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# New Review

A CRITICAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM

**CAPITALISM, FOREIGN MARKETS AND WAR**

By Isaac A. Hourwich

**THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM**

By Louis C. Fraina

**DECLINE OF INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION**

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By Charles Edward Russell

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*A Word On Reorganization*

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
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# New Review

Vol. III.

JANUARY, 1915

No. 1

## TO THE SOCIALIST PUBLIC

The Socialist International is now in process of being re-organized.

It must be re-organized. That conclusion is apparently unanimous, whatever disagreement may exist as to the basis of re-organization.

Upon an adequate re-organization largely depends the rapidity of Socialist progress after the Great War.

The discussion of the basis of re-organization, accordingly, assumes an immediate and vital importance.

The organized and un-organized Socialist sentiment of the world must seriously discuss the problem, arrive at some measure of unanimity, and assert itself insistently in the re-organizing movement.

Before you can answer the query, "Upon what basis shall the International be re-organized?" you must answer another query, "What caused the collapse of the International?"

The answer to that is obvious, and unanimous. Dismissing details, and without emphasizing the guilt of any particular Party or the compelling exigency of any particular situation,—*the International disintegrated because Nationalism assumed supremacy in the councils of the Socialist movement.*

It is now clear that the Socialist International consists in large measure of parties and groups strongly nationalistic.

The nationalistic elements are now a majority in the International. Having overcome the genuine internationalists, the "nationalistic Socialists" directed the international movement to disaster by assuming responsibility for national interests.

This being the situation, the NEW REVIEW submits three questions for the consideration of the Socialist Public:

- 1.—Are Nationalism and Socialism mutually exclusive?
- 2.—Should a test of Socialist Internationalism consist in relentless opposition to militarism, and the steadfast refusal of Socialist

legislators to vote military appropriations, whatever the pretext may be?

3.—Should the International be re-organized to include International Socialists alone, with "Nationalistic Socialists" rigidly denied admission?

Let us hear from you!

## CAPITALISM, FOREIGN MARKETS AND WAR

BY ISAAC A. HOURWICH.

It is the accepted Socialist doctrine that war is essential to capitalism, from which it necessarily follows that all efforts to prevent war under capitalism must prove futile.

The report of the committee on Militarism to the International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart contained the following declaration:

"Wars between capitalistic states are, as a rule, the consequence of their competition in the world's market, for every state is eager, not only to preserve its markets, but also to conquer new ones, principally by the subjugation of foreign nations and the confiscation of their land. . . . Wars are therefore essential to capitalism."

This view was reiterated in the report of the committee on Arbitration and Disarmament to the Congress at Copenhagen, where "modern wars" were held to be "the result of capitalism, and particularly of rivalries of the capitalist classes of the different countries for the world's markets."

John Moody, in the December issue of the *NEW REVIEW*, disputes this theory by showing that the whole structure of modern capitalism is built upon fictitious capitalization which is closely bound up with the credit system, and that the violent disturbance of the credit system which comes with war shakes the very foundations of modern finance and spells ruin to investors and business men.

Joshua Wanhope takes him to task in the *Sunday Call* of December 6, 1914. "Mr. Moody"—says he—"has got his Socialist theory all tangled up," and he undertakes to teach Mr. Moody how to "get his Socialist theory on straight." Says our schoolmaster:

"The Socialist theory—Mr. Moody has evidently got hold of some twisted variation of it—positively does not say that "capital" creates or desires war, or even that "capitalism" does. It is much

more precise and definite and much less given to the use of vague language. It declares instead that 'the capitalist mode of production and distribution'—please get that straight, Mr. Moody—produces conditions in society that make war inevitable."

Mr. Wanhope is so pleased with his fine distinction that he repeats it once more at the close of his lesson:

"Just remember to get your 'Socialist theory' on straight—that not 'capital,' 'capitalists' or 'capitalism,' in the confused manner in which you employ these terms, is the cause of war; that the correct statement is the 'capitalist mode of production and distribution,' as we have stated it before."

What a pity that the committees of the Stuttgart and Copenhagen Congresses had no opportunity to attend Mr. Wanhope's class in Socialist theory! The "twisted variation of it," which the unlucky Mr. Moody "got hold of," has found its way into the resolution of the Copenhagen Congress, which says that "modern wars" are "the result of capitalism." We trust, Mr. Wanhope will concede that to say "war is the result of capitalism" is the same as "capitalism is the cause of war." The committee of the International Socialist Congress is thus shown up to have employed the term "capitalism" in the same "confused manner" as Mr. Moody, and not in Mr. Wanhope's "correct" version. It is deeply to be regretted that the necessity to expound the correct Socialist theory in kindergarten terms adapted to the intelligence of his pupil has left him no space for a definition of his distinction between "capitalism" and "the capitalist mode of production and distribution." Still, perhaps, we may be able to plod along without this fine distinction, bearing in mind the specific statement of two International Socialist Congresses that war is "the result . . . of rivalries of the capitalist classes of the different countries for the world's markets," every state being "eager, not only to preserve its market, but also to conquer new ones."

Let us see how it is done. The Phœnician merchant, or the American trader of early colonial days, incidentally engaged in private war with foreign tribes for his personal account. In our days, however, war has been nationalized. No individual capitalist is permitted to fit out a military expedition of his own.<sup>1</sup>

War must be declared by his national government. It is a mere figure of speech to say "that the capitalist mode of production and distribution inexorably generates the conditions that make war unavoidable." War cannot be fought by "conditions," it must be fought by men. Some individuals must send those men

<sup>1</sup> The filibustering expeditions of our captains of industry to Central and South America are invariably aided by some revolutionary faction which is fighting for the control of the government of its country.

to fight. We sometimes speak figuratively of the war of competition. A Socialist speaker has likened war to an industrial crisis, claiming that both phenomena are independent of the volition of the individual capitalist. There is, however, a material difference between them. An industrial crisis is not "declared," it is the cumulative effect of the uncoordinated activities of a multitude of capitalists, each one pursuing his own end, quite unconscious of the doings of the others. A war, however, is the concerted act of a number of individuals called "government." If war breaks out as the result of "rivalries of the capitalist classes of different countries," then it must have been willed by the individuals composing these capitalist classes. To say that war is the result of competition for foreign markets, means merely that a number of capitalists desire to sell their goods in foreign countries, and, being prevented by the governments of those countries from doing so, are eager to open a way for their goods by force of arms. In order to prove, however, that war is the work of "the capitalist classes," it is necessary to show that all capitalists of the country, or a majority of them, or a minority of them which controls a major part of the capital of the nation, are interested in foreign trade. A glance at the statistics of foreign trade is sufficient to show that this theory has no foundation of fact.

The inherent contradiction of the capitalistic society, according to soap-box Socialist theory, is that its production necessarily exceeds its power of consumption, because the worker receives in wages only a part of his product, and inasmuch as a part is less than the whole, the workers cannot buy their products with their wages. The excess must be sold in the foreign market.

The statistics of foreign trade, however, show, on the contrary, an excess of imports over exports in every capitalistic country of Europe.

The exports from Great Britain and Ireland for the year 1913 were distributed as follows: To British possessions 33 per cent., to foreign countries 67 per cent.<sup>2</sup> Thus the greatest colonial empire of the world exported to foreign countries twice as much merchandise as to all its colonies. The net imports to Great Britain and Ireland from foreign countries for the same year amounted to £152,000,000, whereas the net exports from the United Kingdom to British possessions amounted only to £17,000,000,<sup>3</sup> *i.e.*, the net exports to British possessions reduced the excess of imports over exports by only one-ninth (11 per cent.).

The entente between Great Britain and Russia dates from the spoliation of Persia by those champions of small nations. It is

<sup>2</sup> Computed from Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom, 1913, p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 69, 75, 77 (computed).

worthy of note that the exports from the United Kingdom to Persia for 1913 were valued only at £725,000,<sup>4</sup> which was less than one-fifth of one per cent. (0.17%) of the total exports from the United Kingdom to foreign countries.

From a business point of view, the whole adventure was thus nothing but a case of petty larceny.

Let us now take Britain's greatest rival in the world's markets, Germany. Her exports to her colonies in Africa for the year 1912 amounted to 44,000,000 marks, which represented one-half of one per cent. (0.5%) of her total exports. Her exports to British India were valued at 107,000,000 marks, *i.e.*, more than twice as high as her exports to her own African colonies. Her net exports to her African colonies amounted to 6,000,000 marks, the net exports to her other colonies were insignificant.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, the expenditures of all her colonies exceeded their revenue by \$21,000,000.<sup>6</sup> In other words, the administration of the colonies cost the German people two dollars for every dollar of German products exported to the colonies.

It is evident from these figures that only a minority of the capitalist class has an economic interest in colonial possessions.

Louis B. Boudin is reported to have advanced the idea, in his lectures on the war, that the dominant feature of modern capitalism is the production of steel, which is the economic foundation of Imperialism. The manufacturers of steel are seeking colonies and spheres of influence, in order to be able to export their steel for the construction of railways, etc. This theory sounds very plausible, but it finds no support in statistics.

Great Britain produces more than one-half of her steel (56 per cent.) for export. Yet her export of "iron and steel and manufactures thereof" to all countries in 1913 was only 10 per cent of her total exports.<sup>7</sup>

Germany exported in 1912 one-third (34 per cent.) of her iron production; yet the value of "iron and steel and manufactures thereof" exported by her to all countries during the same year represented only 13 per cent. of her total exports.<sup>8</sup>

The figures show that only a very small minority of the capitalists have an economic interest in the exports of steel products.

No statistics are available, except for the United States, to show to what extent manufacturing is dependent upon foreign

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 187.

<sup>5</sup> *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1913, p. 237.

<sup>6</sup> Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 1913, p. 693.

<sup>7</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 195, 209, 362 (computed).

<sup>8</sup> Statistical Abstract for the Principal and Other Countries, pp. 101, 135 (computed).

trade. The following table shows that the factory industries of the United States were but slightly dependent upon exports, and yet capitalism has reached its highest development in the United States:<sup>9</sup>

|   | Millions of dollars |       | Increase<br>per cent. |
|---|---------------------|-------|-----------------------|
|   | 1904                | 1909  |                       |
| Manufactures:   |                     |       |                       |
| Net value of products (a).....  | 9,821               | ....  | ....                  |
| Value added by manufacture (a) .  | 6,293               | 8,529 | 35                    |
| Exports of manufactures for fur-<br>ther use in manufacture and ready<br>for consumption..... | 524                 | 671   | 28                    |
| Per cent. ratio to net value of prod-<br>ucts of manufactures.....                            | 5.3                 | ....  | ....                  |

(a) The terms of the table require the following explanations: The products of one factory are often used as material in another. The total value of manufactured products accordingly includes many duplications. In order to eliminate them the census for the year 1904 divided all materials into crude and partly manufactured; the value of the latter was deducted from the total gross value of products, in order to arrive at the net value, which is approximately the total value of products for the year. The census for the year 1909 did not continue this classification of materials, confining itself to the value added by manufacture, which is the total gross value of products less the cost of all materials. Judging by the figures for 1904, the value added by manufacture is approximately about two-thirds of the total net value of products.

The proportion of exports to the total output of factory products of the United States is approximately 5 per cent.<sup>10</sup> It is obvious that the export trade plays a very subordinate part in modern capitalistic industry. No doubt, certain groups of capitalists are dependent upon exports for their profits, but they represent only "special interests," which are by far not identical with the economic interests of the whole capitalist class.

It is true that people do not always know their own economic interests, or they may not always act exclusively from economic motives. So it may be that the German capitalists are all militarists. So were Mr. Hyndman and Mr. Blatchford a few years ago, when they joined in the clamor for greater armaments. Yet neither of them was consciously working for the interests of capitalism. When it is asserted by Socialists that war is essential to capitalism, they mean that war is an integral part of the economics of capitalism, precisely as the slave trade was an integral part of

<sup>9</sup> Figures taken and partly computed from Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 1909, p. 194; 1913, pp. 176, 647.

<sup>10</sup> The ratio of exports to the net value of products for 1904 was 5.3 per cent. From 1904 to 1909 the value added by manufacture increased 35 per cent., while the value of exports increased only 28 per cent., from which it may be inferred that the proportion of exports to the total output of factory products has not increased.

the economics of slavery. This assertion, however, is not borne out by actual facts, as disclosed by statistics.

Each of the modern capitalistic nations exports a great deal more of its products to the markets of its competitors than to its own colonies; and even in the colonial markets foreign manufacturers freely compete with those of the home country. To be sure, any nation can erect a tariff wall against foreign manufactures. But this is by no means an impassable barrier. It merely encourages foreign manufacturers to establish plants in the tariff-protected country. Capital is international, even if Socialism may be nationalistic.

The revival of the mercantilist view of colonial markets among people claiming to be Marxists is due to a misconception of the production and circulation of surplus—value, which has found expression in the "underconsumption" fallacy. This subject is reserved by the writer for a separate article.

## THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM

BY LOUIS C. FRAINA

There was no collapse of *Socialism* in Europe. It was a collapse of Socialist illusions—a logical and necessary collapse. Socialism remains intact, to take thought, clarify its theory and tactic, and recommence its journey toward its goal. The only ominous thing about the future of Socialism is the blind stupidity of those who refuse to recognize this collapse and its reasons, and who mumble the same phrases that in a tragic crisis proved utterly illusory.

Socialists may well vision progress towards Socialism as a consequence of the Great War. But if that progress is to be achieved, the Socialist movement must adapt itself to transformed conditions and new requirements. This is what makes the attitude of many Socialists alarming. Instead of courageously facing the future they turn to the past. It shows lack of intelligence and adaptability, energy and character. Why insist on the guilt of Capitalism? That doesn't absolve Socialism. Why prate of the International? The "International" was dominantly nationalistic, and has collapsed. Why insist on the supreme utility of parliamentary action when parliamentary action showed itself impotent in the European crisis? Why ascribe the German Socialist collapse to the movement being "non-revolutionary" and run by "politicians"? We must look for the social forces which produced these facts. Above all, why speak of "revolution" in the glib fashion customary in the past? After the war new conceptions of reform

and revolution must be developed, and new conditions of revolutionary action prevail. Let us cease indulging in the illusions and phrases which frequently pass muster as Socialist thought and Socialist propaganda.

#### REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Incidentally, another discouraging thing is the kind of arguments generally used to show how the war is making for Socialism. One of these arguments runs this way: The warring governments are making "ciphers" of the capitalists; the capitalist "is not even consulted as to the use to be made of 'his' property"; the privately-owned railroads of England are being operated "exactly the way the military authorities think necessary, without the least regard for the 'owners'," and this proves "the collapse of the profit system"! But in what way does all that make for Socialism? Are military dictatorships and Socialism synonymous? Property has always been at the arbitrary disposal of governments in time of war; Benjamin Franklin expressed the matter tersely: "Property is the creature of society, and society is entitled to the last farthing whenever society needs it." That is not Socialism. The actions of the warring governments in Europe are at the most giving an impetus to State Capitalism and State Socialism. The war is not making for Socialism because governments are trampling on the "rights of property"; nor because Guesde and Vandervelde are members of bourgeois cabinets; nor because people are going to revolt against the governments "responsible" for the war and its horrors. For the hope of progress toward Socialism one must look deeper—deep into the social process itself. *The Great War is making for Socialism in the sense that its consequences mean a new and better basis for the Socialist struggle against Capitalism.*

The war has unloosed tremendous forces which are bound to revolutionize bourgeois society. We shall see a new era of Capitalist development, of industrial expansion—not "the collapse of the profit system"; the rise of a new and mightier Capitalism; and this should mean Socialist progress; Marx repeatedly called upon Socialists to assist the political and economic development of Capitalism. Beaten or victorious, Germany will be transformed: industrial Bavaria ascendant and not Junker Prussia; profound political transformations imminent, if not actually achieved, at the close of the war,—on the march to political democracy and non-feudal Capitalism. In all probability, France will emerge with State Socialism dominant in its government; the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine with its large coal and iron resources would mean a mighty impetus to industrial development. An industrialized Russia, with Capitalism making gigantic progress, will achieve what the social-revolutionary

martyrs did not—just as the Napoleonic regime, and not Robespierre and Marat, accomplished the fundamental work of the Revolution. With this clearing out of pre-capitalistic conditions, and the emergence of a higher and more definite Capitalism in Europe and other sections of the world, class groupings and class antagonisms become simplified and intensified; and clarity of social divisions makes easier the task of revolutionary Socialism. Socialism is the expression of definite social conditions, and does not develop equally under any and all conditions. All of which means a clear-cut revolutionary movement and Socialist progress, providing Socialists do not assume fatalistically that the process will go on beautifully of itself to the desired end.

The war has shaken, should shake, us out of the rut. Social development alone is not going to do our work. Our own ineptitude may undo things. Our own actions are the determining factor in the future of Socialism. We must become more fearless in action and in thought—particularly in self-directed thought. We must use Socialist theory to analyze our own actions as well as those of our foes. The Socialist movement must become humanized, concern itself more with human emotions and the spiritual reality of life. Theory is not all. Socialism must identify itself with psychology. A thorough reconsideration of Socialist principles is the order of the day. Marx should be translated into terms of modern social conditions. On the basis of Marx, Socialist propaganda has erected an unreal, metaphysical structure of theory and tactics which must be destroyed,<sup>1</sup> and it matters not whether the structure is "revolutionary" or "revisionist." Marx gave us the general principles to be used intelligently, progressively.

#### SOCIALIST ILLUSIONS

In spite of our scientific claims we are not sufficiently scientific in our methods of thought. Instead of considering the social process as a whole, as Marx did, we tend to emphasize particular, isolated facts,<sup>2</sup> to not consider in our theoretical and tactical conclusions *all* the facts of the social process; and generally to square

<sup>1</sup>"We will have to go back twenty years and pick up the broken threads of the revolutionary movement where both the leaders and the rank and file of the German Socialists laid them down so long ago, and understand the principles which will permit a re-birth of the movement."—Frank Bohn, in the *International Socialist Review*, December, 1914. That is our task; but not all of it. We must rescue Socialist principles out of the muck of compromise and confusion, and then fearlessly apply them to contemporary conditions to develop the new tactics of Socialism.

<sup>2</sup>Chief among the aspects of Capitalism neglected by Socialists are its economic elasticity, the new vigor yielded Capitalism by the tremendous untapped resources of pre-capitalistic countries, and the necessity of nationalism as an instrument in the industrial and political development of these pre-capitalistic countries.

facts with theory where we do not ignore the facts entirely. This produces a multiplicity of illusions, confusions and compromises.

A pervasive Socialist illusion expresses itself in the concept that proletarian interests are now determinant in social progress. They are not. Marx foresaw that these interests *would become* determinant. His disciples, however, proceeded to emphasize the determinant character of proletarian interests, and to deny other social groups and economic interests their due importance. But these groups and interests asserted themselves. Instead of recognizing their social value and drawing an emphatic distinction, Socialists practically and often theoretically identified these non-proletarian interests with the interests of the proletariat itself. Being the more determinant, these non-proletarian interests assumed dominance in the Socialist movement.

That was precisely the colossal error of the German Social-Democracy. Fundamentally, the Social-Democracy has been a bourgeois Republican movement. The reaction in 1848 crushed the revolutionary middle-class in Germany; national unity was achieved with the feudal Junkers' power intact, and bourgeois democracy still a thing of the future. Instead of concerning itself exclusively with the interests of the proletariat, the Social-Democracy assumed the task of finishing the work left undone by the bourgeois revolution,—a necessary task in the social process, but one which should not have been identified with Socialism. The task of bourgeois revolution itself was hampered by this combination of Socialism with bourgeois reform. Many people who desired reform were frightened away by the Socialist phrases; a clear-cut bourgeois Republican movement would have accomplished the reforms infinitely easier. Socialism was warped in its theoretical and practical activity, denied its own normal development, allied with social groups and interests alien to the proletariat. Within recent years the Social-Democracy has made it clear that its fundamental task was to secure constitutional, Republican government in Germany. Bourgeois Republicans are necessarily and intensely nationalistic; and the Social-Democracy's support of the Kaiser in a national crisis was a logical result of its bourgeois character, hence nationalistic spirit.

Organized Socialism in all lands has been nationalistic, although not to the extent it has in Germany. The war has proven this conclusively. French and Belgian Socialists justify their going to war almost wholly on nationalistic grounds. Italian Socialists are indulging largely in nationalistic sentiments. British Socialism is intensely nationalistic; while the American Socialist Party's anti-immigration policy is essentially nationalistic. Organized Social-

ism has denied Nationalism any utility and necessity while itself strongly nationalistic.

This problem of Nationalism is a crucial one in a discussion of the future of Socialism. The propaganda of Socialism has been based on the assumption that Nationalism is an anachronism—a prejudice of the past—an entirely useless survival in the process of social evolution. The Great War has shaken this assumption; the developments consequent upon the war will smash the assumption completely.

The Great War proves, if it proves anything, that Capitalism is still dominantly national. This shatters another Socialist illusion—the illusion that Capitalism is actually international. Truly, capital roams the world over seeking new fields of endeavor; continually expanding, expansion is a necessity of modern Capitalism. But the impulse behind this expansion is still national. Nations with a highly-developed Capitalism acquire colonies and protectorates to serve national ends. Capitalism, accordingly, is not international economically; much less is Capitalism international in consciousness and aspirations. Undoubtedly the *trend* is toward internationalized Capitalism; in the meantime, however, national Capitalism being still dominant, Nationalism functions in the social process.

#### A NEW ERA OF NATIONALIST DEVELOPMENTS

Nationalism was an active cause of the Great War, and one of its larger consequences now visible is a new and mightier series of nationalistic developments. Current recognition of this assumes the form of demanding new national groupings in Europe and the integrity of small states. But the subject is much deeper than that; and its thorough analysis is of vital importance in that Nationalism may modify substantially many phases of Socialist tactics.

The history of Western Europe since the close of the Middle Ages is intimately identified with the history of Nationalism. Ascending Capitalism develops the nation-state, which plays a vital part in the overthrow of feudalism and the establishment of Capitalism. Ascending Capitalism requires freedom of trade within as large a territorial unit as possible, national markets exclusively for national capital, a common system of coinage, weights and measures, a strong central government to protect capital, the development of a sentiment of solidarity among the people of a particular national group. The nation-state develops the illusion of common interests among its people, awakens a sense of solidarity, produces national institutions and national culture, and provides the necessary conditions for Capitalist progress. The

mercantile City-State evolves into the Nation-State. The unit of the Nation-State is determined racially, not economically; Capitalism not being powerful enough to make the unit economic, yet sufficiently powerful to arouse and transform the sense of racial solidarity into national unity. The sense of racial solidarity alone does not create national unity—economic interests assume a racial character; in spite of an intense racial consciousness, Turkey never became a real nation because there was no ascending Capitalism in Turkey to provide the necessary economic stimulus. As a consequence Turkey decayed, as Italy decayed when the City-States that were creating a necessity and sentiment for national unity in the thirteenth century waned in power with the shifting of the centre of commercial gravity to northwestern Europe. While an expression of Capitalist development, Nationalism may become an independent factor in the social process, much more dynamic and dominating in a particular situation than its economic basis.

Progress in the Balkans was inconceivable while alien rule impeded freedom of economic, political and cultural activity. National unity in the Balkan states was given impetus by the growing needs of agriculture and commerce; and since national unity was partially achieved through the help of European diplomacy, these economic needs have become larger and more aggressive. The Balkans aspire to a deeper racial, political and economic autonomy—indispensable for the progress of national Capitalism. The assertion of Nationalism meant a struggle of liberty against the feudal tyranny of Turkey and Austria-Hungary. Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania sought to include within their national states territory and people still under foreign domination; this would have meant greater freedom of trade and larger national markets—an impetus to ascending Capitalism. These aspirations were threatened by the military power of Turkey and the policy of economic coercion systematically pursued by Austria-Hungary.<sup>3</sup> To nullify this economic coercion, M. Pasitch, the Servian premier, organized in 1904

<sup>3</sup> Socialists who monotonously intone, "Capitalism caused the war," and interpret "Capitalism" as meaning the profits of industrial capital or the "capitalist mode of production," should consider that *agrarian* interests were largely responsible for Austro-Servian antagonisms. The Hapsburg monarchy is run by the feudal agrarian caste, which to make big profits prevented low prices by imposing prohibitive tariffs on agricultural products. These tariffs were aimed at the Balkan states, particularly Serbia, whose exports consist almost wholly of agrarian products. Among other factors, ascending Capitalism requires a free peasantry, free in the non-feudal sense. At this epoch problems of Capitalism are largely translated into terms of agrarian interests. Napoleon was an instrument of ascending Capitalism, yet his regime was predicated upon the peasant class recently freed from feudal vassalage. Stolypin's agrarian reforms in 1906 by destroying the remnants of feudal agriculture in Russia provided one of the indispensable factors of Capitalist development, which since then has been rapid. An independent farmers class is necessary for national Capitalism in Mexico.

a customs-union among the Balkan states, which led directly to the Balkan League that crushingly defeated Turkey. This might have prepared the way for the national unity of *all* the Balkan states (identically as the victory of Prussia in 1870 consummated German unity) had not the intrigues of Austrian diplomacy precipitated the second Balkan War and the League's collapse. The hope of the Balkan future lies in a Greater Serbia and Rumania, and in the federative or national unity of all the Balkan states.

The utility of Nationalism is not restricted to the Balkan stage of social development. Nationalism is necessary, and potently necessary, in Italy and Portugal. Still partly feudal and an agricultural expression, Italy is economically divided against itself, without organic economic and national cohesion; North and South are economically hostile, and each seeks control of the government. This antagonism retards economic growth—much as the antagonism between North and South prior to the American Civil War retarded our own economic growth. Italian unity and the Italian government have not yet taken deep root among the people and institutions of Italy. But there is a strong nationalist movement and nationalist party; the Socialist movement itself is largely democratic and republican, while one section of it is avowedly nationalistic. The task of Nationalism in Italy is the identical task of Nationalism in Spain and Portugal, and even more necessary.

Bearing in mind the historic function of Nationalism, it is immediately obvious that Nationalism has a tremendous role to play in Russia. With Capitalism forging into being, ascending, Nationalism will become a vital factor in cultural and political activity. Indications are many that one of the war's consequences in Russia is a new Nationalism, not temporary and jingoistic, but the expression of the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie.

Consider a map of the world, and you immediately perceive how preponderant is the part thereof not developed capitalistically. South America is still "on the make." There is a powerful nationalist agitation in Egypt and India, aiming at the overthrow of British rule; an agitation equally indispensable in Persia. One useful result of protectorates and colonialism among "effete" civilizations is the stimulus given to the spirit of Nationalism by the introduction of partial Capitalism. The problems of China and Mexico are largely identical, national: creating a free peasantry, shaking off the clutch of foreign Capitalism, developing a homogeneous national bourgeois class which shall establish bourgeois institutions and bourgeois democracy; that is, national Capitalism. Foreign financial and economic penetration in China and Mexico is a danger to normal, fundamental progress, which only the rise of a



strong national bourgeoisie can avert. Unless national Capitalism assumes dominance, China and Mexico will decay as Turkey decayed.

At this point an important query suggests itself: Is Nationalism necessary in fully-developed Capitalist nations? It is an illusion to conceive now of fully-developed Capitalism. Capitalism still has to complete its cycle of development; and in this completion Nationalism plays an important part.

In completing its development Capitalism passes through the phases of State Capitalism and State Socialism. State Capitalism means the political synthesis and economic conservation of all sections of the Capitalist class nationally; the rise of a more intensely national Capitalism with national egoism at its *nth* power. International Capitalist interests become more completely, though temporarily, subordinated to national interests. The basis and animating spirit of State Socialism is fundamentally nationalistic, imbued with race prejudice and nationalist hatred of immigration. State Capitalism and State Socialism imply a large measure of social reform; and as social reform prospers and the interests of larger social groups are conserved by government, the sentiment of Nationalism acquires deeper power and reality because more actually identified with the well-being of the people. "State Capitalism and State Socialism are *necessarily* nationalistic . . . for when private industrial enterprise and competition have become insignificant, and the privileged classes include a majority of the population, a large part of the energies of the nation will be thrown into the competition of the governmental industries with those of other nations. There will be competition of nations instead of competition of individuals."<sup>4</sup> American Progressivism is intensely nationalistic; and its attitude in many ways suggests a sort of international piracy in favor of narrow national interests.

#### SOCIALISM AND NATIONALISM

The end of the Great War will see a new era of nationalist developments, not created by the war, but given a tremendous impetus by it. Capitalistically undeveloped countries will have an opportunity for larger industrial activity and develop a higher capitalism. State Capitalism and State Socialism will be given a powerful

<sup>4</sup> William English Walling, *Progressivism and After*, p. 293. The war lends a new and deeper interest to this book. It throws light on the collapse of German Socialism, and is tremendously suggestive of the new tactics Socialism should adopt. The chapter on "Nationalistic Socialism" is perhaps the most valuable in the book, and particularly illuminating at this time. One need not accept Walling's sharp distinctions and peculiar emphasis on what may be called "social automatism." One must draw the conclusion Walling does not—that the existing Socialist party has no *Socialist* function to perform unless completely transformed in theory and tactics.

impetus by events in Europe. This means, of course, new and stronger national antagonisms; but this does not necessarily mean a new era of armament and war. As governments cease to represent merely a section of the ruling class which profits by war, and through State Capitalism represents the interests of the *whole* ruling class, war loses its inevitable character and frequency. The dangers of the new Nationalism are of a different sort and more directly affecting Socialism.

Socialism must cease doing the ostrich act. It must recognize the potency and social reality of Nationalism, and while recognizing Nationalism as a fact organize on a strictly non-nationalistic basis. A new series of nationalist development being inevitable in the social process, Socialism cannot set itself in opposition. But we must assume no responsibility for it. Nationalism will perform its function without us. We must concern ourselves with other and more revolutionary things. Considering the insistent influence of progressive nations upon the less progressive, and the rapid rate of progress in modern society, these new nationalist developments will rapidly perform their function, undoubtedly within our own generation. This means that Socialism must prepare itself for the revolutionary task of the immediate future,—the fundamental task of Socialism.

But while not participating in the impending social changes, we should not detach ourselves from living conditions. The "intellectual" and platonic revolutionist is useless, and ridiculous. Socialism must identify itself with a vital social force,—a developing, aggressive force. We must emphasize a new culture, the spirit of the future; and develop a conception of life more vital and revolutionary than State Capitalism and State Socialism. But all this must be done as an expression of the activity and interests of a class ascending to power.

Social reform being an integral part of the new Nationalism, the temptation will be strong to many Socialists to participate therein. Many will distinguish between reformism and Nationalism, denying that in this connection reformism is nationalistic in spirit and scope. But that distinction will have to be made; and we should not forget that reformism was an important factor in the German Socialist collapse. Ours is a deeper cause than that of social reform; and all the more must we avoid reformism considering that social reform is being organized by progressive Capitalism. While the new Socialism recognizes the social process as a whole, it cannot express all phases of that process; it can express only a *particular* phase, that which is most potent of the Socialist revolution.

As the new Capitalism consequent upon the Great War develops,

the unskilled proletariat becomes more numerous, more powerful and homogeneous; "organized by the very mechanism of Capitalist production itself" (Marx). These unskilled workers are the pariahs of the new Capitalism. But simultaneously they become our revolutionary class, dynamic agency of the revolution which must climax the nationalist developments. The unskilled proletariat expresses those final class interests the triumph of which means the end of all class rule, and in this sense becomes the instrument of revolutionary Socialism.

The immediate task of revolutionary Socialists after the war, however, will be an uncompromising fight against "Nationalistic Socialism." The collapse of the International being due to Nationalism, the natural conclusion should be, "Drive Nationalism out of the Socialist movement!" The tendency among conservative Socialists, however, is to justify and even glorify Nationalism. This tendency is general. In the American Socialist party it is expressed by Morris Hillquit. According to a New York *Call* report, Hillquit in his second Cooper Union lecture on the war said: "If there is anything the war can teach us, it is that *when national interest comes into conflict with any other, even class interest, it will be the stronger*. National feeling stands for existence primarily, for the chance to earn a livelihood. It stands for everything that we hold dear,—home, language, family and friends. *The workman has a country as well as a class. Even before he has a class.*" The implications in these utterances are obvious, and menacing. If the workers have a country before they have a class, then national interests are superior to proletarian interests, and the chief purpose of Socialism becomes the conservation and development of national interests—all of which is good State Socialism.

The lines of the struggle against "Nationalistic Socialism" are now visible in the German Party,—a struggle *within the party* of the revolutionary minority against the nationalistic majority. It is immaterial which triumphs; the struggle is bound to end with one group on top, the other out—unless compromise prevails, and that would be suicidal. A "split" is necessary; and this "split" will allow "Nationalistic Socialism" to gradually coalesce with bourgeois Progressivism, State Socialism being their objective. This coalition compels *Socialism* to become more and more revolutionary, and Socialism appears stripped of its illusions and non-proletarian characteristics. It is at this stage alone that the fundamental revolutionary problems of Socialism, economic, political and cultural, particularly the role of the unskilled, receive adequate consideration and expression.

Our fight against "Nationalistic Socialism" must be a fight

against all its manifestations. "Nationalistic Socialism" involves a multiplicity of non-proletarian and non-revolutionary characteristics. Militarism is one of its dangers. Socialism is against militarism. On this point there can be no equivocation. Socialism is international or it is not. If it is not, then Socialist legislators may vote military appropriations, encourage mightier armaments, prepare for universal carnage. If it is international, then under no circumstances can Socialists vote military appropriations, and we must unflinchingly carry on our anti-militaristic and anti-patriotic propaganda. But that is not all. Socialism may be against militarism and remain nationalistic; pacifist Socialism is not necessarily international Socialism. While the fight against Nationalism in our movement necessarily rages around the Socialist attitude to militarism, we must fight to crush "Nationalistic Socialism" itself, and not a particular manifestation alone.

#### A NEW INTERNATIONAL

In re-organizing the International, it is not sufficient to exclude militaristic Socialists and "Nationalistic Socialism." A more drastic re-organization is indispensable. The new International should rigidly exclude all Socialist elements tainted with Nationalism; dynamically emphasize its opposition to militarism and deny admission to all parties and groups in any way militaristic. But after that is done, the task of re-organization will have just begun. And one of the first problems which will then press for solution will be, "A Socialist International or an 'International of Labor'?" The old International, indulging the illusion that any part of the working class fighting Capitalism was *ipso facto* class-conscious, admitted trades-unions and labor parties that repudiate the class struggle, and the policy of which is indistinguishable from bourgeois liberalism. Because of this policy, and other factors, the old International gradually lost its Socialist stand-point. The new International will have to base itself on a recognition exclusively of groups, economic and political, that are Socialist—abandon the ambiguous criterion "labor" as a test of admission.

Another necessary thing is that decisions of the International shall have more binding power than in the past. The International cannot legislate for the whole international movement; but if it is to have no power at all, and if its decisions can be repudiated, as the American Socialist party repudiated the Stuttgart resolution on immigration, then the International becomes useless and meaningless. National autonomy is necessary; but it is just as necessary that the national groups shall be co-ordinated into an International with power to act in an international crisis and in matters of international policy. An indispensable condition for a real International

will be the willingness of a particular national group to forego its national interests and autonomy in favor of the larger interests of the International as a whole.

As the International loses its overwhelmingly European complexion and the new world-developments proceed, the International will see the necessity of formulating a policy concerning the "backward races." And what shall be our attitude to this problem, the most formidable issuing out of the Great War? Largely one of insisting that these races must be left alone to develop their own economic and cultural resources. European and American interference must be courageously and consistently opposed. Workers of the "backward countries" are not to become the vassals of the Capitalist Class and Aristocracy of Labor in Europe and America. The rapid development of the "backward races" will shortly produce movements to shake off alien domination; and this means new antagonisms between the East and the West. Should not the policy of the International stand by the East in order to avoid race-war, and stimulate progress and international comity?

#### ANTI-IMMIGRATION AND RACE-WAR

The American-British doctrine of racial exclusion is a menace now, and bound to become more menacing as the great East awakens to independence and power. Anglo-Saxons demand the "open-door" in China, exploit India, but shut the door tight against the Hindoos, Chinese and Japanese in America, Canada and Australia. Here in America this stupid prejudice and anti-immigration propaganda is growing stronger. The East has no racial quarrel with the United States or England, unless Anglo-Saxon prejudice provokes a quarrel. A book just published, *Japan to America*, composed of representative Japanese opinion on the relations between Japan and the United States, makes it clear that the danger lies in the unfriendly attitude of Americans: "Japan is desirous of being friendly with the United States, but feels hurt that there is prejudice against her civilization and her ideals because her people have yellow skins." The Japanese are human and won't meekly accept insults.

American race prejudice, by arousing racial enmity and denying the mobility of labor, may instigate race-war. The American craft unions are working to this end with their reactionary anti-immigration attitude which illusorily seeks to protect craft interests. And the American Socialist party, dominated by the ideals of the craft unions, cravenly echoes their anti-immigration stupidity.

Socialism cannot tolerate race prejudice and anti-immigration. Its internationalism must be real. Surely Socialism may not adopt a policy inferior to the views of Viscount Kaneko voiced in *Japan*

to America: "If, therefore, there is anything Japan has to teach the white nations, it is the fact that mankind is a one and indivisible whole, that the yellow race is not inferior to the white, that all the races should co-operate in perfect harmony for the development of the world's civilization." Upon Socialism rests a tremendous responsibility. The danger of potential race-war is a call to action, and demands a revolutionary international Socialist policy.

#### PARLIAMENTARISM AND ECONOMIC ACTION

Parliamentarism showed itself utterly futile in the European crisis. The supreme utility attached to parliamentarism was a strong factor in destroying the morale and taming the fighting energy of the German Socialist movement. Marx bitterly satirized those who consider parliamentarism creative and dynamic. Even had the German Socialists had the will to oppose the war, what effective means could they have adopted? Parliament had no control over events; all the Socialist parliamentarians could have done was to vote against the war credits, which would not have averted war. The unions had no initiative, the political movement having always played the dominant role. A General Strike? But a General Strike implies virile economic organization, conscious of its power and aware of its decisive utility, accustomed to playing a leading part and not acting in obedience to a parliamentary-mad bureaucracy. The German Social Democracy has always denied the unions any vital function, conceiving them as an auxiliary of minor importance with no revolutionary mission to perform.

Parliament—political government—is essentially a bourgeois institution, developed by the bourgeois in their fight against feudalism, and expressing bourgeois requirements of supremacy. Socialism, of course, cannot ignore political government; it is an expression of class war in capitalist society, and political action becomes a necessary form of action. But the proletariat must develop its own fighting expression, its own organ of government,—the revolutionary union. Socialism seeks not control of the State, but the destruction of the State. The revolutionary union alone is capable of dynamic, creative action.

Economic action assumes dominance in our tactics as the Socialist movement becomes more definite and aggressive; political action becomes an auxiliary. Revolutionary unionism develops the initiative and virility of the proletariat, unites the proletariat as a fighting force. It organizes the proletariat not alone for every-day struggles but for the final struggle against Capitalism. Revolutionary unionism prepares the workers for their historic mission of ending political government and establishing an industrial government—the "administration of things." Revolutionary union-

ism, finally, can secure for the workers all necessary immediate reforms through their own efforts, without the action of the State. In this process Revolutionary Unionism develops itself as the means for the overthrow of State Socialism.

These are the larger outlines visible in the future of Socialism. The Great War will simply produce new conditions for new Socialist action—not the Revolution. Socialists have believed that a universal war such as that now in progress would end in Revolution. In a letter I received recently Lucien Sanial says: "The present European War is pregnant with a mighty revolution." Engels prophesied revolution as a consequence of the Great War which "must either bring the immediate victory of Socialism, or it must upset the old order of things from head to foot and leave such heaps of ruins behind that the old capitalistic society will be more impossible than ever and the social revolution though put off until ten or fifteen years later, would surely conquer after that time all the more rapidly, and all the more thoroughly." But it is now clear that the Great War does not mean Revolution; all it will do is provide the necessary factors for new Socialist action productive of ultimate revolution. Let us direct our efforts accordingly.

## AS TO MAKING PEACE

BY CHARLES EDWARD RUSSELL

If the present commercial and social system is to remain unimpaired, the end of the war will probably see the terms of adjustment bedeviled by the powers of darkness for their own benefit; but that fact need not blind us to the only possible arrangement that would be of use to mankind.

Neither that, nor the efforts of the worthy but deluded souls that for indiscernible reasons (if any) are trying to bring about a peace at the present time.

Peace is a lovely thing and usually above other blessings desirable, but a peace made now would be a greater calamity than the existing state of war. Peace now would be nothing but a truce in which everybody, including ourselves, would sedulously prepare for the next war, about five years off.

We might as well forget, therefore, any idea of a peace conference or congress to be held now. Being in this mess, there is no way out of it but to fight through to the end and have done with it.

For observe that the principles established at the present stage of this war are these:

1. Treaties have no validity and can be broken at convenience.
2. Small nations have no rights that great nations are bound to respect.
3. A nation can reject arbitration and insist upon war, and still suffer nothing in the estimation of mankind.
4. Absolutism is right, proper and enduring.

If you make peace while these principles have the potent endorsement of success in arms you nail them upon the world indefinitely

It might be possible under such conditions to maintain organized society and proceed with the work of civilization, but I don't know how.

If you utterly destroy every standard of national ethics and ideal of national good faith, how can you expect to have any standards of individual ethics? How will you preserve "the faith that holds the moral elements of the world together?" How will you have any standards except brute strength?

All the world's chances of enduring peace and of escape from profound reversion lie simply in this, that the war shall be prosecuted to the cataclysmic end. Let us pray that this may be tremendous enough to smash the competitive system and abolish it from the earth forever. The chances, I admit, would be greater of this delectable result if most of the enlightened men of the earth were not out on the firing line trying to kill one another; but anyway, that is the first and greatest hope.

And the second is like unto it, that the people of Europe shall perceive at the close of this war, or before, the monstrous idiocy and monstrous peril of maintaining in this day a monarchical form of government. The threat of war will never be removed so long as we go on fooling with this absurd and poisonous thing. A race of in-bred lunatics sits upon the thrones of Europe and directs the destinies of the nations. If this war is prosecuted to its logical conclusion, and the invertibrates that clamor for peace before there can be any peace do not muddle everything, there is a fair chance that Europe will come out of its trance and begin to live politically in the Twentieth Century instead of the Seventeenth.

There is, I say, a chance. The great danger point will be when the job is about half done and weak souls, afraid of changes and appalled by the horrors about them, will be moving for peace at any price even though it shall mean infinitely greater horrors within a few years, even though it would mean the defeat of everything we believe in, and the long triumph of monarchical mediævalism. To smash up the armaments, sink the battleships, melt

down the 42 centimeter howitzers, rid the earth of the blight and pestilence of militarism and imperial ambitions will take much more sacrifice than we have yet gone through. We should remember that monstrous crimes usually exact monstrous penalties. The world has tolerated these things and wallowed in them. We shall not throw them off like an old garment; the price is yet to be paid, now, or in the next world convulsion, take your choice. Men not afraid of their own thoughts will hope that it will be now, and that the work in hand will not be interrupted until it is done so thoroughly that it will not have to be done over again.

## THE INNER SITUATION IN RUSSIA

BY PAUL AXELROD

[Paul Axelrod is one of the leaders of the "minority" or opportunist faction of the Russian Social Democrats. In this article he gives an account of Russian conditions that is especially valuable in view of the complete suppression of the Russian Socialist press by the Czar. It was contributed to the Bremen *Burgerzeitung* and reprinted by *Vorwaerts*. We reproduce the more important parts of the article in the following translation.]

The attitude of the bourgeois classes as well as the masses of Russia is quite different now from what it was at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. The possessing classes are entirely with the government. They support the war with all their strength, and expect the greatest results from victory for themselves, and believe, without criticism, the assertion of the Czar's government that it mobilized for the sole purpose of conducting effectively the negotiations for the protection of Servia. They ask: why did Germany answer our mobilization not only with mobilization, but with war? They assert that this is a case of an offensive war on the part of German Imperialism, which feared that the introduction of the three-years' military service in France and the military reforms and building of railroads in Russia would make the situation much less favorable for it than at present, when both of these countries are in a state of military transition. . . .

The patriotism of the Russian bourgeois is of a new character; it has an entirely modern nature. The bourgeoisie does not control the politics of Russia. Indeed, it has hitherto had very little influence, and no direct influence at all. But it hopes by means of an energetic support of the war to secure for itself a share in the government, to make itself indispensable. The war, according to the feeling of the Russian bourgeois, will put before the government

tasks with which it alone, without the bourgeoisie, is not strong enough to cope. They believe that the military alliance with England and France, the democratic western powers, strengthens Russian Liberalism. Together with this motive, there appears another with the influential part of the bourgeoisie. It might get along for many years with the aid of internal reforms, especially in agriculture, without further expansion in Asia; that is, through such reforms the development of the internal market might be greatly increased. But internal reforms demand the overthrow of the Czarism and the abolition of all pre-capitalistic plundering. The Russian bourgeoisie is afraid of this struggle, and so allies itself with the Czarism, and strives for new conquests in the East and South. Victory over Germany is to make way for this expansion; and as a result the wave of patriotism and enthusiasm for war is truly great and strong in Russia to-day.

That is as much as to say that the people is also influenced. Among the masses the sentiment for war has grown up out of the stories of the oppression of the orthodox in Austria which the liberal and reactionary press, reaching further and further among the people, has spread, and to which the trials in Mamaros-Cziget and Lemberg gave nourishment. The not yet uprooted belief in the Czar, as the leader of orthodox great Russia, has come to life again. To this may be added the dislike of the Germans, which has long existed among the petty bourgeoisie in country and town. The high bureaucracy was German, and German for these unenlightened layers of the population are all foreigners, therefore all enemies, even when they have nothing to do with Germanism. The government and the militarist ruling classes are making use of all this to drag the peasants and petty bourgeoisie along with them, and arouse in them the necessary enthusiasm.

The working class itself does not live outside of this environment but in it, and besides in Russia it is much nearer socially, psychologically, and culturally, to the peasant masses than in the west of Europe. It is clear that under such conditions the feeling just pictured must influence the workers. Prior to the war, their advance guard, the Social Democratic workers, were in the midst of a great strike of a frankly revolutionary character. It is a mistake to say that the workers gave up the strike because the danger of war aroused their patriotism. The situation was really quite different. The workers were almost worn out by the mass strike of the last weeks before the war. Then came the fierce blows of the counter-revolution. The government suppressed the labor press, put hundreds of enlightened workers and the leaders of the organized movement in jail, and arrested a part of the political leaders.

It did this in order to gain a free hand for the war game. This is why at the time war broke loose the Russian Social Democracy was weakened and disorganized, incapable of doing its international duty in using all means to resist the war. When the Social Democratic workers had to march from the fields of their internal war against the Czarism to the battle-fields of the world-war, they were certainly not enthusiastic and patriotic. Many of them may have thought the defeat of Czarism would bring revolution; that Russian victory would demand such efforts as to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Czarism. In either case the rate of movement of Russian political and economic progress would be accelerated.

The Social Democracy of Russia was entirely disorganized before the war. Nevertheless, it was strong enough to make use of the only tribune that was at its disposal, the Duma, for denying its responsibility for the world-war, for saying to the people that the Czarism was waging it, not for the interest of the people, but against them. It may be said in a number of party papers in Germany that leaving the hall of the Duma by both factions of the Social Democrats after the reading of their declaration was a weak form of protest, being only an abstention from voting instead of voting against the war loan. This is an incorrect statement. In the Duma the leaving of the hall has always been the strongest form of protest, and the behavior of our brave comrades was considered among Russian parties as the strong demonstration of protest. [The recent arrest of the Duma Socialists shows that the government shares this view.]

The Social Democracy of Russia will not allow itself to be held back from the struggle against the Czarism by the combination of any internal or external events. I must add, however, that nationalistic sentiments and tendencies have penetrated into our revolutionary circles, and even as far as the Social Democracy. I hope that this, so far as the Social Democracy is concerned, has only happened within narrow limits. Many comrades appear to share the hopes of the Liberals and ignorantly believe that the national uplift developed by the war will change into a political uplift, no matter how the war may end. The chief influence, however, among the Russian Social Democracy appears to come from anxiety as to the fate of Democratic France. . . .

A Russian proverb says: "Nothing bad without good." The elementary warlike tendency produced by the war among the mass of the people, the bourgeois classes, and even in the educated democracy, contains something of a positive nature. The realm of the Czar is completing its metamorphosis into a modern capitalistic state. In this lies a guarantee that however the war may

end, the class movement of our laboring masses will not be checked, but will, on the contrary, develop new momentum.

## THE DECLINE OF INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW ZEALAND

BY ROBERT H. HUTCHINSON

[Mr. Hutchinson's article is the result of eight months' recent study and observation in New Zealand, and is particularly interesting at this time in view of the demand for compulsory arbitration in Colorado.]

The strike appeals to the imagination, it grips the public attention and touches the conscience, and any scheme to eliminate the disorder will consequently attract interest. Such a scheme took the form in New Zealand of the Arbitration Law, and for a decade after its inception in 1894 that country enjoyed an era of peace. It is now fourteen years since Henry Demarest Lloyd wrote "A Country Without Strikes," depicting New Zealand in the most roseate hues as the Paradise of workers and the land of industrial peace. Other publications in a similar vein appeared at about the same time. All, however, concurred in the opinion that the system was still in its infancy, still an experiment, and that its ultimate results could not then be foretold.

Several years have passed since that time and the progress of events has brought clearly into the foreground some features which in earlier years were less patent, if, indeed, apparent at all. However the opinions of employers and employed may have differed fourteen years ago, they are tending lately to agree more and more in regard to the success of the court. The attitude of the general public, too, in New Zealand has changed, and if not exactly in concurrence with that of persons whose work comes within the purview of the Act it at least shows pretty well which way the wind is blowing.

Undoubtedly New Zealand's compulsory method is the best, for voluntary arbitration has proved often enough impracticable. For where there is no power to enforce the decisions of the court its awards are worthless, and inevitably the losing side, if it feels itself the strongest, will tear up the award and resort to a trial of strength. Yet the term Compulsory Arbitration, as applied to the New Zealand method, may be misleading. No one is compelled to arbitrate; but if a union of workers or association of employers choose to submit to the system they register under the Act, and

then if either demands arbitration the other must also appear before the court. The awards of the court have then the force of law and any infraction of them is visited with a penalty. Moreover, any union or association of employers may, if they choose, cancel their registration and try their fortune in other ways. The State does not step in and impose arbitration at its own instance; the initiative lies with the aggrieved party. The term "Mandatory Arbitration" is perhaps a more suitable one. Once under the law you must obey it; but you are free at any time to step out of its pale. In discussing arbitration, then, whether in New Zealand or merely theoretically, we will assume a system of legally enforced awards.

Whatever secondary results there may be, the primary function of arbitration is to prevent strikes. In order to do this the court must grant workers the benefits which they would otherwise seek by means of the strike, and as the principal of these is the raise of wages the main problems of arbitration turn about that point.

At the outset a very serious difficulty is met with. The court finds itself in a most perplexing position, for it has no legal or generally accepted principles upon which to proceed. Upon what basis will it act? The worker demands "a living wage," the employer asserts that he can afford to give no more. Inevitably the questions, "What is a living wage?" and "How much can the industry bear?" must be disposed of, and there are no legal precedents or conventional standards to look to for solution. Decisions are to be made "according to the merits and substantial justice of the case," and the judges must act "in such manner as they find to stand with equity and good conscience." These are vague terms. But they must necessarily be so, for the court, being an extra-legal affair, must set up for itself anew the principle of justice by which it is to be guided. Thus the legislative functions necessarily inherent in a court of law extend to an indefinite point in this new institution. In meeting such questions as "what proportions of the returns are labor and capital entitled to," "to what degree is the employee to be independent or the employer to have his way," "what is a living wage," the court must not only exercise the duty of adjudication but must formulate anew a whole system of ethical philosophy. The problem of right and wrong must be re-solved and re-stated. The judges are asked to empty themselves of all preconceived notions, so to speak, and with a fresh and clear vision to pronounce their decision "according to the merits and substantial justice of the case."

With this generally accepted standard of ethics as its footing, can the court make the system of arbitration a success?

Let us not labor over an analysis of standard ethics but let us look rather to their origin and the forces which maintain them. Men's moral opinions in the large majority of cases are determined by the economic class to which they belong. "Law and order" to the capitalist means the maintenance of things as they now are; but to the wage worker the spectacle of women and children ground to death in factories and smothered in tenement houses is not in keeping with *his* idea of "law and order." The working class has a quite distinct system of ethics. The vertical divisions of mankind into tribes and nations resulted in tribal and national moral codes. Similarly the horizontal stratification of our society has brought about distinctions in class ethics. Child labor and abject poverty is to one class a legitimate and necessary factor of business, while by the other it is branded as theft and murder. The use of force by one is "for the public peace," while an act of violence by the other is termed criminal, though the perpetrator may do it in the name of liberty and justice. Which code of ethics is the standard is the point at issue.

"Wherever there is an ascendant class," says John Stuart Mill, "a large portion of the morality emanates from its class interests and its class feelings of superiority." Law is of its nature conservative, reflecting the economic and social conditions of the times and designed avowedly for the preservation of those conditions. Ethics serve the same purpose and differ little in their nature from law, except in the fact that they are not codified. It is upon this class standard of equity as a basis that the judgments of the court must be delivered and those judgments will be enforced by the law. The point now is that this all-important moral standard is the direct product of the capitalistic regime, and that the workers' complaints are also the results of this same regime and are directed against it. Thus to set up a system of arbitration for the purpose of settling disputes which are a result of our economic structure, upon a system of ethics and law which are also a result of the economic structure, and the tendency of which is to maintain that structure, is fallacious and can be no true solution of the problem.

Would arbitration be feasible, then, judging it purely upon its economic side?

To answer this we must look again into the two practical questions upon which the system is supposed to work. These questions are, "what is a living wage?" and "what increased expense resulting from higher wages or shorter hours can the industry bear?" To answer the first is impossible. How is it possible to determine the standard of life for the human race? What

court has the right to declare that one part of the community shall live by a lower or higher standard than the other? Furthermore, where is the process, once begun, to stop? "The most essential feature of man," said John Fisher, "is his improveableness," and once he attains a higher level of life he will not be satisfied but to strive for even higher. The worker, once accustomed to a better standard, will not remain satisfied; and as long as he has the spectacle of wealth before him, of men enjoying what he has not, he will agitate for better conditions. To base the decisions of the court upon the "living wage" is only to resort to the most temporary and transient of expedients.

The question of what the industry can bear is a more complex one and requires longer consideration. To answer it we must determine what the just returns to profit should be and how far the curtailing of profit can go on without endangering a withdrawal of capital. The employer in most cases declares that wages are dependent upon profit while the worker is more likely to insist that such is not the case. In the competitive system the profits of any firm must depend upon the degree to which that firm is superior in its management and circumstances to the marginal firm in the same business. Now, wages are simply one item in the sum total of its expenses, and therefore are not dependent upon profits, but rather the reverse is true; profits are dependent upon—among other things—wages. Where free competition obtains, labor is to the employer a commodity just as much as the raw material which he buys. If profits increase he will no more give the worker an additional sum than he will pay a bonus to the producer of raw material, or to the insurance company, or to the landlord.

Labor is placed by the institution of arbitration in an anomalous position. In the last analysis the Arbitration court is simply an organ for the legal regulation of wages, and labor becomes the only commodity on the market the price of which is regulated by law. Interest is the payment made for the use of his wealth to a capitalist who does not undertake any enterprise himself personally. It has been defined as "a guaranteed share of the profits." Under free competition the *entrepreneur* is at liberty to secure his profits in whatever way he can, so long as he renders to capital its regular returns. He may cut down wages, buy cheaper, or raise prices. Under the arbitration system, however, the laborer steps up to the level of the capitalist and demands that he, too, for the use of his labor, shall receive a stipulated return, and secures the force of law as a guarantee. This cuts off one avenue of profit-making for the *entrepreneur*. He must now

guarantee the capitalist his return, and the worker his in addition. To do this he must either bring pressure to bear upon the producer of raw material in order to buy cheaper, or else he must improve his machinery and management, or finally put up prices. To do the first is almost impossible, the second can give relief only up to a certain point, but the third he can accomplish relatively easily. He does so. Then there sets in a reaction of public opinion, newspapers talk about the high cost of living, agitation begins against the tariff, and he is confronted with the spectre of having to compete with an influx of cheap foreign goods. This brings him face to face with the producer of raw material and a conflict ensues. They parry and thrust until, in the course of time, to save the situation the State steps in and in some form or other arbitrarily regulates the price of raw material. This is by no means fanciful; an incipient measure to that effect was enacted in New Zealand in 1908. Arbitrary determination of what one item of expenditure is to be leads inevitably to the arbitrary determination of the others. In the words of Professor Taussig, "Compulsory Arbitration, carried to its logical outcome, means settlement of all distribution by State authority."

Under what favorable conditions the system of arbitration was inaugurated in New Zealand must be borne in mind at the outset. Prior to its inception the country had been under the thumb of the large farmer, a condition which continued until a coalescence of the small farmers and the laboring men of the towns effected, in 1890, the overthrow of the conservatives and the entrance of a liberal party into Parliament. Now, although a protective tariff stood behind the manufacturer, the worker and farmer controlled the government and together they regarded the manufacturer and commercial man as their antagonist. The country was limited, its exports in the way of manufactures practically nothing, and its population small and homogeneous. There was no "rabble" of unemployed, labor was scarce, of a high order and valuable, and the tariff wall enabled the manufacturer to shift any additional expense resulting from legislative pressure on to the consumer. Add to this the fact that beginning in the later '90's a wave of commercial prosperity swept the country, and it must be granted that New Zealand's position was somewhat ideal for the institution of a court of Arbitration. On the whole the idea was acceptable. Farmers looked to it as one instrument among others to curb the arrogance of the manufacturers; workers saw in it a means of improving their lot; and even the employers welcomed it as a medium for settling disputes and were glad to grant concessions to their employees for the benefits which would accrue from industrial peace.



It would be futile to delay in criticising the sundry benefits and drawbacks which have resulted from the arbitration law in New Zealand. Undoubtedly it has benefited the progressive employer by eliminating the cut-throat competitors who reap their profits through sweating and child labor. Great educative benefits also have resulted from the necessary publicity accompanying an award, and the popular criticism to which the court was continuously exposed. The worker, of course, has profited greatly. It has meant for him not only increase of wages and improved conditions under which to work, but additional leisure and independence as well. But on the other hand, employers have complained that labor has decreased in its efficiency, and other critics fear that though it has helped to unite and solidify labor in general, it has taken the steel out of the men and left them without initiative. Meanwhile the public complains that prices have gone up and the investor declares his capital in danger.

These things, however, are mere side issues of the fundamental problems to be solved, and whatever success may have been obtained here or imperfection patched up there, the ultimate issue will inevitably be the same.

From the years 1894 to 1905, the first eleven years of the Arbitration Act's existence in New Zealand, there were no strikes. In 1906 there was one; in 1907 there were 12; the next year there followed again 12; the next, 4; then 11; then 15; then 20; until in 1913 there were 23. The majority of these strikes were called by unions which had failed to receive satisfaction at the hands of the court. Though the strikes resulted well for the workers during their first recurrence, the total number settled in favor of employers was 42, of employees 25, while 28 were compromises. Of the 23 strikes during the year 1913, 21 were settled in favor of employers, 1 in favor of employees, and 1 a compromise. Add to this the fact that New Zealand has only just recovered from the most serious and widespread strike since 1890, and it must be admitted that the system is showing signs of failure.

The attitude of the workers has of recent years radically changed. Whereas ten years ago the voices foretelling the failure of the court were very few indeed and ill received, the opinion is growing prevalent that they were the voices of true and not false prophets. In fact, to support the Arbitration Court among some labor circles today is tantamount to declaring oneself a reactionary. Men and women among the workers feel that the court is owned and controlled by the Capitalist class, that though their labor representative is a factor of it, yet he is counterbalanced by the employers' representative, and the judge, being also a member

of the Supreme Court, belongs by his training and social affiliations to the other class, and is unavoidably biased. Whereas a few years ago contrary opinion was directed against the personnel and practice of the court, it is today resolving itself into a belief that the basic principle of arbitration is at fault. Furthermore the court must act within laws enacted by a capitalist controlled parliament, and to plead before it under such circumstances is a hopeless predicament. Public opinion behind the court forbids it, in fact, to act in any other but according to the most conventional conceptions of justice. During the last few years the tendency of the court has been to regard the workers as a discontented class revolting against a perfectly satisfactory order of things, and upon whom the court must pass sentence. The reputation for industrial well-being which New Zealand enjoys makes it additionally difficult. One hears it said, "the workers here are better off than in any other country in the world; they have no right to complain."

It is impossible for the judges to act impartially, they are too much restricted on every side, the pressure of the capitalist class too great. They must accept the existing order of things and not strike out into wider fields in search of principles of justice. Their "equity and good conscience" is perforce limited. I recently attended a case in which the decision was delivered against the workers. The man who had pleaded the workers' cause afterwards said to me, "The Judge is a perfectly good man and I believe he means well; but what can he do? Why, I would have had to give the same decision myself." Indeed a glance at the awards of past years will illustrate the fact that in regard to the ethical principles upon which the court has proceeded, it has managed to cover a circle very little larger than that of an ordinary court of law.

Precedent likewise plays so important a part that no case today can possibly be tried on its own merits. In its procedure the court has fallen irretrievably into conventional and stereotyped methods and the casual observer would hardly distinguish it from a court of law. And whereas in former days the court commanded a foremost position in public interest, it has now sunk into secondary importance. One would be surprised to see how little notice is taken of its movements, and how cursorily the newspapers recount its decisions.

The court is no longer the focussing point of public interest in industrial matters. It is no longer the axle around which turn the wheels of business life. Differences between employers and workers are settled to an ever increasing extent outside the court, and moreover, force is again being called into play. Workers

are resorting to the strike. Employers, however, cling to the system and use it in a previously unnecessary way. When a union failing of its purpose before the court, cancels its registration and declares a strike, the employers rush in a squad of men, pay them good wages for the time-being, form them into an arbitration union upon a programme dictated by themselves (the employers) and, before the strikers know it, they must either join the new union at the employers' pleasure or go without work. This procedure has been a feature of almost every recent strike and was notoriously so during the late crisis. Nor are the employers loth to use force to effect their purpose, and police and specials are called in to settle their affairs. It is entirely erroneous to believe that violent action has always been initiated by the strikers. On the contrary it has been the necessary expedient to which the employers have had to resort in order to keep their heads above water in the fierce competitive struggle.

Such is the practical outcome; other inevitable results are no less in evidence. Though wages have risen since the inception of the act, prices have gone up in much greater proportion, and there is not a wage earner who finds himself in a better position today than he was twenty years ago. In other respects New Zealand has progressed along substantially the same path as have other countries. Wealth has become more and more concentrated into the hands of the few, poverty is slowly but surely on the increase, and class distinctions are becoming each day more pronounced. With the tendency of business towards monopoly and the inevitable rise in the cost of living, labor is awakening, uniting, and demanding its just share of what it produces. The effect of these twenty years of arbitration and good times has been merely to lull the worker into a comfortable and self-satisfied condition until he felt himself quite as good as his employer. He had but to step up to the Arbitration Court and his demands materialized. He had leisure, comfort, and good pay. But today he feels that all these years he has been fooled and cheated and the court seems a very grim joke indeed.

No doubt the world was astonished to learn six months ago that the "Country without strike" was undergoing as serious an upheaval as that from which other countries are accustomed to suffer. The truth is that the arbitration system has reached its limit. Under the capitalistic method of production and distribution it has done for the workers as much as is possible; it can do no more now than grant petty concessions and awards. It is well-nigh powerless. The real battle between capital and labor, meanwhile, takes place outside the walls of the court room. I was

surprised, in a conversation with the Judge of the Court, to observe how little significance he attached to the importance of Arbitration. He gave it me as his opinion that a very few years of business depression would result in the abolition of the court entirely.

In short, the system of Arbitration may be said to have run its course. Whatever may have been the hopes and fears of economists twenty years ago, the events of the past year or so have proved conclusively that for the greater problems which confront New Zealand, the theory of arbitration is no solution. It has acted as a mere palliative and has not touched, as by its nature it could not, the underlying causes. The very principles of ethics upon which it must base its decisions, together with the economic system which it perforce must uphold, forbade its success. The competitive system and the private ownership of the means of production, with all their concomitant evils, prevail in New Zealand as surely as they do elsewhere. They are the causes of the industrial strife and the increase of poverty there as much as they are in other countries. The fact that industrial arbitration, the most effectual of all mitigating influences, has turned out a failure, is additional proof that not regulation of the capitalistic system, but total abolition of it is the ultimate solution.

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## ARE SOCIALISTS OF THE WORLD BEING USED BY THE KAISER?

BY WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

Some reasons for believing that this sensational question may be answered in the affirmative are contained in the terms of the invitation to the International Socialist Peace Conference at Copenhagen, and in an interview of Troelstra, the Dutch Socialist leader, with representative German Socialists.

The terms of the invitation, as summarized by the New York *Volkszeitung*, contain the remarkable condition, to wit, that the Conference is *not to discuss the causes of the war, or the responsibility of any of the Socialist parties in letting it be brought about*; but was to confine itself to formulating terms of peace upon which the Socialists of the world could agree.

This condition is so remarkably agreeable to the feelings of the German Social Democracy, that it would seem that the neutral countries at whose instance the peace conference has been called are extraordinarily under the influence of the German Social De-

mocracy. This would be but a continuation of an influence already well known; but there is more to it.

The great change in the opinion of the Socialists of the small neutral countries since the beginning of the war, is indicated in an interview of Troelstra with the German Socialists, printed in the *Vorwaerts* of November 4th, and taken from *Het Volk* of Amsterdam. Troelstra claims to have met nearly all the German leaders, and gives lengthy accounts of his interview with Kautsky, Bernstein, Haase, and others. The following points in the Dutch leader's interview with Haase are important:

The discussion turned to the attitude of the German party with respect to Belgium. I was assured that our Party in the committee of the Reichstag had always insisted on respecting the neutrality of the smaller countries. How now did it come about that it did not protest against the violation of Belgian neutrality on August 4th? I asked this question of the chairman of the Reichstag group, our Comrade Haase, and his answer was as follows: "The declaration of our Party had been previously decided upon by our group, and given to the President of the Reichstag before the group knew of the violation of Belgian neutrality. The group, every time it has been given the opportunity, has always declared decidedly for the observation of treaties of neutrality."

Two points must be noted in this connection. On August 4th, the German Chancellor declared in the Reichstag that Belgium was already invaded, or would be invaded. The Reichstag thereupon declared a recess for an hour, and it was only after it met again that the Socialist declaration was read by Haase—no mention of Belgium, nor even France, being made. Next, it must also be recalled that the German Socialists voted a second war loan in the Reichstag on December 2nd, after the full treatment of Belgium was known to them, and after it had been declared in *Vorwaerts* and elsewhere that the government was making its chief efforts against France and England. Doubtless the German Socialists have explanations ready on these points; but we are interested chiefly here in the fact that Troelstra has taken their ground, and it will be noted in the rest of his statement, that he assumes, first, that the German Socialists did not know of the violation of Belgium, and second, that, if they had known, they would not have voted the credits, a supposition disproved by the second vote.

Troelstra continues as follows:—"In looking through the German papers it has occurred to me that it was only after the 4th of August that the ultimatum to Belgium, and the following events were related in the press." Bethman-Hollweg's confession of the violation of Belgium, however, was noted in these same papers, and concerning this Troelstra says: "Information of the Chancellor that Belgium was probably already invaded was tied up with the

declaration that any wrong that had been done would be made right." Socialists never accept any governmental promise, but according to Troelstra, they were justified in accepting the governmental excuse and promise at this time.

Troelstra also asked Haase what the Social Democracy would think of a possible annexation of all Belgium. His answer was: "The German Social Democracy is the enemy of all annexation, both on Democratic grounds, and in the interest of Germany itself. In its declaration of August 4th, the Reichstag group took this standpoint, and since that time the Party press has also frequently repeated it." This brings us to a report from the best authority that the German government has consulted with the German Socialist leaders, and expressly invited them to take a stand against the extreme position of the Military Party. Accordingly the German government regards the demand for the annexation of Belgium in Germany as one that might embarrass it in the peace negotiations, and wishes to hold Belgium and Poland only as pawns in the diplomatic game. The peace plan of the Bavarian Party suggests the same thing. The Bavarian leaders, in their supposedly secret session, took a position on annexation which may prove thoroughly useful to the German government. They demand the autonomy of territories on both sides, or the maintenance of the *status quo*, and they are willing to have a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein, and German Poland, but only provided there are also plebiscites in the Baltic provinces, Finland, and Russian Poland. There is no question, from the Socialist point of view, that the more plebiscites held the better. And, therefore, as far as this element of the peace negotiations is concerned, a drawn war, as between Russia and Germany, would be a most desirable outcome. But it is possible that the war will not be a drawn war, and in that case, the International Socialist position evidently requires as many plebiscites as possible; any are better than none, and Socialists have definitely rejected the idea of the balance of power. Even in this Bavarian plan, for example, there is suggested either a "concert of Europe" or a league of "all against the aggressor," an idea evidently closely akin to the proposed League of Peace. But the Bavarian Socialists will consent to plebiscites in Germany only if there are plebiscites elsewhere, and they are willing that the Keil Canal, and the Dardanelles should be neutralized, but only provided the Suez Canal and Gibraltar are also neutralized, or internationalized.

Another question asked by Troelstra of Haase, was whether Germany would favor a non-partisan investigation of the cruelties in Belgium. Haase's answer was as follows:

Each of the warring powers accused the other party of conducting the war in an inhuman way and of violating the laws of war. I regard it as necessary, after the end of the war to have an expert investigation by a non-partisan tribunal, for the discovery of the facts in the interests of historic truth; so that those may be declared innocent, who are wrongly accused, and so that the guilty may be discovered.

There is no suggestion here as to any possibility of indemnities, which suggests that Haase takes the position of Kautsky and Bernstein, against all indemnities—a position we have every reason to suppose is acceptable to the German government, and it is even probable that this stand also was actually encouraged by the government, so as to use the Socialist Party as a counter-weight against the impossible demands of the German militarists. It is evident that no international tribunal is going to grant any indemnity to Germany, unless she secures the most unexpected victories. Indemnity for Belgium, on the contrary, will be demanded by the Allies and approved by the whole civilized world. It is not surprising that the German Socialists, who have voted all war credits, and adopted the government's explanation of the war, should agree with it also as to the terms of peace. It is for this reason that the Socialists are allowed to express such views as we have mentioned, in spite of the very rigid censorship. And nothing could be more desirable from the governmental point of view than that the Socialists should be able to carry out their hope expressed by Haase to Troelstra, to have something to say about the terms of peace.

And those Socialists of other countries who are already prepared to forget the nationalism of the German Party are now preparing, apparently, to support that Party in its peace policy. So that, after all, the missions of Suedekum, Fischer and others to Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, and other countries, may be bearing fruit.

## THE A. F. OF L. CONVENTION

The representatives of unskilled labor met a decided defeat at the A. F. of L. convention held at Philadelphia in November. The craft element continues to dominate the organization. But in the view of one observer the struggle revealed an influence that is "undermining the old American Federation of Labor."

This critic, Louis Levine, writes at some length on the subject in the *New Republic*:

In the words of the newspapers, the "radical wing of labor has met with defeat." Still, even this convention revealed the presence of forces making for fundamental changes in the labor movement. There were dramatic moments when it was evident that great powers of feeling and will are pent up in the hearts of the men and women of labor, powers that some day will break through the barriers of crafts and narrow calculations. When Mother Jones spoke, when the resolution on the situation in Colorado was introduced, when the conditions of child labor in Georgia were described, when Michigan, West Virginia, Arkansas, Gloversville and similar situations were discussed, the intensity of the potential powers of labor for determined forms of action could not be missed.

It is not strange that most of these moments came in the train of incidents growing out of the work of the Miners' Unions. The miner typifies the worker whose arrival upon the scene means new forms of organization and new methods of action in the labor world. Conditions in the mines first suggested the economic role of the semi-skilled and unskilled worker. The miners have therefore grouped about them the newer elements of labor and have led in blazing new ways for American unionism.

In connection with this development, the resolutions recommending active campaigns of organization among school-teachers, stenographers, bookkeepers, clerks, and similar sections of salaried people are very interesting. Of especial interest is the rejection of the resolution to organize affiliated unions in crafts where existing national organizations are already a menace to affiliated trades. Discussion disclosed that it was intended as a declaration of war on the railroad brotherhoods, bricklayers, and similar independent organizations. Mr. Gompers's fight against this resolution, its subsequent rejection by the convention, and the passage of the resolution to organize the salaried occupations referred to above, show the desire of the controlling element of the Federation to attract the higher grades of labor outside. The evident hope is to bring them sooner or later into the fold, where they would form the natural ally of the skilled elements in their fight against the rising tide of the semi-skilled and unskilled.

A test of strength came in the vote on the resolution in favor of a general eight-hour law for all workers. The overwhelming defeat

of this resolution showed, as Mr. Levine says, "the hold of the well-organized skilled crafts on the Federation." The culmination of the struggle between the two elements may be postponed, Levine believes, by compromises. "But the problems of organization, method, and wider social policy cannot disappear, and on these points disagreement is fundamental. The struggle for the settlement of these problems will determine the leadership, policies, and destinies of the Federation during the coming decade."

The failure of the opposition is the failure of the United Mine Workers. It is generally known that the miners' union contributes a fifth of the membership of the A. F. of L.; that it is almost twice the size of any other union. In 1912 it led the opposition; in 1914 it accepted what it spurned in 1913, the seventh vice-presidency and a place in the executive council. The officers of the United Mine Workers explained that their recent fight against the mining companies was all they could manage. Unfortunately the loss of spirit in the convention was a reflex of the failure of the officers of the United Mine Workers to live up to the fighting spirit of their members in either Colorado or West Virginia. The delegates were given an opportunity to choose between the opportunist reformers of the Socialist party and the direct actionists as pure and simple trade unionists. The resolutions committee opposed a resolution which proposed that the A. F. of L. inaugurate a legislative campaign for the limitation by statute of the hours of work for men as well as for women to eight. The committee recommended instead that the regulation of wages and hours of labor should be undertaken through trade union activity and not made the subject of laws except for women. Adolph Germer used the resolution as the occasion to voice the Socialist party's opinion of the A. F. of L. and its policy. He opposed the recommendation of the committee on the theory that all state action, even the action of a capitalist state, was to the advantage of labor. He had no misgivings as to the results of state action. He believed apparently in the beneficent results of state awards, whether the state was Socialist or Capitalist; he made no distinction. Labor, he said, should ask everything and should take all it could get from the state. He gave the California delegates, who stood for the original resolution, an opportunity to say that they were not afraid of labor legislation in California because they had political power. Gompers reminded Germer that labor could gain its economic advantages only through its own united strength.

While the vote on industrial organization as presented by the miners had fallen off and the issue had been dropped by them in convention, the men working in the railroad shops of the country, since the 1912 convention of the A. F. of L. had successfully forced

their national unions to relinquish their interference in the settlement of wage conditions in the shops of sixty railroad systems in the country. In these shops machinists, boiler makers, blacksmiths, sheet-metal workers, carmen, plumbers, steam-fitters, electrical workers, shovelmen, railway clerks and switchmen had pooled their interests and made joint agreements which obliterated craft lines.

It is the belief of many of the men that the question of organizing the unskilled will not be met by overcoming the selfish interests of the skilled or by looking to the skilled to pull the unskilled up: that it will be met as shop management and industrial efficiency pulls the skilled worker down to the unskilled; and even the stereotypers seem to realize that it is only a question of time when the craft contract will fail to protect even the most favored son.

H. M.

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## CORRESPONDENCE

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### THEORY, REALITY AND THE WAR

#### *To the NEW REVIEW:*

It is surprising to find so able a writer as Isaac A. Hourwich gazing at the European war through the spectacles of internationalism, and apparently considering those the only glasses through which it is possible to see correctly. Others deplore the recrudescence of patriotism, as if patriotism was itself a crime; while others take refuge in economic determinism and assert, with true Oriental fatalism, that this unparalleled calamity has struck the world because it had to. Thus we revolutionists are absolved from all our sins of negligence, and can comfort ourselves with the reflection that we still live in the best possible of worlds.

All this will land us nowhere; can bring no satisfaction to those who long for action and fundamental changes; furnishes no adequate reply to those who scoff at us as weaklings. Moreover, as it seems to me, most of this theorizing labors under the disadvantage of being contradicted flatly by the facts. To support Hourwich's contention it is necessary to believe that Herve, in arms against Germany, is a traitor to his life-time principles, and that Frenchmen, Belgians and Britons, who have thrown comfort and personal safety to the winds, are mad with passion and blind reactionaries. My instinct will not stomach the assumption. It tells me that, in great emergencies, the judgment of the active many is better than that of the philosophizing few, and I point out that there are probably not a hundred men in France or Belgium today who take the Hourwich position. Yet these men have put their lives, the future of their families, everything they hold dear, at stake, and in such circumstances men think hard and hesitate long before they leap.

In my view the revolutionary movement has made itself far too long the plaything of mere words and rigid theories which do not fit the facts of life. For example, internationalism, which is merely the new-fangled name for the old abstraction of the fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man, has been fairly worshipped as an all-sufficient fetich. Yet surely it is not the first and foremost thing but the last, the weakest and probably, therefore, the least essential. It is not a contradiction of patriotism but its

development, just as patriotism itself, is a development of the family and the family a development of the individual. Surely the individual may be fine as such, and also, at one and the same time, fine as a family man, as a member of a race from which he is proud to have descended, as a citizen of a country endeared to him by a thousand memories, and as an internationalist who seeks to establish justice, regardless of color, creed or race. These relationships are not exclusive of or contradictory to one another. Each may well complement the others, and the individual is at once the starting point and goal. To the practical importance of this philosophizing I now invite attention.

Herve, Guesde, Vandervelde and the rest of them are not to be judged as internationalists but as individuals, as men; and the question of whether their action shall be justified or not must hang on its own intrinsic merits. I am not the less of an internationalist because I uphold my individual, family or national rights and defend my fireside or nation against attack. My righteousness or guilt does not depend upon my creed but on the character of my activity; on the decisive question of whether I am an invader or am combating invasion. That is the crucial question, and that is the question the international revolutionary movement must decide definitely, first of all. No dogmatic argument will bring men to abandon the right of self-defense or overthrow the fact that self-preservation is nature's basic law.

For my part I believe the invader was that German military oligarchy in which the Kaiser is the head offender, but my own diagnosis may well be faulty. What I insist on is the need of thorough diagnosis, that we may fix the responsibility and punish; that we may distinguish the real enemy and attack; that we may move from talk to action. Revolutionary movements in an immediate future are now inevitable, and enlightenment should direct them, that good may follow. I suspect that the next move on the revolutionary board must be an international attack on militarism, and I emphasize my contention that it will be effective in proportion to the accuracy with which we fix the responsibility for the present war. For, if we lose ourselves in vain conjectures; if, hypnotized by phrases, we maintain a dignified neutrality; if we are too indolent to sift the evidence and publish far and wide the proven facts; if, in a word, we fail to do our work and seize our opportunity, we shall continue as powerless as, alas! we seem to be today.

The social revolutionary era is already well advanced, and we should not ignore it. Within the last few years there have been great upheavals in widely-separated countries, and the action taken has corresponded closely to the propaganda previously made. For instance, one of the most frequent accompaniments of recent revolutions has been attack upon the church, due surely to a propaganda which has taught the masses that the clergy have deceived them. But probably for one hearty hater of the church you will find at this moment a hundred who detest the military, including the Hessian police, far more intensely. If ever, therefore, a movement was ripe for birth it should be this anti-military movement, for this war's greatest agonies are yet to be endured and as those agonies increase hatred of the warrior caste will grow. Surely it must. Surely the next move on the revolutionary board is self-evident and we should be prepared to make it.

Nothing ends as it began. Already it is manifest that the older conceptions of Socialism and Anarchism—creeds still in the making, often at one and often violently opposed—themselves are changing. Anarchists are no longer the only ones who dread the centralized, military-moulded State. Socialists have no monopoly today of the great conviction that the interests of the producer as against the destructive idler are always one. What is felt all round is that we are still pitifully weak, although the world is in a crisis that calls loudly for strength. What is desired ardently by millions is a movement strong enough to alter things, and alter them fundamentally. The very stars in their courses seem to be fighting for a great coming-together, and, as it appears to me, this war gives us an opportunity we never have had and never may have again.

Hayward, Cal.

WM. C. OWEN,  
Editor, "Land and Liberty."

## A SOCIALIST DIGEST

### KAUTSKY'S NEW DOCTRINE

For two months the official spokesman of the German party and editor of the party weekly, *Die Neue Zeit*, was silent on the main question. He wrote about the war and about the coming peace, brilliantly, and as a revolutionary Socialist. He neither justified the German party's support of the war on August 4th—when it voted the war loan and endorsed the war as a war of defense against Russia—nor did he seek to defend it directly or indirectly.

But now Kautsky has once more assumed the rôle he has so frequently played in recent years, that of official Party apologist. In *Die Neue Zeit* of October 2nd—after two months of agitation—he has worked out a theory and defense of the action taken by the German Party, which, as he expressly states, is absolutely new.

A generation of International Socialist Congresses and discussions of war, Kautsky says, had failed to produce the real criterion needed to tell Socialists which wars they are to favor and which wars they are to oppose. First, Kautsky rejects the criteria of the official party statement read by Haase in the Reichstag on August 4th. He denies that the German Socialist majority is justified either on the ground that this is a war of defense, or on the ground that it is mainly a war against the Czarism. Kautsky reminds us that when Bebel proclaimed that Socialists should support this kind of war, first in 1900, in the Reichstag, and then in 1907, at the Essen Congress, and said that he would "shoulder a gun" in case of Russian attack, he (Kautsky) and other German Socialists repudiated both criteria. Kautsky reminds us of his speech at that Congress, in which he pointed out that the next war would not be a war against Russia, but a world-war, and that all governments would claim to be on the defensive and would be believed by the people. Kautsky then proceeds to show that the excuses of "defense" and "the Russian menace" or "the Slav peril" are less valid than ever now. But he does not stop there. He also repudiates his own criterion which he set up against Bebel in 1907, and which is widely accepted by Socialists everywhere, namely, that Socialists can support a war only if the interests of the proletariat, of democracy, and of internationalism demand it. He finds that this criterion also fails at the present crisis, that it does not offer a sufficient

defense for the action of the German Socialists in supporting the present war. Whereupon he abandons, not the defense of the German party, but his own principles.

Now let us turn for a moment to his debate with Bebel in 1907. In 1900 Bebel said in the Reichstag:

You will find that in case of war with Russia, the Social Democratic element, which you designate as unpatriotic and hostile to the Fatherland, will perform its duty fully. Indeed, if we were attacked by Russia, whom we regard as an arch enemy to all Europe and to Germany especially, since it is upon Russia that the German reaction rests, I myself, old as I am, would be only too willing to shoulder a gun against her.

At the Essen Congress of 1907, this speech was brought into the discussion, and Bebel offered the following in explanation:

Did the comrades fail to note that I only spoke of the defense of the Fatherland? I expressly added at the time that, if we ever should really be called upon to defend the Fatherland we will defend it because it is our Fatherland, the ground upon which we live, whose speech we speak, whose customs are ours, because we wish to make this Fatherland into a country which, for perfection and beauty, shall have its equal nowhere. We defend this country not for you (capitalists) but against you. And so we must defend it if it is attacked. In connection with this, it has been said to me; and Comrade Kautsky, too, has harped upon this string, "What is an aggressive war?" Well, can it be said to-day, when larger and larger circles of people are interested in politics, that we still cannot judge in each particular case whether it was an aggressive war or not? A deception in such matters might have been possible in the seventies, but is no longer possible to-day.

Kautsky then defined this view as follows:

I ask whether the Social Democracy of every country is in duty bound to take part in every war of defense? If, for example, Japan attacks Russia, are the Russian Socialists obliged to defend their nationality, to support the government? Certainly not! We are not to be guided by the criterion as to whether it is a war of attack or a war of defense, but whether it is a danger for proletarian and democratic interests. Indeed, in case of a war, it is not a national question for us, but an international question. For a war between great powers will become a world war, will affect all Europe, and not only two countries. The German government might some day inform the German proletariat that it was attacked. The French government might inform the French to the same effect, and then we would have a war in which French and German proletariat would follow their governments with the same enthusiasm, and murder one another and cut one another's throats. That must be avoided and it will be avoided if we adopt the criterion, not of defensive war, but of proletariat interests which at the same time are international interests.

Fortunately it is a misunderstanding to suppose that the German

Social Democracy, in the case of war, would judge by national and not by international standards, that they would feel themselves first as a German, and then as a proletarian party. The German proletariat are united with the French proletariat, and not with the German capitalists and aristocrats.

But now Kautsky quotes most of this passage only expressly to declare it insufficient. He feels the need of a new doctrine, and the following is a summary of his argument.

The first stone of his new doctrine is the statement that "it may be taken as a matter of course that nobody can work practically for the defeat of his own country." But we cannot let this first statement pass. The Russian Socialists are working for the defeat, or at least against the victory, of the Russian government, and with Kautsky's approval. Bebel and Liebknecht in abstaining from the vote of the war loan in 1870, refused to give the Government and the war their more or less valuable moral support. And it is said on unimpeachable authority that leading German Socialists, including Kautsky's circle, if not Kautsky himself, desire victories for Germany in the East and defeats in the West.

Kautsky continues with the proposition that there are "international situations in which the powers involved run into an *impasse*, out of which none of them can emerge peacefully without material losses in strength and prestige, so that a yielding without war would amount to a defeat for each and everyone of them." And on the Continent, in the present war "each one of the *peoples* (!) was threatened by the most serious losses in case of defeat and was threatened with the most crushing defeat in case they did not strain every nerve." (Our italics.) He then concludes:—

So if it comes to war in spite of all the efforts of the Social Democracy, then each nation must protect its skin as well as it can. Therefore the Social-Democrats of each nation have the same right or duty to take part in this defense and none of them has a right to blame the others.

Unfortunately this last statement is ambiguous, though the context makes the meaning clear. Since conscription prevails in all Continental countries and insurrection at the outbreak of war is regarded by the overwhelming majority of Continental Socialists as impracticable, there is little question that they must all go to war, without any reproach from the Socialists of hostile countries. The only question is whether they should give their governments voluntary financial and moral support by voting war loans and similar actions. And it is this that Kautsky specifically defends.

Kautsky no longer discriminates according to proletarian international and democratic interests then, but argues that the one fact that invasion menaces all countries alike, puts them all on the same

level. And he levels their cases also. The French, for example, feel it a duty to fight against German monarchism and militarism. But—

The German Social-Democrats for the most part feel the same duty to fight, for the war appears to them as one of a country with general and equal suffrage and freedom of speech and organization against the despotism of the Czar—somewhat of an overstatement of the German case in view of the existence of an absolute government in Prussia. And Kautsky himself says, a few lines below, in complete contradiction to the above, that in view of the strength of the revolutionary forces in Russia, a war against Russia is no longer necessary “either in order to break the power of the Czar, or to protect the democracy of western Europe”—which completes the case against this argument. He says further:—

The Germans are struggling simultaneously against the Czar and against the Republic, the French simultaneously against German monarchical imperialism and for Russian Absolutism. Where is the interest of democracy and the proletariat?

This is obviously not a balanced statement. For it does not say what the Germans are struggling for—namely Kaiserdom and militarism. Just as surely as the French are struggling—in some measure—for Russian Absolutism so surely the Germans are fighting the battles of Prussian Absolutism. And Kautsky admits as much in another passage where he says: “One may discuss the question as to who is the aggressor and who the attacked, whether a victory of Germany over France or a victory of France over Germany is a greater danger for the democracy of Europe, etc.,” clearly recognizing as he has always done up to his present somersault, the German peril as well as the Russian peril.

Moreover, Kautsky strangely fails to mention in this connection the fact that two out of Germany’s three enemies, are more democratic and politically more advanced than Germany, and so do not menace its democracy, and would certainly check, to some degree at least, the menace even of the third power in the combination, Russia. Yet he recognizes the political superiority of England, and France—both in this article and in all his other writings.

But Kautsky now drops his international, democratic, and proletarian criteria and puts Germany on a level with France and England also when it comes to discussing peace. Absolutism, military caste rule, landlordism, etc., according to his view, are not involved as causes of the war, so they should not suffer in the Socialist peace policy. The sole important causes of the war, he says, are imperialism and large armaments.

Kautsky, therefore, protests against terms of peace that involve any “punishment” or “diminishing” of the enemy country—on the

ground that all governments were equally on the defensive in the war. Yet is this not the best time to demand the fulfillment of the German Socialist demand for autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine and similar treatment for the German Poles and Danes? And how about Belgium? Socialist Congresses have *always* and *unanimously* declared that the rights and sovereignty of small countries are inviolable. Kautsky demands independence for what is left of Belgium, but what about indemnity? He has declared in another article also quoted in the NEW REVIEW, that there must be no indemnities.

Kautsky thus stands with Bernstein, and on all practical matters agrees with the German majority—although his arguments differ from those of Scheidemann, Fischer, and Suedekum. Justice to Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, etc., would not be considered by the Kaiser without a crushing defeat for Germany or a revolution. Kautsky contemplates neither. He therefore declares as insufficient his own principles—of fifteen years’ standing—that the Socialist position in wars is to be determined by the interests of democracy, internationalism and the proletariat and propounds his new doctrine, which practically amounts to this, that all peoples are on the defensive in wars, and must therefore support them.

Kautsky adds that a war may become aggressive in point of fact and that this may change the attitude of the Socialists of the aggressive country. Yet if Germany was not the aggressor in Belgium, was there ever an aggressive war? And if it was an aggressive war, the episode being over, how can Kautsky deny to Belgium what slight balm a colossal indemnity could afford? There is only one answer: Kautsky has ceased to be the spokesman of international Socialism and has settled down into the rôle of official apologist for the German Party—a position more than ever dubious after the nationalistic stand of that Party majority in the present war.

W. E. W.

## IS GERMANY FIGHTING AGAINST RUSSIA OR AGAINST ENGLAND?

The German government and the German Social Democrats declared at the beginning of the war that the chief aggressor was Russia, that the chief danger was Russia, and that war was chiefly directed against Russia. There can be no question that the German government has completely changed its position and that the feeling of the ruling classes of Germany is now directed mainly against England. *Vorwaerts* quotes an interesting interview with Witting,



a former governor of Posen, from which the following are the most interesting sentences:—

It is a war of life and death between England and Germany, and if necessary a war to the last man. We ask no forgiveness from England and will give none. . . . For France, we feel only sympathy and regret. The hatred against Russia is growing less, whereas hatred and contempt for England is more and more strongly expressed by high and low. Warn America not to be deceived by any peace group. We are prepared for three years, and at the conclusion it will be a war only between Germany and England. The English have firmly decided to destroy our Fatherland. We have accepted the challenge and no German government would be tolerated for a moment which would consent to a peace dictated by England.

*Vorwaerts* observes that this feeling is felt among influential circles in Germany, and continues as follows: "We would only like to remark that this programme differs somewhat from the programme with which the war was *opened*, and the statement of Herr Witting that the *hatred against Russia is growing less* appears to us very worthy of notice. We also know that Herr Witting—and *not he alone*, is using all his strength to win the ruling circles for his programme." The italics are *Vorwaerts'* own.

The Leipzig *Volkszeitung*, perhaps the second most influential Socialist paper in Germany, is somewhat more outspoken. A recent article is devoted mainly to disproving the various charges about the English conduct of the war, such as the alleged mistreatment of the German citizens in the British concentration camps, the capture of a German hospital ship, and certain foolish rumors which it altogether denies—moreover asking the question whether similar instances cannot be found on the German side:—"We should not be Pharisees."

But the main interest of this attack on "Anglophobia" is its introductory paragraph, in which it is suggested that the Socialist reason for the support of the war, namely, that it was against Russia, has disappeared, and in which this organ renews its previous prediction that the war would result in an alliance of Germany and Russia against European Democracy. This paragraph is as follows:—

"Anglophobia" is celebrating orgies in a certain part of the German bourgeois press, perhaps one may say in the greater part. Unfortunately it has also colored a part of the Social Democratic press, though in a somewhat milder form. In this part of the German press England is, so to speak, the only enemy with which Germany has to deal—Russia, the danger of attack from the East, the danger of the destruction of the middle European civilization by Eastern barbarians, has vanished from the vision of these sheets. Comrade Bernstein rightly asks, in his article, which we publish in

another place to-day, if the war, as it is now preached to the German people, is still the same war for which the loan was granted on August 4th. Then the question was the struggle against Russian barbarism. Then the irreconcilable hatred which the supporters of the idea of freedom, and, above all, the Social Democrats, felt towards the Czaristic flayers of the people, and the Czarist system, were utilized by the whole of the bourgeois press, including the most extreme right, in order to portray the war as a struggle against Russian oppression and barbarism. To-day, nothing is said about Russia, and England is portrayed as the expression of everything inhuman and base. This agitation hides a great danger within it; we could imagine nothing worse for the development of Europe than the possible union of Germany with Russia at the cost of the western powers, for which the present agitation is preparing the way.

And now we have a long and able summary of the state of mind of the governing classes of Germany, from the pen of Troelstra, the Dutch Socialist leader, who recently spent a considerable period in that country, and had access to the best information. Troelstra points out that the ruling classes are divided into two parties, the Industrialists and the Agrarians. The Industrialists are the more militaristic of the two, for they look forward to a peace that means a continued struggle against both England and Russia. The Agrarians are the more reactionary, though less militaristic, since they advocate an early and separate peace with Russia, and an alliance with that country—which would mean, of course, a renewal of the Holy Alliance of 1849, and the annihilation of such beginnings of democracy as now exist in Germany and Austria.

Troelstra says of the first or Industrialist group:—

It is striving for a new league of the middle European states, and has a great following not only among professors and publicists, but also in the government itself.

The proposed league of states is to be an economic entente of all the countries of middle Europe from Roumania in the southeast to Holland in the northwest, and is to be directed against England.

By the economic entente of these states, is to be understood a customs union in which Holland and the other countries under consideration should enter in the same way, and it is hoped with the same favorable results as Hamburg, in its time was taken into the tariff union of Germany. But it is also taken for granted that a certain degree of military unity would tie this league of middle European states together as well as tariff unity. The number of the states which, besides Germany and Austria and Hungary, are to enter into the union, depends upon the outcome of the war. The greater the victory of Germany, the more numerous the states which will be forced into the contemplated league. In the case of a decisive defeat of the Allies, the adherence not only of Belgium, but also of France is counted upon.

In a brochure of the well-known jurist, Von Liszt, it is even demanded that the Scandinavian countries must also be forced to

join this league of middle European states. The whole North Sea coast is in this way, and through German influence, to be closed against England, both by a tariff union and by a military treaty. The proposal has also been heard to call into existence a Baltic League of states, under the leadership of Sweden, and including Finland, which is to be directed more against Russia. It was sought to win the Swedish Socialists for this plan, but of course in vain. Both plans are also considered as parts of a single plan. The quarters in which this league of European states find its supporters includes chiefly commercial, shipping and industrial circles, that is, the large capitalists, and it stands under the influence of the Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor.

Troelstra describes the Agrarian party in German governmental circles as follows:—

It consists chiefly of agrarian landlord noblemen, and has a strong support in the general staff and in the Crown Prince. The agrarian *Deutsche Tages Zeitung* is the official organ of this tendency, and it has already repeatedly given expression to the thought that a separate peace must be concluded with Russia as soon as possible.

The *Volkszeitung* points out that both these groups are militaristic, and stand for those high customs tariffs which, more than all other causes put together, keep nations apart—by preventing the gradual development of indissoluble economic bonds. Troelstra's remark that the first plan is directed more against England than the second seems unfounded. It is certainly more directed towards building up a sea power against England, but the agrarian plan of an alliance with Russia would create an overwhelming land power both in Europe and Asia, also directed largely against England. This seems to be the real distinction. The Party which wishes to create an over-sea empire for Germany through sea power is naturally less reactionary at home, since land militarism is with it a secondary consideration. It requires a large army, but evidently only for defensive purposes. Since it does not contemplate an alliance with Russia, it evidently looks forward to an armed peace on land, and to the division of its enemies there.

It seems then that the more powerful Party at present does not rely upon a separate and early peace with Russia. But it relies upon a result which would be as paralyzing for the democracy of western Europe as a peace with Russia would be for the democracy of eastern Europe, namely, the defeat of the semi-democratic countries France and England, and continued antagonism with the western powers. The *Volkszeitung* says that this would even lead in the direction of a war for world-power, not only against England but also against America and Japan.

But the danger of a Russian alliance is after all the greater.

For a defeat of England and France will be far more difficult for Germany to achieve than a defeat of Russia, or at least a long drawn out struggle on the Eastern frontier which exhausts both powers, and leads towards an alliance between them.

Finally it may be pointed out that the moderate or nationalistic wing of the German Socialist Party, which supports the war, was the one to cry out at first against the Russian danger. Whereas the revolutionary wing, which had been far more active in helping the Russian revolutionists to fight the Czar, made light of that danger. But now that the possibility of a German-Russian alliance grows nearer, and the Russian danger is vastly increased, we find the press of these nationalistic Socialists, led by the Chemnitz-Volksstimme, mostly directing their outcry against England, while their monthly, the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, even claims that the majority of the German Socialist papers take this stand. It was in the *Monatshefte* a few years ago that it was declared:—

The development of German Socialism depends upon the numerical increase of the proletariat; the numerical increase of the proletariat depends upon the growth of German industry; the growth of German industry depends upon foreign trade colonies, and a large navy: Therefore German Socialism depends upon a large German navy.

## MARX AND ENGELS NOT PACIFISTS

BY EDWARD BERNSTEIN

Marx and Engels applied the expression, "Riding principles to death" to the action of Bebel and Liebknecht in abstaining from the vote of the war loan [in 1870]. This opinion did not deter Marx from recognizing that outspoken protest at such a time was an act of courage, and he expressed his praise in a letter. But Marx added that the time for demonstrations of this kind did not last indefinitely, and might not apply to the conduct of the whole war. In other words, one might well give notice by abstention that one refused responsibility for a war, while not forgetting during the war itself, what one owes to the safety and independence of one's own country, to its national existence. That this meant at that time taking part in the war, is emphasized by Marx in his second address to the International on the war, in which he says:—"The German working people have energetically supported the war which it was unable to stop, as a war for Germany's independence and for the freeing of Germany and Europe from the crushing nightmare of the second French Empire."

But just as the time for a demonstration against the war on the ground of principle could not last indefinitely, this applies also, according to Marx, to the period of recognition and support of the war. This he shows in the letter treating of the absence of Bebel and Liebknecht. Marx decisively agrees with the plan of an answer

[by the International] to the German party Executive, which Engels had laid before him on his own request, and in which Engels says (see letter of Engels, Aug. 15, 1870):

"I think the German Social Democracy can: 1.—Take part in the national movement insofar and as long as it limits itself to the defence of Germany (which under certain conditions does not exclude the offensive) until peace is declared; 2.—Emphasize the difference between German national interests and dynastic Prussian interests; 3.—Work against any annexation of Alsace-Lorraine; 4.—As soon as a republican, non-chauvinist government is at the helm in Paris, to work for an honorable peace with it; 5.—Continue to keep in the foreground the unity of the interests of German and French workingmen, who did not justify the war and did not make war upon one another; 6.—Indicate the menace of Russia."

In this very sense, as it is known, Marx answered, as may be seen from the Manifesto issued after Sedan. He and Engels scrupulously pointed out the period for which the support of the war by Social Democrats was proper. This period for them was marked by the change of the war from one of defense to one of conquest. In making this distinction, they allowed a wide place to the war of defense. They recognized that such a war also justified measures of attack, since it was necessary to cripple the power of, and desire for, attack on the part of the enemy. On this point they showed themselves free from all prejudice. As to anything, however, that went beyond this, where it was no longer a question of the demands of military necessity but of the future of the relations of the civilized people of Europe, where the politics of the people were at issue, they made their position clear.

Their correspondence clearly shows how it was their concern for the future of Europe, and so of Germany itself, which determined their attitude to question of annexing Alsace-Lorraine, as this was more and more loudly demanded by the German people after the decisive German victories; and how little the mere desire for opposition had to do with their fight against annexation.—*Translated from "Die Neue Zeit."*

### AN AMERICAN SOCIALIST PARTY RESOLUTION AGAINST MILITARISM

The Socialist Party of Minneapolis has proposed a resolution which would make forever impossible in this country such action as that taken recently by the German Party. The resolution is in part as follows:

Be it resolved, that according to the views of Local Minneapolis, no Socialist legislator can vote, under any conditions, for the maintenance of any kind of militia, army, or fleet for any purposes—even national defense; that it is the duty of the Socialist Party of the United States to organize the working people of this country in such a definite way that it may be able to protect itself against all wars which capitalism may declare—with the exception of the

class war—and that the working-class may be in a position to fight war with revolution.

Of this resolution, the New York *Volkszeitung* remarks: "In opposition to the view hitherto represented by the resolution of the Socialist Congresses, no distinction is here made between defensive, and offensive war, a change of front made necessary by the events of recent months." The *Volkszeitung* points out that this does not make impossible the Swiss system by which every citizen has a gun in his house and is trained to use it. The *Volkszeitung* further says that the movement has sinned greatly in this direction:—

Because greater and greater effort was being made to "popularize" Socialism, that is, to cut off its corners, so that it would arouse no opposition anywhere, because a greater and greater effort was being made to emphasize the Socialists' "love of country" and to place beyond any doubt their "loyalty" to the "ideal of patriots," in order that the international might record a million new votes every year, the quality of the movement has seriously deteriorated.

### THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST PEACE CONFERENCE

The International Conference which was to convene at Copenhagen on December 6, has been postponed to January 15-16, at the request of the American Socialist party. The New York *Volkszeitung* gives the following account of the origin of the Conference:

On October 11 a conference of Socialist delegates of the three Scandinavian countries took place. . . . It was decided that a general conference should be held in which the Socialists of all countries should take part, including those of the belligerent nations. On this proposition the Berlin *Vorwaerts* remarks: "Naturally the Parties of the belligerent nations are also to take part." But at the time when the Scandinavian conference was in session, a meeting of delegates of the French and Swiss Socialists was being held, in which the question of the calling of an International conference was also discussed. The French declared that under the present conditions they could not think of taking part in any conference. The Swiss comrades, who are in closest touch with the Italian Socialists, now take the position that an International conference under the ruling conditions can have prospects of success only if it is a conference exclusively of the delegates of the neutral countries, in which the Socialists of the countries at war do not participate.

The Socialists of Scandinavia and Holland seem to have agreed to this view. In the speech representing Copenhagen, in which the assembly of a conference on December 6 is mentioned, it is expressly emphasized that only the neutral countries are invited to send delegates.

In the present situation it seems to us also that the Socialists of those countries who are not taking a direct part in the bloody

struggle which is now laying Europe waste may easily come to an agreement, not only upon steps for an early peace, but also upon the rebuilding of the International. The participation of representatives of the countries at war would naturally bring questions into the discussion upon which, in view of the ruling national animosities, it would be impossible to secure an agreement.

A conference of representatives of the neutral countries alone promises success. And the discussion to admit delegates of the neutral States alone to the proposed conference, has our undivided support.

The Independent Labor Party has formulated a peace program, which is as follows:

I. Frontiers should represent Nationalities and should be determined not by military conquests but by the natural divisions of race, religion, language, and custom.

II. Subject peoples should be granted self-government and should be allowed to decide by plebiscite whether they desire to be under the suzerainty of any Power.

III. The policy of the Balance of Power by which the nations of Europe have been divided into antagonistic camps should be superseded by a League of Europe, of which all nations should be members and uniting whom there should be an International body to judge all quarrels and differences.

IV. The Constitution of each nation should be democratized. The people should be given full control of the legislature, and women's claim to citizenship should be recognized. Secret diplomacy should be entirely abolished and foreign policy placed under the jurisdiction of Parliament.

V. The Armament Industries of the different nations should be taken out of private hands and placed under State control, so that syndicates may no longer be tempted to exploit national jealousies for profit.

VI. The ideal towards which we should move is a United States of Europe in which national armies and navies are replaced by an International Police Force.

A meeting of Bavarian Socialist leaders of the faction in control of the German Party endorses these demands and is even more radically pacifist. The Bavarians name the sections for which plebiscites are to be taken. The list includes not only conquered territory but also *Alsace, Lorraine, Schleswig, Poland, the Baltic Provinces, Finland and the Trentine* and it suggests also the neutralization of *the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, the Kiel Canal, the Suez Canal and Gibraltar*.

The Bavarian plan also develops much further the steps towards a Concert of Europe and a United States of Europe. An international police would not be international if some Great Power refused to enter it. But there could then be an "alliance of all against the aggressor" which is similar to the proposed League of Peace.

The Bavarians make other suggestions which might gradually evolve a United States of Europe and abolish secret diplomacy. They propose "international parliaments and permanent international committees" and "international police and law courts for minor offenses, such as espionage and assaults" which are such frequent pretexts for war.

### A DISCIPLINING OF LIEBKNECHT?

The New York *Volkszeitung* prints an editorial under the above title. We take the following translation from the New York *Call*:

The cabled report that the Social Democratic members of the German Reichstag have turned against Karl Liebknecht because of his refusal to vote the government's war credit of five billion will bear confirmation. Should it prove true and be found that Liebknecht is to be disciplined by the parliamentary group, it will mean an end to the proud unity of German Social Democracy, and a beginning of that breach that many predicted when, on August 4, the Deputies without a protest sanctioned the war credits.

Let there be no mistakes about the matter. Liebknecht does not stand alone, neither in the parliamentary faction nor still less in the Party. We know that in the Party caucus fourteen of seventeen Deputies registered their protest against the war credits of August 4, and that they, together with Liebknecht, were silent during its passage, because the parliamentary group had instructed the minority to give way before the greater number. That discipline and acknowledgment of majority rule to which the German Socialists are so accustomed held sway, but at this session Liebknecht alone rebelled. This, despite, as we know, the increase in the number of Deputies who acknowledged they erred in their voting on the credit bill on August 4. Deputies who on August 4 voted in favor of the appropriation have since openly admitted they blundered. Many, too, may have considered that additional credits must not be withheld, now that Germany is plunged into war. . . .

The feeling that the Deputies were on the wrong path is more widespread among the rank and file of the Party than among the parliamentary group itself. We learn through reports from Berlin, Leipsic, Bremen, Hamburg, Stuttgart and other sources that great masses of the rank and file are not at all in sympathy with the course taken by their Reichstag representatives. Conditions caused by the war stop their mouths for the time being. But even the restraint under which Germany to-day suffers cannot entirely hush voices are raised, despite all censorship, against the unworthy stand of certain other party papers as regards the war, and protests against such stands are finding ready echo in many groups of the membership.

That these groups will not look favorably upon a disciplining of Liebknecht because of his opposing vote is certain. Perhaps the dissatisfaction would not immediately become noticeable, because

prevailing conditions in the empire and the pressure exerted by the government would make it impossible. Just so much stronger, however, will it manifest itself on the return of normal conditions, and, as said before, make a split imminent in the once proud German Social Democracy.

So far on the field of battle the German Government has achieved no notable success. Yet, in a certain way, she has won a notable victory. She has succeeded in dealing her "inner foe" a blow from which it will only emerge with great difficulty.

Such a victory, to the Prussian-German regime, is well worth all the wasted blood of the German people.

A cable dispatch to the New York *Times*, from Berne, Switzerland, throws light on Liebknecht's action:

It now appears that at the meeting of the Reichstag on Dec. 2 Dr. Liebknecht, a Socialist Deputy—the only member who voted against the war budget—handed in a motion which the President of the Reichstag refused to put to a vote. This document, dated Berlin, Dec. 2, has just reached me and contains the following passages:

"Germany, an accomplice of Czarism and hitherto a model of political reaction, has no vocation for the rôle of deliverer of nations. The deliverance of the Russian as of the German people must be brought about by themselves. The war is not a German defensive war."

Dr. Liebknecht's motion concluded by demanding a speedy peace without conquest. While agreeing to the distress credits as necessary and also to anything capable of mitigating the hard lot of the soldiers, the sick and the wounded, the resolution nevertheless protested against the war; against the capitalistic policy which caused it; against plans for annexation; against the breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg; against the military dictatorship and the disregard of social and political duties, of which the Government and the ruling classes were guilty, and therefore refused to vote for the war credits.

This motion was not allowed to be published by the German press.

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### GERMAN SOCIALISTS GRANT THE NEW WAR LOAN AGAINST ENGLAND

The official Socialist explanation of their vote in favor of the first war loan was that it was a war of defense against Russia. The vote in favor of the second war loan, on Decemebr 2nd, is explained on the ground that it is a war of defense against England. The following article indicates, first, that one faction of the moderate wing of the Socialist Party has as strong a feeling against England as against Russia, and second, that another member of that faction on the moderate wing confines its hostility to Russia:

Reichstag member Dr. David attacks, in the *Mainz Volkszeitung*, Edward Bernstein, who, in the *Leipszig Volkszeitung*, had proposed the question as to whether the conditions under which the Social Democratic Reichstag members granted the loan on August 4th, were still present, as the war against the East had become a war against the West. Among other things David says:

In the early days of August, when our assent to the war loan was decided upon, England had not yet gone to war against us, and we still hoped that it would preserve a neutral attitude. Unfortunately England forthwith joined our convinced enemies; it believed that its national independence and civilization were threatened, and declared war on Germany. That is a new factor which caused a complete readjustment, which Bernstein and the rest of us deeply regret. So it happened that we could not throw the masses of the army against the Russians in time, in order to be able to smash the Czarist colossus, while keeping up a victorious defensive. Just as it is a matter of course for us Social Democrats to regard a cowardly separate peace with Russia as a great political calamity, so it is just as much a matter of course that we should show our teeth to the English war power, with its white and parti-colored allies. If we are once more under the necessity of granting a new war loan, we owe that in the first instance to the conduct of English politics, so that Bernstein's question is to be answered with Yes. Yes, it is the same war, and our conduct in it will remain the same. Bernstein quotes an expression from *The Labor Leader* which shows that there are men among our English comrades who condemn the conduct of their own government and find the unanimous action of the German people just and reasonable. Good! But let him also draw the conclusion from this that it is our right and duty to do all we can in order to give our country the power to hold out until an honorable and assured peace.

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### HOW THE PRUSSIAN SOCIALISTS VOTED THE WAR LOAN

A report that the Prussian Socialists in the Landtag had voted in favor of a war loan attracted widespread attention because Liebknecht and other radical Socialists are members of this body. The truth of this matter appears in the following report and in a letter of Liebknecht.

The session took place on the 22nd of October. The new loan was justified largely by the fall in the income of Prussia due to lessened receipts from railways and other leading sources of income. And although the Prussian government, being more than half absolute in character, can use the money for any purpose it pleases, the government representative, Delbrueck, in asking the Landtag to grant the loan, mentioned specifically only certain purposes which every Socialist might approve. The loan was to be used chiefly for the purpose of affording relief to those suffering

directly or indirectly from the war, and especially for the purpose of affording public employment. The state proposed to continue its building activities, to increase its construction of canals, to undertake a reclamation of waste land on a large scale, to give financial relief to the families of government employees, to provide for the increase of food and fodder, and to furnish four hundred million marks for the relief of the districts laid waste by the Russian Army in East Prussia.

The Socialists had decided to give this loan their unanimous support, and to define their attitude towards it by a declaration. They objected primarily to the fact that there was no way of making the government accountable for this vast expenditure, and that no opportunity was given for amending the government proposal in committee.

The declaration pointed out that nothing was said about maintaining an existing scale of wages in the vast governmental works to be undertaken, and it called upon the administration to provide work for the unemployed first, and for the prisoners of war only afterward. It demanded that the working people should be represented on the East Prussian relief committee, and, above all, it demanded the granting at this great crisis of equal suffrage in Prussia. Two points ought to be noted in the declaration. In demanding equal suffrage, the radical Socialists who composed the majority of the Socialist group in the Prussian house did not emphasize the loyalty and patriotism of the working people, but only the fact that they were, as a matter of fact, contributing so largely in lives and property to the protection of the Prussian state. This position is particularly notable because an issue of *Vorwaerts* a few days before (Oct. 20) had asked the Prussian government to establish equal suffrage on quite different grounds—*Vorwaerts* having fallen into the hands of the revisionist or majority faction of the Party on the 30th of September. *Vorwaerts'* plea for the suffrage was as follows:

“In view of what this war has shown, we have again and again heard the confession, even from those who were enemies of the labor movement and of equal suffrage, that they had underestimated the feeling of responsibility to the State and the political understanding of the working people; the confession that no discrimination could any longer be made in the valuation and treatment of political parties.”

This amounts to the claim that the Socialists are as nationalistic and pro-governmental as any other class. Against this the Prussian Landtag group in its declaration said only that “the whole German people is making the heaviest sacrifices in property and blood without distinction of race or class.”

Here are the closing words of the Socialist declaration:

“We express the hope that the passionate desire that this frightful war which is tearing the peoples to pieces, may come to an early and assured peace, for the sake of the German people and all mankind, and that everything may happen which may serve to the fulfillment of this hope and this wish.”

The Socialist position was brought out more clearly by the publication in *Vorwaerts* the next day of the following declaration of Karl Liebknecht:

“I must urgently ask you to report the following points, and to add them to your account of the sitting of the Prussian Legislature on the 22nd of October.

(A) “In the reading by Dr. Delbrueck of the greetings of the Kaiser to the house, the whole house stood, with the exception of the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats, who were in their places, remained seated. This is not mentioned in the report. [This action would be *lèse majesté* in any other place but the House, and the *Vorwaerts* reporter could not have failed to notice it.]

(B) “In the closing words of Dr. Delbrueck about the War, applause was heard in the Right, in the Center Party, and among the Liberal parties. But not among the Socialists. [This omission of *Vorwaerts* is noteworthy, as it is the custom of all German papers and especially the Socialist papers, to report the parties from which applause comes.]

(C) “In the closing speech of the President, *Vorwaerts* does not mention the fact that half of our faction had already left the room, and that the others surely did not take part in the applause.

“As to the cheers for the supreme war lord, it is said in the report: ‘The House took part in the cheers.’ Here, too, it is not mentioned that half of the Socialist members had left the room before these cheers, and that those who remained behind, if they were true to the plan of action that had been decided upon, only arose, but did not take part in the cheering.”

## “CIVIL PEACE” IN GERMANY

One of the policies insisted upon by the military authorities in Germany is that of “civil peace.” It will be remembered that *Vorwaerts* was allowed to continue its publication after having been suspended on September 30th, only on a change of management, and the assurance that the class struggle would not be mentioned. The supposition is that all class attacks are to cease, though *Vorwaerts* still constantly complains that, while such attacks are made by the ruling classes and by the employers, the Socialists are forced to be very mild in their criticisms both of employers, and of the government, and to appear always on the defensive. The discussion of this enforced “civil peace” now takes the

first place in German Socialist newspapers and periodicals. In a recent number of *Die Neue Zeit*, the historian of the Party, Franz Mehring, discusses the question from the historical standpoint, and again uses his influence and that of *Die Neue Zeit* for a bitter criticism of the Party majority which voted the war credits. Mehring's principal points are as follows:

The shattering fact that the International has broken down, and that the behavior of the German Social Democracy is judged unfavorably by its sister Parties, even in the neutral states, is in part explained by the fact that the German Party authorities, and especially the German Party press, has adapted itself to the so-called "civil peace," abandoned the definite expression of Party principles during the war. They have done this under the iron pressure of military dictatorship, but they have done it just the same, and by this action they have created the impression among foreign comrades that the German Social Democracy has given itself over body and soul to imperialism.

This appearance is deceitful, as we know, still a deceitful appearance may do great harm. Even if the "civil peace" is only an interim, this interim will leave its shell behind it. When the Party gives in to it, it offers a sacrifice that is only justified by the most pressing and the highest interests of the nation. The ruins of the International warn us, and one does not need to be a prophet to foresee that the Party may be brought to the most fateful decisions by the question of the "civil peace."

Notwithstanding this cautious introduction, Mehring proceeds to show that he does not think the Socialists can afford to bow to the "civil peace" idea:

The problem is this: Is the "civil peace" a matter of life and death to the nation? And this question can be answered only by historical experience. If it is asked how was it with the "civil peace" in the year 1870, then I believe that I should not refuse to answer this question.

Mehring discusses lengthily the internal situation in 1870, of which we give only his conclusion:

These memories of the year 1870 are enough to show that in that year of military dictatorship a civil peace was regarded by no one as a question involving the national existence—not by the political Parties of which not one kept it, or ever demanded it of the others, and not by the government of which the highest head, on the contrary, blocked the first tendency in this direction in the well justified fear that through a "civil peace" the German interests among the foreign powers might be vitally damaged.

Mehring here refers to the policy of Bismarck to create the impression abroad that civil freedom existed in Germany, and that the German government stood for civil rights. Even after the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine had been proclaimed as the aim of

the government, Bismarck refused to take any action against those who protested. Mehring explains Bismarck's motives as follows:

That the maintenance of civil rights was a matter which Bismarck really had at heart, not even his most ardent admirers have ever claimed for him. The explanation lies in another direction. Bismarck feared nothing more in the Fall and Winter of 1870 than the intervention of neutral powers in the war, and their offers of friendly services he feared even more than their threats.

Mehring concludes the Social Democratic concessions to the "civil peace" policy were not in any way necessary in the measure in which they have taken place, but are due solely to the domination of the Party by the Opportunistic and Nationalistic wing.

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## MILITARISM AND STATE SOCIALISM

By militarism we often mean merely an aggressive and warlike spirit. But the expression is playing a most important part in the discussion of the war and is being used with a far more definite and at the same time with a far larger meaning. Many who speak of Prussian or Russian militarism mean a social system. The *New Statesman* gives us a most illuminating discussion of militarism in this sense:

Militarism is less a theory of armament than a theory of politics. It is the subordination of the citizen to the soldier. It is the elevation, day in, day out, of the military spirit above all the other virtues a man can possess. It is a belief that a nation's civilization at its highest is expressed in terms of armed forces—that, as Professor Cramb put it, "a nation's military efficiency is the exact co-efficient of a nation's idealism." It is the praise of the army and the navy not as the instruments but as the masters of politics. It involves the annexation of the ordinary man as a soldier and his subjection as a politician. It means the organization of the State first and foremost as a fighting machine, and only incidentally as a human society struggling to express itself in manifold activities. This, certainly, is what Militarism means in Germany, and Germany is the only Militarist State (in the full sense of the words) in modern Europe. It is a State primarily organized for war in a way in which, say, conscriptionist France is not. France is organized for war not as an end but as a means. Germany is organized for war as the grand and necessary peroration of her policy. Prussia in recent years might be described as a vast continuation school in which the young men were taught the language, art, and religion of war. . . .

The Militarist State, being the organization of national egotism, sacrifices to its egotism international law and decency:

In this respect all nations have a rather shady past. The point is, however, that while most States are ruthless by passion, the Militarist State is ruthless by principle.

There was never a better example of this than the Kaiser's speech to the recruits at Potsdam in 1891 when he said, "It may happen, though God forbid, that you may have to fire on your parents or brothers. Prove your fidelity then by your sacrifice."

The first element of militarism is nationalism, "nationalegoism" unchecked by any consideration of other nations—except as possible enemies. The second element of militarism is the acceptance of war—as a permanent human institution: "It all comes of an unhealthy preoccupation with war—of looking upon war not as a last resort or a wild accident, but as a happy necessity. Germany has thought about war till life in terms of peace seems an unnatural thing."

What gives special significance to the *New Statesman* article is that there is a third element in militarist States which it recognizes but finds more difficult to handle. Indeed this British organ of State Socialism is in full sympathy with the coercive organization which is a central feature of Prussian militarism. Its criticism of militarism after all is not the most fundamental, for it objects to Bernhardt only in that he puts the national State "in the place that ought to be given to humanity." Let the Prussian policy be made international and war impossible and it becomes more or less identical with the policy of the *New Statesman*:

In a world which is for the most part a garden full of weeds one is bound to feel a certain enthusiasm for a State which aims at order and organization in its life. One sees in it that passion for discipline upon which progress in morals, politics and the arts so largely depends. It would be possible to find in it even the prophecy of Socialism. Militarism is Socialism which has gone wrong. It is Socialism without liberty, Socialism without equality, Socialism without fraternity. But it is interesting to note that it is in Germany and Sparta—the two States which have been most famous for what is called State Socialism—that Militarism has flourished. Sparta's State Socialism in its origin, it may be confessed, ought rather to be described as State Utopianism—so far, at least, as the upper classes were concerned. Lycurgus, we are told, imposed upon the landed citizens that equality of income which Mr. Shaw is now advocating in Kingsway Hall for the modern European; but, more than this, he practically abolished money, as so many of the old-fashioned Socialists would have liked to do in the nineteenth century. If the Spartans had had a deep sense of freedom, their love of discipline, of simplicity, of State service, might have resulted in the foundation of the first Socialist State in Europe.

The *New Statesman*, it will be noted, endeavors to protect itself from criticism by providing that freedom, liberty, fraternity, and equality shall be grafted upon the coercive state.

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