples and helps them draw closer together and consolidate. At least 75 per cent of the Soviet population now speak fluent Russian. At the same time, other types of bilingualism, when a language other than Russian, e.g., Ukrainian, Uzbek, Tatar, etc., is the second language, have become widespread during the years of Soviet government; according to the 1979 Census, over 12 000 000 people belong to that group.

Unlike material culture with its tendency towards standardisation, intellectual culture largely preserves its ethnic hue, partly because of the linguistic features of many of its components. In addition, parallel to the disappearance and dislodgement of certain elements (chiefly religious) from the former cultural heritage, there has been the revival and development of certain cultural elements that were formerly either dying off or confined to only a given ethnic group. This is reflected specifically in the revival of certain handicrafts, and in the development of various kinds of folk art. At the same time, ethnic integration has affected even these areas of intellectual culture.

Even so, the national specificity of the artistic culture of the Soviet peoples cannot be reduced absolutely to the heritage of the past and to folk art; much of it stems from new creative professional skills. A consequence of the fact that during the years of Soviet government, literature and art have become accessible to the people has been an unprecedented growth of certain ethnic cultures. All the peoples of the USSR now have a greater fund of artistic works; they are also more interested in art and exhibit a wider range of intellectual requirements. However, the spread of the professional arts among the Soviet nations could have been solely the result of predominantly national development. At the same time, guided by national traditions, professional cultural workers of every ethnic community to some extent or another develop new features in the distinctive aspects of their culture and promote new traditions. Even though there are constant exchanges between Soviet nations, many of the components of the arts which acquire an international character are still able to retain national forms or to be embodied in more or less expressive national variants. Professional culture is the sphere where international interpermeation is generally most evident, which is key to the continuing development of the artistic herita-

ge of the peoples of the USSR.

In many Union and autonomous republics professional literature and theatre, music, painting, and architecture originated and developed thanks to assistance from people of other Soviet nationalities (most frequently, Russian) with the established forms of culture; the same is true of education and health. This led not only to a gradual evening out of the cultural standards of certain peoples and to the overcoming of archaic survivals, but also helped strengthen cultural affinity.

Bilingualism has meant that Russian translations of writers from the national republics are now generally accessible to all in the USSR. It is only via Russian that the many small peoples and ethnographic groups can also embrace world culture. Cultural exchanges are promoted by featuring works by national composers and playwrights at central theatres and through participation of art workers from the Union republics in central arts exhibitions. Increasing contacts and exchanges in all fields of culture stimulate the internationalisation of artistic preferences. The combination of common Soviet cultural elements with national forms is a feature of current Soviet spiritual culture, with an essentially uniform socialist content. The all-Union press, radio, TV and cinema systems play a major role in establishing this culture. Equally significant is the internationalising effect of Soviet science, particularly the social sciences, which in Soviet society play a very important part in internationalist education.

The Soviet peoples are also being brought closer together by common socialist ethics, which have become the standards of behaviour of all Soviet people and are enshrined in the moral code of the builder of communism. The Soviet people as a whole are building the material and technical foundation of communism, and characteristic of all is their communist attitude towards work, and their uncompromising struggle against money-grubbing, parasitism, greediness, and profiteering. Another feature of the Soviet people is their thirst for knowledge, creative attitudes towards work, and confidence in their future. Over the years of Soviet government the USSR has become a country of mass atheism. The break-away from religion served to overcome the former alienation of many peoples and national narrow-mindedness.

Ethnic integration processes can be seen distinctly in family and marital relations, which are important spheres of daily life. A result of this has been a levelling out of marriageable age and the growing equality of rights among the members of the family. Today, the family structure is characterised by relative homogeneity. While in prerevolutionary Russia the large patriarchal family was more or less the norm, especially among the minorities in the outlying districts, today the small family, albeit substantially differing in the number

of children, can be said to be the norm, even among the peoples of Central Asia, the North, and the Caucasus. Family alienation, forced marriages by parents' choice, and the despotism of the head of the family which formerly plagued many peoples of the USSR, no longer exist. Family ceremonies have also become simplified and internationalised to a large extent. In addition to their foundation through civil acts, new socialist civil ceremonies often accompany marriages, childbirths and the naming of children.

Common holiday traditions are evolving as well. In fact all the peoples of the USSR celebrate common Soviet holidays such as the anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, May Day, International Women's Day, Victory Day and Soviet Constitution Day in the same way. In recent decades, most Soviet peoples have made it their custom to celebrate New Year's Day. Today, the entire country recognises days of many important professions. Non-religious ceremonies to celebrate important events connected with people's public role are also being instituted. Naturally, several decades is too short a period for traditional ceremonies to evolve completely. Also, it is characteristic that the new civil ceremonial traditions, even though they do have a certain ethnic colour, evolve not so much as national, but common Soviet traditions.

As the peoples of the USSR influence each other, enrich each other's intellectual culture and assimilate what world culture has to offer, they develop not simply an international culture, but a culture common to all Soviet people. This can be seen not only in the sphere of professional arts and literature, but, what is particularly significant, in everyday life, ranging from common Soviet revolutionary traditions, holidays, ceremonies and customs to rules of common etiquette and common names.

The evolution of a common Soviet culture has been accompanied by the emergence of common Soviet forms of cultural organisation (all-Union radio and TV, central press and book-publishing, etc.). Also helping the Soviet nations and nationalities to draw closer together are the common education system, countrywide medical and cultural institutions, all-Union creative associations, etc. At present, conditions of cultural life are gradually drawing closer on an all-Union scale; nevertheless the people of each national republic have access to cultural institutions located throughout the USSR. Museums, libraries and theatres, as well as hospitals and clinics in the country and republican centres, resorts and sanatoriums in the southern regions, are frequented by the entire population.

The fabric of common Soviet culture is far more profound than any mono-national culture, as it has been enriched by the most progressive elements of the cultures of all Soviet nationalities. For this reason, attempts by Western Sovietologists to represent cultural integration in the USSR as 'Russification' (the enormous con-

tribution of Russian culture to the common Soviet culture notwithstanding) are totally groundless and do not correspond to Soviet reality.

The common Soviet intellectual culture is a common system for assimilating and transmitting not only the achievements of the individual Soviet nations, but those of world culture as a whole, especially that of the fraternal socialist countries (primarily via the medium of the Russian language).

Although it is international in character, the culture of the Soviet people still preserves its specific features. In this respect, socialist restructuring, the disappearance of religious barriers, the emergence and development of bilingualism and the resultant evolution of a common Soviet spiritual culture may be considered a process of cultural reorientation and the formation of a common Soviet historico-cultural sphere, which combines within itself more new permanent features which appeared in Soviet times than it does the conventional 'Western' and 'Eastern' cultural traditions. That is why Soviet scholars are absolutely right when they protest against concepts that one-sidedly qualify the contemporary restructuring and development of the culture of the Soviet peoples as a process of 'Westernisation'.

As a developed socialist society was being built, common traits developed among the peoples of the Soviet Union which resulted in a new socialist Soviet way of life. Consequently, these common traits of Soviet behaviour, character and world outlook are gradually becoming decisive, irrespective of social and national background. The socialist way of life is a major characteristic feature of the new historical community, the Soviet people.

This community is a dynamic phenomenon. With establishment of mature socialism, its state-political characteristics have changed. The 1977 Constitution of the USSR proclaims that the Soviet state, which emerged as the dictatorship of the proletariat, has developed into a state of the entire people. At the same time, Leonid Brezhnev made a special point of the fact that it would be incorrect to regard the Soviet people as a single Soviet nation.

> We would be taking a dangerous path if we were artificially to step up this objective process of national integration.[1]

As a multinational social and political community, the Soviet people are also conceptually reflected in national consciousness. When somebody identifies himself with a specific ethnos, he usually links this with an awareness that he is part of the Soviet people. This awareness is associated with the common national pride of the Soviet people, a pride which is far deeper and more ex-

[1] L. I. Brezhnev. *Our Course: Peace and Socialism* (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1978), p. 143.

tensive than ethnic sentiments.

The fact that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has implemented the basic principles of the Leninist national policy does not exclude the need for comprehensive and constant consideration for national factors, for carefully regulating relations between the peoples of the multinational USSR, and for examining those relations. National factors play and, in the foreseeable future, will continue to play a major role in Soviet life, so it should be expected that the programme documents of the CPSU continue to highlight them.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state consider the increasing all-round affinity of Soviet nations and nationalities to be an important objective process in the building of a communist society, and take this into consideration in their policies which promote the consolidation of the Soviet multinational community.

Characterising the results of national development in the USSR in the 60 years since the October Socialist Revolution, Leonid Brezhnev noted:

> The equality, fraternity and unbreakable unity of the peoples of the Soviet Union became a fact... The increasing process of the drawing together of nations is seen in every sphere of life in our society.[1]

Yet, on the whole, the entire experience of the multinational USSR, the first socialist state in human history, convincingly confirms what the founders of Marxism-Leninism were able to foresee—that national antagonisms would disappear with elimination of class antagonisms, and that objective conditions would then arise for nations to draw increasingly closer together. Soviet experience provides a vivid example of how one of the most painful and complex issues of social development has been solved under socialism.

Авторский коллектив

СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ЭТНИЧЕСКИЕ ПРОЦЕССЫ В СССР

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Present-Day Ethnic Processes in the USSR is devoted to the ethnic changes that are taking place in such areas as the material and intellectual culture of the peoples of the USSR, their languages and family relations, and the effect of the economic, social, and demographic factors on them. Much attention is paid to description of the ethnic situation and processes in the USSR before the establishment of the Soviet system, and to the conditions and factors influencing ethnic processes in the country.

The bulk of the book is devoted to a consideration of the processes themselves, but ethnic aspects of the cultural interaction, flourishing, and steady convergence of all the nations and peoples of the Soviet Union, and the moulding of a new, historical community—the Soviet people, are also studied.

The concluding part of the book characterises the dynamics of the numbers of ethnic communities, and the general and specific features of the development of ethnic processes among the various peoples of the USSR.