
The USSR

Proposes

Disarmament

(1920s-1980s)



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The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s-1980s)



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СССР ПРЕДЛАГАЕТ
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20-е—80-е ГОДЫ

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INTRODUCTION

For the Soviet state—which entered history heralding “a world without wars”—the struggle for disarmament is its immutably fundamental foreign policy.

With the firm establishment of the ideas of scientific socialism in the USSR, the humane ideal of a world without wars and weapons became the main political objective of the world's first socialist state.

For the USSR, the struggle for disarmament is not propaganda rhetoric, but a serious and important matter. In attaching exceptionally high significance to disarmament, Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, emphasised that *disarmament is a natural slogan for socialist society*.

According to Lenin's concept, disarmament—as the material basis of international security—is the main direction for joint efforts by all states to form a system to ensure a universal, lasting, and just peace. Thus, progress in limiting and halting the arms race is in the interest of all those who cherish peace and considerably improves the chances for multi-faceted peaceful co-operation among states with different social systems.

The Soviet concept of disarmament, like the entire strategy of peace and peaceful co-existence, is free of illusions or impractical projects. In fact, it is profoundly viable and objectively reflects the urgent requirements of peaceful development and presupposes realistically feasible measures. Disarmament is not a one-time action, but a long-term stage-by-stage process requiring great efforts in the struggle against militarist circles.

The Soviet concept of disarmament attaches great significance to using all factors to promote peace and assigns a special role in this to the public. The Soviet concept is based on the fact that *the idea of disarmament, having taken possession of the broad masses of people, can become a major material force in world politics*.

Already as far back as July 19, 1921, in a note to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, the USA, China, and Japan, the Soviet state first officially and definitively proclaimed disarmament to be its basic foreign policy goal.

The period preceding the Second World War was characterised by numerous concrete Soviet efforts to make disarmament a central issue of practical interest in international politics. Already in 1922, Lenin said that in order to secure peace the world needs not words, which are bandied about in abundance anyway, but deeds, simple and clear solutions and concrete measures.

At the International Economic Conference of Genoa of April 1922, the Soviet delegation proposed a plan for universal armaments reductions which provided for consistent and substantial measures to reduce armies, navies and armaments universally; as a first step the plan stipulated the complete ban of the most barbaric methods of warfare and instruments of destruction used against the civilian population such as poison gases, aerial warfare, etc. Thus, the Soviet state, in its very first initiative, posed the task of universally reducing armaments not theoretically, but quite concretely.

The first international forum held in Moscow on December 2-12, 1922 was likewise devoted to disarmament: the Soviet delegation submitted its plan for proportional arms reduction to its other participants, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, and Finland.

From the very moment of its birth, the USSR has worked tirelessly to strengthen peace and international security through disarmament, ultimately through general and complete disarmament. Back in February 1928, the USSR had already submitted a draft convention on immediate, complete and general disarmament to the League of Nations Commission for the Disarmament Conference. According to this draft, armies, navies and air forces were to be disbanded; all munitions and armaments destroyed; all naval vessels and warplanes scrapped; military service prohibited; fortresses and naval and air bases stripped of armaments and dismantled; all arms-producing facilities eliminated; the appropriation of funds for military purposes stopped; war ministries, general staffs and all kinds of military administrations and training institutions disbanded; and so on. However, the Soviet proposal was rejected by the British, French, Japanese, and American delegations, which called

the Soviet approach to disarmament too "simplistic" and calculated to impress.

In this way, obstructionists of disarmament in the West tried to discredit a proposal which was, in fact, the first one of its kind in the history of international relations.

Today, the Constitution of the USSR specifies the achievement of universal and complete disarmament as one of the main directions of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union has never pursued disarmament from the position of "all or nothing"; and already in 1928 it proposed its first programme of partial disarmament measures in the form of a draft convention on the reduction of armaments. The draft was submitted by the Soviet delegation to the Preparatory Commission after the draft convention on general and complete disarmament was rejected. The USSR proposed a progressive and proportional cut back of all armaments based on the composition and numerical strength of the armed forces of different states. The Soviet draft stipulated corresponding reductions of armaments by one-half, one-third and one-quarter in direct proportion to the size of the arsenals of individual states. Military expenditures were also to be cut correspondingly. All these measures were to be achieved within two years. But this Soviet draft was also turned down by the capitalist states, which were unwilling to make even the slightest move towards arms reductions.

Ever since then, the USSR has considered partial measures to be a way to ultimately achieve general and complete disarmament. Partial measures include both measures to regulate the limitation, reduction or elimination of individual systems and types of weapons as well as measures to contain and halt the arms race in specific geographic areas. Partial measures are also those that would limit the development of the arms race in new directions and slow it down, reduce the danger of war and are preventive in nature.

Beginning with its first initiatives on the international scene, the USSR has regarded the limitation of armaments and disarmament as universal issues that affect all nations. Emphasising the responsibility of major military powers in containing the arms race in its most significant fields, the USSR, at the same time, believes that *all states, without exception, irrespective of their size or military and economic potential, could contribute to the search for a constructive solution.*

In fact, the USSR was the first to pose the problem of

disarmament in this manner. Already in 1922, the Soviet government proposed to hold a disarmament conference in which all countries would participate. Also, in 1932-1934, the USSR actively participated in the Geneva World Disarmament Conference, seeking to use it to advance the cause of disarmament and to prevent imminent Nazi aggression.

In 1928, the USSR was the first to join the Briand-Kellogg Pact on banning war as an instrument of national policy. After that, it proposed at the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva the adoption of a declaration on the definition of aggression and the attacking side. But the Soviet proposal was rejected.

Proceeding from the fact that the USSR rules out war as an instrument of national policy, the Soviet delegation to the Conference stressed that general and complete disarmament was the most reliable guarantee against war. To initiate actual disarmament, the USSR proposed the conclusion of a Convention on General and Complete Disarmament. This proposal did not exclude partial measures, for instance an agreement on proportional and progressive arms cuts. But since the capitalist West again responded with silence, the USSR proposed to turn the World Disarmament Conference into a permanent peace conference that was to prevent the outbreak of war. However, this proposal was also turned down.

The World Disarmament Conference in Geneva failed to produce any results. In their struggle to redivide the world, the Western states evidently placed their bets on war: the disarmament talks came to a deadlock.

Continuing its efforts to prevent aggression and the impending war, the USSR drafted a convention on the definition of aggression and concluded non-aggression, mutual assistance, and neutrality treaties with its neighbours.

Even though before the Second World War the imperialist powers' opposition prevented any real progress in disarmament, the fact that the issue of limiting armaments and achieving disarmament had become prominent in international politics was in itself quite significant. *In its tireless struggle, Soviet diplomacy had laid down a solid foundation for promoting and intensifying the struggle for peace and disarmament in our day.*

After the Second World War, the issue of curbing and halting arms race took on a new qualitative dimension. Nuclear weapons threaten to destroy mankind; this circumstance

has changed commonly accepted ideas on what is possible and admissible in international affairs.

The existence of nuclear weapons has made it essential to establish a system which would reliably guarantee durable peace based solely on disarmament. Besides, the paramount task in the struggle for disarmament today is to curb and halt the arms race in its most dangerous area involving the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons.

Soviet diplomacy took into account the fact that the problem of reducing nuclear armaments substantially differed both in character and complexity from the disarmament issues faced before the Second World War, and therefore required other than military solutions.

However, the United States and other Western countries preferred military solutions to political ones and opted for a military pressure. In fact, they were the first to develop virtually all the world's major weapons systems, including the atom bomb, the inter-continental strategic bomber, the nuclear-powered submarine, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, multiple warheads for intercontinental missiles, cruise missiles, and many others. Lately, this list has also come to include the neutron bomb and binary weapons, a new type of chemical weapon.

The main role among the above is assigned to nuclear weapons, on which the US relies in developing and implementing its military and foreign policy doctrines that justify policy from the position of strength. The United States has officially assigned to its nuclear weapons the role of a deterrent and that of a "nuclear umbrella" with which Washington allegedly covers its allies. The military doctrine of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) established in 1949 by the United States, from the very outset envisaged first use of nuclear weapons by its member-states, and this significantly increased the danger of a world catastrophe.

In addition to nuclear weapons, the West is also building up other very dangerous weapons of mass destruction, in particular, chemical weapons, not even mentioning the fact that it is producing and modernising conventional armaments, such as tanks, artillery, small arms, etc., on an increasing scale.

The seventies were an important landmark in the struggle of the USSR and all peace forces against the nuclear

threat and for real disarmament. Those years were marked by substantial changes in the balance of forces, including, in particular, the establishment of approximate parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO in strategic nuclear armaments, medium-range nuclear weapons, and conventional armaments. This balance, which arose due to the increased might of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, became an objective factor without which international detente would have been unthinkable. At the same time, this military balance gave rise to an urgent need for both sides to strictly observe the principles of equality and equal security; for both to abandon all attempts to acquire unilateral advantages at the expense of the security interests of the other side; for making attempts to gain military superiority inadmissible; and for both to ensure a mutually acceptable balance of interests.

The historic achievement of the seventies was that the consistent struggle of the USSR and other socialist countries for international detente made it really possible to reduce the danger of war. This began the formation of a system to guarantee stable and lasting peace based not on a balance of fear, but on the balance of security and trust among all nations and on the active participation of all states, both great and small, in ensuring international security and developing mutually beneficial co-operation. Detente was a turn away from the cold war and confrontation to talks and co-operation thereby improving the general atmosphere and the very essence of international relations.

In the seventies, on the initiative of the USSR and the other socialist countries, and due to a more realistic approach on the part of the United States, a mechanism for multilateral and bilateral disarmament talks was set up. Further development and improvement of this mechanism were substantial elements of detente that positively influenced the international situation.

The seventies also witnessed the initiation of a whole set of measures to guarantee peace. A number of agreements restricting the sphere of the arms race and limiting the build-up of armaments were signed and went into effect, viz. the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; and the UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

The agreements on limiting strategic arms (SALT-I) signed in Moscow in 1972 were in themselves of truly historic significance. They signified the first major step towards further limitation of armaments and a transition to real disarmament. This became possible because the Soviet and American sides had reflected therein their decision to adopt a constructive approach, one based on equality, to their relations, including those in the military sphere. This envisaged their equality as partners in international affairs despite all the differences between their ideological and political systems, as well as their equality in the sense that the existence of approximate parity was recognised of the two historically different military potentials. The June 18, 1979 Vienna Treaty between the USSR and the United States on limiting strategic offensive armaments (SALT-II) was based on these principles.

The major nuclear powers, viz. the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France, were covered by agreements to prevent the accidental or unauthorised outbreak of war. For the first time ever, were introduced in world practice various confidence-building measures, based on international law, under which the participants were, for example, to notify each other about military exercises and to invite observers to military manoeuvres, i.e. measures designed to remove suspicions about their military activities.

The system of agreements for reducing the arms race was of paramount political significance and demonstrated that disarmament was feasible given the desire of the participants in such talks.

All these moves showed that new, important criteria and standards have begun to materialise in the international military-political relations. A new political style in resolving questions of war and peace is now apparent, and it primarily involves flexibility in seeking mutually acceptable decisions based on the balance of interests of all sides.

It should, however, be recognised that despite these positive changes in international relations, the opponents of detente, who have tremendous influence, have not laid down their arms. At the turn of the eighties, due to the desire of the US military-industrial complex to break the existing

military balance on which international security is essentially based, the world situation became acutely aggravated.

In attaching paramount significance to the task of preventing a nuclear holocaust, the USSR tried to come to an understanding with the United States, chiefly during Soviet-American talks on nuclear armaments. However, the US showed no desire to reach an agreement on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons on the principle of equality and equal security. Moreover, Washington and its NATO allies posed an additional strategic threat to the USSR and other socialist countries by deploying US first-strike nuclear missiles in some West European countries thus eliminating the possibility of continuing the Geneva talks.

Nonetheless, the USSR is still prepared to discuss the issue of both strategic and "European" nuclear armaments on a constructive and mutually acceptable basis.

The USSR still favours the idea of making Europe free of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons and for both sides, without losing time, to make a major move in that direction. At the same time, the USSR intends to strengthen its security only on the basis of equal security for all, not at the expense of others.

Many recent Soviet foreign policy moves have been aimed at creating a politically and psychologically effective anti-war climate. One of them, the Soviet draft declaration on the condemnation of nuclear war, had special significance and was approved by the majority of the participants in the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly. Among other things, the Soviet Declaration clearly voiced the view of the world's scientific community that there would be no possibility to limit the detrimental consequences of a nuclear war, a war in which there could be no winners, and resolutely condemned such a war as something that would contradict human conscience and reason, something that would be the most atrocious crime against mankind. It also declared as criminal acts the development, advancement, proliferation, and propaganda of military doctrines designed to justify the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons first and the permissibility of nuclear war as such.

The USSR thinks it very important for nuclear powers to pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. Such a pledge would not only be a major political and legal guarantee of security, but would also have quite definite practical consequences for existing military doctrines. It would impose

greater restrictions on training troops and staffs and in specifying the composition of armaments. At the same time, it would be instrumental in providing even stricter controls for excluding unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic.

The Soviet decision not to use nuclear weapons first is a wise and practical commitment. Now, if other nuclear powers would do the same, it would be a major step towards eliminating the threat of war in general and nuclear war in particular. It would *in reality be tantamount to banning the use of nuclear weapons.*

In refusing to make the no-first-use commitment, and in seeking to belittle the significance of the Soviet pledge, the United States and its allies have collectively pledged that none of their weapons would be used other than for a retaliatory strike. Thus, they try to set off this statement to the Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. However, the value of such statements becomes clear when one looks back at history. It is common knowledge that no aggressor has ever perpetrated aggression without seeking to make believe it was a "retaliatory strike". Furthermore, the Reagan Administration's strategic doctrine envisages a possible preemptive first nuclear strike by the US under the pretext that it would be designed to prevent a hypothetical attack against the United States. Hence, according to NATO assumptions, this preemptive nuclear strike would also be a "retaliatory strike". In other words, the NATO Council formula does not in any way preclude NATO aggression involving the use of any kind of weapons.

References to an alleged Soviet military build-up, and, in particular, to that involving conventional armaments, are not just malicious slander; they are designed to conceal US unwillingness to renounce the use of force as required by the UN Charter.

The Western countries' approach to the proposal made by the USSR and its allies early in 1983, that the NATO members and the states parties to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation conclude a Treaty on the Mutual Renunciation of the Use of Armed Force and on the Maintenance of Relations of Peace was by no means constructive. Under the treaty, the signatories would pledge not to use nuclear and conventional weapons first and, hence, renounce any first use of force whatsoever against one another. Such a treaty would appropriately envisage a similar pledge by the member-states

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of both alliances on non-use of force against third countries, including those that have bilateral allied relations with them as well as non-aligned and neutral nations. Although this treaty was to be signed by the member-states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, all other European states would have the right to participate in the drafting and to sign it, inasmuch as neutral and non-aligned European countries also have an interest in safeguarding peace in Europe. The treaty would, from the very outset, be open for accession, on equitable terms, to all other world states wishing to accede.

In fact, it would be natural for all states, both members of military alliances or neutral and non-aligned countries, to make such commitments, which would fully correspond to the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.

Unfortunately, throughout 1983, the Warsaw Treaty member-countries received no meaningful answer to their proposal from the NATO governments.

On its part, the USSR is prepared to resume tripartite talks with the United States and Britain on a complete and universal ban of nuclear arms tests; Washington broke off these talks unilaterally in 1980. The USSR is also ready to ratify, simultaneously with the US, the Soviet-American agreements of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of underground nuclear arms tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Another goal of Soviet diplomacy today is a quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms freeze by all states which possess such weapons. This measure, which the USSR proposed to other nuclear powers both on a bilateral basis and at the UN, would check the momentum of the arms race.

The USSR also regards preventing the arms race in outer space and banning the use of force both in outer space and from outer space with regard to the Earth as a most important and urgent task of our time. In this connection, it has made an exceptionally important unilateral commitment not to launch into outer space any kinds of anti-satellite weapons, as long as other states, including the USA, refrain from doing so. The Soviet initiative which calls for the conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space with regard to Earth was widely supported at the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly.

For many years now, the USSR has insisted on a com-

plete and universal ban on chemical weapons, and has participated actively in the deliberations on this question at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. From 1976 to 1980, the USSR conducted bilateral talks with the United States on banning chemical weapons; Washington broke off the negotiations.

In 1982, at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, the USSR submitted a proposal on the basic provisions of a convention for banning the development, production and accumulation of stockpiles of chemical weapons and for their destruction. In proposing this document, the USSR took into account the positions taken by other countries, including those on the question of verification.

The USSR is prepared to negotiate for an agreement on the whole range of verification techniques, including national and international verification measures.

In order for talks on chemical disarmament to be effectively completed, peaceful rhetoric and a show of activity are not enough. What is needed is a constructive approach based on results already achieved which takes the other countries' viewpoints into account. In short, honest, business-like talks aimed at achieving concrete accords are what is needed.

Curbing the arms race on the high seas and in oceans could be a major contribution to the prevention of war. The USSR believes that the time has come to reach international agreements on the non-expansion of naval activity of states in areas of conflict or tension; to seek solutions that would bar the big powers' navies from patrolling areas remote from their coasts for long periods of time; to take steps that would bring about the withdrawal of nuclear-weapon warships from certain ocean areas of the globe; to establish restrictions on the presence of specific classes of warships in those areas; and so on.

The USSR could go even further to achieve the direct and effective limitation of naval armaments; relevant Soviet proposals to this end were addressed to all the major naval powers and other interested states.

The Soviet Union is also putting forward constructive proposals at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. For many years now, the initiatives and active efforts of the USSR and other socialist countries in Vienna have been designed to over-

come the deadlock at the negotiations caused by Western mathematical manipulations concerning the number of NATO and Warsaw Treaty troops stationed in Central Europe.

* * *

Cited above are just some of the key directions on which the Soviet state concentrates its attention in international affairs. Understandably, all this in no way presents an exhaustive view of Soviet foreign policy. For a more comprehensive view, we refer the reader to the documents attached hereto which embrace all the stages of the USSR's struggle for disarmament from the first days of this state's existence to our time. These documents will also show the reader that the Soviet Union is continuing its struggle for:

- the development, adoption, and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme;
- the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear states;
- the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on territories of states where there are no such weapons at present;
- the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones in various areas of the globe;
- the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction;
- talks offering a way for substantial reductions in the current levels of conventional armaments and armed forces; and
- the search for ways of reaching agreement on limiting sales and supplies of conventional armaments.

Nuclear powers bear special political responsibility before mankind; thus, the adoption of the standards of relations among them, as proposed recently by the USSR, would be highly conducive to improving the world situation. The USSR is prepared to pledge together with other nuclear powers to recognise those principles as binding. According to the Soviet view, they would be basically as follows:

- to regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of their foreign policies and, should the danger of a nuclear conflict arise, to hold urgent consultations to eliminate that danger;
- to renounce the propaganda of nuclear war in all forms;

- to pledge not to use nuclear weapons first;
- under no circumstances to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which have no such weapons on their territories;
- to make all forms of proliferation of nuclear weapons inadmissible;
- based on the principle of equal security, to strive for the reduction of nuclear armaments until their complete elimination in all forms.

An agreement on these issues would initiate a genuine breakthrough in all international affairs.

Especially noteworthy in this connection is the scale of current anti-war and anti-nuclear movements, the participants of which acutely realise the danger of a nuclear catastrophe and demand that all states urgently take practical counter-measures to halt the race to annihilation.

V. PETROVSKY,
D. Sc. (Hist.)

Chapter One

THE USSR's STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT IN THE 1920s AND 1930s

History shows that the credit for putting disarmament on the agenda of international politics goes to socialism, which from the very start became a powerful socio-political current in Europe.

The first international conference to touch upon the problem of disarmament was held in 1899 in the Hague, and it already had to take into consideration socialism's influence on the masses. This is how the great powers justified the need for convening the Conference: "The *latest type of militarism* offers a powerful weapon to corrupting socialist propaganda."¹ Eighteen years later, in 1917, Soviet Russia, the world's first socialist state, emerged on the historical scene; in 1919, the Versailles Treaty powers created the League of Nations whose Covenant read: "... the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."² This stand was prompted by two factors, namely, by the anti-war sentiments of the masses, who had lived through the horrors of the First World War, and by the desire of the imperialist powers to counterbalance the Soviet Government's first foreign policy document, the Decree on Peace.

Thus, the very appearance of Soviet Russia on the world

¹ *Krasny Arkhiv* (Red Archives), Moscow, Vols. 1-2 (50-51), p. 74.

² *League of Nations. The Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 8, No. 1. Encyclopedia Britannica. Chicago-London-Toronto. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1947. Vol. 13, p. 833.*

scene turned disarmament from an abstract ideal of humanistic philosophers into a global issue concerning all mankind.

Yet, the principle of disarmament proclaimed by the Covenant of the League of Nations was not implemented; the imperialist states were at fault for this. Instead of actually solving the problem, they went on endlessly discussing how to draft a document on general and complete disarmament. It is true that on May 19, 1920 a commission of military experts was set up, and on February 25, 1921 the Temporary Mixed Commission on matters of disarmament was established, but the activities of both bodies boiled down to academic debates concerning disarmament criteria. These debates continued until April 1922, when a special conference, to which a Soviet delegation was also invited, convened in Genoa, Italy.

At that forum, the issue of disarmament was for the first time placed on a business-like footing by the Soviet representatives. Georgi V. Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated on behalf of the Soviet Government that his "Delegation intend to propose, in the course of the Conference, the general limitation of armaments, and to support all proposals tending to lighten the weight of militarism".¹ At the same time, he proposed to ban the most barbaric forms of warfare, such as poison gases, air warfare, etc., and the means of destruction aimed against civilian populations.

The Soviet Russia's simple and concrete proposals instantly made it tower over the imperialist powers because it represented a force that strived for disarmament in word and deed. Chicherin's statement proved that for a socialist state disarmament is not simply a matter of rhetoric, but a very serious business.

However, once the Soviet statement was made, on the imperialist countries' side Louis Barthou, head of the French delegation, jumped to his feet and retorted that disarmament was not on the agenda, adding, "I must give warning that, when, and if, the Russian Delegation propose to discuss this question, they will find themselves faced not only with a

¹ *International Economic Conference of Genoa. Provisional Verbatim Record. First Plenary Session. April 1922.* Genoa. Stabilimento Fratelli Pagano, 1922, p. 51.

reservation and protest, but with an absolute denial, definite, categorical, final and decisive, on the part of the French Delegation.”¹

Taking into account that all the Allied governments, which actually determined the outcome of the Conference, essentially shared the French delegation's view, the Soviet delegation was compelled to remove the issue of disarmament from the agenda.

Thus, the very first confrontation on the question of disarmament between socialism and imperialism showed that the latter categorically refused to hold talks on concrete measures. In fact, the capitalist states even failed to try to find some plausible grounds for their unconditional refusal.

Having rejected the Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament, the imperialist powers did not even agree to partial measures to limit armed forces and armaments.

On June 12, 1922, the government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) proposed to the governments of Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland to convene a joint conference in Moscow to discuss measures for a proportional reduction of armed forces and armaments. Shortly afterwards, a similar proposal was made to Romania.

The governments of those countries could not bring themselves to reject the Soviet proposal openly, for already at that time the slogan of disarmament had become too popular. However, they obviously did not intend to discuss disarmament in a business-like and constructive atmosphere either. In order to work out their common line at the proposed Moscow conference, they held a preliminary meeting the final protocol of which stated: “No matter what the Russia representative's proposals at the upcoming conference might be, they will undoubtedly envisage significant reductions in the armed forces of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. Such proposals should be regarded as unacceptable in advance.”²

Objectively, the Soviet government's proposed plan for a proportional reduction of armaments was equally advantageous to the USSR and the aforementioned countries both politically and economically. But Poland, in coalition with

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

² *Central State Historical Archives of the Latvian SSR. Final Protocol of September 23, 1922 Meeting (in Latvian).*

the Baltic states, acted under the influence of the leading imperialist states to ultimately wreck the Moscow Conference. They concealed their refusal to disarm by the demagogic formula: "Material disarmament first of all requires moral disarmament."¹ *The desire to substitute verbose declarations on the need to create political premises for measures of actual disarmament had eventually become one of the disarmament opponents' most favourite methods; they sought to drown the idea itself in a flood of false words and assurances about their desire for peace.* In this respect, little has changed since then, except that their demagoguery has become even more refined.

The next stage in the USSR's struggle for disarmament began several years later. In December 1925, the League of Nations set up a Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, and the USSR was also invited to take part. But Moscow replied that it would agree to be on the Commission provided the meetings would be held outside Switzerland (because of the Soviet-Swiss conflict over the assassination in Lausanne of V. V. Vorovsky). Nonetheless, the imperialist powers insisted on holding them in Geneva. As the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs noted, "the League of Nations thus intentionally barred us from participation in the conference".²

As a result, the USSR did not participate in the first three sessions of the Preparatory Commission, and their ineffectiveness revealed the true intentions of the imperialist countries at the talks. On May 20, 1926 *Pravda* noted: "None of the participants in the Conference is thinking of disarming itself, but only of disarming others in order to grow stronger militarily itself... The bargaining is not about achieving 'disarmament', but a 'balance' between the armed forces of different powers, each of whom tends to interpret that 'balance' in its own favour."

The distractive abstract rhetoric in the Commission compelled the British representative Lord Cecil to resign. In his letter to Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, Cecil openly admitted that his resignation was provoked by the Preparatory

¹ *Conférence de Moscou pour la limitation des armements.* Moscou, 1923, p. 93.

² *USSR Foreign Policy Archives.* Letter of USSR Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to Soviet Ambassador in London, May 12, 1926 (in Russian).

Commission's failure, largely due to the British Government's stand on disarmament.¹

By the start of the fourth session, the Soviet-Swiss conflict had been settled, and the USSR could take part in the Preparatory Commission. From the very outset, the Soviet delegation made it clear it did not intend to lose time on scholastic discourse about disarmament, and declared that it would "struggle against attempts to deviate to insignificant questions and fruitless resolutions".²

The USSR backed this statement by subsequent actions. On November 30, 1927, it submitted for discussion by the Commission an extensive fourteen-point draft programme for universal and complete disarmament. By insisting on such disarmament as "the sole effective guarantee of peace that meets not only remote ideals, but also mankind's urgent present-day requirements"³, the USSR voiced its readiness to co-operate in drafting any proposal that would open up the issue of disarmament for resolution.⁴

Bourgeois politicians gave the Soviet proposals a hostile reception. Without giving too much concern to whether or not their statements were well-substantiated or sufficiently conclusive, they simply tried to present the Soviet declaration as unrealistic and even harmful to the cause of peace. The unconstructive stand of the imperialist states, and their obvious desire not to allow the adoption of effective recommendations and to turn the discussion into an abstract discourse on peace and security, doomed the Preparatory Commission's further work to failure. The Soviet draft for general and complete disarmament was discussed from March 15 to 24, 1928 only to be turned down under various pretexts by the British, French, Japanese, and American governments. The imperialist powers also rejected the Soviet draft for a convention on the reduction of armaments which envisaged partial disarmament measures. Thus, imperialism once again showed its reluctance to conclude any concrete agreement on disarmament. Analysing the Western stand, the Fifth Congress of Soviets stated: "The rejection of the

¹ *A History of Diplomacy*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1965, p. 513 (in Russian).

² *Ibid.*, p. 514.

³ *In the Struggle for Peace*. The Soviet Delegation at the Fifth Session of the Disarmament Commission, Moscow, 1928, p. 33 (in Russian).

⁴ *A History of Diplomacy*, Vol. 3, p. 515 (in Russian).

Soviet disarmament drafts in the preparatory commission on disarmament and the evident reluctance of the capitalist countries belonging to the League of Nations that sat in the preparatory commission to make even the smallest step towards a reduction of armaments only tends to confirm once again that these countries . . . build their entire policy on preparations for another world war.”¹

This conclusion was confirmed during the third stage of the USSR's struggle for disarmament between the two wars, namely, at the World Disarmament Conference, which the Western powers had turned into an armaments conference. Whereas at previous such forums there was just a lot of shop talk, after which all the participants parted for home with nothing to show for their effort, this Conference, in effect, encouraged both the arms race and Germany's remilitarisation.

Inasmuch as the Conference took place at a time when the European capitalist countries were directly preparing for the Second World War, it could not lead to real disarmament. Having proposed on February 18, 1932 a resolution for general and complete disarmament, the USSR set itself the goal “to make war as such impossible”.² But the capitalist powers' sole objective was to weaken their adversaries in a future war for the re-partition of the world, and to achieve unilateral advantages in armaments. The Western drafts to counterbalance the Soviet plan for universal and complete disarmament, e.g. the MacDonald Plan, the Tardieu Plan, and the Hoover Plan, were actually drafts of “security from disarmament”, not of disarmament and security. However, the common Western goal in drafting proposals was to conceal their preparations for a new spiral in the arms race on the eve of the Second World War. In this connection, *Pravda* wrote: “The imperialists want to turn the Geneva Conference into a huge smokescreen to conceal from the public opinion of the working people of all countries their feverish preparations for a new world war.”³

The only country to display a constructive approach to disarmament at the Conference was the USSR. From the

¹ *Soviet Foreign Policy. Vol. I. 1917-1945*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 250.

² *Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Vol. 15, Moscow, 1969, p. 102 (in Russian).

³ *Pravda*, February 12, 1932.

very outset, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs voiced the desire that disarmament stop "being a tennis ball bounced from one committee or subcommittee to another, from one conference to another, from one session to another".¹

In addition to its draft convention on general and complete disarmament, the USSR proposed partial disarmament and voiced its readiness to discuss other concrete proposals as well. However, Germany, which was a participant in the Conference, pursued the notorious tactics of "all or nothing". First it suggested complete Allied disarmament, knowing perfectly well that the Allies would not agree to that. When the latter rejected universal and complete disarmament, Germany began to seek its own rearmament under the slogan of "equality in armaments". In fact, it demanded "equal rights" in arms build-up in the form of an ultimatum, threatening to walk out from the Conference.

On December 10, 1932, the heads of the British, French, American, Italian and German governments gathered for an urgent meeting in Geneva to discuss Germany's ultimatum. The meeting resulted in a resolution recognising that Germany and all the other nations which had disarmed under the Versailles Treaty had equal rights in armaments.

After that, there was nothing else to keep Germany at the Conference, and in 1933 Germany walked out, actually wrecking the forum. No doubt, Britain, France, the United States, and Italy, which had turned down both Soviet disarmament drafts and legalised Germany's rearmament, were largely responsible for its failure. In 1934, the USSR proposed "to turn the Conference into a permanent, periodically convening Peace Conference".² But the imperialist countries rejected this, too, and began to openly prepare for a second world war. The Western politicians' attitude to the problem of disarmament in the period between the two world wars was expressed by Winston Churchill, who on July 13, 1934 declared in the House of Commons: "I am very glad that the Disarmament Conference is passing out of life into history"³

¹ *Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Vol. 15, p. 420 (in Russian).

² *Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Vol. 17, 1971, p. 358 (in Russian).

³ Churchill, W. S., *The Second World War*, London, Vol. I, 1949, p. 92.

After the Geneva Conference, no disarmament talks were held until the end of the Second World War. Thus, the initial period of the USSR's struggle for disarmament had actually ended in 1934, and though Soviet efforts failed to bring tangible results they nonetheless had a tremendous political effect in promoting sympathies towards the USSR in the remotest parts of the globe. Richard Barnet, a well-known US historian, justly noted in this connection: "Since that time the disarmament theme has advanced the prestige of the Soviet Union around the world."¹

¹ Barnet, R. J., *Who Wants Disarmament?*, Boston, 1961, p. 65.

**Excerpt from the Note
by the Government of the RSFSR
to the Governments of Great Britain,
France, Italy, the United States,
China and Japan**

July 19, 1921

The Government of Russia can only welcome any disarmament or reduction of military expenditures, a heavy burden for the working people in all countries. Still, it believes that the matter of guarantees that such disarmament will actually be effected should be cleared up first, in view of its doubts that such guarantees would be feasible at present. Nevertheless, the idea of disarmament itself cannot be approached by it otherwise than as one deserving promotion. Such disarmament, in its view, would be a result brought about by the proliferation of the social transformations which have taken place in Russia. However, non-participation of the Government of Russia in the international discussion of this subject would only induce Russia to ignore the decisions adopted thereby, which the Government of Russia, if not represented, would not be a party to.

Izvestiya, July 21, 1921.



**Excerpt from the Statement
by the Soviet Delegation
at the First Plenary Meeting
of the Genoa Conference**

April 10, 1922

[...] All efforts toward the reconstruction of the economic position of the world are vain, so long as there remains suspended over Europe and the world the menace of new wars, perhaps still more devastating than those of the past years. In this respect also Russia is disposed to contribute to the consolidation of peace to the extent which is possible and within the limits of the social and economic order existing in the majority of countries. The Delegation intend to propose, in the course of the Conference, the general limitation of armaments, and to support all proposals tending to lighten the weight of militarism, on condition that this limitation is applied to the armies of all countries, and that the rules of war are completed by the absolute prohibition of its most barbarous forms, such as asphyxiating gas and aerial warfare, as well as the use of means of terrorising peaceful populations. It follows that Russia is equally ready herself to realise the limitation of armaments, on condition of a full and complete reciprocity, and on condition that she is furnished with the necessary guarantees against any sort of attack upon or interference with her internal affairs [...]



Records of the Genoa Conference, Moscow, 1922, pp. 78-82 (in Russian).

**Statement by M. Litvinov,
Head of the Soviet Delegation,
at the First Meeting
of the Fourth Session
of the Preparatory Commission
for the Disarmament Conference
in Geneva**

November 30, 1927

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been unable to participate in the three sessions which have already been held by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, has entrusted its Delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission to make a declaration covering all questions connected with the problem of disarmament.

1. The Government of the USSR adheres to the opinion it has always held that under the capitalist system no grounds exist for counting upon the removal of the causes giving rise to armed conflicts.

Militarism and navalism are essentially natural consequences of the capitalist system. By the very fact of their increase they intensify existing differences, giving a vast impetus to all potential quarrels and inevitably converting these into armed conflicts.

The people in all countries, however, enfeebled and impoverished by the imperialist world war of 1914-1918 are imbued with the determination to struggle against imperialist wars and for the guaranteeing of peace between the nations.

This is precisely what has made it possible for the Soviet Government to accept the invitation of the League of Nations, the latter having expressed itself in favour of disarmament. In so doing the Soviet Government demonstrates in the face of the whole world its will to peace between the nations, and its wish to make clear to all with the real aspirations and true desires of the other States with regard to disarmament.

Despite the fact that the world war of 1914-1918 was called the "War to end war" the whole history of post-war international relations has been one of unintermittent and systematic increase of armed forces in the capitalist States, and of a vast increase of the general burden of militarism.

So far, none of the solemn promises of the League of Na-

tions have been even partially fulfilled, while in all its activities in this regard the League of Nations has systematically evaded setting the question in a practical light.

All the work done by the Preparatory Commission in this regard has been, so far, of a purely decorative nature. Indeed, the League of Nations only approached the question of general disarmament in 1924. It was decided to call a conference on general disarmament on the 1st May 1925, but up to the present not only has the matter of general disarmament not advanced a single step, but the date of the conference has not even been fixed.

Likewise, the League of Nations has been fruitlessly engaged upon the question of the limitation of war budgets since 1920.

The reluctance to put into practice the policy of disarmament was manifested both in the methods adopted and the alternation of the questions of disarmament and guarantees, while simultaneous attempts were made to sum up in detail all the factors determining the armed power of the various countries concerned. Such a setting of the question evoking endless and fruitless arguments on so-called military potential, affords an opportunity for the indefinite postponement of the fundamental and decisive question—the actual dimensions of disarmament.

There can be no doubt that by setting the question thus at the coming Disarmament Conference not only will it be impossible to achieve the curtailment of existing armaments, but States belonging to the League of Nations may even receive legal sanction for increasing their armaments.

The Soviet Government has systematically endeavoured to get the question of disarmament definitely and practically formulated. Its endeavours have, however, always encountered determined resistance from other States. The Soviet Government—the only one to show in deeds its will to peace and disarmament—was not admitted to the Washington Conference of 1921-22, devoted to questions of the curtailment of marine armaments. The proposal of general disarmament made by the Soviet Delegation to the Genoa Conference on the 10th of April 1922, was rejected by the Conference.

Despite this opposition, the Soviet Government has never relaxed in its determined endeavours with regard to disarmament. In December 1922, a conference was called in Moscow, by the Soviet Government, of representatives of the

border States for the joint discussion of the problem of proportional curtailment of armaments. The Soviet Government agreed to a considerable diminution of its armaments despite the fact that this would not affect many great Powers always ready, whether under the obligation of treaties or not, to come to the assistance of the other countries represented at the Moscow Conference should these be involved in conflicts with the Soviet State.

• A definite scheme for the limitation of armaments was proposed at that Conference by the Soviet Government. This scheme was, however, rejected.

Despite the sceptical attitude of the Government of the USSR towards the labours of the League of Nations, it accepted the invitation of the 12th December, 1925 to attend the coming Disarmament Conference, and only the Soviet-Swiss conflict, evoked by the assassination of Mr Vorovsky, Minister Plenipotentiary of the USSR, and the subsequent acquittal of the assassins by the Swiss Court, has prevented the USSR from attending the previous sessions of the Preparatory Commission.

In now sending its Delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, the Government of the USSR has authorised it to present a scheme for general and complete disarmament.

2. The USSR Delegation is authorised by its Government to propose the complete abolition of all land, sea and air forces.

The Government of the USSR suggests the following measures for the realisation of this proposal:

(a) The dissolution of all land, sea and air forces and the non-admittance of their existence in any concealed form whatsoever;

(b) The destruction of all weapons, military supplies, means for chemical warfare and all other forms of armament and means of destruction in the possession of troops or in military or general stores;

(c) The scrapping of all warships and military air vessels;

(d) The discontinuance of calling-up citizens for military training either in armies or public bodies;

(e) Legislation for the abolition of military service, either compulsory, voluntary or recruited;

(f) Legislation prohibiting the calling-up of trained reserves;

(g) The destruction of fortresses and naval and air bases;
(h) The scrapping of military plants and factories and of war industry equipment in general industrial works;

(i) The discontinuance of assigning funds for military purposes both on State budgets and those of public bodies;

(j) The abolition of military, naval and air ministries, the dissolution of general staffs and military administrations, departments and institutions of every kind;

(k) The legislative prohibition of military propaganda and military training of the population and of the military education both in State and public bodies;

(l) The legislative prohibition of the patenting of all kinds of armaments and means of destruction, with a view to the removal of incentives to the invention of the same;

(m) Legislation making the infringement of any of the above stipulations a grave crime against the State;

(n) The withdrawal or corresponding alteration of all legislative acts, both of national or international scope, infringing the above stipulations.

3. The Delegation of the USSR is empowered to propose the execution of the above programme of complete disarmament as soon as the Convention in question comes into force, in order that all the necessary measures for the destruction of military stores be completed in a year's time.

The Soviet Government considers that the above scheme for the execution of complete disarmament is the simplest and the most conducive to peace.

In the case, however, of capitalist States rejecting immediate actual abolition of standing armies, the Soviet Government, in its desire to facilitate the achievement of a practical agreement on complete disarmament, is prepared to make a proposal for complete disarmament to be carried out simultaneously by all contracting States, by gradual stages, during a period of four years, the first stage to be accomplished in the course of the coming year.

National funds, freed from war expenditure, to be employed by each State at its own discretion, but exclusively for productive and cultural purposes.

4. Whilst insisting upon the views just stated, the USSR Delegation is nevertheless ready to participate in any and every discussion of the question of the limitation of armaments whenever practical measures really leading to disarmament are proposed.

5. The Delegation declares that the Government of the USSR fully subscribes to the Convention on the prohibition of the application for military purposes of chemical and bacteriological substances and processes, expresses its readiness to sign the Convention immediately while insisting on an early date being fixed for its ratification by all States, and considers that, in order to ensure the practicability of the Convention, it would be necessary to raise the question of the establishment of workers' control over those chemical industries susceptible of being rapidly converted to war purposes in States having a highly developed chemical industry.

We have laid before you our programme of disarmament, but realise that its radical and exhaustive nature may make it appear at the first glance complex, difficult of realisation and perhaps even utopian. This, however, is merely because the problem of complete disarmament has always been treated as a forbidden subject and never yet thoroughly dealt with. We understand perfectly that the realisation of this programme may not be compatible with certain political interests, chiefly those of the Great Powers, the interests of war industries or those of the numerous groups of speculators, but I contend that in itself the problem of complete disarmament presents no difficulties and is capable of rapid and easy solution. It is in any case a great deal simpler and would require far less time to work out in detail than the schemes which have so far been used as a basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission.

I confess, that on acquainting myself with the findings of this Commission, I was aghast at the complexity, confusion and multiplicity of the questions with which that of disarmament had become involved. The Commission has, in effect, devoted several sessions to the discussion of the enumeration and headings of the clauses to make up an international convention for limitation of armaments. Unanimity has only been achieved with regard to certain trivial and common points. The overwhelming majority of the clauses—or rather their headings—evoked dissensions which have so far failed to be reconciled either by the Commission itself or by private negotiations between the Governments concerned. If and when, however, these dissensions have been reconciled, the Commission will still only be at the threshold of its real difficulties. The Commission will have to agree to the satisfaction of all as to what constitutes security for each country and individually, the extent and im-

portance of its international obligations, its geographical peculiarities and other special features, before the level of its effectives, technical armaments, military and air vessels, etc. can be established.

The mere enumeration of these questions will suffice to bring before us the utter hopelessness, more, the utopianism, of expecting this question to be solved within any imaginable period. The latest manifestations of international life, various international treaties recently concluded, lead not to the unification but rather to the still further division of the European and non-European countries into political groupings, and to the intensification of their mutual antagonisms, and do not afford the slightest grounds for optimism as to the outcome of the questions before the Preparatory Commission. To crown all, attempts are still being made to delay for a long time to come the work of the Preparatory Commission pending the solution of a series of political questions not less confused and complex than those I have already mentioned. One thing is certain: if the present basis of the Preparatory Commission's work is not changed, it is—even if not exploded by the abundance and weight of its own internal differences—condemned to years, if not decades, of work either completely sterile or productive of quite intangible results.

We live in a time in which the outbreak of fresh wars is no mere theoretical danger. This is not merely our opinion—many responsible statesmen in capitalist countries have expressed the same fears quite recently. The imminence of war is making itself felt everywhere. If it is to be averted, something will have to be done. In our opinion, the best guarantee of security for all peoples and all countries is immediate, complete disarmament. This problem should be faced immediately and solved in the shortest possible time. Those countries postponing the solution of this problem are taking upon themselves an enormous responsibility. I therefore beg to move on behalf of the Soviet Delegation the following resolution:

“Whereas the existence of armaments and the tendency they show to growth by their very nature inevitably lead to armed conflicts between nations, diverting the workers and peasants from peaceful, productive labour, and bringing in its train countless disasters;

“Whereas armed force is a weapon in the hands of

Great Powers for the oppression of peoples in small and colonial countries; and

“Whereas the complete abolition of armaments is at present the only real means of guaranteeing security and affording a guarantee against the outbreak of war,

“The Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference resolves:

“1) To proceed immediately to the working out in detail of a draft Convention for complete and general disarmament on the principles proposed by the USSR Delegation;

“2) To propose the convocation, not later than March 1928, of a Disarmament Conference for the discussion and confirmation of the proposals provided for in Clause 1.”

We are fully aware that certain circles will endeavour to stigmatise our programme and resolution as propaganda. We are quite ready to accept this challenge and declare that we are making propaganda for peace and shall continue to do so. If the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference is not a suitable place in which to make peace propoganda, then apparently we are here under a misunderstanding. The Soviet Government pursues, and has always pursued a resolute peace policy which it has always shown, and is still showing in deeds as well as in words. Only a few days ago, when the clouds of war seemed to be darkening the horizon on the east of Europe more ominously than ever, everything in its power was done by the Soviet Government to avert a calamity. It brought all possible arguments to bear upon the Lithuanian Government to persuade it immediately to declare the cessation of the state of war between Lithuania and Poland. The Soviet Government was also instrumental in persuading Lithuania's other two neighbours, having offered the same advice, and steps were also taken by it in Warsaw tending towards the maintenance of peace. This peace policy of my Government gives us a special right to declare that we shall not let a single opportunity slip for making the most intensive propoganda for peace and disarmament.



*Preparatory Commission for the
Disarmament Conference. Fourth
Session, 1st Meeting. November
30th, 1927.*

Draft Convention for Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament


Submitted by the Delegation
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission
of the International Disarmament Conference

February 15, 1928

To the Secretary-General,

The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference having put forward a proposal concerning the abolition of armaments at the fourth session of that Commission, I have the honour to send you herewith a draft disarmament convention, together with an explanatory note.

I have the honour to request you to forward these documents with all possible speed to the President and members of the Preparatory Commission, and to the Governments of all the countries represented in the League of Nations. The documents mentioned are intended to serve as a basis for the discussion of the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is included in the agenda of the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission.



(Signed) M. LITVINOV,
Head of the Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the Preparatory Commission
for the Disarmament Conference.

*League of Nations.
Documents of the Preparatory
Commission for the Disarmament
Conference. Series VI.
Geneva, 1928, p. 324.*

CONVENTION

Being animated by the firm desire to safeguard general peace;

Considering that the existence and increase of armed forces constitute an immense danger, and must inevitably lead to further armed conflicts;

Considering that attempts to go too deeply into the question and to examine in detail every factor relating to the existence and increase of armaments have ended in failure or have retarded the solution of disarmament questions:

The contracting states

Solemnly acknowledge that the only true method which can contribute to the safeguarding of peace is the general and complete abolition of all armed forces, and conclude the present Convention, having for this purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

Who, having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed that complete disarmament shall be undertaken, as from the date of entry into force of the present Convention, and shall be terminated within a period of four years so as to restrict the possibility of armed conflicts from the first year onwards.

Chapter I

EFFECTIVES OF THE ARMED FORCES

Article 1

All military units and formations, as well as all the effectives of the land, naval and air forces, whether of the home country or of its overseas possessions, shall be disbanded within four years as from the entry into force of the present Convention, and shall not in future be allowed in any form, whether open or secret.

The disbandment of the effectives shall be carried out in four successive stages:

- (a) In the first year, as from the entry into force of the present Convention, one-half of the effectives in service, whether officials, officers, or other ranks, shall be disbanded, and

(b) In the following years the remaining effectives in equal parts.

Note.—By effectives of the armed forces is meant effectives serving with the colours in the active army as well as the trained military reserves in each of the contracting states entered on the muster rolls of the various military and public organizations.

Article 2

The Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation, as well as general staffs, all military schools and all kinds of military commands, institutions and establishments shall be abolished, except as provided for in Article 5 of the present Convention, within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, and may not be reconstituted.

Article 3

Within a period of one year as from the entry into force of the present Convention, all returns and documents relating to military trained reserves, and kept by government institutions and public organizations, shall be destroyed.

Within the same period, all laws concerning the organization of recruitment shall be repealed.

Article 4

Within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, all documents relating to the mobilization of armed forces shall be destroyed; all mobilization measures shall be prohibited in future.

Article 5

For four years as from the entry into force of the present Convention, it shall be permissible in accordance with a special convention to maintain staffs, commands, institutions and establishments to the extent strictly necessary for the application of the technical measures required by the disbandment of the armed forces and by the performance of the necessary administrative and economic work relating to **disarmament**.

Article 6

All the files concerning the disbandment of the armed forces shall be forwarded to the civilian Ministries, within four years as from the entry into force of the present Convention.

All the files and archives of the Ministries of War, Marine, and Aviation, of the army units and of the staffs, commands, institutions and establishments, shall be destroyed within the same period.

Article 7

The personnel of the disbanded armed forces shall be provided with employment in other spheres of social and economic work. Until they are provided with employment, they may be provisionally maintained at the expense of the general state budget.

When the aforesaid persons are awarded pensions based on the number of years of service, the years spent in military service shall be reckoned as spent in the service of the state.

Article 8

The credits assigned for the upkeep of the armed forces, either in the state budget or out of the funds of the various associations, must be confined to the sums strictly necessary for the upkeep of armed forces remaining in actual military service in accordance with a special convention.

Within four years the budget for the upkeep of the armed forces must be abolished, and may not figure under any heading in the state budget.

Article 9

Within a period of one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, all laws concerning military service, whether compulsory, voluntary, or by recruiting, shall be abrogated.

The conditions of service in the armed forces until the completion of total disarmament shall be laid down in special regulations by each of the contracting states.

Article 10

Immediately after the entry into force of the present Convention the following shall be prohibited by law:

1. Special military publications:
 - (a) Scientific research and theoretical treatises.
 - (b) Works on military history.
 - (c) Manuals of military training.
 - (d) Military regulations.
 - (e) Manuals of all kinds for the study of the technical implements of war.
2. The military training of the population, including the calling up of trained reserves, and military propaganda among the population.
3. The military training of young people, either by the state or public associations.

Chapter II

MATERIAL

Part I. Land Armaments

Article 11

Within one year of the entry into force of the present Convention, the reserves of arms, ammunition and other instruments of armament and destruction enumerated below, and at the disposal of the Ministry of War shall be destroyed. Tanks, poisonous war materials and the appliances by which these materials are diffused (gas-projectors, pulverizers, balloons, and other apparatus), whether in service or in reserve, shall first be destroyed.

The arms strictly necessary for the effectives remaining with the colours may be retained by the armed forces of each of the contracting states. The proportion between the armed forces of each state and the quantity of technical implements of war enumerated in the list given below shall be determined in a special convention.

In the second, third and fourth years as from the entry into force of the present Convention, the destruction of all types of armaments shall be carried out by consecutive stages in proportion to the limitation of personnel.

After the completion of disarmament in each of the con-

tracting states the minimum quantity of arms and ammunition required for all kinds of police forces and for personal use may be retained in accordance with Articles 39, 43, and 44.

List of war material to be destroyed:

1. Automatic and magazine rifles.
2. All kinds of machine-guns, including machine-rifles and light and heavy machine-guns.
3. Mine-throwers and grenade- and bomb-throwers.
4. Revolvers and automatic pistols issued to troops.
5. Rifle and hand grenades.
6. Rifle and military revolver ammunition.
7. Guns of all calibres and types, and ammunition for same, whether complete or in component parts.
8. Tanks.
9. Gunpowder and explosives employed for exclusively military purposes.
10. All poisonous materials for war, as well as the appliances by which they are diffused, such as gas-projectors, pulverizers, balloons and other apparatus.
11. Flame throwers.
12. All technical military implements not enumerated above and intended for the wounding and destruction of man by man, as well as all parts of the articles enumerated above.

Article 12

All orders placed by the Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation for any of the armaments enumerated in the Annex to Article 11 of the present Convention shall be cancelled.

War material for the manufacture of which orders have been placed abroad shall be destroyed in the country in which it is manufactured.

Article 13

Compensation shall be paid for loss due to the cancelling of the orders mentioned in Article 12, and of the orders for the special naval and air force armaments enumerated in Articles 21 and 27, placed by the Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation. Such compensation shall be given either in

conformity with the legislative practice of each of the contracting states or in accordance with the terms of the contracts.

Article 14

Armoured cars and all other armoured means of transport, except tanks, must be disarmed, that is to say, stripped of their armour plating and their weapons which must be destroyed. This must be effected within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention.

Article 15

Revolvers and sporting guns (of a non-military pattern), intended respectively for personal defence and sport, may be left in the hands of private persons in virtue of special permits. The number of these revolvers and sporting guns which each of the contracting states may possess shall be fixed by a special convention in proportion to the number of the population.

Article 16

Explosives capable of being used for industrial, agricultural or other socially useful purposes shall not be liable to destruction, but shall be handed over by the Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation to the respective economic organizations within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention.

Part II. Naval Armaments

Article 17

Within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention, all capital ships, cruisers, aircraft-carriers, and submarines shall be withdrawn from the naval establishments.

Article 18

All other vessels and floating material constructed for the special purposes of war and enumerated in the annexed list,

together with naval aircraft, shall be withdrawn from the naval establishments within four years, withdrawal proceeding in equal parts each year, in conformity with a special convention.

List of vessels to be disarmed:

1. Coast defence battleships.
2. Torpedo craft of all types.
3. Monitors.
4. Gunboats of over 3,000 tons.
5. Floating batteries.
6. Hydroplanes of all types.

Note.—Vessels and their armaments may be retained under the conditions laid down in Articles 43 and 44 of the present Convention for the establishment of a maritime police force and for the protection of frontiers.

Article 19

The personnel of vessels withdrawn from the naval establishments shall be immediately disbanded.

At the end of three months from the removal of the vessels from the naval lists, the ordnance of such vessels and their mines and torpedo appliances shall be rendered useless in accordance with special technical arrangements; the reserve naval ordnance intended for these vessels, and torpedoes and mines, shall be destroyed.

During the nine following months the ordnance rendered useless and the mines and torpedo appliances shall be removed from the vessels and destroyed.

Article 20

Within three months of the removal from the naval establishment of vessels which cannot be employed for pacific purposes, all the machinery on board shall be rendered useless in accordance with special technical arrangements.

During the following nine months, the machinery on board shall be removed, after which the vessels themselves shall be entirely dismantled.

Article 21

As from the entry into force of the present Convention, the existing naval programmes shall be cancelled; any new construction of warships shall be forbidden.

All warships under construction or undergoing repair on orders given either in the home country or abroad shall be disarmed in the same way as vessels of the service fleet of the contracting states.

Article 22

The armament of vessels belonging to the mercantile marine shall be destroyed in the same way as that of warships during the first year of the coming into force of the present Convention.

It shall be forbidden in future to adapt and arm vessels belonging to the mercantile marine for military purposes.

Part III. Air Armaments

Article 23

During the first year of the coming into force of the present Convention, heavy bombing aircraft, torpedo-carriers and dirigibles shall be removed from the air force lists.

Article 24

All other military aircraft not mentioned in Article 23 above and which, by reason of their specifically military properties, cannot be used for social or economic purposes, shall be destroyed within four years, destruction proceeding in equal parts each year, in conformity with special technical arrangements.

Article 25

Within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention all stocks of aircraft bombs and other weapons intended to be discharged from aircraft shall be destroyed.

Article 26

The whole of the armament of military aircraft which are to be preserved for social or economic uses must be removed

and destroyed at the end of three months from the time of their withdrawal from the air force effectives. Such aircraft shall be then handed over to the respective civil organizations.

Article 27

All the aircraft belonging to the active air force must be disarmed as well as all aircraft which are in reserve or under construction on orders given in the home country or abroad.

Article 28

The arming of aircraft and all fittings for mounting weapons on aircraft shall be prohibited in future.

Aircraft intended for peaceful purposes may only be retained to an extent which is strictly in accordance with the real economic or social requirements of each country. The number to be allowed to each contracting state shall be determined by a special convention.

Part IV. Fortifications and Bases

Article 29

Within three years of the entry into force of the present Convention, the whole of the armament of fortresses and other fortified works and of naval and air force bases shall be rendered useless in conformity with a list contained in a special convention.

During the following year, the armament shall be removed and destroyed and the fortifications dismantled and demolished; it shall in future be forbidden to construct new fortified works of any kind.

Part V. Armament Industries

Article 30

With the entry into force of the present Convention, all state and private undertakings shall cease to produce any of the armaments enumerated in the list annexed to Article 11

or any of those mentioned in Articles 19, 23, 24 and 25; preparations shall be made to convert these undertakings for purposes of peaceful manufacture.

Until these undertakings are re-equipped for peaceful purposes or until the workers in armament undertakings have found employment in other enterprises, these workers shall be supported by the state, which shall provide for their requirements out of the defence budget.

Article 31

During the first year following the entry into force of the present Convention, the plans, testing apparatus, and models intended for armament industries shall be destroyed.

Article 32

Within two years of the coming into force of the present Convention, factories and enterprises engaged in the manufacture of war material and also arsenals shall be dismantled, except in the cases provided in Article 34 of the present Convention.

In state or private undertakings, all frames, machines, tools, and appliances intended exclusively for the manufacture of war materials enumerated in the Annex to Article 11 of the present Convention and in Articles 19, 23, 24 and 25, shall be destroyed.

Article 33

It shall be forbidden in future to restore any factories, enterprises, and arsenals engaged in the manufacture of war materials or to prepare any state or private productive undertakings for the manufacture of the war material enumerated in Articles 11, 19, 23, 24 and 25.

Article 34

In order to produce the minimum of arms and ammunition necessary for the police forces of all kinds provided for in Chapter III of the present Convention, and for the personal use of citizens for the purposes referred to in Article 15 of the present Convention, each contracting state shall be authorized to retain the necessary undertakings, of which

the number, productive capacity, and method of production, as well as the arrangements concerning the trade in arms, shall be laid down in a special convention.

Article 35

The production of the explosives required for the building and mining industries shall be regulated by each of the contracting states in strict conformity with economic requirements, and shall be subject to control in virtue of a special convention.

Article 36

It shall be forbidden by law to patent any form of armament, or any means of destruction.

Chapter III

ORGANIZATION OF PROTECTION

Part I. Protection on Land

Article 37

The effectives of the Customs guards, local police and forest and other guards, in each of the contracting states and the amount of their armament, shall not for a period of four years after the conclusion of the present Convention exceed the number and amount as at 1 January 1928; these effectives shall not be organized in such a way that they can be utilized for war.

Article 38

On the expiry of the period of four years laid down in the present Convention for effecting complete and general disarmament, the maintenance of a protective and police service, the personnel of which shall be engaged by voluntary contracts of service, shall be authorized in the territory of each of the contracting states, for the purpose of customs and revenue police supervision, internal police and the protection of state and private property; the amount of weapons

and simple armament strictly necessary may also be retained.

The effectives of these categories of services shall be laid down in a special convention and shall be proportionate to the population of each of the contracting states, the length of the means of communication, the existence of objects which are deemed by the state to require protection, the development of forestry, etc.

Article 39

Magazine rifles firing ten rounds and pistols of a calibre not exceeding 0.8 cm may be retained for arming the police forces and guards.

Reserve ammunition may be stored in places laid down in a special convention, but must not exceed 1,000 rounds per rifle, and 100 rounds per pistol.

The annual supply of munitions must not exceed the amount strictly required to replace worn-out armament and the actual consumption of ammunition.

Part II. Protection at Sea

Article 40

On the expiry of the period of four years laid down in the present Convention for effecting complete and general disarmament, a maritime police service shall be organized which shall exercise its functions in conformity with a special convention and which is intended for the necessary protection of the natural products of the sea and of submarine cables, the suppression of piracy and of the slave trade, and other objects which may in future form the subject of international protection on the high seas.

Article 41

With a view to protection at sea, the waters of the globe shall be divided into sixteen zones, as enumerated below.

List of Zones of Protection

Number of Zone	Name of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
1	Baltic Sea	The whole zone of the Baltic Sea, including the Cattegat and the Skager Rack; the zone is bounded on the west by long. 8°E. of Greenwich.	
2	North Sea	This zone (beginning with the north) is bounded by: lat. 70°N. from long. 4°W. of Greenwich to the west coast of Norway; the west and south coast of Norway as far as long. 8°E. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as its intersection with the German coast; the German, Dutch, Belgian, and French coasts as far as Cape St. Mathieu; the line joining this cape to the Lizard; the south and then the east coast of Great Britain as far as long. 4°W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as its intersection with lat. 70°N.	
3	Eastern Section of the Arctic Ocean	This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: long. 170°W. of Greenwich from the North Pole as far as the intersection of that meridian with lat. 66°30'N.; this parallel as far as the coast of the USSR; the coasts of the USSR, Finland and Norway as far as lat. 70°N; this parallel as far as long. 4°W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the North Pole.	
4	Western Section of the Arctic Ocean	The zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: long. 4°W. of Greenwich from the North Pole to the intersection of this meridian with lat. 60°N.; that parallel to its intersection with the east coast of Canada; the	

Number of Zone	Name of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
5	Mediterranean Sea	<p>east and north coasts of Canada and Alaska as far as lat. 6° 30'; that parallel to its intersection with long. 170°W. of Greenwich; that meridian as far as the North Pole.</p> <p>The whole zone of the Mediterranean. It is bounded on the north-east by the line Sed-El-Bahr—Kum-Kaleh; on the south-east by the north entrance of the Suez Canal; on the west by the line joining Cape Spartel and Cape Trafalgar.</p>	
6	North-east Section of the Atlantic Ocean	<p>This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: lat. 60°N. from long. 30°W. of Greenwich to long. 4°W. of Greenwich; this meridian to its intersection with the north coast of Great Britain; the north and west coasts of Great Britain as far as the Lizard; the line joining the Lizard and Cape Mathieu; the west coast of Europe as far as Cape Trafalgar; the line joining Cape Trafalgar and Cape Spartel; the west coast of Africa to the Equator; the Equator to long. 30°W. of Greenwich; that meridian as far as lat. 60°N.</p>	
7	North-west Section of the Atlantic Ocean	<p>This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: lat. 60°N. from the east coast of Canada to long. 30°W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the Equator; the Equator as far as the east coast of South America; the east coast of South America, Central America and North America as far as lat. 60°N.</p>	

Number of Zone	Name of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
8	South-east Section of the Atlantic Ocean	This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: the Equator from long. 20°W. of Greenwich to the west coast of Africa; the west coast of Africa as far as Cape Agulhas (long. 20°E. of Greenwich); this meridian as far as the South Pole; long. 20°W. of Greenwich from the South Pole to the intersection of this meridian with the Equator.	
9	South-west Section of the Atlantic Ocean	This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: the Equator from the east coast of South America to long. 20°W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the South Pole; long. 70°W. of Greenwich from the South Pole as far as the intersection of this meridian with the south coast of Tierra del Fuego; the south and east coasts of Tierra del Fuego and South America as far as the Equator.	
10	Black Sea	The whole zone of the Black Sea, including the Sea ^r of Marmora; the zone is bounded on the south-west by the line Sed-El-Bahr—Kum Kaleh.	
11	Northern Section of the Indian Ocean	The boundaries of this zone (starting from the north-west): the south entrance of the Suez Canal; the west, south and east coasts of Arabia and the south coast of Asia as far as the north entrance of the Malacca Straits; the west coast of Sumatra and the south coasts of the islands of Java, Sumbawa, Flores and Timor as far as the eastern extremity ⁿ of the island of Timor; a line drawn from the eastern	

Number of Zones	Name of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
12	Southern Section of the Indian Ocean	<p>extremity of the island of Timor to Cape Londonderry (Australia) as far as lat. 11°S.; along this parallel as far as the coast of Africa; the east coast of Africa as far as the south entrance of the Suez Canal.</p> <p>The zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: lat. 11°S. from the east coast of Africa to a line drawn from the eastern extremity of the island of Timor to Cape Londonderry (Australia); this line as far as Cape Londonderry (Australia); the west and south coasts of Australia as far as long. 143°E. of Greenwich; along this meridian as far as the South Pole; long. 20°E. of Greenwich from the South Pole as far as the south coast of Africa (Cape Agulhas); the south and east coasts of Africa as far as lat. 11°S.</p>	
13	North-west Section of the Pacific Ocean	<p>The zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: lat. 66°30'N. between the coast of the USSR and long. 170°W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the Equator; the Equator as far as long. 155°E. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as lat. 41°S.; this parallel as far as the east coast of Australia; the north coast of Australia as far as Cape Londonderry; a line drawn from Cape Londonderry to the eastern extremity of the island of Timor; the north coast of the Sundari islands: Timor, Flores, Sumbawa, Java, and the east coast of Sumatra as far</p>	

Number of Zone	Name of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
14	North-east Section of the Pacific Ocean	<p>as the north entrance of the Malacca Straits; the west, south and east coasts of the Malay Peninsula and south and east coasts of Asia as far as lat. 66°30'N.</p> <p>This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: lat. 66°30'N. from long. 170°W. of Greenwich to the west coast of Alaska; the west coast of North, Central and South America as far as the Equator; the Equator as far as long. 170°W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as lat. 66°30'N.</p>	
15	South-west Section of Pacific Ocean	<p>This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: the Equator from long. 155°E. of Greenwich to long. 135°W. of Greenwich; long. 135°W. of Greenwich as far as the South Pole; long. 143°E. of Greenwich from the South Pole to the south coast of Australia; the south and east coasts of Australia as far as lat. 11°S.; this parallel as far as long. 155°E. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the Equator.</p>	
16	South-east Section of the Pacific Ocean	<p>This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: the Equator from long. 135°W. of Greenwich to the west coast of South America; the west coast of South America and the west and south coasts of Tierra del Fuego as far as long. 70°W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the South Pole; long. 135°W. of Greenwich from the South Pole to the Equator.</p>	

Note.—Protection on inland seas washing the coasts of two or more states shall be regulated by special agreement between such states.

Article 42

The safeguarding of the international interests mentioned in Article 40 shall be entrusted, in accordance with a special convention, to regional groups of states having access to the waters enumerated in the list annexed to Article 41 of the present Convention.

Article 43

Supervision shall be exercised by maritime police vessels with a tonnage not exceeding 3,000 tons and armed with not more than two guns, the calibre of which shall not exceed 50 mm. The crews of police vessels shall be recruited by voluntary enlistment.

A maximum of 20 rifles or pistols may be retained for the armament of the crew in conformity with Article 39 of the present Convention.

Article 44

Customs supervision in territorial waters shall be exercised by unarmed vessels of the maritime Customs police having a tonnage of not more than 100 tons.

The number of the above mentioned vessels in the possession of each contracting state shall be determined by a special convention and shall be proportionate to the length of coastline.

The personnel of the maritime Customs police may be armed with rifles and pistols and shall serve on the terms laid down in Article 43 of the present Convention.

Note: The limits of territorial waters shall be fixed by a special agreement.

Chapter IV

CONTROL

Article 45

Within three months of the coming into force of the present Convention, there shall be organized a Permanent In-

ternational Commission of Control, Commissions of Control in each of the contracting states, and local Commissions of Control.

Article 46

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be entrusted with:

(a) The supervision and control of the normal and proportional progress of disarmament, with the general co-ordination of measures for carrying out the provisions of the present Convention and with the notification to each state of offences against its stipulations.

(b) The preparation of an agreement for bringing pressure by non-military measures upon any states which disturb the normal progress of disarmament as laid down by the present Convention and conventions supplementary thereto.

(c) The selection of localities, the procedure and the technical conditions for the destruction of material and the preparation of all the necessary supplementary technical agreements.

(d) The selection of centres for the manufacture of arms, the volume of such manufacture and the regulation of the trade in arms.

(e) The publication of information concerning progress in the work of disarmament.

Article 47

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall consist of an equal number of representatives of the legislative bodies and the trade unions and other workmen's organizations of all the states participating in the present Convention.

Later, the Permanent International Commission of Control may be supplemented by representatives of international associations whose aim it is to establish pacific relations between states and which have pursued this aim with success provided that these organizations express a wish to participate in the work of the Permanent International Commission of Control.

The seat of the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be at . . .

Article 48

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Permanent International Committee of Experts, consisting of an equal number of military, naval, air and other experts belonging to all the states acceding to the present Convention.

Article 49

The Permanent International Committee of Experts shall act under the orders of the Permanent International Commission of Control; it shall give opinions and shall deal with all especially technical questions referring to the execution of the present Convention.

Article 50

The Commission of Control in each of the states shall consist of representatives of the Permanent International Commission of Control appointed by the latter, representatives of public associations, trade unions and workmen's organizations, and of representatives of the peasants and the rank and file of the armed forces in the state in question.

The appointment of members of the Commission of Control shall be confirmed by the Permanent International Commission of Control.

The seat of the Commission of Control shall be the capital of the state concerned.

Article 51

The Commissions of Control in each state shall co-ordinate the disarmament work of the local Commissions of Control in absolute conformity with the present Convention and in accordance with the instructions of the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 52

The local Commissions of Control shall consist of representatives of municipal and public organizations, trade unions and workmen's associations, and of representatives of the peasants and of the rank and file of the army.

The number of local Commissions of Control, their head-

quarters and the radius of their activities shall be determined by the Commission of Control of the state in question. The latter Commission shall approve the composition of the local Commissions of Control.

Article 53

The local Commissions of Control shall proceed directly with the work of disarmament within the radius of their activities in accordance with the instructions of the Commission of Control in their country.

Article 54

The following may not be members of central or local Commissions of Control:

(a) Professional ex-soldiers and officials of the Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation.

(b) Owners of and large shareholders in military industrial undertakings, owners of and large shareholders in banking and commercial enterprises with interests in military undertakings and the trade in arms, and higher employees in all these undertakings.

Article 55

All the contracting states shall seek to give the widest publicity to the progress of disarmament and shall afford the organs of the Permanent International Commission of Control every facility for the full investigation of all activities of the state, of public associations and of private persons which are connected with the application of disarmament, or which, in the view of the Permanent International Commission of Control or its organs, give rise to doubts concerning the observance of the undertakings solemnly entered into with regard to disarmament and the discontinuance of all military preparations.

Article 56

The decisions of the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be taken by a majority vote and shall be binding on all the contracting states.

Article 57

The costs of maintenance of the Permanent International Commission of Control and its organs, as well as the expenses relating to the work of control, shall be defrayed by all the contracting states in a proportion to be settled in a special convention.

The expenses of the national and local Commissions of Control shall be defrayed by each of the contracting states.

Chapter V

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS; BREACHES OF THE CONVENTION; RATIFICATIONS

Article 58

Within one year of the entry into force of the present Convention, all the contracting states shall enact legislation providing that a breach of any of the stipulations of the Convention shall be regarded as a grave offence against the state.

At the same time, all acts of national or international importance which are contrary to the above-mentioned clauses shall be repealed or amended.

Article 59

Within nine months of the entry into force of the present Convention, the following conventions shall be concluded:

(a) In conformity with Article 8 of the present Convention, a convention on the number of staffs, commands, establishments and institutions left to each of the contracting states until the completion of full and general disarmament.

(b) In conformity with Article 15 of the present Convention, a convention on establishing the quotas of weapons for personal defence and sport.

(c) In conformity with Article 28 of the present Convention, a convention on the number of aircraft intended for serving the cultural and economic needs of each of the contracting states.

(d) In conformity with Article 29 of the present Convention, a convention giving a list of the fortresses, fortifications and naval and air bases to be destroyed.

(e) In conformity with Articles 34, 35 and 39 of the present Convention, a convention concerning the storage and production of, and trade in, a minimum quantity of war material.

(f) In conformity with Articles 41, 42, 43, and 44 of the present Convention, a convention concerning protection at sea, the allocation of the areas of protection at sea and the number of vessels required for maritime police and customs purposes.

(g) A convention laying down the constitution of the Permanent International Commission of Control and of its organs, as well as the allocation of the costs connected therewith.

(h) A convention regarding the measures of non-military pressure to be taken against states disturbing the normal progress of disarmament as provided for in the present Convention and in the supplementary agreements thereto.

Note.—The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be responsible for arranging to summon the states participating in the present Convention to a Conference for the conclusion of all the supplementary conventions mentioned in the present article.

Article 60

In the case of a direct breach of the present Convention by one of the contracting states an extraordinary assembly of the representatives of the contracting states participating in the present Convention shall be summoned as expeditiously as possible by the Permanent International Commission of Control to decide upon the steps to be taken.

The steps taken to exercise pressure must not be of a military character.

All disputes between states shall be settled by the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 61

The present Convention shall enter into force as from its ratification by all the states in conformity with the legislative practice of each of the contracting states.

Article 62

In order to determine the attitude to be taken in regard

to states not ratifying the present Convention, the contracting states shall convene a World Congress in the month of 192 , at

Article 63

The instruments of ratification shall be drawn up in five copies and shall be deposited in the capital of one of the states in the five continents.

The ratification of the present Convention in conformity with the provisions of Article 61 shall be notified to all the contracting states by

MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE DRAFT CONVENTION FOR IMMEDIATE, COMPLETE AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT

1. The Draft Convention for Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament is based on the destruction of the principal elements which form the armed strength of a country, that is to say, the organized armed forces on land, on sea and in the air, their material, and the industries connected with the production of armaments.

The Draft Convention further provides that, at the expiry of a year after its coming into force, the land, naval and air forces of all countries shall be reduced to an establishment which would be useless for warfare, thus limiting the possibility of armed conflict, even before disarmament has been completed.

2. The Draft Convention merely sets forth the general principles of disarmament applicable to the armed forces of all countries, without going into the detail of each, on the supposition that, when the essential principles have been adopted, all those details will be dealt with in a subsequent discussion of the whole question of disarmament. Thus in any case there is no need to work out technical details, this being a matter for a special body to be set up after the Convention has come into force.

3. Chapter I of the Draft Convention embodies the principles of disarmament so far as they relate to effectives.

For the first year it provides for the discharge of half the total establishment of officers, officials, and other ranks, the closing down of military schools, Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation, military staffs, commands, institutions

and establishments, and, at the same time, the destruction of mobilization plans for the armed forces and trained reserves.

By these means, armies and fleets will be reduced to a condition in which they cannot easily be used for attacks by one country on another. What is left of them will be principally occupied in effecting disarmament in connection with the destruction of material, which requires a certain amount of personnel for various kinds of work.

In this connection, questions concerning the organization of armed forces for carrying out the first stage of disarmament are looked upon as domestic questions for each country.

As regards armies organized on the territorial system, with small cadres periodically supplemented by variable effectives, disarmament will be carried out on the same principle, namely, that at the end of the first year 50 per cent of the cadres and 50 per cent of the trained reserves included in the variable effectives will be discharged.

For the rest, Chapter I of the Draft Convention develops and explains in detail the proposals put forward by the USSR delegation at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

4. Chapter II contains the most important provisions regarding the destruction of material:

(a) This chapter again deals with the principal aspect of disarmament during the first stage—the destruction of all reserve stores intended for mobilization, of which the first to be destroyed are to be those that might be employed against the civil population.

(b) After the first stage of disarmament, the army of each country will retain such arms and munitions as are strictly necessary for the establishment maintained during the succeeding years. The scale of technical war material will be limited by a special convention. The object of this limitation, as of all measures contemplated in Chapter I, is to prevent the armaments maintained during those years from being used for purposes of war.

(c) By the destruction of material is meant its reduction to a condition in which it cannot possibly be used for purposes of war.

The technique of the destruction of material will be worked out later in all its details, on the principle that the utmost possible use should be made of material which has

value for purposes of other than military production, and for the increased welfare of peoples.

(d) Article 15 of the Draft Convention provides that sporting guns of non-military pattern and revolvers for sporting purposes and for self-defence may be retained. In view of the general social situation, these measures are particularly necessary in countries where communications are undeveloped.

(e) As regards naval armaments, the Draft Convention provides in the first place for the destruction of capital ships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc., all of which are mostly used in the pursuit of imperialistic aims. The classes of warships enumerated above are removed from the effective battle fleet by the immediate discharge of the entire ship's company, which will limit the possibility of using such vessels; thereafter all the ship's ordnance will be rendered useless and then removed and destroyed (the first to be removed will be the indispensable parts of the guns, gun-laying apparatus, fire control apparatus, mine-laying and torpedo firing apparatus, etc.). When the material is rendered useless, the ammunition, mines and torpedoes will at the same time be destroyed. It will thus become impossible to use these warships for war purposes without lengthy preparation.

The Draft Convention allows of the use of disarmed warships as merchant vessels when necessary alterations have been made.

By dismantling warships is meant their disarmament by the removal of their armour-plating, the destruction of the special apparatus such as turrets, gun platforms, control positions (*roufs de guerre*), aircraft platforms, war signalling apparatus, and any other special devices for war purposes.

(f) The disarmament of military air forces involves in the first place the destruction of heavy aircraft as engines of war. Taking into consideration the social importance of aircraft as a means of communication, the Draft Convention does not make the destruction of the material essential to disarmament, since some of the aircraft can be converted to social and economic uses; but as there is no great difficulty in fitting aircraft for bomb dropping and as this can be done very quickly, the number of aircraft in the civil fleet must admittedly be proportionate to the country's genuine need, and this is provided for in Article 28 of the Draft Convention.

(g) Fortifications and bases must be destroyed, since they can be used as bases for aggression.

(h) The question of the destruction of war industries is particularly complicated, because a highly developed industry contains great potential forces for the production of armaments. Here, again, however, there are a number of essential appliances by the destruction of which the manufacture of armaments can be made very difficult. These include drawings, measuring instruments, models, frames, machines, tools, and appliances specially designed for the manufacture of armaments. Further, the actual demilitarization of military factories, their use for the manufacture of non-military products, the employment in other factories of plant that is not specifically military, and the destruction of everything necessary for mobilization preparations, will make it a very complicated matter to use these factories for war purposes.

5. Chapter III deals with the organization of protection, and, in this connection, in order to prevent any possibility of using the various forces for military purposes or as a nucleus for disguised military forces, the establishments of the police forces or militia, gendarmerie, and other kinds of guards must be kept strictly within their present limits throughout the period of four years provided for the completion of general disarmament. Subsequently, the establishments of the Customs and revenue guards and local police will be fixed by a special convention on a scale proportionate to the population, length of communications, property to be protected, and development of forestry.

Police forces of every kind must be armed with modern weapons of the simplest pattern, because if a more complicated armament were retained, it might be easier for these formations to be used as armed forces in attacks by stronger upon weaker countries. Naval policing is regarded not as a matter to be dealt with separately by each country, but as providing for the needs of a whole group of countries, so that it cannot possibly be turned to imperialistic ends. Maritime police will only be provided with the armament strictly necessary for the performance of their duties.

6. Although complete and general disarmament is wholly conditional upon the goodwill of all countries it seems necessary to make definite arrangements for its successive stages and for the maintenance of proportions, and to establish a special body to work out the technical details of

disarmament and settle any disputes which may arise. With this object, Chapter IV of the Draft Convention lays down the principles of the control which is based upon the widest reciprocity, full publicity, and participation in the work by those classes of the population which are most interested in the speedy completion of disarmament.

As there is at present in the world no authority whose decisions must be obeyed by all countries, this status might be conferred upon a Permanent International Commission of Control—which of course presupposes the goodwill and the consent of all countries. The composition of this Commission would be a guarantee of the impartiality of its decisions, and, as there would be a Committee of Experts attached to it, technical questions could be quickly settled.

7. Chapter V contains suggestions for the conclusion of supplementary conventions on various questions connected with disarmament, and indicates the procedure for ratifying conventions and settling any questions arising out of violations.

It is this group of questions that are the most complicated; but the Draft Convention does not allow of any military pressure being brought to bear on any country, because such measures are apt to give rise to serious international conflicts; and it is hoped that most countries are so genuinely anxious to effect complete and general disarmament that other means will always be found to compel any country seeking to violate the obligations it has assumed to discharge them faithfully.

**Draft Convention
on the Reduction of Armaments
Submitted by the Delegation
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

March 23, 1928

CONVENTION

Considering that the immense growth in armaments and in militarism in general imposes a heavy burden on the peoples of the entire world and lowers the level of their culture and their material well-being;

And considering that the atrocious struggle between the various States for predominance in armaments and the tendency to increase the number of weapons for murderous and destructive military purposes are one of the factors which increase the possibility and the likelihood of armed outbreaks;

And desiring to protect to the fullest possible extent the peaceful population of workers against the immediate dangers which threaten their life and property in the event of the outbreak of armed strife;

The Contracting States have decided, with the object of taking a first serious and genuine step towards general and complete disarmament, to conclude the present Convention by appointing as their representatives

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who, having communicated to each other their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Whereas a comparatively small number of the most powerful States, which aspire to a role of world domination, which expend on land, naval and air armaments a large portion of the national budgets, and which possess the power at any moment to increase unduly the armaments

which support their aggressive policies by availing themselves of highly developed industries, have at their disposal by far the greater proportion of land, naval and air armaments.

The Contracting States recognise that the only just course to pursue is that of a progressive reduction of all kinds of armaments as regards their composition and number, this method being the least injurious to the interests of the weakest States, which are economically dependent on the stronger, and it is accordingly desirable to take this principle as a basis for the reduction of armaments.

Chapter I.—ARMED LAND FORCES

Section 1.—Effectives

Article 1

In accordance with the Preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States, when effecting the reduction of the armed land forces, agree to divide all States into the following main groups:

(a) Group A: States maintaining armed land forces numbering over 200,000 men serving with the colours in the active army, or having in the cadres of the armed land forces more than 10,000 regular officers or more than 60 regiments of infantry (180 battalions);

(b) Group B: States maintaining armed land forces numbering over 40,000 men serving with the colours in the active army, or having in the cadres of the armed forces more than 2,000 regular officers or more than 20 regiments of infantry (60 battalions);

(c) Group C: All other States maintaining armed forces inferior in number and composition to the figures given for Group B;

(d) Group D: States disarmed after the world war.

Notes.—1. In all the calculations mentioned above, account shall be taken of the total number of the armed land forces maintained by the State in question in the home country, in occupied territories and in the colonies, including military police, military gendarmerie corps and depot guards.

The numbers of the police forces organised on a military basis, gendarmerie, Customs guards, train guards, forest

guards and other armed corps organised for the needs of the Customs preventive service, for the maintenance of order within the country and the protection of Government and public property shall be determined by means of a special Convention.

2. By persons "serving with the colours in the active army" are understood all persons serving permanently in the cadres of the armed forces and all persons serving in the army cadres as conscripts.

3. By "officers" (commanders) are understood all persons who have received specific military training and are described as "officers" (commanders) under the military law of the Contracting States.

Article 2

Recognising that, among the methods of reducing armed land forces, the simplest and the fairest for all the States concerned, and that which at the same time least affects the system of organising, recruiting and training such forces, consists in applying the same coefficient of reduction to all States in the same group (Article 1 of the present Convention), the Contracting States agree to fix the coefficient at the following figures: (a) States in Group A shall reduce their armed land forces by one-half; (b) States in Group B by one-third; (c) States in Group C by one-fourth.

Note.—The proportionate strength of the armed land forces for States in Group D shall be fixed under special conditions to be determined by the Disarmament Conference.

Article 3

The armed land forces of the Contracting States shall be reduced by applying the coefficients mentioned in Article 2 of the present Convention to the following totals:

(a) To the aggregate total of the effectives serving with the colours in the active army, men belonging to the variable militia formations, the territorial formations, the organised reserves and other military formations receiving military training with the colours or elsewhere; officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks shall be reckoned separately in each case;

(b) To the number of the organised units and corps of the main categories of field troops in the regular or territorial armies, in the militia forces, in the organised reserves and in other military formations which can be employed immediately without an order for mobilisation or which exist and are recognised in peace-time as cadres of the armed forces in war.

Article 4

The number of the effectives and units and the corps of the land forces which the Contracting Parties must not exceed shall be laid down in a supplementary Convention based on the following principles:

(a) The coefficients of reduction mentioned in Article 2 of the present Convention shall be applied to each State according to the group to which they belong (Article 1 of the present Convention) separately in the case of: (1) each category of armed land forces (regular army, territorial militia, organised reserves, etc.); (2) the total number of the armed land forces stationed in the home country, in occupied territories and in the colonies; (3) the total number of regular officers and regular non-commissioned officers and officers of the variable effectives; (4) the number of units and corps of each category of troops.

(b) In accordance with the foregoing, the following tables shall be annexed to the supplementary Convention. Each table shows, after the reduction of each category of armed forces, the remaining number of units and corps of infantry, field artillery and cavalry which make up the general effectives classified under the headings of officers, non-commissioned officers and voluntarily enlisted other ranks (total number), of the administrative services, civic education service, intendance, chaplains department, etc.:

Table I: Maximum home forces;

Table II: Maximum overseas forces stationed in the home country;

Table III: Maximum forces of dominions and other overseas possessions;

Table IV: Maximum forces of the home country stationed in each colony, dominion or other overseas possession;

Table V: Maximum of the total forces of each State.

(c) The aforesaid coefficients of reduction used in cal-

culating effectives will be applied to the effectives of the armed forces as shown in the returns on January 1, 1928.

Article 5

With the object of limiting the accumulation of trained reserves, the Contracting States agree:

(a) To reduce in each year-class, according to the coefficients of reduction given above, the aggregate number of men who have received military training and of officers who have received military training either with the colours or elsewhere;

(b) To pass legislation prohibiting the existence of any civil bodies organised on a military basis by specialised instructors drawn from the army, and the assembly of such bodies for training, as also the military training of the civilian population at the instance of civil associations.

Section 2.—Material

Article 6

For the armament of land forces, the existing patterns shown in the tables at January 1, 1928, shall be retained, except tanks and heavy artillery with very long range, which are essentially designed for aggression.

Article 7

All implements of war directed primarily against the civilian population which does not directly take part in the armed conflict (military aircraft and chemical weapons) must be destroyed as provided in the special Convention.

Article 8

The quantities of arms for the land armies shall be strictly limited according to:

(a) The needs of the army in time of peace;

(b) The number of trained reservists in each year-class, the number of such classes being the same for all countries in any one group (Article 1 of the present Convention) and not exceeding ten classes for countries in Group A, with a

subsequent progressive increase of 50 per cent and 100 per cent respectively for Groups B and C.

Article 9

The maximum number of weapons allowed for every thousand trained reservists shall be fixed for each country in strict conformity with the normal proportions existing in the principal arms in different countries and for different forms of armament.

Article 10

The actual maximum quantities of arms allowed for troops at depots and elsewhere in the territory of the State, which quantities may not be exceeded, shall be fixed on the bases laid down in Articles 8 and 9 of the present Convention, by an additional Convention and by annexed tables according to the list in paragraph (b) of Article 5 of the present Convention.

Each table must contain general summarised figures under the following heads:

1. Rifles, carbines and pistols: (a) automatic; (b) non-automatic.

Note.—Automatic rifles, carbines and pistols are to be classified as light machine-guns.

2. Machine-guns: (a) heavy; (b) light.

3. Artillery: (a) light field guns (76-millimeter guns and 122-millimeter howitzers); (b) heavy field guns (105-millimeter guns and 150-millimeter howitzers); (c) heavy guns and howitzers (over 150 millimeters and up to 204 millimeters); (d) mortars and trench mortars of all patterns; (e) guns accompanying the infantry: (aa) guns and howitzers; (bb) mine-throwers, grenade-throwers and bomb-throwers;

4. Armoured cars;

5. Spare parts, machinery, gun carriages and gun barrels;

6. Cartridges (for rifles and pistols);

7. Grenades (hand and rifle);

8. Shells for guns of the calibres and patterns mentioned above;

9. *Armes blanches.*

Article 11

All arms in the territory of the Contracting States over and above the quantities specified in Article 10 of the present Convention shall be destroyed.

Chapter II.—NAVAL FORCES

Article 12

In accordance with the principles set forth in the Preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States agree to effect a reduction of their naval forces on the following basis:

(a) States which on January 1, 1928, had a fleet whose aggregate tonnage exceeded 200,000 tons shall reduce their naval forces by one-half, such reduction to affect both the aggregate tonnage of the entire fleet and the tonnage in each of the following classes of warship: capital ships; other warships of displacement exceeding 10,000 tons; light forces; submarines.

(b) States which on January 1, 1928, had a fleet whose aggregate tonnage was less than 200,000 tons shall reduce their naval forces by one-fourth of the aggregate tonnage of the entire fleet.

(c) As soon as the present Convention comes into force, aircraft-carriers shall be struck off the establishment of the navy. Within six months they must be disarmed and so converted as to make it quite impossible for them to be used for warlike purposes.

Note.—The strength of the naval forces of those States which were disarmed after the war of 1914-18 shall be fixed in accordance with special principles to be laid down by the Disarmament Conference.

Article 13

The maximum specific tonnage which must not be exceeded by the Contracting States shall be fixed in accordance with the above-mentioned principles by a special Convention, to be concluded within three months from the day on which the present Convention comes into force.

Article 14

The division of the fleet into vessels which are to be struck off the naval establishment and vessels which are to remain on the establishment, the names of the vessels being given (within the limits of the tonnage allowed under Article 12 of the present Convention), shall be effected by each Contracting Party. Within one year from the coming into force of the present Convention, those warships which each Party designates to be struck off the establishment of the navy must be disarmed and put into such a condition that they cannot possibly be used for warlike purposes.

Note.—The disarmament of warships comprises the removal of the armour, guns and torpedoes, the destruction of special fittings, armoured turrets, conning towers, fire-control instruments, communications for use in battle, and aircraft-launching devices.

Article 15

The procedure for striking vessels off the naval establishment and putting them into such a condition that they cannot possibly be used for warlike purposes shall be fixed by an additional technical agreement which shall be attached to the present Convention, and shall be concluded in accordance with Article 13 of the present Convention.

Article 16

The Contracting States agree that, as from the entry into force of the present Convention, warships (both those which are to be constructed in future and those which are now on the stocks) shall only be constructed to replace vessels of the corresponding classes or categories which have been retained on the establishment of the fleet after the reduction has been effected as provided in Articles 12 and 13. Such vessels must satisfy the following conditions:

(a) Except in case of total loss, no vessel may be replaced until it has reached the age-limit, as specified below:

Capital ships	} 25 years
Coast defence vessels	
Cruisers of over 7,000 tons	
Cruisers of under 7,000 tons	} 20 years.
Flotilla leaders	
Torpedo-boat destroyers	

Submarines 15 years.

(b) The maximum standard displacement for a warship shall be fixed at 10,000 metric tons. Vessels of more than 10,000 tons displacement now included in the naval forces shall be struck off when they reach the age-limit specified in paragraph (a) of this article;

(c) The maximum calibre of the guns mounted in warships shall be fixed at 12 inches (304.8 millimeters);

(d) No warship may be fitted with appliances for the carrying of aircraft;

(e) The maximum limits for vessels by classes and categories are laid down as follows:

Class or category of vessel	Standard displacement	Calibre of guns	Age-limit
Capital ships } Coast-defence vessels } Cruisers of over 7,000 tons	10,000 tons	12 inches (304.8 millimeters)	25 years
Cruisers of under 7,000 tons	—	8 inches (203.2 millimeters)	25 years
Flotilla leaders } Torpedo-boat destroyers } Torpedo-boats } Submarines	— 1,200 tons 600 tons	6 inches (152.4 millimeters) 4 inches (101.6 millimeters) 4 inches (101.6 millimeters)	20 years 20 years 15 years

Note.—The standard displacement of a ship is the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, with engines and boilers, equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements and supplies of every description that are intended to be carried in war, including fuel and reserve feed water for engines and boilers. The calculation must be made in metric tons.

Article 17

The Contracting States agree to assume the following obligations: (a) not to use for warlike purposes warships

which have been struck off the establishment of the fleet and replaced by new constructions (except in cases which may be specially provided for in supplementary technical agreements); (b) not to hand over or sell their warships to foreign states if the latter can use them as warships super-numerary to the establishment laid down for each State by the present Convention; (c) not to build or allow to be built in their territories any warships exceeding any of the limits laid down in Article 16 of the present Convention; (d) not to cause new vessels to be constructed in foreign yards over and above the limit laid down for each Contracting State; (e) not to equip merchant vessels with any apparatus or appliance enabling such vessels to be used for warlike purposes.

Article 18

The Contracting States agree to limit the quantity of shells and torpedoes as follows: (a) for guns of calibres from 8 to 12 inches (203.2 to 304.8 millimeters), 200 rounds each; (b) for guns of calibres from 4 to 7.9 inches (101.6 to 200.7 millimeters), 500 rounds each; (c) for guns of calibres less than 4 inches (101.6 millimeters), 1,000 rounds each; (d) for each torpedo-tube, two torpedoes.

Article 19

All supplies of ammunition and torpedoes over and above the quantities specified in Article 18 must be destroyed.

Chapter III.—AIR ARMAMENTS

Article 20

Within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, all military dirigibles and aircraft shall be disarmed and placed in a condition precluding their utilisation for military purposes.

Note.—The disarmament of aircraft belonging to the armed forces includes the removal of guns, machine-guns and special appliances for the discharge of bombs and other instruments of destruction.

Article 21

In conformity with the Preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States agree, when carrying into effect the reduction of air armaments, to divide all States into the following main groups: (a) Group E: States having more than 200 aeroplanes in service in their armed forces; (b) Group F: States having from 100 to 200 aeroplanes in service in their armed forces; (c) Group G: States having fewer than 100 aeroplanes in service in their armed forces.

States in Group E shall reduce their air forces by one-half; States in Group F by one-third, and States in Group G by one-quarter, with a simultaneous reduction of the engine-power of each aeroplane to 400 horse-power on the ground.

Article 22

In addition to the standard laid down in Article 21, reserve machines, and engines for these machines, up to a number not exceeding 25 per cent of the total number of aeroplanes in service after their reduction, may be maintained in the establishment of the air forces.

Article 23

All other machines, whether in service or in reserve, together with the engines for these machines, in excess of the limits laid down in Articles 21 and 22 of the present Convention shall be destroyed.

Article 24

When applying Articles 21, 22 and 23 of the present Convention, aeroplanes with engines of over 400 horse-power shall be the first to be destroyed.

Article 25

All arming of civil aircraft and all fittings enabling them to be armed or to be utilised for war are prohibited.

Article 26

With regard to the types of aeroplanes and their armaments, Article 6 of the present Convention shall apply. The armament of military air forces is included in the standards laid down in Article 10 of the present Convention.

Article 27

All stocks of air bombs and other instruments of destruction intended to be discharged by aircraft shall be destroyed within three months of the entry into force of the present Convention. It shall henceforth be prohibited to manufacture or retain them in the army or in the reserve of the military air forces.

Article 28

The effectives of the military air forces must be reduced in proportion to the decrease in the number of machines in service.

Article 29

The precise maximum numbers of machines in service and in reserve, of the engines intended for their use, and of the military air force effectives, classified as officers, pilots and other personnel serving on board aircraft, which must not be exceeded by the Contracting States, shall be fixed in conformity with Articles 21 and 28 of the present Convention in a supplementary Convention.

To the latter shall be annexed the following tables:

Table I: Maximum armed air forces stationed in the home country;

Table II: Maximum armed air forces stationed in each colony, dominion or other oversea possession;

Table III: Maximum of all armed air forces.

Article 30

With a view to restricting the production of military aeroplanes and the trade therein, the Contracting States agree to conclude, within three months from the entry into

force of the present Convention, a supplementary Convention on the limitation to be imposed on the manufacture and trade in war aeroplanes in proportion to the legitimate requirements of the new effectives of the military air forces as fixed in the tables indicated in Article 29.

Chapter IV.—CHEMICAL METHODS OF WARFARE

Article 31

All methods of and appliances for chemical aggression (all asphyxiating gases used for warlike purposes, as well as all appliances for their discharge, such as gas-projectors, pulverisers, balloons, flame-throwers and other devices) and for bacteriological warfare, whether in service with troops or in reserve or in process of manufacture, shall be destroyed within three months of the date of the entry into force of the present Convention.

Article 32

The industrial undertakings engaged in or adapted for the production of the means of chemical aggression or bacteriological warfare indicated in Article 31 of the present Convention shall be dismantled within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention on the basis of an additional technical agreement.

Article 33

The Contracting States undertake, within three months of the entry into force of the present Convention, to ratify the Protocol on the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare signed at Geneva in 1925.

Chapter V.—ARMAMENTS BUDGETS

Article 34

The total amounts of the armaments budgets calculated at their true values shall be reduced in proportion to the reduction of land forces in Groups A, B and C, of air forces in Groups E, F and G, and of naval forces as provided for in Articles 12 and 13 of the present Convention. The said

reduction in budgets shall also apply to the items of expenditure on personnel (pay, clothing, victualling, quarters) and those relating to orders for implements of war and ammunition and to their upkeep.

Article 35

No secret funds intended to disguise extraordinary expenditure on special preparations for war and the strengthening of armaments may be included in State budgets.

In conformity with the above stipulation, all expenditure on the upkeep of the armed forces of each State shall be brought together in a single chapter of the State budget; it shall be open to publicity in all respects.

Article 36

The reduction of the armaments budgets shall be carried out as from the year 1929 *pari passu* with the reduction of armed forces and of war material. As from 1930, the maximum figures of these budgets shall be fixed separately for each of the Contracting States. Thereafter, no increase shall be made in them.

Chapter VI.—TIME-LIMITS FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION

Article 37

The reduction of land, naval and air armaments in conformity with Articles 2, 5, 11, 12*, 21, 22, 23 and 28 of the present Convention shall be carried out by the Contracting States in the course of two years, the first year being devoted to preparatory work and the second to the practical application of all the measures relating to the reduction of armaments.

Article 38

All the other measures for the reduction of armaments

* Due to an error in the English version of *League of Nations. Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Series VI* (Geneva, 1928, pp. 347-355.) Art. 12 was not originally mentioned.

shall be carried out within the periods provided for in the relevant articles of the present Convention (Articles 20, 27, 31, 32 and 36).

Chapter VII.—CONTROL

Article 39

Within three months from the date of entry into force of the present Convention, a Permanent International Commission of Control shall be organised, with the following duties:

(a) The supervision, control and general co-ordination of the measures relating to the application of the present Convention, and the notification to each State of breaches of the provisions of the present Convention;

(b) The preparation of an agreement concerning the pressure to be brought to bear upon States which may fail to carry out the provisions of the present Convention and of the supplementary conventions and technical arrangements completing it;

(c) The selection of the places, the procedure and the technical conditions for the destruction of material, and the preparation of all the necessary supplementary technical agreements;

(d) The study of questions relating to further reductions of armaments and the preparation of international agreements relating thereto;

(e) Communication to the Contracting States and the public of information concerning progress in the work of reducing armaments.

Article 40

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall consist of an equal number of representatives of the legislative bodies and of the trade unions and other workers' organisations of all States participating in the present Convention.

The Permanent International Commission of Control will later include representatives of international associations whose aim it is to establish pacific relations between States and which have pursued this aim with success, provided

that these organisations express a wish to participate in the work of the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 41

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Permanent International Committee of Experts, consisting of an equal number of military, naval, air and other experts belonging to all the States acceding to the present Convention.

The Permanent International Committee of Experts shall act under the orders of the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 42

The following may not be members of the Permanent International Commission of Control:

(a) Professional soldiers and officials of Ministries of War, Marine and Military Aviation;

(b) Owners of and shareholders in military industrial undertakings, owners of and large shareholders in banking and commercial enterprises with interests in military undertakings and the traffic in arms, and higher employees in all these undertakings.

Article 43

With a view to ensuring genuine control, the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be entitled to carry out investigations on the spot in the event of reasonable suspicion of a breach of the present Convention and of the subsequent supplementary agreements on the reduction and limitation of armaments, and to appoint for this purpose special commissions of enquiry.

Article 44

In enterprises for the production of war material or in enterprises capable of being utilised for the manufacture of armaments, a permanent labour control may be organised by the workers' committees of the factories or by other organs of the trade unions operating in the respective enter-

prises, with a view to limiting the possibility of breaches of the corresponding articles of the present Convention.

A similar control shall be set up in the various branches of the chemical industry, of which a list shall be drawn up by the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 45

The Contracting States undertake to furnish the Permanent International Commission of Control, within the time-limits fixed by it, with full information as to the situation of their armed forces, in accordance with the list and tables prescribed by the present Convention and the subsequent supplementary agreements on the reduction and limitation of armaments, as well as with particulars of the number of aeroplanes and dirigibles in civil aviation registered as such in the territory of each of the Contracting States.

Article 46

The statutes of the Permanent International Commission of Control, the procedure for examining complaints concerning the non-observance of the obligations entered into for the reduction and limitation of armaments, the organisation of the procedure to be followed in local investigations, and the nature of labour control in regard to production (Article 44) shall be settled by means of a supplementary Convention within not more than three months from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention.

Chapter VIII.—RATIFICATION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION

Article 47

The present Convention shall enter into force as from the date of its ratification, in conformity with the legislative practice of the Contracting States, by all the States in Groups A and B for the reduction of land armaments, as laid down in Article 1 of the present Convention, or in the first group for the reduction of naval armaments, as laid down in paragraph (a) of Article 12 of the present Convention.

Article 48

All subsequent supplementary Conventions to be concluded in consequence of the present Convention shall be signed and ratified within not less than six months from the date of the entry into force of the latter.

Article 49

The instruments of ratification shall be drawn up in five copies and shall be deposited in the capital of a State in each of the five continents.

The ratification of the present Convention in conformity with the provisions laid down in Article 47 shall be notified to all the Contracting States by

League of Nations. Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Series VI. Geneva, 1928, pp. 347-355.

**Declaration by the Delegation of the USSR
at the Final Meeting
of the Preparatory Commission
for the Disarmament Conference**

December 9, 1930

I

The delegation of the USSR, which is not a Member of the League, is participating in the deliberations of the Preparatory Commission without assuming any obligations as regards the League of Nations. For this reason, it did not take part in the preparation of the Report which is to be submitted to the Council.

However, taking into account the fact that the Report of the Preparatory Commission is a document intended for publicity, and for the needs of the future Disarmament Conference, the Soviet delegation thinks it necessary to explain its position during the labours of the Commission, and to explain its attitude to the Draft Convention elaborated by the latter.

That attitude is entirely negative and is thus completely at variance with the appraisal by the Committee's majority as reflected in the Report supplemented to the Draft Convention. That is an additional reason for our delegation for refusing all responsibility for the Draft prepared by the Preparatory Commission and for declining to participate in its analysis, which is given in the Report.

The Soviet delegation's position on disarmament, expressed in detail in all its proposals and statements as reflected in the records of the fourth, fifth and sixth sessions, is herein summarized as follows.

II

Faithful to the fundamental principles of the Soviet Government's foreign policy, the Soviet Delegation has taken a most active part in the work of the Preparatory Commission, moved by the consistent desire to see genuinely effec-

live measures adopted for the reduction of all kinds of armaments with a view to reducing, to some extent at least, the danger of war.

In doing so, and as opposed to many other delegations, whose efforts in their entirety were aimed at protecting their military interests and using the Convention on Disarmament as a means for establishing a new balance of existing forces, which would better correspond to their intentions, the Soviet delegation has clearly stated that it is not seeking any special advantages and is prepared to agree to the destruction of armaments or to their maximum reduction.

The Soviet Delegation has always vigorously opposed attempts to make disarmament conditional on security or other arbitrary factors usually used to justify the need for maintaining or enhancing armaments.

III

With this fundamental aim as its starting point, the Soviet Delegation from the first day of its participation in the work of the Preparatory Commission submitted a proposal for immediate, complete and general disarmament. This draft was rejected at the fifth session of the Commission. The Commission at the time had no serious argument to put forward against the Soviet proposal; it confined itself to stating that "practically all its members are of the opinion that this Draft cannot be accepted by the Commission as a basis for its work, which work must be pursued along the lines already mapped out".

In rejecting the Soviet Draft Convention for Disarmament the Preparatory Commission rejected the only effective guarantee of peace, at the same time recording its opinion that the Statutes of the League of Nations do not admit of complete disarmament.

IV

In the same spirit, and in the hope of securing the adoption of measures for disarmament, with at any rate some degree of efficacy, the Soviet Delegation, after its first draft had been rejected, taking into account the fact that the great majority of the Commission had opposed to the Soviet proposal for total and general disarmament the conception of partial and gradual reduction of armaments, put forward

a Draft Convention for the reduction of armaments without, however, abandoning its initial draft.

V

The Soviet Draft Convention for the reduction of armaments was based on three principles, which are the fundamental principles of all genuine reduction of armaments. They were explained by the Soviet Delegation on April 17th, 1929. They are as follows: (1) Existing armaments should be substantially reduced; (2) this reduction should be based on proportional principles or on any other equally objective standard, applying equally to all States with certain exceptions in favour of the smallest and least protected countries; (3) the numerical coefficients of reduction to be fixed in the Draft Convention by the Preparatory Commission.

By its resolution of April 19th, 1929 the Commission rejected the three principles put forward by the Soviet Delegation, thus demonstrating that it has little desire to bring about a genuine and effective reduction of armaments.

VI

The successive rejection by the Preparatory Commission of two Soviet proposals, one for complete disarmament and the other for reduction of armaments, would have given the Soviet Delegation sufficient grounds for deciding to withdraw from participation in the work of the Commission. But desirous as it was to persevere to the last in the attempt to elicit from the Preparatory Commission some sort of tangible results, and unwilling as it was to afford anyone a pretext for attributing the patent lack of success of its labours to the non-participation in the deliberations of representatives of the USSR Government, the Soviet Delegation continued to take part in the work of the Commission.

VII

In taking part in the discussion of the draft prepared by the Commission itself, the Soviet Delegation endeavoured, by means of amendments and concrete proposals, to do something towards bringing the Commission's draft nearer to the conception which must underlie any Draft Convention for the reduction of armaments.

During the debate the Soviet Delegation not only spoke out in favour of individual principles, but also made its own proposals, pressed for their adoption and voted in favour of them and against proposals tantamount to renouncing disarmament; it opposed any system aimed at justifying or concealing such renunciation.

Regrettably, the overwhelming majority of the Preparatory Commission, by systematically rejecting the Soviet motions and following always the line of least resistance, deprived the Commission's draft, from which all figures had already been omitted, of all meaning, using the draft to mask and justify the maintenance and increase of existing armaments.

VIII

The Soviet Delegation considers it necessary to state in precise form its most important and most general objections to the Draft Convention as it has emerged from the last Session of the Preparatory Commission. Its objections are as follows:

1. The Soviet Delegation has strongly insisted on the need for an appreciable reduction of armaments. In 1929, the Preparatory Commission would not agree to mentioning this principle; in 1930, although it included the principle in its Draft at the insistence of the Soviet Delegation, it did so in a form which was quite unsatisfactory.

The Soviet Delegation is opposed to the ambiguous formula "limitation and as far as possible reduction" in place of a clear and precise statement that it is absolutely essential for existing armaments to be reduced to an appreciable extent. The Soviet Delegation notes that the formula adopted leaves a free field for the maintenance and even increase of armaments.

2. The Preparatory Commission's decision on the limitation of the armed forces' effectives in peacetime is, in substance, a non-measure, since the General Staffs themselves do not seek any increases in the strength of modern armies. Quite the opposite, the armies' structures and the quality of their effectives are undergoing major changes towards greater emphasis on military requirements during mobilisations and in war-time. Thus, as regards the question of the effectives, the Preparatory Commission is merely reflecting modern militarism's latest tendencies.

The USSR Delegation is opposed to the Commission's decision with regard to effectives, for the following reasons:

(a) Owing to the refusal of the Commission to reduce the trained reserves which constitute one of the principal elements of the armed forces amassed in peacetime, with a view to creating enormous modern armies in case of war;

(b) Owing to the refusal of the Commission to lay down for each arm separately the reduction in the number of professional soldiers, officers and non-commissioned officers and pilots, the high percentage of which guarantees the rapid formation of big armies;

(c) Owing to the inadequate character of limitation of the period of military service alone, which in the case of certain countries is only a device for increasing the trained reserves.

3. The Soviet Delegation is opposed to the refusal of the Commission;

(a) to reduce directly the material of land armaments in service, in reserve or in stock which, in view of the mechanisation of modern armies, are a means of making good the reduction in the numbers of men;

(b) to abolish tanks and long-range artillery, representing the most aggressive form of armaments and the most dangerous for the civilian population, and to prohibit the introduction of newly invented implements of war, as fostering the competition in armaments.

4. The Soviet Delegation is opposed to the refusal of the Commission to lay down the minimum limits proposed by the Soviet Delegation for the various classes of vessels of war and their guns with a view to limiting the aggressive and destructive power of contemporary navies, and is opposed to the excessive standards given by way of indication, and to the exemption of a considerable number of warships from all reduction.

The Soviet Delegation is also opposed to the fact that the future Convention confirms the Naval Treaties of Washington and London which have legalised the maintenance of the total tonnage of the fleets at their present high level and the considerable increase of various classes of warships.

The Soviet Delegation is further opposed to the refusal of the Commission to forbid the adaptation of merchant vessels for use in time of war as naval units.

5. The Soviet Delegation notes that the minimum limits for individual naval units, as stipulated by the Commission

in approximate terms, differ substantially from those proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

Battleships:

The Commission's figure—35,000 tonnes or less;

Soviet proposal—10,000 tonnes or less.

Submarines:

The Commission's figure—2,000 tonnes or less;

Soviet proposal—600 tonnes or less.

It should be noted that the determination of standard displacement on the basis of the method chosen by the Commission would artificially reduce the vessels' tonnage to 40 per cent of the actual displacement.

6. The Soviet Delegation is opposed to the refusal of the Commission to prohibit aerial bombardment, which constitutes a special danger for the civil population taking no direct part in military operations.

The Soviet Delegation is also opposed to the refusal of the Commission to reduce all the military air material in stock.

The Soviet Delegation is further opposed to the refusal of the Commission to render compulsory the reduction of armaments in the home country and in each oversea country separately, failing which the Colonial Powers, by concentrating their armed forces in one of these territories, are capable of threatening the neighbouring countries or the native population. The same objection applies to the effectives of all armed forces.

7. The Soviet Delegation is opposed to the refusal of the Commission to prohibit the manufacture in peacetime of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, and their storing with armies and in depôts, which compromises the effect of the prohibition of their use in war-time.

8. The Soviet Delegation cannot take any definitive decisions on the chapter on budgetary reduction, since the Commission has refrained from adopting any concrete resolution on this subject, referring it to the Committee of Experts, without having decided to reduce military expenditure under each separate head.

The Soviet Delegation lays particular stress on the fact that budgetary reduction alone is an inadequate form of reduction, if it is not associated with a direct reduction of material.

9. The Soviet Delegation expresses no opinion as to chapters IV and VI of the Draft Convention, since the question

of publicity and supervision of armaments is dependent entirely on the manner and extent of their reduction. The Soviet Delegation must clearly state that the publicity of neither the armaments subject to limitation nor of those subject to reduction can replace their actual reduction or even their limitation; it is opposed to any attempt to use publicity as a method of concealing the refusal to limit or reduce armaments.

The Soviet Delegation must, however, state that it is in favour of equality for all the signatories of the Convention, in regard to their representation on the Permanent Commission, and that it is opposed to the execution of the Convention being entrusted to an organisation of the League of Nations.

The Soviet Delegation is further opposed to any system which leaves any country free at its discretion to exceed the normal limits of armaments laid down, thus depriving the Convention of all meaning.

10. The Soviet Delegation emphatically protests against the refusal of the Commission to pass final judgment on the article which allows exemptions to the western neighbours of the USSR in the event of the USSR not acceding to the Convention. This article, expressly directed against the USSR, reflects the intention of a number of states to present the USSR as an obstacle to peace and disarmament. Such an allegation, which this Delegation will refrain from evaluating, is obviously not worthy of being refuted. As correctly noted by the Delegate of Poland, the USSR is the only State which, throughout its 13 years of existence, has never deviated in its foreign policy from its peace programme, despite numerous attempts to provoke it to armed resistance against various attacks to which it was repeatedly subjected.

This Delegation protests against the decision to submit this proposal to the Conference by mentioning it in the Report.

IX

The above considerations render impossible the acceptance of the Draft Convention by the USSR Delegation, and strengthen the Delegation's determination to continue its unwearying struggle for peace and to defend its own proposals for disarmament before the coming Conference.

X

With reference to the resolution of the Preparatory Commission of April 19, 1929, in which it is stated that the Commission decides to annex the Soviet Draft Convention, if the Soviet Delegation so desires, to the Report which will be presented by the Commission at the end of its labours to the Disarmament Conference, the Soviet Delegation expresses its certainty that the Commission will carry out that decision and will communicate the Soviet Draft Convention at the same time as its own to the Conference.

The Soviet Delegation requests that the present declaration, which is to take the place of the reservations and remarks concerning the position of the USSR, should be annexed to the Report, those remarks and reservations having been to a very large extent expunged from the Report of the Commission.

USSR Delegation at the Final Session of the Disarmament Commission, Moscow, 1931, pp. 85-91 (in Russian).

TASS Report on the Question of Establishing a Truce in the Build-up of Armaments

October 22, 1931

On September 8, 1931, in a speech to the League of Nations Assembly, Italian Foreign Minister Signor Grandi proposed to conclude a general agreement on establishing a truce in the build-up of armaments until the end of the deliberations of the Disarmament Conference scheduled to convene on February 2, 1932. On September 11, at the same League of Nations Assembly, the Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch and Swiss delegations submitted a corresponding draft resolution. The Third Commission of the League of Nations Assembly concerned with the problem of disarmament resolved on September 19 to invite the governments of the United States of America, the USSR and Turkey to send their representatives to the Third Commission to discuss the question of establishing a truce in the build-up of armaments. The USSR received the invitation on September 20.

On September 21, Comrade Litvinov replied to the Chairman of the League of Nations Assembly in a telegram in which he noted the USSR Government's readiness to support any proposal in the sphere of reducing armaments and expressed his consent to join Signor Grandi's proposal provided it would be adopted as binding by all countries and cover all types of armaments, and provided that the proposal would in no event replace or remove from the agenda the main question of disarmament or reduction of already existing armaments, an issue to be resolved in the very near future.

Subsequently, at the Third Commission's discussion of the question of establishing a truce in the build-up of arma-

ments, the Italian delegation introduced a proposal for the planned truce to start from November 1, 1931, for a period of one year.

This truce was to be embodied in the form of a "solemn declaration" by individual states. On September 30, the League of Nations Assembly adopted a resolution in which it requested the League Council to address an "urgent request" to governments that they, without predetermining the decisions of the future conference or the programmes and proposals to be made at that conference, "would refrain from any measures aimed at increasing their armaments". The Council was also to request the respective governments to declare whether or not they were prepared to accept such a truce in the build-up of armaments until November 1, 1932.

Izvestiya, October 22, 1931.

Draft Declaration Concerning the Definition of Aggression

February 6, 1933

Believing it necessary, in the interests of ensuring universal security and facilitating the achievement of an agreement on the maximal reduction of armaments, to define as accurately as possible the notion of aggression in order to eliminate pretexts for justifying such;

Proceeding from the principle of equal rights of all states to independence, security, and self-defence;

Inspired by the desire, in the interests of universal peace, to provide every nation with the right to develop freely in the way and at the rate it chooses, and to fully safeguard therefore the security, independence and complete inviolability of its territory and freedom of self-defence against attack or invasion from outside, but exclusively within the bounds of its own frontiers; and

Assuming it necessary to give guiding instructions to international agencies that would determine the attacking side,

The General Commission declares:

1. A state that first perpetrates one of the following actions shall be regarded as the attacking side in an international conflict:

(a) one that declares war on another state;

(b) one whose armed forces, even without a declaration of war, invade the territory of another state or intentionally attack its sea or air vessels;

(c) one whose land, naval or air forces have subjected the territory of another state to artillery shelling or have purposefully attacked its sea or air vessels;

(d) one whose land, naval or air forces land in or are

brought into the bounds of another state without permission of the latter's government, or violate the terms of such permission, for instance with regard to the timing or expansion of the area where they were to be stationed;

(e) one that establishes a naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state.

2. No political, strategic, or economic considerations, including the desire to exploit natural resources on the territory of the attacked state or to obtain any kind of other benefit or privilege, nor any reference to significant amounts of investments or other special interests in a given country, nor the rejection of features of that country's state organisation, can serve to justify an attack provided for in Paragraph 1.

In particular, none of the following can serve to justify attack:

A. The internal situation in any given state, e.g.:

(a) the political, economic or cultural backwardness of a given people;

(b) any imagined shortcomings of its administration;

(c) potential threat to the life or property of foreign nationals;

(d) revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements, civil war, disturbances or strikes;

(e) establishment or preservation in a given state of a given political, economic or social regime.

B. No actions, laws or instructions of any state, for example:

(a) violations of international treaties;

(b) violations of trade, concessional or other economic rights and interests of a state or of its citizens;

(c) severance of diplomatic or economic relations;

(d) economic or financial boycott;

(e) refusal to pay debts;

(f) ban or restrictions on immigration or changes in policies toward foreign citizens;

(g) violation of privileges of official representatives of another state;

(h) refusal to let armed forces pass through to the territory of a third state;

(i) religious or anti-religious measures;

(j) border incidents.

3. In case a state declares mobilisation or concentrates considerable forces near its borders, the state threatened by

such actions may resort to diplomatic or other means for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It may, in the meantime, also take retaliatory measures of a military nature, similar to those indicated above, but without invading foreign territory.

The General Commission has resolved to include the aforementioned principles in a Convention on security and disarmament or in a special agreement that would constitute an inseparable part of the above-mentioned Convention.

Izvestiya, February 8, 1933.

Chapter Two

THE USSR IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR (THE 1940s-1960s)

The end of the Second World War brought about qualitatively new conditions for the USSR's struggle for disarmament. These were chiefly the result of substantial changes in the balance of forces on the world arena in favour of peace, democracy and socialism. The "crusade" undertaken by world imperialism against the USSR had failed. Also, the second stage in the general crisis of capitalism had undermined the imperialist countries' dominant position in world politics. Socialism had become a force that could no longer be ignored, both in matters of post-war world reconstruction, and in other international issues.

Already during the Second World War, on October 30, 1943, on the USSR's initiative, the Four Nations Declaration on General Security involving the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and China stated: "The Four powers solemnly declared that they would consult and cooperate with each other and with other members of the United Nations for the purpose of achieving a feasible general agreement on arms regulation in the postwar period."¹ In line with this, the principle of disarmament was reflected in the United Nations Charter, the task of creating an effective system for regulating armaments having been entrusted to the UN Security Council.

Shortly after the Second World War, the arms race, through the United States' fault, came to involve nuclear weapons. The USSR's main efforts in the post-war period were therefore directed at reaching an agreement for banning the use and production of atomic weapons. If such an agreement was not then concluded, the responsibility fully rests with the leaders of the United States, who intended

¹ *History of Soviet Foreign Policy. Vol. I, 1917-1945*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 449.

to use their momentary nuclear superiority to blackmail the socialist countries.

On the basis of such considerations, the United States and its allies, while officially taking part in disarmament talks, either advanced proposals which were totally unacceptable to the USSR, or endlessly manoeuvred to go back on their own proposals which the USSR had originally supported. But, then, no other development of events could be expected. Bernard M. Baruch, the US representative at the UN Atomic Energy Commission in determining the American stand on questions of disarmament, declared: "Don't let us be the first to disarm! . . . We must be strong."¹

This stand excluded any possibility of achieving real nuclear disarmament. In the period from 1946 to 1952, the United States not only blocked Soviet disarmament proposals, but sought to create its own system for controlling the production of nuclear weapons in other countries. The Baruch Plan proposed by the US in March 1946 served this purpose.

Once, US leaders advanced the view that nuclear disarmament had not been achieved because the USSR did not approve of the plan. The Soviet Union really did reject it, for it was totally incompatible with the interests of Soviet national security. In fact, the Baruch Plan envisaged the creation of an international agency that would actually put production of nuclear weapons in the USSR and other countries under US control. Besides, the United States would be able to collect military intelligence in countries producing fissionable materials. This was an inequitable project with far-reaching plans, and the USSR, quite naturally, rejected it.

To counterbalance the Baruch Plan, on June 19, 1946, the USSR submitted to the UN Atomic Energy Commission a draft convention on the complete and unconditional prohibition of the production and use of nuclear weapons stipulating for the destruction, within a three-month period, of finished and unfinished nuclear armaments.

The United States turned the draft down under the far-fetched pretext that it envisaged no system of controls. However, when the USSR, on June 11, 1947, submitted a new draft with detailed proposals on atomic energy controls, the US representatives in the United Nations rejected it

¹ Baruch, Bernard M., *The Public Years*, Pocket Books, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 363.

again. The same fate befell two subsequent Soviet proposals, one for the simultaneous prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control over the observance of that agreement (1948) and another for introducing permanent (not periodic) control (1952).

This completed the first stage of the USSR's post-war struggle for disarmament, and with it, quite a tense period in Soviet history, when the United States pursued a policy of "atomic blackmail" by using its monopoly on nuclear weapons. During those years, a concrete agreement on nuclear disarmament was never reached. However, the struggle for banning the new weapons of mass destruction was not waged in vain. It mobilised democratic public opinion, with which the US government had to reckon. The popularity of the idea of nuclear disarmament was manifested, among other places, in the Stockholm Appeal of the Committee of the World Congress of Defenders of Peace which was signed by 500 million people. During the period of the US "nuclear monopoly" the resolute Soviet stand and the anti-nuclear public movement were important factors due to which Washington dared not use nuclear weapons on a global scale.

On September 29, 1949, TASS published a report on an atomic weapon test in the USSR. This put an end to US "nuclear monopoly". However, already four months later, on January 31, 1950, US President Truman declared: "Accordingly, I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb."¹

This brought the nuclear arms race to a qualitatively new plane and ushered in the next stage (1953-1958) of the USSR's struggle for disarmament. In that period, the Soviet struggle for nuclear disarmament was accompanied by new constructive initiatives aimed at reducing conventional armed forces and armaments under effective international control.

Already in the autumn of 1946 and 1948, at the First and Third Sessions of the UN General Assembly, the USSR came up with proposals on the universal reduction of armaments. The 1948 proposals were designed to ban atomic weapons and reduce by one-third all ground, naval, and

¹ Truman, Harry S., *Memoirs*, Vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope*, Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 1956, p. 309.

air forces within one year, a project that was to involve the USSR, the United States, Britain, France and China. In 1954, the USSR submitted to the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the UN Disarmament Commission the basic provisions of a draft international convention for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, for a substantial reduction in armaments and armed forces, and for the establishment of international control over the observance of the convention. This document was the synthesis of all the major Soviet proposals of the first eight post-war years.

The Soviet draft engendered controversies among the Western countries to produce a new Anglo-French disarmament plan, which, among other measures, envisaged banning the production and use of nuclear weapons. However, this contradicted the US approach, which was essentially aimed at splitting the questions of nuclear and conventional disarmament. Nevertheless, White House representatives did not openly oppose the Anglo-French memorandum in the hope it would be rejected by the USSR. The USSR went half-way to meet the British and French proposals by submitting to the UN on May 10, 1955 a new draft disarmament convention that took into consideration the provisions of the Anglo-French plan.

Evidently, the West did not expect such a turn of events. Actually reluctant to disarm, the United States, Britain and France went back on their own proposals. Besides, Britain, clearly under US pressure, changed the initial wording of its proposals by suggesting to start solving the issue of disarmament by reducing conventional armaments. However, when the Soviet side took this into account, and on March 27, 1956 submitted to a subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission a plan for reducing conventional armaments, the Western countries, in complete contradiction with their own previous assertions, declared that this question could not be examined in isolation from the problem of nuclear disarmament. It thus became clear that *in no way did the Western countries intend to agree to any real disarmament measures. Their participation in the negotiations on the problem was designed to involve the states in a vicious circle of endless arguments so as to postpone the solution of the problem and to conceal NATO's mad arms race.*

Seeking to wreck Soviet efforts to achieve disarmament,

the Western powers did not disdain to use their "old" arguments and to invent "new" ones. For instance, they claimed that Soviet intentions to disarm were "insincere", and that the USSR's policies were aggressive, and again put "security guarantees" in opposition to disarmament.

To substantiate the allegations concerning the "Soviet threat", the Western propaganda machine widely resorted during the post-war period to false assertions that the US was allegedly "behind" the USSR in armed forces and armaments. The US military would use such falsifications when America was about to adopt new programmes of development of new types and systems of weapons and to start new rounds of the arms race.

The policy from the "position of strength", which US ruling circles had adopted after the Second World War, and their desire to continually boost US armaments, led, during the cold war years, to the formation of stable stereotypes in US political thinking as regards determining American "national security" from a position of military strength. US Secretary of the Air Force Donald A. Quarles openly declared that "the United States was going to rest its security not on the abolition of power but on the retention of overwhelming air-atomic power; not on 'disarmament' in the old-fashioned sense but on the capacity to retaliate; not on 'banning' or 'destroying' atomic bombs but on retaining them."¹

The United States proceeded from the postulate that a strong US military potential would be its trump card in talks on settling international disputes, and Washington did not conceal its intention to use American military superiority as an argument in such talks. In a conversation with former West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles openly said that "there can be no question of a broad agreement on disarmament while political issues remain unresolved".²

In effect the West's aggressive, militaristic policy excluded the possibility of reaching an agreement on disarmament. The historic significance of the USSR's struggle for resolving this issue in the 1940s and 1950s is in that the

¹ "US and 'Disarmament'. An Analysis of Washington's Stand: Overwhelming Power Is Our Security", *The New York Times*, September 6, 1955, p. 8.

² Konrad Adenauer. *Erinnerungen, 1955-1959*, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, 1967, S. 309.

Soviet drafts of an international convention on disarmament submitted to the UN, the Soviet desire to meet the wishes of the Western negotiations counterparts halfway, and Soviet explanation of Moscow's nuclear disarmament drafts had mobilised the broad public, whose pressure on the governments of imperialist countries created certain difficulties for the imperialist policy from a "position of strength". Besides, the Western countries', chiefly America's, behaviour in the UN, a behaviour which was reduced to boycotting the Soviet proposals showed the West's obvious reluctance to agree to even the slightest measures in nuclear disarmament and clearly indicated that it was the United States and its NATO partners who were imposing the arms race on the Soviet Union, not the other way round, as Western historians later claimed.

As for the USSR, it persisted in its struggle for disarmament in subsequent years as well. On September 18, 1959, it submitted to the 14th Session of the UN General Assembly a Declaration on General and Complete Disarmament, which read: "After carefully considering the present international situation and the experience of earlier disarmament negotiations, the Government of the Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that the best means of solving the disarmament problem, which is the chief international problem of our time, is complete and general disarmament by all States."¹

The constructive nature of the Soviet plan and its popularity the world over did not allow the Western countries to openly oppose the Soviet proposals, whose discussion by the 14th Session of the UN General Assembly led to the adoption on November 20, 1959 of a UN Resolution on General and Complete Disarmament, which noted that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today".² Concrete examination of the Soviet plan was entrusted to a Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, formed under an agreement reached by the governments of the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France.

¹ *United Nations General Assembly. Official Records. Agenda item 70. Annexes 14th Session, New York, 1959, Document A/4219, p. 4.*

² *United Nations Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during Its 14th Session 15.IX-13.XII. 1959. General Assembly. Official Records: 14th Session. Supplement No. 16 (A/4354), New York, 1960, p. 3.*

The Committee's first meeting was held in Geneva on March 15, 1960. Its work showed that the Western powers opposed general and complete disarmament. This was because they continued to place their stakes on "nuclear superiority". In the early sixties, the United States began to implement gigantic programmes for stockpiling nuclear weapons and modernising their delivery systems. The following fact illustrates the scale of the arms race that began at that time in the United States. In 1963, Robert McNamara, then US Secretary of Defense, declared that, in comparison with the previous year, the number of US tactical warheads had increased nine times.¹ In those years, the United States built a nuclear submarine fleet, a system of Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles and other weapons systems.

The discussion by the UN General Assembly of the Soviet draft on general and complete disarmament demonstrated that the capitalist countries were not prepared for such a comprehensive solution. At the same time, however, the opponents of disarmament failed in their attempts to prevent a number of pertinent agreements from being signed in the sixties, namely the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water (August 5, 1963); the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (January 27, 1967); the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (July 1, 1968); and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (February 1971). These were the first agreements in the history of mankind to really curb the arms race.

¹ Yefremov, A. Y., *Nuclear Disarmament*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 43.

**Draft International Convention
on the Prohibition of the Production and
Use of Weapons Based on Employing
Atomic Energy for Mass Destruction**

**Submitted by the USSR Delegation
to the UN Atomic Energy Commission on June 19, 1946**

(List of States Parties to this Convention)

Profoundly aware of the enormous significance of great scientific discoveries involving the fission of the atomic nucleus and the generation and use of atomic energy for raising the welfare and living standards of peoples throughout the world, and for developing culture and science for the benefit of mankind;

Inspired by the desire to do everything possible to promote the fullest use by all peoples of scientific discoveries in the sphere of atomic energy for improving the life and welfare of all peoples and for the further progress of human culture;

Clearly aware that great scientific discoveries in the sphere of atomic energy constitute a significant danger, primarily to peaceful cities and the civilian population if these discoveries were used to employ atomic weapons for purposes of mass destruction;

Recognising the importance of the fact that existing international agreements have already banned the use in war of asphyxiating, toxic and other similar gases, as well as all similar liquids, substances and processes, and bacteriological weapons that have been justly condemned by public opinion in the civilised world, and believing that the international prohibition of the use of atomic weapons for mass annihilation of people corresponds to the aspirations and conscience of all the world's peoples to even a greater measure; and

Inspired by the firm intention to prevent the threat of use of these scientific discoveries to the detriment and against the interests of mankind;

Have resolved to conclude a Convention on the prohibition of the production and use of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and, to that end, have appointed their plenipotentiary representatives (list of plenipotentiary representatives to follow), who, having submitted their credentials, found to be in complete order, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare their unanimous resolve to prohibit the production and use of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and to that end pledge:

- (a) under no circumstances to use atomic weapons;
- (b) to prohibit the production and storage of weapons based on the use of atomic energy;
- (c) to destroy, within a three-month period as of the date on which this Convention goes into effect, all their stockpiles of complete and incomplete atomic weapons.

Article 2

The High Contracting States declare that any violation of Article 1 of this Convention shall be a very grave international crime against humanity.

Article 3

The High Contracting States, within a six-month period as of the date from which the present Convention goes into effect, shall promulgate laws stipulating the severe punishment of violators of the provisions of this Convention.

Article 4

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 5

This Convention shall be open for accession to any State, both member and non-member of the United Nations Organisation.

Article 6

This Convention shall go into effect after approval by the Security Council, and following ratification by half of the signatory States, including all the UN member-states listed in Article 23 of the UN Charter and after their deposit of the instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 7

After its entry into force, the present Convention shall be binding for all States, both members and non-members of the United Nations Organisation.

Article 8

This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of which are authentic, shall be drawn up in one copy and deposited in the records of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall forward certified copies to all the Parties to the Convention.

Izvestiya, June 23, 1946.

Proposals Concerning Atomic Energy Controls

**Submitted by the USSR Delegation
to the UN Atomic Energy Commission on June 11, 1947**

The Soviet Government, in addition to and in development of its proposal concerning the conclusion of an international convention banning atomic and other basic weapons of mass destruction submitted on June 19, 1946 for consideration by the Atomic Energy Control Commission, also submits for examination by the aforementioned Commission the following basic provisions that should underlie an international agreement or convention on atomic energy control.

1. To ensure the use of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the international convention banning atomic and other basic types of weapons of mass destruction, in order to prevent violations of the convention banning atomic weapons, and to protect states that observe the terms of the convention from the risk of infringement and digression thereof, strict international controls shall be imposed simultaneously over all enterprises engaged in the extraction of atomic raw materials, producing atomic materials, and generating atomic energy.

2. To implement measures for controlling atomic energy enterprises, an International Commission for Atomic Energy Control called the International Control Commission shall be established within the framework of the Security Council.

3. The International Control Commission shall have its own inspection staff.

4. The terms and organisational principles of the international control of atomic energy, and the composition, rights and duties of the International Control Commission, as well as the provisions on the basis of which it shall con-

duct its activities, shall be determined by a special International Convention on Atomic Energy Control to be concluded in accordance with the Convention Banning Atomic Weapons.

5. To ensure effective international control over atomic energy, the following basic provisions shall underlie the Convention on Atomic Energy Control:

(a) The International Control Commission shall be composed of representatives of states represented in the Atomic Energy Control Commission established by a General Assembly decision of January 24, 1946, and the former may establish any subsidiary bodies it shall find necessary for exercising its functions.

(b) The International Control Commission shall establish its own rules of procedure.

(c) The staff of the International Control Commission shall be selected on an international basis.

(d) The International Control Commission shall periodically inspect enterprises which extract atomic raw materials, produce atomic materials and generate atomic energy.

6. In inspecting atomic energy enterprises, the International Control Commission shall:

(a) Examine the activities of enterprises that extract atomic raw materials, produce atomic materials and generate atomic energy, and their records;

(b) Check available reserves of atomic raw materials, materials and unfinished products;

(c) Study their production operations within the scope necessary to control the utilisation of atomic materials and atomic energy;

(d) Observe the implementation of the rules stipulated by the Control Convention for operating those enterprises, and work out and prescribe technological control regulations for such enterprises;

(e) Collect and process information on the extraction of atomic raw materials, production of atomic materials, and generation of atomic energy;

(f) Conduct special inspections in the event of the suspicion of violations of the convention banning atomic weapons;

(g) Make recommendations to governments on questions relating to the production, storage and utilisation of atomic materials and atomic energy; and

(h) Make recommendations to the Security Council on

preventive and punitive measures against parties violating the conventions banning atomic weapons and on the control of atomic energy.

7. To perform the control and inspection tasks entrusted to the International Control Commission, the latter shall have the right to:

(a) Access to any enterprise engaged in the extraction, production and storage of atomic resources and materials, or using atomic energy;

(b) Familiarise itself with production operations at atomic energy enterprises within the scope necessary for controlling the utilisation of atomic materials and energy;

(c) Weigh, measure and perform various kinds of analyses of atomic resources, materials, and unfinished products;

(d) Demand from the government of any state and verify various kinds of information and reports on the activity of atomic energy enterprises;

(e) Demand various kinds of explanations on questions relating to the activity of atomic energy enterprises;

(f) Give recommendations and presentations to governments on the production and utilisation of atomic energy; and

(g) Submit for examination by the Security Council of recommendations on measures against Parties violating the conventions banning atomic weapons and on control over atomic energy.

8. In accordance with the tasks of international control of atomic energy, the following provisions shall underlie research activity in the field of atomic energy:

(a) Research work in the field of atomic energy shall be governed by the need to observe the Convention banning atomic weapons and to prevent the utilisation of such research for military purposes.

(b) States that have signed the convention banning atomic weapons shall have the right to conduct unrestricted research in the field of atomic energy in order to find ways to use it for peaceful purposes.

(c) In the interests of the effective implementation of its control and inspection functions, the International Control Commission shall have the opportunity to conduct research activity to find ways to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Such activity would permit the Commission to be aware of the latest achievements in the field; the Commission would employ its own skilled international staff

necessary for the practical implementation of control and inspection measures.

(d) In conducting research work in atomic energy, a major task of the International Control Commission shall be to ensure a broad international exchange of information in this field and to provide all necessary assistance through consultations to those States Parties to the Convention which may need such assistance.

(e) The International Control Commission shall possess the necessary material resources, including scientific laboratories and experimental facilities, for the suitable organisation of its research activities.

Pravda, June 13, 1947.

**Proposals Banning Atomic Weapons
and Reducing by One-Third
the Armaments and Armed Forces
of the United States of America,
Great Britain, the USSR,
France and China,
the Permanent Members
of the Security Council**

**Submitted on September 25, 1948
by the USSR Delegation to the Third Session
of the UN General Assembly**

Noting that up to the present time nothing has been done to implement either the Assembly's resolution of January 24, 1946 on atomic energy, or its resolution of December 11, 1946 "On the Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments";

Recognising as a primary task the banning of the production and utilisation of atomic energy for military purposes;

Recognising that a universal substantial reduction of armaments would meet the goal of establishing lasting peace and strengthening international security, and would correspond to the interests of peoples in alleviating the heavy economic burden they bear as a result of excessively large and ever growing expenditures on armaments in various countries;

Taking into consideration that the great powers which are permanent members of the Security Council possess an overwhelming mass of armed forces and armaments and bear the main responsibility for maintaining peace and universal security; and

In order to strengthen the cause of peace and eliminate the threat of a new war kindled by expansionists and other reactionary elements,

The General Assembly recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council, i.e. the United States of America, Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France and China as a first step in reducing armaments and armed forces to reduce within one year all their available land, naval and air forces by one-third.

The General Assembly recommends the banning

of atomic weapons as they are designed for aggressive purposes, not for defence.

The General Assembly recommends the establishment of an international control body within the framework of the Security Council to observe and control the implementation of measures pertinent to the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the banning of atomic weapons.

Izvestiya, September 26, 1948.

The USSR Government's Statement on the Testing of a Hydrogen Bomb in the Soviet Union

The other day, a type of hydrogen bomb was detonated in the USSR for testing purposes.

As a result of a powerful thermonuclear reaction in the hydrogen bomb, the blast was very powerful. The test showed that the power of a hydrogen bomb is many times greater than that of an atomic bomb.

It is common knowledge that the USSR has had atomic weapons for several years now, and that it has conducted tests of those weapons. As it follows from the August 8, 1953 statement by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. M. Malenkov at the 5th Session of the Supreme Soviet, the USSR has also mastered the secret of producing the hydrogen bomb.

This Soviet Government statement caused numerous comments abroad. Some foreign circles that had previously made their stakes on the US monopoly on the atomic bomb, and subsequently on the hydrogen bomb, seek to intimidate people with the fact that the USSR knows the secret of producing hydrogen weapons in order to thereby evoke concern and accelerate the arms race.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to declare that, as previously, there is no ground whatsoever for such concern.

In accordance with the USSR's immutable policy of strengthening peace and international security, the Soviet Government has repeatedly proposed to the governments of other countries to significantly reduce armaments and ban the use of atomic and other kinds of mass destruction weapons, having established within the framework of the United

Nations Organisation strict international controls over that ban.

Today, too, the Soviet Government firmly adheres to this same position.

Izvestiya, August 20, 1953.

Draft Declaration
by the Governments of the United States,
Britain, France,
the People's Republic of China
and the USSR
on the Unconditional Renunciation
of the Use of Atomic, Hydrogen, and
Other Kinds of Mass Destruction Weapons

Submitted by the USSR Foreign Minister
to the US Secretary of State
on January 30, 1954 in Berlin

The Governments of the United States of America, Britain, France, the People's Republic of China, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Resolved to deliver mankind of the threat of a destructive war involving the use of atomic, hydrogen and other kinds of mass destruction weapons,

Seeking in every possible way to promote the use of the great scientific discoveries in atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of peoples and to improve their living conditions,

Believing that the unconditional renunciation by States of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other kinds of mass destruction weapons corresponds to the basic goals of the United Nations Organisation and would be an important step toward the complete removal of atomic, hydrogen and other kinds of mass destruction weapons from States' arsenals, accompanied by the establishment of strict international control ensuring the implementation of the agreement banning the use of atomic energy for military purposes, and

Guided by peoples' aspiration to defuse international tension,

Solemnly declare that they unconditionally pledge not to use atomic, hydrogen, and other kinds of mass destruction weapons; and

Call upon all other States to join this Declaration.

Izvestiya, September 26, 1954.

**Draft Resolution on the Cessation
of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Tests**

**Submitted by the USSR Delegation
to the First Committee at the Eleventh Session
of the UN General Assembly on January 14, 1957**

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the peoples of the world at the continuation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests,

Noting that the continuation of tests of such weapons constitutes a threat to the life and health of the population of all countries of the world,

Considering that the cessation of tests of thermonuclear weapons would remove this threat to the population, would meet the universal desire of the peoples, and would correspond to the humanitarian purposes of the United Nations,

Calls upon the States conducting atomic and hydrogen weapons tests to discontinue them forthwith.

Izvestiya, January 17, 1957.

**Proposal by the Soviet Government
on the Question of the Banning
of the Use of Outer Space for Military
Purposes, the Elimination of Foreign Bases
on the Territories of Other Countries,
and International Co-operation
in the Exploration of Outer Space***

March 15, 1958

Today the attention of mankind is riveted on the question of what use is to be made of the tremendous new achievements of science and engineering that have put the energy of the atomic nucleus at the service of mankind, and that have opened up new prospects for the exploration of outer space through the launching of artificial earth satellites, which constitute an outstanding victory of human knowledge over the mighty forces of nature. The future of man-

* This proposal was handed by A. Sobolev, USSR Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to the UN Secretary-General on March 15, 1958, together with the following letter:

"On instructions from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I have the honour to submit herewith the text of the proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of the banning of the use of outer space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign bases on the territories of other countries, and international co-operation in the exploration of outer space.

The Government of the USSR requests the inclusion of the above question in the preliminary agenda of the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

I enclose a memorandum in accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure.

(Signed) A. SOBOLEV
Permanent Representative of the USSR
to the United Nations

MEMORANDUM

The Government of the USSR has submitted to the UN Secretary-General its proposals on the question of banning the use of outer space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign bases on the territories of other countries, and international co-operation in the exploration of outer space. This question is proposed by the Soviet Government for the inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly with a view to elaborating a general international agreement, open to all States, on the above questions."

kind depends to a considerable extent on whether these achievements of science and engineering will serve peaceful aims ensuring the greater well-being of all people or whether they will be used for further intensifying the arms race which may plunge the world into a destructive war in which the latest weapons of mass extermination will be used.

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that today, when relations between States are characterized by suspicion and mistrust, when States have atomic and hydrogen weapons in their armaments and when new, even more destructive types of these weapons are being evolved, the danger of such a war will constantly hang over mankind unless agreement is reached on outlawing nuclear weapons and directing the latest achievements of science and engineering towards peaceful uses for the good of mankind.

The achievement of such an agreement would eliminate the menace of another world war in which nuclear weapons would be used, and would open up unlimited opportunities for the joint exploration and harnessing of the still unexplored forces of nature, which would promote even greater scientific and technological progress in all fields, including the exploration and utilization of outer space. Such an agreement would pave the way for broad international co-operation in combatting by joint efforts such natural calamities as floods, droughts and hurricanes, which cause great damage to all nations. It would make it possible to launch a common onslaught on the deserts and wrest them from nature for peaceful and creative endeavours, and would help to pool all efforts for a resolute fight against the diseases which take a toll of millions of human lives.

Co-operation between scientists of various countries is already being effected in a number of branches of science and engineering. The joint studies that are being conducted by scientists throughout the world under the International Geophysical Year programme are a wonderful example of this co-operation. Within the framework of this programme, scientists are closely co-operating in the sphere of meteorology, in the study of the Antarctic, the oceans, terrestrial magnetism, the ionosphere, cosmic rays, and so forth.

There is no doubt, however, that this co-operation can be greatly expanded and extended to many other fields of human activity if agreement is reached on a radical solution of the disarmament problem, including a complete ban on the atomic and hydrogen weapons, the liquidation of military

bases on foreign territories, and the like. This would in equal measure ensure the security of all States and would bring about a situation where all the peoples of the world could live in peace, without fear of the morrow.

A number of statesmen in the United States of America and some other countries have recently made statements in which they raised the question of a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes. President Eisenhower, too, mentioned this question in his recent messages to N. A. Bulganin. He suggested that the use of outer space for the testing of military missiles should be discontinued and that the manufacture of weapons envisaging the use of interplanetary space should be stopped. In making this proposal, President Eisenhower singled out from the general disarmament problem only one question—the question of intercontinental ballistic missiles, leaving aside the other highly important aspects of the problem. He proposes, in fact, to ban only intercontinental ballistic missiles.

It is well known, however, that it is not the intercontinental ballistic missiles themselves that are a threat to mankind: it is the atomic and hydrogen bombs which can be installed in them as warheads. This, indeed, is obvious, for the factor determining the peaceful or military purpose of a missile is not some engineering and technical peculiarities of its construction but whether it carries a peaceful sputnik, instruments for the study of outer space, or a nuclear charge in the form of atomic or hydrogen bombs for the purpose of mass destruction and extermination.

The ICBM is already an accomplished fact. Scientists and engineers now are thinking of launching even more powerful space probes into space as their next step. This march of scientific and technical thought, this process cannot be arrested, and indeed, it is not in mankind's interest that it should be. The duty of statesmen is to direct scientific and technical progress in this field towards exclusively peaceful uses, so as to ensure that intercontinental or any other missiles are used for peaceful research, for conquering outer space, and not for the destruction of human beings.

It is noteworthy, however, that while proposing a ban on the intercontinental ballistic missile, the United States bases its military plans on the use of atomic and hydrogen bombs carried by the short- and medium-range missiles

which it already possesses, and is making feverish efforts to perfect the existing missiles and to develop new ones. Evidence of this is the growing atomic and missile arms race which is proceeding in the United States on an unparalleled scale. Billions upon billions of dollars have been allocated in the United States for the design and manufacture of missiles and atomic and hydrogen bombs.

These missiles equipped with nuclear warheads are to be supplied to numerous United States military bases on foreign territories. It is no secret, and it is being openly admitted by United States military leaders, that these bases and missiles are intended to deal a blow at the vital centres of the Soviet Union. The question therefore arises: is it not true that these military preparations carried out by the United States constitute a grave threat to the security of the Soviet Union and the peaceful States friendly to it? Why is it then that the United States proposals suggest the outlawing of intercontinental ballistic missiles which could be used, by way of retaliation and only by way of retaliation, against targets in the territory of the United States, while evading the question of eliminating American military bases on foreign territories which are intended for the launching of missiles possessed by the United States armed forces and for the use of American bombers?

Can it be said that atomic and hydrogen bombs dropped from aircraft which take off from American military bases situated, for example, in Europe or North Africa, are less dangerous than bombs delivered by intercontinental missiles? Of course not. Atomic and hydrogen bombs are equally capable of dealing death and destruction whether they are delivered to their targets by intercontinental ballistic missile or are carried from military bases with the aid of bombers or other means of conveying atomic and hydrogen weapons.

One cannot fail to see that in raising the question of banning the use of outer space for military purposes, the United States is making an attempt, through a ban of the intercontinental ballistic missile, to ward off a retaliatory nuclear blow through outer space while maintaining its numerous military bases on foreign territories, intended for attacking the Soviet Union and the peaceful States friendly to it with nuclear weapons. Before the appearance of the intercontinental missile, many persons in the United States had counted on American territory being relatively safe, believing that the whole weight of the retaliatory blow in case

of war would fall on the allies of the United States on whose territories American military bases are situated. The creation of the intercontinental ballistic missile has radically altered the situation and has upset these calculations. This is the reason for the desire to remove this new factor—to ban the intercontinental missile while preserving military bases advanced well beyond the frontiers of the United States and as near as possible to the frontiers of the USSR.

Needless to say, the Soviet Government cannot agree to such an approach to the problem which would take into account the security interests of some States while ignoring the security interests of others.

It is necessary to find such a solution of the problem as would ensure in equal measure the security of the United States, the Soviet Union and all other States. This would be served by putting into effect such a measure as the banning of the use of outer space for military purposes with the simultaneous elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries, first and foremost the countries of Europe, the Near and Middle East and North Africa.

In order to ensure the security interests of all States to the maximum degree, and also in the interests of developing international co-operation in outer space research for peaceful purposes, the Soviet Government proposes the conclusion of a broad international agreement which would include the following basic provisions:

1. A ban on the use of outer space for military purposes and an undertaking by States to launch probes into outer space only under an agreed international programme.

2. The elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other States, primarily in Europe, the Near and Middle East and North Africa.

3. The establishment within the framework of the United Nations of appropriate international control over the implementation of the obligations set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. The establishment of a United Nations agency for international co-operation in the exploration of outer space which could have the following functions:

To work out an agreed international programme for launching intercontinental and space rockets with the aim of studying outer space, and supervise the implementation of this programme;

To continue on a permanent basis the outer space research now being carried on within the framework of the International Geophysical Year;

To serve as a world centre for the collection, mutual exchange and dissemination of information on space research;

To co-ordinate national research programmes for the exploration of outer space and render assistance and help in every way towards their realization.

The Soviet Government proposes that this problem should be discussed at a conference with the participation of Heads of Government in order that agreement should be reached on it, at least in principle.

With a view to the working out of a general international agreement in which all States could take part, the Soviet Government has simultaneously submitted this question for consideration at the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The United Nations can and should make its contribution to the solution of problems of such exceptional importance for the strengthening of international peace as a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes and the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries. The application of these measures would break the disarmament deadlock and would to a considerable degree promote an easing of international tension, the establishment of confidence among States and the development of broad international co-operation in many spheres of human activity.

The adoption of this proposal of the Soviet Government would greatly reduce the danger of war in which nuclear weapons would be used; it would constitute a major step toward the complete and unconditional prohibition of atomic and nuclear weapons with their elimination from armaments; and it would promote the development of broad and effective co-operation among States in space research for peaceful purposes.

Izvestiya, March 16, 1958.

**Draft Non-Aggression Pact
Between the States Parties
to the Warsaw Treaty
and the NATO Member-States**

**Approved at the May 24, 1958 Meeting
of the Political Consultative Committee
of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty
of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance**

The Contracting Parties, the States Parties to the May 14, 1955 Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, on the one hand, and the member-states of the April 4, 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, on the other,

Wishing to promote in international relations the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter;

Attaching major importance to the need to maintain and develop peaceful relations and co-operation among states based on the principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, non-aggression, and mutual respect for their territorial integrity and state sovereignty;

Inspired by the desire to help reduce international tension and create an atmosphere of universal trust in international relations; and

Believing that, in conditions when two confronting groups of states exist in Europe, the adoption by the participants of these groups of mutual pledges not to resort to force or threat of force in international relations would have major importance for improving the international situation, halting the arms race, and eliminating the threat of a new war,

Have resolved to conclude this Non-Aggression Pact and have authorised to sign it: the following States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, and the Romanian People's Republic;

and the following NATO member-states:

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Article 1

Noting that the use of force or the threat of force in international relations is prohibited by international law, specifically by the United Nations Charter, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO member-states solemnly pledge to strictly observe this ban, and not to resort to the use of force or the threat of force against one another jointly or separately.

Article 2

All disputes that may arise between one or several States that are Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, on the one hand, and one or several NATO member-states, on the other, shall be settled only by peaceful means on the basis of the strictest adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, in the spirit of mutual understanding, through negotiation between the parties concerned, and through the use of other means of peaceful settlement of international disputes as stipulated by the UN Charter.

Article 3

In the event there arise situations that could endanger the preservation of peace or security in Europe, the States Parties to this Pact shall hold consultations with one another for the adoption and implementation of such joint measures which, in accordance with the UN Charter, would be found suitable for reaching a peaceful settlement.

Article 4

This Pact shall be concluded for a term of 25 years.

The Pact shall go into effect as of the day of its signing by duly authorised representatives of the States Parties to the May 14, 1955 Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance and the member-states of the April 4, 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

In the event the April 4, 1949 North Atlantic Treaty and the May 14, 1955 Warsaw Treaty are no longer in effect, the present Pact shall no longer be effective.

Article 5

This Pact, the English, French, and Russian texts of which are authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Duly certified copies of the Pact shall be forwarded by the UN Secretary-General to the governments of the signatory States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Authorised Representatives have affixed their signatures and seals to the present Pact.

Done in 1958

Izvestiya, May 27, 1958.

Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament

September 18, 1959

An agreement among States to limit and destroy the means of waging war has long been the cherished dream of mankind. Long before it experienced the horrors of world wars, disarmament had been proposed and urged by public figures, statesmen and the parties most closely connected with the working people.

The adoption of effective measures to achieve disarmament is in the interest of every State, large or small, irrespective of its social system and way of life. There is not a nation today that does not view with a deep sense of alarm the present rivalry among States in the production of armaments, a rivalry that has taken on unprecedented proportions, particularly in the development of ever more destructive and lethal weapons of war. There is nothing the nations desire more earnestly than to end such rivalry, fraught as it is with dire consequences for the fate of the world.

*General and complete disarmament is the way
to save mankind from the scourge of war*

People have come to think of the armaments race as a spectre always marching a step ahead of war. That was the case when Europe, arming feverishly, moved step by step towards the First World War. The same pattern was repeated in the thirties when "guns instead of butter" became the keyword in a number of countries and the flow of armaments again began to fill the arsenals to capacity. Everyone knows how that ended. The nations were plunged into the Second World War which brought them disasters and hard-

ships beside which those mankind had experienced in the darkest periods of its history paled into insignificance.

The war ended and yet men and women were still unable to find peace. Almost the very day after the last battles had been fought, the world was again gripped by the armaments fever, but on this occasion the danger to mankind was greater, because preparations for nuclear warfare were involved.

Never before has the armaments race been fraught with so much danger as it is today in the era of the atom, electronics and the conquest of outer space.

However horrible may have been such means of extermination as rapid-firing automatic weapons, tanks, long-range artillery and aerial bombs, they cannot in any way be compared with atomic and hydrogen weapons and missiles. All the means of destruction available to mankind throughout the centuries, taken together, would constitute but a small fraction of those now at the disposal of the two or three Powers which possess nuclear weapons.

In fact, it is common knowledge that the discharge of a single large modern hydrogen bomb releases destructive energy greater than that of all the explosives manufactured throughout the world during the four years of the Second World War.

The introduction of atomic weapons and missiles into the armaments of military forces, the training of military personnel in their use and the adaptation of military strategy and tactics to the new types of weapons have already reached such an advanced stage that any future military conflict between the Powers may well become a way in which every weapon of destruction now available to the belligerents will be employed. Outer space, which was inaccessible to mankind only a year or two ago, can now be used, just as the sea and the air were used before it, to deliver a nuclear attack against any point on the globe.

Generally speaking, both world wars broke out between neighbouring countries with a common frontier. Today war can break out between States which are several thousands of kilometres apart and may involve whole continents.

In such a war, if it cannot be averted in time, distances would be measured in thousands and tens of thousands of kilometres, time in minutes and seconds and losses in millions, tens of millions, and hundreds of millions of human lives. It would be a war in which there would be no dis-

inction between front and rear, between armies in the field and the civilian populations, between soldiers and children.

The emergence of military alliances that virtually cover the whole globe and are heavily armed against each other has produced a situation in which a small spark, an incident seemingly of local significance, would be enough to unleash the holocaust of war. Although the general system of military commitments has so far not been set in motion and the brakes have held, there neither is nor can be any guarantee that this will continue to be the case in future.

Never before have so many States and individuals been involved in military preparations as at the present time. Today tens of millions of persons are in the armed forces. If we add to the number of those in military service the men and women connected directly or indirectly with the production of armaments, military research and other activities relating to the provision of supplies and services for the armed forces, we find that hundreds of millions of men and women have been diverted from peaceful employment. A vast amount of human energy, knowledge, ingenuity and skill is, so to speak, being sunk in a bottomless pit, is being swallowed up by expanding armaments.

The armaments race has also spread to States economically unable to support the burden of armaments, a burden which, from the military standpoint, is jeopardizing their very existence. Military bases in the territories of foreign States and armed forces stationed thousands of kilometres from their own frontiers provide clear proof of this.

On the other hand, the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of some Powers and the establishment of air, naval and missile bases increasingly close to the borders of other States compel the States against which these military preparations are directed to take the necessary steps to strengthen their own security and safeguard the peaceful life of their peoples. The Soviet Union, all the socialist countries and many other peace-loving States would like to undertake a complete conversion of their economy and resources to peaceful purposes so that they can provide the people with ample food, clothing and housing. However, they cannot devote their entire efforts to peaceful construction without mortally endangering the vital interests of their peoples and their own very existence. When one side arms, the other side must do likewise. The quantity of weapons of mass destruction is steadily increasing and, at the same

time, the danger of a military explosion is growing.

Today atomic and hydrogen bombs are not only being stored in ultra-secret depots. They are being fitted on bombers which make flights over the territory of many Western European countries. We are nearing the stage when extremely powerful and long-range weapons can be launched not only on the orders of Governments, but at the will of individuals posted at the control panel of these weapons. But it is unlikely that a State on whose territory a nuclear cargo is dropped as a result of evil intent, technical failure or accident, will investigate the cause of such action; it will be compelled to react as it would against a military attack, against an act of war. Can we allow the issue of peace or war to be settled by blind chance? Do all these facts not provide further proof that we can go no further along the road of armaments? The Soviet Union by no means considers that an armaments contest is completely inevitable and that it must at all time be a concomitant of relations between States. The Soviet Union has based and still bases its foreign policy on the assumption that it is possible to prevent the future development of human society from taking the course which has led to two world wars and to ensure that the history of human society ceases to be a chronicle of sanguinary wars.

Weapons are created by the hands of man. The same hands can also destroy them.

The problem of disarmament has already been under discussion in the United Nations for almost fourteen years. It had previously been considered for many years by the League of Nations and by the Disarmament Conference convened by the League. However, no practical results have so far been achieved in terms of agreed decisions among States.

Much could be said about the causes of this gloomy situation that prevails with respect to disarmament. But what we need to do now is not to delve into the past and become further embroiled in controversy but to remove the chief obstacles on which all previous attempts to reach an agreement on disarmament have foundered.

The whole course of the negotiations on disarmament, which have lasted for many years, shows that the problem of organizing control over disarmament has been advanced as one of the chief obstacles to the attainment of such an agreement.

The Soviet Government has always stood, and still stands, for the establishment of strict international control over the fulfilment of agreements on disarmament measures when such agreements have been reached. Every Soviet proposal on the prohibition of atomic weapons and of the testing of such weapons, as well as on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, has invariably been accompanied by specific proposals for the establishment of effective international control. The Soviet Government has, however, been consistently opposed to the control system being converted into a programme of measures unrelated to the actual implementation of disarmament, and more particularly to the control organs becoming organs for the collection of intelligence data on the armaments of States under conditions in which disarmament would not in fact be taking place.

In present circumstances, however, the organization of control does involve real difficulties quite apart from the complications which have been artificially injected into the problem. These difficulties will become quite clear in reference to a problem such as that of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

As we know, the same fissionable materials can be used at the plants concerned both for the production of nuclear weapons and for peaceful needs. This means that in present circumstances, when atomic energy is being increasingly used in the economy, some of the fissionable materials may be surreptitiously diverted to the production of weapons.

To avoid, in the present atmosphere of distrust, all suspicion that some State or other was concealing its use of atomic materials for military purposes, foreign controllers would have to be granted access to a very large number of plants in each country, and that would in fact amount to establishing a sort of foreign trusteeship over a large sector of the country's economy. At the same time and for precisely the same reason—distrust among States—not one State is prepared to admit foreign controllers and inspectors to its enterprises, particularly those engaged in military production.

Clearly, in the present circumstances, with the continuance of the armaments race, international tension and lack of confidence, the essential conditions for the establishment of overall control are absent.

So long as distrust prevails between States, the opponents of disarmament can easily make any disarmament measure

subject to control conditions which other States cannot accept. Indeed those States which for that or any other reason raise such far-reaching demands regarding the powers of control organs have themselves no inclination whatever to accept such control terms if ever they are put into effect.

In such circumstances any deliberate attempt to advance inflated control requirements and especially to put the establishment of control before disarmament as a prerequisite for any disarmament measures, is tantamount to blocking all approaches to the solution of the problem.

The Soviet Government considers that the time has come to make a sober assessment of the situation that has developed and to admit that since the approach used so far in seeking a solution of the problem of disarmament has failed to produce the necessary results, the proper conclusions should be drawn from that fact. The Soviet Government believes there can be but one conclusion: *that it is the duty of all States and of the United Nations urgently to seek a new way of solving the problem of disarmament, which is the burning problem of our time.*

What is this new way? How can an end be put to a situation in which great wealth extracted by man from nature, and transformed by scientific genius, by the skill of engineers and the efforts of many millions of workers, is wasted on producing means of destruction and extermination? How is it possible to prevent tens of millions of people who are at the peak of their creative force and energy from being torn away from useful work to serve in the armed forces and to train for a war of devastation?

The majority of statesmen and public figures as well as the broad masses of the population of all countries already recognize that another world war would be a fearful tragedy for everybody, and for some countries whose area is not large but whose population density is high it would be a disaster threatening their very existence.

The task now is to find some means of preventing mankind from being engulfed in a nuclear missile war.

In the present state of international relations and at the present level of military technology when any military conflict may lead to a nuclear missile war, the only way to ensure the security of all States is to exclude the very possibility of war. As long as large armies, air forces and navies exist, as long as there are nuclear and missile weapons, as long as young men on the threshold of life are trained

first of all in the arts of war, and general staffs work out the plans for future military operations, there is, and can be, no guarantee of peace between peoples. The most effective and solid guarantee of peace, in keeping not only with the loftiest ideals but also with the urgent demands of the people, is not the balance of armaments, which every State endeavours to interpret in such a way as to turn it to its own advantage, but the inability of States to wage a war for lack of material means.

After carefully considering the present international situation and the experience of earlier disarmament negotiations the Government of the Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that the best means of solving the disarmament problem, which is the chief international problem of our time, is *complete and general disarmament by all States*.

By complete and general disarmament the Soviet Government means the renunciation by all States without exception of the maintenance of any kind of armed force apart from minimum contingents for internal security (militia, police) equipped with small arms and designed to maintain order in each country.

This means that land armies, navies and air forces will cease to exist; general staffs and war ministries will be abolished, and military training establishments will be closed. Tens of millions of people will return to peaceful, constructive work.

Foreign military bases now established in a number of States, which are detrimental to sovereignty and security of those States and extremely harmful to the cause of international confidence and co-operation, will be abolished.

All atomic and hydrogen bombs in the possession of States will be destroyed and their further production discontinued. Energy derived from fissionable materials will be used exclusively for peaceful economic and scientific purposes.

Military missiles of all ranges will be eliminated, and missiles will remain only as a means of transport and for the exploration of outer space for the benefit of all mankind.

Guns, tanks, shells, and torpedoes will be melted down to provide metal for the needs of peaceful construction work. Warships and military aircraft will be scrapped.

Stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons accumulated by some States, asphyxiating and poisonous substances, and cultures of lethal bacteria which are potential

sources of severe epidemic disease will all be finally and irretrievably destroyed.

Such is the disarmament programme which the Soviet Government submits to all States for their consideration and firstly to the Members of the United Nations, proposing that it should be put into effect without delay.

This is a radical programme, but that is precisely what guarantees that it can be carried out in the present circumstances. The existence of blocs of Powers, opposed to one another, in which dozens of States are committed to mutual military obligations, together with the dizzy pace at which military technology is developing, demands bold and far-reaching decisions if peace is to be ensured.

The proposal for complete and general disarmament is to be distinguished from all other disarmament proposals, since its realization would completely exclude any inequality and would rule out the possibility that military advantages of any kind would be created for any State.

Hardly anyone would deny that if a radical decision was taken to bring about the general and complete disarmament of all States within a short firmly established time-limit and if that decision was put into effect, the entire international situation would change completely. Relations between States, including countries belonging to different social systems and to opposing military and political blocs, would be put on a completely new basis.

Fear of possible aggression by any State would in fact be removed. The readiness of States to undertake complete general disarmament would be convincing factual confirmation of the absence of any aggressive intentions on their part and of their sincere desire to base relations with other countries on the principle of peaceful co-existence. Furthermore, with the destruction of armaments and the abolition of armed forces no physical possibility whatsoever would remain that States could pursue any policy but that of peace. The abolition of the means of waging war would provide an even more solid basis for co-existence between States as relations between States could no longer develop along any other lines.

General and complete disarmament would remove the distinction between the victors and the vanquished in the last war. The significance and international prestige of Powers would be determined not by their military might but by the extent to which they participated in creating the material

and spiritual riches of mankind. The prestige of individual States and the importance of their contribution to the history of mankind would be measured not by the number of their divisions, bombers or missiles, the tonnage of their warships and submarines, or their stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs, but by their achievements in the production of material wealth, in the improvement of the working and living conditions of the people and in the struggle for the prolongation of life.

Naturally even after the completion of a general disarmament programme, contradictions between States will remain, particularly between States with different social and economic systems. These contradictions will not, however, be resolved through military clashes but by peaceful economic competition, by the struggle of ideas, and with the help of other peaceful means as prescribed in the United Nations Charter.

General and complete disarmament will remove also the difficulties connected with control. In such circumstances States will have nothing to hide from each other, and there will be every opportunity to carry out checks or inspections if there is any doubt about the good faith of any State in fulfilling its disarmament obligations.

In other words, the decision in favour of general and complete disarmament would at last make it possible to break the vicious circle of distrust between States, which now fetters them in their negotiations on partial disarmament measures and prevents them from making any progress whatever.

When general and complete disarmament has been achieved, a new and much more favourable atmosphere will be created for the solution of many complex political problems still outstanding, including those in Europe.

Lastly, the achievement of general and complete disarmament would offer all countries new prospects of economic development. There would be unprecedented opportunities for a rapid improvement in the living standards of all nations, since funds could be put to good use that are now being spent by States on the maintenance of armed forces and the manufacture of armaments.

The opponents of disarmaments not infrequently try to discredit the very concept of disarmament asserting that the cessation of armaments manufacture would inevitably cause economic difficulties and bring unemployment to many peo-

ple now engaged in the armament industries. But this is a specious argument.

Surely, current production of lethal weapons consumes vast sums of public money, which could be used for building houses for the population, new schools for children and free hospitals for those needing medical treatment, and for providing or increasing old-age and disability pensions. Surely the use of these funds for peaceful purposes offers the fullest opportunities for employment.

There can be no doubt that general and complete disarmament would create conditions for the material and intellectual development of all countries at a rate many times in excess of the present one. The thousands of millions that would flow like a torrent into the civil economies as a result of the cessation of military expenditure would be used in far more favourable circumstances than those prevailing at present. The artificial barriers with which States isolate themselves and jealously guard their scientific and technological achievements for military and strategic reasons would gradually fall away. Scientists in all countries would be able to devote their work exclusively to the service of society and the improvement of living conditions. The unimpeded exchange of information would give new impetus to scientific, technical and economic progress in all States, at the individual and at the collective level.

If all States pooled their efforts and provided the funds needed for waging an all-out offensive against such enemies of mankind as cancer and other serious diseases which still resist treatment, these diseases could soon be defeated. General disarmament would furnish the prerequisites for such a concerted effort to improve the health of mankind.

The greater mutual confidence between States resulting from general and complete disarmament would favour the extensive development of international trade. The artificial barriers in the form of discriminatory restrictions, lists of prohibited goods, etc., employed by certain Powers to prevent the extension of this trade, would disappear. The industries of such countries as the United States, the United Kingdom, Western Germany and France would at last be able to avail themselves of the existing wide opportunities for securing large foreign orders. Mutually beneficial trade would have a favourable influence on the economies of trading States.

General and complete disarmament would also create new

opportunities for providing assistance to States whose economies are at present under-developed and need help from the more advanced countries. The allocation of even a small proportion of the resources, released by the cessation of military expenditure by the great Powers, for assistance to such States would inaugurate a new era in the economic development of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The following example will suffice:

The Aswan High Dam and the hydroelectric installations associated with it, now under construction on the Nile in the Egyptian part of the United Arab Republic, probably constitute the most impressive project now being carried out in any of the under-developed countries of Africa or Asia. If general and complete disarmament is achieved and highly developed industrial countries set aside say 10 per cent of the resources thus saved for assistance to under-developed countries, such allocations from the budgets of two Powers alone—the United States and the Soviet Union—could finance the construction of several such dams every year.

In 1958 the direct military expenditure alone of Member States of the NATO military bloc totalled 60,000 million dollars. One-tenth of this sum, if used to help under-developed countries, would finance the construction, every year, of more than ten iron and steel plants, similar to those now being built in India.

Such are the opportunities for promoting the economic progress of under-developed countries on the basis of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union is in favour of making the fullest use of these opportunities.

This is not the first time the idea of general and complete disarmament has been put forward. The Soviet Government made proposals to this effect in the period between the two world wars. The interests of rival groupings of Powers attempting to turn the military might of aggressive States against the only socialist State then in existence prevented the adoption of that Soviet proposal, with disastrous consequences for peace.

Opponents of the proposals for general and complete disarmament were then wont to say that the Soviet Union had made the proposals because it was economically and militarily weak. This false argument may have misled some people, but it is obvious to everyone today that to talk of the weakness of the Soviet Union is absurd, and that the new

Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament is prompted solely by the desire to promote the establishment of lasting peace between nations.

The Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and all the socialist countries are sharply opposed to war and to the manufacture of weapons of war. It would, however, be incorrect to imagine that States with a different social system have no reason to support sincerely and unreservedly a proposal for general and complete disarmament. Destruction of the means of waging war cannot, and will not, be detrimental to the national interests of any State. No Government with genuine concern for the fate of its country and its people can adopt an unfavourable attitude to a proposal for general and complete disarmament.

There are over a 100 States on the political map of the world. The States are at different levels of economic development, they have different political and social systems and their peoples have different living conditions and levels of culture. But, despite the different circumstances in which the peoples of the various countries live, they have one thing in common: the desire to prevent another war and to secure everlasting peace on earth. When no State is physically able to take military action against other States, the course of international relations will be dominated by genuine mutual confidence.

In the belief that all these lofty aims can and must be attained by the concerted efforts of all States, united in the spirit of the peaceful principles of the United Nations, the USSR Government submits for the consideration of the United Nations *a proposal for general and complete disarmament:*

Programme for general and complete disarmament

A programme for general and complete disarmament must include the following measures:

The disbanding of all armed forces (land, naval and air forces) and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form;

The destruction of all forms of armaments and military supplies both in the possession of the armed forces and in depots;

The elimination of all warships, military aircraft, and all other types of military equipment;

The complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the cessation of the manufacture of all types of these weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States and the destruction of stockpiles;

The complete cessation of the manufacture, and the destruction of all types of war missiles, irrespective of their range, including military space vehicles;

The prohibition of the production, possession and storage of the means of chemical and bacteriological warfare, and destruction of stockpiles of these types of weapons;

The abolition of military bases of all kinds—army, navy, and air force—in the territories of foreign States and all missile-launching installations;

The cessation of military production at war plants and at war production units in general industrial plants;

The termination of all military courses and training, both in the army and in public organizations, and the enactment of legislation abolishing military service in all its forms—compulsory, voluntary, by recruitment, and so forth;

The abolition of war ministries, general staffs, military educational institutions and military and paramilitary establishments and organizations of all kinds;

The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from States budgets or from public organizations and private individuals;

The prohibition by law of war propaganda and the military education of young people, and the enactment of legislation prescribing severe penalties for the infringement of any of the measures enumerated above.

States shall retain at their disposal only strictly limited contingents of police (militia), the size of which shall be agreed upon for each country and which shall be equipped with small arms and be used exclusively for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens.

For the purpose of supervising the timely implementation of the measures of general and complete disarmament, an international control organ composed of all States shall be established. The staff of the control organ shall be recruited on an international basis with due regard to the principle of equitable geographic distribution.

The international control organ shall have at its disposal all the facilities necessary for the exercise of strict control. The functions and powers of this organ shall correspond to

the nature of the disarmament measures being implemented.

The Soviet Government proposes that the programme of general and complete disarmament should be carried out within as short a time-limit as possible—within a period of four years.

The following measures are proposed for the first stage:

The reduction, under appropriate control of the strength of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China to the level of 1.7 million men, and of those of the United Kingdom and France to the level of 650,000 men;

The reduction of the strength of the armed forces of other States to levels to be agreed upon at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world conference on general and complete disarmament;

The reduction of the armaments and military equipment at the disposal of the armed forces of States to the extent necessary to ensure that the remaining quantity of armaments corresponds to the level fixed for the armed forces.

The following is proposed for the second stage:

The completion of the disbandment of the armed forces retained by States;

The elimination of all military bases in the territories of foreign States; troops and military personnel shall be withdrawn from the territories of foreign States to within their own national frontiers and shall be disbanded.

The following is proposed for the third stage:

The destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles;

The destruction of air force equipment;

The entry into force of the prohibition on the production, possession and storage of means of chemical and bacteriological warfare. All stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the possession of States shall be removed and destroyed under international supervision;

Scientific research for military purposes and the development of weapons and military equipment shall be prohibited;

War ministries, general staffs and all military and paramilitary establishments and organizations shall be abolished;

All military courses and training shall be terminated. States shall prohibit by law the military education of young people.

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, States shall enact legislation abolishing military service in all its forms—compulsory, voluntary, by recruitment, and so forth, and prohibiting the re-establishment in overt or covert form of any military or paramilitary establishments and organizations.

The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from States budgets or from public organizations, shall be discontinued. The funds made available as a result of the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used to reduce or abolish taxation of the population, to subsidize national economies and to furnish extensive economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries.

For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the measures of general and complete disarmament, an international control organ shall be established. The extent of the control and inspection exercised shall correspond to the stage reached in the phased disarmament of States.

Upon the completion of general and complete disarmament, which shall include the disbandment of all services of the armed forces and the destruction of all types of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, missile, chemical, bacteriological), the international control organ shall have free access to all objects of control.

The control organization may institute a system of aerial observation and aerial photography over the territories of States.

* * *

While the programme of general and complete disarmament is being carried into effect and until the final disbandment of all armed forces, States shall maintain the same ratio among the various services of their armed forces as existed at the time of the entry into force of the disarmament agreement.

The programme of general and complete disarmament shall be carried out by States in strict conformity with the

time-limit specified in the agreement, and its implementation may not be suspended or be made contingent upon the fulfilment of any conditions not provided for in the agreement.

To anticipate possible attempts on the part of States to circumvent or violate the agreement on general and complete disarmament, the agreement shall contain a provision stipulating that any question of its violation shall be submitted for immediate consideration by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, in accordance with their respective sphere of competence.

It goes without saying that the Soviet Government wishes to approach the existing situation realistically, and if at present the Western Powers do not, for one reason or another, express their readiness to embark upon general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government is prepared, as before, to come to terms with other States on appropriate partial measures relating to disarmament and the strengthening of security. In the view of the Soviet Government, the most important steps are the following:

(1) Establishment of a control and inspection zone and reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the Western European countries concerned;

(2) Establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe;

(3) Withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European States and abolition of military bases in the territories of foreign States;

(4) Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and the member States of the Warsaw Treaty;

(5) Conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack by one State upon another.

The Soviet Government considers it appropriate to recall its disarmament proposals of 10 May 1955, which outlined a specific scheme for partial measures in the field of disarmament. It is convinced that these proposals constitute a sound basis for agreement on this vitally important issue.

With respect to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, the Soviet Government has been and still is in favour of immediate cessation of such tests for all time.

The Soviet Government expresses its deep conviction that the proposed radical solution of the disarmament problem would ensure a profound change in the course of internation-

al relations, would bring into being an atmosphere of confidence among States and would create conditions for the peaceful life of nations. The Soviet Government calls upon the Governments of all countries of the world and, in particular, upon the Governments of the great Powers, which possess the most powerful armed forces, which are permanent members of the Security Council, and which bear a special responsibility towards the nations for universal security, to proceed jointly and without delay to the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control¹

Submitted by the USSR Delegation
to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee
on March 15, 1962

PREAMBLE

The States of the world,
Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the
peoples,

Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, the more so under the present conditions of the headlong development of means of mass annihilation, such as nuclear weapons and missiles for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society,

¹ Subsequently the Soviet Union has introduced the following amendments to the Draft Treaty (for texts of the amendments, please refer to the footnotes to the corresponding Articles of the Draft Treaty):

(a) To Articles 11 and 24—on the reduction of conventional armaments by 30 per cent during the first stage and by 35 per cent of their original levels during the second stage.

(b) The inclusion of an additional Article 17a Measures to Reduce the Danger of the Outbreak of War.

(c) To Article 11—on the reduction, during the first stage, of the armed forces of the USA and of the USSR to 1 million 900 thousand each (originally proposed by A. Gromyko in his statement before the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee on July 24, 1962).

(d) To Articles 1, 19 and 28—on extending the total time limit of disarmament to 5 years, including the extension of the duration of the first stage to 18 months and of the second stage to 24 months (originally proposed by A. Gromyko in his statement before the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee on July 24, 1962).

(e) Amendments to Articles 5 and 21 and the inclusion of an additional Chapter V-A on the maintenance of an agreed strictly limited number of ICMBs and ABM systems of the USSR and the USA on their own territories pending the completion of the second stage (originally proposed by A. Gromyko in his statement before the UN General Assembly session on September 21, 1962).

The text of the Draft Treaty with the above amendments was issued as Document A/C.1/867 of September 24, 1962 and Document ENDC/2/Rev.1 of December 14, 1962.

Discharging the historic mission of saving all the nations from the scourge of war,

Proceeding from the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and feasible way to fulfil mankind's age-old dream of assuring eternal and inviolable peace on earth,

Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilation of people and of destruction of material values,

Seeking to direct all resources towards the assurance of the further growth of welfare, and socio-economic progress in all countries of the world,

Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, neighbourliness, equality of States and peoples, non-interference, and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries,

Reaffirming their dedication to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty, and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

PART I. GENERAL

Article I

*Disarmament Obligations*¹

The States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake:

1. To carry out, over a period of four years, general and complete disarmament entailing:

The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;

The prohibition, and destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the manufacture, of all kinds of weapons

¹ On September 24, 1962 the Delegation of the USSR replaced the text of the first sentence of Paragraph 1 of this Article by the following text:

"1. To carry out, over a period of five years, general and complete disarmament entailing:"

of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;

The destruction and discontinuance of the manufacture of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;

The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases, and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State;

The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;

The termination of military training of the population and the closing of all military education institutions;

The abolition of war ministries, of general staffs and their local agencies, and of all other military and paramilitary establishments and organizations;

The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment, and the termination of their manufacture, except for the manufacture of strictly limited amounts of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;

The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or from organizations or private individuals.

2. To have, at their disposal, upon completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms, and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of Article 37 of the present Treaty.

3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously, in three consecutive stages, as is set forth in Parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place upon a decision by the International Disarmament Organization that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified, and that any additional verification arrangements, recognized to be necessary for the next stage, have been prepared and can, when appropriate, be put into operation.

4. To carry out all measures on general and complete dis-

armament in a manner that at no stage of disarmament could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all States parties to the Treaty.

Article 2

Control Obligations

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control, and to assure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in Parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all States parties to the Treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in Part V of the present Treaty.

4. In all States parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to assure the adequate representation on it of all three existing groups of States.

This staff shall exercise control, on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and their manufacture, and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The States parties to the Treaty shall in good time submit to the International Disarmament Organization such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as are necessary to carry out the measures of the corresponding stage.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament the International Disarmament Organization shall be kept in being to maintain supervision over the implementation by States of the obligations they

have assumed, so as to prevent the re-establishment of the military potential of States in any form whatsoever.

Article 3

Obligations to Maintain International Peace and Security

1. The States parties to the Treaty have solemnly resolved in the course of and after general and complete disarmament:

(a) to base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly co-existence and co-operation;

(b) not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use to these ends the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;

(c) to strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

2. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia), remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament, in any manner other than for the assurance of the internal security of States or for the discharge of their obligations to maintain international peace and security, under the United Nations Charter.

PART II. FIRST STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 4

First Stage Tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases on alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories, and to reduce their armed forces, conventional armaments and their manufacture, and military expenditures.

CHAPTER I

Elimination of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Military Bases on Alien Territories, and Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Those Territories. Control over Such Measures

A. MEANS OF DELIVERY

Article 5

*Elimination of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons*¹

1. There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed all missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical (except for strictly limited numbers of missileless aircraft of all types. There shall be completely demolished all launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of missiles and pilotless aircraft, other than those pads that will be retained for peaceful launchings under the provisions of Article 15 of the present Treaty. All instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of the above

¹ On September 24, 1962 the delegation of the USSR replaced the text of Paragraph 1 of this Article by the following text:

"1. There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed all missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types, except for strictly limited agreed numbers of intercontinental missiles as well as anti-missile missiles and surface-to-air air defence missiles retained by the USSR and the USA exclusively on their own territories until the completion of the second stage. [On April 28, 1965 the Delegation of the USSR replaced the latter words by the words 'third stage'.] Also retained shall be a strictly limited number of missiles to be converted to peaceful uses under the provisions of Article 15 of this Treaty.

"Except for those required for the missiles retained under the provisions of this article, all launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of missiles and pilotless aircraft shall be completely demolished; all instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of the missiles and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed; all underground depots for such missiles, pilotless aircraft and all subsidiary facilities shall be demolished."

mentioned missiles and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such missiles, pilotless aircraft and subsidiary facilities shall be demolished.

2. The manufacture of all kinds of missiles and pilotless aircraft, and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. All enterprises, or workshops thereof, engaged in their manufacture, shall be dismantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the manufacture of such items shall be destroyed; the premises of such enterprises, as well as general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such missiles and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall control the execution of the measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. For the peaceful exploration of space there shall be allowed the manufacture and testing of appropriate missiles provided the plants manufacturing such missiles, as well as the missiles themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 6

Elimination of Military Aircraft Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed, all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft, repair and maintenance facilities, and storage places at these airfields shall be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such aircraft shall be closed.

2. The manufacture of all military aircraft referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. Enterprises, or workshops thereof, designed for the manufacture of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the manufacture of civil aircraft or other peaceful items.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall control the execution of the measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

Article 7

Elimination of All Surface Warships Capable of Being Used as Vehicles for Nuclear Weapons, and Submarines

1. There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed, all surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines of any class or type. Naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of the above warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and converted to peaceful uses by the merchant marine.

2. The building of warships and submarines referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants, wholly or in part designed for the building of such warships and submarines, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall control the execution of the measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

Article 8

Elimination of All Artillery Systems Capable of Serving as Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed, all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivery for nuclear weapons. All subsidiary instruments and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed. Surface storage places and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire non-nuclear stock of munitions for such artillery systems, whether at gun sites or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems, and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof, shall be destroyed.

2. The manufacture of artillery systems referred to above in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. To this end all plants, or workshops thereof, engaged in the manufacture of such systems shall be closed or dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The manufacture of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the manufacture of such munitions shall be completely dismantled, and their specialized equipment destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall control the execution of the measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

B. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND TROOPS IN ALIEN TERRITORIES

Article 9

Dismantling of Foreign Military Bases

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5 through 8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty, which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories, shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or standby, as well as all depot bases of any designation. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments at such bases for which provision is made in Articles 5 through 8 of the present Treaty, shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall be destroyed on the spot in accordance with Article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State which owned the base. All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. Living quarters and subsidiary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the States on whose territory they are located.

2. The measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be fully applicable to those military bases that are used by foreign troops even though legally they may belong to the State on whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented in regard to those

army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other States or groups of States, regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at these bases at the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the bodies of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment and use of military bases in foreign territories, shall become invalid and unrenovable. The granting henceforth of military bases for use by foreign troops, and the concluding to this end of any bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements shall be prohibited.

3. The Legislatures and Governments of the States parties to the present Treaty shall enact legislation and promulgate decrees to ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall control the execution of the measures referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

Article 10

Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Alien Territories

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5 through 8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have troops, or military personnel of any nature, in foreign territories, shall withdraw all such troops and personnel therefrom. All armaments, and all installations of a military nature, which are located at points where foreign troops are stationed, and for which provision is made in Articles 5 through 8 of the present Treaty, shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall be destroyed on the spot under Article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing troops. Living quarters and subsidiary installations formerly held by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the States on whose territory such troops were stationed.

2. The measures set forth in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be fully applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces, or engaged in the manufacture of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes on foreign territory.

The said persons shall be recalled to the territory of the State whose citizenship they hold, and all previous treaty obligations, decisions by bodies of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to their activities, shall be invalidated and unrenovable. The future dispatching of foreign troops, military personnel, or the said civilians, to foreign territories, shall be prohibited.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall control the withdrawal of troops, the destruction of installations, and the transfer of the premises referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to exercise control over the recall of civilians referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article. The legislation and decrees referred to in Paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the present Treaty, shall include provisions prohibiting the citizens of States parties to the Treaty from serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities for military purposes in foreign States.

CHAPTER II

Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditures. Control Over Such Measures

Article 11

Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments¹

1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels:

¹ On September 24, 1962 the delegation of the USSR replaced the text of Paragraph 1 of this Article by the following text:

"1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels:

"The United States of America—1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees;

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.

(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article)."

On July 16, 1962 the delegation of the USSR replaced the text of Paragraph 3 of this Article by the following text:

The United States of America—1,700,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees;

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—1,700,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.

(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article).

2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out primarily through the demobilization of personnel released due to the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in Articles 5 through 10 of the present Treaty, and chiefly by way of the complete disbandment of units and ship crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

3. All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the disbanded units shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Conventional armaments and equipment intended for reserve forces shall also be destroyed.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are disbanded and released, conventional armaments and military equipment destroyed, and shall also control the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

"3. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment in military units and in depots shall be reduced by 30 per cent as regards every type of all categories of these armaments. The armaments, military equipment and munitions subject to reduction shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

"All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds used by them, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities."

Article 12

Curtailement of Conventional Armaments Manufacture

1. Proportionately to the reduction of armed forces, as provided for in Article 11 of the present Treaty, the manufacture of conventional armaments and munitions not referred to in Articles 5 through 8 of the present Treaty, shall be curtailed. Such curtailment shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in the manufacture of such armaments and munitions. These enterprises shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises, and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 13

Reduction of Military Expenditures

1. The States parties to the present Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their manufacture, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and withdrawals of troops from foreign territories, as well as the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the curtailment of the manufacture of such armaments as provided for in Articles 5 through 12 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. At the same time a certain share of the funds thus released, shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this share shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall control the execution of the measures referred to in Paragraph

1 of this Article, through its financial inspectors, whom the States parties to the Treaty shall undertake to assure unhindered access to the records of central financial offices pertaining to the reduction of budgetary allocations of States due to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, including the relevant acts of their legislative and executive bodies.

CHAPTER III

Measures to Ensure the Security of States

Article 14

Restriction of Displacements of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. From the very beginning of the first stage and until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5 through 8 of the present Treaty, the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships, and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, shall be prohibited.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall control the compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article. The States parties to the Treaty shall provide advance information to the International Disarmament Organization about all launchings of missiles for peaceful purposes, as provided for in Article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as about all flights of military aircraft within their national frontiers and movements of warships within their territorial waters.

Article 15

Control Over Launchings of Missiles for Peaceful Purposes

1. The launching of missiles and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article through the establishment of inspection teams at the sites for peaceful missile launchings which shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every missile or satellite before their launching.

Article 16

Prevention of the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The States parties to the Treaty, owning nuclear weapons, shall undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their manufacture to States not owning them.

The States parties to the Treaty not owning nuclear weapons shall undertake to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other State into their territories.

Article 17

Prohibition of Nuclear Tests

The holding of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited. (If such a prohibition is not implemented under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed).¹

Article 18

Measures to Improve the Capacity of the United Nations to Assure International Peace and Security

1. To ensure that the United Nations is capable to effectively protect the States against threats to or breaches

¹ On July 16, 1962 the delegation of the USSR added Article 17a:

Article 17a Measures to Reduce the Danger of the Outbreak of War

1. From the very beginning of the first stage, significant joint troop movements or exercises with the participation of armed forces

of the peace, all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council on making available to the latter armed forces, assistance and appropriate facilities, the right of passage included, as provided for in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

2. The armed forces provided under the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the corresponding States and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be fully manned, equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, commanded by the military authorities of the corresponding States, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

CHAPTER IV

Time-limits for Measures of the First Stage. Transition from First to Second Stage

Article 19

*Time-limits for Measures of the First Stage*¹

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into effect. No measures of general and complete disarmament of two or more States shall be prohibited.

The States parties to the Treaty agree to make, in good time, notifications of important troop movements and exercises of their national armed forces within the limits of their national territory.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions among States or groups of States for the purpose of improving the liaison and mutual understanding among them.

3. The States parties to the Treaty shall agree to establish rapid and reliable communications among Heads of Government and with the UN Secretary-General.

4. The measures listed in this Article shall remain in effect even after the completion of the first stage until the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

¹ On September 24, 1962, the delegation of the USSR replaced the text of this Article by the following:

Article 19

Time-limits for Measures of the First Stage

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force (under Article 46 of this Treaty), within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.

2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 18 months.

force (under Article 46 of the present Treaty), within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.

2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 15 months.

Article 20

Transition from First to Second Stage

In the course of the last 3 months of the first stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the results of the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to reporting on them to the States parties to the Treaty, as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART III. SECOND STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 21

*Second Stage Tasks*¹

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the further reduction of their armed forces, conventional armaments and their manufacture, and military expenditures.

¹ On September 24, 1962, the delegation of the USSR replaced the text of this Article by the following:

Article 21

Second Stage Tasks

The States parties to the Treaty shall undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, to complete the elimination of all military missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and retained by the USSR and the USA after the completion of the first stage, as well as to effect the further reduction of their armed forces, conventional armaments and their manufacture, and military expenditures.

CHAPTER V

Elimination of Nuclear, Chemical,
Biological and Radiological Weapons.
Control over such Measures

Article 22

Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

1. (a) There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities.¹ Fissionable materials extracted from such weapons, whether directly attached to the troops or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for the immediate re-establishment of weapons and they shall form a special fund for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be fully destroyed.

All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished.

(b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons purposes shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for immediate use in nuclear weapons, and shall be transferred to the above-mentioned special funds.

(c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall control the execution of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons referred to above in Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Paragraph.

2. (a) The manufacture of nuclear weapons, and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely

On April 28, 1965, the delegation of the USSR replaced the text of this Article by the following: "*Article 21. Second Stage Tasks.* The States parties to the Treaty shall undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as to effect the further reduction of their armed forces, conventional armaments and their manufacture, and military expenditures".

¹ On April 28, 1965, the Delegation of the USSR supplemented this sentence by the following: "except for warheads and missiles temporarily retained by the USSR and the USA in accordance with Paragraph 1, Article 5 of this Treaty".

discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to peaceful production. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the manufacture of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the manufacture of such weapons, shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful production.

(b) The measures for the discontinuance of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes referred to above in Subparagraph (a), shall be executed under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy.

The States parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organization documents pertaining to the extraction of nuclear raw materials, to their processing and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes.

3. Each State party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedure, enact legislation on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and on amenability under the criminal law for any attempt at its re-establishment by individuals or organizations.

Article 23

Elimination of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons

1. There shall be eliminated from the arsenals of States, and destroyed (neutralized), all kinds of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to the troops or stored in various depots and storage places. Simultaneously all instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons as well as all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation shall be destroyed.

2. The manufacture of all kinds of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be com-

pletely discontinued. All plants, installations, and laboratories that are wholly or in part engaged in the manufacture of such weapons, shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful production.

3. The measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be executed under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.¹

CHAPTER VI

Further Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditures. Control over Such Measures

Article 24

Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments²

1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America—One million enlisted men,

¹ On September 24, 1962, the delegation of the USSR added Chapter V-A:

CHAPTER V-A

Elimination of Nuclear-Capable Missiles Retained After the First Stage

Article 23-A

1. All intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and surface-to-air air defence missiles retained by the USSR and the USA under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 5, shall be eliminated together with their launching and guidance systems.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall control the implementation of measures referred to above in Paragraph 1.

In the Soviet delegation's draft of April 28, 1965, the above Article was deleted.

² On July 16, 1962, the delegation of the USSR replaced the text of Paragraph 2 of this Article by the following:

2. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment in military units and in depots shall be reduced by 35 per cent of the original levels as regards every type of all categories of these armaments. The armaments, military equipment and munitions to be reduced shall be destroyed, while the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or transferred for peaceful uses.

The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

officers and civilian em-
ployees;
One million enlisted men,
officers and civilian em-
ployees.

(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this Article).

The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out primarily through the demobilization of personnel previously attached to the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under Articles 22 and 23 of the present Treaty, and chiefly by way of the complete disbandment of units and shipcrews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

2. All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the units being disbanded shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are disbanded and released, conventional armaments and military equipment destroyed, and shall also control the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

Article 25

Further Curtailment of Conventional Armaments Manufacture

1. Proportionately to the reduction of armed forces, as provided for in Article 24 of the present Treaty, the manufacture of conventional armaments and munitions shall be

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds previously used by them, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

curtailed. Such curtailment shall, as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in the manufacture of such armaments and munitions. These enterprises shall be dismantled, their specialized machine-tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine-tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. The measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 26

Further Reduction of Military Expenditures

1. The States parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, and the discontinuance of their manufacture, as well as to the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the curtailment of the manufacture of such armaments as provided for in Article 22 through 25 of the Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the second-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. At the same time a certain share of the funds thus released shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this share shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. Control over the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 13 of the Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall also be assured unhindered access to materials pertaining to the reduction of budgetary allocations of States due to the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

CHAPTER VII

Measures to Ensure the Security of States

Article 27

*Continued Improvement of the Capacity of
the United Nations to Assure International Peace
and Security*

The States parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures, referred to in Article 18 of the present Treaty, regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

CHAPTER VIII

**Time-limits for Measures of the Second Stage.
Transition from Second to Third Stage**

Article 28

*Time-limits for Measures of the Second Stage*¹

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 15 months.

Article 29

Transition From Second to Third Stage

In the course of the last three months of the second stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the results of the implementation of this stage.

Measures pertaining to the transition from the second to

¹ On September 24, 1962, the delegation of the USSR replaced the text of this Article by the following:

Article 28

Time-limits for Measures of the Second Stage

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 24 months.

the third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be similar to those provided for the first stage under Article 20 of the present Treaty.

PART IV. THIRD STAGE OF GENERAL
AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 30

Third Stage Tasks¹

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, to fully disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military establishment of States.

CHAPTER IX

**Completion of the Elimination
of the Military Establishment of States.
Control over Such Measures**

Article 31

*Completion of the Elimination of
Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments*

1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces the States parties to the Treaty shall disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserves of each State party to the Treaty shall be fully abolished.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall destroy all armaments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remained at their disposal after

¹ On April 28, 1965, the delegation of the USSR supplemented the text of this Article by the following paragraph:

"The USSR and the USA shall undertake to complete the total elimination of all missiles, together with their nuclear warheads, which remained at their disposal under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of this Treaty."

the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the disbanding of troops, and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc. to peaceful uses.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty.

Article 32

Complete Termination of Military Production

1. Military production at factories and plants shall be terminated with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for purposes referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the present Treaty. The factories and plants, subject to elimination, shall be dismantled, their specialized machine-tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general purpose machine-tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the manufacture of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination, shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments for the manufacture of armaments, military equipment, munitions and materiel with national or foreign Government-owned enterprises and private firms, shall be annulled.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 33

Abolition of Military Establishments

1. There shall be abolished war ministries, general staffs, and all other military and paramilitary organizations and

institutions designed to organize the military effort of States parties to the Treaty. The States parties to the Treaty shall:

(a) demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations;

(b) abrogate all legislative acts, rules and regulations governing the organization of the military effort, and the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations;

(c) destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilization and the operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war.

2. The entire process of the abolition of military and paramilitary institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 34

Abolition of Military Conscription and Military Training

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. Simultaneously there shall be disbanded all establishments and organizations dealing with military training as provided for in Article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 35

Prohibition of the Appropriation of Funds for Military Purposes

1. There shall be discontinued the appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from government bodies or private individuals and public organizations.

The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful

purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population, and the subsidizing of the national economy. At the same time a certain share of the funds thus released shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this share shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. To organize control over the implementation of the provisions of this Article, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access to legislative acts and budgetary documents of the States parties to the present Treaty.¹

CHAPTER X

Measures to Ensure the Security of States and to Maintain International Peace

Article 36

Contingents of Police (Militia)

1. To maintain internal order, including the safeguarding of the frontiers and of the personal security of citizens, and to ensure compliance with their obligations pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter, the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have after the complete abolition of armed forces, strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms.

¹ On April 28, 1965, the delegation of the USSR added Article 35a:

Article 35a
Destruction of Missiles and Nuclear
Warheads Thereof Retained Until the
Completion of the Third Stage

1. At the end of the third stage, all intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and surface-to-air air defence missiles, together with their nuclear warheads and launching and control systems, retained by the USSR and the USA under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of this Treaty shall be destroyed.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall control the implementation of the measures referred to above in Paragraph 1.

The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each State party to the Treaty shall be as follows:

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2. The States parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantities of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms, their quotas and types for each party to the Treaty shall be specified in a special agreement.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said light firearms.

Article 37

Provision of Police (Militia) Units to the Security Council

1. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, on its request, units from the contingents of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and appropriate facilities, including the right of passage. The placing of such units at the disposal of the Security Council is carried out under the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. To ensure that urgent military measures may be undertaken, the States parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness that part of the police (militia) contingents which is intended for joint international enforcement action. The size of the units which the States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, as well as the areas where they are stationed, shall be specified in agreements to be concluded by the States parties to the Treaty with the Security Council.

2. The command of the units referred to in Paragraph 1 shall be made up of representatives of the three principal groups of States existing in the world on the basis of equal representation. The commanding body shall decide on all questions by agreement among its members representing the three groups of States.

Article 38

Control over the Prevention of the Re-establishment of Armed Forces

1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be under the control of the International Disarmament Organization which shall verify the reports by States about the areas where such contingents are stationed, their strength and armaments in every such area, and about all movements of substantial contingents of police (militia).

2. For the purposes of control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments, abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the States parties to the Treaty.

CHAPTER XI

Time-limits for Measures of the Third Stage

Article 39

The third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the results of the implementation of the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament, with a view to reporting on them to the States parties to the Treaty, as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART V. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

Article 40

Functions and Main Bodies

The International Disarmament Organization, to be set up under Paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organization", shall have a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference", and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council".

The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to supervision of the compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions related to the assurance of international peace and security, which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided on by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

Article 41

The Conference

1. The Conference shall comprise all States parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year, and special sessions which may be summoned on a decision by the Council or on request from a majority of the States parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters pertaining to the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the Headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each State party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority, and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and may make recommendations

to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure.

4. The Conference shall:

- (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
- (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;
- (c) Approve the budget recommended by the Council;
- (d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
- (e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with Article 47 of the present Treaty;
- (f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
- (g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.

Article 42

The Control Council

1. The Council shall consist of:

- (a) The five States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;
- (b) . . . (number) other States parties to the Treaty elected by the Conference for a period of two years.

The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world.

2. The Council shall:

- (a) Practically direct the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set up such bodies at the Headquarters of the Organization as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in accordance with the present Treaty;
- (b) Submit to the Conference annual reports and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;
- (c) Be in constant touch with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly

notify it of any infringements by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty;

(d) Review the results of the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to reporting on them to the States parties to the Treaty, and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on an international basis, so as to ensure that the three principal groups of States existing in the world are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among those persons who are recommended by the Governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;

(f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;

(g) Elaborate instructions to direct the operations of the various control elements;

(h) Make timely analysis of incoming reports;

(i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary to control the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for by the present Treaty;

(j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 43

Privileges and Immunities

The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each State party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent

and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

Article 44

Finances

1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be met by the States parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organization shall be drawn up by the Council and approved by the Conference in accordance with Paragraph 4(c) of Article 41 and Paragraph 2(f) of Article 42 of the present Treaty.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditures of the Organization according to the following scale:

(The agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present Article).

Article 45

Preparatory Commission

Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty the States represented on the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee shall set up a Preparatory Commission with the task of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organization.

PART VI. FINAL CLAUSES

Article 46

Ratification and Entry into Force

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the Signatory States in accordance with their constitutional processes, within a period of six months from the date of the signing of the Treaty, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat by all the permanent members of the Se-

curity Council, as well as by those States that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by (number) non-aligned States.

Article 47

Amendments

Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, and ratified in accordance with their constitutional processes by the States referred to in Article 46 of the present Treaty.

Article 48

Authentic Texts

The present Treaty done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese and Spanish languages, each being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the Signatory States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty.

Done at . . .

Pravda, March 16, 1962

Draft Non-Aggression Pact Between the Warsaw Treaty Members and the North Atlantic Treaty Participants

Submitted by the Delegation of the USSR
to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee
on February 20, 1963

The states, members of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955, on the one hand, and the states, members of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, on the other hand,

Fully resolved to take steps to do away with international tension and create an atmosphere of confidence in international relations, with a view to promoting the consolidation of universal peace and reaching an early agreement on the basic problems of our time, especially on the question of general and complete disarmament,

Confirming their intention to abide strictly in relations with each other by the aims and principles of the United Nations Organization,

Have agreed on the following:

Article One

The states, members of the Warsaw Treaty, and the states, members of the North Atlantic Treaty, solemnly pledge to refrain from aggression, threat of force or use of force by any means incompatible with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, both against each other and in their international relations in general.

Article Two

All issues, which may arise between one or several states, members of the Warsaw Treaty, on the one hand, and

one or several states, members of the North Atlantic Treaty, on the other hand, shall be solved by peaceful means only through talks among the sides concerned and through the use of other means for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, envisaged by the United Nations Charter.

Article Three

In case of situations affecting the interests of both sides or capable of creating a threat to peace and security, the signatories to the present pact shall consult each other to take and carry out joint measures, which, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, may be found fit for the peaceful settlement of these situations.

Article Four

The present pact shall remain in force as long as the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955, and the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, remain in force.

Article Five

The present pact is to be ratified by its signatories in conformity with their constitutional procedure. The ratification instruments will be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations, who will inform all the states, signatories to the pact and also all the other United Nations members about the deposition of each instrument.

The present pact will come into force as of the day of the deposition of the last ratification instrument.

Article Six

The present pact, the Russian, English and French texts being authentic, will be registered and deposited with the United Nations Secretariat. The duly attested copies of the pact will be forwarded by the United Nations Secretary General to the governments of the states, signatories to the present pact.

In evidence thereof the undersigned representatives of the states, members of the Warsaw Treaty, and the states, members of the North Atlantic Treaty, have signed this pact and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in 1963.

Pravda, February 21, 1963.

Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

September 25, 1965

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

In conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Desiring the earliest possible attainment of agreement on the complete prohibition and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons within the framework of general and complete disarmament under strict international control,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, thus facilitating the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to transfer such weapons in any form—directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States—to the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons and not to accord to such States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons.

The said Parties to the Treaty shall not transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them or over their emplacement and use, to units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

2. Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to provide assistance—directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States—to States not at present possessing nuclear weapons in the manufacture, in preparations for the manufacture or in the testing of such weapons and not to transmit to them any kind of manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.

Article II

1. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to create, manufacture or prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons either independently or together with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other States. They also undertake to refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons in any form—directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States—for purposes of ownership, control or use and shall not participate in the ownership, control or use of such weapons or in testing them.

The said Parties to the Treaty shall not seek to acquire control over nuclear weapons or over their emplacement and use for units of their armed forces or personnel thereof, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

2. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to obtain or seek to obtain, from States possessing nuclear weapons, assistance in the manufacture of such weapons or relevant manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.

Article III

The Parties to this Treaty shall refrain from offering any support, encouragement or inducement to States seeking to own, manufacture or exercise control over nuclear weapons.

Article IV

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all Parties possessing nuclear weapons. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all Parties possessing nuclear weapons.

Article V

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments hereby designated the Depository Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all Parties possessing nuclear weapons and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VI

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article VII

This Treaty, the Russian, English, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in ... copies at the city of on the ... day of

Izvestiya, September 25, 1965.

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the present Convention,
Desiring to further international peace and security of peoples,

Aware of the exceedingly serious consequences for all mankind of a nuclear war,

Confirming the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, adopted by the General Assembly in 1961,

Considering that the conclusion of a Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would significantly contribute to the solution of other disarmament questions,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Each Party to this Convention gives the solemn undertaking to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them and from inciting other States to use them.

Article 2

Each Party to this Convention undertakes to make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at agreement on the cessation of production and the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons in conformity with a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.

3. This Convention shall be open to any State for accession.

4. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of . . . , which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

5. This Convention shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Parties to the Convention possessing nuclear weapons.

6. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

7. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of any other notification.

Article 4

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 5

This Convention, the Russian, English, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

Izvestiya, September 23, 1967.

**Draft Convention
on Banning the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Chemical
and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
and on Their Destruction**

September 19, 1969

The States Parties to this Convention,

Being convinced of the tremendous importance and urgent need for excluding from national arsenals such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Being guided by a desire to promote progress toward achieving the goals of general and complete disarmament,

Wishing to contribute toward strengthening trust between the peoples and toward a general improvement of the international climate,

Believing that scientific discoveries in chemistry and bacteriology (biology) should be used in the interests of the whole of mankind for peaceful purposes only,

Recognizing the great importance of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925, banning the use in war of asphyxiating, poison and other such gases and bacteriological means, and containing generally recognized standards of international law,

Reaffirming their loyalty to the aims and principles of this protocol and urging all states to observe them strictly,

Recalling resolutions 2162B (21) and 2454A (23) of the U.N. General Assembly which condemned all actions running counter to the Geneva protocol of June 17, 1925,

Taking into consideration the conclusions contained in the report, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly and the Disarmament Committee, concerning grave consequences the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons would have for mankind,

Expressing its desire to contribute toward the implemen-

tation of the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

Every State Party to the Present Convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire in any other way chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

Article 2

Every State Party to the Convention undertakes to destroy within a . . . time limit and with the observance of all the necessary safety measures, all the earlier stockpiled chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons it has at its disposal, or to gear them to peaceful needs.

Article 3

Every State Party to the Convention undertakes not to help, encourage or induce any individual State, a group of States or international organizations to develop, produce or acquire in any other way chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and stockpile these weapons.

Article 4

Every State Party to the Convention bears international responsibility for observing its provisions by legal and natural persons who are operating in its territory, as well as its legal and natural persons outside the boundaries of a given State.

Article 5

Every State Party to the Convention undertakes to adopt in the shortest possible time and in accordance with its constitutional procedures, all the necessary legislative and administrative measures to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons as well as to destroy these weapons.

Article 6

States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult and cooperate with each other in the solution of questions that may arise in connection with the implementation of the provisions of the present Convention.

Article 7

1. The present Convention is open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the present convention before it enters into force under point 3 of the present article, may accede to it at any time.

2. The present Convention is subject to ratification by signatory states. Instruments of ratification and documents on accession shall be deposited with the governments of . . . which are appointed hereby as Depository Governments.

3. The present Convention enters into force after the deposition with . . . of the instruments of ratification of governments including instruments of ratification of the governments of States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as other governments appointed as Depository Governments of the present Convention.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or documents of accession are deposited after the entry into force of the present Convention, it shall become effective on the day of deposition of their instruments of ratification or documents of accession.

5. The Depository Governments immediately notify all States which have signed or acceded to the present Convention, on the date of each signature, on the date of deposition of each instrument of ratification and each document of accession, the date of the entry into force of the present Convention and other notifications.

6. The present Convention shall be registered by the Depository Governments in accordance with article 102 of the U.N. Charter.

Article 8

The present Convention, of which the Russian, English, French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally authentic, is deposited with the archives of the Depository Governments. The duly witnessed copies of the present Convention

are forwarded by the Depositary Governments to the governments of States which have signed the Convention or acceded to it.

In witness thereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present Convention.

Done in ... copies in the city of ... day ... year ...

Izvestiya, September 20, 1969.

Chapter Three

**THE USSR'S STPUGGLE
FOR DISARMAMENT
IN THE 1970s AND 1980s**

Mankind entered the 1970s with definite experience and even real achievements in solving the problem of disarmament. In particular, for the first time in history the Western countries were compelled to sign agreements which curbed the arms race at least "horizontally".

However, keeping the arms race in check is still not disarmament in the full sense of the word, but only an approach to solving the issue. Real disarmament measures and "vertical" curbing of the arms race were achieved in the early 1970s.

By that time, the world socialist system started to become a decisive force in global development. The July 1969 Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties stated: "Imperialism can neither regain its lost historical initiative nor reverse world development. The main direction of mankind's development is determined by the world socialist system, the international working class, all revolutionary forces."¹ The economic and political successes of socialism were augmented by the establishment of "strategic parity" between the USSR and the United States. After his inauguration in 1969, US President Richard M. Nixon had to admit that the US and Soviet strategic potentials were on the whole balanced.

The beginning of international detente was powerful impetus for the resolution of the problems of arms limitation and disarmament. For the first time in history several agreements were reached which not only restricted the sphere of

¹ *World Marxist Review*, "Documents of International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow, June 5-17, 1969. Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle Against Imperialism and United Action of the Communist and Workers' Parties and all Anti-Imperialist Forces. Adopted on June 17, 1969", July 1969, Vol. 12, No. 7, p. 7.

the nuclear arms race, but which were the first real measures involving actual disarmament. This chiefly concerns the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (signed on April 10, 1972), the USSR-US Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (May 26, 1972), the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (May 26, 1972), and the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (July 3, 1974).

During the Soviet-American Summit held in the summer of 1974, the two sides also signed a Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (July 3, 1974), in line with which they continued further talks resulted in the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (May 28, 1976).

Thus, *the early seventies involved a major positive shift in curbing the arms race and, at the same time, in the development of the historical basis for further progress in this respect.* Taking this into account, the USSR put the task of supplementing political detente with military detente on the international political agenda. However, in the period that followed, most of the Soviet initiatives in the sphere of disarmament failed due to the fierce resistance of international reactionaries who sought to thwart disarmament talks and impose a new spiral in the arms race.

In the summer of 1977, under direct US pressure, the NATO Defence Planning Committee approved directives to member-nations for the latter to annually increase their military budgets by 3 per cent through 1984. After that, the Supreme Commander of NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe reported that the NATO countries had reached agreement on 140 measures for increasing the West's military preparedness. The new unprecedentedly large-scale NATO programme for building up and modernising armaments was adopted by the May 1978 NATO Council Session held in Washington by the Alliance's heads of state and government. On December 12, 1979, under Washington's flagrant pressure, NATO foreign and defence ministers approved the production and deployment of 108 Pershing-2 launchers and 464 cruise missiles in a number of West European countries.

The Reagan Administration took an even tougher foreign

policy course. From the very outset, it made a sharp turn towards building up US military muscle and gaining superiority in strategic offensive forces so as to act from a "position of strength". To that end, during the first year of the Reagan presidency, US military expenditures were raised to as much as 186 billion dollars, and during the second year to 226 billion. All these appropriations were to be used for a new US strategic programme for the eighties in line with which, first of all, Washington is rapidly building up its strategic offensive forces, including the MX intercontinental ballistic missile, the Midgetman missile, new nuclear-powered *Ohio* class missile submarines, new B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, the multi-purpose Shuttle space system, and long-range air-, sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles.

At the same time, in compliance with President Reagan's decision, active work is under way to create an anti-missile defense system with space-based components, which is known as "Star Wars". Washington is developing a ground- and space-based ABM system in the vain hope of delivering with impunity an unimpeded first nuclear strike. This ABM system would be based on directed energy and particle beam weapons, lasers, and computer technology. All these measures are accompanied by openly militant US statements that peace is not the main thing and war is not so terrible as it seems to be, evidently designed to intimidate and pressure the USSR and other socialist countries. These statements also imply the desire of US imperialism to break out of the situation of "mutual deterrence" which was brought about by the establishment of a military balance between the USSR and the US and ensure for the United States the capability to deliver against the USSR a first nuclear strike.

Actually, all the strategic armaments systems now being deployed in the United States possess improved characteristics as regards their accuracy and nuclear explosive yield. Washington's first-strike doctrine also envisages that the United States would deploy new medium-range weapons systems on the frontiers of the USSR and other socialist countries. By intimidating their West European allies with the "Soviet threat" and by compelling them to accelerate the arms race, American ruling circles have, for many years, pursued one goal: to turn Europe into the most highly potential area of a Soviet-American military conflict and to

ward off a nuclear strike against US territory. In other words, *they are taking great efforts to realise the concept of a "Eurostrategic war", in which they could attain their global objectives without risking destruction themselves.*

Washington's new aggressive doctrines backed by an unrestrained arms race show that imperialism has not abandoned its attempts to change the existing strategic balance in its favour and to resolve by force the historical dispute between the two social systems. At the same time, they reflect the desire to put psychological pressure on the socialist countries, primarily on the USSR. Western strategists think that NATO's military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries, and the Alliance's ability to deliver a first strike against the latter, would exert military and psychological pressure on their opponents to make them more compliant.

Many realistically thinking political figures have lately voiced concern about the lack of progress at the Soviet-American arms limitation talks. The USSR shares this concern. But who, then, bears the responsibility for this state of affairs? Who hinders progress at these talks? To answer these questions, let us again refer to the facts.

At the end of 1978, the United States unilaterally broke off Soviet-American talks on limiting arms trade. In 1979, America was also at fault for the termination of US-Soviet talks on anti-satellite systems and on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Finally, in May 1980, Soviet-American talks on banning chemical weapons were broken off, and at the end of 1980 the tripartite Soviet-Anglo-American talks on general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests were also suspended.

The US Administration prevented SALT-II from taking effect, and Congress has still not ratified the 1974 US-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Washington is stubbornly preventing agreement from being reached on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction at talks in the Disarmament Committee; at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe; and on a number of other issues.

In deploying their missiles in Europe, the Americans have

created difficulties for the Soviet-US talks both on "European" and strategic nuclear weapons. Washington tried to use the talks to cover up the arms race and naturally the Soviet Union cannot take part in such an unworthy game.

States' attitude towards treaties and agreements they have already concluded always bespeaks their true intentions. The USSR has always observed both international law and all its treaties or agreements. It has always been and remains a reliable partner in international affairs, and if Moscow signs a treaty this means it is fully resolved to strictly and fully observe its letter and spirit.

But Washington's attitude towards treaties and agreements is different. A scornful attitude towards the international community and generally accepted norms of interstate relations has become a rule for the US leadership. The Reagan Administration is actually pursuing a policy aimed at wrecking previously signed disarmament agreements and is attempting to shatter those in force and already proven effective, such as the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-I) and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger repeatedly stated that the United States, depending on the results of ongoing work on antimissile systems, could demand the revision or even abrogation of the ABM Treaty. In this way, Washington threatens to undermine one of the cornerstones of the entire process of limiting strategic armaments.

Thus, facts unambiguously show that responsibility for the existing state of affairs rests with those who were time and again the initiators of major military build-up programmes that escalate the arms race; with those who, under various pretexts, had broken off talks on different aspects of limiting armaments and on disarmament; with those who openly go back on understandings already reached and agreements already signed.

In blocking constructive agreements at disarmament talks, the United States demagogically substitutes talks about arms control for disarmament talks. Besides, Washington seeks to distort the Soviet stand on this matter and to accuse Moscow of not wanting to accept any verification measures.

However, controls have never been a problem for the USSR in implementing disarmament agreements. In fact,

they are important for the Soviet Union no less, if not more, than for others. Also, the Soviet approach to this issue is concrete, rather than limited to general declarations. Moscow's policy goes as far as to favour the establishment of general and complete control when general and complete disarmament has been achieved.

In recent years, to justify its arms build-up, the US Administration has made wide use of the concept of talks "from a position of strength" claiming that by the launching of new military programmes the United States will allegedly strengthen the American position and promote the conclusion of agreements at negotiation. At the same time, Washington claims that, after the US had done that, it would no longer be necessary to actually implement those programmes, and they would, allegedly, be scrapped.

However, it is common knowledge that, in reality, Washington's "nuclear trumps", acquired under the pretext of "strengthening its negotiating position", were subsequently turned into real armaments. This happened to Minuteman-3 missiles, to the B-1B strategic bomber, to the MX programme, and to the Trident missile submarine.

The concept of talks "from a position of strength" is clearly a logical absurdity, since the talks themselves are said to be aimed at reducing the level of military confrontation, while raising the level of such confrontation is declared to be their "premise". In this case, however, the US Administration is in no way guided by logic, but by concrete objectives. In fact, it seeks to achieve military superiority over the USSR, either through a direct arms build-up, or by misusing the negotiating machinery itself.

The absurdity of US ruling circles' approach is obvious. It would be naive to assume that the other side would passively watch how Washington uses its "nuclear trumps" to implement specific military programmes. In fact, the USSR would inevitably take retaliatory measures. Moscow has time and again declared that the USSR would not allow the existing military balance to be changed in the United States' favour, and that any talks with the Soviet Union from a "position of strength" would be utterly doomed to failure, and US strategists must be well aware that in this respect Moscow's word and deed have never diverged.

In assessing the existing disarmament situation, one can only infer that US imperialism's desire for military supe-

riority and its intention to reassume the historically non-existent role of world policeman make new disarmament agreements impossible.

Yet, despite the current tense international situation, despite the American and Western countries' new obstacles to military detente Communists are convinced that the problem of disarmament will sooner or later be solved. *Reality itself has put this problem on the international agenda and the need to resolve it is dictated by the interests of humanity's survival.*

The Soviet disarmament programme is not aimed at obtaining any unilateral advantages; in fact, it envisages a mutual refusal to continue the arms race, something that would serve both sides and meet the interests of all nations. This programme is quite realistic, for it is based on a sober assessment of the international situation, on recognition of the fact that international reaction's current counter-offensive, and the activation of circles connected with the military-industrial complex in imperialist countries, in effect, lead nowhere.

The disarmament issues which the USSR has put on the international agenda could be solved if the states whom they concern show good will.

The experience of the 1970s convincingly shows that states with different social systems can find mutually acceptable approaches to solving disarmament issues. This is evidenced in the impressive number of corresponding agreements signed in those years. Besides, the experience accumulated at the Madrid meeting of the Helsinki Conference participants also confirms that different policies, opposing assessments of current international affairs, and existing world tensions, are not insurmountable problems as regards working out decisions that would clear the horizons of world politics.

As for the USSR, it not only proposes an extensive programme of measures for curbing the arms race, but is prepared for business-like talks on each of those steps. Any constructive idea, no matter where it originates, meets and will always meet with Soviet understanding, and there is no type of armament that the USSR would not be prepared to limit or ban on the basis of reciprocity. This was emphasised by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Soviet-American summit in Geneva in November 1985,

**Excerpt from
the Documents and Resolutions
of the 24th Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union**

[. . .] 1. THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE USSR.
THE CPSU'S FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY

[. . .] 3. THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND
THE SECURITY OF PEOPLES.
REBUFF TO THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF AGGRESSION

[. . .] Disarmament is one of the most important international problems of our day. We seek to secure concrete results reducing the danger of war, and to prevent the peoples from accepting the arms race as an inevitable evil.

A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was prepared and has entered into force in the period under review. Although far from all states, including some of the nuclear powers, have yet acceded to it, it does to a certain extent narrow down the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. The important point now is to have the FRG, Japan, Italy and other countries back up their signatures to the treaty with its ratification.

Treaties banning the stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space and on the sea- and ocean-floor have been concluded. But what has been achieved constitutes only the first few steps. It is our aim to bring about a situation in which nuclear energy shall serve peaceful purposes only.

We are engaged in negotiations with the USA on a limitation of strategic armaments. Their favourable outcome would make it possible to avoid another round in the missile arms race, and to release considerable resources for constructive purposes. We are seeking to have the negotiations produce positive results.

However, I should like to emphasise that disarmament talks in general, to say nothing of those involving discussion of highly delicate military-technical aspects, can be productive only if equal consideration is given to the security interests of the parties, and if no one seeks to obtain unilateral advantages.

The struggle for an end to the arms race, both in nuclear and conventional weapons, and for disarmament—all the way to general and complete disarmament—will continue to be one of the most important lines in the foreign-policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state [. . .]

Comrades, the period under review marked the end of the quarter-century since the rout of Hitler Germany and militarist Japan. The fruits of that great victory still live in international realities today. The Soviet people cherish everything that has been attained at such great cost.

For more than 25 years now, our people have lived in peace. We regard this as the greatest achievement of our Party's foreign policy. For a quarter-century now, mankind has been safeguarded from world war. That is another historic achievement of the peoples to which the Soviet Union and its foreign policy have made a considerable contribution. However, the forces of aggression and militarism may have been pushed back, but they have not been rendered harmless. In the postwar years, they have started more than 30 wars and armed conflicts of varying scale. Nor is it possible to consider the threat of another world war as being completely eliminated. It is the vital task of all the peaceable states, of all the peoples, to prevent this threat from becoming reality.

The Soviet Union has countered the aggressive policy of imperialism with its policy of active defence of peace and strengthening of international security. The main lines of this policy are well known. Our Party, our Soviet state, in co-operation with the fraternal socialist countries and other peace-loving states, and with the wholehearted support of many millions of people throughout the world, have now for many years been waging a struggle on these lines, taking a stand for the cause of peace and friendship among nations. The CPSU regards the following as the basic concrete tasks of this struggle in the present situation.

First.

To eliminate the hotbeds of war in South-east Asia and in the Middle East and to promote a political settlement in these areas on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of states and peoples subjected to aggression.

To give an immediate and firm rebuff to any acts of aggression and international arbitrariness. For this, full use must also be made of the possibilities of the United Nations.

Repudiation of the threat or use of force in settling outstanding issues must become a law of international life. For its part, the Soviet Union invites the countries which accept this approach to conclude appropriate bilateral or regional treaties.

Second.

To proceed from the final recognition of the territorial changes that took place in Europe as a result of the Second World War. To bring about a radical turn towards a détente and peace on this continent. To ensure the convocation and success of an all-European conference.

To do everything to ensure collective security in Europe. We reaffirm the readiness expressed jointly by the participants in the defensive Warsaw Treaty to have a simultaneous annulment of this treaty and of the North Atlantic alliance, or—as a first step—dismantling of their military organisations.

Third.

To conclude treaties putting a ban on nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons.

To work for an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, including underground tests, by everyone and everywhere.

To promote the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

We stand for the nuclear disarmament of all states in possession of nuclear weapons, and for the convocation for these purposes of a conference of the five nuclear powers—the USSR, the USA, the PRC, France and Britain.

Fourth.

To invigorate the struggle to halt the race in all types of weapons. We favour the convocation of a world conference to consider disarmament questions to their full extent.

We stand for the dismantling of foreign military bases. We stand for a reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where the military confrontation is especially dangerous, above all in Central Europe.

We consider it advisable to work out measures reducing the probability of accidental outbreak or deliberate fabrication of armed incidents and their development into international crises, into war.

The Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate agreements

on reducing military expenditure, above all by the major powers.

Fifth.

The UN decisions on the abolition of the remaining colonial regimes must be fully carried out. Manifestations of racism and apartheid must be universally condemned and boycotted.

Sixth.

The Soviet Union is prepared to deepen relations of mutually advantageous co-operation in every sphere with states which for their part seek to do so. Our country is prepared to participate together with the other states concerned in settling problems like the conservation of the environment, development of power and other natural resources, development of transport and communications, prevention and eradication of the most dangerous and widespread diseases, and the exploration and development of outer space and the world ocean.

Such are the main features of the programme for the struggle for peace and international co-operation, for the freedom and independence of nations, which our Party has put forward.

And we declare that, while consistently pursuing its policy of peace and friendship among nations, the Soviet Union will continue to conduct a resolute struggle against imperialism, and firmly to rebuff the evil designs and subversions of aggressors. As in the past, we shall give undeviating support to the peoples' struggle for democracy, national liberation and socialism.

Comrades, it is clear from what has been said that the past five years have been a period of vigorous and intense activity by our Party and state in the sphere of international policy.

Of course, in international affairs not everything depends on us or our friends alone. We have not advanced in every sphere as fast as we should like towards the goals we set ourselves. A number of important acts have yet to be brought to completion, and their importance will become fully evident later. But the overall balance is obvious: great results have been achieved in these five years. Our country's international position has become even stronger, its prestige

has been enhanced, and the Soviet people's peaceful endeavour has reliable protection.

24th Congress of the CPSU,
Novosti Press Agency
Publishing House, Moscow,
1971, pp. 33-34, 36-39.

Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

**Letter from Andrei Gromyko,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR,
to the UN Secretary-General**

September 15, 1972

The Soviet Government proposes the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, as an important and urgent question, of the item "Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

The development of the international situation at the present time shows that the trend towards reduction of international tension and the desire to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence are steadily gaining ground. A number of concrete steps which promote the strengthening of international security and a slackening of the arms race have been taken by States.

[. . .] In recent times, a number of agreements have been worked out in the field of limiting the arms race and disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Production of Bacteriological Weapons and on Their Destruction, which is a genuine disarmament measure, has been concluded. The agreements between the USSR and the United States of America on the limitation of strategic arms are destined to play a considerable role in slowing down the nuclear-missile arms race. These agreements, like the Treaties Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, contribute to lessening the danger of an outbreak of war involving the use of nuclear weapons.

Although we note these achievements in the field of ensuring peace and peaceful coexistence, at the same time we

cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in several parts of the world there are armed conflicts, the arms race is continuing and the threat of an outbreak of world thermonuclear war has not been eliminated. Attempts to suppress by force of arms the struggle of peoples for freedom and independence are taking place. All this cannot but arouse deep concern for the fate of international peace and security.

The Soviet Government believes that in the present circumstances the task of the United Nations consists in consolidating the progress which has been made in reducing international tension and taking measures that would promote the elimination of existing conflicts and the creation of conditions that would rule out wars and armed confrontations between States.

An analysis of the present international situation leads us to the conclusion that an effective means of attaining this goal is the consistent application by all States of the principle of the renunciation of the use of force by means of weapons of any type, including nuclear weapons, which are the most destructive weapons of mass destruction. In the nuclear age there is no course open to mankind but peaceful coexistence among States, which presupposes above all the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the solution of controversial questions solely by peaceful means.

Renunciation of the use of force through the application of any means of warfare is one of the most important principles embodied in the United Nations Charter. The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly adopted resolutions calling upon States to renounce the use of force in their relations with one another. The principle of the non-use of force has been reaffirmed in a number of recent General Assembly documents which have commanded wide support from States, particularly the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security.

As a result of steps taken by States with a view to lessening international tension and curbing the arms race, more favourable conditions now exist for further progress in solving the problem of renouncing the use of force by means of armaments of any type and prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

Consideration by the General Assembly of the item "Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", proposed by the

Soviet Union, and the adoption by the Assembly of a relevant resolution would unquestionably constitute an extremely significant contribution to the strengthening of international security and the prevention of armed conflicts.

Renunciation of the use of force must include prohibition of the use of all types of weapons, both conventional and nuclear. The necessity of this approach is clear from the entire course of development of post-war international relations.

The importance of the task of prohibiting the use of armaments of any kind is apparent from the fact that numerous armed conflicts of varying magnitude have occurred since the end of the Second World War. All of them have been conducted with conventional armaments. These conflicts have claimed millions of lives and have brought untold suffering to many peoples. The victims of these conflicts have been chiefly peoples fighting for liberation from colonial oppression. The destructive power of even conventional means of warfare has by now increased so greatly that their large-scale use can lead to the annihilation of entire nations. Moreover, in the present day a local conflict waged with conventional weapons increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear-missile war involving the use of modern means of mass destruction.

If the question of the non-use of force calls for prohibiting the use of weapons of all types, all States will be in a position of equality and none will receive unilateral military advantages. The prohibition of the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons is fully in keeping with the principle of ensuring an equal measure of security for all States.

The broadest possible group of States—above all, of course, all the nuclear Powers, which possess the greatest military potential—must take part in solving the problem of the non-use of force and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The obligation to refrain from using force and to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons is fully in keeping with the United Nations Charter and must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of that most important international instrument. The obligation to refrain from the use of force does not in any sense, of course, imply the renunciation by States of their inherent right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Similarly, renunciation of the use of force

does not infringe the right of peoples, including those of oppressed colonial countries, to carry on a struggle against aggression and for the elimination of its consequences, for their freedom and independence and for their legitimate interests, using all available means in that struggle.

Renunciation of the use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would constitute an important moral and political obligation of States whose implementation would bring about major positive changes in the international situation. It would contribute to the strengthening of international security and would create more favourable conditions for halting the arms race and achieving disarmament. States would be able to devote far more resources to the economic and social development of their countries and to raising standards of living.

Please, Mr. Secretary-General, regard this letter as an explanatory memorandum within the meaning of rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the United Nations General Assembly and have it circulated as an official General Assembly document.

Respectfully, A. GROMYKO
Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the USSR

Izvestiya, September 18, 1972.

**Draft Agreement on the Prohibition
of the Development and Manufacture
of New Types of Weapons
of Mass Destruction and
of New Systems of Such Weapons**

September 23, 1975

The States Parties to this Agreement,
Guided by the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

Desiring to contribute to saving mankind from the danger of the use of new means of warfare, limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament,

Recognizing that modern science and technology have reached a level where a serious danger arises of the development of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons,

Conscious that the development and manufacture of such weapons are fraught with the most serious consequences for the peace and security of nations,

Bearing in mind that recent years have seen the conclusion of a number of important agreements concerning limitation of the arms race and disarmament, including those related to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction,

Expressing the profound interest of States and peoples in the adoption of measures to prevent the use of the achievements of modern science and technology for the development and manufacture of the above-mentioned weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to promote the strengthening of confidence among nations and the further improvement of the international situation,

Seeking to contribute to the realization of the lofty purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to develop or manufacture new types of weapons of mass destruction or new systems of such weapons, including those utilizing the latest achievements of modern science and technology. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons shall include: (to be specified through negotiations on the subject).

In the event that new areas of development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons not covered by this Agreement emerge after the entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall conduct negotiations with a view to extending the prohibition provided for in this Agreement to cover such potential new types and systems of weapons.

2. Each State Party to the Agreement undertakes not to assist, encourage, or induce any other States, group of States or international organizations to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

Article II

Each State Party to this Agreement shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take the necessary measures to prohibit and prevent any activities contrary to the provisions of this Agreement, within the territory of such State or in any territory under its jurisdiction or under its control, wherever it may be.

Article III

1. In the event that any State Party to this Agreement has any suspicions that another State Party has violated the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties concerned undertake to consult one another and co-operate in solving the problems which arise.

2. If the consultations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article fail to produce results mutually acceptable to the Parties concerned, the State which has such suspicions may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such complaint must include evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

3. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Agreement of the results of the investigation.

4. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any State Party to the Agreement which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such State Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Agreement.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the States Parties to the Agreement to develop and use scientific research and discoveries exclusively for peaceful purposes without any discrimination.

2. The States Parties to the Agreement undertake to facilitate scientific and technological co-operation in the use of the latest achievements and discoveries of science and technology for peaceful purposes.

Article V

Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures to limit the arms race of all types of armaments and put an end to it, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VI

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Each proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments and circulated by them to all Parties to the Agreement, which shall inform the Depositary Governments of acceptance or rejection as soon as possible after its receipt.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendment upon its acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Agreement, including

the Depositary Governments, and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of its acceptance of the amendment.

Article VII

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party to this Agreement shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of the Agreement, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Agreement and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VIII

1. This Agreement shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Agreement before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
 2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
 3. This Agreement shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by Governments, including the Governments designated the Depositary Governments of the Agreement.
 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Agreement, and of the receipt of other notices.
- This Agreement shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.


Article IX

This Agreement, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Agreement shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

Done in copies at this day of
....

Pravda, September 25, 1975.



**Excerpt from
the Documents and Resolutions
of the 25th Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union**

[.] I. THE WORLD SITUATION
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE CPSU

[.] 4. PROGRAMME OF FURTHER STRUGGLE
FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION,
AND FOR THE FREEDOM
AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE PEOPLES

[...] Assessing our country's international situation and world conditions, the Party's Central Committee considers that *further struggle for peace and the freedom and independence of the peoples now requires first of all fulfilment of the following vital tasks:*

—While steadily strengthening their unity and expanding their all-round co-operation in building the new society, the fraternal socialist states must augment their joint active contribution to the consolidation of peace.

—Work for the termination of the expanding arms race, which is endangering peace, and for transition to reducing the accumulated stockpiles of arms, to disarmament. For this purpose:

a) do everything to complete the preparation of a new Soviet-US agreement on limiting and reducing strategic armaments, and conclude international treaties on universal and complete termination of nuclear weapons tests, on banning and destroying chemical weapons, on banning development of new types and systems of mass annihilation weapons, and also banning modification of the natural environment for military or other hostile purposes;

b) launch new efforts to activate negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Following agreement on the first concrete steps in this direction, continue to promote military detente in the region in subsequent years;

c) work for a switch from the present continuous growth of the military expenditure of many states to the practice of their systematic reduction;

d) take all measures to assure the earliest possible convocation of a World Disarmament Conference.

—Concentrate the efforts of peace-loving states on eliminating the remaining seats of war, first and foremost on implementing a just and durable settlement in the Middle East. In connection with such a settlement the states concerned should examine the question of helping to end the arms race in the Middle East.

—Do everything to deepen international detente, to embody it in concrete forms of mutually beneficial co-operation between states. Work vigorously for the full implementation of the Final Act of the European Conference, and for greater peaceful co-operation in Europe. In accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence continue consistently to develop relations of long-term mutually beneficial co-operation in various fields—political, economic, scientific and cultural—with the United States of America, France, the FRG, Britain, Italy, Canada, and also Japan and other capitalist countries.

—Work for ensuring Asian security based on joint efforts by the states of that continent.

— Work for a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

— Consider as crucial the international task of completely eliminating all vestiges of the system of colonial oppression, infringement of the equality and independence of peoples, and all seats of colonialism and racialism.

— Work for eliminating discrimination and all artificial barriers in international trade, and all manifestations of inequality, diktat and exploitation in international economic relations.

These are the main tasks, the attainment of which, as we see it, is essential at present in the interests of peace and the security of peoples, and the progress of mankind. We consider these proposals an organic projection and development of the Peace Programme advanced by our 24th Congress, *a programme of further struggle for peace and international co-operation and for the freedom and independence of the peoples*. We shall direct our foreign-policy efforts toward achieving these tasks, and shall cooperate in this with other peace-loving states.

Permit me to express confidence that the lofty aims of our policy on the international scene will be received with understanding and win the wholehearted support of all the peace-loving, progressive forces, and all honest people on earth.

*Report delivered by L. I. Brezhnev.
Documents and Resolutions.
XXVth Congress of the CPSU,
Novosti Press Agency Publishing
House, Moscow, 1976, pp. 30-32.*



Draft World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations

September 28, 1976

The High Contracting Parties,

Solemnly reaffirming their objective of promoting better relations with each other, ensuring a lasting peace on earth and safeguarding the peoples against any threat to or attempt upon their security;

Seeking to eliminate the danger of the outbreak of new wars and armed conflicts between States;

Proceeding on the basis of their obligations under the United Nations Charter to maintain peace and to refrain from the threat or use of force;

Bearing in mind that the definition of aggression formulated and adopted by the United Nations provides new opportunities for the principle of the non-use or threat of force to be consolidated in inter-State relations;

Taking into consideration the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the United Nations Charter and other resolutions of the United Nations expressing the will of States strictly to abide by the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force;

Noting with satisfaction that the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force has been formalized in a series of bilateral and multilateral international instruments, treaties, agreements and declarations;

Recalling in this connection that the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have declared in the Final Act their intention to conduct relations with all States in the spirit of the principles of primary significance set forth therein, among which the

principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force holds its rightful place;

Recalling also that the non-aligned States have expressed themselves in their highest forums in favour of strict observance of the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations;

Inspired by the desire to make renunciation of the use or threat of force in international relations involving all types of weapons, a law of international life;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. The High Contracting Parties shall strictly abide by their undertaking not to use in their mutual relations, or in their international relations in general, force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

They shall accordingly refrain from the use of armed forces involving any types of weapons, including nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction, on land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space, and shall not threaten such use.

2. They agree not to assist, encourage or induce any States or groups of States to use force or the threat of force in violation of the provisions of this Treaty.

3. No consideration may be adduced to justify resort to the threat or use of force in violation of the obligations assumed under this Treaty.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties reaffirm their undertaking to settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security.

For this purpose they shall use, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, such means as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice, including any settlement procedure agreed to by them.

The High Contracting Parties shall also refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation to such a degree

as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.

Article III

Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of States under the United Nations Charter and treaties and agreements concluded by them earlier.

Article IV

The High Contracting Parties shall make all possible efforts to implement effective measures for lessening military confrontation and for disarmament which would constitute steps towards the achievement of the ultimate goal—general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article V

Each High Contracting Party shall consider the question of what measures must be taken, in accordance with its constitutional procedure, for ensuring the fullest compliance with its obligations under this Treaty.

Article VI

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article VII

This Treaty shall:

(1) Be open for signature by any State of the world at any time;

(2) Be subject to ratification by signatory States; instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is hereby designated the Depositary;

(3) Enter into force for each Contracting Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification with the Depositary.

The Depositary shall promptly inform the Governments of all signatory States of the date of each signature and the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification.

Article VIII

This Treaty, the English, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Governments of the signatory States.

Pravda, September 30, 1976.

Proposal by the Warsaw Treaty Member-States

November 26, 1976

The leaders of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, meeting for a conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest on November 25-26, 1976, discussed questions concerning the prevention of war and deepening of the relaxation of international tension and the struggle for strengthening security and developing mutually beneficial co-operation in Europe.

They pointed out that the period that followed the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe bears out the great positive significance of the results of the Conference and the commitments undertaken by its participants under the Final Act.

Considering at the same time that life dictates the need for further stepping up efforts to strengthen peace in Europe and throughout the world and expressing their determination to act precisely in this direction—which was stated by the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty in a special declaration—they came to the conclusion that these aims would be served if all the states signatory to the Final Act pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against one another.

By general agreement of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty—the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—the present letter is accompanied by a draft of a relevant treaty for consideration by all

other participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

* * *

Draft

TREATY

The states-participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, named hereinafter as the High Contracting Parties, inspired by the aims and provisions of the Final Act of the Conference;

Desiring to undertake a fresh common action aimed at strengthening trust among them, at weakening military confrontation and at assisting disarmament;

Expressing their will to act in accordance with the aims and principles of the UN Charter;

Determined not to allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against one another;

Striving to make their contribution to lessening the danger of a nuclear war in Europe and all over the world, have pledged as follows:

Article I

Not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, against one another, on land, at sea, in the air and in outer space.

Article II

The commitment envisaged by Article I shall apply not only to the territory of the states, but also to their armed forces in whatever area of the world they may be.

Article III

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article IV

The Treaty shall be open for signature by any state which signed in the city of Helsinki the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on August 1, 1975.

Article V

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the states which signed it. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the government of... , which is named as the depository state.

2. The Treaty shall enter into force for each of the Contracting Parties from the time of deposition of its instruments of ratification.

Article VI

1. This Treaty, in the Russian, English, Spanish, Italian, French and German languages, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the government of. . .

2. The Treaty shall be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

Pravda, November 28, 1976.

L. I. Brezhnev's Reply to a "Pravda" Correspondent

November 6, 1979

Question: Speaking on October 6 this year in Berlin you declared the readiness of the Soviet Union to reduce, over the current level, the quantity of medium-range nuclear systems deployed in the western areas of the Soviet Union if there is no additional deployment of similar systems in Western Europe. How, in your opinion, is it possible to set about a practical solution of this problem?

Answer: Our proposal, put forward in my speech in Berlin, aims at making headway in tackling the whole complex of problems of military détente and the limitation of armaments on the European continent. The first reactions to this proposal indicate that it has been correctly understood by all those who hold dear peace and security in Europe. At the same time the proposal was, of course, not to the liking of those who wish to see a further spiralling of the arms race on the European continent, especially in the field of medium-range nuclear weapons.

As regards a practical solution to the problem of these weapons, there is only one way to follow—that of starting negotiations. The Soviet Union is of the view that the negotiations must be embarked on without delay. We are prepared for this.

It is now up to the Western powers. It is important, however, that no hasty action be taken which would complicate the situation or obstruct the achievement of positive results. There will be a greater chance of obtaining such results if no decisions are taken on the production and deployment in Western Europe of the above-mentioned systems pending the outcome of the negotiations. And, con-

versely, the chances will be undermined if such decisions are taken within the framework of NATO.

It is also worth mentioning the following:

The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty members have proposed to all states which participated in the European conference that they should undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons against each other. We have not so far received an answer to this proposal. However, I should like to reiterate with all responsibility that now as before the Soviet Union will not resort to the use of nuclear weapons against those states which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories. We are prepared to enter into corresponding undertakings to this effect in due form with any interested state.

Pravda, November 6, 1979.

**Excerpt from the Report
“The Politbureau of the CPSU
Central Committee, the Presidium
of the USSR Supreme Soviet,
and the USSR Council of Ministers
on the Results of Negotiations
Between Leaders of the USSR and the FRG”**

[...] Following the tried and true Leninist foreign-policy course and the line agreed upon by the fraternal socialist states, the Soviet delegation, expressing the will of the Soviet people, focused its attention on the questions of strengthening peace and international security, curbing the arms race, and disarmament.

L. I. Brezhnev, on behalf of the Soviet Union, put forward a set of new ideas and concrete proposals designed to achieve an understanding on these questions, including those concerning medium-range nuclear missiles.

Confirming the position it had spelled out previously with respect to the most correct ways to resolve the question of medium-range arms in Europe, the Soviet side, guided by the interests of peace and security in the broadest sense, proposed to begin the discussion of the question of medium-range nuclear missiles simultaneously and in organic connection with the question of American forward-based nuclear arms. In this, it is understood that any eventual agreements on these questions could be implemented in practice only after the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT-II) had already gone into effect.

The Soviet side also laid out several concrete considerations in connection with the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe in order to give new impetus for progress towards the elaboration of mutually acceptable decisions on the basis of these proposals [...].

Pravda, July 5, 1980

Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation of Nature for Present and Future Generations

Draft Resolution of the UN General Assembly

August 16, 1980

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations",

Conscious of the disastrous consequences which a war involving the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would have on man and his environment,

Noting that the continuation of the arms race, including the testing of various types of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, and the accumulation of toxic chemicals are adversely affecting the human environment and damaging the vegetable and animal world,

Bearing in mind that the arms race is diverting material and intellectual resources from the solution of the urgent problems of preserving nature,

Attaching great importance to the development of planned, constructive international co-operation in solving the problems of preserving nature,

Recognizing that the prospects for solving problems so universal as the preservation of nature on our planet are heavily dependent on the strengthening and development of international detente and the creation of conditions which would banish war from the life of mankind,

Noting with satisfaction the drafting and signature in recent years of a number of international agreements designed to preserve the environment,

Firmly determined to preserve nature on our planet as a prerequisite for the normal life of man,

1. *Proclaims* the historical responsibility of States for

the preservation of nature on our planet for present and future generations;

2. *Draws the attention* of States to the fact that the continuing arms race has pernicious effects on the environment and reduces the prospects for the necessary international co-operation in preserving nature on our planet;

3. *Calls upon* States, in the interests of present and future generations, to demonstrate due concern and take the measures, including legislative measures, necessary for preserving nature, and also to promote international co-operation in this field;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the co-operation of the United Nations Environment Programme, to prepare a report on the pernicious effects of the arms race on nature and to gather the views of States on possible measures to be taken at the international level for the preservation of nature;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item entitled "Historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations: report of the Secretary-General".

Izvestiya, August 16, 1980.

Urgent Measures for Reducing the Danger of War

Draft Resolution of the UN General Assembly

September 23, 1980

The General Assembly,

Conscious that under present-day conditions war would bring untold misery and sufferings to peoples,

Being profoundly concerned over the aggravation of the international situation and over the fact that the ongoing negotiations on arms limitation and on disarmament are being protracted and some of them have been terminated or suspended,

Reaffirming the importance of the Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session,

Convinced that the process of détente can and must be preserved and developed,

Taking into account the need to take urgent measures for reducing the danger of war and strengthening international security;

I

Calls upon States belonging to military alliances to refrain from actions conducive to the expansion of the existing military-political groupings through the admission of new members;

Calls upon States which are not members of the existing military-political groupings to refrain from joining such groupings;

Calls upon all States to avoid any actions which may lead to the formation of new military-political groupings or to the assignment of military functions to those regional organizations which at present have no such functions;

II

Reaffirms that progress in the limitation and subsequent reduction of nuclear arms would be facilitated if, parallel to it, political and international legal measures are adopted for strengthening the security of States and if progress is made in limiting and reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and of other States in the respective regions;

Calls upon all States, and above all States permanent members of the Security Council and countries which have military agreements with them, not to increase their armed forces and conventional weapons with effect from 1 January 1981, as a first step towards a subsequent reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons;

III

Calls upon States participating in talks on the question of providing guarantees to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to make efforts for the speedy elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter;

Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make similar solemn declarations concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of such an international convention;

Recommends that the Security Council examine declarations which may be made by nuclear States regarding the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States and, should all these declarations be found consistent with the above-mentioned objective, to adopt an appropriate resolution approving them;

IV

Stresses the need for a speedy conclusion of an international treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests;

Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States—as an indication of their goodwill and in order to create more favourable

conditions for completing the elaboration of the above-mentioned treaty—not to conduct any nuclear explosions within a period of one year beginning from a date to be agreed upon among them, having made in advance appropriate declarations to that effect.

Pravda, September 25, 1980.

The Peace Programme Put Forward by the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

[...] 5. TO STRENGTHEN PEACE, DEEPEN DETENTE,
AND CURB THE ARMS RACE

[...] The central direction in the foreign policy of our Party and Government is, as it has always been, to lessen the danger of war and to curb the arms race. At the present time this objective has become one of special importance and urgency because rapid and profound changes are under way in the development of military technology. Qualitatively new types of weapons, above all weapons of mass destruction, are being developed. These are weapons of a type that may make control over them, and therefore also their agreed limitation, extremely difficult if not impossible. A new round of the arms race will upset international stability, and greatly increase the danger of another war.

The situation is made graver still by the fact that the policy of the aggressive imperialist forces has already considerably heightened international tensions with all the dangerous consequences that this entails.

There is probably no other country that has in recent years put forward before the world such a wide spectrum of concrete and realistic initiatives on the most crucial problems of international relations, as the Soviet Union has done.

Let me begin with the problem of limiting nuclear armaments, which are the most dangerous to humanity.

All these years, the Soviet Union has worked perseveringly to put an end to the race in such armaments, and to stop their further spread across the world. A tremendous amount of work was done, as you know, in preparing a treaty with the United States on limiting strategic arms. Much was done during the negotiations with the United States and Britain on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. We made an important move by declaring and reaffirming that we will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries that do not permit the de-

ployment of such weapons on their territory. But we have also gone further in our proposals: that the manufacture of nuclear weapons be stopped and a start be made in reducing their stockpiles until they are completely eliminated.

The Soviet Union has also actively sought the prohibition of all other types of mass destruction weapons. And we have achieved something in this field during the period under review. Already operative is a convention banning modification of the environment for military purposes. The basic provisions of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons have been tentatively agreed upon. Negotiations on removing chemical weapons from the arsenals of states are under way, though at an intolerably slow pace. Actions by the peace forces have brought about the suspension of plans for deploying the neutron weapon in Western Europe. All the greater is the outrage of nations over the new Pentagon attempts to hold the neutron Sword of Damocles over the countries of Europe. For our part, we declare once more that we will not begin manufacturing this weapon if it does not appear in other countries, and that we are prepared to conclude an agreement banning it once and for all.

The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries have come forward with a number of concrete proposals on military detente in Europe. In particular, we would like that the participants in the European Conference should undertake not to use either nuclear or conventional arms against each other first, that the existing military blocs in Europe and on other continents should not admit new members, and that no new blocs should be set up.

The Soviet Union and its allies have proposed convening a European conference to discuss and settle questions of military detente and disarmament in Europe. This matter is in the centre of attention at the Madrid conference.

Neither have we slackened our efforts to secure progress at the Vienna negotiations on reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Here the socialist countries have gone more than halfway to meet their Western partners. But we've got to say bluntly that if the Western countries continue to drag out these talks while increasing their military potential in Europe, we will have to take this fact into account.

Many of the important initiatives that the Soviet Union and its allies advanced during the past five years were backed up by resolutions of the UN, including the General

Assembly's special session on disarmament.

The Soviet proposals for consolidating international security and limiting the arms race remain in force. Soviet diplomats and all other officials in the foreign relations sector are continuing, under the guidance of the Party's Central Committee, to press for their implementation.

Our actions are consonant with the aspirations of other countries and peoples. Suffice it to recall that many countries on various continents have advanced proposals that won broad international support—to make Africa and the Middle East non-nuclear zones like Latin America, to set up peace zones in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean. And the resolutions of the European Conference are, in effect, aimed at making all Europe a zone of that kind as well.

We are carrying on the fight for a radical improvement of the international situation. The trustworthy compass here is, as it has been, the Peace Programme of the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU.

Today the state of world affairs requires new, additional efforts to remove the threat of war, and buttress international security. Permit me to put before the Congress a number of ideas directed to this end.

In recent years, as you know, flashpoints of military conflict, often threatening to grow into a major conflagration, have flared up now in one and now in another region of the world. Experience has shown that it is not easy to extinguish them. It would be far better to take preventive measures, to forestall their emergence.

In Europe, for example, this purpose is to some extent served—and fairly well on the whole—by the confidence-building measures carried out in the military field by decision of the European Conference. They include advance notification of military exercises of ground troops, and invitation to them of observers from other countries. At present, these measures apply to the territory of the European states, including the Western regions of the USSR. We have already said that we are prepared to go further and to give notice of naval and air exercises. We have proposed—and propose again—that there should also be advance notifications of large-scale troop movements.

And now we want to propose that the zone for these measures should be substantially extended. *We are prepared to apply them to the entire European part of the USSR,*

provided the Western states, too, extend the confidence zone accordingly.

There is a region where elaboration and use of confidence-building measures—naturally, with due consideration for its specific features—could not only defuse the situation locally, but also make a very useful contribution to strengthening the foundations of universal peace. That region is the Far East, where such powers as the Soviet Union, China, and Japan border on each other. There are also US military bases there. *The Soviet Union would be prepared to hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries.*

We make these far-reaching proposals for confidence building in the belief that their implementation will facilitate progress in the field of disarmament.

Further. It is sometimes said about our Persian Gulf proposals that they should not be divorced from the question of the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan. What could be said on this score? The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss the Persian Gulf as an independent problem. It is also prepared, of course, as I have already said, to participate in a separate settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. *But we do not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed together with the questions of Persian Gulf security.* Naturally, this applies only to the international aspects of the Afghan problem, and not to internal Afghan affairs. Afghanistan's sovereignty, like its non-aligned status, must be fully protected.

Once again, we insistently call for restraint in the field of strategic armaments. It should not be tolerated that the nations of the world live in the shadow of a nuclear war threat.

Limitation and reduction of strategic armaments is a paramount problem. *For our part, we are prepared to continue the relevant negotiations with the United States without delay, preserving all the positive elements that have so far been achieved in this area.* It goes without saying that the negotiations can be conducted only on the basis of equality and equal security. We will not consent to any agreement that gives a unilateral advantage to the USA. There must be no illusions on this score. In our opinion, all the other nuclear powers should join these negotiations at the appropriate time.

The USSR is prepared to negotiate limitation of weapons

of all types. At one time we offered to ban the development of the naval Trident missile system in the United States and of a corresponding system in our country. The proposal was not accepted. As a result, the United States has built the new Ohio submarine armed with Trident-1 missiles, while an analogous system, the Typhoon, was built in our country. So, who has stood to gain?

We are prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of the new submarines—the Ohio type by the USA, and similar ones by the USSR. We could also agree to banning modernisation of existing and development of new ballistic missiles for these submarines.

Now about the nuclear-missile weapons in Europe. An ever more dangerous stockpiling of them is in train. A kind of vicious circle has appeared, with the actions of one side precipitating counter-measures by the other. How to break this chain?

We suggest coming to terms that already now a moratorium should be set on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-missile weapons of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, that is, to freeze the existing quantitative and qualitative level of these weapons, naturally including the US forward-based nuclear weapons in this region. The moratorium could enter into force at once, the moment negotiations begin on this score, and could remain in force until a permanent treaty is concluded on limiting or, still better, reducing such nuclear weapons in Europe. In making this proposal, we expect the two sides to stop all preparations for the deployment of respective additional weapons, including US Pershing-2 missiles and land-based strategic cruise missiles.

The peoples must know the truth about the destructive consequences which a nuclear war could have for mankind. *We suggest that a competent international committee should be set up, which would demonstrate the vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe.* The committee could be composed of the most eminent scientists of different countries. The whole world should be informed of the conclusions they draw.

There are, of course, many other pressing international problems in the world today. Their sensible solution would enable us to slacken the intensity of the international situation, and allow the nations to breathe more freely. But what is needed here is a far-sighted approach, political

will and courage, prestige and influence. That is why it seems to us that it would be *useful to call a special session of the Security Council with the participation of the top leaders of its member-states in order to look for keys to improving the international situation, and preventing war. If they so wish, leaders of other states could evidently also take part in the session.* Certainly, thorough preparations would be needed for such a session to achieve positive results.

In sum, the new measures we are proposing embrace a wide range of issues. They concern conventional as well as nuclear-missile armaments, land forces, and naval and air forces. They touch on the situation in Europe, in the Near East, the Middle East, and the Far East. They deal with measures of a military as well as a political nature. All of them pursue a single aim, our one common aspiration—to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the danger of a nuclear war, to preserve world peace.

This, if you like, is an organic continuation and development of our Peace Programme in reference to the most burning, topical problems of present-day international life.

To safeguard peace—no task is more important now on the international plane for our Party, for our people, and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world.

By safeguarding peace we are working not only for people who are living today, and not only for our children and grandchildren; we are working for the happiness of dozens of future generations.

If there is peace, the creative energy of the peoples backed by the achievements of science and technology is certain to solve the problems that are now troubling people. To be sure, new, still loftier tasks will then arise before our descendants. But that is the dialectics of progress, the dialectics of life.

Not war preparations that doom the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but consolidation of peace—that is the clue to the future.

Report delivered by L. I. Brezhnev.

Documents and Resolutions.

The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Novosti

Press Agency Publishing

House, Moscow, 1981, pp. 34-40.

L. I. Brezhnev's Reply to a Question of the Greek Newspaper "Ta Nea"

Date of publication: April 4, 1981

Question: Speaking at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, you, Mr. President, gave special attention to the struggle for easing international tension. You said specifically that the USSR will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which do not allow such weapons to be sited on their territories. Can your statement take the form of concrete guarantees for such countries as Greece, for instance?

Answer: The Soviet Union has stated more than once that it will never use nuclear weapons against countries which refuse to manufacture or buy nuclear weapons and which do not have such weapons on their territories. This is a sufficiently strong guarantee. But we are prepared to go further and to conclude any time a special agreement with any of the non-nuclear countries, including of course Greece, if it undertakes, for its part, not to have nuclear weapons on its territory.

I avail myself of this opportunity to wish, on behalf of the Soviet people, peace and prosperity to the Greek people.

Pravda, April 4, 1981.

L. I. Brezhnev's Replies to the Finnish Newspaper "Suomen Sosialidemokraatti"

June 27, 1981

Question: The idea of establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons in the North European countries has lately been discussed extensively in that region. What is the Soviet Union's attitude to the possibility of establishing such a zone?

Answer: We regard with understanding the striving of the peoples in various parts of the world to set up non-nuclear zones in order to strengthen their security and to shield themselves to a certain extent from the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war in case it cannot be averted.

The Soviet Union has already stated its positive attitude, too, to the specific proposal on setting up a non-nuclear zone in Northern Europe. There, as distinct from Western Europe whose population today is living on a nuclear volcano, so to speak, these deadly weapons have not so far been deployed. Of course, it would be a good thing if Northern Europe's non-nuclear status is sealed and legally formalized in appropriate way.

The Soviet Union for its part is prepared to assume an obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the North European countries which will participate in the non-nuclear zone, that is, will renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their deployment on their territories. This guarantee of the Soviet Union could be formalized by concluding either a multilateral agreement with its participation or bilateral agreements with each of the countries participating in the zone. We, I repeat, are prepared to do this at any time. It stands to reason that the importance of establishing such a zone for the participants in it

would be greater if similar guarantees were given to them also by the NATO nuclear powers.

Question: During the discussions in Scandinavian countries about their entry in a nuclear-free zone the idea is expressed that the Soviet Union's consent to assuming certain additional obligations with regard to the part of its territory adjoining the zone would promote the establishment of such a zone. Can this be counted upon?

Answer: The guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons against countries included in the zone are undoubtedly the obligation of utmost importance for those countries that the Soviet Union is prepared to assume. But this does not preclude the possibility of considering the question of some other measures applying to our own territory in the region adjoining the nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe. The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss this question with the countries concerned.

Pravda, June 27, 1981.

Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space

August 12, 1981

The States Parties to this treaty,
Motivated by the goals of strengthening peace and international security,

Proceeding on the basis of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,

Endeavouring not to allow outer space to become an arena for the arms race and a source of strained relations between States,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

1. States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which States Parties may develop in the future.

2. Each State Party to this treaty undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to carry out activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 2

States Parties shall use space objects in strict accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace

and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.

Article 3

Each State Party undertakes not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States Parties, if such objects were placed in orbit in strict accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of this treaty.

Article 4

1. In order to ensure compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each State Party shall use the national technical monitoring facilities available to it, in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to place obstacles in the way of the national technical monitoring facilities of other States Parties performing their functions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

3. In order to promote the implementation of the purposes and provisions of this treaty, the States Parties shall, when necessary, consult each other, make inquiries and provide information in connection with such inquiries.

Article 5

1. Any State Party to this treaty may propose amendments to this treaty. The text of each proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary, who shall immediately transmit it to all States Parties.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this treaty accepting the amendment when the instruments of acceptance of the amendment by the majority of States Parties have been deposited with the depositary. Thereafter, for each remaining State Party, the amendment shall enter into force on the date when that Party deposits its instrument of acceptance.

Article 6

This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 7

Each State Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the decision adopted six months before withdrawing from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events which the notifying State Party considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article 8

1. This treaty shall be open for signature by all States at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This treaty shall enter into force between the States which have deposited instruments of ratification upon the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth instrument of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and accession, the date of entry into force of this treaty and other notices.

Article 9

This treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

Pravda, August 12, 1981.

Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe

Draft Declaration of the UN General Assembly

September 22, 1981

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the foremost task of the United Nations, born in the flames of the Second World War, has been, is and will be to save the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war,

Recognizing that all the horrors of past wars and all other calamities that have befallen people would pale in comparison with what is inherent in the use of nuclear weapons capable of destroying civilization on earth,

ON BEHALF OF THE STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMS:

1. States and statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity;

2. There will never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who would take the decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

3. Any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world towards a catastrophe are incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations;

4. It is the supreme duty and direct obligation of the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

The nuclear arms race must be stopped and reversed by joint effort, through negotiations conducted in good faith and on the basis of equality;

5. Nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and only for the benefit of mankind.

Pravda, September 24, 1981.

To the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

On behalf of the Soviet Union and of the 269 million Soviet people, I am addressing the United Nations General Assembly convened at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

The session faces great and responsible tasks. Its agenda includes a number of items of the first importance.

But if we are to single out the most important, the most urgent, the one now worrying people in every corner of the globe and preoccupying the minds of statesmen and public figures in many countries of the world, it is concern for halting the endless build-up of ever more destructive types of weapons, ensuring a breakthrough in the improvement of international relations and averting a nuclear disaster.

Concern for peace is the dominant feature of the Soviet Union's policy. We are convinced that no contradictions between States or groups of States, no differences in social systems, ways of life or ideologies and no transitory interests can eclipse the fundamental need shared by all peoples—the need to safeguard peace and avert a nuclear war.

Today, as never before, purposeful and considered action is required of all States in order to achieve this lofty goal.

Guided by the desire to do all in its power to deliver the world's peoples from the threat of nuclear devastation and ultimately to exclude its very possibility from the life of mankind, the Soviet State solemnly declares:

THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ASSUMES AN OBLIGATION NOT BE THE FIRST
TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

This obligation shall become effective immediately, from the moment when it is announced from the rostrum of the General Assembly.

Why is the Soviet Union taking this step at a time when the nuclear Powers in NATO, including the United States, make no secret of the fact that their military doctrine not only does not rule out the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons but it is actually based on that dangerous premise?

The Soviet Union bases this move on the indisputable fact, which is decisive in the present international situation, that should a nuclear war start, it could mean the destruction of human civilization and perhaps the end of life itself on earth.

Consequently, the supreme duty of State leaders conscious of their responsibility for the fate of the world is to exert every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used.

The peoples of the world have the right to expect that the Soviet Union's decision will be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear States. If the other nuclear Powers were to assume an equally precise and clear obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount in practice to banning the use of nuclear weapons altogether, a goal advocated by the overwhelming majority of the world's countries.

In the formulation of its policy, the Soviet Union will naturally continue to take into account how the other nuclear Powers act, whether they heed the voice of reason and follow our good example or push the world downhill.

Another objective of the Soviet Union's initiative is to increase trust in relations between States. And that is particularly important in the present international situation, when the foundations of trust have been shaken by the efforts of those who are trying to upset the existing balance of forces, to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union and its allies and to destroy all the benefits brought by the policy of détente.

The military and political stereotypes inherited from the time when one side had a monopoly on the atom bomb have

become outdated. The realities of today require a fundamentally different approach to the questions of war and peace. The step now taken by the Soviet Union makes it easier to take a different view of the entire complex of problems involved in the limitation and reduction of armaments, especially nuclear arms, and advances the cause of disarmament in general.

The great achievement of human creative and technological genius enable the world's peoples to open a new chapter in their history. At this moment there already exist boundless opportunities to tackle the solution of such human problems of global magnitude as the struggle against hunger, disease, poverty and many other evils. But that requires making sure that scientific and technological progress is used exclusively to serve the peaceful aspirations of humanity.

The Soviet Union is assuming an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons because it has faith in the power of good sense and believes in mankind's ability to avoid self-annihilation and to ensure peace and progress for the present and future generations.

I should also like to draw the attention of the representatives of States attending the special session of the General Assembly to the following questions.

In the search for measures which would actually halt the arms race, many political and public figures of various countries have recently turned to the idea of a freeze—in other words, of stopping the further build-up of nuclear potentials. The ideas advanced in this connection are not all alike; still, on the whole, we believe, they go in the right direction. We see in them a reflection of people's profound concern about their destiny. To use a figure of speech, people are voting for the preservation of the highest value in the world, which is human life.

The idea of a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals, as a first step towards their reduction and, eventually, their complete elimination, is close to the Soviet point of view. Moreover, our country has been the initiator of concrete proposals aimed at stopping the nuclear arms race in its quantitative and qualitative aspects.

Lastly, there is one more issue which, in our view, the General Assembly cannot disregard.

Dangerous as nuclear weapons are, it must be borne in mind that in the arsenals of States there are other means

of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. It is frightening to contemplate but nevertheless a fact that of the tens of thousands of tons of toxic agents among the armaments of certain countries, a few kilograms would suffice to kill millions of people. And in addition, new programmes for the production of even more sophisticated types of lethal chemical weapons are being launched.

Every effort must be made to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the earth. The Soviet Union is a devoted advocate of this approach. We are prepared to come to an agreement without delay on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons.

In general, the Soviet Union is in favour of moving ahead in all areas where opportunities exist for limiting and radically reducing armaments, be it in nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction or conventional armaments. There is no type of weapon which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or ban on the basis of reciprocity.

I should like to express my confidence that the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will provide an effective impetus for a cessation of the arms race and a transition to practical measures for real disarmament. In this way it will justify the hopes which the world's peoples are pinning on this thoroughly representative forum.

I wish the participants in the session fruitful work for the benefit of all peoples and of universal peace.

L. BREZHNEV

Pravda, June 16, 1982.

Basic Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Proposal of the USSR

June 17, 1982

Chemical weapons are a barbaric means of destruction. Such weapons have already taken tens of thousands of lives and have maimed millions of people. At present, the threat of massive use of much more horrible types of chemical weapons is looming over mankind.

The world's peoples are demanding that this should be prevented and that the very possibility of the use of chemical weapons should be ruled out by prohibiting their production and destroying accumulated stockpiles.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of this. True to the humane purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the USSR has never used chemical weapons anywhere and has never transferred them to anyone.

Motivated by the desire to achieve a comprehensive and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union is submitting to the States Members of the United Nations for their consideration the following basic provisions of a convention on the subject.

I. SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION

General provisions

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never, under any circumstances, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons and undertakes to destroy or divert to permitted purposes the accumulated stocks of such weapons and to destroy or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons.

Definition of chemical weapons

For the purposes of the Convention "chemical weapons" means:

(a) Super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal and harmful chemicals, and their precursors, except those intended for non-hostile purposes or for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons, in types and quantities consistent with such purposes;

(b) Munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of the chemicals released as a result of the employment of such munitions or devices, including those with binary or multicomponent charges;

(c) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

Other definitions

For the purposes of the Convention:

1. The definitions of the terms "super-toxic lethal chemical", "other lethal chemical" and "harmful chemical" shall be based on specific criteria of toxicity (lethality and/or harmfulness) for each of these categories of chemicals (shall be specified in the Convention on the basis of the levels agreed upon in the Committee on Disarmament).

2. "Permitted purposes" means non-hostile purposes and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

3. "Non-hostile purposes" means industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes or purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons.

4. Such terms as "a chemical", "an incapacitant", "an irritant", "a precursor", "capacity" and "a facility" are also subject to definition in the Convention.

Prohibition of transfer

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes:

a) Not to transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, any chemical weapons;

b) Not to transfer any super-toxic lethal chemicals, inca-

pacitants or irritants, or their precursors to anyone, directly or indirectly, even for permitted purposes, except to another State Party;

c) Not to assist anyone, or to encourage or induce anyone, directly or indirectly, to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention.

Non-stationing

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to station chemical weapons, including binary and multicomponent weapons, in the territories of other States and also undertakes to recall all its chemical weapons from the territories of foreign States if they were stationed there earlier (dates for the fulfilment of this obligation shall be specified in the Convention).

Destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons

1. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to destroy its accumulated stocks of chemical weapons or divert them to non-hostile purposes in quantities consistent with such purposes.

2. The destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons shall be begun by each State Party not later than 2 years, and completed not later than 10 years, after the State has become a Party to the Convention.

The first operations for destruction may, as a display of goodwill, be carried out by each State Party possessing chemical weapons as early as the initial stage of the functioning of the Convention.

Elimination or temporary conversion of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons

1. Each State Party undertakes to eliminate or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons.

2. Operations for eliminating or dismantling facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons shall be begun not later than 8 years, and completed not later than 10 years, after the State becomes a Party to the Convention.

3. Any State Party to the Convention shall have the

right, for the purposes of destroying stocks of chemical weapons, to convert temporarily facilities previously used for the production of such weapons and also to carry out the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons at a specialized facility or facilities built for such purposes.

Permitted activities

1. Each State Party to the Convention shall have the right to retain, produce, acquire or use for permitted purposes any toxic chemicals and their precursors, in types and quantities consistent with such purposes.

2. The aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes which are produced, diverted from stocks or otherwise acquired annually or are available shall at any time be minimal and shall not, in any case, exceed one metric ton for any State Party to the Convention.

3. Each State Party which produces super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes shall concentrate such production at a single specialized facility, of appropriate capacity which shall be subject to special agreement.

Protection of the population and the environment

In fulfilling its obligations connected with the destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and the elimination of means of their production, each State Party shall take all necessary precautions for the protection of the population and the environment.

Promotion of development goals

The Convention shall facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for the economic and technical development of the Parties and for international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities. The possibility of interference with areas of activity unrelated to the purposes of the Convention shall be precluded.

II. DECLARATIONS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

1. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, to declare:

- Whether or not it possesses chemical weapons and capacities for their production;
- The magnitude of its accumulated stocks of chemical weapons and capacities for their production;
- The volume of transfers to anyone of chemical weapons, of technological equipment for their production, and of relevant technical documentation which took place after 1 January 1946;
- Whether or not there exist in its territory stocks of chemical weapons, and in what quantities, or facilities for the production of chemical weapons, and with what capacities, which are under the control of, or have been left by, any other State, group of States, organization or private person.

2. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, declare that it has ceased all activities relating to the production of chemical weapons or the transfer to anyone of such weapons, of technological equipment for their production and of relevant technical documentation.

3. Each State Party undertakes to declare, not later than 6 months after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, its plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons, and to declare, not later than one year before the commencement of the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for producing chemical weapons, its plans for their destruction and dismantling, stating the location of the facilities.

4. Each State Party which carries out the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons at a facility (facilities) temporarily converted for such purposes or at a specialized facility shall declare the location of the said facility (facilities) within the time period provided for in the plan for the destruction of the said stocks.

5. Each State Party which carries out the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at a specialized facility shall declare its location before the date of the commencement of the facility's operation.

6. Each State Party shall undertake:

(a) To submit periodic notifications concerning the implementation of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of the available stocks of chemical weapons and of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of

facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. Where such operations are carried out earlier than provided for in the plan, the State Party shall submit appropriate notification;

(b) To submit appropriate notifications three months before the initiation of the implementation of each stage of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons and of each stage of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons; the location of the facility to be destroyed or dismantled shall be stated in the appropriate notification;

(c) To submit, not later than 30 days after the destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and after the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons, appropriate statements to that effect.

7. Each State Party shall undertake to submit annual declaration concerning the following substances produced, diverted from stocks, acquired or used:

— Super-toxic lethal, other lethal and harmful chemicals for purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons;

— Super-toxic lethal chemicals for industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons;

— Other lethal and harmful chemicals for industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and irritants for purposes of law enforcement.

8. States Parties shall proceed from the assumption that chemicals and precursors produced, acquired, retained and used for permitted purposes, when they represent a special danger from the viewpoint of their possible diversion to purposes connected with the use of chemical weapons, must be included in appropriate lists. Each State Party shall undertake to present annually information on the chemicals and precursors of chemicals included in those lists.

9. Each State Party shall undertake to submit notifications concerning each of its transfers to any other State Party, where not prohibited by the Convention, of super-toxic lethal chemicals, incapacitants and irritants and of other chemicals which could be used as components for chemical weapons with binary or multicomponent charges.

10. The above-mentioned declarations, plans, notifications and statements shall be submitted to the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention. Their contents and the procedure for drawing up the required lists are to be defined in the Convention.

III. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION

General provisions on verification

1. States Parties to the Convention shall base their activities relating to the verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention on a combination of national and international measures.

2. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take any internal measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity under its jurisdiction or control that is in violation of the provisions of the Convention.

3. To monitor the fulfilment of obligations provided for in the Convention, any State Party may establish a Committee of National Verification (a national verification organization) which is vested with the necessary juridical rights and whose composition, functions and methods of work shall be determined by the State Party to the Convention in accordance with its constitutional norms.

4. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Convention by other States Parties, any State Party shall have the right to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

Any State Party which possesses national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place at the disposal of other Parties information which it has obtained through those means and which is important for the purposes of the Convention.

5. Each State Party shall undertake not to impede, through the use of deliberate concealment measures or in any other manner, the national technical means of verification of other States Parties.

6. International measures of verification shall be carried out through international procedures within the framework

of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, and through consultations and co-operation between States Parties, as well as through the services of the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention.

Consultation and co-operation

1. The States Parties undertake to consult one another and co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of the Convention or in connection with the application of its provisions.

2. The States Parties shall exchange, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, information which they consider necessary to provide assurance of fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Convention.

3. Consultation and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter. Such procedures may include the use of the services of appropriate international organizations in addition to those of the Consultative Committee.

4. In the interests of enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention, the States Parties shall agree in due form to prevent any actions aimed at deliberately falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with the Convention by other States Parties.

Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention

1. For the purpose of carrying out broader international consultation and co-operation, exchanging information and promoting verification in the interests of compliance with the provisions of the Convention, the States Parties shall establish a Consultative Committee within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force. Any State Party shall have the right to appoint its representative to the Committee.

2. The Consultative Committee shall be convened as necessary and also at the request of any State Party to the Convention within 30 days after the request is received.

3. Other questions relating to the organization and procedures of the Consultative Committee, its possible subsidiary bodies, their functions, rights, duties and methods of work,

its role in on-site inspections, forms of co-operation with national verification organizations and other matters are to be elaborated.

Fact-finding procedure relating to compliance with the Convention. On-site inspections

1. Each State Party shall have the right to request, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, from another Party which is suspected of violating the Convention information on the actual state of affairs. The State to which the request is sent shall provide the requesting State Party with information in connection with the request.

2. Each State Party may, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, send to another State Party which is suspected of violating the Convention a request for an on-site inspection. Such request may be sent after the possibilities of fact-finding within the framework of paragraph 1 of this section have been exhausted and shall contain all relevant information and all possible evidence supporting the validity of the request.

Requests may, in particular, be sent in connection with notifications concerning the destruction of accumulated stocks of chemical weapons and concerning the destruction and dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. The State Party to which such a request is sent may treat the request favourably or decide otherwise. It shall inform the requesting State Party in good time about its decision, and if it is not prepared to agree to an inspection, it shall give appropriate and sufficiently convincing explanations.

3. Within the period of destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of the stocks of chemical weapons, a possibility of carrying out systematic international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) of the destruction of stocks at a converted or specialized facility (facilities) shall be provided for.

4. The Convention shall provide for the possibility of carrying out international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) of the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at a specified facility.

*Procedure for lodging complaints with the United Nations Security Council.
Provision of assistance*

1. Any State Party which has reason to believe that any other State Party has acted or may be acting in violation of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention shall have the right to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. Such complaint shall include all relevant information and all possible evidence supporting the validity of the complaint.

2. Each State Party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the results of the investigation.

3. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to provide assistance or support assistance being provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which requests it if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed or is possibly being exposed to danger as a result of the violation by another State Party of obligations assumed under this Convention.

Relationship with the Geneva Protocol of 1925

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting, or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

IV. CONCLUDING PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

Provision shall be made for a procedure for the signing of the Convention, its ratification and entry into force, arrangements relating to a depositary, as procedure for the accession of States to the Convention and withdrawal from it, machinery for amendments to the Convention, dates for holding conferences to review its implementation and the status of such conferences.

Pravda, June 19, 1982.

Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests

October 1, 1982

The task of averting nuclear war—which is the aim of the efforts of the Soviet Union and of other peace-loving States—makes it imperative to take, *inter alia*, such measures as would impede the development of ever-new types and systems of nuclear weapons.

An effective measure of this kind would be an immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States and in all environments, which at the same time would promote the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Motivated by these goals, the Soviet Union is submitting to States Members of the United Nations for their consideration the following basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

SCOPE OF PROHIBITION

1. Each State Party to this Treaty shall undertake to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear-weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control, in any sphere—in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, under water or under ground.

2. No Party shall cause, encourage or in any way participate in the conduct of any nuclear-weapon test explosions anywhere.

3. A moratorium shall be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under which the Parties to the Treaty shall refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the conduct of such explosions until the relevant procedure has been evolved.

4. Promptly after the entry into force of the Treaty, consideration shall be given to the question of a procedure for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Such a procedure to be agreed upon may take the form of a special agreement or agreements constituting an integral part of the Treaty.

ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY

General provisions on verification

1. The States Parties to the Treaty shall base their activities in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on a combination of national and international measures.

2. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty by other States Parties, any State Party shall have the right to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

3. States Parties which possess national technical means of verification may, in case of necessity, place the information which they obtained through those means and which is important for the purposes of the Treaty at the disposal of other Parties.

4. The States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other States Parties.

5. International measures of verification shall be carried out through international procedures within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with its Charter and through consultations and co-operation between States Parties, as well as through the services of the Committee of Experts of States Parties to the Treaty.

Consultations and co-operation

1. The States Parties to the Treaty shall, in case of necessity, consult each other, make inquiries and provide information in connection with such inquiries with a view to solving any questions that may arise with regard to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

2. The States Parties shall exchange, bilaterally or through

the Committee of Experts, information which they consider necessary to provide assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

3. Consultations and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

4. In the interests of enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall agree in a due form on the prevention of any actions aimed at deliberately falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with the Treaty by other States Parties.

International exchange of seismic data

For the purpose of enhancing assurance of compliance with the obligations under the Treaty, each Party may participate in an international exchange of seismic data. Such international exchange shall be carried out in accordance with the following guidelines.

Guidelines for an international exchange of seismic data

1. Each State Party to the Treaty shall have the right to participate in an international exchange of seismic data, to contribute data from seismic stations on its territory which it designates for participation in the international exchange and to receive all the seismic data made available through the international exchange.

2. Each Party that decides to participate in the international exchange shall designate an appropriate body through which it will communicate with the international exchange.

3. Seismic data shall be transmitted through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization or through any other agreed communication channels.

4. International seismic data centres shall be established in agreed locations, taking into account the desirability of appropriate geographical distribution. These centres shall receive all seismic data contributed to the international exchange by its participants, process seismic data without interpreting the nature of seismic events, make the processed

seismic data available to all participants, and maintain records of all seismic data contributed by participants and processed by the centre. Each centre shall be under the jurisdiction of the Party on whose territory it is located.

5. The Committee of Experts whose establishment is provided for in the Treaty shall draw in its work upon the recommendations contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Seismic Experts of the Committee on Disarmament. Such arrangements include the elaboration of standards for the technical and operational characteristics of participating seismic stations and international seismic data centres, for the form in which data are transmitted to the centres, and for the form and manner in which the centres make seismic data available to the participants and respond to their requests for additional seismic data regarding specific seismic events.

*International Committee of Experts of States Parties
to the Treaty*

1. A Committee of Experts of States Parties to this Treaty shall be established to consider questions related to the international exchange of seismic data. Any State Party shall have the right to appoint its representative to this Committee.

2. The Committee, which shall function on the basis of consensus, shall hold its first meeting not later than 90 days after the entry into force of the Treaty and shall meet thereafter as necessary.

3. The Committee shall develop, in accordance with the Guidelines, detailed arrangements regulating the establishment and operation of the international exchange; it shall facilitate its implementation and co-operation between States Parties in enhancing the effectiveness of such exchange.

4. The Committee shall facilitate more extensive international consultations and co-operation, exchange of information and assistance in verification in the interests of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

5. Other questions relating to the organization and procedures of the Committee of Experts, its possible subsidiary bodies, their functions, rights, duties, proceedings, its role in promoting the international exchange and in on-site inspection, as well as other matters, are to be elaborated.

*Fact-finding procedure regarding compliance with
the Treaty. On-site inspection*

1. Each State Party to the Treaty may if it has doubts regarding an event on the territory of another State which may have been a nuclear explosion, send to that Party a request for an on-site inspection. The request should contain a statement of reasons for it, including relevant seismic and other physical data that could have been associated with a possible nuclear explosion, its time and location.

2. The Party which has received the request, being aware of the importance of providing assurance of compliance with the obligations under the Treaty, shall state whether or not it is prepared to agree to an inspection. If the Party which has received the request is not prepared to agree to an inspection on its territory, it shall communicate the reasons for its decision to the requesting State and inform the Committee of Experts of them.

3. If the requesting State Party is not satisfied with the explanation it received and the information provided on a bilateral basis, it may ask the Committee of Experts for additional information and consultation regarding that request and assistance in fact-finding through scientific and technical expertise.

4. For the purpose of conducting inspection on the territory of the States Parties which may agree thereto, procedures shall be evolved for such inspections and the manner of their conduct, including the list of rights and functions of the inspecting personnel and the definition of the role of the receiving Party during the inspection.

5. The Treaty shall also contain a provision enabling any two or more of the States Parties to agree, by mutual consent, in view of the special interests or special circumstances, on additional measures which would facilitate verification of compliance with the Treaty.

*Procedure for lodging complaints with the
United Nations Security Council*

1. Any State Party which has reason to believe that any other State Party has acted or may be acting in violation of the obligations deriving from the provisions of the Treaty shall have the right to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. Such a complaint should include

all relevant information, as well as all possible evidence supporting the validity of the complaint.

2. Each State Party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of a complaint received by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the State Parties of the results of the investigation.

3. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger or is perhaps being exposed to danger as a result of violation by another State Party of the obligations assumed under this Treaty.

Concluding provisions of the Treaty

The Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by 20 Governments, including the Governments of all States permanent members of the Security Council.

However, the States Parties may agree that the Treaty should enter into force for an agreed limited period, given the participation of three States permanent members of the Security Council—the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Provision should be made for a procedure for the signing of the Treaty, its ratification, the depositary, accession by States to the Treaty, and for amendments.

Pravda, October 3, 1982.

Intensification of Efforts to Remove the Threat of Nuclear War and Ensure the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy

Draft Resolution of the UN General Assembly

The General Assembly,

Noting that the increasingly widespread use of nuclear energy is an objective necessity for meeting the growing needs of mankind in various fields of activity as other, non-renewable energy sources are being depleted,

Taking into consideration the fact that the irreversible process of the development of nuclear energy involves the establishment of a large number of peaceful nuclear installations with a high concentration of radioactive materials,

Bearing in mind that the destruction of such installations would bring on a considerable release of radioactive nuclear materials even if conventional weapons were used, and if nuclear weapons were used, it would have totally disastrous consequences on a global scale,

Expressing its concern at the fact that under such circumstances the unleashing of nuclear war would be all the more dangerous,

Reaffirming the will of the States Members of the United Nations, as expressed in the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe,

1. *Calls upon* all States to intensify their efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy;

2. *Declares* that the deliberate destruction of peaceful nuclear installations even by means of conventional weapons is essentially equivalent to an attack using nuclear weapons, that is to say, to actions of a kind which the United Nations has already described as the gravest crime against humanity;

3. *Notes* that the limitation and reduction of the nuclear arms race will produce more favourable conditions for the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of the energy of the atom;

4. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States, as a first step towards the reduction and ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals, to agree on a simultaneous suspension (freezing) of the production and development of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and also of the production of fissionable materials for the purposes of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons.

Pravda, October 4, 1982.

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**Excerpt from the Report
by Yu. V. Andropov at a Jubilee Meeting
in the Kremlin to Mark the Sixtieth
Anniversary of the Formation of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

December 21, 1982

[. . .] One cannot help seeing that Washington's present policy has sharpened the international situation to dangerous extremes.

The war preparations of the United States and the NATO bloc which it leads have grown to an unheard-of, record scale. Official spokesmen in Washington are heard to discourse on the possibility of "limited", "sustained" and other varieties of nuclear war. This is intended to reassure people, to accustom them to the thought that such war is acceptable. Veritably, one has to be blind to the realities of our time not to see that wherever and however a nuclear whirlwind arises, it will inevitably go out of control and cause a worldwide catastrophe.

Our position on this issue is clear: a nuclear war—whether big or small, whether limited or total—must not be allowed to break out. No task is more important today than to stop the instigators of another war. This is required by the vital interests of all nations. That is why the unilateral commitment of the Soviet Union not to use nuclear weapons first was received with approval and hope all over the world. If our example is followed by the other nuclear powers, this will be a truly momentous contribution to the efforts of preventing nuclear war.

It is said that the West cannot take such a commitment because, allegedly, the Warsaw Treaty has an advantage in conventional armaments. To begin with, this is untrue, and the facts and figures bear witness to it. Furthermore, as everybody knows, we are in favour of limiting such armaments as well, and of searching for sensible, mutually ac-

ceptable solutions to this end. We are also prepared to agree that the sides should renounce first use of conventional, as well as nuclear arms.

Of course, one of the main avenues leading to a real scaling down of the threat of nuclear war is that of reaching a Soviet-American agreement on limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms. We approach negotiations on the matter with the utmost responsibility, and seek an honest agreement that will do no damage to either side and will, at the same time, lead to a reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

So far, unfortunately, we see a different approach by the American side. While calling for "radical reductions" in word, what it really has in mind is essentially a reduction of the Soviet strategic potential. For itself, the United States would like to leave a free hand in building up strategic armaments. It is absurd even to think that we can agree to this. It would, of course, suit the Pentagon, but can on no account be acceptable to the Soviet Union and, for that matter, to all those who have a stake in preserving and consolidating peace.

Compare to this the proposals of the USSR. They are based on the principle of preserving parity. We are prepared to reduce our strategic arms by more than 25 per cent. US arms, too, must be reduced accordingly, so that the two states have the same number of strategic delivery vehicles. We also propose that the number of nuclear warheads should be substantially lowered and that improvement of nuclear weapons should be maximally restricted.

Our proposals refer to all types of strategic weapons without exception, and envisage reduction of their stockpiles by many hundreds of units. They close all possible channels for any further arms race in this field. And that is only a start: the pertinent agreement would be the point of departure for a still larger mutual reduction of such weapons, which the sides could agree upon, with due account of the general strategic situation in the world.

And while the negotiations are under way, we offer what is suggested by common sense: to freeze the strategic arsenals of the two sides. The US government does not want this, and now everyone can understand why: it has embarked on a new, considerable build-up of nuclear armaments.

Washington's attempts to justify this build-up are obviously irrelevant. The allegation of a "lag" behind the USSR

which the Americans must close, is a deliberate untruth. This has been said more than once. And the talk that new weapons systems, such as the MX missile, are meant "to facilitate disarmament negotiations" is altogether absurd.

No programmes of a further arms build-up will ever force the Soviet Union to make unilateral concessions. We will be compelled to counter the challenge of the American side by deploying corresponding weapons systems of our own—an analogous missile to counter the MX missile, and our own long-range cruise missile, which we are now testing, to counter the US long-range cruise missile.

Those are not threats at all. We are wholly averse to any such course of events, and are doing everything to avoid it. But it is essential that those who shape US policy, as well as the public at large, should be perfectly clear on the real state of affairs. Hence, if the people in Washington really believe that new weapons systems will be a "trump" for the Americans at negotiations, we want them to know that these "trumps" are false. Any policy directed to securing military superiority over the Soviet Union has no future and can only heighten the threat of war.

Now a few words about what are known as confidence-building measures. We are serious about them.

Given the swift action and power of modern weapons, the atmosphere of mutual suspicion is especially dangerous. Even a mere accident, miscalculation, or technical failure can have tragic consequences. It is therefore important to take the finger off the trigger, and put a reliable safety catch on all weapons. A few things have already been accomplished to this effect, particularly in the framework of the Helsinki accords. As everybody knows, the Soviet Union is also offering measures of a more far-reaching nature and of broader scope. Our proposals on this score have been tabled at the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments.

We are also prepared to consider pertinent proposals made by others, including the recent ones by the US President. But the measures he referred to are not enough to dispel the atmosphere of mutual suspicion, and to restore confidence. Something more is needed: to normalise the situation, and to renounce incitement of hostility and hatred, and propaganda of nuclear war. And, surely, the road to confidence, to preventing any and all wars, including an accidental one, is that of stopping the arms race and going back to

calm, respectful relations between states, back to detente.

We consider this important for all regions of the world, and especially for Europe, where a flare-up of any kind may trigger a worldwide explosion.

At present, that continent is beset by a new danger—the prospect of several hundred US missiles being deployed in Western Europe. I must say bluntly: this would make peace still more fragile.

As we see it, the peril threatening the European nations, and, for that matter, the nations of the whole world, can be averted. It is definitely possible to save and strengthen peace in Europe—and this without damage to anyone's security. It is, indeed, for this purpose that we have been negotiating with the United States in Geneva for already more than a year on how to limit and reduce nuclear weapons in the European zone.

The Soviet Union is prepared to go very far. As everybody knows, we have suggested an agreement renouncing all types of nuclear weapons—both of medium range and tactical—designed to strike targets in Europe. But this proposal has come up against a solid wall of silence. Evidently, they do not want to accept it, but are afraid to reject it openly. I want to reaffirm again that we have not withdrawn this proposal.

We have also suggested another variant: that the USSR and the NATO countries reduce their medium-range weaponry by more than two-thirds. So far, the United States will not have it. For its part, it has submitted a proposal which, as if in mockery, is called a "zero option". It envisages elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles not only in the European, but also in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, while NATO's nuclear-missile arsenal in Europe is to remain intact and may even be increased. Does anyone really think that the Soviet Union can agree to this? It appears that Washington is out to block an agreement and, citing the collapse of the talks, to station, in one way or another, its missiles on European soil.

The future will show if this is so. We, for our part, will continue to work for an agreement on a basis that is fair to both sides. We are prepared, among other things, to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France—and not a single one more. This means that the Soviet Union would reduce hundreds of missiles, including tens of the latest

missiles known in the West as SS-20. In the case of the USSR and the USA this would be a really honest "zero" option as regards medium-range missiles. And if, later, the number of British and French missiles were scaled down, the number of Soviet ones would be additionally reduced by as many.

Along with this there must also be an accord on reducing to equal levels on both sides the number of medium-range nuclear-delivery aircraft stationed in this region by the USSR and the NATO countries.

We call on the other side to accept these clear and fair terms, to take this opportunity while it still exists. But let no one delude himself: we will never let our security or the security of our allies be jeopardised. It would also be a good thing if thought were given to the grave consequences that the stationing of new US medium-range weapons in Europe would entail for all further efforts to limit nuclear armaments in general. In short, the ball is now in the court of the USA.

In conclusion, let me say the following. We are for broad, fruitful co-operation among all nations of the world to their mutual advantage and the good of all mankind, free from diktat and interference in the affairs of other countries. The Soviet Union will do everything it can to secure a tranquil, peaceful future for the present and coming generations. That is the aim of our policy, and we shall not depart from it.

Pravda, December 22, 1982.

Excerpt from the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member States

January 5, 1983

[. . .] Despite the diversity of the present international problems, the prospects of the situation in Europe and in the world in general depend, to a considerable degree, on whether it will be possible to do away with mistrust and to reduce the degree of confrontation between the two largest military-political alliances—the Warsaw Treaty and NATO—which have tremendous forces at their disposal, especially in the sphere of nuclear weapons. An armed conflict between them would have perilous consequences for all peoples.

The Warsaw Treaty member states have long been pressing for the disbandment of both alliances, and for the liquidation of their military organizations as the first move. This proposal remains effective, and they stress that they are prepared to open talks with the NATO member countries with the aim of reaching a corresponding agreement, beginning with the mutual limitation of military activity.

However, the present critical situation does not allow any delay. Effective measures must be taken immediately, measures capable of diminishing already at this point mistrust between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO member states and fear of possible aggression.

The Warsaw Treaty member states are not seeking military superiority over the NATO member states and have no intention of attacking these states or any other country in or outside Europe. The NATO member states also declare that they have no aggressive intentions. In these conditions there should be nothing to prevent the member states of either alliance from undertaking corresponding mutual com-

mitments which would have international legal force. In the context of the present situation, this would have a particularly favourable influence on further international developments.

Proceeding from this, the Warsaw Treaty member states, through the intermediary of their leading representatives, turn to the member states of the North Atlantic pact with a proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations.

The core of the treaty could be the mutual commitment of the member countries of both alliances not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional arms against one another, and thus not to be the first to use against one another military force in general. This commitment would apply to the territory of all states parties to the treaty, as well as to their military and civilian personnel, naval, air and space craft and other facilities belonging to them, wherever they are situated.

It is appropriate that the treaty should stipulate a similar commitment for the member states of both alliances not to use force against third countries, whether they are countries with which they have bilateral bonds of alliance, or non-aligned and neutral countries.

A substantial part of the treaty could be the commitment of the member states of both alliances not to endanger the security of international sea, air and space communications passing through areas in which no state asserts its jurisdiction.

It is desirable that the commitment on the renunciation of the use of military force should be supplemented in the treaty with a commitment to conduct talks, in a spirit of good will, on effective measures to halt the arms race, limit and reduce armaments and on disarmament, or to facilitate by other available means the successful conclusion of these talks with the aim of achieving practical results at them.

In this direction the two sides could undertake to jointly consider practical measures to avert the danger of a sudden attack and to facilitate the development of mutual exchanges of military delegations, visits of warships and air force units.

The commitment on the renunciation of military force must be linked in the treaty with provisions on the strengthening of the United Nations Organization as a global instru-

ment of collective security. In this connection it would be useful to express in the treaty readiness to co-operate in increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations Organization in the fulfilment of its tasks, in keeping with its Charter, concerning the peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflict situations, the suppression of acts of aggression, and the elimination of threats to international peace and security.

The treaty between the member states of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic pact on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and maintenance of peaceful relations would not, naturally, curtail the inalienable right of the parties to the treaty to individual or collective self-defence in keeping with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The treaty would at the same time free the members of both alliances of the fear that the commitments of alliance existing within each of these alliances could be used for aggressive purposes against the member states of the other alliance and that these commitments could thus endanger their security.

Although it is proposed that the treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations should be concluded between the states of the two military-political alliances, other interested European countries, too, would have the right to participate in its drafting and signing.

From the very beginning, this treaty would also be open to other states that might express a wish to accede to it, and these states would have equal rights as parties to the treaty.

The participants in the session of the Political Consultative Committee are convinced that the conclusion of such a treaty would help overcome the division of Europe into military groupings confronting each other, and that it would comply with the wish of the peoples to live in peace and security. They call on the member states of the North Atlantic pact to give their utmost attention to this new initiative and to give a constructive answer to it.[. . .]

Pravda, January 7, 1982.

Yu. V. Andropov's Reply to an Appeal by a Group of American Scientists and Public Personalities

Esteemed sirs,

Your appeal for banning space-based weapons is permeated with grave concern about the peaceful future of space. I fully share this concern. To prevent the militarisation of space is one of the priority tasks facing mankind, and much depends here, on Earth, on whether it will be achieved.

As scientists and specialists, you are well aware of the extremely dangerous consequences of saturating space with deadly weapons. The statesmen, politicians and scientists really ought already today to do everything possible to prevent the achievements of the human intellect and the accelerating progress of science and technology to be used to the detriment of the people.

I should like to emphasise that it is precisely the Soviet Union, the country which blazed the trail to outer space 25 years ago, which is the initiator and a party to all the current international agreements aimed at securing that outer space be used only for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind.

With a view to solving radically this task, the Soviet Union, as you know, I believe, suggested concluding a treaty banning the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. We submitted a draft of such a treaty to the United Nations Organisation as far back as August 1981. The implementation of this Soviet proposal, in support of which an overwhelming majority of UN member states voted, would mean that a reliable barrier would be raised against attempts to turn outer space into a source of mortal danger to people.

Regrettably, work to draft such a treaty at the Disarmament Committee has not yet actually begun, owing to the position of the USA and a number of other NATO states. Moreover, recent developments have demonstrated that the use of space-based military technology is assigned an ever greater role in US strategic plans, including those announced by the top US leadership.

Now a crucial moment is really coming: either the interested states will sit down at the negotiating table without delay to begin drawing up a treaty prohibiting the placement in space of weapons of any kind or the arms race will go over also into space.

I can assure you that the Soviet Union will continue to exert the maximum effort to prevent the ominous plans of transferring the arms race into space from being converted into reality.

I would like to hope that the scientists and public personalities of the whole world will also make a contribution of their own to making certain that space will forever remain free of any weapons at all, that it will not become an area of military clashes, and that there will be no threat coming from space to those living on Earth.

I wish you success in your efforts to protect peaceful space, efforts which are fully supported in the Soviet Union.

Respectfully,

YU. ANDROPOV

Sovetskaya Rossiya, April 29, 1983.

**Excerpt from Yu. V. Andropov's Speech
at a Kremlin Dinner in Honour of
the Party and State Delegation
from the GDR Headed by Erich Honecker,
on May 3, 1983**

[...] In conditions when the whole of mankind is threatened by nuclear catastrophe it is the duty of all who deal with the adoption of political decisions to put concern for the preservation of peace above everything else. Is it not time for the American leaders to display more political restraint, responsibility and common sense?

This relates first of all to the most pressing need of the day: to prevent a new cycle of the nuclear arms race and to avert war.

The countries of socialism approach these questions with the highest sense of responsibility. Our proposals have been outlined in a number of joint documents, including in the Prague Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty member states. They provide both for the removal of the material means of waging war and for the creation of political barriers to unleashing war. They cover both nuclear and conventional armaments. They take into account the lawful interests of the security both of the European peoples and of the peoples of the whole world. To this day the NATO countries have avoided giving an answer to the new peace initiatives of the socialist states.

We have stated more than once our readiness to consider any other initiatives based on the principle of the equality and equal security of the sides. No attempt to violate this principle has any chance of success. We will not be deceived.

The present moment is a very serious one: one just has to pull a string and the ball will start rolling. And the deployment of the American Pershing Missiles and Cruise Missiles

in Western Europe is capable of playing exactly such a role. If, contrary to all arguments of reason, things go in this direction, then a chain reaction is inevitable. The USSR, the GDR and the other Warsaw Treaty countries will be compelled to take reply measures.

I would not like to think that such a prospect suits the American leadership. But how then must one assess its statements and actions? For it is clearly realised in Washington that neither the "zero" nor the "interim" options, designed to secure the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union and to give the United States military superiority in Europe, can serve as a basis for a just settlement acceptable to both sides.

Likewise, the position of the governments of some other NATO countries cannot but cause perplexion. It is known, for instance, that the statesmen of the Federal Republic of Germany have repeatedly expressed agreement that war should never again be unleashed from German soil. How can this be squared with support for the plans to deploy American missiles on West German soil? For these are first-strike weapons. Besides, the decision to fire the missiles would be made by those who are across the ocean.

The Soviet Union has stated its readiness not to have in Europe a single missile or a single plane more than is possessed today by the NATO countries. We are told that in this event the Soviet Union would have more nuclear missile warheads. All right, we are prepared to reach agreement on the equality of nuclear potentials in Europe both as regards delivery vehicles and warheads with due account, of course, for the corresponding armaments of Britain and France.

In other words, we stand for the USSR having no more missiles and warheads mounted on them than on the side of NATO in each mutually agreed-upon period. In the event of a reduction of the number of warheads on British and French missiles, the number of warheads on our medium-range missiles would be cut by as much. The same approach would be applied also to the aviation systems of this class deployed in Europe. Thereby, an approximate equality would be maintained between the USSR and NATO both as regards medium-range nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, that is missiles and aircraft, and in the number of warheads carried by them. More than that, this equality would be on a much lower level than now.

I particularly want to stress that the fulfilment of this

new proposal would bring about a situation when in the European part of the Soviet Union we would have much fewer medium-range missiles and warheads on them than before 1976 when we did not have SS-20 missiles.

Those who would again say "No" also to this proposal of ours would assume grave responsibility before the peoples of Europe and the whole world because every week and every day lost for the attainment of agreement increases the nuclear danger.

All the peoples and governments must realise the extent of this danger and do everything to protect peace, to turn the development of events back in the direction of detente.

Pravda, May 4, 1983.

Statement by the Soviet Government

The deployment of new US medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, which the US Administration plans for the end of 1983, is a constituent part of its efforts to acquire military superiority. Capable of destroying objectives deep inside Soviet territory, these missiles are designed to complement directly the US strategic nuclear arsenal, and to change the existing regional and global balance in favour of the West. The stationing of these missiles would lead to a serious change in the situation in Europe, sharply aggravate nuclear confrontation, and increase the risk of war.

At all the talks directly or indirectly connected with curbing the arms race, the US Administration pursues an unconstructive, obstructionist policy. This concerns American behaviour at the talks in Geneva, Vienna, Madrid, and other international forums.

The US stand at the Soviet-American talks on limiting and reducing strategic armaments is wholly directed at obtaining unilateral military advantages, not at reaching an honest agreement. In proposing that the Soviet side reduce the most modern types of its armaments, and in amounts significantly exceeding those that would be reduced by the American side, Washington does not conceal its intention to leave virtually untouched the foundations of its nuclear arsenal and its vast programmes for deploying the most up-to-date strategic weapons, including land-, sea- and air-based cruise missiles.

The American proposals at the Strategic Intermediate-Range Arms Limitation Talks are aimed not at halting, but,

in essence, at accelerating the strategic arms race in directions which the United States considers advantageous for itself.

In view of the growing threat to the security of the USSR and its allies resulting from the development, production and introduction in service of new American land-, sea- and air-based strategic armaments, the Soviet Union is now faced with the need to respond by measures for strengthening its defence capability, including the deployment of corresponding new strategic systems. These Soviet steps are dictated by the situation as it actually develops and would represent its response to US actions. Their sole objective is to prevent the existing balance of power from being disrupted.

Compelled to make these steps, the USSR, at the same time, reaffirms that its principled approach to the problem of limiting and reducing strategic nuclear armaments remains unchanged. It is in favour of deep overall cuts in these armaments to enhance general strategic military stability with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

The far-reaching proposals on the mutual reduction of strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads, which the USSR has made in Geneva, provide a good foundation for that.

The USSR's stand on limiting medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe is equally constructive. As is known, the USSR proposes to reduce these armaments in such a manner that the number of its medium-range missiles and warheads would be no higher than that of Britain and France. With regard to both delivery vehicles and warheads, this would be noticeably less than the USSR had in Europe in 1976, when modernisation of Soviet missiles had not yet begun. Nor does the Soviet Union want to have even one medium-range aircraft or one aircraft nuclear weapon more than the NATO countries would have.

Yet, the United States continues to insist on a decision under which it would, in any event, start to position, by the end of 1983, its new missiles in Western Europe in addition to the American forward-based nuclear weapons already there. And Washington would want the USSR to agree to their deployment and, in addition, to unilaterally reduce its medium-range missiles, not only in the European but in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, ignoring similar US

armaments deployed in significant numbers in areas bordering on our country in the east.

The patent unacceptability of such proposals is so obvious that the fact that the United States advances them can indicate only one thing, namely the pronounced American reluctance to search for mutually acceptable solutions based on the principle of equality and equal security.

The USSR believes it necessary to warn in no uncertain terms that if agreement on limiting nuclear armaments in Europe and excluding the deployment of new American missiles there were wrecked, which would result in an additional threat to the security of the USSR and its allies, the USSR would take timely and effective retaliatory measures in this field as well.

The American and NATO decision to start deploying new US missiles in Europe, if implemented, would compel the USSR to revise its decision of last year on a unilateral moratorium on the further deployment of medium-range weapons in the European zone. The need would also arise to take other measures for deploying additional weapons, by agreement with other Warsaw Treaty member-states, in order to create the necessary counterweight against the growing concentration of US forward-based nuclear weapons in Europe and against the other NATO countries' nuclear armaments. As it had repeatedly warned, the Soviet side would also be compelled to take necessary retaliatory measures with regard to the territory of the United States itself.

The possibility of reaching a fair agreement at the Geneva talks exists. Naturally, this could be achieved if the United States and NATO would abandon the deployment of new American missiles in Europe.

The USSR declares that there is still time to stop the dangerous aggravation of the situation. It expresses the hope that the United States and its NATO allies would carefully weigh all the consequences to which the realisation of their plans for deploying new US missiles in Western Europe would lead and that they would respond to the constructive Soviet proposals.

Until an agreement on the reduction of nuclear armaments in Europe and strategic weapons is reached, the USSR once again proposes to freeze these armaments quantitatively and to restrict maximally their modernisation as the first, most readily feasible and, at the same time, effective step.

The duty of all states is to find a solution to the urgent problems of limiting and reducing armaments, primarily nuclear ones, and to return to détente, both political and military. This is dictated by the interests of all peoples and states, no matter where they are located, under what socio-economic system they live, and to what political grouping or trend they belong.

Pravda, May 28, 1983.

Excerpt from the Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the International Situation and the Soviet Union's Foreign Policy

In the tense international situation of today everything possible must be done to halt the arms race, return to the road of detente, and consolidate peace. This would in large measure be facilitated by all the other nuclear powers following the example of the Soviet Union and undertaking a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, as well as by the implementing the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty countries for the conclusion of a treaty between them and the NATO countries on the non-use of armed force and the maintenance of peaceful relations.

One of the most pressing tasks at the moment is to put an end to the nuclear arms build-up. Accomplishing this task would greatly contribute to lessening the danger overhanging mankind.

Proceeding from this, the USSR Supreme Soviet instructs the Soviet Government to address a proposal to the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China for a quantitative and qualitative freeze, to go into effect simultaneously, by all nuclear powers of all nuclear armaments possessed by them. Such a freeze could enter into force first with regard to the Soviet Union and the United States from a date subject to agreement, implying that the other nuclear powers would act in a similar way.

The freezing of all components of nuclear arsenals would sharply increase the level of confidence in relations between states possessing nuclear weapons and would allow a major turn to be made towards improving the overall world climate.

Halting the build-up of nuclear weapons would be an effective and comparatively easy to realise act, a starting point for their subsequent reduction and ultimately total elimination.

It would create a more favourable climate for the achievement of mutually acceptable accords at the ongoing Soviet-American talks on limiting and reducing strategic armaments, and also nuclear armaments in Europe in conformity with the principle of equality and equal security.

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expresses the hope that the supreme legislative bodies and governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and the People's Republic of China would take a responsible and constructive position towards the nuclear freeze proposal and display political determination so that it would at last be possible to break the vicious circle of the arms race in the interests of all nations on Earth.

YU. ANDROPOV

Chairman of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR

T. MENTESHASHVILI

Secretary of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR

Moscow, the Kremlin,
June 16, 1983.

Soviet Government's Appeal

On June 21, 1983, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR submitted to the Ambassadors of the United States, Britain, France and the People's Republic of China the text of the June 16, 1983 Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government's memoranda to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the French Republic, and the People's Republic of China proposing that all powers possessing nuclear weapons freeze all their nuclear armaments both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Such a freeze, the Soviet Government's Appeal notes, would stipulate a halt to the quantitative build-up of all nuclear arsenal components possessed by all parties, and their commitment not to develop new kinds and types of nuclear armaments.

Furthermore, each party would impose a moratorium on all nuclear weapons tests, as well as on tests of new kinds and types of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

The observance of commitments to implement on such a freeze could be effectively verified by national technical means. As necessary, certain additional measures based on co-operation could also be developed and agreed upon.

It goes without saying that a nuclear freeze would be most effective were it to be undertaken simultaneously by all the nuclear powers. The Soviet Government believes, however, that this could be done initially by the USSR and the United States, assuming that the other nuclear powers would follow suit.

The Appeal emphasises that in coming out with this major initiative, the USSR in no way regards the freeze as an end in itself, but considers such a measure to be an effective first step toward reducing and ultimately totally eliminating nuclear armaments, thus removing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe altogether.

The Soviet Government expects that the Governments of the United States of America, Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China would regard this proposal with all attention and seriousness, proceeding from the nuclear powers' great responsibility for safeguarding world peace. The Appeal goes on to say that Soviet representatives would be ready at any moment to start discussions of specific relevant questions with representatives of the above-mentioned states.

Pravda, June 22, 1983.

Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space Against the Earth

August 19, 1983

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the principle whereby Members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Seeking to avert an arms race in outer space and thus to lessen the danger to mankind of the threat of nuclear war,

Desiring to contribute towards attainment of the goal whereby the exploration and utilization of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

It is prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force in outer space and the atmosphere and on the Earth through the utilization, as instruments of destruction, of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in space in any other manner.

It is further prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force against space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner.

Article 2

In accordance with the provisions of Article 1, States Parties to this Treaty undertake:

1. Not to test or deploy by placing in orbit around the Earth or stationing on celestial bodies or in any other manner any space-based weapons for the destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

2. Not to utilize space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner as means to destroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

3. Not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States.

4. Not to test or create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems that they may already have.

5. Not to test or use manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes.

Article 3

The States Parties to this Treaty agree not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States, international organization or natural or legal person to engage in activities prohibited by this Treaty.

Article 4

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 5

1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to consult and co-operate with each other in solving any problems that may arise in connection with the objectives of the Treaty or its implementation.

2. Consultations and co-operation as provided in paragraph 1 of this article may also be undertaken by having recourse to appropriate international procedures within the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Such

recourse may include utilization of the services of the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Treaty.

3. The Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the depositary within one month after the receipt of a request from any State Party to this Treaty. Any State Party may nominate a representative to serve on the Committee.

Article 6

Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to adopt such internal measures as it may deem necessary to fulfil its constitutional requirements in order to prohibit or prevent the carrying out of any activity contrary to the provisions of this Treaty in any place whatever under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 7

Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of States under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 8

Any dispute which may arise in connection with the implementation of this Treaty shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means through recourse to the procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 9

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 10

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have deposited instruments of ratification upon the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth instrument of ratification, provided that such instruments have been deposited by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of entry into force of this Treaty as well as other notices.

Article 11

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

Pravda, August 22, 1983.

Note: The Draft Treaty was submitted to the UN Secretary-General on August 19, 1983.

Nuclear-Weapon Freeze

Draft Resolution of the UN General Assembly

The General Assembly,

Expressing its alarm that the continuing nuclear-arms race seriously increases the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war,

Taking into account the great responsibility of nuclear States for the preservation of universal peace and the prevention of nuclear war,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 B of 13 December 1982, in which it expresses the firm conviction that at present the conditions are most propitious for a nuclear-weapon freeze,

1. *Urges* all nuclear-weapon States to proceed to freeze, under appropriate verification, all nuclear weapons in their possession both in quantitative and qualitative terms, namely:

(a) To cease the build-up of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear-weapon delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons;

(b) Not to deploy nuclear weapons of new kinds and types;

(c) To establish a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems;

(d) To stop the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons;

2. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, to freeze, in the first place and simultaneously, their nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis by way of example to the other nuclear States;

3. *Believes* that all the other nuclear-weapon States should subsequently and as soon as possible freeze their nuclear weapons;

4. *Points* to the urgent need to intensify efforts aimed at the speedy achievement of agreements on substantial limitations and radical reductions of nuclear weapons with a view to their complete elimination as the ultimate goal.

Pravda, October 8, 1983.

Condemnation of Nuclear War

Draft Declaration of the UN General Assembly

October 5, 1983

The General Assembly,

Expressing its alarm at the growing threat of nuclear war, which can lead to the destruction of civilization on earth,

Drawing the attention of all States and peoples to the conclusions arrived at by the most eminent scientists and military and civilian experts to the effect that it is impossible to limit the deadly consequences of nuclear war if it is ever begun and that in a nuclear war there can be no victors,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear catastrophe is the most profound aspiration of billions of people on earth,

Reaffirming its call for the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Resolutely, unconditionally and for all time condemns* nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience and reason, as the most monstrous crime against peoples and as a violation of the foremost human right—the right to life;

2. *Condemns* the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts intended to provide “legitimacy” for the first use of nuclear weapons and in general to justify the “admissibility” of unleashing nuclear war;

3. *Calls upon* all States to unite and redouble their efforts aimed at removing the threat of nuclear war, halting the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated.

Pravda, October 8, 1985.

**Excerpt from the Communiqué
of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers'
Committee of the States Parties
to the Warsaw Treaty**

[. . .] An especially important item at the meeting was the question of continued efforts to prevent the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles and to move towards freeing the European continent of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons completely. The participants in the meeting proceeded from the fact that a new escalation of the nuclear arms race in Europe, if not prevented, would inevitably lead to a sharp aggravation of the situation in Europe and the whole world, and to the further growth of the threat of nuclear war with catastrophic consequences for peoples everywhere. In this connection, they stressed the exceptional danger of the intention to commence in the near future the deployment of new US medium-range nuclear missile systems in certain West European NATO member-countries and of the current preparations for such deployment. In this context, the Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers' Committee expressed growing concern over the lack of progress at the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe.

The Meeting once again declared that the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are resolutely in favour of the quickest possible agreement at the Geneva talks which have now entered their decisive stage. In confirming their stand on the substance of this question, which they had previously expressed in their joint statement of June 28, 1983 in Moscow, they maintain that such an agreement should envisage renouncing the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and a corresponding reduction of existing medium-range nuclear weapons; the missiles subject to

reduction would be destroyed as proposed by the USSR. The agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe should be based on the principle of equality and equal security and promote the stability of the strategic military situation and the balance of forces. This balance should be based on the reduction of nuclear armaments to increasingly lower levels, not on their build-up.

The participants in the Meeting expressed their conviction that there exists a possibility for agreement in Geneva, an agreement that would meet the interests of peoples. In this connection they noted that if by the end of the current year no agreement were reached of the negotiations it would be necessary for talks aimed at this agreement to continue in conditions when the United States and its NATO allies had waived the date they themselves had established for deploying new medium-range US nuclear missiles in Europe. At the same time, the Warsaw Treaty member-states emphasised that the USSR's readiness to continue to observe its unilateral freeze on medium-range missiles stationed in the European part of the country, and to continue the unilateral reduction of these missiles which had begun when the freeze was introduced, would be a major contribution to creating the right atmosphere for the successful outcome of the talks.

Proceeding from the exceptional importance of eliminating the threat of nuclear confrontation in Europe, the Warsaw Treaty member-states make an urgent appeal to all NATO member-states to concentrate all their efforts to exclude the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and to reduce existing medium-range nuclear missiles in the area. They also call on all other European states to help in every possible way to prevent the threat of nuclear confrontation in Europe and to actively promote the success of the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe. No opportunity should be missed to reach an agreement that would meet the interests of all peoples.

The Meeting's participants noted that broad popular peace movements are resolutely and consistently opposed to the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and favour disarmament and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

At the same time, the participants in the Meeting emphasised that those states which would allow new medium-

range nuclear missiles to be deployed on their territories—thus opening a new stage in the nuclear arms race in Europe—would be taking on a grave responsibility before all peoples for the consequences of the deployment for peace there [...]

Pravda, October 15, 1983.

Yu. V. Andropov's Replies to Questions Put by "Pravda"

Question: What is the situation now at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe? Is there any progress there?

Answer: Unfortunately, there is no advance in the direction of accord at the talks. The impasse there continues. The reason for this, I believe, is now clear even to the most devoted allies of the United States and it is only bloc loyalty that prevents them from admitting this openly.

In the two years of negotiations the Soviet Union has convincingly demonstrated that it is ready to accept bold solutions for the sake of averting the nuclear danger from Europe and strengthening security in our continent and in the whole world. The proposals tabled by us provide for a wide range of possible measures: from substantial reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons to the total liquidation of both tactical and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. They contain all the necessary elements for a mutually acceptable accord that would not damage anybody's interests—either the interests of the USSR and its allies, or those of the United States, or the West European countries.

Numerous statements have been made lately in Washington that the United States also stands for agreement and that it has started displaying greater flexibility at the talks. We have made a thorough analysis of all these statements and of what is being said by the American delegation in Geneva. It turns out that the American flexibility does not go further than words. The essence of the United States' line remains unchanged: to ensure for itself a considerable military superiority over the USSR by deploying new American missiles in Europe.

It is impossible, of course, to expect any progress at the talks so long as the United States adheres to its unrealistic, one-sided position according to which the USSR would have to reduce its medium-range nuclear arms while the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty allies would build theirs up.

Question: Have all possibilities of achieving accord been exhausted?

Answer: This depends first of all on the United States, on whether it is prepared to go over to a businesslike discussion or not. The Soviet Union will not give up the search for accord until the United States makes this accord impossible by its actions.

We have displayed and are displaying flexibility in the search for concrete solutions while insisting on the observance of one, imperative requirement: the balance of forces in Europe as regards medium-range nuclear arms must not be upset. The level of these arms on both sides can and must be radically lowered but in such a way as to leave the ratio of forces between them unchanged.

This means, firstly, that new American missiles should not be deployed in Europe, because this would sharply change the entire military-strategic situation to NATO's advantage. Secondly, account should be taken on both sides of all the nuclear weapons of the corresponding range without any exceptions.

We will not retreat from this just demand. But within the framework of this principled position we, I repeat, are displaying flexibility and a constructive approach. Today, too, I can speak of some additional steps on our part in this respect.

First. The Soviet Union, as is known, has expressed readiness to reach agreement on the reduction of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe to identical levels for the two sides both as regards delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft) and the warheads carried by them. Some people ask: what will the Soviet Union do if, in order to ensure equality in the number of warheads on missiles in the possession of the USSR, on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other, it is compelled to have a smaller number of missile launchers than NATO already has?

Well, we are prepared to agree to this too. We are not put off by the fact that in this case and bearing in mind the present number of warheads on British and French mis-

siles, the USSR would have in Europe only about 140 SS-20 launchers, that is, considerably less than the number of medium-range missile launchers in the possession of Britain and France.

Second. Not so long ago we stated that if a mutually acceptable agreement is reached, including the renunciation by the United States of the deployment of missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union would liquidate all its missiles to be reduced in the European zone instead of redeploying them in the east. And again some people ask: could it happen that as the missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union are scrapped there would be a build-up of such missiles in its eastern areas which could then be moved from the east to the west?

There are no grounds whatever for such apprehensions. But to remove all doubts on this score I can say explicitly: there will be no redeployment of Soviet missiles from the east to the west; in the event an agreement is reached limiting nuclear arms in Europe and is enforced, from that moment on the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the eastern areas of the USSR will also be discontinued. And we will firmly adhere to this provided no substantial changes take place in the strategic situation in the Asian region. This implies, first of all, that the United States will not deploy new medium-range nuclear weapons in areas from which they could reach the eastern part of the territory of the USSR.

Third. It is sometimes said that our proposal that each side retain not more than 300 medium-range nuclear delivery vehicles after the reductions would excessively undercut the American air weapon systems of the corresponding range.

It is not our aim to do any injury to the United States. Although in all fairness it should be recalled that Soviet medium-range planes are not based in other countries from where they could reach the territory of the United States.

But here, too, we are prepared to show greater flexibility: to establish for the USSR and NATO equal total levels of medium-range delivery aircraft within a mutually acceptable quantitative range, even if it were to differ substantially from that proposed by us earlier. The exact ceilings could be agreed on and the kinds of delivery aircraft subject to limitation could also be specified.

There is a way out of the impasse the Geneva talks have

reached. It is only necessary not to miss the opportunity. Were the United States to display a genuine desire to achieve a mutually acceptable accord, not much time would be required to work out an agreement.

Question: Some people in the West say that as a sign of good will the Soviet Union could, supposedly, already now unilaterally reduce its missiles in Europe. What could you say about this?

Answer: Yes, we have heard about such suggestions. Sometimes they come from people who are genuinely concerned about the preservation of peace in Europe.

We are not lacking in good will. We have taken many steps, including unilateral ones, aimed at the creation of the most favourable atmosphere for success at the talks.

I may remind you that a year and a half ago the USSR introduced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of its territory. And despite all slanderous allegations to the contrary, this moratorium is being strictly observed. Further deployment of missiles was also stopped beyond the Urals, in areas from which they could reach West European countries.

More, since the talks began the Soviet Union has dismantled scores of medium-range missiles in Europe. To date we have dismantled all the SS-5 missiles previously deployed in the European zone which, incidentally, had a range no less than the SS-20s and a far greater warhead yield.

Those who call on the USSR to reduce unilaterally the number of its medium-range missiles are probably ignorant of the fact that we are actually already doing this. The government of the United States and the governments of other NATO countries are surely well informed of the real state of affairs. However, they are concealing the truth from their peoples, deceiving them.

Meanwhile Washington is bent on starting the deployment of its Pershings and cruise missiles in Western Europe in the nearest future. There are no signs that the United States would be prepared to forego such deployment even if the Soviet Union continued unilaterally to reduce its missiles. On the contrary, everything points to the opposite. For this reason the Soviet Union, naturally, cannot and will not risk its security and that of its allies.

It would be another matter if the United States renounced the deployment of its missiles in Europe within the announced time limits and thereby made it possible to conti-

nue the talks and the search for mutually acceptable solutions. In that event we could start at once reducing our SS-4 missiles (and we have more than 200 of them) and complete their liquidation in the course of 1984-1985. And should it prove possible to conclude an agreement in Geneva on a fair basis, of which we have spoken more than once, a considerable part of the presently existing SS-20 missiles would, naturally, also be destroyed.

Question: Statements are being made in Western capitals that with the commencement of the deployment of the American missiles the talks supposedly will be given a new impulse and become more productive. How are such statements to be assessed?

Answer: This is outright deception designed to dampen the struggle of the West European peoples against the siting of American nuclear missiles in Europe.

One thing should be absolutely clear: the siting of new American missiles in Western Europe will make continuation of the present talks in Geneva impossible. On the other hand, the Geneva talks can be continued if the United States does not start the actual deployment of the missiles.

Pravda, October 27, 1983.

Statement by Yu. V. Andropov

The Soviet leadership has already made known to the Soviet people and other peoples its assessment of the militaristic course of the present US Administration, and warned the governments of the United States and of the Western countries that are at one with it of the dangerous consequences of this course.

But Washington, Bonn, London and Rome have not heeded the voice of reason and American medium-range missiles are beginning to be deployed on the territory of the FRG, Britain and Italy. Thus, the siting of American Pershing and cruise missiles on the European continent is becoming an accomplished fact.

Europe has now been living in conditions of peace for almost forty years, longer than ever before in modern history. This has been made possible by the consistent peaceloving policy of the countries of the socialist community, the efforts of the continent's peaceloving forces and also the realistic position adopted by sober-minded politicians in the West. The approximate balance of military forces, including nuclear forces, that has taken shape in Europe between the states of the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Treaty states, has objectively served the cause of European security and stability.

The United States and NATO as a whole are now taking a step aimed at tipping the scales in their favour. The nuclear missiles that are being deployed near the borders of the Soviet Union and its allies are not at all intended for the defence of Western Europe—no one is threatening it. What will grow as a result of the deployment of American missiles on European soil is not the security of Europe but

the real danger that the United States may bring disaster upon the peoples of Europe.

In the two World Wars the flames of destruction had spared the territory of the United States of America. And today Washington would like to think that by deploying its medium-range missiles in Europe and thus creating an additional nuclear threat to the socialist countries it could divert the retaliatory strike from its own territory. As to the security of the West European allies of the United States, it seems that this interests the American leaders only to the extent to which the West Europeans will be able with their lives and their cities to lessen the retribution for the United States, should Washington yield to the temptation to unleash nuclear war in the illusory hope of winning it.

The deployment of the American nuclear missiles in Western Europe is by no means a step prompted by some alleged concern in the West about the present alignment of forces of the sides in Europe. It has been proved many times on the basis of concrete figures—and this is accepted by many politicians and experts in the West—that at present a rough parity exists in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in medium-range nuclear weapons while NATO has a considerable edge in the number of nuclear warheads. So if anybody has cause to be concerned it is the Warsaw Treaty countries, which are threatened by the military machines of the NATO countries.

Neither can the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, in assessing all this, turn a blind eye to the fact that Washington has also announced a "Crusade" against socialism as a social system and that those who have now issued orders for the deployment of new nuclear arms on our door-steps are basing their practical policies on this reckless scheme. It appears that by deploying the Pershing-2s and cruise missiles in Europe the governments of a number of NATO countries seek to create a concrete nuclear-missile base for this adventuristic scheme.

Can the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries ignore this danger? No, they cannot. That is why the top Party and state leaders of seven socialist countries declared at their meeting in Moscow on June 28, 1983, that under no circumstances would they permit military superiority of the NATO bloc over the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

In confirming their consent to the deployment of American missiles in their countries, the governments of the

FRG, Britain and Italy could not but have known that from the outset the United States had no wish to achieve a mutually acceptable accord on nuclear arms in Europe and did everything at the talks in Geneva and outside them to prevent such an accord. And they could not but have known that the Soviet Union and its allies would definitely take the necessary measures to safeguard their security, and would prevent the United States and NATO as a whole from upsetting the existing rough parity in forces in Europe.

We have also clearly stated that the appearance of new American missiles in Western Europe would make the continuation of the Geneva talks on nuclear arms in Europe impossible.

The decisions adopted in the past few days by the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and Italy unequivocally show that, contrary to the will of their own peoples, contrary to the interests of the security of their countries and contrary to the interests of European and universal peace, these governments have given the go-ahead to the deployment of the American missiles. Thus, they have assumed together with the government of the United States full responsibility for the consequences of the short-sighted policy about which the Soviet Union had warned in advance.

After thoroughly weighing all aspects of the situation that has taken shape the Soviet leadership has adopted the following decisions:

First. Since by its actions the United States has torpedoed the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable accord at the talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe and since their continuation in these conditions would only serve as a cover for the actions of the United States and a number of other NATO countries aimed at undermining European and international security, the Soviet Union considers its further participation in these talks impossible.

Second. The Soviet Union renounces the unilateral commitments which it had undertaken with a view to creating more favourable conditions for success at the talks. It thereby lifts the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR.

Third. By agreement with the governments of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia preparations, about which announcement has been made, for the deploy-

ment on the territory of these countries of operational-tactical longer-range missiles, which were started some time ago, will be accelerated.

Fourth. Since by deploying its missiles in Europe the United States increases the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, corresponding Soviet weapons will be deployed with due account of this circumstance in oceans and seas. In their potential these weapons of ours will be commensurate with the threat posed to us and our allies by the American missiles now being deployed in Europe.

It goes without saying that other measures will be taken to ensure the security of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community.

As we begin to carry out the decisions we have adopted, we declare that the counter-measures from the Soviet side will be kept strictly within the limits dictated by the actions of the NATO countries. The Soviet Union, and we stress this once again, does not seek military superiority, and we shall do only what is absolutely necessary to prevent the military balance from being disrupted.

Should the United States and the other NATO countries display readiness to return to the situation that existed before the start of the deployment of the American medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will be prepared to do likewise. In that event our earlier proposals on questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms in Europe would again be valid. In that case, that is, if the former situation should be restored, the USSR's unilateral commitments in this sphere would become effective once again.

The Soviet Union declares with all firmness and in no uncertain terms that it continues to adhere to the principled policy aimed at halting the arms race, and first of all the nuclear arms race, at reducing and ultimately eliminating the threat of nuclear war. It will continue to make every effort to attain these noble aims.

The Soviet Union remains committed to the cause of finding the most radical solution of the question of nuclear arms in Europe. It reiterates its proposal to make Europe free of nuclear weapons altogether, both medium-range and tactical ones.

The Soviet leadership calls on the leaders of the United States and the West European countries to weigh once again all the consequences for their own peoples and the whole of mankind of the implementation of the plans to

deploy new American missiles in Europe.

We are already living in a very fragile world. That is why responsible statesmen must evaluate what is now taking place and adopt a rational decision. It is human reason alone that can and must save mankind from the grave danger. We call on those who are pushing the world along the path of an ever more dangerous arms race to give up their unattainable hopes of thereby achieving military superiority enabling them to dictate their will to other peoples and states.

The Soviet Union is convinced that peace can be strengthened and the security of peoples guaranteed not by building up and inventing ever new types of armaments but, on the contrary, by reducing the existing armaments to immeasurably lower levels. Mankind has so many tasks which are not being solved only because colossal material, intellectual and other resources are being diverted. From this point of view too, the attainment of accords on a radical reduction of nuclear and other arms would be a blessing for all peoples.

The Soviet leadership declares that in fulfilling the will of the Soviet people it will continue to do everything in its power to avert the danger of war and to preserve peace for present and future generations.

Pravda, November 25, 1983.

Proposal

of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation to the Member-States of NATO on the Question of Freeing Europe of Chemical Weapons

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty believe that the presence of chemical weapons on the densely populated territory of Europe poses a great danger to all European states and peoples. The use of toxic agents in Europe would lead to especially severe consequences for civilians, and the contamination of vast areas. By some estimates, in the event of a conflict involving the use of chemical weapons, the ratio of dead among servicemen to civilians could be one to twenty.

Under the current aggravated international situation, the danger that chemical weaponry might be used is rising, primarily in Europe.

The radical elimination of the chemical threat to the states and peoples of Europe and other areas of the globe may be secured by banning chemical weapons and eliminating their stockpiles on a world-wide scale. The socialist countries' concrete and realistic proposals to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva are aimed at the attainment of just this principal goal and represent an urgent and consistent effort towards the elaboration of a relevant international Convention.

At the same time, before this global problem is solved, and in order to promote its solution, certain parallel steps could and must be undertaken within the bounds of the European continent. This would permit the substantial reduction of the risk of chemical warfare in Europe and, consequently, in the whole world and pave the way for reducing the arsenals of chemical weapons. Such moves are urg-

ently needed also to prevent the possible build-up in Europe of chemical weapons and a dangerous spiral in the chemical weapons race.

Partial regional measures for curbing, reducing and eliminating chemical weapons would, compared with global measures, affect a lesser number of states and would be easier to agree upon and implement. At the same time, such regional measures leading to the elimination of a whole class of mass annihilation weapons would undoubtedly strengthen European security, help alleviate the threat of war, consolidate mutual trust, and improve the overall political atmosphere. Moreover, the implementation of such partial measures would promote the global effort towards the promulgation of a convention on banning chemical weapons, which remains the ultimate objective of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty. This would stimulate the adoption of similar measures on other continents, too. In its full scope, the realisation of the idea of freeing Europe of chemical weapons involving the territories of all the Warsaw Treaty States Parties would also stipulate for the spreading of future measures to corresponding territories of the NATO member-states.

Practical measures for implementing the initiative of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty aimed at freeing Europe of chemical weapons which take into account all factors and circumstances should, preferably, be achieved consecutively, step by step.

In Europe, states' commitments with regard to a chemical weapons-free territory envisaged by a future agreement could, for instance, include a declaration concerning the presence or absence of chemical weapons on the territory; a pledge not to deploy chemical weapons in areas where there are no such weapons at present; to freeze chemical weapons; to remove or eliminate existing stockpiles of chemical weapons; and to renounce the production, acquisition, import and transfer of chemical weapons to states situated within the limits of the given territory. Such commitments should effectively ensure that there would be no chemical weapons on the territory stipulated by the said agreement.

In examining the practical questions connected with freeing Europe of chemical weapons, the experience accumulated in the course of the talks in the Geneva Disarmament Committee on the comprehensive banning of chemical weapons may also prove useful. At the same time, it would seem

undesirable to introduce complicated technical questions which are the subject of these talks.

In drawing up an agreement to free Europe of chemical weapons, the interested states, as necessary, could decide on mutually acceptable adequate forms of verification that would ensure the effective implementation of commitments by all the parties to the agreement on creating a chemical weapon-free zone.

The status of the chemical weapon-free zone should be duly respected. It would be desirable to stipulate that the states whose territories are affected by such an agreement would be given corresponding guarantees in accordance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and in accordance with other international legal documents to be adopted in the future.

It would seem that such an agreement could have the form either of a document that would have binding legal force, e.g. an agreement, treaty, convention, or that of a corresponding multilateral statement (declaration), or several unilateral statements (declarations). Naturally, the contents of such an agreement would be significant for its form. A political statement (declaration) would allow the bypassing of certain complicated technical issues.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty consider it desirable to hold a meeting of plenipotentiary representatives in 1984 for a preliminary exchange of opinions with the NATO member-countries and other interested European states on the question of freeing Europe of chemical weapons.

In the course of that meeting, the participants could agree upon various practical aspects, including that of a suitable forum for future talks on this problem.

Pravda, January 11, 1984.

**Excerpt from
the Speech by K. U. Chernenko
at a Meeting with Voters of
the Kuibyshev Constituency in Moscow**

March 2, 1984

[. . .] The policy of the powers possessing nuclear weapons is of particular importance in our time. The vital interests of all mankind and the responsibility of state leaders to the present and future generations demand that relations between these powers be subject to certain norms. In our view, these norms could be roughly as follows:

—To consider prevention of a nuclear war to be the prime aim of a state's foreign policy; to preclude situations likely to lead to a nuclear conflict. And should such a danger arise, to hold consultations without delay in order to prevent a nuclear conflagration.

—To renounce propaganda of nuclear war in any of its variants, either global or limited.

—To assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

—Under no circumstances to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which have no such weapons on their territories; to respect the status of the nuclear-free zone already established and to encourage the creation of new nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

—To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form; not to transfer such weapons or control over them to anybody; not to deploy them on the territories of countries where there are no such weapons; not to extend the nuclear arms race to new spheres, including outer space.

— To work step by step, on the basis of the principle of equal security, for a reduction of nuclear armaments with a view to finally destroying all types of them.

The Soviet Union has made these principles the basis of

its policy. We are prepared to reach agreement with other nuclear powers at any time on jointly recognising norms of this kind and on making them mandatory. I think that this would accord with the fundamental interests not only of the participating countries but also of the peoples of the whole world.

Pravda, March 3, 1984.

Proposal

Of the State Parties to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation to the Member-States of NATO Concerning Talks on the Non-Increase and Reduction of Military Expenditures

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are deeply concerned about the increasingly rapid continuation of the arms race, which is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences for international peace and security. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are in favour of curbing this race and starting disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. They come out for achieving agreements that would entail an effective reduction of armed forces and armaments with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security, and for the establishment of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level.

The arms race is fed by rapidly growing military expenditures; these are turning into an increasingly heavier burden for peoples irrespective of the level of economic development of different countries and retard economic and social progress. A reduction of military expenditures, primarily by all states possessing nuclear weapons, as well as by other militarily important states, would effectively help to halt the arms race and pave the way for disarmament. In this case, funds thus released could be used for socio-economic development needs including those of the developing countries. With growing international tension it is becoming especially important to take measures for the non-increase and reduction of military expenditures.

All states, first of all those possessing large military potentials, must participate in efforts to non-increase and re-

duce military expenditures. At the same time, the implementation of such measures by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member-states would have special significance, keeping in mind the high proportion of their military expenditures.

In the January 5, 1983 Political Declaration adopted by their Political Consultative Committee in Prague, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty proposed to start, without delay, direct talks between the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member-states aimed at reaching a practical agreement on the non-increase and subsequent reduction of their military expenditures in percentage or in absolute figures. This appeal was confirmed and made tangible at the June 28, 1983 Meeting in Moscow of the leading party and state figures of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR, who again appealed to NATO member-states to start, without delay, direct talks for reaching an agreement on non-increase from January 1, 1984 and for concrete measures for the practical, mutual reduction of military expenditures in the subsequent period.

The proposals of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty for the non-increase and substantial reduction of military expenditures, advanced either jointly or individually, remain in force.

In advancing their proposal to hold talks, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty mean to reach, within the shortest possible period of time, concrete agreements on the non-increase and subsequent reduction of military expenditures, so that the funds thus released could then be used for the economic and social development needs, including those of developing countries. A reduction of military expenditures would help halt the arms race and pave the way for disarmament. The proposed talks on the non-increase and reduction of military expenditures would be a component part of overall efforts towards these goals.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty express their readiness to undertake, together with NATO member-states, joint efforts to search for realistic solutions on a mutually acceptable basis to overcome the difficulties that might arise in discussing the question of the non-increase and reduction of military expenditures. They call on NATO member-states to act in the same spirit.

In addition to the proposals contained in the Prague De-

claration and Moscow Statement, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty propose the following possible steps for reducing military expenditures:

—a reciprocal minor symbolic one-time reduction of the military budgets of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member-states (each state itself would determine the amount to be reduced) with a subsequent freeze of these budgets for about three years; this proposal is designed to facilitate a transition to more radical reductions of military budgets through subsequent talks;

—as a first step, a one-time reduction of the military budgets of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member-states possessing nuclear weapons by some pre-agreed total; the concrete amount to be reduced by each respective country would be established as part of the agreed amount in relation to the respective gross national products;

—reduction of the military budgets of the respective States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member-states in connection with the implementation of concrete disarmament measures that could be worked out in the course of disarmament talks (as soon as an agreement were reached, the participants in various talks would specify amounts by which they would reduce their respective military budgets);

—mutually-agreed-upon establishment of maximum ceilings for military budgets below the existing levels.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are prepared to study proposals on any other measures for the non-increase and reduction of military expenditures.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty proceed from the fact that agreements on the reduction of military expenditures must be implemented in such a way that all the participants in the given agreements would be sure that the latter are implemented.

To reach concrete agreements, it is necessary to make maximal efforts; to conduct talks in a business-like manner and in a positive spirit; to undertake steps that would promote the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the progress of such talks; and not to undertake moves that could complicate them. Mutual restraint in military expenditures and other similar measures based on reciprocity could play positive roles in this process.

All this means that these talks would be conducted with the direct participation of all the countries that are parties to the two alliances. The States Parties to the Warsaw

Treaty proceed from the assumption that the talks would start as soon as possible. They suggest that preliminary working consultations of member-states of both alliances be held in order to agree on the objectives, date and place of the talks, and on the level of participation, etc. The date and place of such preliminary consultations could be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty believe that the proposed talks would help improve the political climate in Europe and the whole world, and would meet the vital aspirations of peoples, who are concerned by the continuous deterioration of the international situation and by the growing arms race.

We express the hope that a positive response to this would be received as soon as possible.

Pravda, April 6, 1984.

K. U. Chernenko's Reply to an Appeal by Socialist International Leaders

**To the Chairman of the Socialist International,
Willy BRANDT, and the leaders of the Socialist,
Social-Democratic and Labour Parties making up
the Socialist International**

I have read your appeal with great care. We fully understand your anxiety at the serious deterioration in the situation in Europe, and in international affairs as a whole.

The arms race, including the nuclear arms race, is escalating and presenting an ever growing threat. At the same time the process of negotiations on nuclear arms limitation and reduction has been disrupted, and moreover, as the facts indicate, disrupted deliberately.

All this is the result of the well-known policy aimed at upsetting the existing balance of forces and gaining military-strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. No soothing statements that nothing special is taking place, no show of peaceableness can hide the disastrous nature of such a policy.

We share the view expressed in your appeal that it is essential to work for a change for the better. Yes, dialogue is necessary, including, of course, dialogue between the Soviet Union and the US. But this dialogue must be honest, businesslike, and aimed at working out agreements complying with the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union has both the will and the determination to conduct matters in this way.

This, however, calls for corresponding readiness on the part of the United States. Yet the US Administration, although it has of late professed a desire for dialogue with the USSR, is not backing it up with anything concrete. Moreover, these professions are belied by practical steps. Each US nuclear missile deployed on European soil is a new step

towards the danger line. Does this really indicate readiness for truly businesslike negotiations, for settling the issues which are so important for Europeans, for all peoples?

It is clear from this that it is not a question of talking, of making statements about readiness for talks, but rather of readiness to remove the obstacles which have been put in the way of the talks on nuclear arms limitation and reduction.

It is this that the Soviet Union advocates.

We have been and remain convinced supporters of halting and reversing the arms race. The whole set of proposals put forward by the Soviet Union pursues this aim. To freeze all nuclear arsenals immediately, to limit and reduce substantially strategic arms, to lower the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe radically, to prevent the militarisation of outer space and to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons—these and other measures aimed at removing the threat of war are dictated by life. They are realistic and meet equally the interests of all states, the demands and hopes of the peoples of the world.

This is also true of the proposal we put forward recently that an agreement be reached on certain norms by which the relations between the nuclear powers should be guided and that these norms be of a binding nature. It is important that all the nuclear powers make the task of preventing nuclear war the central one in their policy and build their mutual relations accordingly.

The reaching of agreement on the issues mentioned could mark the beginning of real breakthrough in the international situation as a whole, and in Soviet-US relations. By concerted efforts, and given the political will, the situation can be changed for the better.

It is important to restore the atmosphere of international confidence; there is an acute need for this. A useful role in this can be played by the Stockholm Conference. Proceeding precisely from such an understanding of the significance and tasks of the Conference, the Soviet Union advocates reaching agreement, first of all, on major measures, namely, renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and of the use of armed force in general.

Of late various quarters in the West, including the Socialist International and many socialist and social-democratic parties, have for their part also put forward initiatives aimed at reducing the threat of nuclear war and lessening

international tension. This shows that there is a real urge to reactivate the process of detente.

But this will not happen of its own accord. Effective and urgent measures are needed to put the situation right.

The Soviet Union is prepared for broad and active cooperation with all states and all peaceloving social forces in the struggle to reduce the danger of war and consolidate peace. This holds absolutely true for the parties that are members of the Socialist International.

I would like for my part to emphasise most definitely that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue an unswerving policy aimed at curbing the arms race, reviving detente and strengthening European and international security.

Yours respectfully,
K. CHERNENKO

Pravda, April 5, 1984.

Statement by the Soviet Government

June 30, 1984

The Soviet government most insistently draws attention to the need for urgent measures to prevent the militarization of outer space.

An extension of the arms race to space would greatly increase the risk of a military catastrophe and would harm prospects for the limitation and reduction of armaments in general. An awareness of this is growing everywhere, and demands are mounting for a halt to such a development before it is too late. Everything must be done not to miss this opportunity and to tightly close all the channels to the militarization of space.

In practical terms, this means that weapons of any kind—conventional, nuclear, laser, beam or any other weapons—must not be launched into space and placed there on either manned or unmanned systems. Space weapons in any basing mode must not be developed, tested or deployed either for anti-missile defence or as anti-satellite weapons, or weapons against targets on earth or in the air. The systems already developed must be destroyed.

The use of force in space or from space against earth, and also from earth against objects in space must be banned for all time.

Such an approach, under which a whole class of armaments—attack space systems, including anti-satellite and anti-missile space-based system as well as any ground-, air-, or sea-launched systems intended to hit targets in space—would be banned and eliminated, makes it possible to ensure reliable verification of the observance by the sides of their commitments.

The Soviet government suggests to the government of the United States that Soviet-American talks on preventing the militarization of outer space could start at the level of specially appointed delegations. The question of the complete and mutual renunciation of anti-satellite systems should be resolved at these talks as well.

These talks could be started in Vienna in September of this year, given the consent of the Austrian government. The specific date for the opening of the talks could be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

To provide favourable conditions for agreement, and to take practical measures right away to prevent the space arms race, the Soviet Union also offers to impose, on a reciprocal basis, a moratorium on the testing and deployment of these weapons as from the date the talks open. Naturally, other states will be welcome to join this moratorium.

As the leading powers in space exploration, the USSR and the USA must do everything they can to ensure a peaceful sky for mankind and to set an example to other states in accomplishing that global task by laying the foundations for a multilateral agreement to this effect.

In view of the urgency and importance of this question, the Soviet government expects an early and positive response from the US government to this message.

* * *

The text of the Soviet government's statement was handed officially to the government of the USA.

**Excerpt from the Speech
by General Secretary
of the CPSU Central Committee
Mikhail Gorbachev
at the Central Committee Plenary Meeting**

March 11, 1985

[...] Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States will open in Geneva tomorrow. The approach of the USSR to these negotiations is well known. I shall only reaffirm this: we do not strive for unilateral advantages, for military superiority over the United States, over NATO countries; we want a termination, not a continuation of the arms race, and therefore propose a freeze of nuclear arsenals and an end to further deployment of missiles; we want a real and substantial reduction of the arms stockpiles—not the development of ever new weapon systems, be it in space or on Earth. [...]

*Our Course Remains Un-
changed: Peace and Pro-
gress*, Novosti Press Agency
Publishing House, Moscow,
1985, p. 17.

Excerpt from Mikhail Gorbachev's Interview with "Pravda" Editor

April 7, 1985

[. . .] We suggest that the USSR and the USA introduce, for the entire duration of the talks, a moratorium on the introduction—including research and development, testing and deployment—of space strike weapons, and a freeze on their strategic offensive armaments. Simultaneously, deployment of medium-range American missiles in Europe should be discontinued accordingly, the build-up of our reciprocal measures would be stopped.

American leaders declare that they are for sweeping reductions in armaments. If that is really so, it would be logical to first put a halt to the arms race and then immediately proceed to reductions.

We are for an honest dialogue. We are ready to again demonstrate our goodwill. As of today, I would like to stress this once more, the Soviet Union is introducing a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and suspending implementation of other reciprocal measures in Europe. The moratorium will remain in effect until this coming November. What we decide to do after that will depend on whether the USA chooses to follow our example: whether or not it will stop deployment of its medium-range missiles in Europe. [. . .]

Pravda, April 8, 1985.

Excerpt from Mikhail Gorbachev's Statement

April 26, 1985

[...] The development of Star Wars weaponry is only beginning. It has, however, already caused a great deal of insecurity throughout the world, and is leading to a destabilisation of the overall system of international relations and to a further aggravation of the political and military confrontation. Both the initiators of this provocative undertaking and those who are being induced to take part in it, would do well to remember this.

Our approach is fundamentally different: outer space must not be turned into a new source of the threat of war; new strike space weapons must not be developed, and those anti-satellite systems which already exist must be eliminated. At the same time, we propose that an agreement be reached on a sweeping reduction of nuclear armaments with a view to total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

One simple and natural step that suggests itself in this regard is the freezing of nuclear arsenals of both sides. It is objected to on the grounds that, allegedly, this would consolidate Soviet military superiority. But, first, there is no such superiority. This we have shown more than once using statistics which Washington has not once been able to disprove. And, second, who says that we want to stop at freezing the arsenals? On the contrary, we insist on complementing this step with a drastic reduction of nuclear armaments.

We have already suggested that both sides begin by reducing strategic offensive armaments by one-fourth. But we would have no objections to more deep mutual reductions. All this is possible if the arms race does not spill over into outer space, if space remains peaceful. [...]

Pravda, April 27, 1985.

Excerpt from Mikhail Gorbachev's Interview with Press Trust of India (PTI)

May 18, 1985

[...] When entering into the Geneva talks with the United States we agreed that their aim was to prevent an arms race in outer space, terminate it on Earth and begin radical reductions of nuclear arms, with a view to completely eliminating them.

It is possible to begin with what the leaders of the six countries proposed, i.e. to stop the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons, freeze nuclear arsenals and start to reduce them, prevent the arms race from spreading to space, and conclude a treaty banning all nuclear tests.

We have proposed as a first step that further arms build-up be halted, that the USSR and the USA should impose a moratorium on the development, including research, testing and deployment of strike space weapons for the duration of the Geneva negotiations and freeze their strategic offensive armaments, and that the deployment of US medium-range missiles in Europe and the build-up of our counter-measures be discontinued.

The Soviet Union has already unilaterally imposed a moratorium until this November on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and has suspended the implementation of other counter-measures in Europe. True to its word, the USSR has been strictly abiding by the terms of this moratorium. We are entitled to hope for a more serious and thoughtful assessment of our initiative by Washington and its NATO partners, and for restraint in US missile deploy-

ment in Western Europe. Reciprocity in this matter could help place the Geneva talks on a practical footing.

And, finally, on the question of ceasing nuclear weapons tests. We have repeatedly urged the USA and other nuclear powers to do so. The USSR has been proposing that the nuclear states declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions until the conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. It could be instituted as of August 6, 1985, i.e. on the 40th anniversary of the tragic atomic bombing of Hiroshima, or even earlier.

The Soviet Union is also ready immediately to resume the negotiations on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, talks which broke down through the fault of the USA. It is high time to put into effect the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-US treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which have not yet been ratified—again not through the fault of the Soviet side.

[...] As to the Soviet Union, it has always advocated peace and security in Asia, and equitable cooperation between Asian states. This fully applies to the Indian Ocean area. We support the idea of converting it into a zone of peace.

It is common knowledge that for a number of years the USA has been preventing the convening of an international conference on this question. It has also unilaterally broken off the Soviet-US talks on limiting military activities in the Indian Ocean, even while the USA itself is constantly building up its military presence there.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly voiced its readiness to resume the talks. At the Soviet-Indian summit in 1982 the Soviet Union proposed that all states whose ships use the waters of the Indian Ocean should, even before the convening of a conference, refrain from any steps which might aggravate the situation in the region. This Soviet proposal remains valid. Specifically, the states concerned should not send large naval formations or hold military exercises there, and those non-littoral countries which have military bases in the region should not expand or modernize them.

The struggle for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean now hinges on the convening of an international conference on the issue. I would like to stress our desire to work vigorously with other interested states to ensure that such a forum is held and that the Indian Ocean eventually be-

comes a sphere of vital interests of the states located on its shores, and not of any others, a zone of peace rather than one of tension and conflicts. [. . .]

Information Bulletin. Documents of the Communist and Workers' Parties. Articles and Speeches, Prague, No. 14 (534), Volume 23, 1985, pp. 4-6.

**Excerpt from
a Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev**

[...] Motivated by a desire to help stop the dangerous competition in the build-up of nuclear arsenals and to set a good example, the Soviet Union has decided to unilaterally discontinue all nuclear explosions as of August 6th of this year. We call on the government of the United States to terminate its nuclear explosions beginning on the same date, which is marked, throughout the world, as the day of the tragedy of Hiroshima. The announced duration of our moratorium is until January 1, 1986. However, it will remain in effect beyond that date if the USA in its turn refrains from conducting nuclear explosions.

There is no doubt that a mutual moratorium of the USSR and the USA on all nuclear explosions would set a good example for the other nuclear-weapon states.

Pravda, July 30, 1985.

Excerpt from Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech at a Meeting with French MPs

October 3, 1985

[...] And now I would like to inform you of the new steps being taken by the Soviet Union. They pursue the same aim: to stop the destructive process of the arms race and to eliminate the danger of war which is hanging over mankind.

First. A few days ago we proposed to the government of the United States of America that agreement be reached on the total prohibition of space strike weapons for either side and on genuinely radical—50 per cent—reductions of the number of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the other's territory.

In other words, we are proposing a practical solution to exactly the same tasks which were agreed upon by both sides early this year to be the aims of the Geneva talks: not only to stop the arms race but to drastically lower the level of armaments and at the same time prevent an arms race in space.

There is hardly any need to explain how all this would strengthen strategic stability and mutual trust. [...]

Second. Concerning medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. With a view to facilitating agreement on their speediest mutual reduction (in Western Europe, we are often told, there is also great interest in this), we believe that it is possible to conclude a corresponding agreement separately, independently of direct connection with the problem of space weapons and strategic arms. We think this road may turn out to be practical.

In this context I feel it is important to explain our stand on the issue of the place of the nuclear potential of France

and Britain in the European balance of forces. This potential is rapidly growing and we can no longer ignore it. The French side pointed out that France's nuclear forces are not subject to discussion without her participation. This stands to reason. Hence it follows that it is time to start a direct dialogue between us on this subject and try to find an acceptable way out through joint effort. The Soviet Union is prepared for such a direct dialogue with France and, of course, with Britain as well.

I want to stress at this point that we will most carefully take into consideration the security interests of France. As we see it, the question of a reduction in her armaments is not on the agenda at this stage.

Third. You know that we have announced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. The number of SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union has on standby alert in the European zone is now 243. This means that it corresponds exactly to the level of June 1984 when the additional deployment of our missiles was begun in response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe. The additional SS-20 missiles that were deployed in the process have been taken off standby alert, and the stationary facilities for these missiles will be dismantled within the next two months. This is verifiable. As to our reciprocal measures in respect to the territory of the United States itself, they continue to remain in force.

I would also like to explain how we define the term "European zone" in this case. This is the zone in which medium-range missiles capable of striking targets on the territory of Western Europe are deployed.

It should be added that we have already totally dismantled the older, and very powerful, SS-5 missiles and are continuing to dismantle SS-4 missiles. This means that on the whole the number of medium-range missiles in the European zone of the USSR is now much smaller than it was ten or even fifteen years ago. In imposing this self-limitation we proceed from the broad interests of European security. I think Europe is now entitled to expect a move by the United States in response—the termination of further deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European continent.

[...] Combined with our previous actions, our latest proposals, we feel, provide a package of constructive and realistic measures which would bring about a genuine

break-through in the development of international relations, a break-through in favour of peace, security and cooperation among nations.

This, if you will, is our programme for defusing the explosive international situation threatening peace. We expect that in response to our proposals the West will traverse its part of the road.

[. . .] The task of totally banning chemical weapons and eliminating their stockpiles is becoming ever more urgent. At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the Soviet Union is actively participating in the drafting of a relevant convention. We are meeting our partners in the talks half-way on a number of substantial aspects, including verification. I am sure that it is quite possible to reach agreement on reliable verification.

Incidentally, this also suggests the following idea. If it has been possible to reach an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms, why not apply the same method to chemical weapons? This would work in the general direction of a total ban on these weapons. The Soviet Union would be prepared to take part in the drafting of an international accord on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. We are also prepared to do everything in our power toward the creation of a zone in the centre of Europe free from chemical weapons.

[. . .] Security in Europe, as well as international security as a whole, can only be achieved by following the path of peaceful coexistence, relaxation of tension, disarmament, strengthening of trust and development of international cooperation.

This is a long and difficult road, even more so since it requires the overcoming of mutual suspicions, mistrust and prejudices accumulated over decades. But there is no other road if we want to live. And like any long road, it begins with the first steps which are often the most difficult to make. We understand this and want to help ensure a solution of the task—for ourselves and for you. It is this that motivates the proposals I have already mentioned.

This also applies to the Stockholm conference where the important matter of mutual trust in the military field is discussed. It appears to us that the contours of future accords are gradually beginning to take shape there. They include making the principle of non-use of force more concrete and imparting maximum effectiveness to this principle.

They comprise a definite set of confidence-building measures in the military field, what might be called safety fuses to prevent an erroneous interpretation of the actions of the other side in conditions of an aggravation of the military confrontation. A number of states, primarily neutral states, propose that agreement be reached on mutual exchanges of annual plans for military activity subject to notification. We are willing to reach such an accord in the hope that it will help overcome suspicion and impede covert preparations for war.

The ideas of establishing nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, including our continent—in the northern part of Europe and in the Balkans—are becoming increasingly widespread. We support these ideas and are ready to take part in the appropriate guarantees wherever necessary. We think the idea of creating a corridor, free of nuclear arms, along both sides of the line dividing the two military-political groupings is useful. We also maintain that states which do not possess nuclear arms, nor have them on their territory, are fully entitled to reliable guarantees of their security based on international law, guarantees that nuclear arms will not be used against them.

[...] I believe that in the present situation it is especially important not to emulate medieval fanatics and not to extend ideological differences to interstate relations. Stability in these relations, their reduced susceptibility to political situations will likewise consolidate stability in Europe as a whole.

We do not think, for instance, that there is an eternal taboo on the possibility of contacts in some form between the organizations of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic alliance as organizations, not to mention the elimination, in the more or less foreseeable future, of Europe's division into opposing groupings. As is known, this is precisely what we and our allies are proposing. But as we see it, even with the existence of the two blocs, it is possible to create such a *modus vivendi* that would blunt the acuteness of the present confrontation.

For a Peaceful Future of Europe and of All Mankind, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1985, pp. 39-48.

**Excerpt from the Statement
by Warsaw Treaty Member-States:
To Avert the Nuclear Threat
and Bring About a Turn for the Better
in European and World Affairs**

[...] The interests of terminating the nuclear arms race also imperatively demand the implementation of such a measure as putting an end to all nuclear explosions. The meeting voiced support for the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on such explosions. The ball is now in the USA's court.

This goal could also be promoted by the adoption of a mutual obligation by the Soviet Union and the United States of America to refrain from deploying any nuclear weapons on the territories of states which have no such weapons, not to build up nuclear arms arsenals and not to replace such weapons with new ones in countries where they have already been deployed.

The USSR and the USA could also set a good example in curbing the conventional arms race.

The meeting participants suggest that the USSR and the USA undertake not to develop or produce new types of conventional weapons which are comparable in their effect to mass destruction weapons.

They also suggest that the numerical strength of the armed forces of the USSR and the USA, including those outside their national territories, should be frozen as of January 1, 1986.

The mutual freeze of the military budgets of the USSR and the USA, beginning from the next fiscal year, would also be an effective measure restricting the arms race in every direction.

*To Avert the Nuclear Threat
and Bring About a Turn
for the Better in European
and World Affairs, Novosti
Press Agency Publishing
House, Moscow, 1985,
pp. 12-13.*

Excerpt from the Article
“Washington’s Allegations and Actual Facts”
by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev,
Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff,
First Deputy Defence Minister of the USSR

[. . .] As far as Soviet SS-20 missiles in the European zone are concerned, our proposal has long been known. The USSR is prepared to reduce their number and retain no more than the number of corresponding missiles of France and Britain (counted by warheads). Should the USA withdraw its medium-range missiles from Europe, the Soviet Union will immediately reciprocate by this reduction.

Should a European agreement be reached, the USSR will not deploy additional SS-20 missiles in the country’s eastern regions, with the understanding that the strategic situation there remains substantially unchanged, that additional US nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union are not deployed.

To continue. The US Administration maintains that under our proposal the American side—unlike the Soviet side—would have to reduce its triad by more than 50 per cent, because its “allied commitments” would supposedly prevent it from giving up its medium-range missiles and forward-based systems. But the USSR also, has allies and corresponding commitments, which have been signed and are unswervingly being observed. Why should it be that the USA would retain its medium-range missiles and forward-based systems which are threatening the USSR and its allies? With the help of its first-strike weapons, the USA seeks to entrench itself along the borders of Warsaw Treaty member-states and secure for itself strategic superiority. That is the crux of the matter.

[. . .] At present, the strategic offensive weapons of the two sides are becoming comparable in terms of their ef-

fects. There is no difference between the Soviet ICBMs and the American Trident SLBMs as far as their combat potential is concerned. Therefore, strategic weapons should be considered and assessed as a package, as a single whole. This has always been the foundation of negotiations. The new Soviet proposal is also based on this. It provides for each of the components of the strategic triad of either side, be it American SLBMs or Soviet ICBMs, to not exceed 60 per cent of the aggregate number of warheads (6,000 units) retained after the reduction. This means that should our proposal be implemented, each of the triad components would be liable for reduction, including the Soviet ICBMs.

[. . .] Thus, after the 50-per cent reduction of corresponding nuclear armaments which has been proposed by the USSR, approximate parity would be maintained—obviously, on a significantly lower level. Even though the USA would have somewhat more strategic delivery vehicles than the USSR (1,680 vs. 1,250), the sides would nevertheless have an equal number of warheads (6,000 each), which would ensure the approximate strategic parity.

Pravda, October 19, 1985.

Mikhail Gorbachev's Press Conference. Geneva, November 21, 1985 (Excerpts)

[. . .] We are prepared for a sweeping reduction in nuclear arms, provided the door is firmly closed for starting an arms race in space. On that condition, we are ready to cover the first stage on the basis of the principle of a 50-per cent reduction in nuclear arms and then, drawing the other nuclear powers into this process, to move further on the road of radical reductions.

[. . .] The Soviet Union is open to verification. Provided an accord is reached to ban deploying weapons in space, we are prepared to open our laboratories, on the basis of reciprocity, for the verification of such an accord.

[. . .] If the American side also stopped all tests of nuclear weapons and we signed a relevant agreement, there would be no problem with verification including international verification, on our side on this issue as well.

If both sides agree to cut their nuclear weapons by 50 per cent, then of course it will be necessary to verificate this process, and we are interested in this no less than the Americans are.

Pravda, November 22, 1985.

**Excerpts from
the Statement by General Secretary
of the CPSU Central Committee
Mikhail Gorbachev**

Pravda, January 16, 1986

[...] The Soviet Union is proposing a programme for ridding mankind of the fear of nuclear catastrophe to be carried out beginning in 1986.

[...] How does the Soviet Union now visualise in practical terms the process of reducing nuclear weapons, both delivery vehicles and warheads, until they are all destroyed? Our proposals amount to the following:

Stage One. Within the next 5 to 8 years the USSR and the USA will reduce by half the nuclear arms that can reach each other's territory. On the remaining delivery vehicles of this kind each side will retain no more than 6,000 warheads.

It stands to reason that such a reduction is possible only if the USSR and the USA mutually renounce the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons. As the Soviet Union has repeatedly warned, the development of space strike weapons will dash all hopes of reducing nuclear weapons on Earth.

The first stage will include the adoption and implementation of the decision on the complete elimination of medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles of the USSR and the USA in the European zone as a first step in clearing Europe of nuclear weapons.

At the same time the United States should pledge not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries, while Britain and France should pledge not to build up their respective nuclear armaments.

The USSR and the USA should from the very beginning

agree to stop all nuclear explosions and call on other states to join in such a moratorium as soon as possible.

[...] *Stage Two*. At this stage, which should start not later than 1990 and extend over 5 to 7 years, the other nuclear powers will begin to join in the nuclear disarmament process. To begin with, they will pledge to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to have any in the territory of other countries.

At this time the USSR and the USA will go on with the reductions agreed upon in the first stage and also take further measures to scrap their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear weapons.

Following the completion by the USSR and the USA of the 50-per cent reduction of their relevant arms in the second stage, another radical step is taken: all nuclear powers destroy their tactical nuclear arms, namely, weapons with a range (or action radius) of up to 1,000 km.

At the same stage, the Soviet-American accord on the prohibition of space strike weapons will have to become multilateral, with the obligatory participation in it of the major industrial powers.

All nuclear powers would stop nuclear weapons testing.

There will be a ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity approaches that of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

Stage Three begins not later than 1995. At this stage, all remaining nuclear weapons are to be scrapped. By the end of 1999 there will be no nuclear weapons on Earth. A universal accord is to be drawn up to ensure that such weapons shall never again reappear.

It is envisaged that special procedures will be worked out for the destruction of nuclear weapons as well as for the dismantling, conversion or destruction of delivery vehicles. In the process, agreement will be reached on the number of weapons subject to scrapping at each stage, on the sites where they are to be destroyed, and so on.

Control over the armaments to be destroyed or limited will be carried out both by national technical means and through on-site inspections. The USSR is ready to come to terms on any other additional verification measures.

[...] Guided by [...] the wish to take another practical step within the context of the nuclear disarmament programme, the Soviet Union has taken an important decision.

We are extending for another three months our unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions which expired on December 31, 1985. The moratorium will remain in effect longer if the United States, too, also stops nuclear tests. We again offer the United States to join this initiative whose significance is apparent to literally everyone in the world.

[. . .] All experts, scientists, politicians and military men agree that a cessation of tests would indeed reliably seal the channels for upgrading nuclear weapons. And that is a top priority task. The mere reduction of nuclear stockpiles, unaccompanied by a prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests, offers no way out of the nuclear threat dilemma, because the remaining weapons would be modernized and there would still be an opportunity for developing increasingly refined and deadly nuclear weapons and testing their new types at testing grounds.

Therefore, the cessation of tests is a practical step towards the destruction of nuclear weapons.

I want to say from the outset that possible references to verification as an obstacle to a moratorium on nuclear explosions would be totally groundless. We declare most definitely that for us verification is no problem. Should the United States agree to stop all nuclear explosions on a reciprocal basis, the due verification of compliance with the moratorium will be fully ensured by national technical means as well as through international procedures, including on-site inspections whenever necessary. We are inviting the USA to come to terms with us on this score.

The USSR is strongly in favour of the moratorium becoming a bilateral, and later a multilateral, action. We are also in favour of resuming the trilateral negotiations (involving the USSR, the USA and Great Britain) on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests. This could be done immediately, even this month. We are also prepared to begin without delay multilateral test ban negotiations in the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, with all nuclear powers taking part.

Non-aligned countries are proposing consultations with a view to extending the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to apply also to underground tests, which are not covered by the Treaty. The Soviet Union agrees to this measure as well.

[. . .] In a few days, the Soviet-American talks on nuclear

and space arms will be resumed in Geneva. When we met with President Reagan last November at Geneva, we had a frank discussion on the whole range of problems that were the topic of those negotiations, namely space, strategic offensive arms, and medium-range nuclear weapons. It was agreed to step up the negotiations, and that agreement cannot remain a mere declaration.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva will be instructed to abide strictly by that agreement. We expect the same constructive approach from the US side, above all on the question of outer space. Outer space must remain peaceful; strike weapons must not be deployed there. Neither should any be developed. And let there be most rigorous control, including inspection of relevant laboratories.

[...] We are deeply convinced that we should go to the third millennium not with a "star wars" programme but with large-scale projects for the peaceful exploration of space by all mankind. We propose that all concerned begin drawing up and implementing such projects. This is one of the best ways of ensuring progress on our entire planet and establishing a reliable security system for all.

To prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space means removing the obstacle to deep cuts in nuclear arms. On the negotiating table in Geneva is a Soviet proposal for reducing by half the corresponding nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and the United States, which is an important step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. To padlock the door to a solution of the outer space problem means not wanting to stop the arms race on Earth.

[...] Let me turn to the European aspect of the nuclear problem.

[...] The Soviet Union has for long since proposed that Europe should be freed of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. This proposal still stands. As a first and radical step in that direction we are now proposing, as I have said, that already in the first stage of our programme all medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles of the USSR and the USA in the European zone should be destroyed.

[...] The Soviet Union holds that it is entirely feasible to completely eliminate such barbaric instruments of mass destruction as chemical weapons before the end of this century.

At the talks on chemical weapons held within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament certain

signs of progress have appeared of late. However, the talks have been dragged out intolerably. We are in favour of intensifying the talks in order to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on destroying their existing stockpiles, as agreed upon with US President Reagan in Geneva.

In the matter of banning chemical weapons, as in other disarmament matters, all participants in the talks must display a fresh view of things. I would like to make it perfectly clear that the Soviet Union is in favour of the earliest total destruction of those weapons and of the industrial plants for their production. We are prepared to ensure timely notification of the location of plants producing chemical weapons and the cessation of such production, and are ready to start working out procedures for destroying the relevant industrial facilities and also to proceed soon after the convention enters into force to destroying the stockpiles of chemical weapons. All these measures would be carried out under strict control, including international on-site inspections.

A radical solution to this problem would also be facilitated by interim measures. For example, agreement could be reached on a multilateral basis not to transfer chemical weapons to anyone and not to deploy them on the territories of other states.

[. . .] Beside eliminating weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of states, the Soviet Union proposes that conventional armaments and armed forces should also become objects of agreed reductions.

An agreement at the Vienna negotiations could well give the start to progress in this direction. It seems, indeed, that the contours have appeared of a possible decision to reduce Soviet and US troops and subsequently freeze the level of the armed forces of the opposite sides in Central Europe. [. . .] We are aware that the possible agreement on troop reductions will naturally require sensible verification. And we are prepared for it. As for compliance with the commitment to freeze the number of troops, permanent control posts could be established in addition to national technical means to monitor any military contingents entering the reduction zone.

Now about the important forum known as the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It is called upon to put up

barriers against the use of force and covert preparations for war, whether on land, at sea or in the air. The possibilities of this have come into evidence.

As we see it, especially in the current situation, it is essential to reduce the number of troops participating in major military exercises notifiable under the Helsinki Final Act.

The time has come to effectively tackle the still outstanding problems at the Conference. The tightest bottleneck there, as we know, is the issue of notifying regarding major ground, naval and air exercises. Those are serious problems, of course, and must be handled thoroughly in the interests of building confidence in Europe. But if a package solution of the problems is not achieved now, why not explore look for their partial solution, and, for instance, come to terms on notification of major ground and air exercises, and leave the question of naval activities until the next stage of the Conference.

[. . .] Implementation of our programme would fundamentally change the situation in Asia, deliver the nations in that part of the globe, too, from fear of the nuclear and chemical danger, and heighten security in the region to a qualitatively new level.

We regard our programme as a contribution to the joint search of the Asian countries for common comprehensive approach to shaping a system of secure and durable peace on that continent.

[. . .] Our new proposals are addressed to the whole world. Initiating active steps to halt the arms race and reduce armaments is a necessary step towards coping with the increasingly acute global problems, the deterioration of the environment and the need for finding new sources of energy, combating economic backwardness, hunger and diseases.

[. . .] The Soviet Union wants each measure limiting and reducing arms and each step related to the destruction of nuclear weapons to bring the nations greater security and, indeed, enable them to allocate more funds for improving people's life. It is only natural that peoples seeking to shake off backwardness and achieve the level of industrially developed countries associate the prospects of shaking off the dependence on imperialism caused by their foreign debt, which is draining their economies, with the limitation and scrapping of armaments, reducing military expenditures and using the freed resources for social and economic

development. This subject will doubtless figure prominently at the coming international conference on disarmament and development to be held this summer in Paris.

The Soviet Union is opposed to making the implementation of disarmament measures conditional on so-called regional conflicts [...]

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From the very outset, the watchword of the Soviet state has been to secure a world without wars. Hence, the struggle for disarmament has invariably been the main direction of Soviet foreign policy. This struggle is not propaganda rhetoric, but a highly significant and practical matter, and the USSR has now steadfastly adhered to this position for almost seventy years. The Soviet concept of disarmament is free of illusions and impractical projects. It is well substantiated and objectively reflects the vital requirements of current world development.

The documents contained in this volume, the first of its kind, clearly show that disarmament is the natural and permanent goal of socialist society. All of them, in one way or another, deal with the problem of disarmament from the birth of the Soviet state to the present day.



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