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Bertrand Russell in Soviet Russia

By JACOB WITTMER HARTMANN

IT IS not certain that the first expressions of a new religion or a new art will always be appreciated by outside observers for what they really are. Early Christianity, which was undoubtedly a real religious force, and which certainly bore within it the germs of a long and very impressive development of many arts, did not appear to the Roman masters as anything else than a dangerously seditious irruption which had to be suppressed at any cost. We doubt whether even the most gentle and sympathetic Romans of the Augustan period—those who deplored the massacres of Christians and were for giving them a “fair deal” with the rest of the population—had any real understanding of the mighty alteration in the mode of life of the Roman Empire which was finding its crude expression in the first stirrings of the Christian sect and in its earliest, exceedingly primitive, artistic production. Of course, those Romans who were themselves Christians, who had that sympathy with the oppressed classes that had kindled them with the flame of the new life, must have understood the importance of what was in progress; but we could not expect such understanding from even the well-disposed outsider.

It is often a source of kindly amusement to those of mature years to be obliged to hear the frenzied and inspired words of atheism spoken by the young, for it is impossible to think that such devotion to no god can be without religion. How is it that Mr. Bertram Russell could have taken so literally the man who told him in Russia a few months ago that art and religion were matters of no moment for that country? “We haven’t time for a new art any more than for a new religion,” were his exact words. Mr. Russell really

does not believe this man, for he has furnished us with all the data we need to refute him. Thus, to quote Mr. Russell:

“The Communist who sincerely believes the party creed is convinced that private property is the root of all evil; he is so certain of all this that he shrinks from no measures, however harsh, which seem necessary for constructing and preserving the communist state. He spares himself as little as he spares others. He works sixteen hours a day, and foregoes his Saturday half-holiday. He volunteers for any difficult or dangerous work which needs to be done, such as clearing away piles of infected corpses left by Kolchak or Denikin. In spite of his position of power and his control of supplies, he lives an austere life. He is not pursuing personal ends, but aiming at the creation of a new social order. The same motives, however, which make him austere make him also ruthless. Marx has taught that Communism is fatally predestined to come about; this fits in with the Oriental traits in the Russian character, and produces a state of mind not unlike the early successors of Mahomet.”*

Here is a description that seems to register the impressions of a person who has just been in contact with a “religion” he does not understand. And note how the presence of the strange enthusiasm leads to attempts at a racial explanation, to a feeling that it is essentially “Russian”, or “Oriental”, to the surprising (for the reader) analogy with the “successors of Mahomet” (later varied by the substitution of Cromwell’s Puritans for Mahomet’s successors); at least Mr. Russell has not found a parallel in the blind nationalistic fanaticism preached by certain sections of the population of the European nations before and during the Great War. The devotion of the Russian people to the ideal of a nation that is the common

* “Soviet Russia—1920”, by Bertrand Russell, *The Nation*, New York, July 31, 1920.

possession of the whole population (a devotion that is by no means peculiarly "Russian" or "Oriental", and that seems to be sufficiently prevalent outside of Russia to have made the masses in all countries understand perfectly well that they must do everything in their power to prevent their masters from crushing the Russian Revolution) is as near to a religion as anything that has been born in the last few centuries, and it is difficult to find parallels to a devotion so complete and self-sacrificing. Mr. Russell likes to compare the present Russian situation with that of England under Cromwell after the Revolution of 1648.

"The sincere Communists (and all the older members of the party have proved their sincerity by years of persecution) are not unlike the Puritans in their stern politico-moral purpose. Cromwell's dealings with Parliament are not unlike Lenin's with the Constitutional Assembly."

The parallel with the Cromwell period is by no means perfect. Cromwell's firmness and severity in dealing with counter-revolutionary parliaments may have been as great as Lenin's, but not his consistency of purpose and inflexible mental straightness. Cromwell was an opportunistic "revolutionist" of the type of Martin Luther, and was not opposed to making concessions that jeopardized the interests of those sections of the population that had most strongly supported the overthrow of the monarchy.* Lenin, together with the Bolshevik group and its successor, the Russian Communist Party, has remained true to those classes that made the revolution possible, and all the severity which the present dominant party of Russia is sometimes obliged to use in order to preserve the achievements of the revolution, is directed not against those parties who insist on putting through the revolution with absolute consistency, but against those elements whose policy of concession and coalition has endangered the very existence of the new state. Cromwell's policy toward true Communists of the type of Gerard Winstanley and John Lillburne was one of opposition, repression, and persecution, which is quite different from the policy of the Russian Soviet Government and that of the party now dominant in that government.

But Mr. Russell should not be one of the first men to object to the alleged absence of art and religion in Russia, for Mr. Russell seems to be entirely irreligious. He rejoices that "English life has been based ever since 1688" upon "that kindness and tolerance which are worth all the creeds in the world," although he admits that his fellow-countrymen "do not apply to other nations or to subjects races" the dictates of this "kindness and tolerance." The fact is that Mr. Russell is a member of a class which in England as well as in other countries has no religion, no creed, and therefore is inclined to exalt as a creed, when he needs one, those practices of that class which have made its mode of life seem pleasant and exem-

plary to those who have been able to lead it. The college professor—and Mr. Russell is a distinguished mathematical scholar who occupied a chair at Oxford, and we may therefore speak of him as a college professor—who is shielded in many ways from the rude contacts to which much of the rest of the population is exposed, frequently comes to regard the privileges of his class as the common possession of the entire population. He meets persons who are cultured and refined, and who are unable to use poor English, and falls into the serious error of believing that the use of choice diction and the affectation of a "judicious attitude," of "detachment" from life's merely personal interests, are accomplishments that are accessible to the entire well-disposed section of the body-politic, eschewed only by those whose vulgar natures have denied them the faculty of appreciating such achievements. Constantly in contact with persons of modest wants, like himself, but of excellent powers of enjoyment and appreciation, he forgets that many have been excluded from the charmed circle they would love to enter (has he read "Jude the Obscure"?), and that many more, in fact, almost the whole population, have never wanted to enter it, have never wanted to lead detached lives, but have always eagerly pursued interests that have been more compelling than those of a merely kindly, detached and tolerant discussion of affairs. In fact, Mr. Russell must know that though "kindness and tolerance" be "worth all the creeds in the world," it is a view which not only is not applied to other nations or to subject races, but is not applied, except within a small group, in England either.

Real life in England is not always a gentle discussion between intellectuals; there is much vigorous hating and a strong tradition of physical violence, expressed in often cruel juvenile games and frequent resort to fisticuffs by all classes. Mr. Russell's tradition of delicacy has so completely cut him off from his own countrymen that he entirely misrepresents the really vigorous tone of English life, which is often far from kindly and tolerant.

The Russian Revolution is also not "tolerant." Every individual who took part in the great achievement of November 7, 1917, had suffered personally the blows of tyranny and economic exploitation. Through long years of preparation, the political bodies had been organized, on whom would ultimately depend the execution of the great project of overthrowing the Czarist Government. False leaders had been interposed, and for the six months before November one mass upheaval after the other had come to naught because of the readiness of these faithless ones to dilute the demands of the people in a pointless and disillusioning policy of compromise and coalition. The Soviet Government was established in November precisely because every attempt to put through a revolution by using the efforts of gentle, well-meaning "sympathizers" had failed, and because the Bolshevik Party had promised that it would carry out the

* Eduard Bernstein, *Sozialismus und Demokratie in der Englischen Revolution*, 2d ed., Stuttgart, 1908.

Revolution without compromise, without coalition. To the Bolsheviks the masses looked for salvation, for peace, bread, and land, after all the others who had promised them these things had turned out to be deceivers.

The world knows how well the Bolsheviks and the government they founded carried out the promise to give peace, bread, and land to the people; the world also knows that it is because of its services to the Russian people in these and other ways that the Soviet Government, and its dominant party, are allowed to continue in power. And the world also knows that in this achievement of returning their possessions to the people the Soviet Government has had to encounter the opposition of every force of reaction inside and outside Russia. It has been impossible to fight all these forces with gentle means, although gentle means were more frequently applied than is commonly known. How was it possible to use gentle means against the Staff of the Seventh Army, to whom the defence of Petrograd against Yudenich had been intrusted, and which turned out to be in league with Yudenich, and preparing to hand over the city to him? How is it possible to fight active counter-revolutionists without the use of force? Do not forget that it is hard for men in power to feel that they should give up this power; Mr. Russell himself declares this to be a fact with regard to Communists; can he not see that it applies much more strongly to the great body of exploiters and parasites who ruled Russia until November, 1917?

"Almost all men, when they have acquired the habit of wielding great power, find it so delightful that they cannot voluntarily abandon it. If they were men who were originally disinterested, they will persuade themselves that their power is still necessary in the public interest; but, whether with or without self-deception, they will cling to power until they are dispossessed by force."

Perhaps such powerful elements would prefer to remain undisturbed in their kindly and tolerant discussion of what they conceive to be public affairs; and to retain this privilege of "detached" and "disinterested" discussion they are often willing to let loose on an unhappy nation all the terrors of espionage, imprisonment, exile, physical torment, and the death penalty. With such tenacity do they cling to their gentle privileges, that only force, determined force, can dislodge them.

And what shall be said of the intellectual elements who had fed from the hands of the mighty in Russia, who felt perhaps instinctively that their privilege also of "kindly and tolerant" discussion was threatened by the downfall of the class on which they depended? Did they not vigorously defend the reaction in order to keep the people from power? Did they not write against the Soviet power in counter-revolutionary papers, take part in counter-revolutionary conspiracies, conduct counter-revolutionary propaganda in foreign countries?

The first duty of a revolution is to defend itself. Self-defence requires the use of force where necessary. Revolution is first and foremost an act of force—the overthrow of an existing government—

and then the defence of the new government against such remnants of the old order as continue actively to oppose it. Every petty noble who can draft a little army and secure financing for it from foreign powers will raise such an army and hurl it against the new government; the capitalists of the whole world will unite in increasingly greater numbers for the purpose of crushing the new organization, by crippling its transportation, blowing up its bridges, burning down its factories and wireless stations, discouraging those elements who are eager to work, and destroying its stocks of food. No measures can be too stern to be used in putting down rebellious acts of this kind, and if a little of the leisure of detached non-combatants of the Russell type has had to be sacrificed in the process, we can only say that no revolution was ever made to please pacifists, and that Mr. Russell would probably not find any revolution to suit his taste.

A gentleman who had always lived among nice people and had been pleased with their pleasant manners, manners perfectly possible because no serious interests were colliding, was suddenly thrown among plain men faced with great problems, who were more concerned with the solution of their problems than with the delicacy of their methods. This is Mr. Russell's difficulty. And yet he would no doubt understand Schiller's words, spoken by Wallenstein, to the effect that the mind has room for many things, even for discordant thoughts, while space is filled with real objects, many of which collide unless carefully distributed:

Eng ist die Welt und das Gehirn ist weit.
Leicht bei einander liegen die Gedanken,
Doch hart im Raume stossen sich die Sachen.

Mr. Russell's own inference from his own facts should have been: Applied Socialist is being born in Russia; it has all the rudeness and animation of physical life, and it will tolerate no fooling.

* * *

A CONCESSION granted by Mr. Russell is that the Mensheviks have not fared so badly under the "Bolshevik tolerance" as to be deprived of representation altogether; he admits that of the 1,500 members of the Moscow Soviet, forty are Mensheviks, although every possible hindrance is placed in the way of electioneering by opposition parties; Mr. Russell enumerates a few of these:

"In the first place, the voting is by show of hands, so that all who vote against the government are marked men. In the second place, no candidate who is not a Communist can have any printing done, the printing works being all in the hands of the state. In the third place, he cannot address any meetings, because the halls all belong to the state."

Mr. Russell's objections are the typical objections of a bourgeois democrat. And yet Mr. Russell knows perfectly well that whenever any government finds it necessary to devote all its energies to the struggle to maintain itself against external enemies—which was the case of England during the World War, and with Soviet Russia after the Revolution—many of the so-called "safeguards" of democracy must be abandoned. We are not cer-

tain that Mr. Russell's charges are correct: our direct communications from Soviet Russia are too incomplete to permit us to speak with authority on the technique of elections; but there is a certain refreshing return to the most "democratic" procedure in the picture Mr. Russell paints, of a whole nation resorting once more to direct, open, frank recording of opinion by word of mouth. No doubt the Soviet Government must withhold freedom of the press from political parties suspected of being in league with foreign and counter-revolutionary enemies; but to all genuine workers freedom of the press and of assembly are guaranteed by the constitution of the Soviet Government.

But it is difficult to believe that the Soviet Government is as "autocratic" as Mr. Russell says, even for those who have not had the information we have just given. It is true that the text of decrees concerned with the mechanism of elections is not in our possession, and we are obliged to depend on data from the mouths of those who have witnessed elections in Soviet Russia; it is not the first occasion on which we have wished that there might be complete postal and telegraphic intercourse between the United States and Soviet Russia. But there is a way of considering this question logically, even though much of the necessary data be not at hand. A government that is autocratic feels the necessity of suppressing discussion, of denying the right of assembly, of drawing the inhabitants apart rather than bringing them together. Let us see whether any effort is made to prevent people from gathering for discussion in Russia. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in its existence of less than three years, has already had no less than seven sessions, and is now engaged in the preparations for its eighth All-Russian session, and of course the subsidiary Soviets are holding very frequent local sessions. The pages of this weekly have from time to time printed the proceedings of workers' gatherings, and the impression one gains from the official wireless messages is that such gatherings are constantly in progress and are well attended; we had a number of recent photographs of such conferences and demonstrations in the last issue of SOVIET RUSSIA. Lenin addresses the Textile Workers' Congress; the All-Russian Congress of Wireless Operators sends out a message to the wireless operators of the world; a Congress of the Poorer Peasants of Russia meets in a brilliantly lighted hall in Moscow; teachers and librarians are constantly holding congresses of provincial as well as national scope; to one not accustomed to the present condition of affairs in Russia, the probable impression of the exceedingly active political life would be rather one of over-interest in politics, of too many meetings, of too much participation in public affairs, and we have no doubt when some gentleman of Mr. Russell's type, who has given up all interest in things political, goes to Russia and witnesses the universal love of discussion and liberation that seems to have seized that country,

he will come back with pessimistic tales of a land going to the dogs for too much democracy, for too much talk, too much attention to everyone's opinions.

* * *

FINALLY, let us come to Mr. Russell's personal impressions of individual Russians of importance. He is particularly interested in Lenin, Trotsky, and Gorky. In Lenin he finds religion: "religious faith in the Marxian gospel, which takes the place of the Christian martyr's hopes of Paradise, except that it is less egotistical." It is just in Lenin that we had thought the Marxian method unmixed with elements of religion; we had rather supposed that it was the Russian masses who would transform the Marxian teaching into a religion. It is interesting that Trotsky made a more favorable impression on Mr. Russell than did Lenin; certainly there are a number of Americans who will agree from personal observations not much more than three years old that Trotsky "has bright eyes, military bearing, lightning intelligence, and magnetic personality." Russell met Gorky at Petrograd and found him in bed seriously ill. "Gorky has done all that one man could to preserve the intellectual and artistic life of Russia. But he is dying, and perhaps it is dying too." And perhaps it isn't. Gorky himself has his own ideas on the subject, which he appears not to have succeeded in communicating to Mr. Russell. We have recently seen a Swedish translation of what appears to be Gorky's latest book,* a study of the relations of the *petit bourgeois* spirit to the Revolution, and, while we do not like to speak of a man of Mr. Russell's self-sacrificing and intellectual spirit as a *petit bourgeois*, there are many lines in this new Gorky book that make Mr. Russell appear in the light of a small man interested only in comfortable and pleasant discussion with nice people, and not in the hot, fierce breath of creation, the blast of social transformation, which is less pleasant than magnificent—but whose magnificence only those can see for whom life is more important than any of its external forms.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND GERMANY

According to German newspaper reports, the German representative, Gustav Hilger has arrived in Moscow and has been received by People's Commissar Chicherin. When receiving him, Comrade Chicherin declared that Russia's attitude towards Germany would be dictated by the sole wish to establish closer economic, political, and cultural relations. Temporarily, Hilger is only a semi-official representative and holds practically the same position as does the Russian representative, Comrade Kopp, in Berlin. An official resumption of diplomatic relations, therefore, is still a thing of the future.

* *Smaborgaren och Revolutionen*, Translated by Ture Nerman, in the series "Roed Kultur", Stockholm, 1920.

Soviet Russia and England

The real significance in a financial way of the Russian advance into Poland could be determined more nearly than at present if the real intent of the Soviet powers were recognized. As the week ended the military outlook was decidedly discouraging, but only as much of the diplomatic exchanges were coming to light as the British Premier elected to make public.—Financial Page, *New York Times*, Monday, August 9, 1920.

I

Note handed by M. Krassin to Mr. Lloyd George at their interview on July 29:

"In submitting the following reply to the declaration made by the Prime Minister and other members of the British Government at the sittings of June 7, I am constrained once more to point out the abnormal conditions in which the representatives of the Soviet Government have been placed in connection with the present negotiations.

"The plenipotentiary representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, whose presence is absolutely necessary at the negotiations in the course of which the British Government has raised purely political questions, has not been admitted, whilst my own telegraphic intercourse with the Soviet Government has been very imperfect. Between twenty-five and thirty per cent of outgoing and incoming telegrams have failed to reach their destination, and numerous telegrams have been received in a highly mutilated condition.

"Nor have we succeeded up till now in organizing a courier service with any regularity, despite the promised assistance, owing to the difficulties and delays in the issue of visas by the countries through which the couriers have to pass. These circumstances not only deprive me of the possibility of promptly returning answers to questions put to me and of submitting as promptly questions on our part, but also prevent me from fully and precisely informing myself of the decisions, and intentions of my Government.

"The British Government has put forward as the main conditions of the renewal of commercial relations between Soviet Russia and Great Britain the demand for a mutual pledge to cease all propaganda and hostile acts, and for the recognition in principle by the Soviet Government of Russia's liability towards private creditors.

"On the first question it is necessary to distinguish between the propaganda of communist ideas amongst laboring masses of the Western European countries and the organizing of the working class of those countries for the final struggle against the capitalist order on the one hand, and the general direction of the foreign policy of Soviet Russia against the Entente countries, particularly Great Britain, and complicity with or direct participation in, hostile acts directed against Great Britain in various countries of the Near and Middle East, including India, on the other.

"So far as the Communist propaganda and interference in the political life of Great Britain are concerned, the Soviet Government is prepared to give a formal pledge not to carry on such propaganda in England either openly or secretly, and not to interfere in her internal political life, if a general agreement is reached between the two countries concerning the renewal of economic and commercial relations and if the British Government on its part undertakes not to carry on any propaganda in Russia against the Soviet Government, provided that such undertaking does not prevent the representatives of the Soviet Government in England from issuing through the press or some other channel denials of false or deliberately perverted reports and communications regarding the fundamental principles of the Soviet Regime or incidents in the life of Soviet Russia.

As regards the general foreign policy of Soviet Russia, the Soviet Government has more than once proclaimed to the world its readiness to begin peace negotiations which alone would put an end to all hostile acts between the various States and bring about the complete restoration of peace. The Soviet Government would be perfectly willing to revise the fundamental

principles of its foreign policy, and, in particular, withdraw from all participation in hostile acts directed against Great Britain, if the British Government were to give a similar undertaking.

"The loyal fulfilment of this understanding would have to be properly guaranteed by a special treaty between the two governments, to be drawn up at a special conference composed of an equal number of representatives and experts on either side without the right of objection to any members of such conference on either part. The Soviet Government would be prepared on the question of place and time of such conference to meet the wishes of the British Government in the most liberal spirit.

"A considerable difficulty in the drawing up of such treaty is presented by the fact that Great Britain is a member of a military Coalition, some members of which are to this day directly or indirectly in a state of war with Soviet Russia and are taking part, in one way or another, in hostile acts directed against her, in consequence of which an undertaking on the part of Great Britain to stop hostile acts would lose a good deal of its importance, as it could easily be paralyzed by the action of Great Britain's Allies in continuing their assaults against Soviet Russia and in supporting her enemies by any and every means.

"It would seem, therefore, that a final settlement of this question would only be possible by the negotiations for the conclusion of a formal and definite peace.

"The British Government makes it a preliminary condition for the restoration of commercial relations between the two countries that the Soviet Government recognize in principle the liabilities of the Russian State towards private creditors.

"Such formation of the question obviously tends to the disadvantage of Soviet Russia, since in consequence of the nationalization of land, factories and works, as well as of commerce, the greater portion of the private claims on the Russian side has been transformed into state claims, and Soviet Russia, therefore, in case of an unqualified acceptance of the above claim of the British Government, would risk losing the preferential right to put forward a large number of quite incontrovertible claims of her own.

"The liabilities to private persons form but a fraction of the mutual liabilities of the two countries, and there is absolutely no ground to put forward for accepting, in the order of priority, this particular fraction of the mutual liabilities. The argument that the British business world would, without such recognition, never agree to resume trade negotiations with Russia is refuted by the numerous declarations of British business men anxious to resume such relations as soon as the obstacles raised by the British Government in their way have been removed.

"Such declarations frequently emanate precisely from such British industrialists and business men who have claims on Russia, as these business men quite justly think that, in the absence of all possibility in the near future for ruined Russia to pay the claims of her creditors, the immediate resumption of trade relations will constitute the best and probably the only means of gaining such advantage through regular intercourse with Soviet Russia as may in the next few years more than meet such claims.

"The demand to recognize private claims has for its object to protect in the first place the interests of those capitalist circles of Great Britain who have already taken full advantage, with great profit to themselves, of the war of 1914-1918, and are now trying to exploit to perhaps still greater advantage to themselves, the winding up of that war. The workers' and peasants' government of Soviet Russia cannot pos-

sibly recognize the interests of this particular section of the population as the most important and as deserving preferential treatment.

"On the contrary, from the point of view of the Soviet Government, primary importance and urgency attach to the private claims against the Entente Powers on the part of the hundreds of widows and orphans of workers and peasants of the Soviet Russia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Siberia, whose kith and kin have perished from British and French bullets and shells during the so-called intervention, that is, the wholly uncalled-for interference of the Entente in the internal affairs of Russia. Russian debts towards British subjects were contracted as the result of certain agreements or undertakings entered upon in respect of such persons by the previous Government of Russia.

"Such agreements and undertakings towards British subjects were, however, annulled by the acts of the British Government itself at the moment when it began war and intervention against Soviet Russia and proclaimed a blockade, having for its object to compel the Russian people, by famine and privation, to renounce the form of government which it had chosen after having overthrown the autocratic Czarist regime.

"Hence the question at issue at the present moment cannot possibly be the recognition of treaties and agreements abrogated by the war, but only their restoration—an act which is only possible after the Soviet Government has been officially recognized as the result of peace negotiations and the signing of a peace treaty.

"The Soviet Government agrees to the examination of all mutual claims, including those arising from liabilities towards private British subjects in conjunction with peace negotiations at a conference to be held on the basis of an equal number of delegates and experts without the right of objection to anyone on either side.

"If the British Government regards the immediate clearing up of all misunderstandings and frictions in the domain of foreign policy and in particular the cessation of all hostile acts in the Middle and Near East, as well as the immediate settlement of material claims on the basis of reciprocity as necessary and urgent, the Soviet Government will be prepared to meet such desire half way, but does not regard, for reasons of principle as well as on actual practical grounds, an agreement on such points as possible, except as the result of formal negotiations for the restoration of peace relations between the two countries.

"Should the British Government be unwilling to enter into such official negotiations for the restoration of peace relations between the two countries, the immediate resumption of economic and commercial relations appears, nevertheless, possible, on the following basis:

1. All controversial questions in the domain of foreign policy, as well as those relating to the participation of individual Governments in coalitions, alliances, and individual enterprises of a hostile character to the other country, as well as all questions relating to the mutually material claims of Governments and subjects, are to be postponed until such time as they may be settled by diplomatic methods at the Peace Conference.

2. The two Governments immediately proclaim the resumption of economic and commercial relations, and announce the temporary suspension of the material claims of the Russian State and Russian subjects against Great Britain and the British Empire, and of British subjects against Russia, pending the settlement of the question at the Peace Conference.

3. The fundamental principles for the resumption of trading relations are immediately established, including:

- a. Concrete measures for the removal of mines in the Baltic and other seas, as well as other measures for the safety of navigation.

- b. An official announcement to all neutral countries about the renewal of commercial relations be-

tween Russia and Great Britain and the complete freedom of navigation from and to Russian ports.

- c. The establishment of commercial representations in the two countries on the basis of reciprocity and immunity, with the right of free sojourn, travel, communication with other countries by letter, telegram and courier and the use of cypher.

- d. An agreement by which passports, certificates of identity, powers of attorney, protocols, agreements, and such like documents issued or certified by the authorities of one country are recognized as valid in the other country on the basis of reciprocity.

"With particular regard to Clause (c), I have the honor to add that the suggestion made by the British Prime Minister about applying to commercial representatives the principle of prior consent to their appointment on the part of the Government of the other country is unacceptable to the Soviet Government, since, from the point of view of the bourgeois governments of Europe who, on principle, are opposed to the Soviet regime, every representative of the Soviet Government might be treated as *persona non grata*.

"The reference to the agreement concluded by myself in Sweden does not refute, but, on the contrary, bears out the point of view of the Soviet Government, since the consent given to this reservation in their agreement with Sweden is already bringing about the impossibility of establishing commercial representation of Soviet Russia in Sweden.

"The Soviet Government, being anxious as much as possible to meet the wishes of the British Government, will not object to the right of each Government to insist upon the immediate recall of such members of the trade delegation of the other country, with regard to whom an infringement of the laws of the country in which they reside, or, in particular, participation in political propaganda or interference in the internal affairs of the country, will save been proved.

"In conclusion, on behalf of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, I have the honor once more to bring under the notice of the British Government and the entire British people, and particularly the British laboring masses, that it is the most urgent and earnest wish of the Government of Soviet Russia and of the entire Russian people, to conclude at the earliest possible date a full and general peace, without reservation, with all the powers who in recent years have taken part in hostile acts against her."

II

Mr. Lloyd George's reply was handed to M. Krassin on the eve of his departure for Moscow on July 1:

"The British Government has given careful consideration to the Memorandum of June 29, produced by M. Krassin, on the negotiations which have been proceeding since the arrival of the Russian Delegation at the end of May. The British Government has, during the course of these negotiations, shown its sincere desire to end the isolation of Russia from the Western world and to reach an agreement for the resumption of trading relations which might pave the way to a general peace.

"They do not think that any useful purpose will be served at this moment by attempting a detailed reply to the Russian Trade Delegation Memorandum or by entering into arguments of a recriminatory character. The negotiations have now reached a stage where it is necessary to bring them to an issue. It is not clear from M. Krassin's Memorandum whether the Soviet Government really desires the restoration of trading relations or not, or what are the conditions upon which it is willing to resume them.

"In order, therefore, to arrive at a definite decision, the British Government now repeats what it has declared throughout, that it is willing to make an agreement for the mutual cessation of hostilities and the re-

sumption of trading relations with Russia, and asks for categorical replies, yes or no, as to whether Russia is prepared to enter into a trade agreement with the British Empire and other powers on the following conditions:

"1. That each party refrains from hostile action or undertaking against the other and from conducting any official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of the other party; and, more particularly, that the Soviet Government will refrain from any attempt by military action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire. For reasons already given, this, in the opinion of the British Government, is the fundamental condition of any trading agreement between Russia and any Western Power.

"Trade is only possible under conditions of peace or armistice. The British Government proposes what is tantamount to a general armistice as the condition of the resumption of trade relations, in the hope that this armistice may lead ere long to a general peace.

"2. That all British subjects in Russia should be immediately permitted to return home, all Russian subjects in Great Britain or other parts of the British Empire who desire to return to Russia being similarly released.

"3. That the Soviet Government, in return for a corresponding undertaking from the British Government, agrees to recognize in principle that it is liable to pay compensation to private citizens who have supplied goods or service to Russia for which they have not been paid. The British Government asks for some declaration of this kind at the present time because it believes something of this nature is essential to the effective starting of trade between the two countries.

"It considers it a matter of simple justice, for instance, that where a merchant has supplied the Russian people with a thousand ploughs which have been used or are still being used by the Russian people to their own great benefit, that the Russian people should admit that they ought to pay that merchant and the workmen who manufactured the ploughs for the goods and services they have rendered. Unless Soviet Russia is prepared to admit that it must deal with those whom it now wishes to trade on some recognized principles of justice, trade on a large scale such as is desired on both sides will be found to be practically impossible. The British Government does not ask that these debts should be settled now.

"It is prepared to leave the determination of Russia's liabilities under this head as well as all other questions relating to debts or claims by Great Britain on Russia or by Russia on Great Britain to be mutually settled at the negotiations of peace. But it considers it necessary that the Soviet Government should make a declaration on this point in order to give the necessary confidence to Western merchants, manufacturers and workers to embark upon manufacturing and trading operations.

"4. The British Government agrees to the conditions laid down by the Soviet Government in regard to commercial facilities, communications and so forth, provided that they are mutual and excepting that it cannot agree to surrender the right possessed by every civilized Government, and which it freely accords to the Soviet Government also, to object to the entry as an official agent of any Government of any person who is non-grata to itself.

"It asserts, however, that it has no intention of debarring any Russian on the ground of his Communist opinions, provided the agents of the Russian Government comply with the normal conditions for friendly international intercourse.

"The British Government now awaits a definite statement from the Soviet Government as to whether it will accept these principles as the basis of an agreement to

reopen trade negotiations between Russia and the British Empire and any other power willing to accept the same conditions. If an answer is returned in the affirmative the British Government will be willing to discuss details with any experts or representatives which Soviet Russia may nominate, except such as have already been refused.

"Should, however, no affirmative reply be obtained within one week of the presentation of this Note, the British Government will regard the negotiations at an end, and in view of the declared unwillingness of the Soviet Government to cease its attacks upon the British Empire will take counsel with its Allies as to the measures required to deal with the situation."

III

The text of the Soviet Government's acceptance of the foregoing offer of the British Government is reproduced below:

"Complying with the desire of the British Government and with the object of arriving at an early peace between Russia and Great Britain, the Russian Soviet Government accepts the principles laid down in the Allied memorandum transmitted on July 1 by the British Government to the President of the Russian Delegation, Krassin, as the basis of an agreement between Russia and Great Britain, which agreement will be the object of negotiations, which must begin without delay, between both Governments.

"The Soviet Government agrees that the plan proposed by the British Government will have to be considered as a state of armistice between Russia and Great Britain, and shares the British Government's expectation that this armistice will pave the way to a definite peace. At the same time the Soviet Government protests against the affirmation, contrary to the real facts, relative to the presumed attacks of Soviet Russia upon the British Empire.

"The Soviet Government emphasizes once more that as to Soviet Russia in her relations with Great Britain, she desires nothing but peace, and that the absence of the same disposition on the other side was the only cause preventing it from being as yet attained."

IV

Note from Lord Curzon from Spa to Chicherin on July 11, demanding an armistice for the Poles, and asking for a reply within a week:

"The British Government notes the acceptance by the Russian Soviet Government of the principles laid down in its memorandum of July 1, as the basis of an agreement for the resumption of trade relations and the cessation of mutual hostilities, and it therefore agrees to continue the negotiations for a definite trade agreement as soon as the Russian delegates return.

"The British Government has a further proposal to make. The Soviet Government of Russia has repeatedly declared its anxiety to make peace with all its neighbors; the British Government, which is no less anxious to restore peace throughout Europe, therefore proposes the following arrangement with this object in view:

"a. That an immediate armistice be signed between Poland and Soviet Russia whereby hostilities shall be suspended. The terms of this armistice should provide on the one hand that the Polish army shall immediately withdraw to the line provisionally laid down last year by the Peace Conference as the Eastern Boundary within which Poland was entitled to establish a Polish Administration; this line runs approximately as follows: Grodno, Vapovka, Nemirov, Brest-Litovsk, Dorugusk, Ustilug east of Grubeshov, Krilov, and thence west of Rawka Ruska east of Przemysl to Carpathians. North of Grodno, the line which will be held by the Lithuanians will run along the railway running from Grodno to Vilna and thence to Dvinsk.

"On the other hand, the armistice should provide that the armies of Soviet Russia should stand at a distance of fifty kilometers to the east of this line; in Eastern Galicia each army will stand on the line which they occupy at the date of the signature of the armistice.

"b. That, as soon as possible thereafter, a Conference sitting under the auspices of the Peace Conference, should assemble in London, to be attended by representatives of Soviet Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland, with the object of negotiating a final peace between Russia and its neighboring states.

"Representatives of Eastern Galicia would also be invited to London to state their case for the purpose of this Conference. Great Britain will place no restriction on the representatives which Russia may nominate, provided that they undertake while in Great Britain not to interfere in the politics or the internal affairs of the British Empire or to indulge in propaganda.

"The British Government as a separate proposal suggests that an armistice should similarly be signed between the forces of Soviet Russia and General Wrangel, on the condition that General Wrangel's forces, shall immediately retire to the Crimea, and that during the armistice the Isthmus be a neutral zone and that General Wrangel be invited to London to discuss the future of troops under his command and the refugees under his protection, but not as a member of the Conference.

"The British Government would be glad of an immediate reply to this telegram, for the Polish Government has asked for the intervention of the Allies, and if time is lost a situation may develop which will make the conclusion of lasting peace far more difficult in Eastern Europe; further, while the British Government had bound itself to give no assistance to Poland for any purpose hostile to Russia and to take no action itself hostile to Russia, it is also bound under the Covenant of the League of Nations to defend the integrity and independence of Poland within its legitimate ethnographic frontiers.

"If therefore Soviet Russia, despite its repeated declarations accepting the independence of Poland, will not be content with the withdrawal of the Polish armies from Russian soil on the condition of a mutual armistice, but intends to take action hostile to Poland in its own territory, the British Government and its Allies would feel bound to assist the Polish nation to defend its existence with all the means at its disposal.

"The Polish Government has declared its willingness to make peace with Soviet Russia and to initiate negotiations for an armistice on the basis of conditions set out above, directly it is informed that Soviet Russia also agrees. The British Government therefore would be glad of a definite reply within a week as to whether Soviet Russia is prepared to accept the aforesaid proposal for putting an end to further unnecessary bloodshed and giving peace to Europe."

V

Text of the Soviet Republic's reply to the Allied ultimatum of July 11:

The Russian Soviet Government is the more pleased to acknowledge the declaration of the British Government of its desire to contribute to the establishment of a general peace in Eastern Europe, as even quite recently, at the time when the complications between Russia and Poland were developing, which led to the Polish advance against Russia and the Ukraine, the British Government, unfortunately, did not manifest the same desire to contribute to the cause of peace in Eastern Europe. Earlier, also—namely, at the time when Soviet Russia was trying to obtain peace with the Border States—the British Government did not support the attainment of this aim, and, again, when the Estonian Government was preparing to conclude peace with Soviet Russia in December of last year it received a warning in the name of the Supreme Council.

The present change in the attitude of Great Britain on the question of peace between Soviet Russia and other States is in complete harmony with the wishes of Soviet Russia, whose desire to live in peace with all other States, to which reference is made in the last communication of the British Government, remains firm and unalterable.

Regarding Poland, likewise, in spite of the latter's wanton aggression against the Soviet Republic, Soviet Russia remains as faithful as before to the principles she has proclaimed so often, and to her earnest desire of establishing peaceful relations with all peoples.

The question, however, of the cessation of the armed struggle between Russia and Poland will be unfavorably influenced by the fact that on the part of the Polish Government there has been no direct declaration to the Soviet Government regarding its wish to conclude peace. Numerous utterances of representatives of the Polish people have come to the knowledge of the Soviet Government in which they express themselves in an extremely bitter sense as to the British Government's political action on this question, and information has been likewise published in the Press as to a decision of the Polish Diet to reject the proposal of an armistice with Soviet Russia.

The Soviet Government must, therefore, consider with some caution such proposals so far as they do not come directly from the Government and as long as the danger exists that the attitude of the Polish Government will not correspond to the declarations of other Governments which speak in its name.

The necessity of a direct communication from the Polish Government to the Soviet Government in this case is the more urgent as the past attitude of the British Government in the conflict between Poland and Russia can hardly be considered as a reason for assuming the role of mediating between these two governments.

If at the time when the Polish Republic was preparing its wanton aggression against Russia and the Ukraine the British Government not only made no attempts at hindering this aggression, but even left without any answer the communication of the Soviet Government to the Entente Governments on this question; if at the time when the Polish offensive has had, as a result, military disaster for Poland, the British Government tries to assume the role of mediator in order to suspend the hostilities that have become so disastrous for Poland, the position which results for the British Government from this line of action is such that it deprives it of the role of an impartial third party which would alone render possible its mediation between the belligerents.

It is necessary to remind the British Government, likewise, that it has itself described the state created by the adoption by Russia of its memorandum of July 1 as a state of armistice, and that it has, therefore, described itself in this way as a belligerent waging war against Soviet Russia—a fact that can in no way create a normal basis for the recognition of its role of mediator between Soviet Russia and another belligerent.

Regarding the British Government, the Russian Government has in its answer to the memorandum of July 1 made an absolutely conciliatory declaration, including the acceptance of all the demands of the British Government. It has thus shown its anxious desire to remove completely all conflicts and to obtain a definite peace with Great Britain. It desires, likewise, to establish peace with Poland, and in the attainment of this aim it considers direct negotiations with Poland without any "immixion" from outside, as necessary as direct negotiations with Great Britain in its relations with the latter.

The Soviet Government is the less inclined to accept the proposed mediator for the negotiations with Poland as the reconciliation with Poland (which it earnestly desires) can only be hampered in such a case, in view of the subordinate position which Poland's interest and fate, in comparison with interests foreign to Poland,

are occupying in the domain of relations between Soviet Russia and a third power.

With a frankness which can alone completely remove all misunderstandings between the two governments, the Soviet Government ventures to recall to the British Government that, when one of its members defended in the House of Commons the help given to Denikin and Kolchak, he justified this line of action of the Government by the argument that the struggle of Denikin and Kolchak against the Soviet Government presumably helps towards the defense of Indian and of British interests in Asia; in general, against the dangers which are alleged to threaten them.

Not long ago, when the Head of the British Government was negotiating with the Head of the Russian Trade Delegation regarding the resumption of trade relations, he referred to the relations between Russia and the numerous other States as to facts that can have some influence upon the commercial relations between Russia and Great Britain.

The Soviet Government is of opinion that reconciliation with Poland can be successfully accomplished only in case the interests of both parties are taken into consideration, seeing that these interests can easily be reconciled; and this aim will be, on the contrary, extremely hard to attain if these interests are subordinated to the interests of a third Power.

The laboring masses of Russia desire full and complete reconciliation with Poland, and, in order to attain this aim the Soviet Government considers it necessary to remove from the action of reconciliation all that does not belong to the interests and desires of the two peoples and Governments.

In the matter of reconciliation with Poland the Soviet Government finds it necessary to consider, besides the interests and desires of the Russian laboring masses, only the interests and desires of the Polish laboring masses, and it finds it therefore possible to attain peace with Poland only through direct negotiations with the latter.

It must also point out that it has already obtained without foreign "immixion," complete reconciliation with three neighboring States, and that Esthonia has concluded peace with Russia, in spite of the warning of the Supreme Council; that the treaty between Russia and Georgia has been, at the moment of the negotiations between the Head of the Russian Trade Delegation and the Head of the British Government, a complete surprise for the latter; and that the British Government was deprived of all information regarding the peace between Russia and Lithuania when, in its ultimatum of July 12, it pointed to Lithuania as to one of the Border States with which Russia has still to obtain peace.

The Soviet Government thinks that it can, with the same success, obtain peace with Poland through direct negotiations as it did with three other neighboring States.

The Soviet Government considers still less admissible the interference in the cause of peace between Russia and Poland of the group of governments called the League of Nations, whose covenant is quoted by the British Government in its ultimatum of July 12.

The Russian Government has never received from the so-called League of Nations any communication as to its creation and existence, and it has never had the opportunity of adopting a decision about the recognition or non-recognition of this association of States.

When acquainting itself from unofficial press sources with the covenant of the so-called League of Nations, the Soviet Government could not leave unnoticed the fact that, according to Article 17, the non-members in case of a conflict with members of the so-called League of Nations can be invited to submit to its decision as if they were members. The Soviet Government can in no way agree that one group of powers should assume the role of supreme body over all the States

of the world; and watching over the full inviolability of the sovereign rights of the Russian laboring people the Soviet Government absolutely rejects the pretensions of any foreign groups of Powers claiming to assume the role of supreme masters of the fate of other nations.

It absolutely rejects, therefore, every "immixion" of this association in the cause of peace between Russia and Poland.

Direct negotiations with Poland are in full harmony with the wishes of the Soviet Government, and it declares therefore, that if the Polish Government addresses to Russia a proposal to enter into peace negotiations the Soviet Government will not reject its proposal, and will also consider in the most friendly spirit any subsidiary proposal as to an armistice or some other means intended to facilitate peace negotiations.

The Soviet Government also expresses its willingness to agree to a territorial frontier more favorable for the Polish people than the frontiers indicated by the Supreme Council in December last, and proposed once more by the British Government in its ultimatum of July 12.

The Soviet Government cannot leave without notice the fact that this frontier was elaborated by the Supreme Council in some parts under the pressure of counter-revolutionary Russian elements, adherents of the Russian capitalist and landed class, and that, for example, as to the region of Kholm, the decision of the Supreme Council clearly reflected the influence of these counter-revolutionary elements and followed the wishes of the anti-Polish policy of the Czarist and Russian imperialist capitalist class on this question.

Soviet Russia is willing, in general, as to the peace conditions with Poland, to meet the wishes and interests of the Polish people the more fully, the more the Polish people in its internal life enters upon the path creating a solid basis for really fraternal relations between the laboring masses of Poland, Russia, Ukraine, White Russia, and Lithuania, and creates guarantees that Poland will cease to be an instrument of aggression and intrigue against the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia and other countries.

As a separate proposal, the British Government has put forth the idea of an armistice between Russia and the mutinous ex-General Wrangel. The Soviet Government, however, cannot shut its eyes upon the indissoluble connection between the military operations of Wrangel, which were supported by the Entente Powers, and the Polish campaign against Russia and the Ukraine. This close connection found its expression in the negotiations and the military agreement between Wrangel and the representatives of the Polish Government.

Wrangel's offensive, which coincided with the advance of the Polish Army in the Ukraine, was only a subsidiary military manoeuvre aiming at rendering more difficult the struggle of the Russian and Ukrainian troops against the Polish aggressor, and at facilitating the latter's task. The army and administration of Wrangel, being almost completely deprived of sources of revenue of their own, exist almost entirely with the financial help received from some Entente Powers.

His military operations are carried out exclusively with the help of the war material sent by these Powers. This war material is brought to him on British ships or from harbors under British occupation, and the proposal itself regarding Wrangel in the British ultimatum of July 12, in which the British Government decides for Wrangel that he will come to London for the discussion of the fate of his troops, shows with complete evidence that he is only a subordinate agent of the British Government and partly of its Allies.

The Soviet Government, in its wish to obtain peace with the British Government, and wishing to meet the latter's desires, confirms once more its willingness to guarantee personal safety to the mutinous ex-General Wrangel, to all persons belonging to his army, and to

the refugees under his protection, on the condition of immediate and full capitulation and of surrender to the Soviet authorities of all the territory he occupies and of all the war material, stores, buildings, means of communication, and so on in his power on the same terms as was proposed by the Soviet Government with reference to the Northern Government of the ex-General Miller.

The Soviet Government cannot, however, remain indifferent to the repeated attempts of the British Government to transform the Crimean Peninsula into an inviolable permanent asylum for the mutinous general and for other mutineers who, in fact, are the British Government's subordinate agents, and thus really to render the Crimean Peninsula a British Dependency. It is impossible not to mention that, at the time when the Archangel and the Murmansk region was in the same subordinate position to Britain, the British authorities ruled there unrestrained, and acted as the Supreme Power, devastating the whole region, wasting its natural resources, and exporting to Britain as much as possible of its riches.

The bearer of the will and the representative of the interests of the Russian laboring people, the Soviet Government, cannot remain indifferent to any violation of its vital interests and of the inviolability of its territory, and it protests most strongly against the attempt of Great Britain to annex in fact the Crimean Peninsula.

It must be pointed out that the present proposal of the British Government is a violation of its preceding proposal, which became an obligation, after having been adopted by the Soviet Government, regarding the cessation of any help and support to ex-General Wrangel. The Soviet Government is, therefore, of opinion that the greatest possible concession on its part—a concession which is the outcome of its anxious desire to come to terms with the British Government—is its willingness to agree to the capitulation of ex-General Wrangel and of his troops, with the guarantee of their personal safety.

The Soviet Government thinks that the proposal to convoke in London a Conference of representatives of Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland, is the outcome of insufficient information of the British Government as to the relations between the Russian Republic and her neighbors. The peace treaty between Russia and Lithuania was signed on July 12, and the negotiations between Russia and Latvia, and Russia and Finland are being carried on independently without foreign interference, and their further continuance on the same lines is the best pledge of their successful result.

Being animated with the most earnest desire to put an end to all conflicts between Russia and Great Britain, and to the struggle between them, and to obtain a definite peace with Great Britain, the Soviet Government rests its hopes upon the Delegation which it sends to London, with additional members, for the

purpose of carrying on negotiations with the British Government on the basis of the British Memorandum of July 1, and of the reply of the Soviet Government of July 7, in order to obtain a full agreement with Great Britain. This aim will be attained the more successfully if all new and strange elements which can only do harm to the beginning of an improvement in the relations between Russia and Great Britain are kept aside.

(Signed),

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, CHICHERIN.

VI

To Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Foreign Office, London.

I am instructed by Mr. Chicherin to acknowledge your message of July 2, Number 1312, transmitted through the Russian Trade Delegation in London, and to point out that the Russian Government are in possession of a number of undoubted informations about the continuation of help to Wrangel by Great Britain. In particular Batum continued to be the supply base for Crimea. Small craft with supplies of war materials were being daily despatched to Wrangel from Batum. The British authorities in Batum were arresting workmen who refused to load these supplies. A transport of war material, petroleum and benzine loaded for Crimea on June 17, was put on fire by the workers in Batum port. At same time the British authorities organized in Batum recruiting of soldiers for dispatch to Crimea. Several thousand men were recruited in Batum in short time, middle of June. The Governor General of Batum declared to the representative of volunteer army, General Drotzenko, that England has sent out to Wrangel two thousand guns besides horses. Middle June British ships transported in great numbers from Batoum to Theodosia, and Sebastopol Cossacks going to join Wrangel. On June 21 a large steamer loaded with various war material and goods for Wrangel was to leave Batoum for Crimea. The Russian seamen refused to carry the goods to the volunteer army. When attempt was made to replace them by Englishmen, the Russians raised anchor, intending to go out into the open sea, but the steamer was sunk by gun fire of British batteries. *The Daily Express* of June 25, brings an account of its Constantinople correspondent of how the British authorities are forcibly sending Russians from Turkey to Sebastopol, where they are made to enlist in Wrangel's army, under threat of being hanged. These few individual facts picked out of a large number in our possession afford undeniable proof that Great Britain or its agents continue to give support to Wrangel and that all the inferences the Russian Government formerly drew from these facts thus remain in force.

LITVINOV.

Copenhagen, July 19, 1920.
Hotel Cosmopolite.

Military Review

By LT.-COL. B. ROUSTAM BEK

New York City, August 8, 1920.

IN THE *Detroit Times* of July 20, 1920, I firmly stated that "unless there is an armistice, the Polish capital will be occupied by the Soviets within three or four weeks."

This was not a prophecy or an optimistic supposition; my declaration was simply an inference from the military situation of both belligerents, as well as the political and strategical condition of the rest of the world.

Such a strategical center as Warsaw may be captured only if the Polish army has suffered complete defeat on the battlefields. Conversely, once this defeat has been accomplished, the fall of Warsaw is certain. The Germans were unable to capture Paris in 1914, because General Joffre, by skillful manoeuvring, on the one hand, succeeded in withdrawing his army beyond Paris, practically intact, and the vigorous Russian invasion of East Prussia, on the other hand, forced the Ger-

The Military Situation in European Russia on August 8, 1920



The heavy dotted lines indicate the Polish and Crimean fronts. The lighter dotted line indicates the Polish front as it was on July 18, 1920. The line of small crosses indicates the farthest Polish advance before the present drive of the Russian armies.

mans to make a regroupment of their forces that was most unfavorable for their strategy.

In spite of several tactical reverses, which the Anglo-French army suffered while falling back, the Germans were unable to force their enemy to accept a decisive battle; on the contrary, the Anglo-French armies were able to accomplish a concentration and to complete their mobilization.

As soon as the German General Staff understood that the Anglo-French field army had succeeded in escaping the general battle, the German army stopped its dash on Paris, and took the defensive, thus permitting the Allies to counter-attack, which resulted in the first serious tactical reverses of the invaders on the Marne. Then the Great War lost its manoeuvring character (*Bewegungskrieg*) and became a war of purely positional type (*Stellungskrieg*). This was the German method of warfare, and is commonly known as trench-warfare and the reason for it was that the Germans were first of all concerned with keeping their fighting forces as long as possible on the enemy's territory with the least possible losses, thus preventing their adversary from reaching their strategical objective—Berlin. There cannot be any doubt that Germany succeeded in this absolutely. German territory was occupied by the Allies only after the armistice was signed in France, and finally, the German people escaped the most terrible possibility of the war—invasion by the Allies.

Quite different is the Polish situation at present.

Polish strategy aimed at Moscow as its objective, and the Poles directed all their efforts to find the main Russian army, in order to challenge it in decisive battle and destroy it, thus opening for them the gates of the Russian capital.

The Polish General Staff, thanks to the unreadiness of the Russian Red Army on the western front, succeeded in concentrating its armies and finally found its enemy's main forces east of the Berezina and Dnieper rivers, thus accomplishing two important strategical tasks of the planned campaign. Now the Poles had to defeat the Russians. In order to do this, the Polish command sent to the battle front not only all its first and second lines armies, but also the greater part of its strategical reserves, a fact which now is fully established. So the Poles have had practically all their fighting forces in the field against Russia. But, unfortunately for them, they were unable to defeat the Soviet armies, but were defeated themselves, and finally the main bulk of their tactical body, their field army, was annihilated. After a careful study of the way in which the retreat of the fragments of the beaten Polish armies was carried out, their fighting body is seen to be in panic-stricken flight, with the pursuers at their heels. The Russians are speedily pressing the beaten enemy towards Warsaw—and Lemberg.

Therefore, in spite of all the endeavors of the Entente press to assure public opinion that the Polish army can be reorganized and will recover its fighting ability for further resistance to the

Soviet Army, I can state that the Polish field army is completely beaten and that the gates of Warsaw are wide open to the victorious Red Army.

The Russian Red General Staff well knows that it will have no difficulty in entering Warsaw, but its main idea is not so much to capture the Polish capital as to force the Entente to accept the terms dictated by Soviet Russia from Moscow. We must not neglect the fact that at the present moment the Russian strategy supporting the diplomacy of the Soviets. First of all, the supreme military command of the Red Army directs its forces to preventing the Entente from supporting the beaten Poles by sending them fresh reinforcements through the so-called corridor with a landing base at Danzig. In order to accomplish this, the Northern Russian army, basing itself on Bialostok, captured Lamzha, about sixty-five miles northwest of Warsaw, and occupied Mlava, about seventy miles northwest of Warsaw, thus threatening the communications of the Polish capital with Danzig through the corridor built by the Allies.

The Red Russian Army in the northern part of the battle front is very strong and fully ready to meet any attempt of the Entente to support the Poles, in case this foolish and militarily abortive measure should be resorted to by the senseless Anglo-French military leaders. In one of my former articles I have already explained the reason why the Allies would be unable to reinforce the Polish fighting body with their troops—I repeat again that it is an impossibility no less than the suggestion that England might involve Europe and America in a new war with Russia. The Poles themselves understand this, and in distress and fear they appeal to President Wilson for moral support. An army which needs such support from the outside is no longer an army at all.

There cannot be any doubt that the Red Army's vanguard is already in the sphere of defense of the Polish capital in spite of conflicting reports from Poland. Already on August 4, the Associated Press informed us that in some sectors the Red cavalry was seen 36 miles from Warsaw.

The first rumors of a possible armistice found me in Detroit, Michigan, and I was asked by the representatives of the local press to make a statement about its possibility. It was about July 19 when the Russian Red Army was east of Brest-Litovsk, and Bialostok was still held by the Poles.

"As a military man, I hope there is no armistice," I stated, "only through defeating the Poles will Russia be safe from other attacks. Poland forced the war on Russia, though my country made several overtures to prevent it. Unless the Allies stop backing Poland in its unwarranted warfare, they will regret it later.

"I am against an armistice for the same reason that I was against the armistice with Germany. The Allies and United States should have gone to Berlin. Though they won the war tactically, they lost it strategically. Such would be the case, I fear, should Russia treat with Poland now." (The Detroit Times, July 20, 1920.)

Naturally, the Russian Soviets are seeking peace, and they would not have rejected an armistice in the moment when the circumstances were such as to allow its acceptance, but there cannot be room for an armistice, when the victory is in the hands of the Red Army and when one hour of vacillation or delay may be disastrous to the victor.

Therefore it is clear why Lloyd George and Millerand are doing their utmost to arrest the victorious advance of the Red Army even for ten days. This time will be sufficient for the Poles to bring the fragments of their beaten army into a certain order, and to receive from their supporters their "moral" help, which will not prevent the final disaster and only prolong the premature agony of the Polish militarism. According to the *New York Times* of August 9 (*Associated Press*, August 8):

Before receipt in Moscow of the note dispatched as a result of Friday's conference between Premier Lloyd George and Leo Kamenev of the Russian delegation, today's announcement says, the Soviet Government instructed its delegation to communicate to the British Government the following statement:

"Resultant on acceptance by Poland of the armistice terms, which will deal principally with reduction of her armed strength, the Soviet Republic will be prepared to begin withdrawal of her troops to the line drawn by the Supreme Council in 1918 and indicated again by Earl Curzon (British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), in his note of July 20 to M. Chicherin (Bolshevist Foreign Minister), and considerably to reduce the number of Soviet troops on this line if the Allies, particularly France, undertake not to advance and not to support any advance against Soviet Russia on any front and to withdraw General Wrangel's army from the Crimea."

There is no doubt that Moscow is standing firm on its decision and does not show any confidence in the promises and "guaranties" of the Entente. On the other hand the Russian people know well that the Allied blockade still is hanging over Russia and was never lifted, as it is alleged, and therefore to threaten Russians with a new blockade would be fruitless. A new performance on the seas, which England and France may stage for their "democracies", is the senseless bombardment of certain Russian ports, even Kronstadt and Petrograd included, but the results of such a game would be the same as they were in the past; serious experts, I am sure, will share my opinion.

The sufferers would be only those countries which have just begun to trade, thinking the seas are open for them, and Great Britain herself will suffer most of all, and she knows it.

Soviet Russia has broken through the *cordon sanitaire* of Clemenceau, and in spite of the British blockade on the seas, Russia will still be able to continue her fighting for freedom and justice, and she will win. Let the Allies take the matter seriously, let them understand that Italy has parted company with their criminal coalition, and there are many other nations in Europe which are far from joining in their new plot against Soviet Russia.

According to the latest news from Paris (*New York Times*, August 9), the Reds are massing troops in the region of Mlava, north of the capital,

for a drive upon Warsaw, in conjunction with the movement of troops from the east. "The Bug river was crossed by the Reds on a wide front," the gessage says, and there can be no doubt that the Warsaw-Danzig railroad has already been cut.

The Red Army is so close to the capital that its siege artillery already started the bombardment of the outer forts of Warsaw on Friday. There is no danger to the city, however, because these forts are very near the town, but the fall of one of them means the capture of Warsaw.

The withdrawal of the Polish Government from Warsaw to Cracow proves that the surrender of the new capital of Poland is a matter of a very short time.

I think that after the retreat of the government a new government—a Soviet Government—will be established in the city, which will seek contact with the military command of the Red Army. The fact that the Warsaw police were directed to the front (*New York Times*, August 9), is suggestive in this connection.

I believe also that the Reds have already captured Siedlec, fifty miles east of Warsaw, and Lublin has also fallen into the hands of the Red Army. (Lublin is situated about 100 miles southeast of Warsaw, and has great strategic importance.) From there the Red troops are moving in a northwesterly direction, along the Lublin-Warsaw railway, aiming at Ivangoro, situated on the eastern bank of the Vistula, about sixty miles from Warsaw. These places are now bases for the Russians in their operations against the Warsaw fortified region.

It seems that the Poles are making a last mad effort to save their capital. Thousands of men are working on the defenses on the east bank of the Vistula, the great semicircle taking in the ex-fortress of Novo-Georgievsk, the forts of Modlin, Segev, Sielce, and Ivangorod. They stopped repairing the great bridge destroyed by the Russians in 1915. There are two more bridges, one for railway traffic only, and another for vehicles; the latter is overcrowded by refugees.

The Russian airmen are freely flying over the city and dropping . . . not bombs, but only propaganda . . . Did the Poles and their Allies, when they flew over Kiev and other Russian places, limit themselves to dropping printed propaganda? The hour has come when the Polish *Shliakhta* must pay their debts to the Polish proletariat.

On the eve of the fall of the Polish capital it will be interesting to recall that Warsaw was not originally the Polish capital. Warsaw, situated in the territory of the former duchy of Mazovia, was founded by a Mazovian duke, Conrad, in the ninth century, who built a castle there. In 1526 the Poles and Lithuanians, after their endless quarrels, reunited, and Warsaw became the residence of their kings. In 1550, Sigismund Augustus (*Wasa*) proclaimed Warsaw as his capital, thus suppressing the old Polish capital, Cracow.

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IN A NOTE dated December 24, 1918, one of the many offers of peace addressed by the Soviet Government to its enemies, Maxim Litvinov stated clearly the alternatives then open to the capitalist powers. One choice, he said, was "to come to an understanding with the Soviet Government, to withdraw foreign troops from Russian territory, to raise the economic blockade, to help Russia to regain her own sources of supply, and to give her technical advice how to exploit her natural richness in the most effective way, for the benefit of all countries badly in need of foodstuffs and raw materials." The other alternative was "continued open or disguised intervention on the present or on a still larger scale, which means prolongation of war, further embitterment of the Russian masses, intensification of internal strife, unexampled bloodshed." The choice has always been open and still remains open. So long, indeed, as the imperialist leaders are permitted the power to make any choice, these alternatives remain open to them: peace with Soviet Russia for the benefit of all peoples, or war. During the nineteen months that have elapsed since Litvinov stated the case, the imperialists have held their power and have made always the same choice. Under one pretext or another, by dint of every imaginable intrigue and conspiracy, they have managed to keep up the war. It was no easy task. They have had to lied to their own peoples, they have had to lie to one another, they have, we do not doubt it, even had to lie to themselves, in order that the zest for slaughter and destruction should not lag. The peoples sickened of carnage, and the need for foodstuffs and raw materials grew month by month. From Soviet Russia came repeated offers of peace, over and over again, to every nation, to every ruler, to all peoples. But the choice remained for war. While there was still a man to be conscripted or a puppet state to be thrust into the fire of nationalist ambitions, the leaders held to their course.

The truth is, of course, that they never seriously considered the alternative of peace; nor will these leaders ever voluntarily choose the way of peace while the power remains to them to make war. Soviet Russia again offers them the alternatives. But if there are still men who can be summoned or driven to fight against the Workers' Republic,

and if there are still other men who will make munitions and transport them to the battle, we know that the choice of capitalist rulers will be as before. The war will go on. But if at last the decision is for peace, we shall know what that means. We shall see these same leaders hiding their impotence and chagrin under a fine masquerade of statesmanship and diplomacy. But we shall know that they have made peace only because they no longer had the power to make war.

THE ALLIES appear now to be still determined to fight Soviet Russia, but they are beginning to resort once more to their pretended readiness to conclude peace. France, the backbone of eraction in Europe at present, must refrain from any attempt to send a French army into Poland, in order to "defend" that country, and the sending of black colonial troops into Poland would probably be very unpopular: it has already been found impossible by the French to use such troops in western Germany. Black troops are as a matter of fact not any more savage than whites, but the characteristic experiences of colonial exploitation must reduce native Africans, or natives of any continent, to a point where they are ready to cut the throat of any white man—or woman—and as the only whites accessible to their weapons are subjects of defeated and associated powers, they refrain for the moment from attacking their real exploiters, their masters who have come victorious out of the Great War. Poland probably likes colored troops as little as she does French or English or German troops, and the Polish people would tolerate their presence only as long as they might be compelled to. Small nations who enjoy the "protection" of the great League are often in the unenviable position of being forced to carry out its mandates even to the point of courting destruction themselves. Their selfish governing classes accept the League's favors, as did the rulers of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—for a time—until they found that serving the Entente was a business that was ruinous not only to the proletariat of the small border states, but also to the bourgeoisie in those regions. Even Finland is now engaged in peace negotiations with the Soviet Government, at Dorpat, while Esthonia and Lithuania have already signed full treaties of peace with Soviet Russia. How long will Poland look to the West? Her real friend is in the East.

WHO WILL next bear the burden of carrying out the demands of the Entente? The answer is already before us, in the news reports of the daily press. Roumania and Hungary are preparing to raise armies to be placed at the disposal of the great powers. Fourteen-year old boys and fifteen-year old boys will be drilled to make cannon-fodder for French and English imperialism, and when the masters of Hungary and Roumania have exhausted the resources in man-power of those countries, their peoples will force them to make peace with Soviet Russia.

Germany seems disinclined to become a link in the *cordon sanitaire*, but it is possible her ruling classes may be forced by the Entente into the position of hangmen of the Russian Revolution, a position that some of them are no doubt ready to assume. Perhaps this will precipitate a proletarian revolution in Germany. To what extent preparations are already being made in Germany for intervention in Russia it would be difficult to say, beyond the fact that some of the reports of such preparations appear to represent empty gestures. Thus, German newspapers have recently had references to an army of trained volunteers that was being raised by Guchkov, of Provisional Government fame, in East Prussia. But great Soviet armies are passing along the southern and eastern border of that province, and Guchkov's forces have made no effort to attack their flank. And yet the reports in the German papers have been full of rumors of millions of rubles raised by Russian counter-revolutionaries in Sweden to pay the expenses of Guchkov's armaments, while the German Government has been described as facilitating this work in every way. All of which may be true or not—but Guchkov seems willing not to invite destruction at the hands of the Red Army.

* * *

NEWSPAPER REPORTS state—on what authority we do not know—that the Soviet armies are to reestablish the border of 1914 between Poland and Germany. That is a rather peculiar way of saying that they may have been ordered to occupy all of what was Russian Poland, and not to invade German or Austrian Poland, although we have no knowledge of the nature of the instructions under which the Red Army is advancing. As long as the Entente has a square mile of Polish territory they will throw its unhappy population into war with Soviet Russia. Possibly it may be less necessary to occupy the Polish "corridor"; the Entente might encounter other than Polish opponents if it should attempt to raise armies anywhere in Prussian Poland.

* * *

SEVERAL NATIONS have already practically made peace with Soviet Russia. The New York Times of August 7 reports that Soviet Russia is sending a representative to Rome, while Italy already has a representative at Moscow. Coming fast upon the news of the arrival in Vienna (reported in the London Daily Herald, July 24) of the Soviet Government's representative to Austria, on July 22, this opening of relations between Italy and Soviet Russia seems to be but a link in a long chain. Mieslav Bronsky is the name of the new Soviet representative in Vienna. It is not so long ago that the first representative, Kamenev, was sent away from that city. Thus one government after another is finding it necessary to recognize that if there are to be dealings with Russia, they must be with the government that really represents the people and the power in that country, namely, the Soviet Government.

NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY

OMSK, June 6.—The total results of nationalization of industry since the November Revolution show that during the past two years 5,000 large commercial establishments, constituting ninety per cent of the industry, have been nationalized. The government also nationalized 16,000 vessels and all the banks. At the same time ninety state trusts have been formed out of the enterprises which were nationalized. In the domain of rural economy 6,000 agricultural artel-communes have been organized. The smaller domestic industries, as well as the cooperative industries, not only were not nationalized, but were upheld by decrees. 3,000,000 workers found employment in the nationalized industries. During the two years of Soviet rule, the Department of State Construction began building up fifteen large enterprises, a number of which have already been completed.

MILITARY REVIEW

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Thenceforth Warsaw became the objective of aggressive attempts by Sweden, Russia, Brandenburg, and Austria. In 1655, Charles Gustavus, of Sweden, captured Warsaw, and in 1764 the Russians occupied it also. In 1773, the first partition of Poland took place, and in November, 1793, the Russian army captured Warsaw. In 1806, Napoleon entered the Polish capital, and in 1807, according to the peace of Tilsit, an independent Duchy of Warsaw was created, but the Austrians invaded it in 1809 and kept Warsaw until June 2. After having defeated Napoleon's army and annihilated the Polish forces at Berezina, the Russians entered Warsaw February 8, 1813.

In 1831, during the first insurrection of the Poles, Warsaw witnessed terrible bloodshed, and was captured by the Russian General Prince Paskevich. A new uprising of the Polish people against the autocratic Russian oppressors took place in 1863, and once more blood flowed in Warsaw, which was taken by the Russians.

During the Great War, the Germans, after having captured the capital of Poland, returned it to the Polish imperialistic *Shliakhta*, with the idea of transforming Poland into one of the provinces of the Kaiser, but the Russian Revolution saved the independence of Poland. Unfortunately, the country fell under the rule of the Polish capitalistic class, which became obedient servants of the imperialistic Entente, who finally hurled the Polish people into a criminal war with Soviet Russia.

Now the Polish autocracy is defeated by the Russian people, and Soviet Russian armies are approaching the gates of Warsaw, but the Russian Red armies will enter the Polish capital with no idea of conquering it, but with a sincere desire to take it from the usurpers who tried to subject the Polish people to the despotism of the capitalistic coalition of the world, after which Soviet Russia will return it, together with the rest of the country, to the Polish workers and peasants, thus freeing the Polish people from western slavery.

The Economic Situation in Soviet Russia

(Continued from Vol. III, No. 5, of SOVIET RUSSIA)

Our steel and iron industry depends entirely on the working of the coal mines. The following figures will give an idea as to the decrease in the production of the former:

Year	Ore
1916	350 million poods
1917	232 " "
1918	22 " "

Therefore, the decrease in comparison with 1916 was ninety-four per cent. In the same manner smelting of cast iron has decreased, falling from 176 million poods in 1916 to 125 million poods in 1917 and to 17 million poods in 1918, a total decrease of ninety per cent.

The transportation of cast iron and all kinds of metals from the Donets Coal Basin has decreased in the same degree. The average produc-

factories, which always had had a unique significance for our industry, as well as for the rest of the country.

The second largest factory, which is just as important for our industry, is the Alexandrovsk-Briansk Works. This factory was closed in March, but it was intended to open it, giving it for the first two weeks about 70,000 poods of metal, and for this it was necessary to have 115,000 poods of fuel.

Those factories of the Donets Coal Basin which were occupied by the Soviet forces, could be working now if they were supplied with a satisfactory amount of fuel and ore. Under such conditions they would be in a position to give the following quantities of metal (in accordance with the data for 1916):

Quantities in Million Poods

Factories	Rolled Products	Consumption of hard material fuel	Consumption of ore	Production of cast iron	Mould pigs
Dnieprovsk	20.02	46.53	42.92	24.09	24.99
Alexandrovsk ...	11.86	40.45	35.44	20.25	16.02
Ekaterinoslavsk-Shoduar	2.52	14.10	9.00	4.89	7.62
Nizhni-Dnieper .	7.02	5.28
Kramatorsk	3.62	15.47	15.88	8.62	4.49
Druzhkovsk	8.04	21.64	14.37	8.24	9.44
Donets-Urievsk .	8.72	26.43	24.17	13.06	11.32

tion is shown in the following figures:

1916	170 million poods
1917	109 " "
1918	13 " "

and this makes a decrease of ninety-two per cent in 1918 in comparison with 1916.

Under such adverse circumstances, the position of the large steel and iron factories is very difficult, particularly in connection with the shortage of coal. In accordance with the investigation of the metallurgical industry, made by the Ukraine's Economic Council, the position of the industry can be pictured as follows:

The Dnieper Works in February were working only part time; the factory's normal yearly production has been 25 million poods of cast iron, and in addition the factory produced:

Railroad bandages	3 million poods
Railroad axles	1½ " "
Sheet iron and iron plate...	2 " "
Rails and assorted iron.....	10 " "
Wire	4 " "
Metal products	4 " "

In February the above works had only two million poods of fuel, which comprises only a half month's normal supply. On account of such shortage, the factory was closed for an indefinite time on the 1st of April, and this deprived us of the opportunity to make use of the largest of our

From the above table it is evident that if these six mills were supplied with enough fuel, they could produce a great deal. But this was impossible on account of the shortage of coal which has paralyzed the entire production. Due to this shortage, the Dnieprovsk Works had to close, and the rest of the mills were greatly hindered in their work.

We cannot hope to resume the work of the above factories in the near future, due to the shortage of coal. When occupying these factories we could only use their stocks of metal. It was impossible to take stock of same as there was not enough time for this. But it was evident, that such stocks as accumulated in the factories during the German occupation and the former regime, were not carried away by the bourgeoisie, but remained intact in the factories.

According to the stock-taking of the 1st of May, in the factories and warehouses of the Ekaterinoslav district there were:

About 9,000,000 poods	cast iron (smelted).
" 15,000,000	" cast iron.
" 250,000	" ferro-manganese.
" 80,000	" ferro casts.
" 2,000,000	" pig-iron.
" 45,000	" sheet steel.
" 5,000	" instrumental steel.
" 50,000	" all kinds of steel.

"	850,000	"	assorted iron.
"	150,000	"	sheet iron.
"	32,000	"	fancy iron.
"	86,000	"	sheet iron.
"	140,000	"	beams and rails.
"	150,000	"	all kinds of rails.
"	180,000	"	bandages.
"	35,000	"	tin plate.
"	350,000	"	wire.
"	45,000	"	axles.
"	100,000	"	nails.

A considerable quantity of all kinds of pipes and parts, screws, screw-nuts, pegs, etc.

In the factories and warehouses of the Donets Coal Basin, in the part occupied by the Soviet forces, there were:

- About 12 million poods cast iron.
- More than 1 million poods ferro-casts.
- About 4 million poods pig-iron.
- About 280,000 poods all kinds of steel.
- About 2,500,000 poods assorted and fancy iron.
- About 1,000,000 poods sheet iron.
- More than 1½ million poods beams, rails.
- About 460,000 poods wire.
- 300,000 poods gas and iron pipes.
- 200,000 poods nails.

Denikin, of course, will not be able to requisition all of the above stocks, as Denikin's forces will not have the necessary facilities to remove them.

Economic organs of the Soviets in the Donets Coal Basin have taken the right course in their activity. They have decided, first of all, to nationalize the largest factories of the metallurgical industry, to unite them in one unit, creating in this way, one administration, and thus realizing the syndication and trustification of the industry, which they are applying on a large scale in Soviet Russia.

In case we get back the Donets Coal Basin, the important question of resuming the work of the metallurgical factories will again arise. We will have to supply them with fuel, because their underproduction will affect the work of machine factories and repair shops in Soviet Russia.

To requisition such stocks as have accumulated in the Donets Coal Basin factories will not be difficult, inasmuch as the former organs of the Soviets in the Ukraine coped with this alone more or less satisfactorily. For instance, for the railroads about one and a half million poods of metal were removed during the two months' work of the Birozaga, and a number of nail factories of Central Russia were supplied with six months' normal supply of wire.

Our main problem, in case we succeed in occupying at least a part of the Donets Coal Basin, will be to supply as soon as possible the necessary metal for Central Russia, which is all important in this time of metal hunger which the country is undergoing.

The time, during which the Donets Coal Basin is occupied by Denikin's forces, we can use for our work in the Urals. It is true that the Ural region has been, for a very long time, under the

Kolchak forces, which have, to a large extent, hindered its work. The main obstacle for resuming the work in the Ural factories will be the inability of supplying its industry with the necessary lumber, which is the only fuel used there. For the production of one million poods of cast iron a year it requires about 91,000—98,000 feet of timber, which could be obtained by cutting down about 700-800 acres of timber.

There were 50 million poods of cast iron smelted in the Ural mills in 1913 against 175 million poods in the mills of the Donets Coal Basin. There are in the Ural district four and a half times more foundries than in the Donets Coal Basin, and about twice as many blast-furnaces as in the South. Smelting of cast iron in the Ural district foundries amounts to about 339 poods to one workingman, against 1,620 poods in the South, and 5,000 poods in America. The Ural region is immensely rich with ore; according to Professor Bogdanovich, there is twice as much ore in the Urals as in the Krivoli-Rog Basin, totaling about 25 milliard poods.

The fundamental question in regard to the development of the Ural industry is its unification with the Kouznetzki Basin in Siberia, rich with coke coal, so necessary for the development of the metallurgical industry in the Urals, and which would enable it to get along without the wood fuel. But, at the present time, the Kouznetzki Coal Basin is not under the Soviet power, and the work of requisition and development which the Soviets started, was interrupted by the Czecho-Slovak movement.

In this manner, the Ural district, at least temporarily, can depend only upon wood fuel, and the work here will be hindered due to the fact that wood fuel is usually prepared during the winter, but this winter the Ural district was under the power of the bourgeoisie, who only partially supplied the factories with the necessary fuel. On this account, it is hardly probable that the factories will be able to produce to the full extent, as is desirable and necessary for the country. To resume their work will be possible only after a considerable length of time, and only a small part of the factories will be able to resume their work in the near future; for instance, the Zlatoust Works have enough fuel and metal to resume their work, and the following are working:

Asha-Balashov, Ust-Kateav, Simsk District, and others. Temporarily, it will be necessary to use such stocks as can be found in the Urals. The metal is scattered in various parts of the district. Part of it can be found in the factories, part on the docks. To verify precisely the quantity of metal in possession of the Soviets will be very difficult. The mills are not provided with the necessary facilities to take up this question, and there are no labor organizations which can handle this matter.

Pradmet, which is interested in obtaining metal, has already started the transportation of the same from the Urals. Loading of ships has

commenced on the quays of Ufa, where there are about 275,000 poods of cast iron; there are all kinds of metal on the wharfs of Akteshevo on the White River, and 28,000 poods of cast iron on the wharf at Shaksha on the river Ufkima, where there are also considerable quantities of nails, wire and sheet iron (about 2,000,000 poods). According to the calculation of the commission, which was sent to the Ural district for metal, about 2,500,000 poods of metal could be transported from the Urals on ships.

At first, only transportation of metal from the Ural metal mines will be possible, and only later the resumption of the work of the factories at normal speed. In connection with this, it will be necessary to supply with fuel the factories of this industry, and this will require a large number of workmen for woodcutting.

In regard to fuel, Russia is not very secure in this respect. As was outlined above, temporarily we cannot depend on coal from the Donets Coal Basin. There only remains the Moscow Coal Basin, which can give only a small quantity of coal (maximum 50-60 million poods) and of a variety which cannot be used for transport and industry.

Coal of the above Basin can be used only right on the spot. Such small quantities of coal are obtained in the Undermoscow Coal Basin that this Basin has no significance for the country. Only about 40-50 million poods of coal can be obtained, which cannot improve the fuel situation at all.

Other fuel which plays an important part in our industry is turf. But this is found mostly in the Central Districts where the food situation is the worst. We cannot count upon development of turf culture. The situation as to liquid fuel is still worse. Soviet Russia is cut off from Baku and Grosnograd, and it is impossible to get any quantity of oil from there. The Baku District is over-saturated with liquid fuel. According to approximate calculation, there can be found about 150-200 million poods of liquid fuel, which cannot be transported either through Turkey or by way of the Black Sea. According to casual and contradictory information which we get from the Caucasus, the railroads there cannot accommodate even a small part of its transports. The famous Caucasian oil pipes are not working, as they were destroyed by the civil war. Only Soviet Russia is in a position to get oil from the Caucasus, but England prevents that, striving to prevent bartering between the Caucasus and Soviet Russia.

In spite of the above difficulties, the work of industrial enterprises in Soviet Russia is continuing, of course, with many hindrances and intervals, but is, nevertheless, working without interruption.

The foundation of the whole work is the grouping of factories of similar industry into one body. The economic policy of the Soviet Government is already giving certain results. It is based partly on the nationalization of industry and confiscation from private owners. This system was first applied after the October revolution, and since

then it has been infallibly put to practice by the Soviet Government. At first it was unsystematic and chaotic, and only with time it got to be an efficient system of economic measures, dictated by economic expediency and economic necessity. Nationalization of industry at present is accompanied by the organization of corresponding organs which guide and direct the given industry.

At the outset, these organs were only created for separate enterprise, but later on they were organized for groups of factories with one central administration, embracing a group of enterprises of similar industry. Along this line were organized central administrations for a group of machine factories, airplane, automobile, textile, chemical and other factories and mills.

Notwithstanding all difficulties which arose in the work of the above industrial enterprises, despite the shortage of raw material and fuel, they continued to work; but the above difficulties hindered the production of the factories. Production of the following factories: Sormovski, Kolomenski, Mietischincki, Kulebski, and Vikeunski in 1917 was about 62-68 per cent of the production in 1916. In 1918 it was 33-38 per cent of that in 1916, and in the Kolomenski factory it was only 14.3 per cent of that in 1916. Of course, shortage of fuel and raw materials played an important part in the decrease in production in these factories. For nine months of 1918, locomotive and car manufacturing factories (Nevski, Putilovski, Sormski, Kolomenski, Brianski, Botkinsiki, Khar-kovski, and Gartman, manufactured 38 passenger train locomotives, and 103 freight locomotives, and during this time, part of the above-mentioned factories were for some time occupied by enemy forces. The following car manufacturing factories: Putilovski, Petrogradski, Phoenix, Dvigatel, Moscovski, Soromovsky, Malisovski, Tverskoi, and Odesski, for nine months manufactured 175 passenger train cars, 3,578 freight cars, and 362 special cars, and part of these factories was also occupied at some time or other by the enemy.

In 1919, the work of the locomotive and car manufacturing factories was resumed. During five months the factories of Soviet Russia released 65 new locomotives; 6 locomotives in January, 12 in February, 13 in March, 16 in April, 18 in May. They also released cars as follows: 255 in January, 247 in February, 350 in March, 345 in April, and 243 in May, a total of 1,440 cars.

It must be remembered, that beginning with the last part of 1918 manufacturing of new locomotives and cars was stopped, and all attention was concentrated on repairing the rolling stock. For the first five months 154 locomotives and 1,440 cars were repaired.

Airplane and automobile factories comprise another group of industrial enterprises. In Soviet Russia there were seventy-eight such factories in May of this year. The average production of these factories for the first four months of this year—repairing of 480 automobiles, in a month, i.e., 0.058 for one workingman in a month, against

0.067 of the provincial factories, shows that the production of provincial factories is higher than that of Moscow (0.059).

In the first quarter of 1919 the Economic Council of the Northern District worked out a program of work which was more or less successfully achieved by the metal-working factories of the Northern District. For instance, they performed sixty-eight per cent of the work of preparing new locomotives, seventy-seven per cent of work outlined in the program of building new freight cars, other works, between thirty-three and fifty per cent. In regard to war supplies, the factories contended with this part of the work quite successfully. They produced ninety per cent of heavy guns of the program, 220 per cent of three-inch mountain guns, 150 per cent guns zenith, 230 per cent howitzer, 90 per cent trucks, 102 per cent artillery wheels, 25-75 per cent of the rest of the works outlined in the program.

The shipbuilding program was achieved to the extent of 66-83 per cent, and only in regard to barge repairing was it as low at 13 per cent.

From 60-90 per cent of the work for farming equipment was performed.

The program of machine manufacturing was performed to the extent of 12 per cent for engines of inside combustion, and from 38-60 per cent of various machines and lathes.

From 20-28 per cent of the program for automobile and motorcycle repairing was carried out.

The same policy of concentration was applied to the textile industry. The textile factories were nationalized and combined into separate units for joint work. Uniting of mills of similar character on a certain territory into one unit for joint work with one administration was the most popular form of concentration in this industry. Such units are called "Shrubs." In Central Russia the following units were created: *Presnenskoe*, consisting of four mill factories, with 2,090 spinning spindles, 7,180 weaving looms, thirty-two printing machines, *Moscowsko-Bladimorskoe*, consisting of four factories with 309,936 spinning spindles, 6,760 weaving looms, thirty-five printing machines, *Daniilovskoe*, consisting of seven factories with 189,824 spinning spindles, 5,845 weaving looms, thirty-four printing machines; *Serpouchovskoe*, eight factories, 28,454 spinning spindles, 7,858 weaving looms, thirty-nine printing machines; *Kovrovskoe*, twelve factories, 232,556 spinning spindles, 7,615 weaving looms, twenty-one printing machines; *Orechovolikinskoe*, eight factories, 521,356 spinning spindles, 11,490 weaving looms, eight printing machines; *Ivanovo-Vosnesenskoe*, four factories, 159,664 spindles, 9,460 looms; *Teikovskoe*, three factories, 93,994 spindles, 3,523 looms; *Tverskoe*, six factories, 456,608 spindles, 11,553 looms, twenty-four printing machines; *Saratovskoe*, four factories, 58,040 spindles, 128 looms; *Bogorodskoe*, four factories, 298,772 spindles, 7,870 looms, four printing machines; *Kineshemskoe*, four factories, 223,190 spindles, 5,444 looms. Thus, the above thirteen units cover about seventy to eighty

per cent of the normal production of the textile industry, and include seventy-two factories with 324,974 spindles, 90,115 looms, 221 printing machines.*

Due to a shortage of coal and an inadequate supply of cotton, part of the above mills could not continue their work, and in April and May of this year only four-four per cent of the mills were working, with fifty-three per cent of the spindles, forty-six per cent of the looms, and seventy-two per cent of the printing machines. On account of the shortage of coal 86,000 workmen were dismissed, and at the rest of the mills part time work only was going on. In accordance with the information of the Centrotexile in March and April of this year only 523,000 poods of cotton were to be found on the territory of Soviet Russia. In Turkestan there were about five million poods of cotton fibre, and ten million poods of raw cotton. Nevertheless, these supplies were only of potential importance, and could not be delivered to Russia in the immediate future.

The way to Turkestan, which was for a long time cut off from the rest of Russia by counter-revolutionist armies, is open now, but to obtain there cotton and cotton fibre immediately, is impossible. We must wait for the restoration of the transport system, which suffered most from the war activities. Thus, the improvement of the position of our textile industry is still a thing of the future, although not such a distant future at that. But, notwithstanding all the difficulties of the present situation, the textile industry continued its work. According to the report of the Centrotexile, 158 of the operating mills for three months (January-March, 1919), produced 28,953,481 yards of various piece goods, and 44,015 poods of yarn.

With the impoverished condition of our textile industry even such production counts and is useful.

The position of the textile mills of the Petrograd District was the same, and their supplies of cotton were of a more or less casual character.

It was supposed that according to the program the following quantities of yarn would be manufactured: By the *Sampsonievski mills*, 5,740 poods; by the *New-Paper mills*, 9,500 poods; by *Vibourgskoi*, 7,500 poods; by *Petrovsko-Spasskoi*, 10,650 poods. But in reality there were produced: by *Sampsonievski*, 4,042 poods; *New Paper mills*, 7,640 poods; by *Vibourgskoi*, 1,782 poods, and by *Petrovsko-Spasskoi*, 5,781 poods of yarn. On the whole only fifty to sixty per cent of the work outlined in the program was achieved by the Petrograd District. The chief evil and hindrance in the production of these mills is the shortage of fuel and raw materials. Comparatively better is the position of the woolen industry. According to information of the 1st of July, nationalization of this industry was almost complete.

* One unit seems to have been omitted which accounts for the discrepancies in the totals.

Two factories of the Petrograd Unit were nationalized and twenty-eight factories of the Moscow Unit. Petrograd mills of fine woolen goods are provided with raw materials and fuel for a considerable length of time, but the Moscow mills are worse off, as part of the factories are provided with fuel for only two to three months, and some even less than that. The administration of the textile industry has decided to reopen only eight of the largest mills, and to close down the rest temporarily.

The position of the mills manufacturing heavy woolen goods is still worse, due to a shortage of raw material, gordolent, and fuel. According to information from the Tombov District, it can be expected that about fifty per cent of the mills will be closed on account of the shortage of the above-mentioned materials. Only fifteen and a half per cent of the 46,242 spindles of the Moscow textile mills are working. The provincial mills are somewhat better off, as they would be in a position to work if they were supplied with some of the surrogates. In the warehouses of the Centrotextile there are about 150,000 poods of coarse wool, which will be enough to keep them going for two and a half months, and 110,000 poods of fine wool, enough to keep them going for four to five months.

The general position of our industry is very insecure and we must admit this frankly. It is explained by the fact, that our most important industrial centers, which are the foundation of our industry, are absolutely cut off from us.

Our metallurgical industry was hindered in its development and is in very poor condition, as the Ural metal mines and the Donets Coal Basin were cut off for a long time and only now is there a possibility of using to a certain extent the work of the Ural metal mines.

The work of the Donets Coal Basin which is the foundation of our industry, is badly injured, and it is problematical whether it can be revived in the near future. The only way out of this difficulty is to seize such districts as were taken away from us. Without contact with Soviet Russia these districts cannot exist and develop, notwithstanding their natural riches. As for instance, Turkestan cotton cannot be gathered and used in case there are no direct transportation facilities with Soviet Russia, which provides Turkestan with bread. Unable to obtain the grain, imports of which from Russia fell off in 1917, the natives of Turkestan have cut down the area of cotton plantations from seventy to eighty per cent, and thus have almost eliminated this very important branch of industry. If Turkestan will not be provided with bread this year, the area of cotton plantations will be cut down again, and thus finally it will lead to complete disorganization and confusion in this industry. In the same manner, the Donets Coal Basin cannot be looked upon as an independent unit; for its work it requires building and binding materials, dynamite, all kinds of drills and machines from Soviet Russia.

The Caucasus oil industry is in the same posi-

tion. It requires all kinds of metals for drilling and binding the oil wells, building timber of large sizes, steel ropes, and other materials. Without these materials this industry is disintegrating. And further, without an outlet to Soviet Russia, there is no way of exporting its riches.

The Soviet Government has to solve the following problems of economic construction. First of all it is necessary to unite with those districts which are our source of raw materials and fuel, as without contact with them the existence of Soviet Russia will not be possible. Relations with foreign countries will undoubtedly be resumed in the near future, as they cannot get along without Russia's raw materials. Their own supplies of raw materials are exhausted to the limit, and naturally, they will have to apply to Russia to furnish them with Russian timber, flax, etc. Business relations with Western Europe will be gradually resumed, even if Russia retains the Soviet form of government, and Europe the present form of capitalistic government.

These relations will be concentrated in the hands of the Soviet Government and will be conducted in accordance with existing plans of the Soviet Government. The blockade, which Russia is undergoing at present, cannot last much longer, and when it is lifted, and normal relations with Europe are resumed, we shall furnish them with raw materials which they are in need of, and will get in exchange manufactured products and materials, necessary for the strengthening and restoration of our industry and our industrial activities.

The fundamental principles which were in the past proclaimed by the Soviet Government are being realized and practiced in the interior of the country.

Nationalization of industry on a large scale, and the transfer of same into the hands of the working masses, was the basis of our politics.

The nationalization of industry has gone through many different stages in its development—from a disorderly, purely anarchistic—to a harmonious, systematic nationalization of whole branches of industry as well as separate enterprises, and organization of councils for the purpose of administrating this nationalized industry.

The next step in this direction would be to put in order and to systemize all that which has been previously done by the Soviets.

The main point of our economic reconstruction activities of recent days is the organization of such administrating units as could cope with the difficulties of managing the newly nationalized industry and which could regulate the activities of various branches of our industry.

Judging by the recent facts, we are solving this problem to a certain extent, successfully, and in our work we have to depend a great deal on labor organizations—trade unions—which are at the head of our industrial and economic life.

The general situation of Soviet Russia is such, that the work of realizing our plans is being met

with great difficulties, but nevertheless, the creative work in every line of our economic life is being continued in spite of all.

The necessary basis for our work is the lifting of the blockade against Soviet Russia, and the restoration of connections with our sources of

fuel and raw materials. This can only be achieved as a result of a vigorous fight of proletarian Russia with her enemies on all fronts. Every step forward in this direction will give us a stronger foothold and will determine our success which means life or death for Soviet Russia.

Through Latvia and Esthonia to Russia

By JAKOB FRIIS

REVAL is an extremely old city. It is still very medieval in its character, and reminds one of various German towns, particularly Nurnberg. The old wall around the inner part of the city has survived the ravages of time, almost unimpaired. If one climbs up on this wall, in the evening, or enters one of the old round towers, it is very easy to dream of former times when each town lived its own separate life, in constant fear of foreign conquerors. From this wall one has a view of the low land toward the sea. The enemy who would make an attack upon Reval must be prepared to lose many men while storming the castle gates.

Reval has ancient associations with Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians. Its Esthonian name is "Talinin" which means "the Danish city." It was founded by the Danish king, Valdemar, in 1219, and the three Danish leaves are still extant in its emblem. The population, however, even in those early times, consisted largely of Low Germans, and the city became during the 14th and 15th centuries, one of the most important towns of the Hanseatic league. One of its oldest churches, dating from the 13th century, is called St. Olaus Church, in honor of the Norwegian king, Saint Olaf. In 1561 the city came under Swedish rule and was entirely Swedish until 1719, when it became Russian. There are many reminders of the Swedish rule everywhere. It was with great apparent pride that Comrade Grimlund (who in spite of his Socialism is not without reverence for "glorious memories") called my attention to the many Swedish names upon the old noblehouses at the "Cathedral," that upper part of Reval which is located upon the cliffs, behind the castle wall.

At Reval we had our passports vised by the Russian representative, Gukovski, but in order to cross the frontier we had also to obtain permission from both the Esthonian Foreign Department and the General Staff, as well as a doctor's certificate to prove that we were not suffering from either typhus or cholera. At the Foreign Department there was not much haste shown. Day after day we were detained, always with promises, and when we at last obtained our permission and reached Narva we were also held there. Again permission had to be obtained from the commandant of the border town here, and we were compelled to remain in Narva, though we were eager to get on. We had experienced a view of typhus at close range, earlier in our journey, but it was not until

we reached Narva that we could realize what a plague-infected city meant. The hospitals here were crowded with typhus patients, mostly soldiers from the army of Yudenich. At the hotel, an unclean, unsanitary, place, we met two men from the American Red Cross. They told us of their fight against typhus. Tightly enclosed in rubber coats they had washed house after house with carbolic acid and creosote, and had thereby decreased the death rate in the city to about five per cent, as I remember it. We sent a detailed telegram about their work, from Narva, but unfortunately kept no copy of it. It has not arrived. The Narva authorities probably found it compromising for Esthonia. (In the imagination of western Europe, it is not in Esthonia, but in Russia, that typhus rages.)

My impressions of Narva will never desert me. It was diabolical, that city. The plague was felt and seen everywhere, but upon the streets there walked the elegant ladies, the "light guard" of the Yudenich army, nonchalantly, with soldiers and officers. It seemed that the thought of the nearness of death brought the "joy of living" to a hectic flush upon their cheeks.

As is well known, Narva is famous for its conquest by Charles the XII, in 1700. It is a war town from top to bottom. The great castle walls stand as relics of the time when war was the order of the day,—as indeed it still seems to be. Upon the wide fields outside the city, armies have met many a time and oft. Narva, the typical border town, the town where one lives on the border between life and death.

THE PROTECTION OF LABOR IN SOVIET RUSSIA

By S. KAPLUN
of the Commissariat of Labor

This pamphlet, reprinted for the first time from an English translation that appeared in Petrograd this year, is an authoritative study of the actual operation of the Code of Labor Laws, which has already been reprinted by us in pamphlet form.

Price Ten Cents

SOVIET RUSSIA

Room 304

110 West 40th Street

New York, N. Y.

Press Cuttings

THE NINTH CONVENTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF RUSSIA

Concerning the ninth party-convention of the Communist Party of Russia, which ended on April 5 of this year, the *Pravda* of April 6 writes as follows:

The ninth party-convention of the Communist Party of Russia came to an end on April 5 of this year. The work of this convention differs sharply from that of the other congresses of the revolutionary party. It is sufficient to compare the decisions made at the former conventions of the party with the practical measures passed at the ninth party-convention, instead of resolutions, in order to realize the vast difference between our past and our present.

Until the seventh party-convention our party was one that was still striving for the power with which to destroy the old regime. The seventh party-convention concerned itself almost exclusively with questions of foreign policy. The eighth party-convention had to decide upon the right course of action for the working class in relation to the peasants and to determine in its program the lines of future activity. The ninth party-convention, which convened on the boundary of two epochs—that of war and that of peace (so far as we can, at this time, speak of peace at all)—proceeded under the motto: *work*.

Not until now has it been possible for the Soviet Republic to devote all its energy to work, and it is therefore no wonder that the governing party of the proletariat in its congress treated as a cardinal question the organization of work in the new society. It was a *congress of real builders of the future*.

Before the party-convention of the Communist Party of Russia there existed some differences within the party. These resulted from the limited experience of different groups of members, groups that were active in various fields. It is only quite natural that the activity in the army, in the workers' unions, the politico-economic councils, and the party, so far as those concerned are active exclusively within a special domain and limit themselves to it, should impart a particular stamp to their thoughts and feelings. For that reason just such a party-convention is needed to sum up and unify these individual experiences, to consider different phases of the work and, on the basis of such checking-up, to find a fixed and precise line of action in the matter of party-policy.

The party, as a whole, has of course before this party-convention recognized the need of intensive work. Some there were, to be sure, who were undecided concerning both the question of militarizing the work and the question of methods of management. The convention declared by an overwhelming majority that the highest degree of reality, feeling of responsibility, conscientiousness, and discipline is necessary. It put aside petty illusions and proclaimed the necessity of undertaking a rigid organization of the work throughout the working class itself.

Self-organization.—Constantly the need of a still closer contact with the masses was emphasized. From this it followed that the convention, after it had rejected all talk about independence of the unions, talk revealing a syndicalist-menshevik spirit, emphasized at the same time with all possible clearness that the role of the unions in the domain of organization of production must continually grow in importance. The convention condemned, in unmistakable terms, the attempt of some comrade to minimize this role. More than that, the convention supported unequivocally the view represented by Lenin that the most important problem of the day, without the solution of which we would not be able to avert the threatening situation which has arisen through economic disorganization, is the

actual complete unification of party and union tactics.

The question of organization was likewise one of the purely practical questions which were also treated in a purely practical way. To these purely practical questions belonged also the militia question.

There was nothing clamorous or sensational. On the contrary, the debates at the convention might even seem prosaic. This is, however, an indication of our gigantic growth! We no longer discourse in general terms on what will perhaps be; we consult about what is to take place immediately.

The party emerges from the ninth party-convention just as firmly united as before. Undivided and heroic, radiant with joy in work and combat, it prepares for a new campaign—the most difficult one—the campaign against decay, and with it marches the living embodiment of its unity, of its iron will, Lenin, the man who on the threshold of the sixth decade of his life leads and guides the Russian proletarians who have rebelled.—*Die Rote Fahne*, Vienna, June 9, 1920.

THE LABOR SITUATION IN MALIGNED RUSSIA

Since the newspaper press of the world has spread misleading and false reports about conditions in Soviet Russia, the telegraph bureau *Rosta* is now using every opportunity to obtain the most exact information possible from the foremost representative of the trade unions in Russia, the former Minister of Labor, Alexander Schlapnikov, who kindly gave us an interview shortly before his departure from Stockholm last Saturday.

One of the most frequently repeated lies which has obtained wide circulation is the assertion that a twelve-hour working day has been enforced upon the workers of Soviet Russia. Although *Rosta* has received daily reports direct from Moscow to the effect that in various parts of Russia, in factories, mills, and other workshops, the workers themselves have voluntarily decided to extend the working day, yet even when these reports have been printed the newspapers have given them misleading headlines in order to create false impressions about notices which have been correctly printed. (For instance *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 16.)

Our first inquiry directed to Mr. Schlapnikov was, therefore: "What are the real facts in connection with the length of the working day in Soviet Russia?" He gave us the following answer: "The question as to the length of the working day is in every case solved by the trades unions of that particular trade and with the approval of the workers in that particular industry. As a general rule the question of the lengthening of the working day beyond eight hours has come up very rarely. The attempt to increase labor productivity by lengthening working hours is not at all the last word in the labor policy of Russia. On the contrary we strive to use every expedient which will increase production by utilizing labor power and technical means, such as machinery, within the eight-hour working day and seven hours of night work. The increase of labor productivity by increasing the number of working hours per day was used principally in the sphere of strictly war industry, and all time over the eight-hour day was paid for at the rate of one and one-half the normal rate, and in addition special prizes were given for the increased production resulting therefrom. The workers could not be compelled, naturally, to work beyond that standard set by the decree of the eight-hour day, but class instincts and the desire to defend the republic against its enemies and against economic ruin spurred the workers to a voluntary increase of their working intensity by every means at their disposal."

Our second question was: "What is the truth in regard to the conflicts between the workers and the

Soviet powers, which certain papers have called 'hair raising?'"

"As far as statements about bloody conflicts between the workers and the Soviet power are concerned, and about any repressive influence or authority of the Soviet power, these statements are simply lies. During the civil war the working class was, to a large extent, deprived of its best developed members who either joined voluntarily or were mobilized into the ranks of the Red Army to fight on the fronts. This naturally decreased the level of the conscious intelligence of the workers of the factories and mills, as well as their numbers. The working class, like every other large aggregation of human beings, is not without its 'black sheep' and even among us there were a few counter-revolutionists, as well as provocateurs left from the old Czarist times, especially among the former officers, and the bourgeoisie, who took positions at factories and elsewhere merely to conduct counter-revolutionary activities. On account of the lack of food and the activities of these provocateurs, there have been strikes at Moscow and at Petrograd and attempts have even been made to destroy industrial establishments, such as the water supply of Petrograd, in the spring of 1919. But all these conflicts were solved by the forces and means of the labor organizations, the Soviets, the trade unions, and the factory committees. All these strikes were of short-lived character, and nowhere was the interference of the military power necessary. Just here I may remind you that the guarding of the factories of the war industry has been in every instance entrusted to the labor administration of the workers, all of whom have realized the responsibility of defending the property of the republic against the attempts of the counter-revolutionists to destroy it.

"Those who assert that the labor administration in industrial enterprises in Soviet Russia have 'gone bankrupt' are wrong," Schlapnikov continued. "The facts are the contrary. The labor administration has saved industry from ruin, that ruin which impends wherever capitalist sabotage and speculation lead. The labor administration has obtained great importance and the sphere of its influence widens daily. The labor organizations have now many thousands of active administrators at their disposal. The intelligentsia takes, in the form of technical and administrative direction, a most active part in industry and in the work of the trade unions. The engineers within the metal industry have amalgamated themselves into a special section, and work in the most intimate connection with the metal organizations of all Russia.

"The unity principle in its literal meaning does not exist with us. All the larger industries are conducted by responsible labor administrators who are elected by the labor organizations. All industrial enterprises of a complicated kind are conducted by councils, but subordinate branches, or factories and mills of a simpler nature and for less complicated production, are occasionally conducted by individuals in connection with responsible administrators appointed by the trades unions. As a rule, I might say, that where important decisions in regard to the administration of mills must be made, a council assists, but at those mills which have only to execute the decisions of the head administrators even individuals, or directors, or administrators, may be personally responsible for the accomplishment of the program of production. Laborers may act as directors."

Our last question concerned the transportation system in Russia.

"We have, during the past year," Schlapnikov said, "taken prompt measures as to our rolling stock, and particularly engines. For the present we have succeeded in stopping the continuing increase of disabled engines. The railroad factories are now reorganized according to new factory principles. Up to recent times they have been in the hands of the specific railroad bureaucracy well-known for its routine and hostility to everything that does not bear the seal of the head office. Nowadays we employ our best qualified labor and admini-

strative forces for the transportation department, and with the announce of liquid fire from Grosny and Baku transportation is greatly improving and the results of our activity will make a better showing still, within the next few months. The first and greatest improvement will occur when we are able to renew our entire rolling-stock, and especially engines, of which twenty-five per cent are between twenty and fifty years old. A great number of engines are ready in America for our railroads, and the Americans have been compelled to build special storehouses for them. They cannot use them there themselves on account of the difference in the rail width of the roads.—*Folkets Dagblad Politiken*, April 22, 1920.

THE TRAGEDY OF NIKOLAIEVSK

The Japanese rescue army discovered on its arrival at the harbor that the entire Japanese army and civilian population, with the exception of a few women (fourteen in number) who had married Russians and Chinese, had been massacred. Some Japanese had survived the first battle as prisoners. But with the approach of the rescue army in the harbor, it is reported that the so-called Partisans left the city killing these prisoners. We are deeply sorry for those unfortunates who met with disaster. At the same time we cannot but deplore the thoughtless policy toward Russia which finally caused this tragedy. Had we speedily withdrawn our army from Siberia, such a terrible event would never have happened! At any rate the stationing of a small army in a distant place like Nikolaievsk with the detention of our countrymen there was the root of a mistake. Look! It seems that at Nikolaievsk there were not only Japanese, but also other foreigners. Yet they did not suffer at all. Moreover, is it not the case that the Chinese joined the Partisans and attacked our countrymen? What does this mean? It means nothing but that the Japanese are a target of hatred for all the people in the Far East. What are our people to do about this state of affairs? Although the cruelty of the Partisans is detestable, at the same time our people must seriously think of their own position.—From the *Oriental Economist*, June 12, 1920.

THE OCCUPATION OF NIKOLAIEVSK IS WRONG!

Moreover, we cannot but question the policy of the government in its action in regard to the present situation at Nikolaievsk, by dispatching the reserve army there. As far as we can understand, it seems that our government has deliberately dispatched an army there, without consulting with any of the Russian governments. It is even reported that the Japanese military authorities compelled the Investigating Committee sent by the Vladivostok Provisional Government to return from Alexandrovsk. Moreover the Partisans, being nothing but a group of people, there is no responsible body against whom the Japanese can enter a protest. Thereupon, according to a street rumor, it is repeatedly reported that the Japanese army occupying Nikolaievsk and surrounding strategic points, will not readily give them back to the Russians. We think such a thing impossible, but from the very beginning the government has assumed an attitude of not recognizing any of the Russian governments and so it despatched the army without consulting any Russian government. This street rumor is the natural result. But we say in advance that the Japanese are now a target of hatred for the Russians. Although Japan may temporarily seize Nikolaievsk and other points, as long as this thought is not erased from the mind of the Russians, Japan can never safely keep them. Nay more, if Japan should manifest her territorial ambition, her already difficult position in Siberia, in the Far East, and in the world will grow worse. There is no reason for our government—though it be foolish—to do such a thing.—From the *Oriental Economist*, June 12, 1920.

Documents

PEACE OFFER TO JAPAN

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tokio.

February 24.

Immediately upon its formation, the Russian Soviet Government proclaimed the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, a principal which became the basis of the peace decree of the Soviet Government. Beginning with the month of December, 1917, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs entered into pourparlers with M. Uyeda on the subject of revision of all relations between Russia and Japan, and proposed the conclusion of a new commercial and economic agreement, as well as a convention on the situation in the Far East and on the Pacific littoral. The proposals of the Russian Soviet Government were received by the Japanese Ambassador for communication to his government. However, no reply was received from the latter. Similar proposals were again made by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1918 through the offices of the Japanese Consul, Marimoa Vologda. This time again our proposals were received for transmission to Tokio, but there was no result. In his report to the Fifth Congress of the Soviets, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs expressed once again the desire of the Soviet Government to find a peaceful solution to all the questions pending between itself and Japan. The peace proposals which were repeatedly presented by the Soviet Government to the governments of the Entente were always addressed to them jointly and individually and each time aimed at negotiations of peace with the Japanese Government. At the present time, when all the attempts made to crush by arms the power of the workers and peasants of Russia have proved their absolute inanity, when the Entente governments have withdrawn their expeditionary forces from Russia, and when various governments have already entered into pourparlers with the Russian Soviet Government, we address once more to the Japanese Government the proposal to engage in peace negotiations. The peoples of Russia cherish no aggressive designs against Japan. The Soviet Government has no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of the Japanese people. It fully recognizes the special economic and commercial interests of Japan in the Far East, interests surpassing in several respects those of other countries. It is equally interested in concluding an agreement on this subject which will be useful and of benefit to both parties. The Russian Soviet Government wishes to establish a *modus vivendi* guaranteeing peace between Russia and Japan, and the reciprocal advantages resulting for both countries from the relations to be established between them. Taking into consideration the numerous voices which reach our ears, even from Japan, demanding the security of the needs of the Japanese people by the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Gov-

ernment, the Russian Government expresses the certainty that these needs will be satisfied in effect by the agreement which it intends to conclude with Japan. It does not doubt at all that in view of the deplorable state of affairs resulting from the Japanese expedition in Siberia, and of the growing opposition in Japan even among the powerful political parties against this expedition, it will soon be withdrawn. The People's Commissariat therefore proposes to the Japanese Government to engage in negotiations of peace with the purpose of guaranteeing to the two peoples a peaceful existence of friendship and the mutual satisfaction of their reciprocal interests.

Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
CHICHERIN.

DECLARATION OF INTELLECTUAL WORKERS OF MOSCOW

[The declaration which is printed below was published by a group of intellectuals in Soviet Russia who organized a "Union of Intellectual Workers." Among the founders of this union were many eminent scientists, professors and academicians, such as V. Bekhterev, S. Oldenburg; industrial entrepreneurs and bankers—V. Tarnovsky (formerly an owner of steamers and mills), A. Brofman (formerly Director of the Petrograd Credit Corporation), Zhelvatk (ex-President of the Council of the Ural industrial mines); lawyers, engineers, writers, etc., as, for instance: V. Planson, Margolis, P. Voronov (former General of the General Staff, and Director of the magazine "Russkaya Starina"); former officials of the old regime: A. Babnevsky, S. Korf (an ex-Senator), N. Yalachin, and others.]

THE DECLARATION

We, the undersigned—members of the "Group of Russian Intellectual Workers", adherents of various trends of political and socialist thought—having witnessed all the events occurring in Russia during the last few years, have united for the purpose of applying our energy and our knowledge to restore the productive ability of our country, and to save the balance of culture which was left by the war and the revolution. We also appeal to the public opinion of Europe and America and to our fellow countrymen abroad to point out the only way which could restore as speedily as possible the economic might of the nation and would lead to the resumption of commercial relations between western Europe and Russia.

The revolution in process over two years has entirely destroyed the foundation of the old regime and is persistently forging new forms of the political and social structure. These changes are inevitably accompanied by certain excesses. This movement is reflected in all countries, which, after this unprecedented war, are in need of peace and of the essential means of a cultural life during the

restoration of order and the establishment of a new system in Russia. These, it seems to us, are the causes which prompt the ruling spheres of other countries to attempt to establish a strong political and economic regime in Russia.

As foreign aid is necessary for the economic and productive life of Russia—and this question affects the interests of all countries—just so is foreign intervention and particularly military intervention a danger to the internal policy of the population, constituting 150 millions. In Russia the people are themselves—at the price of suffering and struggle—organizing their new life, their future. For there is no doubt that the ways of violence will bring no positive results, but, on the contrary, will serve as a source of new suffering for the revolutionary people and will lead to the disappearance of the last traces of civilization.

In view of all this, our Russian emigrants must revise their opinions and convictions, which, in their present form, do not conform to the real needs of the country nor to the sentiments and convictions of the popular masses and, particularly, of the numerous groups of intellectuals, whose opinions underwent a radical transformation during these last months in the course of which days and hours seemed like years.

One may, of course, deprecate the excesses which took place in Russia and which merit condemnation, but it is necessary that the Russian intellectuals should not charge these negative actions of a passing nature to the whole Russian people, whose suffering should be mitigated by concessions and individual sacrifices.

The political and economic situation of Russia is obviously severe. Russia is in need of a new jurisprudence, without which civil life is impossible; she is in need of economic reforms and of conditions which would facilitate production and the development of her forces.

But as to the direction which the revolutionary process will take in the future, as to the directing ideas which will ultimately triumph and which will determine the change in the psychology of the people,—all this cannot be foreseen. At any rate, for weighty reasons this change cannot be acted upon by means of violence.

The sole viewpoint on the Russian question is the following: To continue to keep this colossal country isolated from the whole world until she will have solved her economic and social problems is an impossibility.

The interests of Russia and of other countries do not permit this, and the present state of affairs demands:

1. The cessation of any armed intervention in the internal affairs of Russia.

2. The resumption of spiritual and business relations with Russia, irrespective of the regime existing in this country.

3. That extensive aid be furnished the Russian people for the restoration of its economic, material and spiritual forces.

Profoundly convinced that Russia will overcome all difficulties and will reconstruct a new civilized life, we are confident that the ruling spheres of the public opinion of Europe will regard our hopes with sympathy, will respond to our appeal, and will help the Russian people in its efforts to find the road to peaceful toil.

RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Moscow, June 8.

In order to aid the campaign of the laboring masses of Karelia for their social enfranchisement, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee has decided: First, to establish in the localities inhabited by Karelians in the province of Olonets and Archangel, in accordance with article eleven of the Constitution, a distinct regional unity, the Karelian Commune. Second, to charge the Karelian Committee, composed of Comrades Clysing, Jaques Miakki and Vassili Kondjiev, to prepare without delay the assembly of the Soviet Congresses of the Karelian Commune, which assembly will determine the organization of power in this commune.

President of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee,

KALININ.

Secretary, JENUKILSE.

TEXT OF THE TREATY BETWEEN SEMIONOV AND JAPAN

The *Peking and Tien-Tzin Times* of May 27 contains the complete text of the treaty which was concluded between General Semionov, the "lawful successor" to Admiral Kolchak, and Japan, and which was signed by Semionov's representative Nuritov on September 28, 1919. The contents of this treaty are as follows:

1. All governments formed by the Bolsheviki or any political party after the fall of the Kolchak government shall not be recognized by Japan and she must fight them by force.

2. In the recruiting of volunteers for Semionov's army Japan must continuously support Semionov financially, under the control of Japanese officials.

3. Japan must drive out all the Bolsheviki from Siberia.

4. Without regard for the opinion of the Allies, Japan must convince Kolchak of the necessity to transfer all his power to General Semionov.

5. After the fall of the so-called Omsk Government of Kolchak, Japan must immediately recognize General Semionov as the Supreme Ruler of all Siberia.

6. Japan must reorganize the Russian monetary system, in recompense for which she will receive the following:

a. Russia must turn over to Japan as security certain real properties.

b. Japan obtains special leasing rights in the Amur and Primorsk provinces.

c. If the Japanese forces should reach the Ural, Japan gets full ownership rights in the Ural mines. —*Krasnoye Znamya*, Vladivostok, June 8, 1920.

Appeal

Of the First All-Russian Congress of the Agricultural Communes and Artels to the Toiling Peasants

To you, comrades, peasants, the first All-Russian Congress of Agricultural Communes and Artels addresses an ardent appeal to join in the construction of a new, socialist economy. The severe economic distress which the Soviet Republic is living through demands of all of us extraordinary efforts for the reconstruction of our economy, destroyed by the imperialistic war. Only we, the many-millioned peasantry, can and must supply bread to the workers, who will intensify the work in the factories and workshops to manufacture for us the necessary articles of consumption, and agricultural implements. The speediest rehabilitation of railway transport also depends on us. At the same time we must always remember our comrades at the front, who are thrashing the White Guard bands. For them, first of all, we must assure bread and provisions. In addition, we must vanquish another enemy—the cold; we must take upon ourselves the gathering and delivery of wood for the cities and railways. In order to conquer our foes, the enemy at the front and the cold in the rear, we must be organized in communes and in toiling artels. With strict conscious comradeship discipline and with universal revolutionary energy, we will emerge victorious.

The first All-Russian Congress of Communes and Artels has already decided upon a number of measures to furnish every kind of aid to the toiling peasantry and to the families of the Red soldiers, such as:

For the organization and improvement of agriculture, in the artisan industry, by the opening of various shops to repair agricultural implements, to pare hides, to make felt boots, to do tailoring, carpentering and other work. To open loan stations and to establish electric stations to serve the communes and artels as well as the neighboring population. To develop large and small breeding cattle, fowl breeding, and rearing of bees; to organize dairies; to establish seed-plots for gardening; to organize Sundayings to help the families of the Red soldiers and the poorest peasants; to open people's houses, reading rooms, libraries, kindergartens; and to furnish all kinds of aid to the toiling peasantry, and by advice and explanations to settle arising conflicts.

Comrades peasants, organize and unite into a single toiling communal family, for our strength is in union.

The Soviet power, the powers of the workers and peasants, has furnished and will furnish all kinds of aid to the toiling peasantry, and organized into communes and toiling artels, we will overcome all the obstacles on our path and will emerge victorious from the struggle.

Long live a world Commune and the Toiling Peasantry!

Long live the brotherhood of all toilers!

Long live the world leaders of Communism!—*Izvestia*, December 25, 1919.

BLACK SEA MUTINEERS

The following appeal has been issued by the committee appointed to defend the heroes of the Black Sea Mutiny among the French sailors stationed in that region and is taken by us from a recent issue of a French newspaper:

"For having refused to be the accomplices of a government which, in direct violation of all constitutional law, has been guilty of one of the greatest crimes in history—the treacherous attack upon the Soviet Republic—the crews of the Black Sea Fleet are in captivity.

"And their crime? They have refused to starve into submission a great people heroically struggling for freedom; they have refused to bombard undefended towns; they have refused to massacre women and children, and old men who received them as brothers; they have trusted to the word of honor of their officers, and in the justice of their country.

"Their self-sacrifice, their faith in the ideal of human solidarity will ever stand out as an example to all who fight for the emancipation of the world.

"Their idealism and fidelity to principle has won for them the fervent admiration of lovers of freedom the world over; and the oppressed of all lands can take courage from the thought that in one country at least there are men willing to dare all rather than slaughter their fellow-men at the bidding of the bloodhounds that rule over them.

"Citizens of town and country, workers of all trades, and of all creeds! to the rescue!

"Remembering the grandeur of their deeds and of the motives which prompted them, surely the heart and conscience of every one of you must revolt against the sufferings your sailor comrades are called upon to endure. Come, then, to our aid and help to wring from their persecutors the amnesty they have so long delayed."

TRANSPORT ON THE VOLGA

The Moscow paper *Pravda*, of June 15, gives the following information with reference to the work of the water transport:

Up to June 1 by the river Volga there were transported:

	Thousands of poods* in 1919	Thousands of poods in 1920
Bread	1,375	7,189
Salt	2,526	3,381
Wood	5,494	3,943
Timber	381	15,885
Petroleum	2,085	8,444
	<hr/> 11,861	<hr/> 44,842
By the Maryinsky waterway:		
	In 1919	In 1920
Bread	50	263
Salt	2	61
Wood	4,119	9,457
Timber	245	1,395
Petroleum	187	283
	<hr/> 4,603	<hr/> 11,459

It is necessary to point out that the reports referring to the year 1919 (covered in the above figures) are complete, whereas reports for 1920 from some parts are delayed, thus the total number of poods transported in 1920 (when the report is complete) will be greatly increased.

These figures indicate that the work of Russian transport in 1920 has improved in comparison with 1919.

* A pood equals about 36 pounds avoirdupois.

Official Communications of the Soviet Government

ECONOMIC AND OTHER ITEMS

May 24, 1920.

THE FIRST OF MAY

The workers of the March factory at Moscow had refused to work on the First of May and to perform their three hours of work supplementary to the week of the front. A general conference of the workers of the quarter voted disapproval of them. Since the day following the reproach eight hundred workers of the March factory enrolled with the factory committee for work on the first of May. The following day the general assembly of the March factory unanimously withdrew the first resolution adopted against working and decided that in the future the March factory would not limit itself to giving an example itself, but would watch over the good conduct of all other factories on the laboring front.

The journals continue their reports of the First of May. Sosnovski relates how the work went on in the Kremlin, where everybody worked, even Lenin, who was seen with a group of eight workers carrying enormous logs. There were present also the members of the Executive Committee, several commissaries of the people, the members of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions. The rest of the day Lenin delivered several speeches; one was at the inauguration of the monument to liberated labor, replacing the old monument of Alexander the Third. "The capitalist," said Lenin, "called it free labor when the workers and the peasants were obliged to sell them their labor or die of hunger. We call this work slavery. We know it is difficult suitably to organize free labor, especially in the period of transition. The voluntary labor on this holiday is the first step on this road, and, in continuing on the same way, we shall really create free labor." Lenin presided also at the inauguration of the monument to Marx. He inaugurated the Zagorski Workers' Palace in the Lefort quarter and recalled the devoted life of this old secretary of the Bolshevik group of Geneva. Lenin spoke also at the meetings in several quarters and in the factories. The President of the Central Executive Committee, Kalinin, and the Secretary, Lutovinov, worked all day as weighers in the Mikelson factory. In the same factory an oak was planted on the scene of the attempt upon Lenin's life in 1918.

IN THE CAUCASUS

Smilga, commanding the Caucasus front, has declared that the army of the Caucasus had taken every measure to restore the economic life of the country and especially to insure the cultivation of the fields. To this end the soldiers originally drawn from the Kuban have been sent home. The Caucasus labor army has already sent from Grosny by railroad one million five hundred thousand poods of naphtha, and is now repairing the Grosny-Petrovsk oil conduit.

1466. May 6, 1920.

AGRICULTURE

The Central Executive Committee has urged all the executive committees and agricultural sections of the provinces to use every resource in their power to insure the cultivation of the land of peasants who do not own horses.

PROTECTION OF LABOR

The Commissariat of Labor has elaborated a code of laws for social insurance, presenting in detail the rights of citizens and of their families in all cases of permanent or temporary loss of ability to work. This code will be published shortly by the Council of People's Commissars.

SOLIDARITY OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR

There has just arrived from Petrograd a group of Swedish and Norwegian metallurgical workers who have been placed in the factories for the repair of rolling stock.

FOOD RELIEF

At Petrograd, all citizens, in addition to the basic food ration, receive a varying supplementary ration, according to the kind of work done by them. This ration, called the labor ration, is of three kinds, first, for the manual workers who expend more energy; third, for the employes of Soviet institutions. By a recent decision the engineers taking direct part in production are included among the workers of the first class. The whole teaching staff is included among the workers of the second class. This supplementary ration is supplied only for the days of effective labor or legal rest.

INDUSTRIAL RENEWAL

At Petrograd the Salonin factory produced daily four hundred poods of soap powder as against fifty in January. The workers have taken as their motto: "Death to the economic crisis."

The nationalized paper-mills produced in the week of April 17-23, sixteen thousand five hundred and twenty-six poods of print paper for journals, an increase of about five thousand poods over the average of the preceding weeks.

During May there will be resumed at Petrograd the operation of the Phoenix and Lesner Junior factories, the Franco-Russian factory and the factory of Russian motors, previously shut down owing to lack of fuel. *Economic Life* already announces the resumption of work in the Lesner factory. The Phoenix factory will manufacture tools for the repair of rolling stock. The Franco-Russian factory will make copper tubes.

The national manufacture of porcelains at Petrograd is now proceeding on a larger scale than before the revolution. Whereas in December the average production of each worker reached one hundred and sixty pieces per month, it now attains

four hundred and fifty. The factory is making isolators for high-tension currents. The optical section is the fourth in the world. The manufacture of pyroscopes for the measurement of high temperatures is the second in the world, and has produced this year one hundred and forty-six thousand pieces as against the one hundred and twenty thousand expected. The factory has produced for the year seventeen thousand china pieces. The manufactory depending upon the Section of Beaux Arts of the Commissariat of Public Instruction has created a whole series of establishments, schools of ceramics and glass-works, professional courses, a library, and a museum, with a series of lectures for the workers.

EXPORTS

Soviet Russia possesses a stock of about two hundred fifty thousand standards of wood and seven hundred seventy-three railroad ties ready for export. In 1919 seventy per cent of the saw mills on Soviet territory were in operation. New large saw-mills are under construction in the north.

RAILROADS

Economic Life publishes a bulletin of information of the Commissariat of Ways of Communication, showing that the fuel situation on most of the railway systems is perfectly satisfactory. Several lines have used coal, peat, and naphtha instead of wood.

The shops of Kharkov have increased their repairing capacity to enable them to repair eight locomotives per day.

The Second Labor Army has repaired numerous special trains for the transport of naphtha from Grozny. Beginning with May 10, five trains will be sent out every day. In addition, necessary vessels are ready for the transport of naphtha by the Volga. At the same time, the Second Labor Army is continuing the construction of the Saratov railway. On the Uralsk-Iletsk sector the rails and ties are ready for placing. The work is proceeding simultaneously on the whole line.

VOCATIONAL INSTRUCTION

Supplementary courses are being instituted in the Agricultural Academy of Petrovsko-Razumovskoie to obtain earlier promotion of agriculturists.

IN SIBERIA

The productivity of work on the Tomsk line has increased about three hundred per cent. During the last three months two hundred and forty-eight locomotives have been repaired.

THE KAZAN LINE

The official figures for the operation of the Kazan line since the month of January show a constant improvement. The total number of cars daily loaded or received has increased from 940 to 1,303 in April. The average number of locomotives daily employed has grown from 57 to 82. The commercial speed has increased. The duration of stoppage of material has diminished as well as the number of cars awaiting unload-

ing, which has been reduced from 6,000 to 2,500. The number of arrivals of grain at Moscow, at the Kazan station, has grown from 1,037 in January to 2,820 in April. In addition, a comparison of the figures shows that the fixed programs have been almost entirely carried out.

LABOR PROPAGANDA

The *Krasnaye Gazeta* of Petrograd has announced on the 25th of April that the average idleness of empty trains in the first week of April at Moscow was about three and a half days, while at Petrograd it was about six and a half. The journal asked the trainmen of Petrograd the reason for this fact, and invited them to reply. On the 5th of May the journal printed the following response from the station Moscow Vindava Rybinsk, at Petrograd: "The average idleness of merchandise trains was in our station about thirty-six hours on the 18th, that is, a day and a half." The journal continues that the station Moscow Vindava Rybinsk is not a case in point, since the trains at that station are two times less than at Moscow. Who then is to blame, where are the trains, where is the weak point which hinders the work of all the stations of Petrograd? Workers on the railways, reply! Thus the propaganda goes on with fact and emulation.

INDUSTRIAL REVIVAL

At Petrograd three new factories have resumed work, the "Beyond the Glue Seas" factory, the factory for re-inforced cement, and the sixth brick plant, all nationalized enterprises.

THE FIRST OF MAY IN SIBERIA

At Irkutsk there were counted at the fete of the First of May twelve thousand voluntary workers, not including the garrison, the railway men and the women who worked in sewing shops and hospitals. Numerous peasants came to offer themselves in repairing the road. At Yenissei six thousand persons took part in the grand celebration which followed the work.

FUEL

Economic Life publishes a study showing the immense significance in the transport crisis, of the necessity in which Russia was placed of using wood fuel for all machines. At present wood transport still occupies more than half of the loaded trains on all the lines, while every day only ninety-eight trains are loaded with coal. Every new train of coal from the Donets frees three trains of wood, that is, furnishes two trains more for the transport of other articles. In other words, the loss of coal from the Donets and of naphtha from Baku was equivalent to the suppression of two-thirds of its transport capacity for the railway system of Russia.

ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORTS

Economic Life states that the campaign undertaken for the improvement of the ways of communication has resulted in perfect co-ordination between the Supreme Council of National Economy

and the Commissariat of Ways of Communication. There has been created a mixed commission of transports, composed of the representatives of those two organs, which examines all questions of rolling stock, repair, production of changeable parts, manufacture of new material. In particular this commission is now studying the operation of the privileged group of factories designed for the construction and repair of rolling stock. This commission, furthermore, has great value in principle in that it coordinates the activity of the supreme organ of production and that of the transport services. The admitted program looks to the progressive reduction of the number of locomotives out of service until twenty per cent, the normal percentage, is reached January 1, 1923.

EXPLOITATION OF RAILWAYS

The figures published by the service of the exploitation of railways indicated an increase from February to March of two million, seventy-two thousand, two hundred and twenty-three versts traveled. In the same way the figures show an improvement in the rational utilization of locomotives, the average daily amount traveled by each locomotive being about sixty-five versts in February and mounting to seventy-two in March.

From December to March the total number of trains not employed productively, either because of lack of unloading or delays en route or through employment for storage for a long time, has diminished by more than ten thousand.

THE COMMUNIST SATURDAYS

Pravda writes on the subject of the first anniversary of the Communist Saturdays organized on the line Kazan-Moscow on the initiative of a workingman weaver. "One may say boldly that there does not now exist in all Soviet Russia a city where Communist Saturdays have not been organized. They are held even in the country. First the Communist workers were the only ones to take part in them, but soon the movement came to embrace both those without party affiliation and other classes than the workers. This immense extension of Communist Saturdays and their universal success, clearly indicate the extraordinary aptness which devised this form of organization of labor in the present period of transition, a form which has the more value in that it is the first realization of the collective and disinterested labor of the future."

Izvestia remarks that the internal organization of the Communist Saturdays during this year has made immense progress. Not only the quantity, but also the quality of the work is constantly increasing. More and more are the masses imbued with the idea of the necessity of an intensive, prolonged and disinterested labor. The proof of this is that the Saturdays have taken the form of weeks and months of intensive voluntary work.

RUSSIA AND FINLAND

1487. May 8, 1920.

Of the last attempts to conclude an armistice, at a meeting which took place at Rajajoki between Soviet Russia and Finland, Suhl, delegate of the Soviet Government, writes in "Izvestia":

"The pacific declarations of the Soviet Government have been reflected in the armistice conditions proposed by her. Far from claiming an inch of Finnish territory, the Soviet power was ready to admit the provisional neutralization of two contested parishes of the province of Olonets, leaving to the peace conference the definitive decision. In order to avoid every pretext of hostility in the interval, it proposed, also, all along the Russian-Finnish territory of 1914 a line of demarcation, or neutral zone, on both sides of this frontier. On the other hand, the Finnish Government immediately expressed the intention of occupying the northwest part of the province of Archangel, recently liberated from the Whites, together with Petchenga and an outlet on the sea, as well as the whole western part of the province of Olonets or Karelia. It next attempted to impose armistice conditions placing Russia in the most disadvantageous position in case of the resumption of hostilities. The Finnish delegation proposed a zone of protection, so-called, traced almost altogether upon Soviet territory and extending as far as the Murman line, embracing even the suburbs of Petrograd. From this zone Russia would have to retire its troops in favor of the troops of Mannerheim, said to be charged with the protection of the interests of the Finnish Government on wholly Soviet territory. Only in the southern zone was there admitted the presence of thirty to forty men of the Red Army per kilometre of frontier, and this to the very doors of Petrograd. The armistice conditions with regard to the sea, in their original form, would have forbidden all navigation with Petrograd and Kronstadt. Only towards the end the Finns allowed a free passage. The diplomacy of the Finnish military command was sewn with white thread. As soon as the question of Russo-Finnish pourparlers was decided in principle the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs left for London and Paris, taking with him Baron Enkel, Chief of the General Staff. The Finns, in thus developing their maximum program, declared with an altogether military frankness that this was not yet the last word of their government. Immediately following upon the arrival of Holsti and Enkel at London the pourparlers visibly dragged, the delegation retarding at pleasure the communication of new propositions announced, and prolonged sterile debates upon historic questions. In the meantime, Holsti and Enkel are at Paris, breakfast with the president, receive and confer decorations. The international barometer settles, Lord Curzon takes a firmer tone in his humanitarian propositions. The weather changes also in Finland and the tone of the declarations becomes a little provoking. The Russian delegation thus found itself obliged to reply that the

Finnish demands surpassed all that one could expect at the beginning of the pourparlers, it had provisionally to interrupt the negotiations and return to Moscow to report to the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic. Now the Polish invasion shows clearly the internal connection existing between the failure of the peace pourparlers with Poland and Finland. They are the threads of a single web, held somewhere, and some idea of which is given in the tone of Lord Curzon's radios. The people of Finland desire no war, they are resolutely opposed to it. If in spite of the desire of the enormous majority of the nation, the bourgeois government of Finland allows itself to be drawn into the path of imperialist adventurers and expects to make of its people an instrument for foreign interests, that is its affair. Every bourgeois government is free to break its neck as it sees best."

RELATIONS WITH PERSIA

[*Copy of the radio sent by Chicherin to Prince Firouz-Mirza, Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*] June 27, 1920.

Information obtained on the subject of the recent incident at Astara has enabled us to form an exact idea of the nature of this incident.

The city of Astara, finding itself partly on Persian and partly on Russian territory,—a small stream separating the two States—the Persian part of the city was made the object of an attack by armed bandits who crossed the frontier and attacked Russian territory and troops. The latter, during the engagement with the bandits which was forced upon them, found it necessary to conduct the battle partly in the quarters of the city belonging to Persia, especially since the inhabitants of these quarters implored them to do so. The Persian territory was then evacuated immediately by the Russian troops, who are at present on no part of Persian territory. If the Persian authorities maintained sufficient order in the frontier regions to keep Russian property safe from attack, no incident such as that at Astara would have taken place.

We repeat once again that, faithful to its usual policy, the Russian Soviet Government in its policy with regard to Persia is guided by the principle of non-intervention, which ought, however, to be reciprocal and enforced to the same degree by both parties.

Desirous of seeing the strengthening of firm and enduring ties of friendship between the peoples of Russia and Persia, which the Russian people desire, the Soviet Government supports, and will continue to support, all that may tend to this end, regarding itself as the executor of the wishes of the working masses of Russia, who hold the Persian working masses to be their brothers, united to them by a strong solidarity. The Russian Soviet Republic can therefore consider itself, with reason, the only disinterested and faithful friend of the Persian people.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
CHICHERIN.

MESSAGE TO PRINCE MIRZA-FIROUZ, PERSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

July 10.

After the receipt of your wireless message dated June 23, received here July 4, we investigated in detail the questions raised by you, and I am now able to declare to you positively, on the basis of exact data in my possession, that there is now no longer any military or naval force of the Russian Republic in the territory or in the waters of Persia. Forces which according to your declarations are in the districts designated by you, have no relation whatever with our Government, nor was any consignment of arms sent by our authorities or under their protection. The attitude of the Russian Government toward the interior struggles proceeding in Persia is one of non-intervention, in spite of the similarity in ideas between the Government established at Resht and the Russian Government. Non-intervention is the principle not only professed but also carried out by us in Persia, and we apply this principle to both parties, being no more in a position to support the government established at Teheran against that at Resht, than to defend the latter against the former. It is consequently impossible for the Soviet authorities to undertake repressive measures against the government established at Resht, or against its adherents, as you would wish.

The Russian Government is convinced that the principle of non-intervention is the one best adapted to the feelings of friendship and fraternity animating the masses of the Russian people with regard to the Persian masses, and to the relations of neighborliness which it desires to see established between itself and the Government of Persia, for the affairs of the Persian people should be disposed of by the Persian people themselves. The Russian working masses warmly desire that the Persian masses may develop their well-being on the basis of disposing of their own fate in accordance with their own desires. We wish to see the best of relations established between Russia and Persia.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
CHICHERIN.

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Book Reviewed

THE ADVANCING HOUR, By *Norman Hapgood*, Ex-Minister to Denmark. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1920.

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, March, 1917—March 1920. Documents and papers. Compiled by C. K. Cummings, Walter W. Pettit, etc., etc., at the request of the League of Free Nations Associations. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920.

TWO YEARS OF FOREIGN POLICY, by *George Chicherin*. The Relations of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic with Foreign Nations, from November 7, 1917, to November 7, 1919. New York: The Russian Soviet Government Bureau, 1920.

THE first of the above titles represents a book that is primarily concerned, not with Russia, but with the author's conviction that in combating radical thought it is important that conservative elements should use honorable methods in order not to defeat their own purposes. It is natural that in a discussion of this question Mr. Hapgood should have felt obliged to devote two of his chapters to a consideration of the problems the Russian people are facing, and to the manner in which their solutions of these problems are misrepresented abroad. The two chapters are Chapters V and VI, and their titles are respectively "Facing Bolshevism: Our Follies in Russia", and "Facing Bolshevism: The Future in Russia". The former, which opens with quotations from Prince Kropotkin's Letter to George Brandes, in which Kropotkin protests against Allied attempts to restore counter-revolution in Russia, is entirely taken up with a review and criticism of the stupid manner in which newspapers and even government authorities in foreign countries have persisted in misrepresenting to the outside world every step taken in the internal reconstruction of Russia by the Soviet Government. Mr. Hapgood forcibly and ably states the case against the agencies that have so assiduously been poisoning the public mind in all countries against the people of Russia and their government, and quotes in this connection a number of interesting examples similar to those which SOVIET RUSSIA for more than one year has had to present to its readers in its exposure of the campaign of vilification that has been so voluminously waged from so many quarters. Particularly interesting are these examples when they come in the form of documents issued by powerful governments which some persons may have considered superior to petty forms of misrepresentation. Thus, Mr. Hapgood gives us (pp. 109-111) a document issued by the General Staff of the British War Office, entitled: "Notes for Personnel Volunteering for Service With the British Military Mission in South Russia," and dated August, 1919, in which the old tale of the "nationalization of women" is rehearsed in respectable form, that is, its "horrors" are

not emphasized, and are even modestly reduced to application over a small part of the country, instead of being represented as nationwide in their baleful operation. The pretty little paragraph in question is here reprinted (as it appears in Mr. Hapgood's book) from the circular issued to the persons volunteering for this service:

6. The well-known decree for the nationalization of women did not come from the Central Bolshevik Government, but it has been put into force in several towns. By this decree all women were forced to report at a "commissariat of free love", where they might be selected by any man, and had no right to refuse.

Needless to say, Mr. Hapgood points out the absurdity of this invention, and also shows that he considers it mean to cling to such a vestige of the old story when the tale as a whole has been exploded. Perhaps the time-honored "British" quality of self-restraint is beginning to reassert itself, and the indignation against an outrage that never took place is gradually being reduced to more moderate form, finally to disappear altogether. In his Chapter VI, "The Future of Russia," Mr. Hapgood pays somewhat too much attention to the cooperatives as distinct from the Soviet power, being probably under the impression that the cooperatives and the Soviets in Soviet Russia are still functioning as rival organizations, and not as two phases of the same authority. Particularly misleading is the statement appearing at the head of a table at the end of Chapter V: "Much of the solidest information about what is really happening in Russia can be obtained in New York from the agents of the cooperatives," as well as his exaggerated opinion of the disinterested political impartiality of Mr. Alexander Berkenheim, who is, after all, so far out of sympathy with the Soviet Government as to have been involved in machinations against that government in May of this year.

The 400 pages of "Russian-American Relations" present a splendid and authoritative collection of official documents passing not only between the United States Government and the Soviet Government, but between representatives of the United States Government themselves, while they were in Russia studying Russian conditions. Particularly interesting are the communications passing between United States Ambassador Francis and Colonel Raymond Robins. President Wilson's speech to Congress, January 8, 1918, in which the famous fourteen points were first publicly proclaimed, is also printed in full (pp. 68-74), as it contained much that was evidently suggested by the Russian situation, and was later widely circulated in Russia by the United States Committee of Public Information. Other documents are included which make only casual references to the United States, as, for example, the Soviet note to Italy, of February 14, 1919, which is reprinted (pp. 306-317) for the quotation it contains from the letter of Rene Marchand, in which the latter mentions the

attendance of Mr. Poole, "former Consul General of the United States," at a counter-revolutionary gathering of foreign diplomats. But the collection is by no means one-sided: it prints all the available documents concerning the relations between the two countries, not only in the period following the establishment of the Soviet Government, but from the first announcement of the First Provisional Government that succeeded the monarchy. No student of Russian affairs should fail to acquaint himself with the contents of this book, which also has a good introduction in which an attempt is made to place the various documents in their proper setting historically. And in studying these documents, the reader could not supplement them with a better and more readable account of the diplomacy of the period than the splendid report, by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, George Chicherin, entitled: "Two Years of Foreign Policy," which has much good interpretation in its thirty-six pages. It covers the relations of the Soviet Government, not only with the United States, but with other nations as well, and should preferably be read before undertaking the larger book on "Russian-American Relations."

LATVIA AND SOVIET RUSSIA

COPENHAGEN, June 29—According to a telegram from Helsingfors, Finnish troops have been pressed back from East Karelia into Finland by Bolshevik troops.

CHICHERIN TO GERMANY

HAGUE, June 21.—From a Moscow radio we learn that Chicherin has sent a telegram to the German Government in which he repudiates the malicious, prejudiced reports that Russia takes a hostile attitude to Germany.

NEWSPAPERS IN SOVIET RUSSIA

On May 16, the first All-Russian Congress of the workers of the "Rosta" (telegraph bureau of the Russian Soviet Government) was opened in the press headquarters in Moscow, with 109 participants, mostly Communists. The first resolution passed by the Congress was a greeting to Lenin as the leader of the proletariat, as a revolutionary journalist, and as the founder of the Communist press.

The chief of "Rosta", Karschentsev, reported on the work of the past years. Formerly there were only five branches, but at present Russia is cornered with a network of branches. There are sixty-eight provincial branch offices and fifty district branch offices. The task today is the organization of the press and educational work. "Rosta" has established schools of journalism and has assigned literary talents to the various parts of the country.

The Congress took up also: the universal working norms for the provincial sections, the unification of the workers, the financing of the press, and the propaganda among the workers for the creation of their own local organs.

THE NEXT ISSUE

of

SOVIET RUSSIA

Will Contain, Among Other Features, the Following:

1. WOMEN IN SOVIET RUSSIA, by *Helen Blonina*.
2. THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE, by *G. Zinoviev*.
3. TRANSPORTING NAPHTHA FROM THE CAUCASUS, by *U. Larin*.
4. TRAVEL IN RUSSIA IN THE SPRING OF 1920, by a *Swedish Newspaper Correspondent*.
5. NEW PROBLEMS FOR SOVIET RUSSIA, by *N. Lenin*.
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