

# The Communist

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1943

## REMINISCENCES OF LENIN

JOSEPH STALIN

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## WAR PRODUCTION FOR VICTORY

EARL BROWDER

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## BUILDING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

JOHN WILLIAMSON

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## MOBILIZE NEGRO MANPOWER FOR VICTORY

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# THE COMMUNIST

A MAGAZINE OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MARXISM-LENINISM

EDITOR: EARL BROWDER



## CONTENTS

Stalin's Sixty-third Birthday . . . . .	<i>Earl Browder</i> . . . . .	3
Reminiscences of Lenin . . . . .	<i>Joseph Stalin</i> . . . . .	4
Production for Victory . . . . .	<i>Earl Browder</i> . . . . .	10
Prepare the Party for a Nationwide Party- Building and Press Campaign . . . . .	<i>John Williamson</i> . . . . .	30
Mobilize Negro Manpower for Victory . . . . .	<i>James W. Ford</i> . . . . .	38
The Great Patriotic War and Social Science	<i>G. Alexandrov</i> . . . . .	47
The Incoming Seventy-eighth Congress . . . . .	<i>Milton Howard</i> . . . . .	51
Italy at the Crossroads . . . . .	<i>M. Osipov</i> . . . . .	58
British Labor and War . . . . .	<i>R. Palme Dutt</i> . . . . .	62
The Great Offensive . . . . .	<i>Joseph Starobin</i> . . . . .	73
Marx and Engels on Reactionary Prussianism	<i>M. Mitin</i> . . . . .	83
The White Collar Workers and the War . . . . .	<i>Robert Miller</i> . . . . .	88

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By JURGEN KUCZYNSKI . . . . . \$ .15

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Introduction by CORLISS LAMONT . . . . . .02

## **Stalin on the War and the Second Front in Europe**

. . . . . .01

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# STALIN'S SIXTY-THIRD BIRTHDAY

*(Congratulations cabled by Earl Browder, General Secretary, Communist Party, U.S.A., to Joseph Stalin on the occasion of his 63rd birthday, December 21, 1942.)*

**J**OSEPH STALIN,  
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

On your sixty-third birthday the people of the United States, as of all countries, look to the heroic Soviet people and Red Army led by you as their firmest ally and guarantee of victory in this peoples' war of national liberation over the dark forces of fascist barbarism. To the peoples of the world you have given the supreme example of foresight and timely vigilance against the Hitlerite would-be world conquerors, of intimate understanding of the common man with his aspirations and capacities for heroic consecration, of unyielding firmness in opening up the paths of historic progress, of deep wisdom and clear insight which throw light upon hidden dangers and show the way through them, of political and organizational genius which translates words into deeds and thought into action. All the world pays homage to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to Stalingrad which summarizes all these qualities in a great

hammer that is pulverizing the Hitlerite hordes, opening the way to victory, and giving us time to gather our own forces, overcome all hesitations and enemy influences and, at last, even though delayed, to contribute our part in the final struggles in common fighting action against Hitler in Europe. Your example inspires hundreds of millions to emulation, to unexampled unity and confidence, to utmost exertion for that complete destruction of Hitlerism which will restore freedom and progress to humanity. You have raised the glorious banner of Marx, Engels, and Lenin to new heights, winning thereby the love and admiration of the large majority of mankind. The American people find in the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition heading the United Nations their great bulwark of liberty, their hope of the future, their stimulus to battle now with all forces, in the eternal spirit of Stalingrad.

*(Signed)* EARL BROWDER.

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## REMINISCENCES OF LENIN \*

BY JOSEPH STALIN

**I** FIRST made the acquaintance of Lenin in 1903. It is true that this was not a personal acquaintance, it was an acquaintance established by correspondence. But this made an ineradicable impression upon me which has never left me all the time I have been working for the Party. At that time I was in exile in Siberia. My introduction to the revolutionary activity of Lenin at the end of the 'nineties, and especially after 1901, after the publication of *Iskra*, convinced me that Lenin was a man out of the ordinary. At that time I did not regard him merely as the leader of the Party, but as, practically, its creator, because he alone understood the internal substance and the urgent needs of the Party. Whenever I compared him with the other leaders of our Party it always seemed to me that Lenin's comrades-in-arms—Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod and others—were a head shorter than Lenin, that compared with them Lenin was not merely one of the leaders, but a leader of a superior type, a mountain eagle, who knew no fear in the struggle, and who boldly led the Party forward along the unexplored paths of the

Russian revolutionary \*movement. This impression was so deeply ingrained in my mind that I felt that I must write about him to one of my intimate friends who was then in exile abroad, and to ask him to give me his opinion of Lenin. After a short time, when I was already in exile in Siberia, this was at the end of 1903, I received an enthusiastic letter from my friend and a simple but very profound letter from Lenin, to whom, it appears, my friend had communicated my letter. Lenin's letter was relatively a short one, but it contained a bold, fearless criticism of the practical work of our Party, and a remarkably clear and concise outline of a whole plan of work of the Party for the immediate period. Lenin alone was able to write about the most complicated things so simply and clearly, so concisely and boldly—so that every sentence seems, not to speak, but to ring out like a shot. This simple and bold letter still more strengthened me in my opinion that in Lenin we had the mountain eagle of our Party. I cannot forgive myself for having burnt Lenin's letter as I did many others, as is the habit of an old underground worker.

From that time my acquaintance with Lenin began.

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\* From a speech delivered at a Memorial Evening of the Kremlin Military Students, January 28, 1924, seven days after Lenin's death.—*Editor*.

*Modesty*

I met Lenin for the first time in December, 1905, at a conference of Bolsheviks in Tammerfors (Finland). I was looking forward to seeing the mountain eagle of our Party, the great man, great, not only politically, but, if you will, physically, because in my imagination I pictured Lenin as a giant, well built and imposing. Imagine my disappointment when I saw an ordinary man, below average height, in no way, literally in no way, to be distinguished from ordinary mortals. . . .

It is the accepted thing for a "great man" to come late to meetings so that the other people gathered at the meeting should wait on the tenterhooks of expectation for his appearance; and just before the appearance of the great man, the people at the meeting say, "Sh! . . . Silence . . . He is coming." This rite seemed to me necessary because it makes an impression, it imbues one with respect. Imagine my disappointment when I learned that Lenin had arrived at the meeting before the delegates, and having ensconced himself in a corner was conversing, holding an ordinary conversation, with the ordinary delegates to the conference. I will not conceal from you that then this seemed to me somewhat of a violation of certain necessary rules.

Only later did I realize that this simplicity and modesty of Lenin, this striving to remain unobserved, or, at all events, not to make himself prominent, not to emphasize his high position—this feature was one

of Lenin's strongest sides as a new leader of new masses, of simple and ordinary masses, of the very "rank and file" of humanity.

*Strength of Logic*

The two speeches that Lenin delivered at this conference on the political situation and on the agrarian question were most remarkable. Unfortunately, the reports of them have not been preserved. These were inspired speeches, which roused the whole conference to an outburst of enthusiasm. Extraordinary power of conviction, simplicity and clarity in argumentation, short sentences intelligible to all, the absence of posing, the absence of violent gesticulations and high-sounding phrases playing for effect—all this favorably distinguished Lenin's speeches from the speeches of ordinary, "parliamentary" orators.

But it was not this aspect of Lenin's speeches that captivated me at the time. I was captivated by the invincible power of logic in Lenin's speeches which, though somewhat dry, nevertheless completely overcomes the audience, gradually electrifies it, and then holds the whole audience captive. I remember many of the delegates saying: "The logic in Lenin's speeches can be compared to all-powerful tentacles which seize one in their grip on all sides and from the embrace of which it is impossible to release one's self: either surrender or make up your mind to be utterly crushed."

I think that this peculiar feature



of Lenin's speeches represents the strongest side of this oratorical art.

### *No Sniveling*

I met Lenin the second time in 1906, at the Stockholm Congress of our Party. It is well known that at this Congress the Bolsheviks were in the minority, they were defeated. This was the first time I saw Lenin in the role of the vanquished. He did not in the least look like those leaders who snivel and become despondent after defeat. On the contrary, defeat transformed Lenin into a congelation of energy, who inspired his adherents with courage for fresh battles and for future victory. I said that Lenin was defeated. But what sort of a defeat was it? You should have seen Lenin's opponents, the victors of Stockholm — Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov and the others; they did not in the least look like real victors because, in his ruthless criticism of Menshevism, Lenin, so to speak, did not leave a sound place on their bodies. I remember the Bolshevik delegates gathering together in a small crowd gazing at Lenin and asking him for advice. In the conversation of some of the delegates one detected a note of weariness and depression. I remember Lenin, in reply to such talk, sharply saying through his clenched teeth: "No sniveling. Comrades, we shall certainly win, because we are right." Hatred for sniveling intellectuals, confidence in one's own strength, confidence in victory—that is what Lenin talked to us about at that time. One felt that the defeat of the Bolsheviks was a temporary

one, that the Bolsheviks must be victorious in the near future.

"No sniveling in the event of defeat." This is the peculiar feature in the activities of Lenin that helped him to rally round himself an army that was faithful to the last and had confidence in its strength.

### *No Boasting*

At the next Congress, in 1907, in London, the Bolsheviks were the victors. I then saw Lenin for the first time in the role of victor. Usually, victory turns ordinary leaders' heads, makes them proud and boastful. Most frequently, in such cases, they begin to celebrate their victory and rest on their laurels. But Lenin was not in the least like such leaders. On the contrary, it is precisely after victory that he became particularly vigilant, on the alert. I remember Lenin at that time earnestly impressing upon the delegates: "The first thing is, not to be carried away with victory and not to boast; the second thing is, consolidate the victory; the third thing is, crush the opponent, because he is only defeated, but not yet crushed by a long way." He poured withering ridicule on those delegates who frivolously declared that "from now on the Mensheviks are finished." It was not difficult for him to prove that the Mensheviks still had roots in the labor movement, that they had to be fought skillfully, and that over-estimation of one's own strength, and particularly under-estimation of the strength of the enemy, was to be avoided.

"Not boasting of victory"—this

is the peculiar feature in Lenin's character that helped him soberly to weigh the forces of the enemy and to ensure the Party against possible surprises.

### *Principle*

Party leaders cannot but prize the opinion of the majority of their Party. The majority is a power, which a leader cannot but take into account. Lenin understood this not less than any other Party leader. But Lenin never allowed himself to become the captive of the majority, especially when that majority did not have a basis of principle. There have been moments in the history of our Party when the opinion of the majority, or the transient interests of the Party, came into conflict with the fundamental interests of the proletariat. In such cases Lenin without hesitation took determinedly his stand on the side of principle against the majority of the Party. Moreover, in such cases, he did not fear to come out literally alone against all, calculating, as he often said, that "a policy based on principle is the only correct policy."

The two following facts are particularly characteristic in this respect.

*First fact.* The period of 1909-11, when the Party, defeated by the counter-revolution, was undergoing complete disintegration. This was the period of complete lack of faith in the Party, the period of the wholesale desertion of the Party, not only by the intellectuals, but partly also by the workers, the period when underground work was

repudiated, the period of liquidationism and collapse. Not only Mensheviks but also Bolsheviks at that time represented a number of factions and trends, for the most part divorced from the labor movement. It is well known that it was precisely at this time that the idea arose of completely liquidating the underground organization and of organizing the workers in a legal, liberal, Stolypin party.\* At that time Lenin was the only one who did not give way to the general mood and who held aloft the Party banner, rallied the scattered and defeated forces of the Party with astonishing patience and unparalleled persistence, fought against all and sundry anti-Party trends in the labor movement and defended the Party principle with unparalleled courage and unprecedented persistence.

It is well known that in this fight for the Party principles Lenin later proved victorious.

*Second fact.* The period of 1914-17, the period when the imperialist war was at its height, when all, or nearly all, the Social-Democratic and Socialist Parties, giving way to the universal patriotic intoxication, went into the service of the imperialism of their respective countries. That was the period when the Second International lowered its flag to capital, when even people like Plekhanov, Kautsky, Guesde and others failed to withstand the wave of chauvinism. Lenin at that time was the only one, or almost

\* Parties that would be permitted by Stolypin, the reactionary Prime Minister of Russia in 1906-11.—Ed.

the only one, who commenced a determined struggle against social-chauvinism and social-pacifism, who exposed the treachery of the Guesdes and Kautskys and condemned the half-heartedness of intermediary "revolutionaries." Lenin realized that he had an insignificant minority behind him; but he did not regard this as a matter of decisive importance, for he knew that the only correct policy which had a future before it was the policy of consistent internationalism, for he knew that a policy based on principle was the only correct policy.\*

It is well known that in this con-

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\* In connection with the necessity to popularize for our day Lenin's teachings on war and peace in their fullness, unity, and concrete historic setting, we especially recommend to our readers the study of Volume XIX of Lenin's Collected Works and Lenin's writings generally on the national question and national wars of liberation. In relation to this, we bring before our readers a notable passage from Lenin, written during the course of the First World War, setting forth the possibility of the transformation of an imperialist war into a national war:

"It is highly improbable that this imperialist war of 1914-16 will be transformed into a national war, because the class that represents progress is the proletariat, which, objectively, is striving to transform this war into civil war against the bourgeoisie; and also because the strength of both coalitions is almost equally balanced, while international finance capital has everywhere created a reactionary bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that such a transformation is impossible: if the European proletariat were to remain impotent for another twenty years; if the present war were to end in victories similar to those achieved by Napoleon, in the subjugation of a number of virile national states; if imperialism outside of Europe (primarily American and Japanese) were to remain in power for another twenty years without a transition to socialism, say, as a result of a Japanese-American war, then a great national war in Europe would be possible. This means that Europe would be thrown back for several decades. This is improbable. But it is not impossible, for to picture world history as advancing smoothly and steadily without sometimes taking gigantic strides backward is undialectical, unscientific and theoretically wrong." (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX, International Publishers, New York, 1942, pp. 203-04.)

test for a new International Lenin turned out to be the victor.

"A policy based on principle is the only correct policy"—this is the formula with which Lenin stormed new "invincible" positions and won over the best elements of the proletariat to the side of revolutionary Marxism.

### *Confidence in the Masses*

Theoreticians and leaders of parties who know the history of nations, who have studied the history of revolutions from beginning to end, are sometimes afflicted with an unpleasant disease. This disease is known as fear of the masses, lack of confidence in the creative ability of the masses. Sometimes on this ground a certain aristocratic pose is displayed by leaders toward the masses who, although not versed in the history of revolutions, are destined to break up the old and build the new. The fear that the elements may break forth, that the masses may "break up too much," the desire to play the role of nurses who try to teach the masses from books but who refuse to learn from the masses—such is the basis of this sort of aristocratic attitude.

Lenin represented the very opposite of such leaders. I do not know another revolutionary who had such profound confidence in the creative strength of the proletariat and in the revolutionary expediency of its class instincts as Lenin did. I do not know another revolutionary who was so able to ruthlessly scourge the smug critics of the "chaos of revolution" and the "bac-



chanalia of irresponsible actions of the masses" as Lenin was. I remember during a conversation, in reply to a remark made by a comrade that "after revolution normal order must be established," Lenin sarcastically remarked: "It is a pity that people who want to be revolutionaries forget that the most normal kind of order in history is revolutionary order."

Hence Lenin's contempt for all those who tried superciliously to look down upon the masses and to teach them from books. Hence Lenin's constant urging that we must learn from the masses, try to understand their actions and carefully study the practical experience of the struggle of the masses.

December 17, 1942.

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# PRODUCTION FOR VICTORY\*

BY EARL BROWDER

## *Introduction*

**U**P UNTIL November 7, 1942, everything depended upon the realization of the Second Front to actualize the coalition which is the basis of the United Nations. This coalition of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain was a project to which only token commitments had been made by its Anglo-American members until large-scale military engagements gave it substance and actuality. The occupation of Northern Africa by American and British forces on November 7 and the actions that followed, while not yet the realization of the Second Front in Europe, constitute that military commitment to the war which is the essence of the Second Front and bring the full realization of the Second Front close.

This does not mean that the war is won. The war still must be won by fighting. It must be won by the kind of fighting that is inspired by correct policies, and these policies, in their detailed development, still need to be hammered out in harmony with the grand strategy of the war established in the Anglo-

Soviet-American coalition leading the United Nations. This war is not going to be won by purchasing Darlans and Quislings, but by fighting. And as we begin to find that fighting this war, which we have just begun, is not a picnic, we will have to make sure that the irrational rise of optimism that exists in the country at this moment is not followed by an equally irrational plunge into pessimism. We have to make sure that the country is mobilized for maximum support to the development of the offensive and to its full and speedy realization in the Second Front in Europe.

It has been said that the Second Front campaign initiated by the Communists was a mistake because preparations for the Second Front were being organized all the time, and now offensive operations have been started. It is, indeed, a novel experience to be chided for having raised a demand because that demand is now in the process of being realized! However, at no time during our campaigns for the Second Front did we question that the strategy of the Second Front was the established policy of the United Nations. We specifically combated every suggestion that the Second Front campaign was a sign of lack of confidence in the President. We

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\* Abridged text of Report to the National Conference, Communist Party, U.S.A., held in New York, November 29-December 1, 1942.

fought for the Second Front as the established policy of our Government and of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition.

It was necessary to make this fight, and if we had not made it we might not have got the African offensive when we did, because there was taking place in this country and England a mobilization of the Munich and appeasement forces to hamper and weaken the opening of the Second Front and an offensive anywhere. Can anyone honestly claim that these beginnings in Africa—and, as Mr. Churchill put it, Africa is only the springboard to the Second Front in Europe—have been weakened because we mobilized the masses for the Second Front? On the contrary, it is quite clear that the African offensive was facilitated and the nation's war effort was strengthened because of the mass movement for the Second Front.

The Second Front issue is not dead and we still have to mobilize the country for it and against all those who cast doubts on the necessity of the quickest possible opening up of the Second Front in Europe. Probably the opposition to attacking Hitler on the European continent is not going to be so open, especially now since the great Soviet offensive is proceeding so vigorously and according to plan. The Soviet offensive does not, however, give us any reason for slackening our efforts, nor does it relieve the United States and Great Britain of the task of creating the Second Front in Europe. On the contrary, we have to combat energetically

any tendency to relapse into the old Munichite attitude adjusted to the new situation which declares, "Oh, the Soviets are winning the war for us, why should we rush into the scrap?" Such attitudes have to be fought just as much as defeatism which masks itself as confidence that the war is already over.

We can proceed most effectively now to the next step in the unfolding of the United Nations' war against the Axis by concentrating on the problems of a centralized war economy and production for the war. The solution of these problems, following the turn in the war signaled by the events of November 7, has become unquestionably the key link now for the mobilization of the full striking power of our country in the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. By taking the problem of war production as its point of concentration for this period, the organized labor movement can most effectively influence the actual development of events in all fields affecting the war. As our country generally takes hold of this problem and begins to get results, it will move on every other field of action.

The achievement of a centralized war economy is the link by which to mobilize the country politically against the reactionary and defeatist forces trying to stage a comeback on the basis of false interpretations of the last elections. It is the basis on which the country will drive forward to attain maximum production for the war. Through it we will help unify the labor movement and consolidate national



unity, thereby isolating and routing the defeatists. Above all, it will enable us to forge the greatest support to the offensive in the military field, providing the Army and the Navy with the necessary backing for carrying through the victorious Second Front against the fascist enemy. And through it, finally, we will most effectively find the solid base for the fight for a correct policy on international relations, not fully worked out as yet, and in this way strengthen the United Nations and the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition leading it in the historic achievement of victory over fascist barbarism and in the peaceful collaboration for the solution of the post-war problems.

We are proud to say that the Communist Party has been that group in the country which was most united, most unanimous and most far-sighted in its approach to this question. Happily, the general direction for the development of the economic solutions of the war has already been crystallized in circles far beyond anything which we directly guide and shape. Thus, there are the reports of the Tolan Committee in the House of Representatives, the Tolan Bill in the House and the Kilgore-Pepper Bill in the Senate, crystallizing the organizational proposals that arise out of the substance of the Tolan Reports.

Where we must concentrate our thought is in evaluating the possibilities of establishing the principles of the Pepper-Tolan Bills in the actual conduct of the war. We must find and overcome those ob-

stacles which exist in the country in the political and economic relationships and in the detailed practices within industry in general and within each particular plant in industry which hold back the development of a centralized war economy and consequently the guarantee of maximum war production for an all-out military offensive.

In the past weeks we have witnessed a great concentration of forces in support of the correct proposals embodied in the Tolan-Pepper Bills—the heads of all the Congressional committees dealing with war economy (except the Military Affairs Committees of both Houses), the American Federation of Labor, the Railroad Brotherhoods, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations; the Farmers Union and I believe also the Ohio Farm Bureau and some of the New England farm organizations have joined the same camp. There is definitely taking place the crystallization of the best Congressional thought on solving the vital problems of our war economy; the entire labor movement, a growing section of the farmers' organizations, as well as small business and middle class support behind the economic course which we too are supporting.

There is at present a great deal of speculation going on as to the new reorganization proposals which the President is now considering. I do not know that we have enough information upon the President's immediate ideas on the regrouping of the federal agencies on production and manpower to give any

final judgment upon them; but one thing is clear, they move in the direction of the Pepper-Tolan Bills.

While we can be glad that the new proposals go in the right direction, I think that we must not be content with half-measures or consider that half-measures will solve the economic problems of the war. We must continue to press for the full application of the principles of the Pepper-Tolan Bills, not in the spirit of developing any oppositional moods to the Administration, but in the spirit of strengthening the President's hand, making it more easily possible for him to carry through these necessary reorganizational measures. We must arouse the country to support the Pepper-Tolan Bills and give the country an understanding of the far-reaching implications of these bills in order to make it possible for them to be fully adopted.

We must deepen the public understanding of the principles of a planned war economy so that the country may appreciate the detailed policies necessary to implement this basic conception within the framework of the Pepper-Tolan Bills. It would be well to emphasize, therefore, that the Pepper-Tolan Bills merely provide the organizational framework which would make possible and would facilitate the development of a planned centralized war economy. The bills do not themselves provide the plan for developing the economy of the country. They merely provide for the centralization of authority without which these plans cannot take shape nor be effected.

There is, of course, nothing final about our thinking on these problems of war production as developed in the following discussion. We are only beginning to get to the heart of our problems of national economy in connection with the war. It represents an outline of the question, an approach to the most specific and concrete problems of production for the war as they express themselves in the life of the working class and as they are related to every national and international political problem of the war. It is an attempt to hammer out a program whereby we can get a firm grasp of these problems and begin to move toward their solution. If we exclude from this discussion those questions upon which we have already formulated our policy and approach, it is not because we do not consider them an essential part of our economic program, but because we consider it more urgent to concentrate on those key questions on which we have something new to say.

## I. PRODUCTION SCHEDULES

The Office of War Mobilization that is set up by the Pepper-Tolan Bills will have to develop a planned direction, guidance and control of war production and, stemming out of war production, the whole economic life of the country according to definite schedules of production, a term which is more and more beginning to occupy the center of all considerations of the production problems.

The production schedule is that guidance whereby the plant at the

end of a period of operations comes out with a harmonized set of parts which, assembled, produce the finished product without shortages of one thing, and overproducts of another. It is a harmonization of all the various operations of a plant directed toward the maximum assembly of the end product, without delays and without waste.

Applied to war production as a whole and to the entire economy of the country, this principle would make it possible for whole industries and the whole economy of the country to function with the same smooth production and economical operation as prevail in a particular plant. It is evident that it cannot be achieved by the operation of management-as-usual, because when production schedules go beyond a particular plant and a particular concern and begin to embrace the whole field of war production and spread over to the economy as a whole, a new force which has not been present as yet in production must come into play, that is, the directing hand of government authority, and this means the centralization of the direction of the economy through one institution according to one plan.

The necessity of this is clear, because, in the absence of the adjustments of the various parts of the economy through the operation of the market, there are all sorts of bottlenecks and disproportions in production and in the allocation of raw materials and labor which are the greatest single factor in holding back war production and, at the same time, the greatest single

source of defeatist and reactionary political moods and trends within the country. There is no possible way to break all these bottlenecks, dissolve all these disproportions and maladjustments in the economy, overcome the major obstacles to maximum production and extend the productivity of our labor except through the full development of the principle of production schedules, which is the application of economic planning.

#### *The Problem of Raw Materials*

The necessity of such over-all centralized administration of production may be seen most vividly by a glance at such key elements in the production picture as the allocation of raw materials and the distribution of manpower, not to speak of the role of the small enterprises in the whole process of war production.

Take the allocation of raw materials to production. Raw materials and their continuous supply are quite evidently basic to maximum production, in fact to any kind of continuous production in war industry and in the whole economy. What we have seen during the last year has been the breakdown of all attempts, so far, to secure the proper allocation of raw materials. To all appearances, we have been faced with shortages of key raw materials, shortages which have brought about a chaotic situation in war production. A mere indication of these shortages, however, shows very clearly that there is actually no shortage of these materials in the country so far as the needs of war

production at this period are concerned.

There may be an actual shortage at a particular point of operations, and this we see every day. Factories close or are working part-time in the most essential war industries because the raw materials are not present at the point of operations. But an over-all examination of the situation shows that the places where there is an immediate shortage are more than balanced by other places where there is an oversupply. There is over-stocking, which in many cases reflects a definite policy of hoarding of raw materials by individual producing concerns. In the actual working out in life, the system of priorities, which was supposed to prevent such a condition as this, serves to facilitate raw material hoarding because it is not in any way related to a schedule of production requiring a definite apportionment of raw materials.

Clearly, there is no possible way of securing the apportionment of raw materials which will assure uninterrupted production throughout the economy except by a raw materials pool under a centralized control and plan. And this is certainly not possible through the existing system of assigning all of these functions of planning and control to the individual producing concerns, even though there is a high degree of monopolization, especially in the war industry.

Far from securing, through the planning of the individual monopolies, that proper apportionment of raw materials which we are seeking,

this high degree of monopolization produces the opposite effect, because the greater the power of the ten big concerns that hold half of the war contracts, the more they unitedly withhold raw materials from the other concerns and the more they compete among themselves to secure strategic advantage for the control of war production, and especially for attaining the predominant position in industry after the war. One of these big ten of the monopoly producers, for example, will have a shortage of material A and a surplus of material B. Another will have a surplus of material A and a shortage of material B. If their stocks are pooled, the two of them alone would provide continuous production. Because their stocks are not pooled, both of them have bottlenecks and shortages of key materials which limit and even shut down immediate production.

This is the essence of the raw materials allocation problem which is forcing us on to the road of a planned war economy under centralized administrative control as outlined in the Pepper-Tolan Bills.

#### *The Problem of Manpower*

Up until the last week or two we had a situation in the country where manpower was spoken of as one problem and production and economy as another problem. A manpower administrative apparatus was set up and it was going to solve the manpower problem without reference to war production or to the board that was to solve the production problem. And both the

War Production Board and the Manpower Authority were completely separated from the Selective Service apparatus that provides manpower for the armed forces.

And it is a fact that in the last few weeks there has come a rather sudden and general realization that it is impossible to deal with manpower as a problem separate and apart from production and military needs. The manpower problem has now come to be recognized as but one phase of the problem of the economy as a whole, of the production problem and the planning of economic life. It is obvious to anyone who really tries to think about this question, which a few months ago Mr. McNutt thought he was going to solve all by himself, that compulsive measures for the allocation of manpower have no sense except in relation to the needs of production.

It is likewise evident that, without the centralized control of production, any rational use of the manpower of the country is impossible. This is so, in the first place, because manpower for production is intimately tied up with the question of manpower for the armed forces. In the second place, because the proper distribution and use of manpower in production cannot be made if left to the policies of individual producing units. Like all other elements of the production process, manpower has to be rationed, or it will be abused. For the same sort of disproportions and bottlenecks which we noted in the field of raw materials exist in respect to manpower. Indeed, every-

thing that has been said about raw materials could be repeated, with corresponding adjustments, about the treatment of labor power in the various industries and in the particular factories. In the third place, a balance has to be secured in the supply of manpower to war production and to the civilian economy; while, within the civilian economy, proper apportionment is needed between the industrial and agricultural sections of the economy. Clearly, with the rise of an acute labor shortage, such an apportionment can be achieved only in accord with a plan which is enforced by the power of the government behind it.

Here again, as in the case of the raw materials problem, we have an illustration of how the needs of the war break down preconceived notions which stand in the way of establishing centralized administrative control of the economy of the country. Unquestionably the apportionment of labor enforces the necessity of a general overall plan of production.

It must be said, however, that there is not by any means yet the full drawing of the necessary conclusions that flow from the amalgamation of the manpower problem with the problem of production. As yet, there is only a general principle which still has to be realized in the concrete detailed policies that are necessary to carry it through in life. We have to overhaul completely all manpower policies, beginning in the plants and reaching up to the national plan of the allocation of our manpower.

The imperative necessity of this is emphasized by the extent to which we are wasting manpower to-day in the absence of planned production. Just as artificial shortages of raw materials are created by their incorrect distribution, so shortages of manpower are entirely artificial in origin. There is no real manpower shortage in the country; what there is is a poor distribution and a poor utilization of the manpower which we have.

There is also a very sharp disproportion in the distribution of skilled workers within various plants and between different plants and different branches of industry. Some plants have more skilled workers than they can immediately use and they absolutely forbid workers to go to work elsewhere because they think they will need them later on, and in the meantime they keep skilled workers doing common labor jobs. The common laborers are thrown out and the skilled workers are left to do common labor work; and across the street is a plant with orders, closed down because it cannot get a sufficient number of skilled workers.

Manpower is also being wasted because of the failure to pool machines, a question to which there is not yet the slightest approach. At the same time, machines are standing idle, not being used, machines that could fill the urgent needs of plants that are holding back operations for lack of machines.

Similarly, manpower is being wasted because of the failure to distribute war orders to those places

where manpower is already in existence, and very little attention is being paid to the factor of the existence of machines for production in the allocation of war orders.

A further waste of manpower and consequent impairment of production is to be noted in those few centers of production where large gatherings of new workers have been concentrated and where absolutely no attention has been given to provide housing, supply and social services to the workers who are gathered there.

The establishment of a centralized administration of planned production would also accelerate the utilization of new sources of labor power for industry in the recruitment of women, Negroes and others who have been discriminated against or excluded from industry in the past. No doubt considerable progress has been made, especially in the formulation of adequate policies regarding the employment of women and Negroes. What is inadequate, however, is the application of these policies in life.

Closely connected with this is the need of developing a national policy of preparing workers for industry through a system of training in industry proper. The trade unions are going to be forced more and more to take the initiative in developing such a program, which clearly cannot be left to special schools and courses but must be coupled with the process of inducting new workers into production.

Related to this is the whole problem of providing the necessary sup-

ply of skilled workers. The upgrading of workers from the less skilled to the more skilled work is the only possible means of supplying an adequate number of the skilled workers that will be required for all-out production.

#### *The Problem of Small Enterprise*

It is clear, of course, that any sane policy directed toward maximum production will have to take the large producing units, which are the monopolies, as the basic factor in production. But we must not permit that acknowledgment of the basic role of the monopolized industries to blunt our vigilance and our energy in demanding the full mobilization of the economy of the country, including small enterprises, by which we do not mean little shops of ten, fifteen or twenty workers, but small only in relation to the big monopolies which control the bulk of war production now.

And how important this is is clear when we see that, in the actual allocation of war production, plants of 500 and 1,000 workers are considered small enterprise and are by-passed without being used. The sum total of such small enterprises represents a potential productive capacity for the war which would probably reach a large fraction of our present total production.

Great Britain had much the same experience in the early part of the war, concentrating all of its war production in a few large enterprises to the exclusion of small plants. Under the force of the same kind of economic compulsions that we are dealing with in this country,

and especially as a result of the air warfare carried to Britain itself, they were forced to undertake a rapid decentralization of production. We do not have that factor operating upon our development here in this country and, therefore, we cannot expect to have the same speed and completeness in the utilization of small enterprises that have been achieved in Great Britain, where, according to authoritative information, 80 per cent of present war production comes from plants of 200 workers and less. But the British figure indicates that relatively large production is possible from the small plants of the United States, even though it may not be comparable in positive figures to what exists in Great Britain.

In the United States a very small proportion of our production, probably less than 5 per cent, comes from small enterprises today. And although the degree of trustification and large mass scale production is greater in the United States than in Great Britain, imposing greater limitations upon the possibilities of small enterprise, so that, even with the fullest mobilization of all small enterprise, we could hardly expect to have anything like the proportion that exists in Great Britain between small and large business in the war production, we certainly can expect that full mobilization of small enterprise would increase our production at least 30 to 50 per cent. Failure to utilize the small enterprises thus represents an enormous economic waste. And this has significance beyond that of its direct relation to war

production, because it means economic dislocations, unnecessary hardships, and resulting political unrest and reaction, which had a great deal to do with the results of the Congressional elections on November 3.

## II. THE UTILIZATION OF LABOR

### *Increased Productivity*

In the center of the solution of the whole production problem stands the question of the increase in productivity of our workers. Of all the questions of manpower in production, this is clearly the most important. The main channel for the solution of the manpower and war supply problems lies through such an increase in the productivity of our workers.

It must be said, however, that an increase in productivity is being hampered by the almost complete lack of national policies which would control the individual concerns and management in their relation to labor and thereby release both the technological forces at the disposal of management, and the contribution that can be made by labor itself, which is the key to the whole problem.

Now, what are the labor policies which hamper the increase in productivity? Any discussion of this question has to start with the recognition of the high degree of patriotism of the workers. There is unanimous testimony that in every instance where it is made clear that the demands upon labor are entirely in the interest of the war, and the workers see that their efforts and

contributions actually result in providing more material for the war, better dispatch of the material and increased efficiency in conduct of the war, they unanimously respond, and have no complaints to make, even though the demands place new and great hardships upon them.

What is holding back production is not any lack of proper spirit on the part of labor, and we are not going to solve this problem by preaching to labor to be patriotic. Labor is already patriotic. If we preach too much about patriotism, labor will begin to resent it and stop listening to us, because the workers know that preaching is not going to solve anything of this.

Stories from Detroit, Pittsburgh, and other places all agree on this and they all follow one pattern. Where a plant or department takes up a production program and begins to get big results, where production is increased 20, 30 and 60 per cent, there is great enthusiasm. The management congratulates the workers, the Navy Department sends telegrams of congratulation and representatives to the celebrations where the workers are given a production banner, the E banner, and everybody is happy. Twenty-four or forty-eight hours later, management says, "Boys, there is no more work. You have already finished the contracts we have. It will take thirty to sixty days to get new contracts. In the meantime, hang around. Don't get other jobs. You're frozen to this job. You've got to stay here."

What is the effect upon the work-



ers when, after carrying through an increase in production, they find that all they have accomplished is to add to the profits of the particular capitalist for whom they are working, while throwing themselves out of a job for an indefinite period of time or at least making their employment irregular and disorganizing their own life without really increasing the total amount of production for the war? Naturally, the worker whose only reward for his pains is the disorganization of his life and work is angry about it. In place after place the workers are just full of anger and hate against this situation because they see it not only as the defeat of their own individual lives, but as a factor that is disorganizing the whole conduct of the war, and they lose faith in the leadership which is not able to organize their economy better than that, when the life of the country is at stake.

It is ridiculous to approach the workers working under such conditions and ask them to be patient and take it. These workers have to be shown, not that they can take it, but that they can change it, and it is our duty to lead in the struggle for a different kind of situation and a different kind of set-up and to offer policies which guarantee against such things as that taking place.

The strike is not the solution to these questions, and there must be no toleration of the idea of the resort to strike movements as a means of solving these problems. But we must recognize that the enemies of the war are going to manipulate these dissatisfactions for strike

movements and for damaging activities of all kinds unless we find the proper way of solving these problems. And the proper way of solving these problems is not to say—just wait until Washington straightens it out with the Pepper-Tolan Bills. We have got to find forms of activity and struggle down below in every plant and department, in every local union, raising these questions and fighting for them one by one and piece by piece, while connecting this fight up with the whole general solution of the problem represented in the Pepper-Tolan Bills.

#### *Piece Rates and Incentive Wage*

The workers are also victims of another experience which defeats their whole desire and mood for increased output. Within thirty or sixty days after they have begun to register decisive increases in production, the management refuses the piece rates in order to appropriate to the capitalists the full economic benefits of the increased production, bringing the earnings of the workers back to approximately the previous level of lower production. This practice is so extensive that perhaps it could be described as *the* major obstacle to increased production for the war. This is recognized not only by our labor leaders; but even the efficiency engineers and production experts are more and more telling the employers that they are not going to be able to solve their production problems until they *stabilize wage rates* and give incentive rates for increased production, stabilized

for the war period. (It is an essential feature of wage stabilization that the cost of living remains stable, and that overtime rates are maintained. These factors are assumed throughout this discussion.)

The United Electrical Workers Union recognized this problem quite in advance of the country generally and attempted to meet it with a contract which they negotiated with one of the large corporations in that industry, as far back as last March. They got an agreement for a productivity increase program based upon the stabilization of piece rates for the duration and a corresponding increase for the day-rate workers who serve the piece-rate workers on the machines, bringing the day rates up to what the piece-rate workers achieved where there is no increase in the labor force, to supply the machines. But the outcome of this was that, within sixty days after the productivity program showed results, a 6, 8 and 10 per cent increase, the corporation immediately reneged on its contract. First, it declared that it was not possible to give the benefits of this increase to the day workers, and then it followed that up by breaking up the whole guarantee against changes in rates for the duration.

Instead of giving the workers an incentive to increase their output, this policy actually penalizes them for any such increase. Now it is my observation that the workers generally would even be prepared to agree to some sort of forced savings system whereby a proportion of their increased earnings under

increased production would go into war bonds and stamps. But when the worker is penalized to the immediate financial advantage of the employer for every increase in production, we are only placing insuperable obstacles to the development of our war production. This is a problem that cannot be settled effectively and finally by negotiations between the union and the individual concerns. It can only be fully and finally settled by the establishment of governmental policies affecting these questions.

These policies must prohibit the downward regrading of piece rates in the face of increased production and instead provide for a general application of the principle of incentive wages, every increase in production being accompanied by a corresponding increase in wages.

There is a growing recognition of this necessity among production experts in the ranks of management and among governmental officials. In fact, the general principle outlined here is actually recognized in the wage stabilization order that has been promulgated.

The W.L.B. ruling on wages establishes that, in general, wage increases will have to receive the special permission of the War Labor Board, which will not be given except in a very special circumstance. But this order specifically excludes the necessity for such permission for wage increases which are directly based upon increases in production. Under this ruling, even day-wage rates which can be directly tied to norms of production,

can be raised, and they should be raised to the same degree that production is raised above that norm. Since this is true of day rates, it is clear that piece-rate earnings under wage stabilization must also increase as production is increased.

This means that all wages are going to be tied to productivity now. And if we take wage stabilization seriously, we cannot permit to pass unchallenged a single case of reduction of wages and reduction of earnings which is not clearly tied up with the reduction of production. Conversely, we must insist that all increases of production are immediately reflected in an increase in earnings. If we do not fight for that principle, we fail to fight for stabilization.

Stabilization does not mean merely that wages cannot go up. It means with equal force that wages cannot go down. Unfortunately, it is true that the first result of the wage stabilization order has been the inauguration of some reductions in wages through readjustment of piece rates and other time-honored methods of increasing exploitation. Now it is clear that, if wages are not to go down in the face of increased output, they must be raised to the extent of the increase in production. It is equally clear that incentive wage rates not only result in increased production but are in complete consonance with stabilization of wages. For, every increase in piece rates for the achievement of production above certain norms not only results in a greater end product without increasing the cost per unit, but also

helps to solve a whole series of problems of the war economy, and brings economic savings for the country as well as for the individual plant.

To make this point quite clear, let us take a hypothetical plant of 10,000 workers that wants to increase its schedule of production by 25 per cent. Assuming that the plant is working at full capacity, and the productivity per worker remains the same, that plant will have to employ 2,500 additional workers with the corresponding plant space, machines and overhead. For the community in which that plant is situated, it creates the problems of either expanding the housing 25 per cent or increasing the pressure upon the existing housing and worsening the condition of the workers who are there, thereby creating all sorts of social problems around this plant.

But suppose this plant with its 10,000 workers is able to meet this enlarged production by increasing its productivity 25 per cent, achieving the greater output with the original 10,000 workers. It is true that the end supply of commodities is the same in both cases. But in the second case, where the expanded schedule is met by increased productivity, you have avoided the necessity for a 25 per cent increase in the machine and plant capacity and have placed 2,500 additional workers at the disposal of the country to be used for an even greater overall expansion of production. That is a kind of saving most crucial for a war economy.

The simple expansion of produc-

tion is a very expensive and costly thing and is what causes many of our bottlenecks. The time lag involved in such expansion is of crucial importance at this time when maximum output is needed at once. On the other hand, increase in production which does not depend upon extension of plant avoids that time lag and also speeds up the whole process. Clearly, the 25 per cent gain in production involved in this case, which is the result primarily of the more effective labor of the workers, justifies a corresponding increase in their wages.

It is evident from this discussion that we must give our greatest attention to finding all possibilities of increased productivity and that the solution of the war economy is to be found primarily along the lines of increased productivity. This means that we should fight for the fullest possible development of incentive wage rates, not as a simple arithmetical increase in earnings when you go above the norm but as that plus an additional reward which is a part of the economic savings which this kind of increase in production gives for the whole economy.

#### *Stabilized Employment*

It is important for the worker to know not only that his wage rates are stabilized, but that his employment is stabilized, that the speeding up of production does not automatically throw him out of a job. This can be met by the establishment of long-term production schedules, including the allocation of raw materials for each productive plant.

A special variation of this problem is to be found on the waterfront, where there is no possible way of giving the workers any assurance that they are not working themselves out of a job under increased productivity, because the loading of ships is essentially now a loading of convoys, and the quicker the convoy is loaded and out, the quicker the worker is out of a job until the next convoy comes in. While there is no possible way of avoiding that, it is necessary, however, to find particular policies which will meet this situation and give the worker an incentive to hasten the completion of his job even though it means that it shortens the period of his employment.

And here it is clear that the only possible way that that can be done is to guarantee the worker a minimum wage for the duration of the war, making a careful selection of efficient working forces and providing them with a certain basic maintenance whether they are working or not, and giving them an incentive wage for the period of active labor—the quicker they work, the higher the wage. That is the only way in which that kind of special problem can be solved, where continuity of employment is manifestly impossible.

Finally, labor should have the assurance that the government will recapture those excess profits which the employers have gained by directly exploiting the patriotic appeal to the workers. Something in this direction has been done by the President's Committee on Revision of Army and Navy Contracts to

bring down prices because of production increases, among other factors. A more general and effective application of this policy will encourage the resort to increased productivity of labor and the requisite labor policy as the solution to the problems of war production.

### III. ORGANIZED LABOR IN PRODUCTION

#### *Labor-Management Production Committees*

In the struggle to establish the policy of increased productivity the Labor - Management Committees have an important role to play. These committees have been established in principle in declarations of policy by the government. In practice, however, they have been neglected and the detailed policies for their development still have to be clearly worked out.

The reason for this must be found in certain shortcomings on the part of both labor and management. The main factor has been, of course, the political resistance of management in the large monopolized industries to taking labor into any kind of serious cooperating relationship. From the side of labor, there has been too much a tendency to send its representatives into these committees unequipped and unprepared, with no union responsibility for the working out of these problems, the individual committeeman being left to himself, and with no living relation between his function in the committee with either the union or with the workers in

the shop. There is an intolerable isolation of the labor members in the production councils from the mass of the workers and the leadership of their union. This isolation of the individual committeeman or councilman is accentuated by the fact that when he makes proposals for increasing production and these proposals are immediately applied in such a way as to penalize the worker, the labor committeeman is reluctant to boast about it. He hides it because he finds by experience an intense resentment among his mates against the very thing that he proposed for increasing production, but which the management applied in such a way as to penalize the workers.

I am referring now to those cases where the production councils or committees have not taken root and have not produced good results. It is not true, of course, of those that have produced good results. There we find almost uniformly that the production councils or committees that have worked well have been those which have found the way to maintain a working relationship with the union leadership and with the masses of the workers in the shop itself.

Now, what are the tasks of these Labor - Management Production Committees? First of all, they must fight for programs and plans which fit into overall policies such as contained in the Pepper-Tolan Bills now before Congress in order to give them a concrete living expression down in the plants and localities. These policies must be translated into terms that aid the fight

for the stabilization of wage rates and employment in each particular plant, so that the fight for increased production becomes an essential part of the life of the whole plant, directly linked up with the fight for the stabilization of the life of the individual worker in the individual plant.

The Production Committees or Councils must establish guarantees for the stabilization of employment and wage rates through the concrete development of their functions. The Councils must begin to know the production problems. They must be armed with knowledge of the contracts allocated to the plant. They must know the production schedule of the individual plant which is not a military secret, and this knowledge must be made the common property of labor and management.

The Production Councils must develop the spirit of emulation between management and labor, between plant and plant, department and department, and industry and industry, a spirit which will quickly rouse a whole fever of production, if the obstacles and penalties to productivity are removed.

To achieve this, labor must improve its own relationship to the production committees. The whole body of labor must be represented by responsible members who consult about the problems before raising them in the production councils and who report back on the results. This will provide the channel for labor's fruitful participation in the improvement of the production process and will elimi-

nate the unsatisfactory practice of suggestion boxes in the plant which actually deprive labor of the credit and increased responsibility in production affairs which should accompany such suggestions for improvement.

A campaign for the removal of all suggestion boxes is entirely in order. The workers should be encouraged not to drop their suggestions into any boxes. Suggestions are for the consideration of their fellows. The examination and elaboration of all suggestions in the department or factory should first be made by the workers and by leaders of the union. This is the only guarantee against the practice, so deeply resented by the workers, in which their ideas are stolen by members of management and brought forward as their own.

While suggestions must originate with individuals, before they go into the hands of the production council or management they should already have the approval of the responsible representatives of the workers in that shop, and not of an individual. The best minds of the workers should have been turned on the suggestion before it is given in, otherwise there is going to be the unavoidable backfire that disrupts the whole production program, because the workers feel that they are being used, one against the other, to increase their own exploitation, to create new problems in the shop and to break down safeguards necessary for their protection. The traditional practice of management is to "pick" the minds of the workers and use what the

workers know, against the workers. We have to re-educate our managements and employers, and bring them into a new type of relationship with labor which will result in increased production on an important scale, on a scale which is possible only when an organized relationship between workers and management exists.

That is why increases in production require serious extension of the trade union movement. Management cannot get maximum production out of the workers when the workers are unorganized. The trade unions must be inspired by a crusade spirit for the extension of organization, not in the old sense that this is necessary to increase the bargaining power of the unions, but in the new spirit that this is necessary to secure maximum production for the war. This approach must be spread in every union, because it applies not only to war production directly but is equally valid for every category of workers; for, as the Toland Committee says, in a total war there is no unnecessary or non-vital section of economy. Everything that is vital enough to continue to operate is vital to the war economy and necessary to organize. In this respect, it is important to organize the white-collar workers precisely in relation to the key industries.

These problems will be solved only when management and labor cooperate fully and wholeheartedly, through the medium of the management-labor councils, as part of a centralized administration of the economy, and all obstacles to labor's

maximum participation are removed.

Labor must get the right to inspect the books and operations and know the problems of production plans, as well as take part in the realization of these plans, and not be a blind operator of the plans worked out in the secrecy of managerial offices. Indeed, labor must have representation in all war agencies, beginning with the plant and community and going up to the top of the United States Government. War agencies cannot function effectively unless they have the direct representation of labor therein, and that goes for every phase of the war work from a plant committee and a local Red Cross organization up to the Cabinet of the President and the national administration of the economy.

The justification of this conception of labor's role in the solution of production engineering problems is attested to even by the production experts hired by management and the employers. More and more these experts have been coming around to the workers' representatives on the production councils and saying, "Look here, fellows, I brought a plan to the company but they're keeping quiet about it. I give it to you; you bring it in and fight for it. I want to see a better production situation here; management is not keen about this. You boys can help me." And the boys do help him, and more and more the production experts are establishing *sub rosa* connections with the labor side of the production councils.

Further, not only the hired men,

but that type of management which is on a par with the capitalist himself, or is one of the capitalists, especially in the so-called smaller industries, is developing a new relationship to labor on the production question. They have faced the fact that they cannot accomplish their job except in cooperation with the labor movement.

#### *The Trade Unions' New Role*

Labor's new obligations in relation to war production also impose new tasks on the trade unions. Trade unionism today absolutely requires the most profound study of the decisions made by the Boards in Washington, the laws upon which such decisions are based, the precedents which are established in carrying out these rulings, and the experiences of the workers in the shops with the results of these rulings.

Trade union leaders have to become lawyers in the sense that they have to know how to use these regulations in the interests of the workers, because we can be sure that the best legal advice is used by many employers against the workers.

The trade unions have got to demonstrate their interest in this situation by knowing this administrative law better than anybody else. Most of the trade union leaders have so far given very little thought to this. In fact, many do not know that the W.P.B. ruling on stabilization of wages guarantees increased earnings for increased production. They have regarded it too much as a sort of ceiling on

earnings. It is no such thing! They should know that production authority cannot put a ceiling on earnings if they are seriously interested in increasing production.

This whole set of problems involved directly in production must be coupled with the general problems of civilian economy. There can be no separation between war economy and civilian economy, except the separation of sharply defined organs of one single body. The civilian economy is the basis of war production and the proper rationalization of the civilian economy is one of the keys to war production. Rationalization is a system of rationing. Rationing is not some arbitrary interference with the normal course of events. It is the very essence of a sane order. Without rationing there is no sensible plan, and in our understanding of rationing, rationing must be deepened from the mere allocation of existing supplies to the provision of adequate supplies.

Rationing is not merely to take what you have and distribute it according to plan. Rationing is also to distribute your means of production, to provide what you need for distribution. Rationing is a question of guaranteed supplies. This concept of rationing does not yet prevail, and one of the big tasks in the whole field of production is to establish this deeper understanding of the system of rationing. There can be no rational economy without the extension of the principle of rationing into production and supply itself.

There must be developed a gov-



ernmental service of supplies to workers engaged in war production, and from there extended to the economy as a whole. This service of supplies is just as necessary to workers in war production industry as it is to the army and navy.

We must gear whole communities up to the war program, and this requires more attention to the communities that have been by-passed by the war contracts. If they are not given the contracts, they must fight for them, and we must help them to organize that fight for their share of the work to win the war.

This, then, is the heart and soul of our program for war production and for war economy for the quickest possible winning of the war. To advance these policies, they must be formulated in the most concrete forms and pressed upon plant management, upon the local governments, the state governments, the federal agencies, upon Congress, and upon the President, coupling the struggle for these policies with the issues as they are expressed in Washington in the making of national policy and in the setting up of national administration. We must state these policies and win support for them among all the win-the-war forces, bringing the understanding and grasp of the problems of our economy by the masses to bear upon the central direction which is hammering out the national policies for war production.

#### IV. OBSTACLES TO CORRECT POLICIES

It is impossible to conclude the discussion of this phase of the production problem without noting the

obstacles to the development of the proper policies that flow from the Pepper-Tolan Bills. There is first of all the opposition of a section of big business management and its related circles to any degree of governmental guidance and control of the economy of the country. They even oppose the old peacetime regulations designed only to exclude certain abuses. But even where they accept these limited measures of peacetime regulation, which are in no sense control in planning but rather a sort of police operation over the economy, they display a very deeply ingrained opposition to any positive guidance and control of planning by governmental instance over industry.

There is a section of the industrialists which takes the hard-boiled position that running industry is their business and that the government has to keep out of it. In this respect, they absolutely insist upon business-as-usual practices and are ready to fight for them. The recent meeting of the Resolutions Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers expressed this tendency in the sharpest form and also showed the political road that this resistance to a nationally planned economy leads these people. The report that was carried in the *New Masses* a few weeks ago on the discussions of this Resolutions Committee revealed how far-reaching and dangerous this opposition is to the development of a planned economy for victory in the war. The fear of the war economy as socialism, which of course it is not, is something that has to be countered from many angles; but this organ-

ized political resistance to the development of the war economy has to be met with the heaviest political guns.

We must carefully distinguish between those sectors of big business which takes this business-as-usual position with a very clear political motivation, that is, the defeatist section of big business which is actively opposed to the most effective prosecution of the war, and that sector of the industrialists and the bourgeoisie which tends to go along with the business-as-usual position because they fail as yet to see that this is contradictory to their commitment to the winning of the war.

Now, it is my opinion, and I think it will be borne out by the further development of events, that the defeatist leadership within the bourgeoisie has a big influence in their class generally, only to the extent that they can prevent the clear posing of the question of victory in the war. But the moment that they are exposed to a Hitler victory, their influence disintegrates. The industrialists and the big bourgeoisie generally are by no means prepared to go along the road of the Lammot du Ponts, who exert influence only to the degree that they can manipulate the old attitudes and prejudices, while carefully avoiding the sharp presentation of the issues of the war. To the extent that we can bring forward the sharpest posing of the issue of victory, we will split the bourgeoisie away from the defeatist leadership. I think this is true not only in the upper circles of the bourgeoisie but all down the line through the whole field of management. The task is

to isolate the defeatists within the bourgeoisie and help the bourgeoisie to crystallize the will to victory.

Every trade unionist who has been facing these problems practically in the plants and in the industries will have noted to one degree or another a sharp differentiation going on within the ranks of management with more and more the best representatives of management reorientating toward the labor movement and toward the government on the basis of their desire to achieve maximum production for the war. The trade unionists will have found that those elements of management who do not go along that road are meeting with a sharp challenge from their fellows who are more and more going all-out for the war. And in the bourgeoisie, among the industrialists, in the ranks of management, he will have found that the more complete their commitment to all-out war production, the more ready are they to take a more friendly and cooperative attitude to the labor movement. It is almost a universal recognition among them that maximum production means cooperation with the trade unions and the working out of common policies together with the trade unions.

The desire for maximum production and the old hard-boiled, anti-labor attitude cannot go along together; and we must do our best to see that we do not throw over to the reactionaries and defeatists any part of management or the industrialists that can be won for the all-out production program for the war. That is the question in its most general aspect.

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# PREPARE THE PARTY FOR A NATIONWIDE PARTY BUILDING AND PRESS CAMPAIGN

BY JOHN WILLIAMSON

*(Speech delivered at the National Conference, Communist Party, U.S.A., held in New York, November 29-December 1, 1942)*

**O**UR party—and first of all Comrade Browder—has already made important contributions to bring our country to the point where we are today; but, as Comrade Browder's splendid report emphasized, we are now at a turning point. The fulfillment of these tasks at this critical turning point requires from our party much more, and our special contribution has to be increasingly effective political activity that clarifies and activizes the workers and their organizations in order to strengthen the nation and secure victory over the Axis and everything Hitlerism represents.

Under such circumstances, the Political Committee recommends to this conference that we should agree that there is urgent need for deepening and consolidating our party influence through a nationwide recruiting and press building campaign. Clearly, this must be considered in the light of the fact that our mass political influence is greater today than ever before. Nevertheless, in regard to one of the measurements of conscious party support—votes on election day, circulation of our press and party

recruiting—we are far from satisfied. The key is not a question of desire, and the answer is not harassment of either membership or leadership. Rather, we must examine our role in a period when there are mass progressive unions and other progressive forces that unite and activize masses for things we have long championed. We must in such circumstances find the new means of establishing constant contact with the masses without blurring our identity, in order to be able to fulfill our responsibility as a political party that influences and leads the masses and raises their political level. Comrade Browder's report has already outlined the main orientation for us in solving this problem.

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With all the discussion which has followed the article "Strengthening Communist Collaboration in Nation Unity" in *The Communist* for September, our problem now is to systematize our thinking, set certain objectives, and adopt those measures which will guarantee that the entire party can go ahead and solve the

problems which have been in the discussion stage.

We feel that the building of our party at this time is particularly possible because of the combination of two circumstances—first, the growing contributions of the Communists toward the solution of the nation's problems necessary for victory; and, secondly, because ever larger numbers of Americans see in our party a creative political force which helps solve problems of the workers, influences events, and contributes to the course of victory for our nation. We are not establishing figures, although I am sure we all agree that 100,000 members would be desirable in 1943. *As a first step we do propose that we launch a party building campaign for 15,000 new members from Lincoln's Birthday till May 1.*

This party building campaign must be understood as vital to the winning of the war—as part of our win-the-war activities. The campaign to strengthen the party and deepen its influence should be organized around such issues are:

1. Increasing production for an all-out military offensive and opening of the Second Front in Europe.

2. Strengthening labor's war contribution through organizing the unorganized and labor unity.

3. Strengthening the camp of national unity by ruthless exposure and struggle against all appeasers and advocates of a negotiated peace.

4. Struggle to abolish the poll tax and all other divisive legislation aimed against the win-the-war forces.

In the course of such activities we

should show the consistent policies of our party over the years in the interest of the workers and the nation and the specific contributions of our party to the effort. Of course, we must never give the impression that we alone are solving all the problems. Our contributions are only effective to the extent that we are actively collaborating with all win-the-war elements and, first of all, the labor movement.

Whom shall we recruit in this campaign?

1. Workers in industry and trade unions, with special attention to the women workers. Integrated here must be our special attention to concentration industries—coal mining, steel, auto, and shipbuilding.

2. Negro workers, whom it is imperative we influence, precisely because of the confusion and lack of consistent policy adopted by Administration win-the-war forces as well as the A. F. of L.

3. Professionals, intellectuals and white-collar workers.

The method of the campaign will be to combine recruiting and press building with all mass activities and not to conduct it in a flamboyant, noisy style—as a partisan effort—and thus an end in itself. *The key is the branch. If every branch adequately reflects and implements the party policies as adopted by this conference, the 15,000 figure would be quickly surpassed.* We will emphasize an approach to the individual, whom we have contacted through our Second Front activity, our neighborhood war activities, our election work, trade union activity, or who has been a reader or sub-

scriber to *The Worker*. There is no need for any special apparatus. Recruiting will be by the party branch, by special party committees among the members in trade unions, International Workers Order or other organizations. We should try to strengthen further the campaign by getting a number of prominent individuals to join the party during this campaign.

It is necessary that we speed up the adoption of the proposals outlined in the September issue of *The Communist* as to the functioning of the party branch, and the strengthening of our collaboration in the camp of national unity, all with an understanding of certain new relationships of forces.

We propose starting this party building campaign in February, primarily because we want to spend the time between now and February in winning the membership and actives to a new understanding on the following four questions:

1. The present-day role of our party and strengthening the political bonds between the party and the membership.

2. The branch as a public political factor.

3. Simplifying conditions of party membership and reduction in the financial obligation of party membership.

4. Improved branch leadership.

How do we explain the contradiction between our increased party influence—and I think Comrade Browder's report and life itself establish that fact indisputably—and our slow party growth, our unsatisfactory press circulation, and,

in some states particularly, our small vote? The answer is a combination of circumstances.

We no longer occupy the position we did ten or fifteen year ago, of standing alone on the broad progressive issues of the day. Today, there is a mass trade union movement which does not limit itself to narrow economic issues but concerns itself with politics, sports, and cultural affairs. There are other mass organizations and papers which take a positive stand on one or another progressive issue of the day. Then, in its broadest aspect, the majority of our nation, united through the government, is anti-fascist and waging a people's war. This entire development, of great historic significance, and to which we Communists are proud to have contributed, has also its significance for us.

I think we must avoid such theoretically dangerous thinking as that expressing the idea that Left-led trade unions make superfluous the building of the party. This unconsciously leads to undermining our whole political role and to liquidation of the party. Precisely because of our positions of mass influence, our political initiative and responsibility are greater than ever before.

Fundamentally and historically our role remains the same today, but we must place different emphasis under different conditions. While a trade union like the United Automobile Workers of America is outstandingly progressive on many issues, it nevertheless did not fully appreciate the real significance of

the recent elections, or Senator Brown and Governor Van Waggoner would otherwise have been elected in Michigan. Despite its progressiveness on specific issues the U. A. W. A. still has an anti-Communist clause in its constitution, which the recent convention did not change. Or take the newspaper *PM*, of which some people have become enamoured. It is generally progressive, but it never campaigned for a Second Front and it still lumps Communists and Nazis together and calls upon us to dissolve. Similarly with the *People's Voice*—a real fighting Negro paper. Yet, while endorsing Ben Davis, it also endorsed Lane, a Trotskyite Socialist. I cite these things not so much to find fault as to emphasize our role. In a speech he recently delivered in Detroit, Comrade Browder gave the answer to this question when he declared:

“Everything we do today we are doing more and more in collaboration with larger numbers of people. But we are the conscious elements in this process. We are the ones who always know what we are doing and where we are going. . . .”

“Therefore, even when we are dealing with people who on a particular question know more than we do, and we support them, we are still stronger than they are, because the moment they get off from their particular issue they are weak. . . .”

It becomes clear that our special role is to deepen the understanding of the masses and to influence their actions on *all* fundamental issues connected with the winning of the war and thus gradually to deepen

the thinking and strengthen the actions of the people and especially the workers on a national win-the-war program. Today our political leadership must be of such a quality, depth and timeliness that it will be indispensable for every advanced and thinking American worker, especially trade union leader and activist, to treasure membership in the Communist Party.

In our recent discussions on precisely this question we have emphasized the need for more effective independent political activity of our party. This was correct. The contradiction is that, whereas the masses and other political groups see our party, through the declaration, activity and influence of our National Committee and many of our state organizations, as a public political force, with a policy and activity that influence masses and events, the same is not true of our branches. Unfortunately, too often the people who are sensitive and alert to political questions and want guidance for action in the neighborhood, local union or shop, feel they get this guidance better outside the party—which means outside the branch—rather than inside. Obviously the branch is again the key to changing this, and the center of the problem is the political life of the branch. Our branches must drop all sectarian aspects of their work and adopt forms of large ward organizations which will be understood by average Americans.

It is not enough that the majority of our members are active in war activities or trade unions as in-

dividuals. The people must see the party as an organization active in the community where it functions. The branch must gain the same political stature as the State and National Committees. *This means it should become a public political force in the neighborhood.* We have some experiences, such as in Hartford, where the City Salvage Committee chose the Communist Party branch to organize salvage collections in one ward just as it chose the American Legion or the Kiwanis, or a church, for others. New York has a few examples of branch activity in neighborhood flag dedication and blood donor work. Cleveland has an open party ward center which was written up in *The Worker*. Others exist in other cities. But they are still the exception. We must make them the rule. I recognize that within this general question there are special problems which must still be answered—how the branch in a small industrial town should operate openly or what we are going to do to activize members of industrial sections or branches in neighborhood political work. We shall get to these questions as we begin moving on the general problems, and their solution will be in accord with the general direction of our thinking.

The entire question of branch political activity is closely bound up with successful concentration work. A weakness in our concentration activity to date has been the tendency to narrow it down to work inside the union or the shop. That type of work will be reinforced and will bring dividends if it is supple-

mented by community political work in every one of the steel or mining communities. On a broader base the same thing is true of large automotive-industry centers like Detroit, Flint and Toledo.

It becomes clear that until we have adequate branch life and political activity there can be no adequate membership or recruiting of new members. The understanding of the branch leadership must be made clear on this question and we must guarantee that the branch is in the center of activity and functions as a public political force in its community. This means we must re-educate our branch leaders, who today are often steeped in organization detail. *Generally speaking, the branch leader should be a comrade well known in the neighborhood for his public activities in the war, trade union work, election activity and all other questions of concern to the people. He must be respected in the neighborhood on the basis of his work and knowledge.* Any other type of Branch Organizer—no matter how devoted the comrade—is useless for carrying through this policy. We, of course, must re-educate our existing cadres, and train and promote others, especially men and women in shops, trade unions and other mass organizations, to become branch leaders.

Originally we considered a campaign with a double objective of recruiting and *Worker* circulation. Today we recommend that the conference decide as one of the prerequisites for the party building campaign the immediate launching of a movement to get 30,000 new

readers for *The Worker*—20,000 in subscriptions and 10,000 in bundle orders. This will be effective only if we master the renewal problem, so that instead of securing 11,000 new subscriptions and losing 10,000 we really establish an apparatus to get at least 60 per cent renewal. This problem does not need any arguing and we submit it for approval.

Because of the political weaknesses of our branches we engage in recruiting activities without adequate propaganda work—without giving the worker the answer to the things bothering him. If we did more of this our recruiting would multiply overnight. But this also means our own members must be equipped to answer these questions; yes, must be equipped not only to repeat what is written in the *Daily Worker*, but to use that knowledge to answer the specific aspects of the general problems that confront the workers in their union, their labor-management committee, their civilian defense corps, or any other place. Precisely here is where Comrade Browder's book, *Victory—and After*, plays its role; it must not only be sold or even read—it must be studied.

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The second main prerequisite that must be fulfilled to guarantee a successful party building campaign is to simplify the conditions of party membership. The rights and duties of party members are well defined under Article 6 of our Constitution and need no comment.

We think that today all we must require as conditions of membership are the following four points:

1. Agreement with party program and activity in applying it where one is active.

2. Participation in some phase of war work.

3. Reading of the party press, especially the *Daily Worker*.

4. Payment of dues and membership in a branch, but not compulsory regular attendance.

It is necessary to emphasize activity together with agreement with program, otherwise there will not be full clarity on what is expected. Obviously it is not enough to be active in a trade union or in civilian defense. A Communist must be active in a way that differs from others. He should be inspired by party ideology. His activity has a purpose beyond that of the non-Communist.

We emphasize the point about no compulsory attendance. This is not intended to legalize an existing condition. It is intended to change our conception of party membership. Today, although only 40 per cent attend branch meetings, the overwhelming majority of members belong to and are active in some mass organization and to the best of their ability try to apply the party line. However, because we refuse to recognize new conditions, we have a situation where the 50 per cent who do not attend are called "book members," "deadwood," or any one of a dozen other insulting names by branch functionaries who have a purely routine organizational approach to comrades who may be



working in trade unions or civilian defense five or six nights a week. The member who does not attend branches today may be busy in his mass work, and when he does come to the branch there is little or no political discussion on current issues of the day, not to speak of discussion of the political problems confronting him in his place of activity. Today we solve only the problem of giving political guidance to the top trade unionists. We must solve the problem of political guidance to all by changing the character of our branches. This will not only increase attendance. This is the key to recruiting, because through such type of political guidance people can become more effective by being Communists.

As regards the activist in a trade union or other mass organization. We cannot expect all such comrades to participate in what is today narrowly called "party work." If we change the character of branch life and thus get attendance of such activists in trade unions, even if they take no additional assignment beyond the assignment in mass work they already have, they will be taking back from the branch the ability to influence others. Such a member, with guidance from such a branch, will then, through political conviction and without harassment, undertake to sell Earl Browder's book, get subscriptions for *The Worker* and recruit new members for the party.

*Our emphasis is not on O.K.'ing non-attendance at branch meetings, but on establishing a political relationship with the party member*

*instead of the present mechanical organizational relationship. Too often we want to set as standards for all party members the yardstick of the professional revolutionist. The demands we put on members place them almost in the category of abnormal people, with no regard for health, family or contact with the masses. If we establish a political relationship with the member, wipe out the practice of harassment of members, organize only two branch meetings a month, establish a differentiated approach based upon circumstances—then attendance itself will actually increase.*

What do we mean by a political relationship with the member?

1. Most decisive is to be a regular reader of the party press, especially the *Daily Worker*.
2. The center of branch meetings to be political discussions related to the immediate issues of the day.
3. Guidance and personal contact to the member even when he is not able to attend branch meetings.
4. Greater democracy and involvement of members in making all decisions.
5. Establish—as New York is doing—a service department for the branches with a speakers' bureau, film apparatus and cultural activities.
6. Develop branch activity on the basis of activity committees. While retaining group captains, the group system wherever it exists only on paper should be abolished.

*As part of this problem we must reduce the high financial burdens of party membership. We took an*

inadequate survey, but it already showed that it costs from \$4 to \$6 per member per month to belong to the party in a majority of our districts. In regards to finance we too often have a mechanical, non-human approach which allows for no differentiation on the basis of circumstances. Many times the member who revolts at all the assessments, literature payments, hall rents and high dues would gladly contribute if things were presented to him in a different way. Without burdening you with detail, we are determined that the high cost of party membership must be reduced. Besides dues, the member should only be asked to raise money from others once a year for the Press-Election Fund. This means we must cut the deficit on the *Daily Worker* and *Morning Freiheit* by increasing the circulation. It means we must teach the party to raise money from outsiders through activity. It means we must cut down the cost of our apparatus.

We propose to make another reduction in dues at this conference, but ask for the election of a subcommittee to go over the proposals before finalizing our opinions. Reducing the financial cost of the party means better planning in issuing and distribution of literature.

*As the formal disciplinary relationships between the branch and member become less rigid, we must guarantee a strengthening of the political and ideological relation-*

*ships with the member. We must avoid loosening the bonds between the party and membership. The heart of the question is to strengthen the political bond.*

The time between our decision today and the launching of the Party Building Campaign on Lincoln's Birthday must be fully utilized if we are to conduct the campaign successfully. That means that we must all energetically, through immediate State Committee meetings and otherwise, conduct a real ideological campaign within the party to bring about a decisive change in the functioning of the branch and the understanding of branch leadership. It might be appropriate for us to issue a semi-monthly Party Bulletin from the center to assist in this process, which could serve to exchange experiences. We might consider choosing one district to concentrate upon prior to February to prove to the party how mass recruiting can be done. In this preparatory period we must also consider the campaign for 35,000 new readers of *The Worker* as breaking the ground for recruiting. If we do all this and, above all, if we get 250,000 people to study Comrade Browder's book and in this way help our members and branches to find effective solutions to every problem confronting the worker and his organization, then we have every possibility of overfulfilling our objective of 15,000 new members in three months.

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# MOBILIZE NEGRO MANPOWER FOR VICTORY

BY JAMES W. FORD

**T**HE armed forces of the United States are engaged far and wide in this peoples' war for the survival of our nation. The powerful military actions against the enemy are directed at two major points of operation, in the Pacific and in the North African offensive. The latter action is extending itself toward opening a second front on the continent of Europe. Hundreds of thousands of men and enormous quantities of material are being expended. The armed forces are drawing heavily upon the national man power. Further, these mighty military actions are demanding the mobilization of the entire nation for total war. It is required that all Americans, regardless of race or religion, be fitted into the production program for a total war economy, to supply the armed forces and the civilian war needs. The utilization of every available man and woman according to his or her capacities in order punctually to meet the demands of our war needs is the first concern of the nation.

A major step has been taken in this direction. On December 5, 1942, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order establishing the Manpower Commission "to promote the most effective mobilization of

the national man power." This Commission is headed by Paul V. McNutt and is clothed essentially with the following powers:

1. To centralize manpower mobilization under one authority consisting of representatives from the War, Navy, Agriculture, and Labor Departments; the Federal Security Agency; the War Production Board; the United States Civil Service Commission; the National Housing Agency; and such other executive departments as the President shall determine; and a joint representative of the War Shipping Administration and the Office of Defense Transportation.

2. To control "all hiring, rehiring, solicitation and recruitment of workers in or for work, in any establishment, plant, facility, occupation or area designated by the chairman" through the United States Employment Service; and the selection of the number of men required for the armed forces.

3. To control all training programs of the armed forces, assuring the efficient utilization of the nation's educational facilities and personnel for the effective prosecution of the war.

4. To "issue such policies, rules, regulations and general or special

orders" to prevent and relieve gross inequities or undue hardships; and to establish procedures for assuring hearings to any person making claims or appeals.

5. To set up a labor-management policy committee selected from the fields of labor, agriculture and industrial management, and "such other advisory committees" composed of governmental or private groups as the chairman may deem appropriate.

These are the essential policy operational provisions of the Manpower Commission. The commission has full powers to execute these policies.

Undoubtedly, this new Manpower Commission will enable the nation to render the greatest support to the offensive on the military field, providing the armed forces with the means for carrying through the Second Front. The nation must be aroused to fullest support of the Manpower Commission and thereby strengthen the hand of the President in leading the country in collaboration with our allies to victory over the Axis.

The need of a total centralized war economy program was under discussion for several months. Earl Browder strikes at the heart of the question in his book *Victory—And After*, in the brilliant chapter on "The Economics of War":

"Maximum war production requires a centralized administration which will plan, direct, guide, and control the *entire economy of the nation.*"

Browder makes it clear that un-

less bottlenecks, duplication of effort and authority, and conflicts of various kinds are removed, our nation will fall dangerously short in production requirements for winning the war.

The Tolan Committee of the House of Representatives suggested the establishment of an Office of War Mobilization to "inventory and mobilize all the economic resources of the United States, including manpower, facilities, materials, technical and scientific knowledge, and natural resources for maximum use in the provision of military and essential civilian needs," and to "adjust and stabilize the economy in accordance with the needs of full mobilization and other conditions created by the war."

It is in this general direction that the Manpower Commission must go.

The Manpower Commission, however, does not fully meet the requirements or the scope of a total war economy production-manpower machinery.

We must set down as a shortcoming in the Commission itself, first, the lack of provision for a mode of representation that will reflect the full status and authority of labor and farm organizations, whose experiences and position of authority among workers and rural communities could contribute in formulating policies and in accelerating their execution; and, secondly, the absence of a *mandatory* provision for representatives of Negro organizations, who would aid in working out policies to overcome the bottlenecks which are keeping colored

citizens from the fullest integration in the war production.

All told, however, the establishment of the Manpower Commission will shift the base of manpower mobilization from overlapping departments, agencies, bureaus and other apparatuses working at cross-purposes and in confusion, into a rounded-out smooth-running machinery to meet the requirements of efficient coordination and distribution of manpower.

Providing it executes its tasks impartially and in the spirit of all-out effort to win the war, the Manpower Commission can transform the entire nation in morale and in working efficiency; it can make the people a living part of the nation's industrial machinery; it can eliminate slipshod methods in industry and create greater efficiency; it can unite the people as never before and make them assume a sense of national civic responsibility and duty so that they will be alert against bunglers, saboteurs, defeatists, and obstructionists.

#### *The Negro People and the Manpower Commission*

So far as the Negro people are concerned, the new Manpower Commission, especially if it established representation of Negro organizations, offers unprecedented possibilities for eradicating bottlenecks which have kept them out of maximum participation in industrial mobilization. The Commission must immediately remove all technical restrictions and political taboos against colored citizens in industry and in the armed forces. Dis-

crimination is a political problem and is eating at the vitals of mobilization of the total war effort.

The Negro people constitute one of the largest compact groups in our national life, larger numerically than many small nations.\* There are 12,865,518 Negroes in the United States; of this number 9,904,619, or three-fourths, are in the South. The increase in the Negro population in the decade of 1930-40 was 8.2 per cent. There was a decrease of 18.3 per cent in immigration to the United States during the same period. The net increase in the Negro population and the decrease in immigration enhance the potential Negro labor supply for the war effort.

In 1940, 77 per cent of the Negro population lived in the South, as compared to 78.7 per cent in 1930. This indicates a migratory tendency to Northern industrial and urban centers, without, however, indicating a decrease in the ratio of Negro industrial workers in the South. There is a rapid expansion of war industries Southward.

"Nearly one-fifth of all war contracts allotted since June, 1940, have been placed in thirteen southern states."\*\*

Whereas present migratory tendencies of Negroes from the South to Northern industrial centers is not as sensational or numerically

\* *Hammond's World Atlas*, 1942. The population of Canada is 11,419,896; Cuba 4,227,587; Denmark, 3,706,349; Hungary, 12,708,400; Holland, 8,728,600; Belgium, 8,386,553; Greece, 7,108,000; Norway, 2,937,000; Portugal, 6,825,383; Sweden, 6,341,303; Union of South Africa, 10,160,000.

\*\* *Southern Labor in Wartime*, Labor Research Association, New York, 1942, p. 4.

as large as during World War I, there is, nevertheless, a substantial industrial shift.\*

The Negro population in the United States remains, however, predominantly rural and therefore, because of increase in working class composition, retains its twofold nature, viz., industrial and agricultural labor supply.

At the outbreak of the war gainfully employed Negro women were working mainly in service occupations; in the Southwest 82%; in the middle states, 70%. A large part of Negro women workers are engaged in semi-skilled work; 20% in the middle states; 19% in the Northeast; 11% in the Southeast, and 9% in the Southwest.

In the active working and producing ages of 20 to 35 years there are 193,898 more Negroes than there were in 1930. There are approximately two million Negro industrial workers.

Negro industrial labor is becoming more increasingly disciplined and integrated into the trade union movement. During World War I, the Negro population developed a large industrial working class. It was maintained up to the economic crisis of 1929 and beyond, in W.P.A. and N.Y.A., constantly acquiring greater skill.

When trade union organization took a leap forward to the total of 12,000,000 organized workers, Negro workers formed a substantial

part of this total, particularly in the C.I.O. More than 500,000 Negro workers are organized in the C.I.O., A. F. of L., and in independent unions. One-third of the 100,000 members of the C.I.O. in the state of Alabama alone are Negroes.

When the war broke out in Europe and the United States became a supplier of industrial products to the belligerent nations, there was a dearth of semi-skilled and skilled workers for the expanding war industries.

In 1930, however, there were already more than a million Negro workers experienced or trained in skilled industrial and white-collar work. In one year over fifty thousand Negroes had completed trades and industrial courses in vocational and technical schools, and nearly five thousand others were awarded college degrees in chemistry, engineering, and other sciences. There were over seventy-five thousand Negroes experienced as carpenters, bricklayers, painters, electricians, plasterers and cement workers.\* As of today, there are two hundred thousand Negro railroad workers.

In 1930 there were 27,000 Negro mechanics. This number was trebled under W.P.A. and N.Y.A. There are at present available 8,000 mechanics, millwrights and toolmakers; 5,000 plumbers and steamfitters; 6,000 blacksmiths, forgemen and hammermen; and 25,000 iron and steel workers.\*\*

\* An interesting study of this shift has recently been made by Charles S. Johnson, "The Negro Minority," *Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Philadelphia, September, 1942, p. 12.

\* "Barriers to Negro War Employment," by Lester Granger, Executive Secretary, National Urban League, *ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

\*\* Lester Granger, "The Negro and War Production," *Survey Graphic*, November, 1942, p. 469.

This is a partial listing of the available Negro labor supply in the United States up to Pearl Harbor. At the beginning of the war, discrimination was the rule in American industry. Discrimination was a bottleneck holding hundreds of thousands available Negro workers out of vital war industry. Discrimination is still with us. It is a drawback to national unity. It is eating at the heart of the Negro people and aggravating their attitude and morale toward the war effort. The resentment of the Negroes against their treatment has created the mistaken impression in the minds of some people that in the movement and agitation to ameliorate this condition the Negroes are bent on abolishing the prevailing economic and social system in the United States. What is lacking in this impression and in the national liberation character of the war for the entire nation is that the industrialists themselves—the win-the-war section less so, and the appeaser, defeatist section in toto—are unwilling to remove the abuses of elementary civil rights, of social morality and justice, to permit the Negro people to play their full role in helping to win the war, to which they have in their overwhelming majority patriotically committed themselves.

The slowness and inadequacy with which the Government proceeded in breaking down discrimination, terribly aggravated the situation. The Negro people are fully justified in their resentment and struggle against abuses that have meant their rejection as a part of national unity.

#### *Governmental Policy Established*

Finally, however, the Government began to meet the problem. Trade unions, the C.I.O., in the forefront, loyally and patriotically, and joining in solidarity with their Negro fellow workers, threw their weight behind the struggle for employment of Negroes in industry, to strengthen national unity and to meet the production requirements of the war.

The first steps in the establishment of a fundamental governmental policy to break down discrimination in war industries was taken by President Roosevelt on June 17, 1941, in a memorandum to the O.P.M. The President placed the full support of his office behind a statement of the O.P.M. to employers urging holders of war contracts "to examine employment and training policies" in regard to the "full utilization of available and competent Negro workers."

This was followed by Executive Order No. 8802, issued by the President on June 25, stating:

"It is a policy of the United States to encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin."

The President then appointed the Committee on Fair Employment Practices composed of Mark Ethridge; William Green, Philip Murray, David Sarnoff, President of R.C.A.; and two Negro members—Earl Dickerson, City Councilman of

Chicago, and Milton Webster, Vice-President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. A number of investigations and public hearings were held by this Committee on discrimination in defense industries. These hearings disclosed astounding cases of discrimination.

A series of actions tending toward establishing a governmental policy on discrimination against Negroes were further taken by the President in his Message to Congress, by the United States Office of Education, by the National Defense Advisory Commission, by the Labor Division of the Office of Production Management and by the United States Employment Service.

Thus, a Governmental policy was formulated and established. It resulted in partially eliminataing discrimination and in securing employment for many thousands of Negro workers. Skilled and semi-skilled jobs were opened up to Negroes. The Curtiss-Wrights plants hired more than 3,000. Thousands of Negroes were placed in ordinance plants throughout the country. Negroes were employed in navy yards and in shipbuilding. In shipbuilding Negroes were employed in more than thirty-seven different crafts, including work as skilled mechanics. Lester Granger, Executive Seeretary of the National Urban League, writing in *Survey Graphic*, gives the following enlightening facts regarding progress made in the employment of Negroes:

"Between December, 1941, and April, 1942, according to the U. S. Bureau of Employment Security, in

large shipbuilding companies working for the government, Negro employment increased from a total of 6,952 to 12,820. Between September, 1940, and September, 1941, the Negroes employed in navy ship yards rose from 6,000 to 14,000. In the aircraft industry, which virtually employed no Negroes in 1940, 5,000 of that race were employed in 49 plants in May, 1942."\*

The anti-discrimination trend manifested itself increasingly in the policies of the trade unions. Outstanding examples of trade unions fighting against discrimination are the recent actions of the United Automobile Workers Union, the National Maritime Union, and the United Electrical Workers Union.

The U.E.W.A. changed the place of its national convention because hotels discriminated against its Negro delegates. In New Jersey a local of that Union forced the employers to include 20 per cent Negro workers in its training program for 25,000 workers. The U.A.W.A. through its President, R. J. Thomas, took prompt steps to end a local wildcat strike of white workers of that union because Negro workers had been assigned to skilled jobs. Thomas declared that "our constitution provides for safeguarding the rights of all our members irrespective of their race or creed."

The National Maritime Union did a historic job in securing the manning of the merchant ship *S.S. Booker T. Washington* with a mixed crew, under the command of a Negro captain, Hugh Mulzac.

\* *Ibid.*, p. 470.



*Bottlenecks Remaining*

There are, however, many bottlenecks of discrimination that operate against the full integration of Negroes in war industries. Many state employment services refuse to hire Negroes. In eighteen Southern states only 3,215 Negroes, or 4 per cent of the total trainees, were enrolled last January in pre-employment and refresher training courses. Out of 4,630 training courses in other southern states, only 194 were opened to Negro trainees. In Florida only .17 of 1 per cent of its trainees were Negroes. In Texas only 206 Negroes were trained out of 12,472 persons who received training last February. The training of Negro workers is one of industry's foremost tasks—new workers and youth, as well as those presently at work below skilled occupations.

Last July Governor Frank Dixon, of Alabama, refused to sign a contract with the Defense Supplies Corporation for 1,750,000 yards of cloth for defense purposes because of a clause in the contract against race discrimination. Recently in that state appropriation for training Negro workers for war jobs were canceled.

In high schools and other educational institutions in several southern states suitable for training purposes, both state and federal agencies were derelict in granting funds to outfit these schools for training Negro workers for war purposes. In some southern states Negroes are unable to take special types of training because firms engaged in the

particular types of work refused to hire Negroes.

There are numerous plants and factories throughout the country, that still maintain the policy of racial discrimination and refuse to hire Negro workers. In others, where Negroes are employed, they are refused advancement to skilled jobs. By the end of 1943 the nation will require a labor force of 53,000,000 workers. Most of this labor force will have to come from among women. At present there are 1,500,000 more women at work than a year ago. The largest increase in women workers has been of those under 25 years of age and those between the ages of 35 and 55. But with this influx of women into industry, Negro women find themselves up against a wall of discrimination.

The most flagrant and disgraceful cases of discrimination are found in the railroad industry. The following are some of the forms of discrimination that bar Negroes from advancement and full participation in this important war industry:

1. Denial of employment, particularly in the skilled trades, barring of Negro workers from most of the skilled and higher-paid jobs, even when their seniority rights, experience, skill and length of service entitle them to such advancement and promotion.

2. Denial of employment in the following departments and capacities:

- (a) Operating department, as locomotive engineers, train conductors; and locomotive foremen,

brakemen and yard switchmen (except on certain southern roads).

(b) Mechanical department, as machinists, blacksmiths, boiler-makers, electrical workers, sheet metal workers, and carmen.

(c) Telegram and signal department, as telegraphers, signal maintainers, and train dispatchers.

(d) Maintenance of way department, as carpenters, painters, bricklayers, pipefitters, and building trades mechanics in general.

(e) General offices, freight and passenger stations, as clerical employees, ticket sellers, stenographers, and other clerical occupations.

3. Negro youth are completely barred from all apprenticeship systems in the railroad industry. When Negroes are hired for unskilled labor they are in effect denied all opportunity for advancement.

4. Employment of Negroes is confined to unskilled, semi-skilled, low-paid classes of work, principally:

(a) To train porters and maids.

(b) To shop and roundhouse common laborers, car cleaners, in a few instances to mechanics' helpers and other menial and low-paid jobs.

(c) To common track laborers, section hands, and extra gangs.

(d) To porters, truckers, freight handlers and red caps, and in the dining car service, to waiters and "B Class" cooks, with denial of promotion to stewards.

Responsibility for this deplorable situation rests primarily upon the railroad companies.

The railroad unions are the most disgraceful unions in America in

discriminatory practices against Negro workers. All of the railroad unions, some of them affiliated to the A. F. of L., maintain clauses in their constitutions barring membership to Negro workers. The following are typical of some of these clauses: "any white person between the ages of 16 and 65"; (Negroes) "shall be represented in the Grand Lodge by delegates of their own choice *selected from white lodges*"; "White male persons"; "Unless he is a white man 21 years of age"; "He shall be white born"; "Negro sheet metal workers may be organized *in separate locals with the consent of the white local*"; "Must be of the Caucasian race."

But discrimination is not limited to railroad unions. In June, 1942, the Fair Employment Practices Committee cited two unions, the Steamfitters Protective Association and the Chicago Journeymen Plumbers Union, for discrimination against Negro steamfitters and plumbers.

This summer the A. F. of L. organizer at the Kaiser plant in Oregon refused to admit Negro workers to membership in the union, and made the most slanderous statements in the press attacking the entire Negro people. Such policies as these, if not eradicated, cannot but cause the unions to fail as the backbone of national unity and the war effort.

Discrimination by unions against Negro workers is a problem that the entire labor movement must tackle in the spirit of the C.I.O., which brands discrimination as characteristic of our Nazi enemies. In that spirit the C.I.O. adopted the follow-

ing resolution on manpower at its Boston Convention:

"Employers must be directed and compelled to utilize in full the service of Negro workers. . . . Every restriction in the utilization of this manpower must be broken down and immediately eliminated. The C.I.O. has not tolerated any restrictions in its own ranks and now insists that the government see to it that employers utilize this available manpower for the total war mobilization."

It now rests upon the labor movement and the Manpower Commission to break down barriers of discrimination and fully mobilize Negro manpower for the war effort.

The Manpower Commission, together with labor and the entire nation, can and must carry through the established policy of the Government by supplementing this policy with the powers given it in the Executive Order setting up the Commission.

1. *The Commission should immediately set up a committee representative of Negro people's organizations.*

2. Under the authority of the labor - management committees every war plant must immediately tackle the problem of employment of Negro labor, male and female, without discrimination.

3. United States Employment Agencies must forthwith be instructed to place available Negro labor to work, giving immediate attention to those Negroes who have lost jobs through the abolition of W.P.A.

4. All training agencies must be immediately instructed to open ade-

quate training for Negro workers; plants must include Negroes in their training programs; Negro youth must be accorded full apprenticeship opportunities; appropriations should be made to schools and colleges for training Negro youth for war-production industries.

5. The Commission should make an immediate ruling establishing as the governmental policy all measures heretofore established by Executive Order 8802 and other Presidential pronouncements and departmental orders.

6. A special board for hearing cases of discrimination should be immediately established.

7. The Commission should take steps to see that the Constitutional rights of Negroes are upheld in regard to industry and the armed forces.

8. The Selective Service Board should abolish discriminatory practices against Negro selectees; mixed military police (M.P.) and regiments should be established.

9. An immediate ruling should be made for the prompt and adequate promotion of Negroes in the armed services and rapid promotion of Negro officer personnel; discrimination against Negro women in the Waves and the Waacs must be stopped.

10. The Commission should make an immediate ruling on the enrollment of Negro doctors, nurses, and allied professionals in the armed forces.

11. The Commission should take steps for the provision of adequate housing for Negro workers in industrial centers without discrimination.

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# THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

BY GREGORY ALEXANDROV

*(From a report delivered at a recent session of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., held at Sverdlovsk.)*

**T**HE present stage of world history has confronted social science with problems which did not arise and could not have arisen during the lifetime of the founders of Marxism. Therefore, the correct answers to questions posed by the contemporary period must be found by the creative application of the historical-materialist method of research, a method tested by life. There are periods in the life of peoples and states when, in a brief space of time, history traverses a path equal to many decades of normal peaceful development. These are milestones, turning points in world history. In such epochs, all the forces accumulated by society in the course of centuries are set into tempestuous movement. The former course of historic development of society is disturbed and events of a new kind come to the fore.

Today mankind is experiencing precisely such a turbulent, crucial stage. There is no doubt that by the grandeur of present events, the tension and pace of development of so-

cial life, and the character and scope of struggle of the freedom-loving democratic peoples of the world headed by the Soviet Union, England and the U.S.A. against German imperialism, the present period of world history will exert an even greater influence on the destinies of peoples than the most important periods of past historic epochs. The entire character of the present struggle is indicative of the world-historic results which will inevitably be produced by history's greatest battles raging on the Soviet-German front.

The history of wars, just as the history of social sciences, has clearly revealed a very important fact, which has received fresh confirmation in our own days. In the past, the smaller the armies were and the less perfect their technical armaments, the less influence was exerted by social science on the outcome of the war. In our time the situation has changed so radically that without knowledge of the laws of the development of society, it is neither possible to comprehend the contents

of the great struggle for progress taking place nor successfully to influence the course of events in the desired direction.

On June 22, 1941, Hitler Germany launched its criminal and treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. Having achieved a certain advantage at the first stage of military operations, Hitler Germany during the first five months of the war scored some military successes, capturing a considerable amount of Soviet territory. The whole world was stirred by the struggle of those months. The war of the Soviet Union against the German fascist forces of occupation called to active political life new scores of millions of people, for people the world over understood that their destiny and the destiny of their states were being decided in this struggle. At a time when the struggle was only in its first stage, Stalin, the leader of the world's most progressive state, gave a brilliant, far-sighted estimate of the development of events. Behind the endless diversity of the outward manifestations of war events, Stalin revealed the profound basis of unshakable historical facts. Basing himself on these facts, he estimated the essence of the struggle as well as the course of forthcoming battles.

As a true representative of progressive social science, the creator of a new military art, Stalin separated all temporary, transient, accidental and partial factors influencing the struggle in the first stage of the patriotic war from permanently operating, regular, basic factors of the war, the discovery of

which made it possible to understand not only what had already taken place but what was to follow.

Stalin convincingly showed that during the first period of the war the temporary factors, in the form of relative partial advantages of the Hitler army, were at work on Germany's side. The error of many politicians and military men of many countries in estimating the first stage of the war on the Soviet-German front consists in the fact that in analyzing events they mistook the separate, temporary, transient factors which influence the course of individual battles, for factors of a permanent nature, decisive factors which determine not merely the outcome of one or another engagement but the outcome of the war as a whole.

Stalin separated the temporary factors which influenced the first period of the war from the permanent conditions which conform to the established laws of social science and influence the course of the war, constantly growing in significance and in the final analysis predetermining the results of all military operations: the outcome of the war.

Among such permanent, regular factors classed by Stalin as factors lying at the basis of the life of society in wartime were the military factor—the number and quality of the divisions and the abilities of the commanding staffs of the armies; the economic factor—the ability of industry and agriculture to serve a great and protracted war; the internal political factor—the political and moral state of the people, of the

rear of the fighting army; and the foreign policy factor—the relations between the belligerent states and other countries of the world.

It was possible to learn the operation of these basic factors only by discovering the principal tendency of the epoch, the principal line of the historic process which underlies all accidental, transient phenomena and events. To discover this line was possible only by the skillful, creative use of the methods of Marxist-Leninist social science, its application and development in new historic conditions.

Leninist-Stalinist social science enables us to see the direction in which events are to develop in the near future with the greatest scientific thoroughness, faithfulness and precision made possible by this science. Foresight as to the future development of social phenomena receives its objective confirmation only in the subsequent real development of society.

By his analysis of the course and perspectives of the war of the Soviet Union against Hitler Germany, Stalin showed an example of how through the application of Marxist-Leninist social science it is possible clearly, objectively, correctly to foresee the character of events developing at present. Thus, at the very outset of the war, Stalin, enumerating individual advantages of the German Army which insured it certain success at the first stage of the war, directed attention to the temporary character of these advantages. Some five or six months passed and indeed these temporary advantages of the enemy were

liquidated by the Red Army in the course of the war. These advantages turned out to be temporary ones.

At the outset of the war Stalin pointed out that the very nature of the criminal war of Hitler Germany which conceived the idea of enslaving the land of the Soviets, of exterminating the Soviet people, depriving it of a free, independent, self-sufficient life, would inevitably lead to the deterioration of the German Army and this in turn would prepare the ground for its doom. And even seven or eight months of the war saw a serious process of deterioration in the Hitler Army—a process which will grow with the development of events and will more and more eat into the rusty war machine of fascist Germany. The Hitler Army is faced with catastrophe.

Stalin pointed out that in the first months of the war, the Red Army was a young army with no experience in a great modern war. But the day is not far off, emphasized Stalin in his speech of November 6, 1941, when Soviet infantrymen, artillerymen, cavalrymen, pilots and tankmen will acquire the necessary experience and become a terror to the German fascist troops. Stalin's words have become and are increasingly becoming an actual reality.

At the beginning of the war, Stalin noted the just liberation character of the Soviet people's war against Hitler Germany, and foresaw that many states and peoples would rally around the Soviet Union in struggle against the common enemy.

Stalin envisioned the growth of

the international influence of the Soviet Union, the growth of international forces in the struggle against Hitlerism. Indeed, every subsequent month of development brought ever new confirmation of the correctness of the point of view expressed by Stalin with regard to the liberation war of the Soviet people.

Thus, Stalin revealed the future development of the patriotic war, determined its necessary stages and the results of the great battles of 1941-1942.

The entire historic course of development of the patriotic war of the Soviet Union against Hitler Germany, the entire development of social life during the Soviet-German war has been proceeding and will proceed precisely as foreseen by the leader of the Soviet people, Stalin.

The world is living through history's greatest war epic. Embarking on its new adventure in the East, Hitler's party of imperialists dreamed that it would finish the campaign in Russia with one blow and for thousands of years to come establish in Europe an order based on slavery, which by a queer irony of history the Hitlerites for some reason call the "new" order.

The Hitler party is fighting to bring about a change of epochs. But there are changes of epochs which occur in advanced progressive

movements of society toward more perfect and higher forms of social life, and there are changes of epochs when the forces of reaction temporarily triumph in society, forces which strive to turn society's life back to past stages of development, to block the way to progressive development. It is the second type of change of epochs that the Hitlerites are doing their utmost to achieve. But this is not the first time that the world has lived through upheavals bringing death to entire generations of people. Time and again, reaction with fire and sword has barred mankind's path to further development of civilization. But however strong was armed reaction, in the end progressive mankind invariably found sufficient strength to win victory, to preserve and develop the achievements of the human mind.

Thus, history affords an adequate number of examples for our generation to see the irrevocable law of the development of social life—the progressive development of mankind. In spite of the various zigzags and breaks in the path of historic development, in spite of temporary backward movements, ebb-tides and stalemates, this progressive development in the final analysis inevitably forced its way through.

The entire course of the present war shows that that law of historic development operates in our favor.

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# THE INCOMING SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

BY MILTON HOWARD

**B**EFORE the new, 78th, Congress, which settles down to its two-year labors the first week in January, the pivotal question will be the unfolding of a large-scale military offensive in Europe against Nazi Germany, the citadel of the Axis.

It gathers when the Soviet counter-offensive, on the one hand, and the U. S.-British operation in North Africa, on the other, create conditions for transforming the present "turn in the tide" in favor of the United Nations into a torrent of victorious offensive, speeding the disintegration of the German-Italian coalition in Europe, smashing Hitler, and isolating and routing the Japanese forces in the Pacific.

The offensive of the United Nations coalition, then, with all the vast economic, political, and military implications that it carries, is the issue by which all measures will be judged. To hasten the offensive will be the task of the win-the-war forces in the 78th Congress and in the country. To delay, prevent, or limit it will be the goal of the defeatist and obstructionist forces now preparing their line for the opening session.

As a result of the considerable

Republican Party election gains (the causes of which were analyzed in last month's issue), and despite the fact that these gains were accomplished by demagogic promises of a "tougher war" and by the undifferentiated appearance of the Willkie pro-victory Republicans and anti-victory Hooverites before the population, the 78th Congress will unquestionably witness an increased challenge to the victory program of the Government. Under overt and covert attack will be the policy of military offensive against Nazi Germany, the policy of the United Nations and alliance with the colonial peoples, as well as the policy of national unity based on Government-labor-industry collaboration.

## *Defeatist Challenge*

The attack will come from a definite direction; it will proceed with a definite plan of organization. It will come foremost from the extreme wing of pro-fascist industrialists (Lammot du Pont and the National Association of Manufacturers) and their spokesmen in the Republican Party and among the anti-Administration Democrats, whose goal



is to create those internal economic and political conditions which will make an all-out offensive impossible, and therefore make the issue of negotiated peace a plausible one, at least, to defeatist propaganda.

The Hoover - Taft - Vandenberg group in the Senate, and its concomitant in the House led by the Ham Fish-Clare Hoffman group, will seek to strengthen their working coalition, not only with their fellow-defeatists Wheeler, Dies and Reynolds in the Democratic Party, but also with the poll-tax group from the South, which is willing to be drawn into the anti-victory conspiracy on the basis of its own special interest—the defense of its traditional reactionary political positions in the South. The length to which this defense of traditional reaction is willing to go is seen in the threat of Governor Dixon of Alabama to form a Southern Democratic Party whose aim will be to oust Roosevelt, and to foster civil violence against the necessity of bringing the Negro people into the war effort.

While the defeatists in both parties do not dare to reveal their true aims of negotiated agreement with Hitler, they are pretending that their successes in the elections (won by manipulating the difficulties they themselves created by disruption) have given them a "mandate." They define this "mandate" as disruption of the Government's war measures in the field of military strategy, foreign policy, war production, as well as the Government's relationship to the working class. Appearing as "champions of the farmer and pledging

lip-service to victory, they will rise up in the 78th Congress to execute their unfounded "mandate" into a series of sabotaging attacks in every one of these vital areas of war legislation.

The nation can expect, therefore, that the groups representing defeat and Quislingism, regardless of party labels, will display maximum activity in the 78th Congress, and that they will be in a position, thanks to their poll-tax protection and the undemocratic seniority system in Congressional committees, to do great damage.

Yet, despite the numerically stronger position of the Republican Party and the fact the key posts in many Congressional Committees are occupied by Southern poll-taxers, there is no reason whatever to assume a fatalistic attitude toward the 78th Congress as one in which reaction and defeatism must inevitably hold sway. By no means do the defeatist and obstructionist forces have a clear field before them. The alignments and events within the 78th Congress will be greatly affected by the greater events outside, by the course of the war in Europe and in the Pacific. Congress will not be able to escape the effects of strengthened national unity, nor the vast pressure which is bound to be generated among the people for more decisive progress in all phases of the war, in the war economy at home as well as the military offensive abroad .

The country can, to a considerable degree, decide what Congress will do. The country does not hold the views privately held by the small

but powerfully-placed defeatists and politics-as-usual and reactionary anti-labor elements in Congress.

To circumvent the rising intrigues against the war in Congress, it requires only that the win-the-war forces, labor in particular, shall objectively survey the alignments in Congress, the issues on which the basic struggle with the defeatists will, in all probability, be fought out, and take the steps necessary to hasten its own unity and remedy the still-persisting political, organizational and tactical weaknesses in the win-the-war camp.

In deploying its forces, the win-the-war forces will engage the "enemy within" on the following issues, each of which is a concrete aspect of the general struggle for the offensive against the Axis:

For the creation of a centralized war economy (this will be opposed on the ground of "dictatorship" and "bureaucracy");

For the increase of lease-lend aid to our allies (this will be opposed as depleting "our own forces");

For a manpower policy of maximum effectiveness, based on collaboration with the labor movement (this will be opposed as "regimentation" and as "sovietism");

Against the Dies Committee-Clare Hoffman Fifth Column type of disruption by red-baiting; for the abolition of the poll tax (defended by Republican and Democratic Bourbons alike on grounds of "states' rights"); for the abolition of seniority rules which perpetuate reactionary control; for war housing and health plans; and for the protection and extension of social security

necessary for morale and war output.

Let us outline some of these problems. A survey of the activities of the closing days of the outgoing Congress will be useful in this respect.

#### *Defeatist "Coalescence" Tactics*

The outgoing Congress, which was jolted into passing the 18-19 year draft bill by the mass enthusiasm aroused by the African offensive, recovered its disruptive mood shortly after. It displayed this by suddenly springing upon the President another increase in the farm price level, thus weakening price and wage stabilization. Here the Republicans were absent, while the "farm bloc" was permitted to do this by getting a unanimous voice vote. The tactics and problems which the win-the-war forces would have to face in the coming Congress were also foreshadowed by the by-play which followed the scandalous speech of Rep. Melvin Maas (R., Minn.), who launched a rebuke against the African operation by crying "disaster in the Pacific," and by taking up the cry of Hearst that the United States shift its attention from the destruction of Nazi Germany to "saving Western Civilization from the menace of the Orient."

Rep. Maas' speech was the signal for an immediate demand by appeaser Rep. Dirksen (R., Ill.) for a Congressional machinery to "take over the war," to curtail all war expenditures by "supervision" of war agencies, and to dominate "all matters relating to the conduct of

the war." This was followed by the "big gun" demand of Senator Vandenberg (R., Mich.), echoed by poll-tax Democrat Rep. Cox (Ga.) for a "Joint War Committee" to supersede the President and his policies.

The country may be sure that this tactic will re-appear early in the sessions of the incoming Congress.

Defeatism pulled its biggest coup when it successfully operated its coalition tactic in the defeat of the anti-Poll Tax Pepper-Geyer Bill. Here the Hoover forces permitted the poll-tax Senators to "carry the ball" against the Administration, clearing the path for them by passive cooperation (remaining away, no quorums, no attack on the poll tax, and auxiliary assistance by "states' rights" propaganda in certain sections of the Republican press). The defeat of the anti-Poll Tax Bill was correctly seen by the Hoover-Taft forces as a blow to the war effort (weakening full national unity, impeding war production in the South, and providing propaganda weapons to the Axis among the colonial peoples).

On the farm price question, two Southern Democrats raised the threat of joining with the Republican Party forces against the Administration in typical display of reaction-as-usual. Senator Thomas (D., Okla.) warned that if the President vetoes the further increase in farm parity levels (already 116-170 of the earlier standard), "this Administration may be on the way out from top to bottom."

The same tone, only intensified, was heard in the speech of Rep. Cox (D., Ga.) who looked ahead

to the incoming Congress as follows:

*"With the new Congress, this middle line (dividing Republicans and Democrats) will divide in almost equal proportions the membership of the House. But as for me I shall recognize no such division. . . . There will be no coalition against the Speaker nor against anyone else. But there will be, however, coalescence."*

This was welcomed by the Chicago Tribune, which invited the Georgia poll taxer (it had pretended to oppose the poll tax during the November elections) to join "The American Party" coalition which the Tribune is trying to organize by joining the Hoover forces with the Southern Bourbons in a common opposition to the Government and the war.

Similarly, the vital War Powers Bill, requested by the Government to expedite shipments of war supplies and the movements of manpower in and out of the country, was strangled inside the House Ways and Means Committee (where the Democrats have a 15-10 majority) by the "coalescence" of the poll-tax feudal-agrarian and reactionary industrial interests (who feared the undermining of their political power) and the Republicans who shouted "states' rights."

Senator George (D., Ga.) willingly opened the attack on the President's proposal to establish a \$25,000-a-year-limit on salaries, and was quickly followed by support from Senator Vandenberg, the Republican leader of the Hoover forces.

The Hooverite Republicans and Wheeler Democrats, it can be seen, have made certain headway in their tactic of strengthening their "negotiated peace" defeatism, which they cannot sell openly, by making use of the politics-as-usual preoccupations of the Southern Democrats.

### *Real Alignments*

It was in the brief, but sharp and bitter fight over the Panama Properties measure in the Senate that many of the hidden problems came most significantly to light. This measure, proposing the transfer of certain properties to the Republic of Panama, in reality involved our Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America and the right of President Roosevelt to establish the country's foreign policy. Senator Nye (R., N. D.) and Senator Johnson (R., Cal.) instantly seized on the occasion to challenge the Government's commitments to the United Nations, to the Soviet Union particularly, and the validity of the Atlantic Charter.

This struggle was a rehearsal of the fight by which the defeatists and Munichmen in Congress will attempt to break the British-Soviet-American coalition, and to force a "peace" without the complete military destruction of the Axis powers, Nazi Germany above all.

*On this fight, the Hoover Republicans were not able to harness the Southern Democrats to their anti-victory intrigue.* The Senate voted 38-29 for the Government, with all but two Republicans (including Senator Austin of Vermont, assist-

ant minority leader) challenging the Government.

*It is highly necessary, therefore, for the win-the-war camp to guard against any delimitation of its own forces by arbitrary labeling and pigeon-holing of Senators and Congressmen solely on the basis of one or another specific issue.* There can be no question, for example, in the coming fight for a Centralized War Economy as envisaged in the Pepper-Tolan-Kilgore Bill, and in the fight to shackle labor and destroy its organized movement, that certain politics-as-usual groups will be temporarily snared into assisting the coalition of Wheeler-Dies Democrats and Hoover-Taft-Vandenberg Republicans.

*Every effort must be made to avoid this. It is essential that the win-the-war forces differentiate between the deliberate, conscious defeatists, and politics-as-usual elements, otherwise, the tactic of the pro-Nazi Republicans and Democrats of manipulating partisan interests, sectional viewpoints and prejudices and vested interests for their particular, treasonable goal will be unwittingly assisted.*

The nation may expect that the incoming Congress will witness the bi-partisan and defeatist clique attempting to undermine national unity by the use of Goebbels' master-formula for national disruption, red-baiting, on a wider scale than ever practiced before (Rep. Clare Hoffman (R., Mich.) has started a demand for a super-Dies Committee which will have bi-partisan support, whose aim will be to sabotage

the war against Nazi Germany, extending the Dies Committee's efforts at shattering the nation's anti-Axis unity).

The country—and the labor movement in particular—must prepare to meet a Congressional drive aimed to disrupt war production disguised as an old-fashioned "keep-labor-in-its-place" holiday. With the advance of the Red Army against Hitler, and the unfolding of the American-British offensive in Europe, Congress will undoubtedly be the scene of a concerted drive, by the Wheeler-Reynolds and Taft group, to disrupt the war links of the United States with Britain and the Soviet Union. The "problem" of post-war Europe will be used through "warnings" and speculations, to weaken the anti-Axis coalition, to curb the full-scale attack upon Nazi Germany, and to propagate proposals for negotiated peace.

This shows to the win-the-war camp, and above all to the labor movement, what lies ahead, what alignments are needed to combat the enemy, and what needs to be done.

### *Counter-Tactics*

The alignment that can rout the defeatist conspiracy is the alignment of national unity, based on the collaboration of the Roosevelt Democrats, the Willkie Republicans, the united labor movement, the Negro people and the farmers.

It will be the unity and skill of labor's political activity which will be decisive in overcoming the November defeats, in balking the

successful application of the Hoover-Wheeler tactic in Congress, and in influencing the Administration to pursue a bolder and more resolute course in the struggle against the Munichites and obstructionists, for the most vigorous and uncompromising prosecution of our nation's war effort in firmer alliance with our Allies.

*One of the main tactics of the defeatist forces in Congress will be to try to isolate the labor movement by appeals to the prejudices of conservative industrialists and agrarian interests within the win-the-war camp; by deliberate aggravation of antagonisms between the city and rural populations.*

This is the first blow that the nation and labor will have to counter. This can be done only by the participation of the trade unions in the Congressional situation, and the overcoming of disunity in meeting it. United action in Congress by the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. is imperative. That it is equally feasible is indicated by the agreement of the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. on most basic war questions (passage of the Pepper-Tolan centralized war economy bill; taxation of higher incomes; abolition of the poll tax through passage of the Pepper-Geyer Bill; and the extension of the African offensive to an invasion of Europe).

Secondly, the labor movement, by its own unity can greatly aid in establishing cooperative, non-partisan action between the win-the-war Democrats and the Willkie Republicans. This cooperation is essen-

tial to combat the "coalition" tactics of the defeatists in both parties. In this connection, the Willkie Republicans have a special responsibility. To the degree that labor remains disunited in the trade unions and in its political activity, to that degree is it possible for outworn alignments to continue to operate against the nation's war program.

Labor will find that its leadership in the fight for a centralized war economy, and for the military offensive, on the basis of coalition strategy, for the abolition of the poll tax, etc., will make it impossible for the defeatists to execute their sabotage of the war. The fight on these issues cannot be presented to the nation in the old way, but as a war necessity, a national interest in which all classes and groups have a vital concern, since victory depends upon this. To the degree that the labor movement, in collaboration with other groups, unitedly combats the super-Dies Committees, and fights for abolition of the Dies Committee itself as an insidious outfit harmful to the nation's victory drive, to that degree will it be impossible for the defeatist forces to stage their fight against the war in the guise of a fight against the trade unions. To the degree that this is lacking will the Quislings be in a position to prevent all-out offensive and to weaken the United States as a nation by replacing its national unity against the Axis with aggra-

vated internal strife and class friction.

By the formation of a network of legislative and political committees in the state and local organizations, labor and the people will be able to dissipate quickly the appeaser and reactionary gloating that "labor was not able to deliver in the elections," a judgment based not on labor's strength but on failure to use that strength in certain places effectively. Likewise the political action and educational committees of the trade unions are and can become key rallying centers for the political expression of millions of organized workers supporting the Government's war program in Congress.

A necessity for combating the defeatist conspiracy in Congress is the development of *a mass movement to urge, shape and support Presidential executive action for all necessary war measures*, and for influencing the policy of the Government's war agencies, on the one hand, and greater mass participation in these agencies on the other.

The retort to the projected defeatist disruptions in Congress will be the unfolding military offensive, on the one hand, and the greater unity of the nation on the other, with the labor movement the vanguard of this unity. The 78th Congress can be the scene of defeat for the Lavals and Quislings of America who would use it to betray the nation.

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## ITALY AT THE CROSSROADS

BY M. OSIPOV

**T**HE Turkish Premier Saracoglu, in a recent interview with correspondents, related the following interesting episode: On the eve of Italy's entry into the war the Turkish ambassador in Rome went to see Ciano and apparently advised him not to allow Italy to get embroiled in the conflict. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs rejected this counsel of wisdom and declared that "such a favorable opportunity for Italy may occur only once in 5,000 years. Italy will not let it slip. The war will end within forty days with complete victory for the Axis powers."

Since then not forty but 840 days and more have elapsed and Italy's career in the war has been one of suffering and disappointment. Her losses in these two years or so amount to about 800,000 men killed and wounded and taken prisoner. Her naval losses consist of one or two battleships, nine cruisers, fifty destroyers and many submarines. Her aircraft losses up to February, 1942, amounted to 2,100 planes in the war with England alone, and today they constitute 3,000 or 3,500 planes. Her loss of merchant shipping amounts to 2,400,000 tons, of which 1,500,000 tons, or half of Italy's prewar merchant tonnage, has been sunk.

Italy's war doctrine was always one of "swift decisions." A protracted war is beyond her power. Italy's population is condemned to a state of semi-starvation—the bread ration in Italy is the lowest in Europe. Her industries are experiencing an acute shortage of raw materials.

The requisitioning of all internal resources down to and including metal railings and utensils and woolen blankets and mattresses cannot save the situation. Italy is obliged to contract her industry, to "concentrate" it, which means closing down the plants.

The transport situation is drastic. She is perhaps the only country in the world where even traveling on the suburban street cars and buses is rationed.

The blockade is stifling Italy economically. Before the war 60 per cent of Italy's imports passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles. Today Italy is entirely dependent on Germany. The suspension of the deliveries of German coal means the suspension of industry.

Germany has never recognized any other alliance but that of rider and horse; and Italy is getting weary of her brutal German rider. Her grain and wine, fruit and vege-

tables, mercury and sulphur, silk and bauxite, and lastly her manpower are ruthlessly pumped by the Germans out of Italy. In the list of countries which supply Germany with labor power Italy is second only to occupied Poland.

With their usual brazen insolence the Germans inundate the country with countless military, political, economic, technical and cultural missions and agencies, which are the real masters in Italy. The alliance with Germany is highly unpopular in the country. That even the Nazi press is obliged to admit. The Italians, and not without justification, regard the Germans as their age-old enemy.

There is a popular saying: "If we lose the war it won't be so terrible, but if we win it we shall lose everything." This dissatisfaction with the war finds expression in open protests and demonstrations. The opposition to the present policy and a demand for a separate peace and Italy's withdrawal from the war are growing not only among the masses, but also among the intellectuals, army officers, moderate industrial circles and the Catholic and court circles.

The purge of the Fascist Party announced in the spring was also directly due to the growth of the opposition toward the war and to the policy of alliance with Germany. These sentiments became stronger than ever when Italy joined the war against the U.S.S.R.

"Why have our sons been sent to die amid the snows of Russia?" This is the question to which Ital-

ians are demanding a plain answer. Italy's participation in the war against the Soviet Union perhaps shows more clearly than anything else to what an extent Italy has become a vassal state. The Italo-German antagonisms have by no means been ameliorated in the course of this process.

On the contrary, the weakening of Germany as a result of her immense losses on the eastern front and the growing pressure brought to bear by the Germans on Italy to make her activities share more fully in the war on Russia have served to render the Italo-German antagonisms more acute and to undermine the Italo-German coalition.

Big fissures have developed in the Axis. The German forces are hopelessly involved on the eastern front. Germany's strategic plans have suffered bankruptcy, Hitler's military prestige has been sapped and Germany's opportunities of bringing military pressure to bear on Italy have been restricted.

Italy is trying to take advantage of the new military and political situation and the blow to Germany's prestige as the leading power in the Axis system by striving to win back her lost positions in the Balkans and the Danube and to slacken the deadening tutelage to her Berlin ally and master.

In the summer of this year she occupied southern Dalmatia and strengthened her position in Croatia economically and politically. The recent resignation of Quaternik, who was regarded as the German commissar attached to Mussolini's



puppet Pavelic, also testified to the strengthening of Italy's position in Croatia. Occupied Greece and Serbia likewise constitute an area for the Italo-German struggle.

In Hungary, too, Italy is playing an anti-German game. The resignation of Bardossy at the beginning of this year was a blow to Germany. Recently we have been witnessing a vigorous flirtation between Italy and Bulgaria. Thus we see the outlines of Italian diplomatic machinations to create a "shadow bloc" consisting of Italy, Croatia, Hungary and Bulgaria directed against Germany and her more loyal vassals.

The Italo-German antagonisms have above all been focused around the question of the "distribution of the burdens of the war," that is, the number of Italian troops to be sent to the Soviet-German and other fronts. Notwithstanding gross German pressure, Italy has pursued a policy of "economizing on her forces" and has not put all her troops into the field.

For instance, she sent ten divisions to Russia, whereas Rumania, a country with only one-third of Italy's population, sent twenty-two. Even in Lybia there were only eight to eleven Italian divisions. This policy of economizing her forces was the real military guarantee of a certain freedom in foreign policy which Italy strove to secure.

Now this policy will have to be abandoned. The defeat of Rommel's army, the Anglo-American offensive in North Africa and the consolidation of the Allies' positions in Algeria, Tunis and Tripoli-

tania will mean that Italy is caught in an iron vise and will be subjected to continual blows from the sea and air.

On the issue of the fight for Tripoli and Tunis and of the struggle for the rectangle of Sardinia-Sicily-Tunis-Tripoli will depend the whole strategical position of Italy. Two paths confront Italy. One is a resolute fight for Tunis and Tripoli, for mastery in the aforementioned strategical rectangle. This resolute struggle means that Italy must throw all her forces into the field, which means the weakening of her position in the Balkans, relinquishing her strategical reserves and completely submitting to German Nazism. In that case Italy will be converted into an absolute vassal of Germany, like Rumania, and no noise about the "annexation" of Nice and Savoy can camouflage this Rumanization of Italy.

But a resolute fight will at the same time mean that Italy will bleed profusely, that she will be subjected to terrible blows and that untold burdens will fall upon the Italian people. There can be no doubt that Italy will be unable to wage such a fight for long under the extremely unfavorable circumstances and against a superior adversary. She will soon be put out of action.

The other path confronting the Italians is to break the shameful alliance with Germany and to withdraw from the war. It is a path which the Italian people would adopt with enthusiasm; for they know that in the event of an Axis victory, the alliance with **Germany**

would mean the end of Italy as an independent power.

But the prospects of victory have vanished. The only prospect is one of inevitable defeat. There is no reason why the Italians should share with Hitler the price he will pay for his mad adventures. They are seeking for a way out of the war, a way to peace. They are being intimidated by the threat of a German invasion.

But Italy is in a position to defend herself. The overwhelming mass of the Italian army—35 or 50 divisions out of 65 or 70—is stationed within the country (with ten

in the U.S.S.R., 11 in Libya and 12 to 14 in the Balkans). The Italians will be able to defend themselves against the age-old threat from the north, and what is more, they will not be alone.

Thus, the Italians are at the crossroads. One road leads to untold suffering, to complete enslavement to the Germans and to drastic defeat. The other road is one of resolute struggle for emancipation from dependence on Germany and for peace and liberty. *Tertium non datur.\**

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\* A third [road] does not exist—Ed.

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# BRITISH LABOR AND THE WAR

BY R. PALME DUTT

**T**HE speediest victory of Britain and Britain's allies over Hitler is not the special interest of one class or section of the nation, but the common interest of all classes and sections of the nation. This common aim unites widely differing classes and parties, however much they may be opposed on other issues, in a single common task, the organization of the full strength of the nation for the defeat of Hitler. Just as the world alliance unites widely differing states and nations, so the counterpart of this unity of the world alliance is the unity of each nation composing the alliance. The national unity is indispensable for victory over Hitler. A united nation ensures the maximum strength for the speediest defeat of Hitler.

This collaboration of all sections of the nation, of normally opposed classes, parties and organizations, constitutes the united national front for the defeat of Hitler. It finds expression in the united endeavor of the national war effort. In industry it finds expression in the cooperation of employers, management and workers for maximum war production. In the political field it finds expression in the cooperation of parties in parliament and in

elections, and in the support of a Coalition Government of National Unity, based at present on the Conservative, Liberal and Labor Parties. The Government has received national support as the representative of national unity.

The weakness of the national front as at present developed is its formal character of a collaboration only of the official machines of the older parties; it makes no attempt to reach out to the vast web of organizations of the people, social, economic, sporting, religious or political, of youth and of women; it makes no attempt to draw in the practical participation of the masses of active men and women of all parties and of no party. Hence the tendencies of many men and women who are awakening to political life and interest in the conditions of the war and seeking new forms of political expression, to be drawn in the wake of the various new "independent" groupings which crop up like mushrooms, often with very dubious antecedents, and which in fact, whatever their professions, cut across and break up national unity. This has been noticeable in recent by-elections, where the obsolete and unsatisfactory system of selection of candi-

dates to represent national unity, not on the basis of the combined choice of all the democratic organizations in the constituency supporting national unity, but by the nomination of a caucus of whichever of the older party machines regards the constituency as its "property" on the basis of a seven-year-old claim, has led in several cases to a revolt of the electors, the defeat of Government candidates representing national unity and the return of "independent" candidates, although this by no means reflects opposition of the majority of electors to national unity for victory over Hitler.

These tendencies are a dangerous warning signal. The disruption of national unity, even though beginning under the impetus of progressive desires and impatience of a section of the electors, would in fact play into the hands of the powerful reactionary forces which carried through the old policies of conciliation to fascism, which are still heavily represented in the existing Conservative majority in Parliament, and which, although not daring for the moment to proclaim their aim in the open, are on the look-out for any signs of the break-up of national unity to resume their intrigues and combinations for the pursuit of their old aims under new forms.

All serious anti-fascists and supporters of decisive victory over Hitler need to recognize that the inadequacies of the existing united national front, and the legitimate criticisms which can be brought against its present working demon-

strate the necessity to strengthen it, and to strengthen the Government as the representative of the democratic anti-fascist will to victory of the people, and not to weaken it. The disruption of national unity only serves the interests of Hitler.

The transition, which is thus now imperative and urgent, from the present largely formal united national front, which in respect of organization mainly exists on top, to the real living unity of the entire nation, drawing in the active democratic participation of the masses of men and women and of the mass organizations of the people, depends above all on the role of the working class movement. Only a strong, active and united working class, rallying and drawing into activity other sections of the people can constitute the core of national unity. Without this, national unity is distorted and crippled. This is the key to the problems of the present political situation in Britain.

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The tasks which the working class movement needs to fulfill within the common national front for the defeat of Hitler correspond to the character of the conflict and represent the highest level of responsibility in the long record of struggle of the working class.

First, the organized working class should be the strongest champion, organizer and defender of national unity for the defeat of Hitler. Against all hesitations and vacillations in their classes and sections of the nation; against all intrigues of adventurist and pro-fascist ele-

ments for the disruption of national unity; against all moods of passivity, half-heartedness, defeatism, war weariness, flinching from action and sacrifice, or Leftist impatience, either in its own ranks or in the unorganized masses of the people, the strength, unity and leadership of the organized working class should be the most powerful bulwark and rallying center to lead, unite, inspire, hold firm and draw into active participation all sections of the people.

The workers know from twenty years of experience the necessity of unity against fascism. Fascism has previously advanced, not by its superior strength, but by the division of its opponents. The unity of all opponents of fascism is essential for victory. This lesson has been driven home equally by the experience of Germany, Austria and Italy, where the division of the working class and democratic forces permitted the victory of fascism; and by the experience of France and Spain, where the unity of the working class and of the People's Front stemmed the advance of fascism, until inner weakening, or international disunity again broke the front; no less than by the example of China, where the national united front has for five years been able to hold at bay the armed power of Japan and prepare the conditions for future victory. The establishment of world unity against Hitler, on the basis of the world alliance and of the unity of each nation engaged in the common fight against the fascist enemy, has already brought within view the doom of the

Nazi regime and of the Axis aims of world fascist domination. Only the disruption of this unity, division in action or hesitation to bring into play the decisive combined strength of united action, could delay this doom. Therefore the maintenance and strengthening of this unity, both of the world alliance and of each nation fighting in the common cause, and unshakable opposition to every attempt to disrupt this unity or weaken united action, are the dearest interest of the working class in this historical moment. In this life-and-death struggle the working class can afford to lose no allies, however partial, hesitant or vacillating. The working class stands out and must stand out as the most determined upholder of national and international unity for the military defeat of German fascism.

Second, the working class should not only be the most active upholder of the united national front for the defeat of Hitler, but should also be the most active driving force within the united national front. The working class has its positive contribution to make in the sphere of policy, program and leadership. In every field of the struggle, in strategy, in political mobilization, in war production, in social and economic organization, in colonial policy, in diplomatic policy, in propaganda, in the questions of war aims, the most active struggle needs to be conducted for the measures which are necessary in the interests of the world alliance for speediest victory over fascism. The working class movement has the power and

the responsibility to take the initiative in the fight to win support for these measures within the united national front and for their adoption by the Government.

Concretely, in the present situation this means that the organized working class movement should take the lead in the fight for a combined inter-Allied strategy for maximum common action and full utilization of existing forces in order to speed victory, that is, specifically for the Second Front on the Continent of Europe; for the strengthening of the Government by the elimination of the remaining Munichite Ministers and the drawing in of the most resolute, energetic and capable democratic anti-fascist representatives; for the intensification and speeding up of war production by unified planning and effective public control of all war industry under a strong Ministry of Production, and ruthless over-riding of all sectional and vested interests which hamper maximum production; for the enforcement of a closer approach to equality of sacrifice in social and economic policy; for the protection and extension of democratic rights and press freedom for the purposes of anti-fascist mobilization of the people, while operating more stringent measures against fascist and pro-fascist elements and propaganda; for winning the cooperation of the Indian people by the recognition of the independence of India and the establishment of a representative Indian National Government capable of mobilizing and organizing the defense of the Indian people as an

equal partner in the alliance of the United Nations; for the strengthening of political and diplomatic collaboration with the Soviet Union, both in the conditions of the war and in the settlement following the war; for the strengthening of democratic anti-fascist collaboration with the people of Europe enslaved by Nazi rule, and the repudiation of all aims and policies which hinder such collaboration; and for all similar measures which strengthen the anti-fascist alliance, protect its democratic anti-fascist aims and speed victory.

All these are measures which are urgently necessary for victory over Hitler, but in relation to which there is still hesitation, indifference or resistance within the united national front. It is essential to develop an informed public opinion in support of these measures within the united national front, to organize mass pressure in order to overcome reactionary resistance and strengthen the hands of the Government for carrying them out, and to secure their adoption by the Government as the representative of national unity. The working class movement has here a decisive role to play in voicing, leading and organizing the fight for such measures.

Third, the organized working class movement has a special responsibility, in relation to the requirements of the war effort, to protect the standards, conditions and rights of the workers and of the masses of the people. In the interests of the major immediate aim of victory over Hitler, the

workers have had to make many concessions, which under other conditions would have been stubbornly contested. It is the concern of the organized working class movement to see that these concessions are not exploited in the sectional interests of monopoly capital; that the compulsory powers, which have been freely used against the workers, are equally used, wherever the needs of the war dictate, against big capital, and that, within the limitations of war conditions, the standards and health of the working people take precedence as the first charge on all available means of consumption, in place of the present excess consumption expenditure of the upper incomes and propertied sections.

For this purpose the working class movement needs to take special concern for the improvement of the pay, conditions and allowances of those serving in the armed forces and their dependents; the leveling up of old age pensions, widows' pensions and other social service benefits; the improvement of women workers' wages and conditions with the aim to realize effective equality of pay, and the raising of the wages of low-paid sections; the revision of taxation to take all excess incomes above a certain level, and raise the exemption limit for lower incomes; the extension of rationing and price control; the protection of the rights of the workers in the factories; the protection of working class and democratic rights of propaganda and organization, etc. Similarly in the necessary changes in industry the working class organ-

izations can alone judge the best ways and methods to combine the two objectives of maximum production with the safeguarding of the rights and interests and future claims of the workers. All these questions, while the initiative and guidance in solving them must come especially from the working class movement, are no separate interest of a section, but the vital interest of the united war effort, for the purposes of democratic anti-fascist war and for the protection of the future.

Fourth, the strength, unity and active leading role of the working class movement are the best guarantee, not only for the realization of the present maximum war effort and united strategy for victory, but also for the future, for the character of the settlement which will follow the war, for the character of the organization of the world after the war, and for the democratic and social advance which must follow victory over fascism. The working class movement, as the representative of the working people and of the true interests of the nation, has the responsibility to see that the efforts and sacrifices of the people shall not be exploited for reactionary aims, throwing down a Hitler in order to set up some alternative form of reaction; that the settlement which follows the war shall correspond to the democratic anti-fascist aims of the people for the realization of the freedom of nations and the organization of a durable peace; that friendship and collaboration with the Soviet Union and with all the progressive forces of the world

shall be maintained and carried forward; and that the economic and political concessions of the workers during the war, the concentration of monopoly capital and of executive powers necessitated by the requirements of the war, shall not become the basis of the intensified subjection and exploitation of the workers and enthronement of reaction after the war, but that, on the contrary, the advance shall be carried rapidly forward toward the aims of the working class movement, the aims of social liberation. No paper plan and no paper document can guarantee this. The hatching of elaborate plans of post-war reconstruction at the present moment before the premises are present, can easily take on a reactionary hue, or become a diversion from present urgent tasks. Only the real relations of social and political forces at the conclusion of the war will determine the outcome. Only a powerful and united working class movement can ensure that the outcome shall correspond to the interests of the working people. But this depends on the present strengthening, achievement of unity and fulfillment of its present political role of the working class movement. The present determines the future.

In order to fulfill these tasks, the working class movement needs to be strong and united, and with a policy and leadership capable of responding to present needs. The workers need to build up their organizations, trade union, political and cooperative; to achieve unity and overcome sectional barriers and

divisions; to pursue actively a policy and program corresponding to the urgent needs of the war; and to develop effective political leadership. The picture of the outstanding role which the working class movement can and should fulfill in the present situation is still far from the picture of what has so far been achieved. Within the framework of national unity there is not yet working class unity. This is a grave and dangerous contradiction which undermines national unity and shifts the balance in favor of reactionary forces. All the difficulties of the present political situation arise from the fact that there is not yet a strong and united working class movement fulfilling that active and leading role within the united national front which it can and should fulfill. Hence the manifold "independent" groupings are enabled to press their competing claims for the support of the people, and to confuse and weaken the popular forces for the ultimate benefit of reaction.

The experience of the critical years leading up to the present war already demonstrated the truth of this. Why was it possible for the policies of "non-intervention" in Spain, of Munich, of conciliation to Hitler, of refusal of the British-Soviet Pact and sabotage of collective security to be carried through by the Chamberlain Government, in spite of the overwhelming strength of popular opinion against them (87 per cent poll for the British-Soviet Pact, eleven million vote for the Peace Ballot for collective security, etc.) and the actual division of the ruling class, sown in the



division of the Conservative Party? Only because the organized working class movement failed to fulfil its task of rallying and uniting the working class and democratic forces in a common front or People's Front, which would have been capable—as opponents of the policy at the time recognized—of defeating Chamberlain and compelling a change of course. It is now widely recognized that if this policy, which was advocated at the time by the Communist Party, had been followed, we should be in a different situation today, and we should have probably been able to avoid the present war or, had it come, to have met it from the outset in a far more favorable situation.

Today the representatives of the organized working class movement are participating in the Coalition Government for the defeat of Hitler. But this participation of individuals in a War Ministry, with little evidence of important influence on the major questions of policy, is far from equivalent to the active participation of a strong and united working class movement in the common national front, presenting its proposals and program for the common cause, mobilizing public opinion, and able in this way, both directly and through its representatives (whose voice would become strong as the voice of a mighty united movement with popular support), to exercise its due and powerful impress on the combined policy finally adopted by the Government. The weakness of the present situation, which is acutely felt by Labor supporters throughout the

country, is not so much a question of the character of the individual representatives participating in the Coalition Ministry, as of the fact that this personal participation is regarded as a substitute for the participation of the working class movement in the national front, and is even made the occasion for closing down the political activity of the working class movement with consequent tendencies to decline of membership and stagnation of organization, in this moment of most intense crisis, fateful issues and highest responsibility for the whole future of the movement.

In consequence, the criticism is sometimes expressed by some labor supporters that the mistake lies in the participation in the Coalition Government, and that the solution is for labor to come out of the Coalition. This, in the present situation, when labor is in a minority in Parliament, and there could be no question of labor alone representing national unity, is equivalent to the denial of the necessity for national unity for the defeat of Hitler. Such a policy would play straight into the hands of reaction and the pro-Hitler forces. The maintenance of national unity, and of a Government representative of all political sections which stand for victory over Hitler is essential for victory over Hitler and is therefore the vital interest of the working class movement. The fault does not lie in the participation in the Coalition, which is indispensable in the present relations of political forces, but in the policy pursued. The remedy does not lie in the dis-

ruption of national unity, and of the Coalition Government founded on its basis, but in the strengthening of the active role and positive leadership of the working class movement in the national front.

Similarly the criticism is sometimes heard that the labor movement is "dead," that there is stagnation, apathy and passivity in the localities, that organization has fallen to pieces, and that the masses are turning elsewhere; and the conclusion is drawn that the future must be sought in some new "independent" "non-party" grouping or formation without roots in the organized workers or their mass organizations. This gloomy picture of the present situation of the organized working class movement is not a true picture. It is one-sided because it sees only what is going down and not what is rising; it sees a process of change and transition, which is the stirring of new life, as a process of decay and death. It is not the labor movement that is going down, but only old policies and methods which are discredited; new forces are rising to carry forward the movement and respond to present needs. Our task must be to assist this advance, and to clear away the obstacles which still stand in the path of further advance.

The workers are not quiescent. There is in fact abounding life and activity of the organized working class movement, even though still partial, and even though still held in by many limitations. The rise of trade union membership to over six million represent the highest level for twenty years. Organiza-

tion and activity in the factories are more strongly developed than they have ever been, and are full of vitality, with plentiful evidence of keen enthusiasm and mass participation. Sales of working class literature have multiplied many times over during the war, and there is a new and serious reading public among the workers. The Communist Party has more than trebled its membership since the outbreak of war, and more than doubled it in the most recent period, reaching a total of fifty thousand active individual members, a new type of development in socialist organization in this country. On the basis of its policy expressing the plain common interests of the workers and of the entire nation in the present struggle, it has been able to organize campaigns, meetings and demonstrations, with the participation of representatives of all sections of the working class and democratic movement, which have won striking mass support exceeding previous levels of political campaigning and in certain cases exercising a perceptible influence in the political situation (campaigns for the removal of Margesson and Moore-Brabazon, for the Second Front, etc.)\*

\* The Trafalgar Square demonstration for the Second Front in March, 1942, organized by the Communist Party, exceeded any previous level of demonstrations in Trafalgar Square, according to the testimony of the veteran Ben Tillet, ranging over the memories of sixty years since the great demonstrations of the eighties in the early days of the modern political working class movement. Thirty-five thousand participated in this demonstration; in the succeeding Trafalgar Square demonstration of the Communist Party in May, 1942, accompanying the Communist Party National Conference, fifty thousand participated, and unanimously voted a resolution supporting the Communist program for the Second Front and other measures directed to the aim of victory in 1942.

There is therefore no ground for deducing a decline in political interest of the organized workers from the recent decline in membership and local organization of the Labor Party. This is only a reflection of the policies pursued during this period, the closing down of activities, and the harmful effects of the system of bans and exclusions. The removal of these causes could rapidly show a different picture.

The conclusion is evident. If the relatively small numbers of the most politically conscious workers organized in the Communist Party and the united movement have been already able to achieve a degree of mass response untouched by any other political party or organization, how much more could be achieved if the entire organized working class movement were brought behind these demands and mobilized in united activity on a common immediate program?

What is needed? The first necessity is to establish effective working class unity in action. The still continuing opposition of the Labor Party leadership to cooperation of the different sections of the working class movement in the present urgent common fight, and the imposition of the system of bans and exclusions within the political labor movement, with extension to the trade union sphere in respect of trades councils and in some unions, are less than ever defensible in the present situation. Despite the progressive step forward of the establishment of the British-Soviet Trade Union Committee, the policy of hostility to working class unity

within Britain has even been intensified in certain respects since the establishment of British-Soviet unity. An extreme example of this policy has been shown in the attempted banning even of British-Soviet Unity Committees, broadly based on the cooperation of all parties and organizations, political and non-political, under the leadership of the civil authorities, for the promotion of friendship and collaboration between Britain and the Soviet Union—on the grounds that cooperation between Labor Party members and Communists on a common committee and a common platform must not be permitted, even for the common aim of the fight against Hitler. This policy is neither in the interests of national unity for the defeat of Hitler, nor is it in the interests of the working class movement. Fortunately, the bans have not always been successful, and cooperation is extending in practice, in accordance with the healthy sense of the overwhelming majority of the working class movement; but it is still heavily impeded by the present disciplinary measures and the absence of cooperation on a national scale.

The aim of the policy of refusal of unity and disciplinary division of the working class movement is directed to place an artificial barrier between the vanguard of the working class and the main body, and thus seeks to prevent that interaction which is indispensable for the health and growth of the movement as a whole. The Communist Party has established its permanent place in the life of the working class

movement as the representative of a growing body of politically conscious workers, and can make its distinctive contribution and fulfil an increasingly valuable role in the development of the working class movement as a whole. To attempt to prevent this by disciplinary regulations and threats is to attempt to stem the advancing tide of the working class movement. The refusal of unity and the system of division of the working class movement enabled Hitler to come to power in Germany. The same system serves the interests of Hitler in Britain today. It is necessary to make a serious attempt to overcome the present difficulties and find the way to establish united action and the free functioning of a united working class movement, by the cooperation of the Labor Party and the Communist Party, and the removal of those disciplinary bans on cooperation which paralyze the local working class movement or prevent the democratic election of representatives and expression of opinion within the working class movement. The establishment of such working class unity in action would enormously stimulate the growth, self-confidence, enthusiasm and revived activity of the entire working class movement.

Second, such working class unity in action needs to be based on a common immediate program. It is necessary to adopt a common program of action of the united working class movement corresponding to the present needs for the hastening of victory, and to be campaigned for within the framework of the

united national front. The question of working class unity is not merely a question of organization; it is a question of policy. At present there is dangerous disunity in practice, and the authority and responsibility of the working class movement is thereby weakened. Despite the formal participation in the coalition, there is lack of convinced understanding of the necessity of national unity within the local sections, as recent by-elections have shown. Adventurist elements from outside the working class movement are able to take advantage of this confusion to win support for their careerist aims or for groupings hostile to the interests of national unity against Hitler. Trends alien to the working class movement, whether chauvinist or pacifist, are able to take advantage of the passivity to penetrate and win support. When some representative leaders associate with the agitation of a Vansittart; when others are associated with pacifist groupings which are in fact pro-fascist in their policy; when Labor electors withhold support from candidates representing national unity and their leaders hesitate even to appear on a platform in a by-election to recommend national unity; then it is obvious that such demoralization is weakening to the working class movement and prevents it from fulfilling the role which it should fulfil in the national front. The adoption of a common immediate program and campaign of a united working class movement, expressing the urgent necessary measures for speediest victory over Hitler, would rally all

sections of the workers in support, end the weaknesses and vacillations, and lead to the very great strengthening of the working class movement and its political role.

Third, the campaign of the united working class movement needs to be developed with the active cooperation of all sections on the basis of the common program. For this purpose the extension of working class activity, and the protection, restoration or extension of the necessary democratic rights for anti-fascist propaganda and agitation are essential.

Such a revival of working class activity, on the basis of the establishment of working class unity and a united campaign, would not merely strengthen the working class movement and the fulfilment of its role in the national front, but would greatly strengthen the entire national war effort and the will to victory. The strength and the unity of the working class rally wide sections around it. The common program of the united working class, expressing the present needs of the struggle against Hitler, and embodying the necessary

measures for victory, would win an enormous response from the entire nation. The establishment of working class unity on the basis of such a common immediate program would basically change the political situation in Britain and open up a new perspective in the war. This path would lead to the most rapid achievement of a combined strategy, the opening up of the Second Front in Europe, and the accomplishment of those accompanying necessary measures which would help to accelerate the realization of victory.

More than this. A strong and united working class movement in this country would thus help to create the most favorable conditions for the speedy victorious ending of the war against Hitler. At the same time it would represent the most effective force on the side of the people for tackling the problems which would follow such a victory.

In proportion as we fulfil our present tasks, and build up the strength of the working class movement in so doing, we shall be strong also to face the future.

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# THE GREAT OFFENSIVE

BY JOSEPH STAROBIN

**I**T IS the chief significance of Max Werner's book, "The Great Offensive," that it deals with the central and over-riding problem of the war, namely, how quickly and how fully the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition will unify its strategy to deal heavy and coordinated blows against the heart, the core of the Axis, Hitler Germany.

Although the book was written before the events of last November, the initial offensive action by Anglo-American forces in North Africa, and the unfolding of the second winter's offensive by the Red Army, it nevertheless retains its importance as one of the most serious analyses of the necessity and strategy of coalition warfare.

For the beginnings of the Allied offensive operations have not yet solved the problems of strategic coordination among the members of the anti-Axis coalition. The November offensive dealt heavy blows at the Axis. It laid bare the crisis within it, and demonstrated conclusively how vulnerable is the Axis to heavy blows, both east and west.

The November offensive seized the strategic initiative from Hitler. It strengthened the relations between the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. It hastened

greatly the day of the inevitable and inescapable blows which must be dealt upon the Axis in Europe.

But while facilitating the second front, it did not exhaust the problem of creating one closer to the vital centers of Germany's power. And in the light of the Red Army's offensive, which may very well set itself larger strategic aims than did the offensive last year, the issue of coordinated action becomes more, and not less, urgent. The timeliness of Werner's argument, therefore, gives his book its significance.

And it is a mark of the seriousness and clarity of Werner's strategic thinking that in grappling with the problem of coalition strategy, he emphasizes that it must be based solidly on the fact that the Red Army is fighting on the decisive front of the war.

The Red Army, he says, is waging a war of all forms of armament, with a combination of offensive and defensive methods, counterposing to the Nazi army the only truly modern and peoples' warfare the Hitlerites have yet faced.

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The bulk of Werner's book, more than two-thirds of it, is devoted to a detailed study, with copious

quotations from the military literature of several countries, of the way in which the war has developed on the decisive eastern front.

This in itself is a reflection of Werner's belief that the Soviet Union forms the backbone of the United Nations, the basis on which the coalition can fight the war through to an early and complete victory.

"The real World War, the Great War, began only with the German-Soviet war," says Werner . . . its "center of gravity . . . lies in the clash of the two strongest continental powers and remained there even after the war had turned into a global struggle with the entry of the United States and Japan." (p. 9)

It is the forthrightness and persistence of this conception, recognizing the qualitative change in the nature of the war which coincided with its geographic extension in June, 1941, that distinguish Werner's approach from those military experts who are as shallow as they are glib.

Werner lists a number of alternatives confronting the Third Reich prior to the attack of June, 1941. Contrary to the opinion of many experts, he believes the invasion of Great Britain was militarily possible as late as the spring of 1941. He discusses in turn the possibility of a heavy Nazi thrust at the bulwarks of the British Empire in Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine, either via Turkey, via the western desert or even through Crete and Syria.

Yet "without having vanquished Russia, Hitler regarded all his pre-

vious successes and all his possible future conquests as tenuous and ephemeral. . . . According to Hitler's estimation, he could have anything once he had Russia, and he would have nothing without having Russia." (p. 25)

Proceeding from such a decided recognition of the heavy responsibility for the future of the whole war and the whole world which lay on the shoulders of the Red Army, Werner begins a more detailed analysis of the fighting.

In a number of closely written, strongly argued, and well-documented chapters, he surveys the major battles on the eastern front thus far, culminating in what is perhaps the most powerful single chapter, his analysis of the opposing strategies of the Soviet Union and Germany.

All this discussion of military events leads basically to one central thought: namely that while Hitler may have been aware of the military might of the Soviet Union what he did not see was the superiority of Stalin's strategic thinking, based on the superiority of the Soviet system, worthy of its peoples. The Soviet strategy of "de-blitzing" the blitzkrieg at the frontiers and at Smolensk, the strategy of persistent aggressive fighting even within the framework of the larger defensive, the ceaseless guerrilla operations, the policy of building up powerful reserves which go over to the offensive at the moment when the enemy's onslaught has been worn down, its impact absorbed and momentum destroyed—this imposition by Stalin of a war of rapid attrition

on a German army whose gospel was to avoid such a war at any price—this is the heart of Soviet strategy, says Werner. It facilitates the development of coalition warfare and the success of the United Nations over the Axis.

\* \* \*

It is well at this point to generalize on some of the judgments of Soviet policy which Werner introduces in his opening chapters, despite his customary effort to keep political questions out of his military analysis.

As I point out later, the difficulty is not that he keeps politics out, but that when politics creeps in, it is often rather shallow and dangerous stuff.

For example, in one reference to the Finnish war, he speaks on page 11 of "mistakes having been made by both sides" which made "cooperation between the Western powers and the Soviet Union difficult. The Soviet Union lost politically far more by the war with Finland than it gained strategically." Or again, on page 21, he speaks of the Soviet Union having lost during the period of the Soviet German pact "the immediate chance of a continental European coalition against the Third Reich."

Without entering into extended controversy, it must nevertheless be asked: to whom did the U.S.S.R. "lose politically" in the Finnish war—to Neville Chamberlain, perhaps? or to Herbert Hoover? or to Norman Thomas? Now, the whole world can see that Soviet policy in 1939-40 was the heaviest blow

against both the Nazis and the Munichmen.

As for the chances of an "immediate continental coalition against the Third Reich" in September, 1939—on what foundations could this be built—on the decaying French ruling class that was preparing to sacrifice its national independence to Hitler? On the shifting shoals of class forces within Britain, where the Munichmen then still held the decisive upper hand?

Likewise, in his early discussion of Soviet-German relations during the period of the pact, the intrusion of "power politics," however much it simplifies the task of the author, cannot go unnoticed.

That the Soviet Union is a power, is true. That it has a foreign policy and exerts influence in world affairs is true. That some circles may understand its policies best only if they see it in the hard-boiled, *realpolitik* framework to which they are themselves accustomed, may also be true. (But any one who enters this ground without drawing the sharpest distinction between the content, the aims and nature of the Soviet Union in its political relations, and other countries, especially with such cannibals as the Nazi leaders, is entering dangerous ground. The basic positions of Soviet foreign policy were set forth by Stalin in March, 1939, in his address to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

"1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries



maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

"2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighboring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state.

"3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.

"4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders."\*

One would like to hope that a man like Werner who sees the profound differences between the U.S.S.R. and Germany in military and strategic matters would not blur—even casually—those differences in every phase of life and political method.

But to return to the eastern front:

Werner shows that the first German blows, until the battle of Smolensk, were virtually "blitzkrieg in a vacuum," absorbed by the Soviet frontier troops without involving the main Soviet forces or major Soviet weapons.

He places great stress on the vast

tank battles at Smolensk in August, 1941, as having checked the German momentum, and paved the way for the successful defense of Moscow.

By a careful selection of German military literature, he proves that the initial German bulletins of vast and decisive successes were not in any way reports of what was really happening, but only indications of what the Nazi leadership expected would happen. These bulletins express the aims, rather than the achievements of German strategy and are a measure of how that strategy failed.

And it was in these battles, says Werner, that the outstanding characteristics of the Red Army's methods became clear: the superiority of Soviet artillery, the full coordination of all methods and types of arms whether on the defensive or the offensive.

In one of his most provocative passages, he estimates the second Nazi success after the battle of the frontier—the sweep into the heart of the Ukraine, and the city of Rostov.

This appears, says Werner, as a great achievement in terms of occupying territory, certainly important to the Soviet war economy and potentially of great value to the Hitler Reich.

Yet it was these temporary territorial successes, which among other things, form conclusive proof of the distortion and underlying disorganization of the German war plan. As soon as the Nazis were compelled to substitute the occupation of territory for their initial purpose,

\* Joseph Stalin, *From Socialism to Communism in the Soviet Union*, International Publishers, p. 17.

which was the destruction of Soviet armies and the capture of its vital political and reserve centers in the North, the Germans had begun to confess they were being defeated. They were being strategically outwitted and bested by the Soviet High Command.

The Ukrainian campaign represented the severest test of Soviet strategy. The enemy was making great gains, depriving the U.S.S.R. of important resources yet the "pre-requisite" of Soviet strategy was "the assumption that German offensive power, while great, was not unlimited, and this assumption proved to be justified." (p. 66.)

The rich Ukrainian soil proved to be the price which the Red Army paid for German initial superiority. But once the price was paid, the strategic superiority of the U.S.S.R., the strength of the system and its rear, its accumulation of reserves in the center, the growth of a coalition understanding among its Allies proved to be determining factors, nullifying the long-range importance of territorial conquest.

The full significance of this Soviet strategy emerged clearly with the defense of Moscow, a tremendous contest of men and arms, and above all, strategic will—in which the Soviet Command proved itself superior to the German High Command.

This paved the way for the great winter campaign, which shook the Hitlerite system to its foundations, created a crisis not only in its personnel but in its fundamental war plan.

The Soviet communiqué of Dec.

13, 1941, made the basic estimation of the situation that was to unfold in the next weeks:

"The miscarriage of the German plans can under no circumstances be attributed to the conditions of the winter campaign. It was not winter that was at fault, but an organic defect of the German High Command in the field of war planning."

The winter campaign of 1941-42 had limited aims for the U.S.S.R. These were a continuation of its basic aim of wearing down the German army, exhausting its initial material and numerical superiority and weakening it for the anticipated operations of the next year.

A half year's almost continual battle revealed the inadequacy of German combat methods in the face of Soviet resistance. It revealed the growing experience, combat power, coordination of arms by the Soviet armies. It revealed the growing strength of the Soviet people.

\* \* \*

In discussing the battles of 1942, Werner approached some of the ideas which Stalin summarized in his speech of Nov. 6. The essential idea in Stalin's speech was that the Hitlerites were able to develop their offensive only in the absence of a second front in Europe, and then only on one front. Their basic intention was not the cutting off of the Caucasus and the capture of Stalingrad *per se*, but the encirclement of Moscow from the South and the annihilation of the central Soviet armies there.

Werner does not approach this

with anything like the full clarity and precision with which Stalin stated it. But he does indicate that the German High Command pressed southward, not only for reasons of territorial conquest, but as a way of escaping the necessity of battle against the main forces of the Red Army. "It was an outright evasion of the decision by purely military means." (p. 123)

In other words, the Caucasus and Stalingrad campaigns could not be decisive. To gain decision, the thrust had to be made against Moscow. This the German army was no longer capable of doing, after the firm hold which Timoshenko gained on Voronezh and the north bank of the Don and the insuperable resistance of the Soviet armies and guards at the Volga.

Thus the entire battle of this summer, despite its heavy cost to the U.S.S.R., represented a further evasion by the German High Command of its central problem, a further disorientataion of its war plans, and therefore prepared the way for the great crisis that now confronts it.

Werner's chapter on this duel of strategies forms the peak of the book, some of its best written passages, and most exciting reading.

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By contrast, much of the rest of the book lacks the detailed and intensive approach of the material on the eastern front. This is, of course, a reflection of Werner's correct emphasis on the primacy and decisive character of the eastern front fighting. It is also a reflection of his

feeling that nowhere except on the eastern front is truly modern warfare being fought. His surveys of the first year of the Pacific war, as well as his observations on the campaigns in the Mediterranean are hardly more than journalistic summaries.

But this is not because Werner underestimates the role of the United States and Great Britain. It is because he appreciates that the great role of these two powers is yet to be fully played, and must be played as part of the Great Coalition struggle on the continent of Europe.

His chapters on the necessity of coalition, the contrast of the relative strengths of the coalition and his argument for the fulfillment of coalition strategy in conjunction with the Red Army's fight, form some of the most important material—considering the position and influence of the author—that have yet been written on the subject.

"None of the major democratic powers has a war machine that can match the German in completeness and striking power. None of them is able to smash the mighty German war machine alone; that is why they need one another. But combined, and if they deploy their forces to the fullest extent, and completely coordinate their strength, they can be superior to the enemy; they can form the most powerful military alliance that ever came into being." (p. 298)

"The anti-Axis powers can win only by closest collaboration, by a most intensive war of coalition. But until the late summer of 1942 there were three separate military efforts

and three national strategies on the part of the major anti-Axis powers." (p. 305)

"In this period it was not the military reverses, not the Russian retreat, not the lost campaign in the Pacific, not the British defeats in the Middle East that were most threatening, but the delay in coalition planning. . . . A war of coalition against Germany means a two-front war in Europe." (p. 305)

From these three quotations alone, it can be seen how solid and lucid is Werner's strategic thinking. This emphasis runs through the balance of his book.

As for America's role in the war, Werner emphasizes that it differs basically from that it was twenty-five years ago. Then, the U.S. was a man-power and raw materials reserve for the western powers. It entered the war with relatively small forces and turned the tide at the very moment that Germany had reached the point of exhaustion.

Today, says Werner, the United States is also a vast reserve for the United Nations, especially as a great producer of munitions. But it would be a great mistake to believe that its war function is fulfilled merely as a "lease-lend" agency.

On the contrary, he notes, from a number of selections of President Roosevelt's speeches in the past year, the healthy and realistic tendency to involve American forces directly in the fighting at all points of the globe. He notes the tendency to avoid the fatal error of hoarding our own war supplies until we ourselves can use them, or to refrain from using our war supplies until

our armed forces are prepared to perfection.

To avoid the tendency of dispersing our forces at all points of our responsibility and interest in global warfare, at a time when the needs of the whole coalition demand a concentration of forces and armaments in Europe, Werner proposes a "far-sighted strategy" which he defines as a "consistently planned offensive conduct of war" based on the "primacy of the Atlantic-European theatre of war." (p. 312)

As he puts it, whereas "all the available forces of the anti-Axis coalition can be hurled against Germany, but only a fraction of the American forces could be thrown against Japan." (p. 314) It is therefore the function of the United States to act in unison with the main interests of the coalition, rather than separate from it.

And here, time factors are of utmost importance.

"American strategy is faced with the task of meeting the tempo and the deadlines of war. Hitler has staked all on one card: on his 1942-43 offensive. He does not want to wait until the United States has fully developed its industrial capacity. His whole plan can be thwarted, disrupted, and turned into defeat only by military action within a coalition war." (p. 323)

In this connection it is interesting to see that Werner's reference to the probability of an Anglo-American offensive in north and west Africa have no element of the conception that such operations are to be conducted for their own sake.

On the contrary, these are for him important operations, justifying themselves as prerequisites to the unfolding of the offensive into the heart of southern and western Europe.

In defining America's tasks, which include giving the Allies arms superiority, air superiority and contributing toward absolute naval superiority over the Axis, as well as providing the armies for key operations from the British Isles on to the continent, Werner speculates that "sooner or later they [the Allies] will be forced to transform the Mediterranean and North Africa into an offensive front" and he believes that our forces must be adequate for "*the invasion of the European coasts, for the fight for the coasts and individual bases that will ensue.*" (p. 317)

Finally, he says:

"It is erroneous to assume that the sole function of a second front in Europe would be to relieve the Red Army. The second front is not a prop for the Soviets. . . . That the Red Army would be relieved by a second front would be but one of its consequences. Another would be that the Red Army's offensive powers would be unleashed for the benefit of the entire anti-Axis alliance." (p. 329)

Before reckoning this book in its political aspects, I must spend a moment on one aspect of his discussion which is not only insubstantial, but contains rather dangerous implications for coalition strategy thinking. That is his treatment of the Pacific.

Not only does Werner fail to esti-

mate China's role in the war in any detail, not to mention his failure to discuss the colonial peoples in relation to the global struggle, but his treatment of the ultimate campaign against Japan has some real pitfalls in it.

Certainly Japan, Hitler's partner, must be smashed. But it must be smashed by a much more effective Chinese - American alliance, in which China is recognized as a full partner in the United Nations and China land armies and China's land front do not become subsidiary to American naval action. This is something that Werner barely touches on,

On the contrary, he repeats again and again the conception that the Soviet Union will "compensate" for a second front in Europe by opening up a second front against Japan in Siberia. While he does not put the matter precisely as do the appeasers, nevertheless it is clear that in correctly arguing for a second front in Europe he introduces it very often as though it will be "compensated" for by some future Soviet-Japanese conflict.

That such a conflict may or may not take place is a matter of sheer speculation. There are no data at the moment for any real analysis of this question.

To make the second front contingent on Soviet participation in the Far East, as Werner very nearly does, ignores the fact that the war is a world-wide struggle against the Axis as a whole, that the Axis as a whole will suffer decisive defeat with Germany's defeat, and that the Soviet Union in concentrating upon

Germany not only does the entire United Nations coalition a service, but creates the only basis on which the Axis as a whole can be defeated.

The problem of the coalition today is not one of "equality of sacrifice"; if this were true, nothing that the other powers can do might ever equal what the U.S.S.R. has already done.

The problem is one of coordination along the lines of what will most rapidly, most easily defeat the Axis at its core, which is Germany, and thus pave the way for the defeat of Japan. It is Werner's complete underestimation of China's role which accounts for this peculiarity in his emphasis. It is also some quest for additional argument for a second front that leads him to make it "contingent" upon a Soviet-Japanese clash in Siberia. This is wholly unnecessary since the arguments he gives for a second front are in themselves fully convincing and adequate.

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So also on some other shortcomings. These are primarily the shortcomings of any analysis which pretends to dispense with or evade political considerations. For many circles, and from the viewpoint of a certain type of appeal, Werner's careful elimination of any discussion of political factors (or rather a camouflage of political discussion by a "super-military" treatment) will have its virtues. It may appeal to the so-called "professional military" mind, who is not supposed to be governed by political considerations

at all. It will likewise appear to some people to be more "objective" and "trustworthy" because it avoids political discussion.

But from the viewpoint of a full and comprehensive understanding of the unprecedented warfare on the eastern front, or for the crisis in coalition strategy that reached such a sharp point last summer, political analysis is not extraneous, but at the very heart of the matter.

The struggle on the eastern front is to be explained not only by Stalin's strategic superiority, by the tactics the Soviet High Command prescribed, by the relationship of the arms and striking power of the belligerents. One must go into the very nature of the Soviet Union and the Soviet man. What must be investigated by any serious observer are the roots of Soviet patriotism, the roots of the Soviet productive system, the unprecedented unity and flexibility of Soviet institutions which made their war effort in its technical aspects possible.

It is to investigate and understand what Stalin meant when he said, Nov. 6, 1941: "Our losses have been serious. No state in the world would be able to go on after these losses. But the fact that the Soviet Union is now stronger than ever is the best proof of the firmness and basis of the Soviet regime."

Likewise, it is untrue, as Werner says, that "the strategy of the two-front war now meets technical obstacles."

On the contrary, it has met and continues to meet political obstacles. These are to be explained primarily by the defeatist forces still at large

and powerful in the United States and Great Britain, by the pressure and maneuver of these forces, by their striving to break the United Nations alliance, to prevent any Allied offensive altogether in the hope of creating the basis for a stalemate and negotiated peace with the Axis.

So also the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition cannot be considered only in its superiority of arms, and manpower, in the geographic position which impelled all its members to fight together. It must be seen in its deepest historical aspects. It is the inevitable aggregation of nations defending, first of all, their national independence, their right to be, and defending themselves against the "gigantic step backward" which the medieval and bar-

barian Axis strives to impose upon the historic course of the world peoples.

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In noting the stated shortcomings, we hold, nonetheless, that we have, in Max Werner's newest book, a powerful weapon for the clarification of coalition warfare thinking and the speeding of American action toward full and timely coalition strategy in a Second European land Front with our Allies.

This task is more urgent this winter than ever. It is more urgent since the North African development and not less so, which gives the book its value for the entire period of the war.

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# MARX AND ENGELS ON REACTIONARY PRUSSIANISM

BY M. MITIN

**G**ERMANY embarked upon the road of imperialism comparatively late, at a time when the entire world was already partitioned among the other great powers. The German imperialists strove to make up for lost time as quickly as possible, to snatch as big a slice of the pie as they could. This accounts for the exceptionally aggressive, ferocious and predatory character of German imperialism.

Hitlerism is the offspring of this extremely piratical, rapacious, gangster-like imperialism. In actual fact German fascism is carrying into practice the old Kaiser program of imperialist annexation and spoliation. It has even elaborated considerably on this program.

Hitlerism combines in itself all that is most repulsive and despicable in the history of Germany. Hitlerism has assimilated all the most reactionary features of Prussianism: the cult of unrestrained, brute force, the exaction of slavish obedience; the implantation of Prussian drill sergeant tactics and blind discipline in the army; the arrogance of the Prussian Junker; the treatment of other peoples as inferiors, as "sub-men"; perfidy and

provocation in domestic and foreign policy. The Hitlerite clique has stretched these ugly features of Prussianism to the utmost. Hitlerism has given free rein to the most brutal instincts. The fascist militarists, who are looting and enslaving other peoples, are acting with typically Prussian cruelty and inhumanity.

Marx and Engels lived in the epoch of pre-imperialist capitalism. They naturally could not in their day foresee the development of German predatory imperialism. But already at that time the founders of Marxism lashed out furiously against the reactionary tendencies of Prussianism, the ravenous annexationist appetites of the Prussian Junkers and barons. During the entire period of their activity Marx and Engels fought against reactionary Prussianism, demonstrating that it spelt humiliation and catastrophe for Germany. How numerous are the impassioned, profound and apt characterizations of Prussianism in the splendid militant works of Marx and Engels, who repeatedly pointed out that Prussianism was the misfortune of the German nation! How much sarcasm is contained in their



pamphlets, articles and books directed against the self-complacent, narrow-minded and blockheaded exponents of the "Prussian" spirit!

On reading these characterizations we see how the traits so mercilessly and inexorably flayed at the time by our great teachers become manifest in Hitlerism, that extreme expression of piratical German imperialism. That is the reason why the works of Marx and Engels directed against reaction, militarism and Prussianism arm us even today in our struggle against Nazism. Let us cite some of these characterizations, taking them from the published as well as the unpublished works of Marx and Engels now in the archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.

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Everyone knows that the fascist rulers of present-day Germany are engaged with particular zeal in idealizing the history of Prussia, displaying unbounded admiration, verging on deification, for Frederick II and his "genuinely Prussian" qualities. In his still unpublished manuscript entitled *That Prussian Canaille* Marx forcibly depicts the true nature of this "hero" of the Hitlerites. Marx reveals to us the infamous and abhorrent deeds committed by order of Frederick II in Poland. He shows the utter insignificance of the Margravate of Prussia, the perfidy and cunning behind the policy prosecuted by Frederick II, his roughshod militarism and specific method of "waging war."

Marx wrote that world history

knows of no other king whose aims were so trifling. He asked what could be "great" in the plans of an Elector of Brandenburg raised to the kingship, who does not act in the name of the nation but strives merely to see his patrimony, his possessions, rounded out and enlarged on the territory of this nation.

Marx unmasked the petty cheating and bribing, the legacy hunting and other disgusting traits for which this king was known. With particular brilliance Marx describes the major defeats inflicted upon that vaunted "military leader" by the Russian troops at Gross Jagersdorf in 1757 and Kunersdorf in 1759, which led to the occupation of Berlin by Russian troops in 1760.

In *That Prussian Canaille* Marx describes the brutal militarist spirit implanted by Frederick II and embodied in the following notorious formula of his: "A soldier should fear his officer more than he fears the enemy." Depicting in this manuscript the manner in which the Prussian freebooters were lording it in Poland, Marx stated that in the beginning of 1771 entire regions of Prussian Poland were flooded with Prussian mercenaries who committed unheard of robberies, cruelties, villainies and atrocities of every description. The famished canaille did not confine itself to looting on its own initiative and by order of the government. It even exacted a *tribute in women* from the countryside according to a previously drawn up list, and these women were compelled to cohabit with this revolting Prussian militarist rabble.

Are these annihilating words not reminiscent of the outrages by the Hitlerite soldiery on the territory which it holds as yet in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and in the occupied Soviet areas? They explain the unbounded admiration accorded by the Nazis to the Prussian King Frederick II.

The Hitlerites try to screen their monstrous crimes behind a misanthropic "race theory," the entire "wisdom" of which boils down to the assertion that the Germans are a "higher race," while all other peoples must become the slaves of the German bankers and plutocrats. But even this is no invention of the fascists. The stupid, narrow-minded, self-complacent provincial German nobility propagated such ideas as early as the middle of the last century. In his article "Prospects of War in Prussia," printed in the *New York Tribune* in 1859, Marx epitomized the "world outlook" (*Weltanschauung*) expounded at that time by the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* somewhat as follows: All races of Europe, according to this outlook, said Marx, with the exception of the German, were degenerating. France was entering a state of decline, Italy should consider herself quite fortunate that she had been transformed into a German barracks, and the Slavic tribes lacked the moral fiber necessary for self-government, while England had become corrupted by her commerce, so that Germany alone remained stable. . . .

Does not this "world outlook," if you will pardon me for calling it such, of the block-headed provincial

squires of Germany of last century resemble the "ideology" of German fascism of today as much as two peas in a pod? That abominable book, *Mein Kampf*, written by the arch-cannibal Hitler, and the *Myth of the Twentieth Century*, the gangster writings of that Baltic spy Rosenberg, are obvious plagiarisms.

In their articles of the period of the German Revolution of 1848, Marx and Engels, who were fighting for a united, free and independent Germany, untiringly exposed the "exploits" of the German militarists, and the enslavement of foreign nations accomplished with their aid. In an article entitled "The Foreign Policy of Germany" they set forth the extremely reactionary part played by the German militarists in serving as roughshod mercenaries over the course of several centuries. Imbued with profound love for the German people and great hatred for everything servile and reactionary in its history, they wrote a fiery denunciation of the wretched conduct of the German people, who let themselves be used as the blind tools of the reactionary ruling circles. They argued that if it had not been for its blindness, its slavish spirit, its fitness and readiness to play the part of *landsknechts* of the "complacent" executioners and obedient tools of the lords "by the grace of God," the name of German would not be so hated, so accursed and despised abroad, and the peoples enslaved by Germany would long ago have arrived at the normal stage of free development.

It was with great joy and jubilation that Marx and Engels learned

of the revolutionary events of 1848. Placing great hopes on the victory of the revolution, and fighting for this victory, they wrote that after the Germans cast off their own yoke, their entire policy with regard to other peoples would have to be changed, otherwise they would stifle their own young liberty, itself barely more than a hope, by putting it into the same straitjacket into which they laced foreign nations. They affirmed that Germany would be freed to the extent that she freed the neighborhood peoples.

However, the revolution of 1848 was never carried out to its conclusion. The course of events quickly led to the "pacification" of the country, to the triumph of the "policeman and village constable," as Lenin pointed out. Reactionary Prussianism strengthened its hand still more in Germany.

Marx and Engels devoted much of their attention to the "specifically Prussian method of waging war," which manifested itself, incidentally, in 1871, during the Franco-Prussian War. When Napoleon III was defeated and a republic set up in France, the war completely lost its defensive nature, as far as Germany was concerned. However, despite its solemn declarations, the Prussian government continued the war, which now became a war of annexation against the French people. In a number of excellently written works of this period, the founders of Marxism denounced the reactionary, predatory character which the war now assumed.

Engels wrote that in Prussia lists of the French war contributions had

been drawn up which served as a basis for fixing the amounts of the war tribute to be exacted from the individual cities and departments of France; but he adds that, of course, the wealth of France was taken at a much higher figure. He pointed out that provisions, fodder, clothing, footwear, etc., were requisitioned with demonstrative ruthlessness. True also, according to him, were the stories about the wall-clocks that were sent home; he cited the *Koelnische Zeitung* itself in support. Only, he said, in the minds of the Prussian gentry these clocks were not stolen but picked up as abandoned property in the deserted villas near Paris and appropriated for the benefit of "our dear fellow countrymen."

These "brave deeds" of the Prussian Junkers of the period of the Franco-Prussian War fade before the systematic looting and the reign of violence set up by Hitler and termed by him the "New Order."

In their fight against the French partisans the Prussian Junkers, according to Engels, resorted to a method of warfare which was as old as it was barbaric. They made it a rule, Engels tells us, that every town or village in the defense of which one or several of its inhabitants took part, shot upon their troops or aided the French in any way at all should be burned down; that every person caught with arms in his possession and not being, according to their idea, a soldier of a regular army should be shot on the spot. . . . And all this was passed off as following the usual procedure of courts-martial. Everything, he said,

was done with system and by order.

How familiar all this sounds today! The same barbaric treatment of hostages, the same atrocities and crimes, but perpetrated on such a monstrous scale that the cruelty of a Genghis Khan pales into insignificance.

Today, in the period of the Great

Patriotic War against Hitler Germany, it is not amiss to call to mind the remarkable words from the pens of Marx and Engels, who in their day tirelessly labored to expose Prussianism, militarism and the rule of violence that have played so fateful a part in the history of Germany.

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# THE WHITE COLLAR WORKERS AND THE WAR

BY ROBERT MILLER

**T**HE special consideration extended to the salaried employees in the President's Economic Stabilization Order has served to focus greater attention on the problem of more fully integrating the millions of white collar and professional workers in the war effort. Through them in particular, the urban middle classes can be drawn into more active support of the government's win-the-war policies.

The entire organized labor movement, including the organized white collar and professional worker, has extraordinary responsibilities and extraordinary opportunities with respect to the millions of salaried employees and the urban middle classes generally.

The unions of the office workers, newspapermen, architects, teachers, government workers, retail clerks, actors, musicians and others, in order to secure the acceptance of their own program and achieve their own objectives, must become the primary means through which the labor movement functions in relation to the city middle classes.

The white collar and professional unions must be an active force in helping to unite the middle classes

and all other sections of the population with the labor movement in solving the problems before the people, today the basic one of victory over the Hitler Axis. They must demonstrate to the urban middle classes in particular, through their own examples and their own struggles as part of the labor movement, that the more effective prosecution of the war, as well as all other aims of the united people, are best achieved, in the timeliest and most effective fashion, through unity of action with and reliance upon the great and vital forces of labor. They must demonstrate to them how this active association with the entire labor movement strengthens and helps to reinvigorate democracy. They must show how it welds national unity and makes it fully responsive to the people's needs. They must show how this alliance with labor, as a vital part of the strengthening of national unity, brings about the clearest understanding of the nation's genuine interests. They must show how these bring about the more certain realization of the national sentiments of the middle classes themselves, who in our country have always striven in one way

or another for "government of the people, by the people, and for the people."

The fact that most of the white collar unions are still relatively small and represent only a minor fraction of the eligible workers does not mean that they cannot perform these functions. These *are* large tasks for small unions; but it is in the process of meeting just such tasks that small unions become large one.

### *Foil the Defeatists*

The tasks themselves are of extraordinary importance in bringing about the fullest working national unity. Full political support to the Administration for the most effective prosecution of the nation's war policies is essential to the full realization of these policies. For the white collar workers and the middle classes generally to be rallied more fully for these policies not only means increased support for the nation's war objectives. It further means their active alignment and struggle against the defeatist and fascist forces who, in order to advance their pro-Axis policies, try to play on the exceptional economic hazards besetting the white collar workers, and on the confusion present among sections of them.

To achieve this full *political* support for the war effort, the white collar and professional unions must simultaneously discharge their full *union* role. The unions must become the main mass organizations through which white collar and professional workers can act directly on their own behalf and guarantee consider-

ation of their problems. To enable these workers to see and understand how their own interests merge with the interests of the entire people, they must be free of any fatalistic sense of being the victims of hap-hazard social, economic and political forces. A trade union of their own is the channel through which an important guarantee of their own political and economic citizenship can be given.

Whether the white collar and professional unions can expand quickly enough and come forward with greater activity to meet more effectively the demands that the war necessity currently places before them is a question that can be answered by these unions only to the degree that they master the total problems before the salaried employees. Admittedly these problems are exceedingly complex in nature.

### *Present Economic Problems Acute*

The great economic crisis of 1929 and its colossal unemployment broke down the faith of millions of white collar workers in the status quo; it shattered their belief that they were permanently different from the working class. Despair, widespread bitterness and skepticism of capitalism became characteristic among the white collar masses during the early thirties.

Over the past several decades the real wages of white collar workers have been steadily declining. The wage increases secured generally for the working class in 1937 and 1939 were not forthcoming for white collar workers. Recent cost of living

increases have still further cut into the incomes of the white collar workers. Voluntary wage increases have been forthcoming recently, but only in a moderate way. Unemployment has diminished somewhat in recent months, but is still high. Deep, underlying discontent among the white collar masses has therefore increased, though this is held in check by patriotic sentiments and a desire to advance the national interests.

Petty-bourgeois pacifist illusions, however, obtain among sections of white collar masses, who still hunger for the period of relative prosperity and stability they enjoyed from 1923 to 1929, and these, as their incomes decline and their social status deteriorates, lead to real misgivings concerning the war. The Coughlinites, in particular, try to fan these misgivings and doubts into active hostility against the Government. Recalling that German fascism, in foisting itself on the German people, found its first mass base among the unorganized white collar workers and middle classes, the Coughlinites leave no stone unturned to win the white collar workers for their own fascist aims.

Despite the confusions which grow primarily out of uncertainty as to the future, the war has served in a dozen ways to activize the white collar masses to an unusual degree. They make up a large portion of our armed forces and of volunteer civilian defense corps. They demonstrate a great anxiety to contribute their services in every possible manner, although pressing economic

problems create difficulties in the way of making their fullest contribution.

The most important activizing factor among the middle class masses is that we are engaged in a people's war for national liberation. The aims set forth in the Pact of the United Nations, in the Atlantic Charter, the alliance with the Soviet Union, and the reliance of our own Government on our democratic institutions to achieve victory, are having a powerful effect on them. It can be seen, therefore, that the white collar workers represent a great influential force which can be a powerhouse for the war effort and the realization of the aims of the people; and likewise, if ignored, important sections of them can be a reserve force for anti-war and anti-people elements. At this time the inclination of the white collar workers is toward the labor unions, whose successes they admire and who, they feel, genuinely protect their memberships.

The wages of the organized industrial workers are manifestly higher than the salaries of the average white collar workers. White collar workers entering defense industries in increasing numbers are attracted, not only by the better wages, but because such employment is now patriotic and respected and their social status is not impaired in their own eyes or those of society. This recognition of the new and higher dignity of labor makes adoption of the collective bargaining techniques of the labor movement a much easier and more natural process.

Undoubtedly there are more families today containing both industrial workers and white collar workers than ever before. This too cultivates among the still unorganized white collar masses a better attitude toward the labor movement, and a growing understanding that they should be a part of it. Likewise, in some cases, the unions of industrial workers can become direct organizers of the white collar workers. In Detroit, for example, the organization of the automotive workers has not only achieved a generally favorable atmosphere for the organization of white collar workers generally but in many cases the automotive workers provide the direct means of reaching white collar workers employed in many industries.

Thus is opened up a great opportunity to win the white collar and professional workers permanently for the camp of progress and the fight of the people.

It is therefore against the background of these developments and the current need of the fuller mobilization of the white collar workers for the war effort, that the white collar unions have to plan their practical programs.

#### *Social Characteristics*

In addition to the foregoing, there are special factors that have to be considered. The white collar unions consistently have had to contend with the special social characteristics and habits of the white collar workers growing out of their role in capitalist production. While re-

cent changes have favorably modified many aspects of this question, such social characteristics and habits fundamentally remain and have to be dealt with.

America's urban middle classes, which include the self-employed professionals, salaried professionals in government and private employment, and white collar workers in industry, commerce, finance and government, number some 16,000,000 persons, according to the 1940 census. The salaried professional and white collar workers, with whom this article is chiefly concerned, make up the largest and most homogeneous section. While all these categories have different employer relations, they share in the main the same general intermediate class status and social attitudes. Therefore, conclusions based primarily on the experience of the salaried white collar and professional groups would tend to apply for all sections, with modifications in program and tactical approach.\*

White collar workers, occupying an intermediary position in production, have not, as have the manual workers, been welded by the processes of production into a disciplined, cohesive and unified group. Thus, their reactions to historical developments, as Lenin pointed out, tend always to be marked by vacillations, and at times of social crises to be accompanied by panic. This factor demands great skill of organ-

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\* For an extended discussion of this phase of the question, the reader is referred to the article "Organizational Development Among Clerical Workers," *The Communist*, April, 1938.



ization and even greater skill of leadership.

Their primary characteristics stem from the fact that the white collar workers occupy a position between the bourgeoisie and the workers in capitalist society, being exploited by the bourgeoisie, just as the workers, but having the satisfaction, generally speaking, of stable incomes and the hope of rising in the social scale.

Post-1929 developments, as we have noted, shattered this hope for tens of thousands of white collar workers, causing them to turn in growing numbers to the labor movement.

Considerable anxiety developed on the part of the employers in the early 30's because, in this period of great discontent among the masses, they regarded the political adherence of the white collar workers as essential. They were loath to surrender them to the labor movement and unwilling to disgorge enough of their profits to guarantee their continued hold over the white collar masses. They resorted to other means of holding the white collar workers in line. They attacked the white collar unions themselves, and were successful in slowing their growth. Their main method of attack was to resist all efforts at collective bargaining and force unequal and intense struggles on the young unions. But deft use was also made of Red-baiting and other divisive means; widespread efforts were made to convince the white collar workers that unions were not "respectable"; that they blocked opportunities for personal

advancement and led to "regimentation"; that only continued reliance on the bourgeoisie could guarantee an ordered and secure life, in which the individual could realize himself.

These efforts were for a time very successful, because they played upon the traditional hesitations of the middle class to identify itself with the workers and to resist being classed with the workers. It has long ago been noted that the middle class tends to "blur" the lines of demarcation between itself and the bourgeoisie and to mark itself off from the working class. Fostered, therefore, among the white collar and professional workers is the sense of "individuality"—a concept, not of integrating the individual for the conscious and organized fulfillment of his needs in cooperation with his co-workers, but an illusion of self-sufficiency leading to aloofness and isolation. This illusion is stressed in the mind of the white collar worker because only in this way can he reconcile his natural inclination to believe himself above all classes with the harsh reality which no longer permits him to conceal even from himself that his social and economic identity is with the working class.

Yet at many points in the struggles of the labor movement the neutrality, if not friendly cooperation and unity of action, of the middle strata, determines the immediate balance of forces.

Within the middle strata the salaried clerical and professional workers constitute one of the groups best equipped to understand the labor movement and use its

collective bargaining processes. Through the organized white collar workers, major sections, at least, of the middle classes can be won to the labor movement and its future orientation can be in the direction of improving their social and economic position, not by tinkering with money schemes, of which there are many examples, historically and recently, but as part of the movement of the people.

Likewise, the organized white collar and professional workers can and do help the labor movement to understand and overcome the doubts, misgivings and hesitations of other sections of the population and, therefore, more effectively to champion the interests of the whole people.

#### *Organization Needed Now*

The widespread organization of white collar workers is a task of great importance, therefore, to the future of the labor movement and can ease, facilitate and guarantee its ability to meet its own problems and the problems of the entire people. Around the Win-the-War policies of our nation which are championed by the labor movement can be forged bonds of unity with the city middle classes, primarily through the white collar workers, which will be of great bearing on the successful outcome of these policies themselves. Recent successes of the white collar unions help to verify the conclusion that the white collar workers in particular, in the recent period, are increasingly becoming part of the labor movement and are learning to respect it and to rely upon it.

To accomplish the complete organization of the white collar workers and their assimilation into the labor movement, the white collar workers' unions on all issues of the nation's war policy must be well in the forefront clarifying the issues of the day to the white collar and professional workers. Since the economic and social position of these workers does not make them as quickly responsive to crucial economic and political developments and issues as the manual workers, who feel these issues before anyone else on their own skins, a great responsibility devolves on the white collar workers' unions to prepare the salaried employees in advance, in order to help them keep step with such developments, by adopting and advocating the proper policies resulting from this understanding.

In the camp of national unity and in the contribution to the national war effort, the basis of an enduring association between the manual workers and all of the white collar workers can be established. This opens up the path to their mass organization.

The job of organization is one which the entire organized labor movement should tackle as its direct responsibility, not only in order to help the white collar and professional unions, but as a means of buttressing organized labor as a whole. In fields in which the C.I.O. industrial unions are now dominant, for example, some 500,000 white collar workers are employed. The C.I.O. should ensure that these workers either become members of

the industrial unions or of the white collar and professional unions. The same is likewise true of the A. F. of L. While the C.I.O. confers jurisdiction of the white collar workers employed in the industrial fields to the industrial unions, the white collar and professional unions are, as a rule, specially equipped to integrate and educate these workers within the labor movement. The inability to organize or assimilate these workers easily has undoubtedly restricted such organization by the industrial unions. Yet the organization of the white collar workers employed in industry would spur the organization of the white collar and professional workers in all fields of employment more rapidly than any other single thing at this time. This is not a problem which the industrial unions can afford to neglect. In solving it, they should rely upon the experiences of the white collar and professional unions, who more than anyone understand problems and characteristics of salaried and professional employees.

We can see that the mass organization of white collar workers cannot be accomplished except by the application of broad policies, based on national unity for winning the war and showing these workers how the labor movement guarantees and strengthens democracy. This can only be done by demonstrating to them how the heightened tasks which democracy must discharge in winning the people's war can only be accomplished by reliance upon, and participation in, the labor movement as the core of our democracy and national unity.

These policies are equally valid for all white collar unions, whether they are organizing newspapermen, architects, chemists, government employees, sales clerks, or office workers.\* They must, of course, be applied in terms of the specific problems of the workers and industries in which these organizations operate.

The rate of white collar organization will be enhanced greatly by the role and activity of unions like the United Office and Professional Workers of America; the State, County and Municipal Workers of America; unions of federal employees, and department store employees. The U.O.P.W.A. in particular, having jurisdiction over the huge banking, insurance, graphic arts and the non-profit fields, employing close to 1,500,000 people, has demonstrated that a practical union program based on win-the-war activities strengthens the war effort, solves collective bargaining problems and builds the union rapidly. It has made the key to solving all its organizational and bargaining problems the systematic seeking out of means of helping the unorganized workers to become

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\* The principal trade unions (not including the entertainment professions) representing these categories are: The American Newspaper Guild; the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technicians; the United Office and Professional Workers of America; the State, County and Municipal Workers of America; the United Federal Workers; the United Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employees; the American Communications Association. In addition to these national unions—all C.I.O.—there are several A. F. of L. national unions of government and federal locals of professional and office workers, including the American Federation of Government Employees and the National Federation of Post Office Clerks.

more effective in the war effort. It has used projects on an industry-wide basis (such as the Advertising Mobilization Conference in the advertising industry, the Book Mobilization in the publishing industry), as well as more limited types of projects, such as the obtaining of blood banks for the Red Cross, not only from their own members but from the unorganized workers who are approached solely on the basis of helping the Red Cross.

In every field the white collar and professional unions should direct their activities on a national and community scale to gear white collar fields of employment to the war effort. All activities should help the unorganized to engage in specific war tasks. In the vast majority of cases those so drawn in will be doing war work for the first time. Naturally, taking up membership in the union is much easier, once its leadership is accepted in connection with all win-the-war activities. But all activities must be carried on to ensure the strengthening of the war effort which must guide all practical decisions. The program of the white collar workers' unions must seek to bring about more effective economic adjustment of the white collar workers in order to guarantee their fullest contribution to the war effort. This, however, must be a natural part of the union's win-the-war policies. War activities must not be seen merely as a means of promoting collective bargaining. This would defeat both the war activities *and* collective bargaining.

The recent convention of the

United Office and Professional Workers of America was extraordinarily valuable in demonstrating how a practical program of a win-the-war character builds the union by strengthening the war effort. Its official policies are based on:

1. Explaining the issues and changing war developments to the unorganized and the middle classes generally and learning from them what are the obstacles and what help is needed to guarantee an understanding which results in real efforts to help win the war.

2. Industry-wide programs of war activities which promote participation in the war effort;

3. Expansion of collective bargaining to eliminate economic discrimination; and

4. Wider organization of the unorganized based on first winning the workers to help the war effort. Win-the-war activities, the U.O.P.W.A. points out, if sincerely conducted, will inevitably evoke the question: "Why am I not a member of the union?" By making the war the key to all its activities, the union's entire program is achieved more rapidly, and objectives that have been sought for many years now become realizable.

Evidencing the correct application of these policies, this convention was able to register unanimous support of a resolution calling for immediate opening of the Second Front. The response of its members to the North African offensive was demonstrated, not only in sharing general public enthusiasm, but in an upsurge of participation in war activities.

If winning the war is made the guide in evolving the practical programs of the white collar and professional unions and if these programs can be put into operation widely enough, then, with present circumstances which are favorable to organization, the development of mass unions among the white collar and professional workers will come about as part of the entire process of strengthening the war effort of the American people.

In fulfilling the war tasks of the entire labor movement, in meeting

the present and future problems of the nation, in guaranteeing the functioning unity of the American people for the winning of the war, not only for war aims but for peace aims, the widespread organization of white collar and professional workers, for winning them politically for effective participation in the war effort, is a task of pressing importance. The organized labor movement generally and the white collar and professional unions in particular have an opportunity and a duty to render a signal service to the nation.

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