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(A Facsimile and Translation)			

## Economics of a Transition Period

By N. LENIN

ON THE occasion of the second anniversary of the Soviet power I had proposed to write a short brochure devoted to the study of the problem formulated by this title. But in the pressure of daily work I have up to the present succeeded only in sketching the first draft of certain chapters. I have therefore decided to attempt a brief systematic resume of what I consider to be the essential ideas bearing on the question. Doubtless the systematic character of my resume will involve a number of inconveniences and gaps. Nevertheless perhaps I shall succeed in achieving, as far as a concise statement for a review will allow me, the modest aim which I have put before myself.

Theoretically it is beyond doubt that Capitalism and Communism are separated by a certain period of transition, which must of necessity combine the characteristic traits or properties of these two forms of public economy. This period of transition cannot but be a period of struggle between dying Capitalism and growing Communism, or, in other words, between Capitalism already defeated but not destroyed, and Communism, already born, but still extremely weak. Not only for a Marxist, but also for any educated man, however little acquainted with the theory of evolution, the necessity for a whole historical epoch, recognizable by these general characteristics of a transition period, must be self-evident. And nevertheless all the recriminations relative to the transition to Socialism which we are hearing from the mouths of the contemporary representatives of petty bourgeois democracy (and in spite of their self-assumed Socialist label, all the representatives of the Second Internationale, comprising men like Macdonald

and Jean Longuet, Kautsky, and Friedrich Adler, are representative of petit-bourgeois democracy) are characterized by a total ignoring of this self-evident truth.

The distinguishing feature of petit-bourgeois democrats is to cherish a disgust for the class struggle, to dream of a means of avoiding that struggle, to seek always to "come to an arrangement," to conciliate, to round off angles. That is why such democrats either refuse to recognize the whole historical period covering the transition from Capitalism to Communism, or else set before themselves the task of working out plans for the conciliation of the two forces at grips with each other, or of assuming control of the struggle in one of the two camps.

### II.

In Russia the dictatorship of the proletariat must necessarily present certain features peculiar to themselves in comparison with the advanced countries, in consequence of the very backward state and the petit bourgeois spirit of our country.

But at bottom we find in Russia the same forces and the same forms of political economy as in any capitalist country whatsoever: in such measure that those features cannot in any way affect the essential points. The forms which are at the root of public economy are capitalism, small production, and Communism. The fundamental forces are the bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie above all, the peasant class, and the proletariat.

The economic activity of Russia in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat consists in the struggle, during its first stages, of labor, unified on the basis of Communism, within the single

framework of giant production, against small production, and against the capitalism which has been preserved and which is being born again on its basis.

Labor is unified in Russia on the basis of Communism in such measure as, *first of all*, private property in the means of production is abolished, and, *secondly*, the Government of the proletarian state organizes large scale production on a national scale of the state land and in the state enterprises, distributes labor-power amongst the various branches of the economic structure, distributes the accumulated stocks of products for consumption belonging to the state amongst the workers.

We speak of the "first steps" of Communism in Russia (to borrow the expression used by our party program adopted in March, 1919), in view of the fact that all these conditions have been only partially realized by us, or, in other words, in view of the fact that the realization of these conditions is with us only in a primitive stage.

Immediately, in one revolutionary sweep we did all that in the long run could be done in the first days. For example, on the first day of the dictatorship of the proletariat, October 26 (November 8), 1917, private property in land was abolished without indemnification of the great landowners; that is to say, the great landed proprietors were expropriated. In the course of a few months we expropriated, also, without compensation, all the large capitalists, proprietors of factories, workshops, limited liability companies, banks, railways, etc.; the state organization of large production in industry and the transition to "workers' control," to "workers' management," in factories, workshops, railways, etc., are already realized, while in the sphere of agriculture they are only just begun (Soviet estates, large agricultural enterprises organized by the workers' state on the state lands). Similarly, the organization of different forms of association amongst the small farmers as a form of transition from small exploitation of the land for profit, to Communist exploitation, is also only as yet taking shape. One might say the same of the organization by the state of the distribution of products instead and in place of private commerce: that is to say, of the preparation and of the transport by the state of the cereals necessary for the towns and of the manufactured products necessary for the country. Farther on will be found the statistical data so far accumulated on this subject.

Small production for profit remains the form of rural economy.

Here we have to deal with a vast and very deep-rooted groundwork of capitalism. On this groundwork capitalism maintains itself and is reborn, fighting against Communism with the most ferocious energy. The weapons of its fight are smuggling and speculation, directed against preparation by the state of stocks and cereals (and also of other products), and, speaking generally, against the distribution of products by the state.

### III.

To illustrate these abstract theoretical assertions, let us take some concrete data.

The total quantity of cereals prepared by the state in Russia, according to the figures of the Commissariat for Food, amounted from August 1, 1917, to August 1, 1918, to thirty millions of poods. The following year the amount rose to 110 millions of poods. During the first period of the following year (1919-1920) the stocks prepared amount, it appears, to about forty-five millions of poods, in place of the thirty-seven millions prepared during the same months (August-September) in 1918.

These figures eloquently attest the slow but constant improvement of the situation, from the point of view of the victory of Communism over capitalism. And this improvement has taken place in spite of difficulties unheard of hitherto, consequent upon the civil war, and organized by Russian and foreign capitalists, who had at their disposal the whole forces of the most powerful states in the world.

That is why, in spite of all the lies, in spite of all the calumnies of the bourgeois of all countries, and of all their direct or secret agents (the "Socialists" of the Second Internationale,) it remains beyond dispute that, from the fundamental economic point of view, victory is assured in Russia for the dictatorship of the proletariat: that is to say, for Communism over capitalism. And, if the bourgeoisie of the whole world, consumed with such an excess of rage against Bolshevism, organizes military expeditions, hatches plots against us, it is precisely because it realizes perfectly the permanent nature of our victory in the sphere of economic reconstruction, provided we are not overwhelmed by force of arms—which it does not succeed in achieving.

The following statistical material, furnished by the Central Department of Statistics, and which has only just been compiled in order to be given publicity, relates to the production and consumption of cereals, not throughout the whole of Soviet Russia, but only in twenty-six of its provinces (governments). It demonstrates to what degree we have already conquered capitalism during the short space of time which we have had at our disposal, and, in spite of the difficulties unprecedented in the history of the world, amidst which we had to work.

We see that about half the cereals were furnished to the towns by the Commissariat for Food and the other half by smuggling.

An exact inquiry into the feeding of the town workers in 1918 established precisely this proportion. And the bread supplied by the state comes to the workers *ten times* cheaper than the bread supplied by the speculators. The price of bread fixed by the latter is *ten times* higher than the price fixed by the state. That is what becomes apparent from an exhaustive study of workers' budgets.

These are the statistics.



Millions of poods

Twenty-six Provinces of Soviet Russia	Population in millions.	Production of cereals (with- out sowings)	Cereals Supplied		Total quantity at disposal of population	Consumption per head, in poods
			By the Commissariat of food.	By smuggling		
Producing Provinces:						
Towns .....	4.4	...	20.9	20.6	41.5	9.5
Country .....	28.6	625.4	...	...	481.8	16.9
Consuming Provinces:						
Towns .....	5.9	...	20.0	10.0	40.0	6.8
Country .....	13.8	114.0	12.1	27.8	151.4	11.0
Totals .....	52.7	739.4	53.0	58.4	714.7	13.6

The statistics I have just reproduced, if they are studied as they merit, furnish an exact picture which throws into relief all the essential features of the present economic situation in Russia.

The workers are emancipated from their exploiters, and their age-long oppressors: the great landed proprietors and the capitalists.

This step forward in the path of true liberty and real equality which, in its scope, its extent, and its rapidity, is without precedent in history, is not taken into consideration by the partisans of the bourgeois (including the petit-bourgeois democrats), who understand liberty and equality in a sense of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, which they grandiloquently call "Democracy" in general, or "Pure Democracy" (Kautsky). But the workers have in view real equality, real liberty (emancipation from the yoke of the great landed proprietors and the capitalists); and that is why they come out so firmly for the Soviet power.

In an agricultural country it is the peasants who have gained first of all, who have gained more than anyone, who have reaped the first fruits of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The peasant suffered from hunger in Russia under the rule of the great landed proprietors and the capitalists. The peasant had never yet had, in the course of the long centuries of our history, the possibility of working for himself; he died of hunger while supplying hundreds of millions of poods of cereals to the capitalists in the towns and abroad. For the first time, under the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasant can work for himself, and feed himself better than the town dwellers. For the first time, the peasant has made the acquaintance in practice of liberty; the liberty of eating his own bread, liberation from famine. It is in the redistribution of the land that equality reaches, as is known, its highest point; in the enormous majority of cases, in fact, the peasants have divided the land equally amongst the "consumers."

Socialism is the suppression of classes. In order to suppress classes, it was necessary first of all to

overthrow the power of the great landed proprietors and the capitalists. We have accomplished this part of the task; but that part was not the most difficult. In order to suppress classes it is necessary, secondly, to bring about the disappearance of the differences at present existing between the peasants, and this is a problem which is necessarily more protracted. It is a problem which cannot be solved simply by the overthrow of a class, whatever that class may be.

It is a problem which can only be solved by the organized reconstruction of economic life, by passing from small private, scattered production for profit, to large Communist production. Such a transition is of necessity of very long duration, and would only be retarded and hindered by recourse to hasty and insufficiently-considered administrative and legislative measures. It can only be hastened by assisting the peasant in such a way that he is given the possibility of improving, on a vast scale, the whole of the technical side of agriculture, and, indeed, radically to transform it.

To solve this second most difficult part of the problem, the proletariat, after having overcome the bourgeoisie, had speedily to carry out the following line of policy towards the peasant class; it had to wipe out the distinction between the working peasant and the peasant proprietor, the laboring peasant and the trading peasant, the toiling peasant and the speculating peasant.

This difference constitutes the very essence of Socialism. And it is not surprising that the Socialists in words, who are in fact only petit bourgeois democrats (the Martovs, the Chernovs, the Kautskys and Co.) do not understand the essence of Socialism.

This distinction is very difficult, in addition, because in practice all forms of private property, in spite of their differences and their mutual opposition, are confounded in one whole by the peasant. Nevertheless, the distinction is possible, and not only possible, but flows irresistibly from the conditions of rural economy and of peasant life. The working peasant for centuries has been oppressed

by the great landed proprietors, the capitalists, the brokers, the speculators, and their states, including the most democratic bourgeois republics. The working peasant has learnt, through his own experience in the course of centuries, to hate and combat these oppressors and exploiters; and this "education," which life has given him, forced him in Russia to seek an alliance with the worker against the capitalist, against the speculator, against the broker.

But at the same time, the economic conditions under the system of production for profit infallibly transform the peasant (not always, but in the immense majority of cases) into a broker and a speculator himself.

The statistics reproduced above show clearly the difference between the toiling peasant and the speculating peasant.

The peasant who, in 1918-1919, gave to the famished workers of the towns forty million poods of cereals at a price fixed by the state, through the machinery set up by the state, in spite of all the gaps which that machinery reveals—gaps of which the workers' government is perfectly aware, but which cannot be avoided during the first phase of the transition to Socialism—that peasant is the toiling peasant, the comrade, equal in rights, of the Socialist workman, the best ally of the latter, his true brother in the struggle against the yoke of capital. And the peasant who sold in contraband forty million poods of cereals at a price ten times higher than that fixed by the state, taking advantage of the necessity and of the famine with which the town worker was struggling, thwarting the state, increasing and engendering everywhere lies, theft, chicanery—that peasant is the speculator, the ally of the capitalist, the class-enemy of the worker, the exploiter. The surplus cereals which he possesses indeed were gathered in from the common land with the aid of instruments the manufacture of which entailed the labor not only of the peasants, but also of the workman; and it is perfectly clear that to possess a surplus of cereals and to use part of it to launch into speculation is to become the exploiter of the starving workmen.

You desire "Liberty, Equality, Democracy," we are told on all sides, and you perpetuate the inequality of the workman and the peasant by your Constitution, by the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly, by the violent requisition of surplus stocks of cereals, etc.

We reply: there has never been a state in the history of the world which has done as much to abolish the *de facto* inequality, the *real* absence of liberty, under which the toiling peasant has suffered for centuries.

But we shall never admit equality for the speculating peasant, just as we do not admit "equality" of the exploiter and the exploited, of the well-fed and the hungry, or the "liberty" of the first to plunder the second. And we shall deal with the erudite gentlemen who will not understand this difference as we deal with White Guards, even if these gentlemen give themselves the title of demo-

crats, socialists, internationalists (Kautsky, Chernov, Martov).

#### IV

Socialism is the abolition of classes. The dictatorship of the proletariat has done all that it could to achieve that abolition.

But it is impossible to abolish classes at one blow.

And those classes have remained, and will remain, during the period of the proletarian dictatorship; the dictatorship will have played its part when classes disappear, and they cannot disappear *without* it.

Classes remain, but each of them has changed in aspect during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the mutual relations of classes amongst themselves have similarly changed. The class-struggle does not disappear with the dictatorship of the proletariat; it only assumes new forms.

The proletariat was, under class capitalism, the oppressed class, the class deprived of all property in the means of production, the class which alone was directly and wholly the antithesis of the bourgeoisie; and that is why it alone was capable of remaining revolutionary to the bitter end.

After overthrowing the bourgeoisie and conquering political power, the proletariat has become the ruling class; it holds the reins of power in the state; it disposes of those means of production which have already been socialized, it directs the hesitating and intermediate elements and classes; it crushes the reviving resistance of the exploiters. These are *special* problems of the class struggle which the proletariat did not and could not have to face previously.

The class of exploiters, of great landed proprietors and of capitalists, has not disappeared, and it cannot disappear straightway upon the coming of the proletarian dictatorship. The exploiters are defeated but not annihilated. There remains to them an international base, the international capitalism of which they are a branch. They partially retain some of the means of production, they still have money, they still have considerable social influence. The energy of their resistance has increased, just because of their defeat, a hundred- and a thousand-fold.

Their "experience" in the spheres of state administration, of the army, of political economy, gives them a very considerable advantage, with the result that their importance is incomparably greater than the numerical proportion they bear to the rest of the population. The class-struggle carried on by the defeated exploiters against the victorious advance guard of the exploited—in other words, against the proletariat—has become infinitely more violent. And it cannot be otherwise, if one is really considering a revolution, and if one does not comprehend under that term (as do all the heroes of the Second Internationale) mere reformist illusions.

Finally, the peasant class, like all the petite bourgeoisie generally, also occupies under the dic-

tatorship of the proletariat a middle, intermediate, position. On the one hand, it represents a very considerable (and, in backward Russia, an enormous) mass of the workers united by the interests, common to all workers, of emancipating themselves from the great landed proprietor and the capitalist; on the other hand, it comprises small farmers, peasant-proprietors and traders. Such an economic situation inevitably provokes a tendency to oscillate between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And in the intensified struggle between the latter classes, in the extraordinarily violent subservion of all social relations, when we take into consideration the strength of the habits

acquired during the previous epoch of class society—a routine which is particularly noticeable precisely amongst the peasants and the lower middle-class generally—it is quite natural that we should witness amongst the latter desertions from one camp to the other; hesitations, waverings, incertitude, etc.

As far as this class, as far as these social elements are concerned, the task of the proletariat consists in guiding them and in struggling for a position of leadership over them. To rally behind it the hesitating and the uncertain: such has had to be the role of the proletariat.

## Russian "Bolshevism" and the Working Women

By NIKOLAI BUKHARIN

**WE COMMUNISTS** in Russia live under such unusually hard conditions that we have neither energy nor time to record immediately all the important and interesting events created in the course of the revolution and now being further developed. We are entirely taken up with the struggle that is going on for the protection of the revolution, attacked by its deadly enemies; we also must do reconstruction work, so as to bring about Communism. Owing to the pressure of work and struggle we fail to pay sufficient attention to the fact that the new order created also a new, an entirely different individual, who did not exist before, in fact, whose existence before was impossible. The new social relations among the people create and educate new human beings. Everybody is ready to abuse and insult the Bolsheviki,—most people do it without any particular reason, simply for the pleasure of passing judgment on Bolshevism; others have no idea about it and don't know what it really means. Only a few realize what a tremendous rebuilding task Bolshevism is performing for the benefit of humanity. Under the scorching breath of the revolution, and owing to the activity of the Communist Party, there sprang out from the lowest rank of the society, among the creative mass, new people of higher type; they are determined fighters, full of self-sacrifice, bright and faithful workers, real heroes.

It is especially interesting to observe the change which took place among the women of the plain proletarians and peasants. Those hitherto treated like cattle have at last realized that they are human beings entitled to equal rights. They take part in the general struggle against capitalism, against exploitation and slavery in any form. The working-women and the rural female population begin to participate in the administration of husbandry. They sit in the Soviets and Executive Committees of various types and hold responsible positions, and are frequently seen armed, or nursing at the front. The working women of the middle class and the peasant women are especially active in all institutions that deal with the social care of wom-

en, mothers, children, aged people, sick, invalids, etc. They are to be found in institutions for pregnant women, women who have just been confined, for nursing women, in infant asylums, in children's colonies, at vocation centers, in school kitchens, public dining rooms, tea houses, in hospitals, recreation centers, in aged and invalid homes, in public libraries, reading rooms, in propaganda centers for the spreading of communistic ideas and general knowledge; everywhere these simple women are active in bigger or smaller groups; they are, in fact, often the very soul of such establishments. In the performing of their duties they show as much brain as heart, they have an almost "ambitious, passionate enthusiasm" for the new creative abilities, and possess common sense for practical things.

Women who hardly ever heard about Communism before the revolution, many of whom learned to read and write only in the schools of the party organizations, do real good distinguished work in order to realize the Communistic theory. The talents and energy of the women after the revolution, owing to free activity, grow like plants in the sunshine after a shower has just passed. This new life awakens the women of the proletariat and peasants; it gives them tasks and duties, experience and training; it transforms them into revolutionary fighters and co-workers of the Communistic Society. This is still more surprising when we keep in mind all the suffering, strain and struggle which Soviet Russia has had to go through in order to protect its existence and secure its proper development. Here and there the Bolsheviki are compelled to take up anew the struggle against armed forces, to suppress the spirit of capitalism which the counter-revolution of the whole world is ready to save by the force of its weapons; the shattered domestic economy results in privation, hunger, diseases. In spite of all this, Soviet Russia is struggling for a bright future, for a free and happy common life, and the women of the proletarians and peasants are working and struggling together with them. A person who



would have to report the activity and strivings of these women from day to day would have a hard task to decide where to begin and where to stop.

The Cossack Conference now being held in Moscow is very typical as an indication of the new individuality awakening in the women. Women are also taking part in this conference as delegates entitled to equal rights. The revolution opened their eyes, awakened them, transformed them into fighters for the cause of the working people. What a transformation! Before the revolution, these women sat in their Cossack villages, managed their cottages, gardens and fields, as their mothers and grandmothers had done before them. They did not care what took place beyond the boundaries of their little village. When one of these women happened to visit the seat of the county or province, this was an event which gave material for long gossip. Now they participate in the discussions and decisions of their Soviets, they do not hesitate to make the long journey to Moscow. They sit among strangers, whom they have seen for the first time, and they express their opinions, discuss and come to conclusions; they feel as if they were among brothers and sisters, and discuss the most important life-issues of great Russia. Many a sensible remark, a clever suggestion, a thoughtful question, comes from the peasant women. It seems like a dream but it is reality.

The revolution and the Soviet Government offer to every toiler, creating with his hands or brain, the possibility to work for the common welfare and progress, and thus enable him to obtain bread, freedom, dignity, honor, in short—helps him to create an existence worthy of a human being. The right and the duty to cooperate, regardless of sex—that is the rule in Soviet Russia; this cooperation is carried out through the shops, fields and administration. During the regime of the Czar, the women had no part in the political

life of the country. The lady of the higher circle was wife and mistress, she did not care about the affairs of the state. The fate of the women of the masses was similar to this. After the March revolution of 1917, the women of the wealthy classes, namely, the liberals and the intellectual women (the "Intelligentsia") began to take part most energetically in public life. They also appeared as speakers at meetings. But only among the revolutionists could the Russian woman, who has always been so daring and full of self-sacrifice, take a full part in the political life. The revolutionary movement and struggles were carried on by men as well as by women. Not only Sophie Perovskaya, but many other Russian women who found death on the gallows, in horrible prisons, in deserts of snow, have their revolutionary integrity attested with a firm hand. As soon as the revolutionary movement had penetrated the masses, the women also became its supports. The proletarian women did not fail to appear at any economical or social walk-outs, at general strikes, at public information centers, at May demonstrations. Working women and wives of workingmen fell on the battlefields of the revolution. But in comparison with the great number of the working class, the number of women who took part in the political struggle of their class was comparatively small. Only a small group of the elite of the working women was working and fighting for the emancipation of the exploited and suppressed, who were in misery and slavery. Only the proletarian November Revolution brought out the big mass of the working and peasant women, who were seeking and failing, but always conscious of the great ideal. The individuals were growing intellectually and morally through this ideal, and in serving it, these individuals became the majority and are now innumerable.

## Lenin's Address

### At the Third All-Russian Congress of the Council of National Economy

**C**OMRADE LENIN says that he will only briefly speak on those questions with which he had to deal more of late. One of these questions is the organization of management, the question of collective or individual management. In the ensuing discussions, the question is approached on the basis of abstract reasoning, to prove the advantage of collective management over individual. But this leads us far away from the practical tasks of the present time. Such reasoning takes us back to that stage of the primary constructive work of the Soviet power, which we have already passed. It is time to pass to a more practical basis.

Collective management as the basic type for the organization of Soviet management represents something rudimentary and imperative at the first stage, when it is necessary to build from the

ground up. But under the settled, more or less stable, forms, the transition to practical work calls for individual management, as the system which more than any other assures the best use of human abilities and a real, and not merely verbal control over the work.

The experience which the Soviet power underwent in the field of military construction should not be looked upon as an isolated experience. Warfare includes all kinds of endeavors in all fields. The construction of our army could bring successful results only because it was created in the spirit of general Soviet construction, on the basis of class correlations. We find there the same thin layer of the leading class—the proletariat, and a mass of peasantry. And while in other spheres the essence of this correlation was not revealed with absolute clearness, it was given a real test in the

army, which faces the enemy and pays dearly for every mistake. This experience should be pondered upon. It led, developing systematically, from accidental, indefinite collective management through a collective management raised to a system of organization, and has now, as a general tendency, reached the stage of individual management as the only correct basis of endeavor. In any Soviet endeavor you will find a small number of class-conscious proletarians, a large number at a lower degree of development, and a vast mass of peasantry with all the habits of individual economy, and hence of free trade and speculation, which the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and non-partisans call freedom, while we call it the heritage of capitalism. This is the environment in which we have to act, and it demands corresponding modes of action. And the experience of the army has shown us the systematic development of the organization of management from the primary collective forms to the individual form, which is now in force there to the extent of at least fifty per cent.

Collective management at the best causes an enormous waste of effort and hampers the speed and accountability of work required by the conditions of a centralized large industry. If you will turn to the advocates of collective management, you will find in their resolutions, in an extremely abstract formulation, that each member of the collegium should bear individual responsibility for the execution of certain tasks. This has become a commonplace to us. But every one of us who has practical experience knows that only in one out of a hundred cases is this followed in practice. In the vast majority of cases it remains only on paper. None of the members of the collegium is given any definite tasks, and they are not executed under individual responsibility. In general, we have no investigation of the work. Suppose that the central committee of a trade union suggests a candidate for a certain position, and you will ask for a record of work performed by him and examined by experts. You will be unable to get it. We are all only beginning to approach real efficiency.

Our fault lies in the fact that we dream of performing everything by our own forces. We suffer from the most acute lack of workers, and we do not take them from the rank of the workers and peasants, among whom there is a mass of undeveloped administrative and organizing talent. It would be much better if we should pass as speedily as possible from general and in most cases absolutely futile discussions to a practical basis. Then we will actually act as the organizers of the advanced class, and we will discover hundreds and thousands of new men with organizing abilities. We must put them forward, try them, put them on certain tasks, and ever more complex tasks. I hope that we shall accomplish this, that on reviewing our work, after the congress of the Councils of National Economy, we shall take this path, and shall extend and multiply

the number of organizers, so that the inordinately thin layer which has become worn out during these two years will be refilled and augmented. Because the tasks which we are undertaking, and which should redeem Russia from poverty, hunger and cold, will require ten times more organizers, who should be responsible to scores of millions.

The second question, which interests us more than any other,—is the question concerning armies of toil.

This is a task which involves a transition between two periods of our activity. The period which was wholly devoted to the war is not yet ended. A number of signs show that the Russian capitalists will be unable to continue the war. But that they will make attempts to invade Russia is beyond doubt. And we must be prepared. But on the whole, the war which they forced upon us two years ago has come to a victorious end, and we are passing on to tasks of peace.

We must realize the peculiarity of this transition. A country utterly ruined, in the grip of hunger and cold, with destitution reaching the very bottom; and in this country—a people which has been aroused to its power and became self-confident when it found that it is able to withstand, without exaggeration, the whole world, for it was the whole capitalist world that was defeated. And in this original environment we propose armies of toil, in order to solve urgent problems.

We must concentrate on the main task—to gather grain and to bring it to the centers. Any deviation from this task, the least scattering of effort would be the greatest danger, would be fatal for our cause. And in order to make use of our apparatus with all possible speed we must create an army of toil. Concerning this question you have already the theses of the Central Committee and the reports, and I shall not touch therefore upon its concrete aspects. I would only like to point out that at the moment of transition from civil war to the new tasks we should throw all our resources to the labor front and concentrate on this all our energy, to the utmost exertion, with implacable, military resolution. We will not allow now any deviation. Advancing this slogan, we declare that we must exert to the utmost all the live forces of the workers and peasants, and must demand that they should wholeheartedly aid us in this. And then, through the creation of an army of toil, and through the exertion of the energy of the workers and peasants, we will accomplish our fundamental task. We will succeed in gathering hundreds of millions poods of produce and in transporting them to the center. We have them in our country. But it will take incredible, demonic efforts, the utmost exertion of the country, and military resolution and energy, to gather these hundreds of millions of poods of produce and transport them to the center. Here, in the center, we shall largely be busy working out a plan for this, and shall therefore speak of this work and all the other questions,

the questions of financing, of industrial reconstruction and the questions regarding broad programs—these must not distract us at present. We are confronted by this fundamental task—to resist the danger of being enticed by broad plans and tasks. We must concentrate on the most urgent and basic task, resisting any distraction from the chief task advanced by us, namely—to gather grain and produce, to gather them through the state, at fixed prices, in the socialist way of a workers' state and not in the capitalist way, through speculation, and to bring them to the center by overcoming the disintegration of transportation. It is a crime for any one to forget of this task.

To organize the execution of our fundamental task on a more or less sound basis, the leaders of all the state organs, particularly of the Councils of National Economy, should arouse activity to this end in tens of millions of workers and peas-

ants. To this end a comprehensive plan for the reorganization of Russia will be furnished. For this we have ample means, materials, technical possibilities, raw materials, enough of everything to begin this work of reconstruction from every angle, drawing into it all the workers and peasants. Comrades, we shall develop a stubborn struggle, a struggle which will require heavy sacrifices at the labor front, but which we must carry out, because of the famine, cold, disintegration of transportation, and typhus. We must fight all these hardships, and we must commence building our state from all sides on the basis of the methods of large machine industry, in order to become a cultured country and, by means of a sound socialist struggle, get out of that swamp in which other countries, the countries of world capitalism and imperialism, are at present submerged.—*Izvestia*, January 29, 1920.

## Recent Impressions of Poland

(From our Paris Correspondent)

PARIS, June 21.—I have just returned from a five weeks' trip through Poland and White Russia, where I had a chance to observe the political and economic conditions, especially in so far as they affect Soviet Russia. I was most interested in discovering the sentiment of the people on the projected peace discussions between Poland and Russia, which had gone to pieces on the rocks of Polish duplicity and hypocrisy. After I had talked to various individuals of different political shades, I gathered the impression that nobody had ever put much hope in the negotiations. The mass of the people feel so depressed by the war that they accept it as a fatal and eternal thing, and the newspaper discussions of peace could not awake them from the state of pessimistic apathy into which they had fallen.

The poorer class of Polish society are so pressed down by economic conditions that they have little time to think of politics. They are occupied with the problem of seeking their daily bread, in the most literal sense of the word, and have yet to understand the mysteries of politics. Among those peasants who had been made prosperous by the famine conditions, the younger element is still deluded by the jingoistic ideas which both the church and the government are doing their best to propagate; their minds have been artificially wrought up against the Jews as the perpetrators of the ruin that has come upon the country. But in the cities it is impossible to find any enthusiasm for the war. The repeated victory celebrations fell flat after the first one, and now that the victories have been turned into defeats, there can be no more thought of celebrations.

Of the organized labor element, a large proportion are Communists, despite the underground nature of their propaganda. When I left Warsaw,

the city was in the grip of a general strike on the part of the municipal employes. While the strike was non-political in its nature, it did not receive the support of the yellow and chauvinistic Polish Socialist Party, and it marked a distinct orientation towards the left. As for the Polish Socialist Party itself, a motion instigated by Daszynski to have the party associate itself with the government, was defeated by a narrow majority, the vote serving as a warning to the organization leaders that they cannot hope to serve the White Eagle and internationalism at the same time.

The bankruptcy of the Polish aristocracy has been shown by its inability to make peace with Russia. The peace efforts of the Polish government were marked by thoroughgoing insincerity, but the insincerity came from the lack of courage to conclude peace. The National Democrats were apparently the only party that sincerely desired peace, regarding it as essential to their policy of social conservation. But even they did not dare insist upon their program.

The Poles may truly say with Macbeth that they have waded so far in the pool of blood that it is just as far to wade back as to go through to the end. They have staked all their hopes on the defeat of the Soviets and the division of the Russian booty with the Allies. But if there is no booty to divide, the Allies will not repay them for the effort they have expended in fighting the Bolsheviks. The shade of Kolchak looms ominous in the distance as a warning of the treatment the Allies meet out to those who fight for them—and lose.

For the present, Poland is receiving munitions, food and clothing from the Allies for her army. The moment peace is declared, these supplies will be cut off, and the government, which in the two



years since the recognition of its independence should have learned to administer the economics of the country, will have to tackle the problems of reconstruction absolutely unprepared and without aid from their former friends and employers, the Entente powers.

England's policy in Poland has been to spend millions for war, but not a shilling for peace. For investment purposes, English capital has been afraid of the unsettled conditions of the country, but it has been good business to equip the Polish army in order that it might exert pressure on the Soviets and thus hope to extort from them better trade concessions. This is the real explanation of the simultaneous negotiations with Krassin and the support of the Polish and Wrangel offensives by Lords Curzon and Churchill.

When the Poles learned of the Krassin negotiations, a light began to dawn upon them in regard to English policy. The comment of the press with regard to England was extremely bitter, scenting in Lloyd George's action a counterpart to the French betrayal of Kolchak. In the explanations regarding the failure of their offensive, the Poles feature the disillusionment caused by the news of the Krassin negotiations.

After this disillusionment, it would be a bitter pill for the Polish landlords to have to cultivate the friendship of the Russian Soviets, but this is their only recourse if they wish to save the country from ruin and collapse. This friendship does not necessarily imply the adoption of the Soviet form, for the Russians are sufficiently realistic to be friends with people not of their own beliefs. The case of Esthonia, Czecho-Slovakia and Latvia is an example of peace and friendship concluded between Communist Russia and her non-Communist neighbors.

But it is hard to believe that the Polish aristocracy will have the courage and the self-control necessary for this. On my way back from Poland, I talked to a Belgian officer, a member of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, who, while passing through Poland, had interviewed the Polish general staff on the military situation. The Poles had told him that they regarded the Bolshevik war as mere training practice. After they had finished with the Soviets, they would fight the Czechs and the Germans . . .

Those whom the gods would destroy they first make mad. If we are to judge present indications, the Poles are being prepared for just such a destruction.

In a subsequent article I shall deal with the impression the Soviet troops made during their occupation of White Russia.

#### FOR FREE LUNCHES

According to *Economic Life*, 2,100,000,000 rubles have been allotted for the organization of free lunches to the end of the current year. It is proposed to give a quarter of a pound of bread twice a day to all children from four to sixteen years of age.

#### SANITATION IN RUSSIA

"For every thousand in the population of Russia, writes A. Sisin in No. 21 of the *Izvestia* of the Central Executive Committee, "26.7 died in 1914. In Germany, the total mortality was only 16.2, in England, Sweden and Norway 13-14 per 1,000. In the last thirty or forty years, the mortality in Russia rose only 4.8 per cent, in Germany 9.6 per cent, and in England 9 per cent. As far as child mortality is concerned, in 1903-1907, 24.7 per cent of all those born died without reaching the age of one year. Infant mortality does not seem to change much. In 1883-87 it was 26.1 per cent, that is, almost at the same level. In absolute figures, of 5,223,369 souls born in Russia in 1907, 1,217,436 died before reaching the age of one year. In England, the child mortality is only 11.7 per cent, in Norway 6.9 per cent, that is, for every 1,000 born, only 69 died in the first year.

"General cases of sickness in Russia amounted in 1913 to 95,401,750, epidemic illness constituting seventeen per cent of the total, skin and germ diseases fourteen per cent.

"The total number of contagious diseases in 1913 was 14,577,271. They consisted of 3,577,966 cases of influenza, 2,296,629 of malaria, 1,124,477 of syphilis, 775,904 of pulmonary tuberculosis. Scabies, a typical disease due to dirt and ignorance, had 5,532,723 cases in 1914, and trachoma, also a sickness of poverty and dirt, 891,368 cases.

"The small number of medical personnel also had a large effect on the national health.

"In 1915 there were in Russia 33,082 doctors, male and female, and 29,866 assistant doctors. There was only one doctor for each 5,140 population, while in Germany there was one for each 1,960, and in England one for each 1,400. The entire expense of the Czar's government and social institutions for medical and sanitary work in 1914 amounted to 150,000,000 rubles. Only ten per cent of this money was government money. The expense per inhabitant was only one ruble, and only about eight kopeks was spent on sanitation. The rest was spent on medication.

"Sanitation was far from being at all satisfactory. Out of over 1,000 cities in Russia, only 170 had a central water plant; only in fifty was there any sewer system; and only in thirteen was the refuse carried away by water. Many large cities had no doctors at all, and many of the governments had no sanitary organs or institutions whatsoever.

"The victorious revolution has faced Russia more than sharply with all the problems of hygiene, especially as the latter had been entirely neglected thanks to the bloody four years' war, and the crisis caused by the latter. Therefore, having assumed the helm of power, the proletariat must at once begin to put in shape the work of national sanitation, in cooperation with the central government organ, the National Commissariat of Sanitation, so as to forever cut this Gordian knot, this cursed legacy of capitalism."

# КРЕСТЬЯНЕ И СОЛДАТЫ.

Неужели вы еще можете вѣрить большевистскимъ смутьянамъ и обманщикамъ?

Неужели вы еще не видите, что враги народа, захвативъ власть, разграбили достояніе крестьянъ и горожанъ, обездолили рабочихъ своими лукавыми обѣщаніями, привели всѣхъ насъ къ нищетѣ и Родину нашу къ гибели?

Я и мое Правительство заявили вамъ, что мы считаемъ справедливымъ и необходимымъ отдать всю землю трудящемуся народу.

Я это сказалъ и весь міръ слышалъ мои слова, теперь я повторяю это вамъ, крестьяне и солдаты, и я не отступлюсь отъ своихъ словъ. Помните это твердо и не вѣрьте обманщикамъ-большевикамъ.

Помните также, что необходимо скорѣе разбить тѣ банды, которыя въ слѣпотѣ и темнотѣ своей защищаютъ пародныхъ комиссаровъ, забывъ Бога и народъ: Помогайте же нашей Арміи, честно бьющейся за спасеніе Россіи и народа.

Каждый лишній день власти Совѣта Народныхъ Комиссаровъ отдаляетъ тотъ часъ, когда русская кормилица-земля перейдетъ въ руки земледѣльцевъ-крестьянъ, любящихъ свою Родину-мать и спасающихъ ее въ смутное время.

Верховный Правитель и Верховный  
Главнокомандующій Адмиралъ



29 Июля 1919 года, гор. Омскъ.

Омскъ. Тип. Акц. О-ва. „Руск. О-ва. Печати. Дѣла“.

Изданіе Освѣд. Отд. Штаба Верховн. Главнокомандующаго.

PEASANTS AND SOLDIERS:

Can you still believe the Bolshevik trouble-makers and deceivers? Don't you see yet that the enemies of the people, having seized power, looted the property of the peasant and city population, ruined the workers by means of their sly promises, made paupers of all of us and led our country to destruction? My Government and I have told you that we consider it just and necessary to turn over the entire land to the laboring people.

I said this and the entire world heard my words. Now I am repeating it to you, peasants and soldiers, and I shall not go back on my word. Remember this well and do not believe the Bolshevik fakers.

Also bear in mind that it is necessary to defeat those bands which in their blindness and darkness defend the People's Commissaries, having forgotten God and the people: Help, therefore, our Army that is honestly fighting for the salvation of Russia and the people.

Every extra day of power of the Soviet of People's Commissaries removes the hour when the Russian mother-earth will pass into the hands of the farmers who love their country and have saved it in time of stress.

Omsk, July 29, 1919.

Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander-in-Chief,  
ADMIRAL KOLCHAK.



## NEWS FROM RUSSIA

ROSTA, June 10, 1920.—In the White Russian paper, *Svoboda Rossyi*, which is published at Reval, Duschen recently published an article concerning Poland, in which he says, among other things:

"Is it not already time to understand that all Russians must place themselves, at the defence of their Fatherland, in those places which are best adapted to them, in order to repulse the new attack of bandits? All those who will do their task in Russia and close their ranks to defend every foot of Russia's soil need have not fear. The Red Army in Russia has a prominent place, because of its organization. The Russian Army has won on fourteen fronts, has crushed many generals and their followers, but hitherto it has not even yet shown its entire strength. It has met slanders and sneers from the whole world with invincible heroism, bravery, and courage, so that even the worst slanderers have learned to respect it. The army is the pride of the nation, and the Red Army is the pride of the Russian people. It bears evidence that during all the horrors of the past years the Russian people have preserved an enormous spiritual force and firmness. In this respect we may be quite at ease.

"But if there is any possibility of shortening this war, if there is a trace of hope that our weak voices, the voices of the Russian emigrants, can contribute to the cessation of this brother murder, then our duty to our Fatherland consists in openly declaring—'Leave Russia alone. Do not disguise your bandit intentions with assertions that you desire to help the Russian people. Take your hands off! The Russians do not need your help. Let them attend to their own affairs, in their own way!'"

*Pravda* comments on this as follows: "This article is the more characteristic in that it reflects the conception of almost all the Russian emigrants in Esthonia. All refugees and all former White Guards unanimously express in their conversations with the members of the Russian delegation,—'whatever differences of opinion there may be between us and the Soviet Government, we all unanimously wish that the Red Army may crush Poland as fast and as completely as possible.' The same statements have been made unofficially even within Esthonian military circles."

## "PRAVDA" ON THE CADETS

HELSINGFORS.—The Moscow *Pravda* writes that Paris has become the center of the remnants of the Russian bourgeoisie, just as Koblenz was at one time the center of the remnants of the French nobility. Just now eminent Cadets are gathering at Paris to decide definitely how to fight Soviet Russia. Some of them managed to obtain high positions in the financial circles of Paris. Their pockets are being filled by subsidies from the League of Nations. They are trying to resurrect the National Center.

## THE INAUGURATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE RED ARMY

The second day of the fetes on the second anniversary of the creation of the Red Army was also marked by the inauguration of a university of the Red Army, bearing the name of Comrade Tolmachov. Professor Shlebnikov informed the audience of the general plan and history of the organization of the university. There were, first, the instructors' courses, which, at the end of a few months of work, could congratulate themselves on brilliant results. The first group of students finishing their studies was already anticipated for the current March. In view of this pedagogic success, on the one hand, and the intention of the students to pursue their studies, on the other, it was decided to transform the school of instruction into a university of the Red Army, with five faculties to begin with.

## "SOVIET RUSSIA PAMPHLETS"

The Russian Soviet Government Bureau is issuing a series of pamphlet reprints of important Soviet documents. The following are the first four of these pamphlets:

1. *The Labor Laws of Soviet Russia*. Official text, with introduction, by the Bureau, and an answer to a criticism by Mr. W. C. Redfield. 52 pages, stiff paper cover, price 10 cents.  
This is a new edition of the Labor Laws, and every owner of the old edition should have it.
2. *The Laws on Marriage and Domestic Relations*. To be ready about September first. Price 15 cents.
3. *Two Years of Foreign Policy*, by GEORGE CHICHERIN. The relations of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic with foreign nations, from November 7, 1917, to November 7, 1919. 36 pages, stiff paper cover, price 10 cents.
4. *Protection of Labor in Soviet Russia*, by S. KAPLUN, of the People's Commissariat of Labor. This pamphlet, an interpretation of the labor laws of Soviet Russia, is necessary to a full understanding of these laws, and readers should therefore order it in addition to their copies of the laws. This pamphlet has never been published in SOVIET RUSSIA. To be ready August 1. Price 10 Cents.

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**I**N THEIR desperate efforts at the eleventh hour to rescue the Polish Government from the consequences of its ambitious folly, the European politicians once more reveal the impotence of capitalist militarism and the humbug of bourgeois diplomacy. Having encouraged their vassal, Poland, whom at any time they could have easily held within bounds, to embark upon a disastrous adventure, the Allies, beholding the disaster, can think of no way to avert it save by making vain threats against Russia, over whose independent government and victorious worker's army they have not the slightest influence. So we come again to one of those moments, of increasing frequency, when confusion and bewilderment prevail, and the conflicting interests of nationalist ambitions disrupt the solidarity of Allied capitalism. At such times the censorships fail to function and the various official propagandas lack coordination. Even the best trained bourgeois correspondents lose their bearings in this chaos, and, lacking the accustomed guides and restraints, are daily in danger of giving the show away.

The reply of the Soviet Government to the British proposal, which was designed to rescue Polish imperialism from its plight, precipitated the crisis. Mr. Lloyd George, "looking pale and haggard," admitted his bewilderment and complained that the Soviet note was difficult to understand. No doubt it was. Nothing is more confusing to the diplomatists of old Europe, accustomed to a language of evasion and equivocation, than the straightforward talk of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. How could Lloyd George understand a note in which the victors, repudiating the interference of the Allies in the Polish debacle, actually offered the defeated Poles more advantageous territorial terms than those suggested by their western protectors. "Propaganda," cried Lloyd George, in consternation, fearful lest the Poles discover the obvious truth that it is better to be defeated by Soviet Russia than to be protected by the Allies. To add to his embarrassment, the Soviet Foreign Office replied to Mr. George's suggestion of a general peace conference of the border states, by reminding him that Soviet Russia had already successfully concluded peace with Lithuania, Estonia and Georgia, and that negotiations were

proceeding with Latvia and Finland. There was, no doubt, an unpleasant suggestion in the inference that while Mr. George and his peripatetic colleagues had been running about from one watering place to another, talking peace and prolonging war, Soviet Russia had been persistently and successfully making peace wherever possible. It was perplexing to be reminded that the Soviet Government has done more to make peace in the world and has actually conducted more successful peace negotiations with its neighbors than any other power in Europe since the armistice. We gather from the reports of the Prime Minister's discourse, however, that he understood that the Soviet Government was ready to make peace direct with Poland and that he would advise the Polish Government to sue for terms. Perhaps he did not find the Soviet note so difficult of comprehension as he pretended. He did not care where the peace conference met, he said, and did not desire to interfere if the Poles would negotiate directly with the victors. The main thing was to save Poland from the consequences of her "mistake." He concluded with some perfunctory and meaningless remarks about the aid which England and France would give to Poland. The British Ambassador at Berlin had gone to Poland. The French Government was sending "a General who is Chief of Staff," and finally, as some sort of dark hint, "it may very well be that Marshal Foch will follow." What all these worthies would do or could do in Warsaw, except to impede the hasty preparations for evacuation, the Premier did not say.

Over in Paris, M. Millerand was having his say, calling the Soviet note an impertinence, and threatening wildly. "France must keep her word to Poland," said the French Premier, forgetting that only a few days ago no less a personage than Marshal Foch himself had disclaimed all responsibility for the Polish enterprise. One correspondent, reporting the belligerency of the French Premier, remarks dryly that "it is possible that actions may not correspond with orations, for it is difficult to see how France or England can practice a war policy in the present circumstances." Indeed it is difficult. Marshal Foch is not an army corps. Meanwhile Ignace Paderewski, pouring out his heart to the correspondent of the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, tells how Clemenceau and the Supreme Council prevented Poland from accepting the peace offers of the Soviet Government of August of last year, and how, when that offer was repeated last January, the Allies left Poland to her own devices and Poland accordingly conceived herself in the romantic role of the appointed defender of civilization. "The Allies have agreed to support Poland in every way with all their powers," proclaims Millerand with large assurance. Specifically in what way or with how much power, he does not say. At any rate, he adds, France will not negotiate with the Soviet Government until it has recognized the debts of the former Russian governments.



**T**HERE have recently come to light some interesting financial items which must ultimately enter into the reckoning by which the European and American people will count the cost of their unsuccessful military operations against the Soviet Republic. The figures now revealed, we may be sure, are far short of the gigantic total which the promoters of a bankrupt enterprise will have to write off as bad debts and profitless investments. No government would dare acknowledge to its people all at once the full sum of this extravagance and waste. The English Government, for instance, has announced that the total of Great Britain's expenditures on naval and military operations in Russia from the signing of the armistice in November, 1918, to March 31, 1920, was more than fifty-five million pounds sterling. Enormous as this sum is, it is obviously far from the total cost of British intervention. The total in human and economic wastage, of course, can never be reckoned. But this figure only pretends to give the bare cost of English naval and military operations. It is not assumed to cover the expenses of the Canadian invading forces in Siberia, nor does it account for the price of all the material and financial assistance wasted on subsidies and donations to Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, Wrangel, and every other White Guard adventurer who came begging about the Allied treasuries and war offices.

The account rendered by the United States Liquidation Commission covers still another form of expenditure in the anti-Soviet campaign. According to the official report, a total of \$140,104,021 represents the amount of sales of surplus American munitions and supplies to the nations of the defunct "cordon sanitaire," as well as directly to the White Guard counter-revolutionists. These so-called sales were, in effect, direct loans, proffered, according to the official report, because it was believed that they would "serve a very important function in stabilizing the government and social institutions" of the buffer states, and "would help check the insidious advances of Bolshevism." No cash was taken or asked in return. The amount advanced to Poland for checking the "advances of Bolshevism" was \$59,365,000. The other border states received proportionate amounts, and Kolchak's "Russian Government" got its share. It is not our purpose here to question the value of these American investments or the solvency of the debtors. Two considerations do arise, however, upon which it is interesting to speculate. Among the states to which the United States extended credit in this form were Esthonia and Lithuania. Now both of these countries have made peace with Soviet Russia, and under the terms of their respective treaties, both have been allotted a share of the Russian gold reserve. This gold which Esthonia and Lithuania have accepted from Russia is part of the same reserve out of which the Soviet Government is making its initial purchases of supplies in England and in Scandinavia and elsewhere. It is the same gold which the American

Government has warned American manufacturers and merchants is "stolen" and subject to confiscation. Query: Can the United States Government accept payment from Esthonia and Lithuania in this same "stolen" gold? This tainted metal is now inextricably mingled with whatever assets Esthonia and Lithuania may have had before they made peace with Russia, if, indeed, it does not constitute the total of their available reserve. When Esthonia and Lithuania pay the interest on their debts to the United States out of this Russian gold, will the United States Treasury be the receiver of stolen property? At present the American Government forbids the transfer of Russian credits from Esthonia to the United States to pay American manufacturers for goods sold to Russia. Will the same prohibition affect the transfer of gold from the same source when it is to be applied on purchases from the United States Government? We do not think so. Moreover, we are confident that the logic of this situation will shortly result in the removal of the ban on Russian exchange which debars the American manufacturer from the Russian market. It is plain enough that the United States can never in clear conscience collect its debts in Esthonia and Lithuania until it is ready to acknowledge the right of the Russian people to the possession of their own treasury.

The other consideration evoked by the report of the Liquidation Commission arises in connection with the recent outcry from the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce calling for the protection of American investment in pre-revolutionary Russia. The statement of the Chamber is not very specific, but the gist of its seems to be that some Russian Government owes a few Americans a certain amount of money for industrial plants and other investments in Russia. This may be true. Still, it must be apparent, even to the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce, that it is not a question which can be settled in any frank and generous spirit until the United States has recognized some Russian Government—we modestly refrain from even suggesting what government. When the moment for settlement arrives, it is of course inevitable that one side will raise the question of the various subsidies and donations which the American Government has given to counter-revolutionaries engaged in civil war against the Russian Government, and to foreign belligerents engaged in armed invasion on Russian soil, all of which cost the Russian people much sacrifice and expense to suppress. Even leaving aside any direct American participation in hostilities against the Russian Government, these questions must be discussed. But, like the question of remuneration to American investors, all these matters are susceptible of adjustment.

\* \* \*

**A** CONSIDERABLE FLURRY of newspaper headlines, parliamentary interpellations, and trade union resolutions, has been raised in England by the publication of a secret record of Win-

ston Churchill's intrigues with the Russian counter-revolutionaries. The document in question contributes nothing essentially new to the long and sordid record of capitalist imperialism in its futile campaign against the Soviet Republic. It is interesting merely as an exhibit of the peculiar psychology of bourgeois chauvinism engaged in ridiculous plots and pretensions which fool no one but the self-deluded actors. Two copies of this "strictly confidential" memorandum were captured by the Soviet forces, with other more important booty, one at Omsk, and the other at Archangel. In substance it is a report by the Czarist General Golovin to Sazonov, the Czar's ex-Foreign Minister, dated May 6, 1919, recording the progress of the General's negotiations with the British War Office.

General Golovin proceeded cautiously; "taking into consideration," he explains, "that Churchill was all the time very careful to avoid meeting Russian war representatives—being afraid of criticisms on the part of the left element and perhaps on the part of Lloyd George." Through the mediation of one, Sir Samuel Hoare, Golovin prepared a memorandum for Churchill on the plan of operations against Petrograd. Hoare had intended to arrange a "private interview" at his own house between Churchill and Golovin. The General, however, observing some hesitation in this matter, was extremely courteous and considerate. "I understood that he was in doubt as to whether Churchill would wish to violate his outward cautiousness towards us. I frankly told Hoare that I considered it necessary to bear in mind Churchill's wishes, as the latter sees much better the political situation, and that I would not like to embarrass him." So it was decided that Hoare should continue to act as go-between. The General was well pleased with the results of his negotiations. "I was told that everything would be done." On May 4, Hoare reported that Churchill was "extremely interested in the Yudenich business," and so far overcame his fears as to invite the General to visit him personally. Hoare was greatly elated, "and asked me to make it a point to come in military full dress." The romanticism of these absurd creatures is irrepressible. Duly caparisoned for the occasion, Golovin waited upon the War Minister. He records the exact hour of the momentous event—"at 5.30 of the same day"—and was properly impressed by the condescension of the Great Imperialist. The reception was "most cordial," and Churchill "displayed great kindness." The War Minister explained his difficult position: "Until now he was unable to meet the higher representatives of the Russian Army, for the sole reason that, in the interests of the cause itself, and owing to the political conditions of the moment, he had to keep a secret of many things." Circumstances had now altered somewhat; nevertheless, Churchill asked Golovin, "in the name of our common cause," to keep their relations "in full and strict confidence." Getting down to business, Churchill confessed that the question of giv-

ing armed support to the Russian counter-revolution was difficult, because of the "opposition of the British working class." However, "even in this matter, without promising anything, he would try to help." He then outlined the naive plan which he subsequently put into action. Churchill had already declared in the House of Commons that fresh forces were necessary for the evacuation of North Russia. "Under this pretext," reports Golovin, "he would send 10,000 volunteers who would replace the worn-out units, especially the demoralized American and French troops." Then, under this flimsy sham, "he would postpone the actual evacuation for an indefinite period." He promised that the assistance of the newly arrived British detachments should be "actively manifested." "In short," wrote General Golovin, "he will do all he can, but again he added that the success of our common cause demanded great secrecy." The question of support to Denikin was more difficult, "because as far as the North was concerned he had a pretext—that of supporting the British troops already there." No such pretext existed in the south. Another pretext had to be invented. Churchill would send 2,500 British volunteers to Denikin, "under cover of instructors and technical troops, and if these fight side by side with us against the Bolsheviks it will, of course, be natural." There is more of this, but one turns disgusted from the record of such petty chicaneries. Churchill made lavish promises of financial and material support to the various counter-revolutionary enterprises, called himself "the devoted champion of a great united Russia," and histrionically announced to the delighted General that "I am myself carrying out Kolchak's orders." The conversation, reported Golovin, "exceeded all my expectations," and he concludes: "Great Britain's help is guaranteed to us to the fullest possible extent."

This record is little more than a year old. Winston Churchill, the "devoted champion" of the counter-revolution, remains War Minister in the same cabinet with Lloyd George, who negotiates commercial relations with the Soviet Government and disavows responsibility for the Polish offensive. Moscow, well-informed and forewarned, proceeds cautiously and will not be easily tricked by fair words and false promises.

\* \* \*

THE reader is asked to note the tone of the Kolchak proclamation which we have published in facsimile and translation on page 114 of this issue. With the magnanimity of a god, Kolchak assures the lowly that he has heard their prayers and will be kinder to them than are the wicked Bolsheviks. Or shall we rather say, with the magnanimity of a Wrangel, who promises to be no less godlike in his unsolicited largess to the peasants of Russia. The time for gods is past: the people demand their own, and no Kolchak or Wrangel can any longer withhold it from them.



## The Economic Situation in Soviet Russia

THE economic situation in Russia at the present moment can be characterized by a few most typical facts. The fact of the complete suspension of foreign trade, which always played an important part in our economic life, had a great influence over our industry and trade. Approximately the value of commodities exported from Russia, for the five year period, 1901-1905, amounted to 941 million rubles a year, but for the five year period, 1906-1910, it already amounted to 1,205 million rubles a year, which means that on the average there was an increase of twenty-eight per cent in the exports from Russia. The yearly import of commodities for the period 1901-1905 amounted to 632 million rubles a year; for the period 1906-1910 it was 910 million rubles a year—an increase of forty-four per cent. From 1910 to 1912 the exports of Russia, on an average, amounted to 1,520 million rubles. (See Table I.)

For the same three (3) years prior to the war, our complete imports amounted to 1,139 million rubles, and were divided as shown in Table II.

It is characteristic that Russia exported chiefly food products, all kinds of raw materials, mineral ores, and petroleum, and imported chiefly manufactured products.

Imports to Russia were mostly such ware and commodities as were not manufactured on her territory. For instance, for the above three (3) years prior to the war, the following commodities were imported in considerable quantities:

Carriages, musical instruments, all kinds of machines and apparatus, machines and parts, power engines, lathes, sewing machines, binding machinery, harvest machinery (*to the aggregate amount of 50 million rubles*).

Iron and steel products, pewter, lead, (about 15 million rubles each), coal (mainly for Petrograd), paper products, books, tanning materials, fertilizing materials, all kinds of flax and woolen goods, tea, coffee, fruit, etc.

Imports to Russia are given by countries of origin in Table III.

For the above we are using mainly figures of pre-war times, as they are more characteristic for Russia's previous relations with the rest of Europe. Data for the time of the war are entirely different, because during the said period materials for war purposes were mostly imported, which is not characteristic at all of our normal trade relations.

Post-war trade relations of Russia appear most unfavorably, i.e.,—Russia's chief source of supply of all kinds of manufactured goods and commodities, exporting about fifty per cent of Russia's total purchases of said commodities—Germany—cannot be counted upon in Russian foreign trade.

Besides, Germany is so exhausted, that she will not be able to resume her trade relations with the outside world in the immediate future. There remain other European countries, which could, if they would, start trade and bartering relations with Russia, but at the present time this is prevented by purely political combinations. The powerful countries of Europe decided to blockade Soviet Russia, suspending all imports to that country, in spite of the fact, that they themselves are in need of the raw materials, which Russia is in a position to supply them with. This is evident from the fact that some of them were willing to start bartering with her. In any event, we must face the fact that Russia's foreign trade with European countries and bartering relations with the outside world are completely paralyzed and cannot be restored in the near future.

The shortage of manufactured products and other commodities would have to be made up by the products of Russian factories, which is most difficult at the present time. For instance, the agricultural industry would have to increase its productive capacity, which is impossible at present. The same is true for other branches of our industry, which are in the same position, and have to develop their activities without any assistance from the outside. One of the most important factors in the economic life of the Russian Soviet Republic is that Russia is *cut off from her main industrial centers and sources of raw materials and fuel*. Industry can normally develop only when she has at her disposal the main sources of raw materials and fuel, and when the exploitation of the same is not hampered by great difficulties. The geographical situation of Russia's main sources of raw materials is comparatively inconvenient, as they are located in the Donets Coal Basin, in Poland, in the Ural region, in Western Siberia, and very little in the central regions. The same is true of the metal ore mines, which are also for the most part located on the outskirts. The center and the northern part of Russia are comparatively poor in ore, the exploitation of which, is, in addition, connected with difficulties.

The political situation was such, that the Donets Coal Basin was cut off from the rest of Soviet Russia about a year ago, and since then no connection with that region could be established. In the summer of 1918 the Czecho-Slovak movement had began and cut off the second source of metal, the Ural region.

The following figures will give an idea of the production in the above-mentioned industries:

The work of the Donets Coal Basin can be seen by the figures of production for the years 1913-1918. (See Table IV.)

The tables show that the production of these mines has decreased to about one-third of the normal production.

The export of mineral fuel from the Donets

**Exports from Russia, Annual Average 1910-1912 (Table I)**

<i>Products</i>	<i>Value in Million Rubles</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Export</i>
Grain .....	617	40.6
Lumber .....	145	9.5
Flax and hemp.....	103	6.8
Feed .....	77	5.1
Eggs .....	76	5.0
Butter .....	64	4.2
Hides and skins.....	50	3.3
Sugar .....	50	3.3
Other goods.....	338	22.2
Total .....	1,520	100.0

**Imports into Russia, Annual Average 1910-1912 (Table II)**

<i>Products</i>	<i>Value in Million Rubles</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Import</i>
Textile materials.....	203	17.8
Machinery .....	137	12.0
Textiles and yarns.....	83	7.3
Tea .....	59	5.2
Hides and skins.....	53	4.6
Coal and coke.....	43	3.8
Manufactured metal prod- ucts .....	38	3.4
Metals .....	38	3.3
Gum .....	34	3.0
Fish .....	33	2.9
Other merchandise.....	418	36.7
Total .....	1,139	100.0

**Imports by Countries, Annual Average 1910-1912 (Table III)**

<i>Countries of Origin</i>	<i>Value in Million Rubles</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Germany .....	490	43.0
England .....	150	13.2
United States.....	88	7.7
China .....	79	6.9
France .....	58	5.1
Persia .....	36	3.1
Austria-Hungary .....	34	3.0
Other countries.....	204	18.0
Total .....	1,139	100.0

**Production of Coal in Donets Basin, 1913-1918 (Table IV)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Production</i>	<i>Average Monthly Production</i>
1913 .....	1,543,790	128,000
1914 .....	1,683,780	140,000
1915 .....	1,625,580	135,000
1916 .....	1,743,860	145,000
1917 .....	1,510,600	125,000
1918 .....	530,000	44,000



Coal Basin has decreased in the same degree. There were 1,360,000 thousand poods of coal brought out of the Donets Coal Basin in 1916, and 1,034,000 thousand poods in 1917. In 1918 the figure was only 261,000 thousand poods, i.e., a decrease of about seventy-four per cent in comparison with 1916.

A more acute decrease is noticed in the production of the Donets Coal Basin in 1919. The production of the Lisachinski, Marievski, Almasny, Slavianoserbki, and Grishinski mines has been as follows:

January, 1919....	8,719	thousand poods
February, " ....	11,289	" "
March, " ....	11,152	" "
April, " ....	5,459	" "

instead of 38 million poods in 1917 and 14-15 million poods in 1918.

Transport of coal from the above mines has been accordingly:

January, 1919....	4,694	thousand poods
February, " ....	8,451	" "

Taking into account that only one-third of the Donets Coal Basin has been occupied by the Soviet forces, it must be admitted that the production of coal was very low, and under such conditions it is impossible to satisfy the demands of our industry for coal.

The following months (April and May), were even less favorable for that part of the Donets Coal Basin occupied by the Soviet forces. Denikin began his offensive at the Donets Coal Basin and this was a final blow to its work. It was supposed that we would be able to get about 13-14 million poods of coal from that part of the Donets Coal Basin, but the events that followed destroyed all plans and suppositions.

The Donets Coal Basin was occupied by the Denikin Army and this entirely destroyed its production. Judging by the figures which we gave above regarding the production of the Donets Coal Basin in 1918, it cannot be supposed that the production of that part which was occupied by Denikin, could be very considerable; in any event it was four to five times less than the normal production. In regard to the other part of the Basin, which was occupied only recently, the position will be very difficult, as Denikin's offensive is always accompanied by complete destruction. Workingmen from the factories are in flight, many enterprises are left without technical and labor help, and this leads to the complete and final destruction of the mines. Falling and crumbling of coal beds take place, ventilation gets out of order, mines are overflowed, etc. Due to the absence of the workingmen, the work of the coal mines is hindered in such a way as to make its restoration impossible, and the mines are destined for destruction.

The longer the power of Denikin will last in the Donets Coal Basin, the worse it will be for the latter, and the more acute will be the disorganization of all industrial enterprises.

A very close connection with the rest of Russia is necessary for the Donets Coal Basin, because only from Russia can it get all the required products and commodities. For instance, for the restoration of its production of coal to one and a half million poods a year, it is necessary for the Basin to have at least 100,000 cars of timber, of which 75,000 cars must be binding timber.

The redemption of the Basin gave an opportunity to supply it with timber—the part occupied by the Soviet forces received in May about 7,000 cars of timber, including binding timber.

The Donets Coal Basin has none of the above products. The same can be said about the other products necessary for the satisfactory work of the Basin—all kinds of machinery, explosive materials, etc.

The same fundamental principles were applied to the factories and enterprises under the Soviet influence as were applied to those in Soviet Russia, namely, Ukraine's Economic Council had begun the nationalization of the large enterprises of that region. Very soon there was established a central committee for the nationalized coal mines of the Donets Coal Basin, which committee included a number of branches and was to handle the work of the coal mines of the Basin. It was intended to carry out the nationalization of the coal industry slowly and carefully, so as not to injure in any way the normal routine of the work. It was intended to begin with the nationalization of the largest enterprises, which could be counted upon in the production of coal in the region, namely, thirty-four of the largest mines, with 29,000 workingmen. The remaining small enterprises could go on working, but their production would not have any significance for our railroads, transports, and industry, and therefore, supplying them with necessary material could be postponed. Denikin's offensive destroys all these plans, and they are not to be realized until a more or less distant future.

The Donets Coal Basin is a source of coal for all our industry and after the restoration of its work all our hope in regard to fuel will depend entirely upon it.

Restoration of its work will be very difficult, but it must be done as soon as possible, as all other kinds of fuel cannot satisfy the demands of our industry, and will not furnish that which the Donets Coal Basin is able to furnish us with.

*(To be continued)*

### *Chicherin's Pamphlet*

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## Through Latvia and Esthonia to Russia

[The following article appeared in a recent number of "Social Demokraten," Christiania, Norway. It is from the pen of that paper's correspondent in Russia, Jakob Friis.]

ON MARCH 1, Editor Otto Grimlund, of Stockholm, and I, left Stockholm on the steamship *Igel*, bound for Libau, intending to enter Russia via Riga, Reval, and Narva. The route through Murman had not yet been opened, and it was impossible for Grimlund to obtain a passport through Finland, while there were as yet no direct connections between Stockholm and Reval. The way through Libau was thus the only possible one. It proved, however, to be a much more tiresome and troublesome way than we had expected. It took us fourteen days to reach Narva, but as a reward we obtained some very vivid and valuable impressions of conditions in the border states, impressions which were of especial value in making comparisons with conditions in neighboring countries.

As is well known, Latvia and Esthonia became independent states after the Russian revolution. Their populations aggregate not more than three millions, both together. That these two small states have been able to stop the access to the sea of the giant Russia is in itself rather abnormal. It is doubtful whether they can govern themselves, since in the short period of their independence they have already become mutually hostile. If the matter had been one for their decision alone, they would have undoubtedly already been at war with each other, so strong was this hostility, but the Entente powers prevented this war. It was during the worst days of this wrangle that Grimlund and I travelled through Latvia and Esthonia, hearing expressions of opinion from both sides, and everyone said that there was more hatred than love for each other in these two newly founded independent states.

The Letts and Esthonians belong to entirely different races, the former to the Indo-Germanic racial group, forming a single language group, with the Lithuanians and ancient Prussians. The Esthonians, on the other hand, belong to the Finnish-Ugrian race, being as similar as are, for instance, the Norwegians and Swedes.

Libau is "Leepaya" in Lettish and means the "linden-tree town."\* It is an important seaport, which carried on an enormous trading and shipping business before the war, when it had a population of about 110,000 inhabitants. "The great prosperity of the town was evident from its appearance," says a book about Esthonia. "An elegant residence quarter and modern and up to date institutions give the town a modern west European character." So says the book, and it was probably true when the book was written, but

\* Numerous towns in territory no longer Slavic bear evidence of former Slavic occupation; thus, Leipzig, in Saxony, is also derived from the Slavic root *lipa*, "linden-tree," although it is situated in what is now Germanic territory.

times have changed since then. The town looks unclean and decayed, and its impression is far from that of having a "modern west European character." In the best hotel of the town the effect of the years of war can everywhere be seen. The dining room makes a very poor impression, and the food is very scanty. We did not desire to extend our stay here longer than necessary and took the first train, to continue our journey as soon as possible.

Here as everywhere else in the belligerent countries trains were all crowded with people. We knew this in advance, and inquired at the station at Libau if we might be permitted to buy a special stateroom, as we had quantities of baggage which we wanted to keep with us. "Oh, yes," we were told, "it will be all right." It was only necessary to buy eight tickets instead of two. As the difference in cost was not great enough to warrant long discussion, we bought the eight tickets. We did not get the stateroom, however. It was so crowded with passengers that special rights were of no use whatever. Our stateroom was simply taken over and occupied by others.

Riga appears to be a much more modern city than Libau. Before the war it had about a half million inhabitants. It is, moreover, a very old city. In the year 1150 it was razed to the ground by Gothlandian merchants from Lubeck. The inner part of the city has a very venerable aspect. From the broad modern circular boulevards it is only a few steps to the old narrow streets where the religious and guild atmosphere of the middle ages seems still to exist. The high tower of St. Peter's church rises here above the old-fashioned houses and precipitous slanting roof of the monastery of the Holy Ghost. Here stands the ruin of the old church of the Knights of the Sword, St. George's cathedral, where the Augustinian monk Meinhard, Bishop Albert of Bremen, and several others are buried. Together with the merchants from Gothland Meinhard went out to the Baltic States, the merchants to carry on exchange trade with shipments from the Novgorod market, Meinhard to convert the heathens to Christianity. The Hanseatic ships went home again when the autumn storms began, but Meinhard remained and preached among his heathens, among whom he died, in 1196. Bishop Albert of Bremen became, however, the real founder of Riga. With crowds of noble crusaders he founded the colony of Riga and instituted there the famous order of the Knights of the Sword, which carried on the work of reformation with great zeal and faithfulness.

In addition to the churches there are the Guild buildings, which remind one of ancient times. The magnificent "House of the Black Hoods," with its beautiful tower, and the Marie guildhouse with its wonderful architecture, are the most famous.

It is remarkable how little damage has been done to this city in spite of the battles that raged about it during the war. True, however, the beautiful town theatre was destroyed by a 42-centimeter shell, but the city as a whole seems untouched . . .

Before the war Riga was governed by German capital. The upper class of the German merchant families, small and few in number, dominated the economic and political life of the town. They guarded their privileges, carefully upheld their connections with the German home country, and held the Lettish laboring class under a strict German discipline. At the outbreak of the war there were fifty Germans and only fifteen Letts and Russians participating in the local government of Riga.

The provincial national government of Latvia, the "People's Council," now existed at Riga. The Social Democrats had one-third of the representation there. Election to the Constituent Assembly was being held while we were in Riga. We visited the office of the Right Social Democrat headquarters where the young Dr. Kalnits gave us some information on the situation. When the German troops marched into the town in 1918 they formed a Baltic-Lettish reactionary government, but they had to flee when the Bolshevik government came into power. In May, 1919, the government came back again, however. The elections to the Constituent Assembly took place with the participation of everyone above twenty-one years of age. There are five election districts: Latgallia, Riga, Kurland, Sengallian, and Livland. The results depend especially on Latgallia, where the priests have great power over the peasants and where reaction is therefore strong. The Communists boycotted the elections, since they could only work illegally. The trade unions which go with the Social Democratic party number about 25,000 members. The most important question of the election was the attitude towards Russia. The government was against, the Social Democrats for, peace with Russia. I do not remember the immediate results of the election, but the government has been compelled to make peace with Russia. In the same house where I lived in Moscow, later on, peace negotiations between Soviet Russia and Latvia took place. Peace was declared, but on much severer terms for Latvia than they had expected. The Russians reasoned, and rightly, that it was more important for Latvia to obtain peace than for Russia. Had Latvia offered peace at the time when Russia had not yet defeated all her enemies, the Lettish negotiations would have been met with greater benevolence than they met later.

From Riga we proceeded through the border town, Walk, to Esthonia, and, by way of Dorpat to Reval. It was not a pleasant trip.

## THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN PEACE TREATY

June 5, 1920.

On the night of May 3, at 12.20 P. M., peace with Russia was signed by Gregory Uratadse, member of the Georgian Constituent Assembly.

The chief points of the treaty are the following:

1. Russia recognizes unreservedly the sovereignty and independence of the Georgian state, and renounces all previous sovereign claims in reference to the Georgian people or Georgian territory.
2. Russia renounces all interference with Georgia's internal affairs.
3. Questions of boundary will be settled in Georgia's favor. Among other things, Russia recognizes that the whole Batum territory belongs unconditionally to the Georgian state.
4. Georgia and Russia both pledge themselves to maintain strictest neutrality towards each other, and not to permit the establishment of any armed power for the purpose of overthrowing by force the established order of either state. Groups of this nature, which have intruded, or which intrude in the near future upon the territory of the states signing this treaty, must be disarmed and interned.
5. Industrial relations between Russia and Georgia will be established in accordance with the following principles:
  - a. Mutual advantage;
  - b. Mutual renunciation of tariffs.

These conditions will continue to hold until a commercial treaty is signed, which must be concluded within a short time.

Noe Jordania, president of the Georgian Government, wired the Georgian peace delegate in Moscow as follows:

"Congratulations on the conclusion of the peace treaty. Inform the Council of People's Commissars that the news of peace will be received by the people with intense joy. I hope that from now on, all misunderstandings between Russia and Georgia will disappear, and that both nations will work together in peace and harmony for the reconstruction of life on a Socialist basis. Greetings to all friends and comrades."

NOE JORDANIA.

The peace treaty which Soviet Russia has concluded with Georgia is another document true to proletarian foreign policy. Georgia is not an industrial republic, but a bourgeois democratic state, which the Mensheviks succeeded in tearing away from Soviet Russia, with words of bourgeois democracy, and tried to steer into the deep waters of Entente politics. Rather than gain its independence from Moscow, it resorted to dependence upon Entente imperialism. The policy of Soviet Russia was not to set about to overthrow the Menshevik Georgian government, but to make it clear to the Georgian people that the all-Russian Soviet Government entertained no oppressive designs upon them, and would not try to further their political development by violence. In this way, the Georgian Mensheviks had to accept against their will peaceful and friendly relations with Soviet Russia, and Georgia became an ally of Soviet Russia instead of an enemy. And in addition to this, the nationalist agitation of hostile Russians has been abandoned, and the most favorable conditions for the victory of the Socialist Revolution have been created in Georgia.

### PICTURES IN NEXT ISSUE

*The next issue of SOVIET RUSSIA will contain eight full pages of new photographs (Red Army Soldiers, New Moscow Monuments, etc.), printed on special calendared paper. Also, the regular interesting reading matter.*



## A Funeral in the Taiga\*

From the Diary of a Partisan

**WE KNEW** Pankratiev was going to die. For the last few weeks he had been gradually passing away. He was not receiving any food and had acquired the appearance of a living skeleton, with his large burning eyes, into which I dared not look, for so strong was their look, that it seemed Death itself was gazing through them. And there he lay, in the middle of the tent, upon a canvas stretcher, always with eyes open, even in his sleep. We, wounded men, patients of the Partisan Hospital, have suffered enough not to be moved by the moans of that man; but the last few days of his life brought such suffering upon him, so torturing and painful were his animal-like shrieks and groans, that each of us wished the moment of his death would come sooner.

Around us was wild, impassable forest, always mysterious, real Siberian Taiga in its virgin grandeur, unexplored, just as it was thousands of years ago. Wild beasts were roaming right around our camp, sometimes rushing through so near as to make the leaves rustle. And we knew that even the King of the Taiga—the invincible Amur Tiger, was wandering at a mile's distance from us. Wild nature was spreading before us, but we hardly took notice of it. We could not think of the splendor of the trees, and flowers in their full bloom, for our very lives were at stake. Our situation was dangerous, it seemed even hopeless. The Japanese had landed superior forces in our region, and supported by machine guns and light artillery, had driven us Partisans from the villages we held. Armed with old, half-broken rifles and a limited supply of ammunition, and no new supplies in view, we kept up a stubborn fight against the overwhelming forces. Poorly clad, without an adequate food supply, in many cases having black bread as our only meal, we were willing to stand even greater hardships, firm in our determination to see Russia free. We were cut off from the world and received information only accidentally. The only delayed newspaper we ever got was an enemy publication, because the revolutionary press was ruthlessly suppressed, and the newspapers we received always tended to kill our hope for freeing Siberia from the yoke of Kolchak and his foreign supporters.

For us Partisans it was a hard struggle, with victory very far off, perhaps not to be witnessed by us at all. The difficulty of fighting a superior, well-armed, and adequately supplied enemy was increased by the rigors of wild nature that we had to overcome. We never discussed among ourselves what would happen if we were completely beaten. We knew that we had to fight on.

Even more unfavorable was the situation of those Partisans, who had the ill luck to be wounded in various skirmishes with the enemy. When in

battle line, we could not have the consoling thought of a soldier of the regular army, who knew that a well-equipped hospital with the best accommodations was awaiting him in case of injury. The Partisan could not hope for anything. We always preferred to be killed than to be wounded, because terrible uncertainty lay in store for us in the latter case. We might fall into the hands of the cruel, merciless enemy, and we well remembered the case of the torturous death inflicted upon our unfortunate comrades who had been accidentally captured.

And now the worst has happened. Thirty of us were in this little improvised hospital. We were made to move from place to place until the advance of the enemy compelled us to retreat to the thick of the Taiga. We were lucky to have the attention and care of a physician, Dr. Senkievich, but we were cut off from the world and had a very small stock of hospital supplies on hand. On account of this, we had to be very economical with the bandages, washing them over and over again, until nothing but rags remained.

Then there was the terrible vision of hunger coming. The few sacks of flour and beans—the only provisions we managed to take with us—were fast becoming empty. With Japanese and Kolchak troops right around us, how were we to get food? And so we cut down our meagre rations of flour cakes and beans. We were weak and exhausted from our wounds and constant moving from place to place, and here we lay in the open, the damp taiga air pressing heavily on our lungs. We did not complain because of the absence of sugar or meat or any such luxuries—we did not even have bread and were now facing starvation. To aggravate matters, we were in a helpless state and could not even move.

We well knew that we were not in a regular hospital. Each time we cast a glance upon our dying Comrade Pankratiev, we realized the sadness of our situation. We realized that he would survive if he had a chance to be operated upon. But the surgical instruments necessary for the operation were not on hand and could not be procured in the Taiga, and so we had to watch his flesh rot slowly, see his eyes sink deeper into his eye sockets and hear his wild shrieks of pain. It was sad for us to see Pankratiev pass away, because the majority of us, wounded men, were with him throughout the fighting and had learned to like him. He had been destined to live and enjoy health and happiness, but here he was, far from his beloved, to be buried in the thick of the Siberian Taiga. It was not only his fate to give up his life under such conditions and be buried among the wild beasts of the forests. Many more comrades had to pay the price with their young lives in the struggle for liberty. It was just two weeks ago

\* The forests in Siberia are called Taiga.

that we received news of the tragic death of Karl Liebknecht, nephew of the great German Socialist, who was killed by a bullet. In the small forsaken graveyard of Kazanka lies the body of Liebknecht, and a cross with the following simple inscription tells the tale of heroism and hard struggle: "*Here is buried Karl Liebknecht. Peasants, pray for him! He died for you in a strange land.*"

It was early in the morning that we saw Pankratiev's last hours of life. He was unconscious at the end and could not answer simple questions. The few attendants began preparations for his burial. We could not pay proper tribute to his dead body, for we did not even have a saw to make a coffin. And the corpse was laid in the bark of a tree and covered with a sheet. The attendants and those of the wounded who could walk were the only ones in the procession to the place of burial—some thirty paces from our hospital. The little band started off and began to sing the revolutionary burial song, "Vechnaya Pamiat". Those of us who were lying helpless could only hear the pathetic air sung in a subdued voice, and a feeling of mortal anguish overwhelmed us. This was the last we would see of Pankratiev. We did not converse among ourselves and each of us was alone with his sad thoughts. Would we be saved from this fate of perishing in the Taiga? Death from hunger awaited us, for we had provisions only for a few days. Isolated from all villages and farms, we could not expect any new food supplies, except by a miracle. We could not hunt game, because the sound of shooting could be heard by the enemy. Yes, we always felt the danger of being discovered. We never spoke but in a low voice, for did not the Japanese and Kolchak soldiers look for our hospital twice? The last time the Japanese traced all paths so steadily and carefully that they came within less than a mile from our hospital. We gave up our bonfire at night and every little noise in the bushes made us feel the fear gnawing at our hearts. The enemy was persistent in his attempt to find the Partisan Hospital and inflict his vengeance upon the helpless wounded. We knew that and expected no mercy. Every night we fell asleep uncertain whether we might not find ourselves surrounded at daybreak by enemy troops. We were convinced that these were our last days, for we were bound to be discovered.

Slowly were dying away the sounds of "Vechnaya Pamiat", and each one of us was deep in his reflections of our situation.

We were not regretting that we would have to part with our lives in an age so youthful and promising. We had reconciled ourselves to any fate when voluntarily entering the Partisan Detachments. What did one's life matter when Russia's liberty was at stake? The Revolution was demanding a great price to be paid, and we willingly gave our young lives. We felt that the cause was bound to be victorious, for were there not thousands of others like ourselves, who had

parted with everything to bring themselves to the altar of the Russian Revolution? Great physical sufferings, hunger, privations, a superior enemy—what could stop us? Truly, we did not have machine-guns or even good rifles, but we felt that it was not a matter of arms—something more powerful than fast bullets supported us and nothing could stop that—the Revolution was behind us, bidding us fight on, and we joyfully submitted to the call.

We, wounded Partisans, half of whom at best would remain crippled forever, would forget our sufferings, when we reminded ourselves of the devotion of the workers and peasants to our common cause of freeing Siberia from the hated rule of Kolchak. We gained inspiration and a greater desire to battle on, when we thought of the poor peasants, who had to suffer all the wrath and vengeance of the Japanese and Kolchak punitive expeditions. A peasant shared his meagre food with us, or perhaps one of his family went to the hills and shouldered a rifle to fight the oppressors of the country—and often their houses were burned down, and everyone in the village flogged.

We reminded ourselves of the peasant children, revolutionaries of the future, who shared their parents' hatred for the dictator's role. They sang revolutionary songs with real enthusiasm and would rather die than disclose anything that might injure the cause of the Partisans. Here it was, in the village of Novo-Niezhino, that a twelve year-old boy showed singular heroism. The Kolchak troops occupied the village a day after the Partisans had left it. The Kolchak officers seized a twelve year old boy and insisted that he tell the direction in which the Partisans had gone. But the little boy felt that not merely the lives of those men were at stake—something greater than that depended upon his answer, and so he stubbornly claimed that he knew nothing. The officers insisted, threatened, and finally told him that he would be burned alive if he remained obstinate. The big Russian kitchen stove was at the officers' order filled with straw and the boy was shoved into the stove. Then the officer lit a match and ordered the boy to give full information, or the straw would be ignited. The boy knew, but would not tell. The inhuman threat was not carried out, however, and the boy was let out of the stove. What must he have felt when the officer held the match?

We thought of the binding ties that exist between us, Partisans, and the peasants and workers. We are brothers of one great world army that can never be conquered. What did it matter that the Japanese had landed another few thousand soldiers in our region? Was not the whole nation, nay, the entire world with us? We could not measure our forces in thousands of rifles, as the enemy did. We felt we could fight even with bare hands. The Russian Revolution, irresistible as fate itself, told us to wage the battle. We shall fight on . . .

## Official Communications of the Soviet Government

### ENGLAND'S SUPPORT OF WRANGEL

Moscow, June 26.—Simultaneous with the assurances of the British Government that they are not associated with Wrangel's offensive, the latter continues with a considerable display of war material still furnished by Great Britain. One of Wrangel's associates, General Reirshin, who was made prisoner on June 10, declared as follows: "Wrangel receives equipment, such as guns, rifles, and other arms, principally from Great Britain, and secondly from France. Large British ships and small French craft help Wrangel on the sea. He receives fuel from Batum."

In an answer to Earl Curzon's assurances, we asked what Britain would do to enforce her disapproval of Wrangel's action. No answer is forthcoming, but help is steadily being given to Wrangel. When the Entente is thus actively attacking us our masses will be hard to convince of the desirability of recognizing the claims of British creditors. The British Crimean policy is wrecking our efforts; we have seen the effects in the Central Executive Committee at a session with the Trade Union and Factory Committees.

### RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND

Moscow, June 17.—Today at the second sitting of the session of the Central Executive Committee, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, made a report on the whole position of international policy. He showed England's duplicity in supplying Poland and Wrangel with munitions to be used against Russia, saying that while England denied her aggressive policy, at the same time she was evading real diplomatic negotiations with Russia's political representative Litvinov, and during commercial negotiations with Krassin's trade delegation was attempting to bind Russia in political questions without binding the Entente, and wished to take everything from Russia, giving nothing in return.

We desire real negotiations with Britain, but Britain evades them. Opposition speakers, like Ossinsky, Chairman of the Executive Committee, of Tula; Kaganovich, Chairman of the Executive Committee of Tambov, Sosnovsky, member of the Central Executive Committee, attacked Chicherin's peaceful policy demanding stronger action, and especially pointing out the danger in the duplicity of the Entente. All appeals for a stronger policy provoked great applause. A resolution endorsing Chicherin's peaceful policy was carried with fifteen votes against it.

CHICHERIN.

### RUSSO-FINNISH PEACE PARLEYS

Moscow, June 17.—The Russo-Finnish peace negotiations were opened in Yurzev. The Russian representative Kervenec proposed the conclusion of an armistice.

### A SOVIET DENIAL

Moscow, June 20.—Western radios tell lies about Russian troops allegedly marching towards Teheran. Such statements are quite false. All our forces have evacuated Persian soil and waters. A revolutionary Soviet Government headed by Mirza-Kutchuk carries on its struggle with its own forces; it is entirely the work of the Persian people themselves and not in the remotest of foreign interference. The Persian people are determining their own fate.

CHICHERIN.

### POLISH ATROCITIES

1246. May 4, 1920.

The eighth congress of Soviets of the district of Polotsk, after taking cognizance of the lamentable situation in which the population of the canton of Turovian had been placed by the incursion of the Polish legionaries, and the calamities and privations without number which were imposed upon it by the barbarous Poles, expresses its profound sympathy for the victims of the cynical imperialist brigandage. The congress loudly protests before the workers and peasants of the whole world against the savage horrors and barbaric atrocities committed by the Polish troops upon the Russian workers. Moved by the unheard of cruelties of the Polish legionaries and the sufferings endured by the populations of all the occupied localities, the delegates of the congress express the firm hope that the day is near when the workers and peasants will overthrow all the bandits of imperialism throughout the world. It hopes that soon the revolution commenced by the working masses of Russia, which has already passed beyond her frontiers, will bring liberation to all the oppressed nations, and that then, over the corpses of the Polish lords and proprietors, the Russian workers will extend a fraternal hand to the Polish workers, in order to construct with them the radiant future which is called communism.

*The President of the Congress,*

NIKANENOK.

*Secretary, STANUL.*

### PROTEST AGAINST POGROMS

1178. April 22, 1920.

The united committee of public Israelite organizations and an assembly called together by it of the Jewish citizens of Moscow, after having heard on the 19th of April, 1920, a report concerning the bloody pogroms and massacres of the Jews committed in four hundred and forty-seven localities in Ukraine and in several central provinces of Greater Russia, as well as in a part of Poland, by various units of the army of Petlura, Denikin and the Polish legionaries, massacres which have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Jews, and which have been accompanied by the most



horrible atrocities and cruelties, the violation of several tens of thousands of tortured women, the murder of hundreds of children before the eyes of their parents, etc., expressed their indignant protest against all the authors of these savage atrocities, against the governments controlling Denikin and Poland, who, far from taking the least measures to protect the property and welfare of the Jews, have made of the pogroms an instrument of their policy. The bloody events in Ukraine and other parts of old Russia threaten to destroy completely the most magnificent conquests of the human spirit, and excite in all hearts an inflamed contempt for all the direct or indirect authors. The responsibility for the shedding of Jewish blood in torrents rests equally upon all the governments of the civilized world, whom human solidarity should have impelled to take effective measures to prevent the massacres and punish their instigators. The united committee and the assembly place the responsibility for any future excesses which may take place, upon all the peoples of the world, and demand the absolute cessation of similar occurrences. Declaring that even the avowed and known agents of these murders, such as Petlura and his partisans, who have by their orders prepared these bloody massacres and who have directly taken part in them, have remained unpunished, the united committee and the assembly demand the immediate judgment of those responsible directly or indirectly for these bloody events and of the governments which have permitted them. The president of the assembly. *Signed.*

#### BULGARIA AND DENIKIN

1301. April 22, 1920.

The People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs of the Republics of Russia and Ukraine, Chicherin and Rakovski, address to Bulgaria a note of protest against the aid furnished by that government to the counter-revolutionary army. The Bulgarian Government, as is evidenced by the official telegrams of the Bulgarian authorities, has directly delivered considerable supplies of artillery, rifles, and munitions to the representatives of Denikin. At the same time the representative of Denikin in Bulgaria opened a recruiting bureau for Russian counter-revolutionary troops. After the defeat of the volunteer army, its remnants were sent to Varna to reorganize, in the camp created especially by the Bulgarian authorities for the recruiting of this army. Bulgarian territory thus served as a training-ground for Denikin, and also as a concentration camp for the numerous hostages taken in Ukraine by the volunteer army. These acts constitute a violation of neutrality and of the principle of non-intervention by the Bulgarian government. The Soviet governments hope that the Bulgarian people will not allow themselves to be led by a thoughtless government from the true interests of the country into new conflicts disastrous for Bulgaria, already ruined and exhausted by a series of wars.

#### A CRIME OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

1413. April 30, 1920.

In the port of Alexandrovsk, at Sakhalin, some Japanese cruisers arrived, the commander of which declared that he came only to inform himself of the lot of the Japanese subjects, and that he had no aim of aggression. Soon after, the whole Japanese population boarded the cruisers on the pretext of witnessing a spectacle, while the representatives of the Japanese commander declared to the executive committee that on the morrow they would come to treat with it in all friendliness. These events took place on the 22d of April. Immediately after, the Japanese made a landing, took possession of Alexandrovsk, and the wireless station, from which they sent on the 24th the following telegram: "Inform us immediately whether the Japanese officers and soldiers are alive and in what number, and take measures to assure their security." If not, they declared, they would not leave one stone upon another in Alexandrovsk. The Soviet officers replied that no Japanese civil prisoners in their possession in Eastern Siberia were menaced with any danger. At the same time the Japanese landed a thousand men at Dekastri, on the continent. At Khabarovsk, the Japanese worked in concert with the White Guards. Nevertheless, on the 22d of April, an attack of Red troops obliged them to abandon in haste their bases near the city, after having suffered considerable losses. Thus Japanese imperialism, which had many times assured the Soviet command of the loyalty of its intentions, does not neglect an occasion to give itself over anew to its appetite for conquest and its perfidious attacks, preceded by lying declarations of friendliness.

#### THE SOVIET POWER AND CULTURE

1298. April 20, 1920.

In the provinces. The Commission of Kazan for the instruction of illiterates has opened four thousand six hundred and forty special schools attended daily by thirty-five thousand illiterates.

*In a Quarter of Moscow.* The last meeting of the Soviet of the quarter of Khamovniki was devoted to the section of public instruction. The quarter has twenty kindergartens with fifteen hundred children, three times more than one year ago. Some of them are open all day, and these carry on almost entirely the collective education of the children. From the point of view of material, locality and nourishment, these gardens leave nothing to be desired. The quarter has further thirty-one primary schools with seven thousand five hundred children and several colonies in the neighborhood of Moscow or in the country, all in perfect condition. One hundred and fifty communists have been mobilized for the instruction of the illiterate, which has already commenced in all the factories. The Soviet urges the factory committees to take the most active part in the campaign for obligatory instruction.

### EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

A new labor palace containing libraries, reading-rooms and lecture halls is being organized at Moscow.

In the medical faculties of all universities the courses will be continued this year during the entire spring and summer in order to obtain a promotion in medicine on the first of January next.

VIESTNIK.

### THE THEATRE

Lunacharsky points out in *Izvestia* the constant enriching of the revolutionary repertoire. After the already famous play entitled "The Legend of the Communard," there has just been composed a play still superior from a literary point of view, with the title, "The Great Communard." The Petrograd Soviet has also published several original plays full of talent, and suitable for the theatre of the worker and peasant. It is known also that there is at Petrograd a "heroic-revolutionary" theatre, designed especially for the presentation of the new revolutionary repertoire.

### NOT ONLY WORDS BUT DEEDS

(Letter from a worker to the editor of a newspaper in Soviet Russia.)

A few days ago I was walking by chance along the railroad tracks toward the station Yekaterinburg.

Some repair workers were shoveling the snow from off the tracks. Among them I suddenly

espied, on the sixth track, a man whose face seemed very familiar to me. Upon looking at him more closely, I recognized the man, it was Comrade Trotsky.

At first I could not believe my eyes, but then I considered the matter thus:

Why should not Comrade Trotsky work at cleaning off the railroad tracks? For he is the leader of the Labor Army and has to set the whole army a good example. He, the one who is always saying that all, particularly those who sit in the administrative staffs and who lead the political work, should aid in the reconstruction of the transport system—he is the very one whose duty it is to be the first to suit the action to the word . . .

When I saw how skillfully Comrade Trotsky handled the shovel, I continued thinking:

There is a genuine leader of the working people and the Labor Army. He is helping not only with the pen, not only with words, but also with deeds to save the workers' and peasants' Russia from hunger and cold. Our leaders understand not only how to command, how to govern, but also how to work side by side with the simple manual laborer. With such leaders Soviet Russia is unconquerable . . .

And I gave up the errand on which I had set out, and took a shovel, in order that I, like Comrade Trotsky, might contribute a little of my work to the mighty work of the battle on the new front, the labor front.

WORKER IVAN GAYEV.

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