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**SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR
IN THE PHILIPPINES**

**MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FROM SUMMING UP
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH
AND STUDENT MOVEMENT, 1980-92**

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Significance of the People's War in the Philippines¹

**By Jose Maria Sison
Founding Chairman
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The people's war in the Philippines has a special significance today to the world's proletariat and people. It resolutely upholds the leadership of the working class, it puts into practice the Marxist-Leninist theory of state and revolution, perseveres in revolutionary armed resistance to imperialism and reaction and holds high the hope of the working class in fulfilling its historic mission of defeating capitalism and building socialism, amidst a temporarily bleak global landscape resulting from the seemingly impregnable hegemony of US imperialism and the terrible consequences of revisionist betrayal and neocolonialism.

Here is a people's war as a bright example of sallying forth from the cold war period to the new period of global disorder under imperialism. It is inspired by proletarian internationalism and yet is self-reliantly proceeding as before and contributing what it can to the resurgence of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement. The revolutionary forces in the Philippines are battle-tested and are not fazed by the twists and turns of the revolutionary struggle. Their revolutionary optimism arises from the gloom of monopoly capitalism. It is scientifically based on the critique of imperialism as the highest and final stage of capitalism.

For nearly three decades, the people's war in the Philippines has overcome and outlasted a series of reactionary regimes, including

¹ Part 4 of the author's contribution, entitled "National Democratic Revolution Through Protracted People's War", to the *Seminar on the Anti-Imperialist Struggle under the New World Order*, sponsored by the Workers' Party of Belgium, 2-4 May 1996.

a 14-year undisguised fascist dictatorship, and so many forms of intervention by the No. 1 imperialist power. It has proven all wrong the ill wishes and slander of revisionist regimes and parties and their lackeys. It has prevailed over various erroneous currents of "Left" and Right opportunism. The revolutionary unity, fighting will and capabilities of the revolutionary forces and the people are higher than ever as a consequence of the rectification movement.

Since the end of the triumphant wars of national liberation in Indochina in 1975, the people's war in the Philippines has proven to be one of the few most significant armed revolutions in terms of Marxist-Leninist leadership, a clear adherence to a two-stage revolution and perseverance in revolutionary struggle. But since 1975, more attention had been paid by the bourgeois mass media and even by progressive forces abroad to armed conflicts in which the two superpowers in the cold war were directly involved, where the magnitude of fighting was more spectacular, where oil resources were at stake for the imperialists, where more backward forms of oppression, like colonialism and racism, were still being inflicted on the people and where despotism had been overthrown but the "vanguard" petty-bourgeois liberation front was challenged by an armed counterrevolution.

The people's war in the Philippines has outlasted the revisionist regimes and the parties and movements dependent on such regimes and continues to grow in strength and advance. It plays the signal role of demonstrating to the proletariat and people of the world that it is possible and necessary for proletarian revolutionaries to lead an armed revolution in order to pursue the historic mission of the proletariat to defeat imperialism and build socialism.

US imperialism has met with failure in unleashing the so-called low-intensity conflict strategy against the revolutionary forces in the Philippines. This strategy combines frontal military campaigns of suppression with the use of special operation teams, paramilitary forces, death squads, armed religious cults, renegades and

splittists and anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups that pretend to be progressive but are in fact special agents of the US and local reactionaries.

The achievement of the Philippine revolutionary forces in overcoming the US-instigated "low-intensity conflict" strategy is significant in view of US successes with this strategy elsewhere. You will recall that one of the major successes of US imperialism in the '80s against the Soviet Union and Soviet-dependent regimes is the use of this strategy as a kind of people's war in reverse. An anti-communist kind of mass base, religious or tribal, was used to wage guerrilla warfare against anti-US and pro-Soviet regimes such as those in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Nicaragua. This bled the Soviet Union profusely and combined with such factors as the rapacity of the Soviet monopoly bourgeoisie, the arms race and the squeeze on Soviet oil exports to aggravate the Soviet crisis.

The imperialist and reactionary misappropriation of the strategy and tactics of people's war was first suggested by US president Kennedy in his doctrine of counter guerrilla warfare but was overshadowed for a long time by the US failure in its war of aggression in Vietnam until the Reagan administration pushed the "low-intensity conflict" strategy in the '80s. The success of US imperialism in this regard should not daunt but should challenge the revolutionary forces to take the strategic line of protracted people's war wherever they can. A genuine and just people's war, correctly and courageously carried out, can always beat a fake people's war.

The political and social character of the people's war in the Philippines is significantly revolutionary in relation to the more numerous armed conflicts that are currently raging in Asia, Africa and Latin America and in the former revisionist-ruled countries and are without the active leading role of any Marxist-Leninist party. I refer to most of the armed conflicts going on in Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. These are generally

the result of intensified rivalries of reactionary forces in the neo-colonial client-states, which are under severe stress from the general crisis of capitalism.

In the absence of any Marxist-Leninist party, the reactionary forces have all the field to themselves to spew out the slogans of bourgeois nationalism, fascism, racism, ethnocentrism and religion. The crisis conditions can be taken advantage of by Marxist-Leninist parties. But first such parties need to arise and overcome the prior long period of revisionist dominance or influence among the proletariat and the people. In the former Soviet Union, where the legacy of Lenin and Stalin is retrievable, those who swear by Marxism-Leninism are not yet known to be developing any armed revolutionary movement even as all sorts of reactionaries (bourgeois nationalists and religious fundamentalists) and the criminal syndicates are far ahead in arming themselves and in gaining influence in the official armed forces.

The crisis of overproduction of the world capitalist system has victimized the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the former revisionist-ruled countries, especially through the method of finance capitalism and neocolonialism. Thus, the new world disorder is most acute and rampant in these parts of the world. The conditions here are crying out for armed revolution under the leadership of the revolutionary parties of the proletariat.

At the root of the current global crisis of overproduction is the contradiction between the exceedingly high social character of the means of production and the extremely greedy means of private appropriation. There is an unprecedentedly rapid concentration and centralization of capital in supermonopolies through the adoption of higher technology and abuse of finance capital. Contrary to its neoliberal tenets of "big business and small government" and "free market", the monopoly bourgeoisie is viciously using state power to appropriate public resources, press down wages and cut back on social programs.

To score profits and attract shareholders, the winning supermonopolies massacre the jobs, reduce the wage fund and eliminate the firms losing in the competition. They unwittingly undermine their own domestic and foreign markets and create the conditions of social unrest. They raise their rates of productivity and profitability even as those of their entire national economies stagnate or are in fact recessive.

Certain objective conditions in the advanced capitalist countries generate resistance of the proletariat and the people against monopoly capitalism as well as propel the competition of the imperialist countries, which are now engaging in national and regional consolidation of captive markets. But there are also certain objective conditions which continue to prevent the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and people from resurging in the imperialist countries. In their home bases, the imperialists are stronger than elsewhere in suppressing, controlling and deceiving the proletariat and the people. They also use the labor aristocracy, widespread petty bourgeoisification, classical and modern revisionism to block the revolutionary proletariat.

It will be for some time before strong proletarian revolutionary parties can come forward and powerful revolutionary mass movements can reemerge in the advanced industrial capitalist countries. There are already initial mass upsurges. In the meantime, the few existing revolutionary parties of the proletariat have to be persevering in ideological, political and organizational work, militate the proletariat, women and youth and pay attention to the dialectical relationship of the revolutionary struggles in the imperialist countries and those in other countries

Economic competition and political rivalry among the imperialist countries are running. But at the moment the danger of a global war is not yet visible for the simple reason that they can still profitably unite against the proletariat and people. In time to come, however, the conditions leading to interimperialist war will con-

spicuously intensify. We should not miss the point that the end of the cold war has passed on to the beginning of the trade wars among the global centers of capitalism (notwithstanding the World Trade Organization) and the hot wars in the European continent such as those in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, with the NATO being able to fire its guns at one side in the civil war in Bosnia.

As the oppressed nations and peoples fight for national and social revolution, the class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie can also sharpen in the industrial capitalist countries, especially in the weaker ones. The general crisis of capitalism can still grow far more acute than now and result in local wars in lesser capitalist countries. The imperialist powers are overbrimming with arrogance, are engaged in expansionism and are liable to become entangled on different sides in a manner quite different from the current instances when they use the name of the United Nations and babble about "peacekeeping", "human rights" and "humanitarian aid" in order to intervene in different sides in various local wars.

In the meantime, the few armed revolutions led by the proletariat in Asia, Africa and Latin America play the role of being the revolutionary pioneers in a new period of unprecedented crisis and greater disorder, following the end of the cold war between two superpowers. They keep high the hope of the world's proletariat and people for the resurgence of the revolutionary anti-imperialist and socialist movement. #

**Main Conclusions and Lessons
from Summing Up the Experience
of the Revolutionary Youth
and Student Movement
1980-92**

**By the National Youth and Student Bureau
June 1996**

(Based on the result of the summing-up conference called by the General Secretariat-National Organization Department Summing-Up Conference.)

From our experience of 12 years between 1980 and 1992, we have drawn negative and positive lessons which have helped to clarify and deepen our understanding of the theory and practice of advancing and developing the revolutionary youth and student movement (RYSM), maintaining its revolutionary role and contributing to the entire people's war.

In our summing-up, we have clearly identified the major problems and criticized and repudiated the errors and deviations of the revolutionary sectoral movement in the past more than ten years of experience. The forces of the RYSM failed to comprehensively strengthen themselves ideologically, politically and organizationally. Right and "Left" opportunism and deviations plagued the RYSM and squandered whatever advances and victories it had achieved. As the years passed, the revolutionary movement strayed farther away from the correct path of advancing the people's war.

We must thoroughly root out these past errors. As we succeed in this task and in consolidating a revolutionary corps of a suffi-

cient number, the Party and the sectoral mass movement is bound to resurge and restrengthen themselves.

Our determination to rectify errors and revitalize the RYSM

The RYSM suffered the biggest losses ever in its history during the last years of the '80s and the beginning of the '90s. These were largely self-inflicted. In 1993, the Manila-Rizal Youth and Student Bureau (MRYSB), especially those elements who had directly led in implementing the insurrectionist schemes, openly and comprehensively launched an anti-Party campaign. They sought to sabotage and split the sectoral organizations. Within the MRYSB, they led the plot to separate and split away from the Party organization.

Despite their all-out efforts, a sizeable number of Party members and KM activists within the MRYSB stood by the Party and resolutely adhered to the line of national-democratic revolution. The proletarian revolutionaries have launched a thoroughgoing rectification campaign. They have the capability to regain strength.

The RYSB suffered from sectarianism. This worsened in 1988 and in succeeding years this quickly took the form of pushing for autonomy. A struggle over the orientation of the sectoral movement resulted in a change and breakdown of relations between the National Youth and Students' Bureau (NYSB) and the MRYSB. Special arrangements between the NYSB and the MRYSB were disregarded. The usual practice of having the MRYSB secretary sit as an ex-officio member of the NYSB executive committee, aside from an additional member who was supposed to sit in on NYSB meetings, was disregarded. Close and direct working relations were disregarded and cut off. A significant factor that led to the weakening of unity and leadership of the Party within the YS sectoral movement was the prevailing attitude within the MRYSB that the national-democratic stage of the propaganda movement of the '70s had already ended and that we must now launch a "socialist" propaganda

movement. Another factor was the attitude of belittling the importance of maintaining close links with and supporting the revolutionary mass movement in the countryside.

This kind of disorientation worsened from 1992 until 1993 and led to the intense anti-Party campaign and open attempts to demolish the revolutionary sectoral mass movement. The anti-Party elements in the MRYSB made the NYSD their target of intrigues and slander. They intimidated and bullied Party cadres and elements at the basic levels. They sought to grab the leadership of sectoral organizations and when they failed, they launched splittist campaigns. They fenced in units and organs under the MRYS to prevent the rectification movement from reaching them. Cadres who questioned the errors of the Manila-Rizal Regional Party Committee (MRRPC) or who saw the correctness of the Central Committee summing-up were immediately terminated from their positions and intimidated.

The Party rectification movement and the proletarian revolutionary cadres who wished to rectify fought back and frustrated the anti-Party and counterrevolutionary campaign to wreck the revolutionary youth and student movement. Entire units and organs of the Party, together with KM activists in all the sectoral mass organizations, the basic units of the Party directly under the NYSD stood firm and enthusiastically rallied to advance the rectification movement. More or less a hundred cadres left the MRYS to join the rectification movement. By the last quarter of 1993, it could be said that the campaign to wreck the revolutionary sectoral movement had been defeated. In fact in that year revolutionary propaganda, organizing and mobilization on important national issues and the protest movement started to pick up.

Despite the errors and disorientation, the forces of the rectification movement had knowledge of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the basic principles of the Party enough to grasp the import of the line struggle and the great rectification movement launched since 1992. The RYSM has accumulated strength and

grown through the years, especially since 1990. The review and assessment of the situation of the RYSM made in 1989 and specially the 3-year summing up (1988 to mid-1991) conducted by the NYSD in 1991 served a good purpose. Although there were many shortcomings, these helped to focus attention on the issues and the problems confronting the RYSM. These pointed out that the masses being organized were very limited, that the revolutionary forces were very small and that political and theoretical education was grossly being neglected. The question of giving priority to organizing and the relatively small number of the subjective forces were important factors that led to the NYSD's decision to dismantle its military units and to let go of the tactics of "preparing for the upsurge through the anti-imperialist struggle".

Aside from expansion, the NYSD had to take particular measures since 1990 to preserve and protect the Party organization and the organized masses within its scope from the clear insurrectionist agitation and troublemaking undertaken by the MRYS. The cadres and activists did not only become alerted but also became involved in the struggle, especially since 1989, over the analysis and calls pertaining to the issues and the conduct of campaigns, the struggle over the orientation of the sectoral organization and the question of advancing the national-democratic propaganda movement. At the beginning of 1992, the particular struggle pertaining to some problematic or lie-low elements who formed a faction at PUP and UP also came to a head. They fomented intrigues by taking advantage of some weaknesses and problems which they magnified and they maneuvered within both the executive committee of the section to which they belonged and the KM framework. The resulting series of debates served to educate the cadres and activists. The experience actually served to prepare the proletarian revolutionaries for subsequently confronting the anti-Party and counterrevolutionary activities, starting 1992.

An indication of the attempt to put things aright within the RYSM and of the readiness to rectify were the initial moves of the forces of the revolutionary students to integrate with the basic masses in the cities and the countryside in 1989. When the rectification movement began to advance, the number of revolutionary forces from among the students who went for integration in the countryside was much larger than the number during the last ten years. Those who have been actually deployed to work in the countryside rapidly increased.

When the NYSD got hold of the document "Reaffirm our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors" during the first half of 1992, it immediately conducted a study of the document, together with other Party documents issued since 1988. A series of study meetings and conferences among cadres and members was conducted on all the documents issued by the EC-CC and the Central Committee chairman. Under the guidance of these documents, the rectification movement within the RYSM advanced. Theoretical studies and dissemination of revolutionary reading materials were vigorously conducted.

It is not enough that we have immediately identified and criticized some problems. It is still necessary to deepen and broaden our analysis and study. In the latter part of 1993, we summed up the RYSM's experience from 1980-92. This constitutes a deepening of our rectification movement. We clarified the particular aspects and forms of extremely damaging errors and weaknesses in the past. We have drawn negative and positive lessons from these. We have also identified, criticized and repudiated the grave errors and deviations. We must continue to advance the rectification movement vigorously.

We still have enough number of revolutionary forces to enable us to reorganize ourselves and advance the rectification movement until its victory. We need to consolidate and strengthen our current forces in an all-round way—ideologically, politically and organi-

zationally. We must continue to study lessons that we have drawn from our summings-up. Only thus can we ensure the revitalization and restrengthening of the RYSM. The conditions for revolution continue to grow more favorable amidst the worsening economic and political crisis. As early as 1993, there were clear indications of the renewed advance of the sectoral mass movement.

Main conclusions and lessons

1. Having a broad influence and spread among the student masses is an outstanding achievement of the RYSM. It covered the entire country in 1981-82. It was strongest in the National Capital Region (NCR) and fanned out to all the urban centers in the entire country. It increased several-fold in number and strength from the peak reached in the latter half of the '70s after the setbacks inflicted by the imposition of martial rule in 1972. In the main, this victory came as a result of persevering on the revolutionary path and adhering to the principles and the line of national-democratic revolution.

The Party organization and its cadres and organs were built and these served as the backbone of the RYSM. In almost all the biggest or most important schools a revolutionary clandestine movement was in place and it was in these schools where the mass movement was strongest. *Kabataang Makabayan* continued to be led by the Party and mass activists took part in the Party's work of arousing, organizing and mobilizing the youth and student masses. National structures of students' sectoral mass organizations and alliances were built and maintained under the leadership of the Party; revolutionary forces worked within several hundreds of school organizations and associations.

The RYSM has been an important factor in launching, advancing and strengthening of the urban mass movement in the NCR and in the rest of the country. Its contribution to the efforts to expose, oppose and isolate the US-Marcos dictatorship were significant. It

roused and called on the middle forces to participate in the people's movement against the US-Marcos fascist dictatorship.

The RYSM has been the largest and the most active sector in the revolutionary mass movement led by the Party. The current rectification movement reflects the revolutionary enthusiasm of the RYSM in advancing the interests not only of the youth and students but also of the toiling masses. And with the completion of the task of ideological, political and organizational rectification and consolidation, the revolutionary forces at the current level of strength will further revitalize and strengthen the RYSM.

2. Repudiate and rectify the "Left" opportunist errors of the urban "political movement" and insurrectionism. Putschism characterized the "political movement" of intensifying the mass movement through attritive mass struggles. During the last years of the '80s, especially towards 1990, urban insurrectionism engulfed the RYSM. It hindered us from advancing. Worse, it squandered the gains we achieved in every period and in the end wrought havoc on the RYSM. All these clearly reflect the disorientation of the RYSM and its loosening grasp on the line and principles of the national-democratic revolution.

- a. In the latter part of the 1982-83 period, as a result of the rapid advance of the mass movement, the RYSM was erroneously declared as having matured into a "political movement". This was linked to what the Party set as the political preparation of the people for direct participation in the armed struggle as well as to its overemphasis on the urban mass movement. The "political movement" was directed towards the heightening and intensification of the mass movement and mass struggles, without regard for the actual capability of the revolutionary mass movement. It relied on the spontaneous actions of the masses.

The "political movement" notion, which narrowly stressed open mobilizations carrying the slogan "Dismantle the US-

Marcos dictatorship" and intensive and attritive mass struggles, took the place of advancing the RYSM's revolutionary tasks in an all-round way. Solid organizing to allow the Party to strike deep roots within the sector was cast aside. *Ideological, political and organizational consolidation* was neglected while we focused on sweeping organizing and mobilization of the youth and student masses. This overrode whatever limited work had been planned for consolidation and for attending to the RYSM's multifarious revolutionary tasks. By the last quarter of 1984, we started to feel our weakening. The mass movement lost momentum and in subsequent years, the RYSM continued to weaken rapidly.

The "political movement" scheme had the immediate effect of narrowing the RYSM and its links with the youth and student masses. Attention was focused on "legal political organizing" (LPO) for "heightening" the youth and student movement. We lost hold of the alliances and traditional student organizations and associations. We neglected to build and strengthen the Party as the core of a broad consolidated clandestine movement. The narrowed mass base and mass movement, without a sufficiently strengthened clandestine movement at its core, were pitted against the enemy to serve as the "fuse" for intensifying mass struggles and actions aimed at overthrowing the dictatorship. Worship for "intensification" of mass struggles was so ardent that even when the revolutionary mass movement had started to weaken and wobble during the second half of the '80s, the focus remained on "intensification, broadening and heightening" the content and form of mass struggles while hardly any attention was given to the work of consolidating the revolutionary movement.

- b. After an initial advance in 1988, the RYSM from 1988 was immediately set back again as a result of the "intensification"

of the mass movement, attritive mass struggles and urban insurrectionism. The error of urban insurrectionism and the damage it caused in the MRYS during the period 1989-92 must be duly repudiated and rectified. The RYSM had to be comprehensively derailed and dismantled ideologically, politically and organizationally before it could be directed towards insurrectionist "pol-mil" struggles.

3. Concomitant with the error of putschism and urban insurrectionism was the failure to build and strengthen the RYSM. In fact, before the strong antifascist struggles in 1983, neglect of all-round ideological, political and organizational building and consolidation had set in. On the one hand, there was the haste and actual attempt to "heighten" the RYSM and cause an explosion in order to directly confront the dictatorship, but on the other hand, the concept and practice of consolidation was not understood and was not developed. The damage which can be considered self-inflicted as a result of "Left" and Right opportunist errors and disorientation has been the biggest in the entire history of the RYSM.

The RYSM's various revolutionary tasks were not attended to nor developed. Even at the outset, our efforts were focused on triggering an "explosion" in the democratic protest movement for the students' particular demands and problems. Thus, we could not consolidate our advances and gains and use these as basis for pursuing and developing other revolutionary tasks. The enthusiasm and upsurge of the mass movement were not based on an all-round ideological, political and organizational strength of the revolutionary forces. Although youth and student mobilizations continued to be launched, in the main these were actions on student issues in the form of boycott undertaken even by minuscule groups. In a few schools, some of these could be declared as a victory but could not be a real measure of the strength of the RYSM. In the antifascist mobilizations of 1983-84, the spontaneous actions of the masses in the sector was a big factor and was not based on the strength of the

revolutionary movement. In fact, even when we were the ones making them, the calls were not put in the context of the national-democratic struggle and bore the strong influence of the bourgeoisie.

The RYSM's vigorous antifascist campaign and mass struggle neither reflected nor proceeded from a proletarian standpoint, but from a bourgeois liberal viewpoint. The antifascist struggle was not raised nor linked to the anti-imperialist struggle nor to the antifeudal struggle and the armed struggle in the countryside. The slogan "Dismantle the US-Marcos dictatorship" was commonly understood as the embodiment of the comprehensive mass movement. Thus when the Marcos fascist dictatorship fell there was the widespread erroneous notion that the form of rule in the country had changed and that the new regime's declaration to restore democratic rights was such an issue of crucial importance.

We lost interest and virtually abandoned the spirit and practice of making a stand for and supporting the toiling masses and leadership of the proletariat. The thinking that "populism" was the route for advancing the RYSM became rampant. Pursuing a "short route" for mobilizing the youth and student masses took the form of simply entering into "broad" unity/alliance or taking a "broad" position, "not based" on class interests (read proletarian class interests). In this regard, the following are some of the errors committed: limiting ourselves to an antifascist unity in alliances, narrowing our alliance work to political forces that were anticommunist and representative of the bourgeoisie, opportunist handling of the anti-tuition fee hike campaign or attempting to build unity on issues and demands outside a national-democratic framework.

In 1986-87, the NYSD had its own slackening on the class line and its concomitant erroneous analysis of the situation. The "Line of March" influence—with its idea and line of attacking Mao Zedong Thought and the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war, and of recognizing the USSR—seeped strongly into the RYSM.

In our experience, the failure to undertake consolidation work was a major problem that afflicted the RYSM from the beginning until the end of the period being summed up. There were relative advances and expansion at every period, but the failure to consolidate, sustain and stabilize the base for further expansion and consolidation persisted. Every time a certain advance was reached, "consolidation" took the form of the so-called heightening of the mass movement or charging into intensive and attritive mass actions. Invariably the result was the squandering of whatever gains had been initially achieved. This was the pattern nationwide in the periods 1980-84 and 1988-92. This was also the case in Manila-Rizal during the years 1975-80.

4. The measure of a healthy and revolutionary youth and student movement is its strong links with the worker and peasant masses and consistency in upholding their interests and struggles. At every opportunity, it must take a stand from the viewpoint of the toiling masses. This means that propaganda, education and organizing work for the national-democratic revolution is concretized by actual work in helping arouse, organize and mobilize the toiling masses for the revolution. Revolutionary youth and student forces should go to and actually participate in the life and struggles of the masses and in the people's armed struggle in the countryside.

The "particularism" that permeated the RYSM and ran counter to the revolutionary interests of the toiling masses should be thoroughly rooted out. It is a selfish and narrow stand taken from the petty-bourgeois self-interest and viewpoint of the sector. This kind of disorientation ran rampant. Our tasks and our stand on political and national issues were determined on the basis of our self-interest and viewpoint as a sector. Our analysis and calls to action were made without any deep understanding of the people's situation because in the first place we did not do mass work among them. Cadres and activists, campaigns and mobilizations, propaganda and

education work lagged and were narrowly directed to the needs of our own sectoral movement.

This sectoral particularism transcended classes. In advancing the RYSM, the essential standpoint and actual implementation of the tasks of organizing the masses of workers and peasants were not grasped. The propaganda and adherence to the national-democratic line is not an abstract task; it consists of the actual support for the basic interests and demands of the toiling masses. The sectoral particularism carried by the RYSM reinforced the petty-bourgeois standpoint of the student-youth in their spontaneous advance in the mid-'80s. Thus they were easily swayed by the line and calls of the comprador big bourgeoisie and landlords. The popdem line is nothing but a tail of the bourgeoisie.

5. At one level, the RYSM advanced the national democratic propaganda movement. It rallied, organized and mobilized the youth and students to propagate the national-democratic line, analysis and calls on various political and national issues and questions. At another level, the RYSM assisted the Party in disseminating revolutionary propaganda all over the country.

The sector's understanding of the national-democratic propaganda movement was to a large extent lacking and its practice was erroneous. The national-democratic line or the propaganda against the US-Marcos dictatorship was propagated in an abstract way and so was the method of projecting national and political issues. It did not concretely reflect the revolutionary class standpoint as it did not raise the interests and struggles of the toiling masses. Furthermore, the explanation and propagation of the national-democratic line and of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought was very shallow and limited. Worse, when disorientation and deviations set in, the national-democratic propaganda movement became the very vehicle for pushing adventuristically violent mass actions, in an attempt to trigger intense urban "mass" struggles within the frame of urban insurrectionism. There was also the erroneous notion that

the national-democratic propaganda movement is no longer valid and that it ended in 1970 with the First Quarter Storm (FQS), or that it is no longer an important task of the student youth. All these reinforced the petty-bourgeois tendencies of the students.

In 1970-72 the students were among those at the forefront and at the vanguard of the propaganda movement. Later, the revolutionary movement among the workers and peasants also advanced. Together with the open national-democratic center, it became capable of setting the broad revolutionary propaganda. At that point, it was necessary for the RYSM to understand that advancing the national-democratic propaganda movement is closely linked to the struggles of the basic masses—to the conditions, problems and struggles of the workers and peasants. The national-democratic propaganda movement will continue until the completion of the people's democratic revolution.

The emergence of the "supraclass" sectoral movement was, on the one hand, an outgrowth of being young, being petty-bourgeois and having had the experience of not being able to recover from errors and losses. On the other, it bred arrogance within the sectoral movement. We should rectify and be on guard against the tendency to one-sidedly enlarge the positive characteristics of the student sector or the petty-bourgeois, and not to sufficiently or correctly recognize its weaknesses and negative characteristics.

6. The RYSM was correctly deployed during the explosion of campaigns and protests during the early years of the '80s and it rapidly expanded. It established and positioned itself among the youth and students. It linked up with many organizations and formed alliances in a large number of schools. The KM activists and mass organization started to expand and the open mass organization was established. The recruitment of new Party members accelerated and basic Party units started to be built.

But when the "political movement" line emerged and surged, it exposed the organizational looseness of the mass movement and this

quickly fell apart. In the early years of the '80s, the propaganda and organizing teams (POTs) were created as a vehicle for sectoral organizing. The objective was to organize the student masses rapidly and expand among the advanced sections. But there were no corresponding ideological, political and organizational efforts to consolidate the mass movement. The POTs deviated from the earlier method and principle of solid organizing through the organizing group and the organizing committees as outlined in "Our Urgent Tasks".

The POTs were used mainly for sweeping propaganda and agitation in mass campaigns. At the same time, precisely because consolidation had not been undertaken, the POTs became increasingly limited to a few active members. They did not have solid links with the student masses, except for those who were targeted for recruitment to KM. Thus the *barkada* (clique) mentality grew strong and between mass campaigns the barkada flocked together on their favorite roosts. Another formation was the core group (CG), otherwise called a special POT. From what used to be the entire POT, the core group was formed to serve as the leadership of a legal organization. At first glance, with this system, the organizations seemed better covered and organizing more systematic but, in fact, the CG became even more detached from the masses of students. The CG related only to the leadership of legal mass organizations and did no organizing at all among the mass membership.

That the POT was a vehicle for organizing and became a basic component unit of the KM chapter was an even bigger deviation and distortion of the principle of solid organizing. A crucial issue was the even more narrowed consolidation—through the KM—of advanced students from a broad mass. This is difficult to achieve for a clandestine revolutionary mass organization.

Liquidationism or the practice of liquidating the Party emerged within the KM. It took the form of putting emphasis on building the KM chapter rather than building the basic Party unit. The liquidationist orientation for KM to serve as the backbone and lead-

ership of the RYSM separately from the Party, and the formula of limiting the scope of Party leadership to ideology and organization while relegating political leadership to the KM, emerged in the 1984 KM national congress. We must thoroughly rectify this error. The Party leads the KM as part of the clandestine movement and should be *directly assisted by it in revolutionary work*. The Party must develop its comprehensive IPO leadership within the KM.

Ideological and political education work as a requisite for solid organizing among the student masses was grossly neglected. Neither the revolutionary forces nor the legal national-democratic mass organizations carried out extensive education on the national-democratic line and the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. We must organize study circles for this purpose.

The plan to consolidate the advanced sections of the masses in the formation of a semilegal political organization (SLPO) could not be fully implemented. The SLPO never developed into a real national-democratic mass organization, despite the fact that from 1983 onward there was the one-sided concentration of efforts on building it and subsequently on building a legal political organization (LPO) to implement the "political movement" line. Considerable gains in organizing among the traditional organizations and alliances were neglected and consequently lost. Mass organizations are important for solidly organizing and consolidating the RYSM. Traditional organizations have their own importance and should not be neglected. To strengthen the mass organizations, a broad membership is necessary. We must grasp the importance of maintaining strong links and influence within traditional organizations and maintaining their recognition and cooperation. To be able to link up with a great number of organizations, we need to develop a revolutionary corps for it.

7. To build the RYSM, we must have the student masses. Our objective in strengthening the revolutionary movement and carrying out our revolutionary tasks is to be able to organize the great-

est number of youth and students for the revolutionary struggle. In the past, the revolutionary movement one-sidedly focused on launching mass campaigns and mobilizations and sweeping propaganda on issues, and hardly carried out any organizing. The Party failed to strengthen and develop its ideological, political and organizational leadership in the mass movement. No revolutionary education and propaganda was undertaken, mass organizing was sweeping and loose, no strong links with the basic masses were forged, and no building of branches and chapters with large ideologically, politically and organizationally consolidated membership were undertaken.

It is important from the outset to advance the mass movement within the framework of undertaking our revolutionary tasks in a comprehensive way. Based on our actual circumstances in 1980-81, it may have been correct mainly to promote mass protest actions for democratic reforms. This necessarily involved a great deal of attention from the revolutionary forces. However, it was extremely wrong that after the work had advanced and the movement for democratic reforms was in place, no time was allocated for the consolidation of the revolutionary forces. Thus, we failed to use our gains to develop the other tasks of the sectoral movement. Our sectoral movement was not geared for nor put within the framework of advancing the national-democratic propaganda movement.

8. The Party organization within the RYSM reached a scale wider and a level higher than those reached during the second half of the '70s. Within the sectoral mass organizations, national Party groups were built and Party branches were also built, some at section level, in almost all the big colleges and universities in the NCR. The NYSD was at the center of the Party organization in the sectoral movement. It survived four major reorganizations.

It stood as the core of the sectoral movement. The Party organization held the RYSM together and enabled it to recover and re-strengthen itself at every turn when it weakened and suffered losses

and setbacks. The Party and the revolutionary mass activists that it led operated as a clandestine movement and served as the backbone of the open mass organizations and the open mass movement.

Despite our earnest efforts at rectification, Party cadres and members are not immune to previous errors and unhealthy practices. *The malady of bureaucratism still emerges quite often.* Striking are cases of higher organs setting plans, quotas and targets for lower units, without consulting them or thoroughly investigating their situation. Worse, with regard to mass campaigns, mere campaign staff units still ram down targets and plans in utter disregard of objections from cadres and units concerned. The style of “political officer system” is still widespread; in many instances, even secretaries of basic Party units practice this erroneous style of leading. All these must be criticized, repudiated and rectified. For quite a long time, at the NYSD level, we suffered from the practice of concentrating a big number of Party members in staff units, which were detached from the masses and served as added administrative layers.

The NYSD also suffered cases of ultrademocracy, liberalism and factionalism. In 1985-87, there was a flood of statements that contradicted the policies and decisions of the Party; there were debates and caucuses outside regular units or organs, and cases of circumventing policies and lack of enthusiasm in implementing tasks. There were many cases of individuals or some cadres in the branches who spun criticisms against their leadership and often went against the plans and targets even after these had been discussed and studied. In UP and PUP, the KM was used as a vehicle for circumventing and debating the decisions of the Party leadership until it degenerated into outright factionalism. Autonomism, endless debates and disputation and insistence on sectoral “self-dynamism” ending in outright factionalism—all these grew strong within the RYSB. We still suffer from a deeply entrenched malady of liberalism in the form of tardiness in attending meetings despite repeated criticism.

Cadres and members of the Party neglected the practice of integrating with and learning from the basic masses. This, with the lack of ideological and theoretical studies, reinforced petty-bourgeois weaknesses and errors. This sharpened or made more acute the influence of erroneous and bourgeois ideas and weaknesses within the organization. Instead of explaining and convincing Party elements who attended to nothing else but study in the bourgeois schools and earn a diploma, or to take on Party work (not to mention going on full time Party work), the attitude was to let things be. If ever they continued or if they had some problems doing Party work, the usual practice was for them to work in bourgeois institutions. A time came when no one really wanted to work among the workers and peasants and to go to the countryside.

We must strengthen Party life at the basic units in an all-round way. Basic units were formed without being consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally. Organizationally, one had to go through a one-sidedly prolonged period of political tasking, particularly in the open mass movement. Ideological work meant taking the basic Party course and organizational work meant recruiting a new member before the end of the semester. Thus the branch was limited to a few members and practically did not grow from the time that it was built. Recruitment became almost limited to replacing members who had become inactive. This was the effect of neglecting solid organizing of basic units, particularly in small mass organizations, and of neglecting ideological and political education among mass activists.

With the formation of the branches, the units grew and, often, the KM chapters were formed. At that stage, most members became tied to administrative work and the most advanced became team leaders of the branch group and were deployed for work in mass campaigns. Only a few within the KM structure actually undertook organizing work. The POT system of organizing and of having the KM chapter compete with the Party branch in leading the LMO must

be rectified. It is important for the Party to lead the work among the student masses and to be good at conducting propaganda on the national-democratic line and on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought among the masses of students.

9. The RYSM must conduct vigorous revolutionary propaganda and education in order to strengthen itself and advance the national-democratic propaganda movement. To revolutionize the masses of youth and students, it is essential to have a good grasp of the national-democratic line and the principles and theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (MLMZT). Previously, we neglected this work. Our revolutionary propaganda was sweeping and limited to propagating slogans and the national-democratic analysis and standpoint on outstanding sectoral and national issues.

Education work suffered from grave elitism. The comprehensive course on Philippine society and revolution was limited to KM members. The course on the basic principles of MLMZT was limited to Party members. Materials for revolutionary education were not only scarce but were distributed only among the revolutionary forces. The activists and units in the underground movement did not form study groups among the students. The neglect of revolutionary education in the past is a major problem with adverse consequences to our current consolidation work.

To be able to conduct a vigorous education movement among the masses, it is essential to conduct vigorous ideological and political education among the members of the Party. The Party branch must take the important role of ensuring that a systematic and constant program of revolutionary education is undertaken. At the same time, we must recover from the previous neglect of, and strengthen efforts at, forging close links and integrating with the workers and peasants. Thus, we can enrich the theoretical knowledge, the propaganda and calls of the YS sectoral movement.

10. We cannot really build a revolutionary movement in our sector if we continue to neglect and distance ourselves from the

movement and struggles of the workers and peasants. It is not merely in words and in statements that we make their movement and struggles our own. We must integrate and live among them. The practice of joining and supporting workers' strikes and pickets and *deploying forces to the countryside* stopped in 1982. Aside from being limited, revolutionary propaganda in the sector was drawn from abstract knowledge and statistics and not from knowledge validated by direct experience in integration with the basic masses.

As a result of the concept and practice of building a "political movement", the line of urban insurrectionism and Right opportunist errors, the RYSM failed to advance because it tried to advance only its own concerns. Within the framework of the national-democratic propaganda movement, revolutionary education and the training of numerous youth cadres and activists should directly serve the task of arousing, mobilizing and organizing the masses of peasants and workers. Another shortcoming was that the call for integrating and forging close links with the basic masses was reserved only for the revolutionary forces (Party members). At the basic units of the Party and the mass organization, no clear call and no clear system was made for deploying students for various tasks in factories and communities and in the countryside, in accordance with their willingness and capability.

Important specific issues and experiences

1. The victorious democratic protests for reforms in 1980-82 were on the revolutionary track as can be seen from their implementation of, or adherence to, the national-democratic line, analysis and calls on the issues and problems confronting the student masses.

In the application of the national-democratic line, the colonial, commercialized, feudal and fascist educational system was clearly presented as the reflection of an exploitative, oppressive and backward semicolonial and semifeudal society. Thus, for a real change

in the educational system, the sectoral movement must unite with the entire people's movement for a radical change in the social system. The role of US imperialism and the Marcos regime in perpetuating the deteriorating educational system was exposed. The protest movement broadly carried the slogan, "Dismantle the US-Marcos dictatorship!" (Lansagin ang diktadurang EU-Marcos!).

An important step taken to heighten the consciousness of the sector was the launching of mass actions, especially massive street rallies and demonstrations outside school campuses, simultaneous to launching the widespread on-campus boycott movement. The off-campus or street mobilizations and demonstrations served to heighten consciousness regarding the importance of broader and more organized sectoral alliances and struggles for a common set of demands as well as regarding a broader and more organized unity with the masses of workers and other classes and sectors to effectively fight the reactionary regime. By attacking and suppressing us, the fascist troops and police taught us who the real enemies of the people were and also about the reactionary and violent nature of the current state.

Correctly upholding and sustaining the struggles and demands of the masses of students had been an important factor in combating and isolating the reactionary and anticommunist political forces, such as the "social-democrats" and the Lavas since 1980, the popdems and the Pilipino ideology since 1985, and the insurrectionist-leaning RYSB. These were struggles to uphold the revolutionary line against the reformist and bourgeois lines.

2. There was the disorientation regarding the scope, composition and nature of the youth and student movement. From 1983 until 1985, it was regarded as a youth, student and teachers' movement (YSTM). This naturally included the rest of academic personnel and staffers.

For a short time in 1985, the YSM also included worker and peasant youth. This became an issue within the YSM leading or-

gans, with its attendant complications such as how worker and student youth were to be organized, what was its relation to worker and peasant movements, the issues of trade unionism and agrarian revolution and how they were to be mobilized in these other sectoral movements.

In 1987, the YS executive committee-NOC consultation and the new YSM orientation document corrected, firmed up and clarified the scope and composition of the YSM as being the masses of students and the youth in urban communities, mainly petty-bourgeois and semiproletarian youth. Also clarified as a pivotal or decisive factor was the work of mobilizing and organizing among the masses of students.

3. Specific opportunist errors and notions:

a. Since the latter part of 1981, erroneous notions and concepts proliferated in connection with the program of the "advanced substage of the strategic defensive", particularly with regard to the issue of preparing the people politically for participating in the revolution and of one-sidedly giving "priority" to urban work. This grew worse in 1985 and onward when an institution for education in the youth and student sector became a popdem nest and a repository of other anticomunist reading materials. Some of the erroneous notions were the following:

- The victory of the revolution is within sight in the next few years. Through the SCO, the people's war will rapidly move on to the stages of the strategic stalemate and the strategic offensive. Thus what we need principally are only the powerful weapons and ammunition.
- We do not need to go to the countryside. The local revolutionary forces in the countryside are capable and legions are willing to join the NPA. In fact, all they are waiting for are the weapons.

- Feudalism remains a problem, but whether this is a basic problem needs to be reviewed. Changes in the society and in the countryside have been enormous. This is also true with the class composition of the population; the working class has grown while the peasantry has shrunk.
 - We must now restudy the issue of whether the Soviet Union and the CPSU as well as the other East European states and parties are revisionist.
- b. From open forums of various organizations to discuss campaign plans and calls, a formal coalition was established in 1984 and it served as a broader center for students.

It was an alliance or federation serving as the center of various national-democratic sectoral school organizations together with other political forces and traditional school organizations. It was pushed as the articulator for the unified stand of the sector as well as for coordinating its activities. But in the period 1985-86 the coalition became an arena of struggles and splits between the national-democratic forces and the other political forces within it, until it finally collapsed.

Our concept and practice of coalition-building were all wrong. We considered as progressive the likes of the social-democrats, Bisig and other personalities in the sector and underestimated their basic anticommunist and counterrevolutionary character. This was a part of the Right opportunist error of "popdemism" or "populism". In fact, the initiative of the semilegal people's organization waned and weakened. It lost its central character in the open sectoral mass movement as it limited itself to operating and "developing" unity within the coalition. In essence, it verged on liquidating the revolutionary leadership in the sectoral mass movement.

- c. In the UP a line of reformism and localism—actually two faces of the same coin in advancing the local sectoral mass

movement—reigned in 1985. The Party branch decided to lay more stress on carrying local issues and localized mobilizations. It consisted of belittling large political and national issues as well as the question of state responsibility on local issues. Protest actions were held only within the campus.

The Party branch claimed that the basis for this was “the given level of the consciousness of the masses in UP”. This kind of generalization is wrong. The branch failed to recognize that among the students, there are the advanced, middle and backward sections, and thus also failed to appropriately deal in different ways with each of these sections on the tuition fee issue. Worse, because of the internal weakness of the branch, it got easily confused and allowed the erroneous and reformist lines and calls of other petty-bourgeois and bourgeois political forces to run rampant.

4. The legal democratic mass movement under the leadership of the revolutionary forces in the country enjoyed the admiration and support of various youth and student organizations from other countries. With the formation and strengthening of the national sectoral organizations and alliances, the factors emerged for the systematic and continuous international work of the sector.

In fact, the SLPO succeeded in building strong ties with many counterpart organizations in other countries. In 1981, it was formally admitted as a member of an international student association in the whole of Asia. The legal political organization of the urban community youth continued to maintain and strengthen its ties with various organizations and institutions in other countries.

In international work, a great deal of attention was paid to getting aid and support not only for the revolutionary YS movement but for the entire people’s democratic revolution. In this regard, it is important to conduct timely propaganda for the revolutionary movement and maintain correspondence with other organizations and associations abroad.

5. Broad sectoral organizing was undertaken by the student-writers' alliance and student councils' alliance. The number of student councils put up in schools all over the country continued to increase. On this basis, the alliance of student councils was formed. Initially its membership was concentrated mainly in the NCR, with a sprinkling from other cities. It started to take active part in the mass campaigns from the latter half of 1983. In October 1985 through the national consultation of student leaders, the call was made to build the national alliance of student councils. In 1987, the alliance of student councils was firmly and broadly established nationally.

The student councils must unite in order to become more effective instruments for upholding the interests of the student masses as well as the entire people. Through the alliance of student councils, separate student councils in every school throughout the country can strengthen their links and unity and raise their political consciousness and initiative. The alliance has an important role to play in developing and training student leaders.

In 1979, the national-democratic forces started to revive the NCR student-writers' alliance and successfully asserted their leadership over it against other political forces. A little later, the national student-writers' alliance was also established. Its contributions to the protest movement since 1980-81 have been particularly substantial. Its national leaders worked hand in hand with the central legal political organization in representations with the public as well as with state institutions. Furthermore, its national leaders and a sizeable number of its chapters competently explained the stand of the YSM and became a vehicle of national-democratic propaganda.

The national-democratic forces persevered in expanding and building the chapters of the student-writers' alliance all over the country. These continued to serve as lines for national-democratic propaganda. The alliance played an important role in training and producing progressive national-democratic activists and writers in

its numerous chapters, especially in the NCR. It made important contributions by laying the ground for more solid organizing and revolutionary leadership in its chapters in numerous schools.

6. We have developed the tasks and tactics for participating and advancing campus election campaigns and winning student council leadership. A summing up of the experience in campus elections in the NCR was undertaken in 1985. The following are the particular experiences and lessons:

First, the campaign for and the election of the student council is a natural activity for exercising the democratic rights of a major part of the student population. It is an activity of the student masses which is recognized to a certain extent by the school-capitalists and the entire society.

Second, our revolutionary attitude is to transform it into a mass campaign. This means that it presents a very favorable opportunity for national-democratic propaganda, a time for expanding national-democratic influence and leadership over legal machineries and systematically combining the activities of a great number of the students, with a defined political objective and plan.

Third, winning the election in order to serve a revolutionary purpose necessitates the correct formulation and propagation of the political line and slogans of the election campaign and a broad alliance and machinery to mobilize for the campaign. All these must be combined with well chosen and competent candidates, day-to-day analysis of the progress of the campaign, and specific plans for the election day itself.

Fourth, we clarified the political orientation of the student council. The council is an effective weapon of the student masses for upholding democratic interests and welfare. It is a vehicle of the student masses for uniting with and upholding the interests of the broad masses of the Filipino people. The councils have become a training ground and source of many able student leaders, for the

local mass movement as well as for the national sectoral organizations.

7. The KM is the underground national-democratic mass organization of the sectoral movement. It is part of the underground within the open mass movement, of which the Party is the core. Right opportunist liquidationism has been identified and must be rectified within the KM.

a. The Party is at the core of the KM leadership. The KM's Party core ensures the ideological, political and organizational consolidation of the KM;

b. The KM has its organizational integrity and is organizationally not within the Party's democratic centralism. However, individual Party members within the KM are bound by the Party's democratic centralism;

c. Emphasis is on building the KM structure horizontally, expanding membership by reaching and organizing an ever expanding masses of the youth;

d. The KM develops and trains its members for recruitment into the Party.

8. To systematize the method for solid organizing, it is important to study and grasp the basis of the methods used by the organizing groups and organizing committees as laid down in "Our Urgent Tasks". #

Some Points of Clarification on the Conduct of Tactical Alliances (Translation from the original in Tagalog)

By the Bicol Regional Party Executive Committee

In the course of performing all-round revolutionary tasks, we do united front work and, in particular, enter into tactical alliances. At various times, especially during bourgeois electoral campaigns, we deal and enter into agreements with such tactical allies as local politicians and some national politicians. Also in the course of waging armed struggle and of advancing the agrarian revolution, we also deal with some businessmen and landlords.

In the main we have grasped correctly the handling of relations with such tactical allies. But there have been occasions when we committed certain errors and experienced some problems.

In this article, we put renewed emphasis on the principles and policies regarding our united front and tactical alliance work as part of the rectification movement and the further improvement of our principled relations with tactical allies.

As we make these points of clarification, we freely draw from previous clarifications in the text of our primary Party course and from *Philippine Society and Revolution*. We also encourage other comrades to deepen their study by referring to other basic documents of the Party and by summing up and drawing from their own experience.

Towards the conclusion of this document, we have chosen to present the major problems that we have experienced in our conduct of tactical alliances, pointing out the particular forms of the problems and weaknesses that we wish to correct and be vigilant about in the future.

Tactical alliances and united front work

The conduct of tactical alliances is an aspect of our comprehensive united front work and is within this framework. In order to put our tactical alliance work in the proper context, we need to understand the entirety of our united front work.

National united front work is one of the three principal tasks of the Party in advancing the revolution. The objective of the national united front is for the Party to build the unity of all progressive classes and strata in order to advance the national-democratic revolution and isolate and overthrow the most diehard enemies of the Filipino people.

In carrying out the united front, we adhere to the united front policy according to our Party's class line. This policy determines our attitude towards the different classes in Philippine society for the purpose of broadening the influence of our Party and our revolutionary armed forces, encouraging and mobilizing the broad masses of the people to join the people's democratic revolution, and isolating the enemy, especially its diehard elements. The revolutionary class line in turn involves building the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry, winning over the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, taking advantage of the splits among the reactionaries, and isolating and striking at the diehard reactionaries.

As our Party implements the united front policy, it also builds the independent strength of the leading class, the proletariat, through the national war or the agrarian revolution which is waged and supported mainly by the peasantry.

A particular objective of the national united front is to win over the middle forces and elements to the side of the revolution and isolate the enemy diehards.

To ensure our success in this work, we must make clear and timely class analysis to distinguish and differentiate the middle forces and elements from the reactionaries; the main from second-

ary enemies; the enemies of today from the enemies of tomorrow; and, among our friends, to distinguish between reliable and unreliable ones.

The basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry is the foundation of the national united front. It consists of the largest and the most solid revolutionary forces against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. The Party gives principal attention to strengthening and consolidating the basic alliance because it is decisive for advancing the revolution and for building the national united front. The strength of the basic alliance ensures the continuous advance of the revolution and influences other classes to join the united front.

Relying on the basic alliance, the Party wins over as supplementary allies chiefly the urban petty bourgeoisie and secondarily the national bourgeoisie.

The urban petty bourgeoisie are long-term and reliable allies of the working class and the peasantry. It belongs to the basic forces for advancing the revolution.

The national bourgeoisie can also be won over to join the revolution throughout the entire stage of the people's democratic revolution. It can be effectively rallied when we succeed in winning over and mobilizing the urban petty bourgeoisie and in strengthening the basic alliance. However, the national bourgeoisie has a dual character and vacillating standpoint, thus its participation is not consistent and thoroughgoing.

The Party monitors and takes advantage of the splits among the reactionaries. There are opportunities, especially when the revolutionary forces are strong and powerful, for exploiting such splits up to a point where one section of, or certain elements from, the reactionary classes can be made to take the side of advancing the people's basic interests. Under such circumstances, they become tactical allies since they are unreliable and temporary.

When entering into a tactical alliance with a section of the reactionary classes, the Party and the revolutionary movement must exercise vigilance and firmness in principle. Firstly, tactical allies only take a limited stand in favor of, or do not wholeheartedly advance, the people's basic interests. Secondly, they always try to derail the revolutionary movement in order to advance their own class interests against those of the people and the nation.

At the current level of the revolution, our conduct in exploiting the contradictions and splits among the reactionaries usually takes the form of concentrating attack on the principal and the most die-hard among them.

We gain some advantages from neutralizing one section of reaction as it does not go all out in fighting the revolution for a certain period. At the maximum, we can make limited use of the resources of tactical allies for strengthening the basic forces of the revolution.

The alliance against the narrowest target is within the tactical-alliance framework. In order to further take advantage of the splits among the reactionaries, we pay particular attention to isolating and hitting the worst faction among the reactionaries, which is the most favored by US imperialism.

By ranging the broadest alliance against the narrowest target, we further strengthen the forces against reaction. As in dealing with tactical allies, we also exercise vigilance against betrayals and maneuvers of reactionary elements so we can protect the interests of the basic revolutionary forces and prevent the revolution from being led astray.

From our long experience in united front work, we can draw the structural requirements for the persistence and advance of the revolutionary united front according to the Party's revolutionary class line.

The first requisite is building the unity of and strengthening the Party as the representative of the proletariat in the course of ad-

vancing the two-stage revolution. At this level, we put the Party in the position of leading the entire national united front. It is the Party's resolute, farsighted and self-sacrificing work that ensures the recognition of its prestige and leadership by the other classes.

The Party constantly builds and leads the people's army, the armed struggle and the revolutionary movement and struggle of the basic masses. It recruits its members from the workers' unions, the people's army, the youth and the mass movement based in the countryside and in the cities.

The second requisite is building the basic alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry by arousing, organizing and mobilizing the peasant masses and building the New People's Army and the peasant associations under the leadership of the Party.

The third requisite is broadening the basic alliance of the working masses to include the third basic revolutionary force, the urban petty bourgeoisie, through the underground NDF allied organizations as well as through open alliances.

The fourth requisite is further broadening the alliance of the positive forces of the revolution, which links the three basic revolutionary forces, with the national bourgeoisie. Currently there is no actual formal organizational expression of all these four positive forces other than members and groups of the national bourgeoisie that cooperate with the revolutionary movement in areas where the armed revolutionary movement and the trade union movement are strong.

The fifth requisite is seeking temporary alliances with some sections of the reactionary classes against the most reactionary faction. This was clearly demonstrated at the national level during the anti-fascist struggle. Enlightened landlords and businessmen have shown cooperation by paying taxes to the people's government, allowing our use of certain facilities, and heeding our calls on such issues as land reform, improving wage relations, fielding relatively good candidates in elections, etc.

The sixth requisite is building the broadest possible alliance that can be ranged against the narrowest target, the reactionary clique in power or most favored by US imperialism. We fight and defeat the most reactionary clique one by one and one after another, and in the process we accumulate revolutionary strength.

Principles guiding the national united front

Of foremost importance is the Party's proletarian leadership in the united front. To win the national-democratic revolution and advance it towards the socialist revolution, a strong proletarian leadership in the united front is necessary. If the Party does not assert its leadership, the united front will be led astray, the leadership of the bourgeoisie will prevail and the revolution will be compromised to counterrevolutionary feudal and bourgeois interests. Furthermore, the Party lays stress on building the national united front as a united front for armed struggle and relies on the organized strength of the basic revolutionary forces, especially the masses of workers and peasants, and the armed strength of the people's army which is built according to the interests of the worker-peasant alliance.

Another principle is conducting alliance work on the basis of our own strength. This means entering into alliances on the basis of the given strength of the subjective forces established by the Party through the peasant war, building the people's army, building and advancing the revolutionary mass movement and building the Party.

Furthermore, alliance work should not hinder but should advance these forces and tasks. The principal method for broadening and strengthening the national united front is by broadening and strengthening the revolutionary organizations of workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie amidst the revolutionary struggle of the armed masses and not through parliamentary struggle.

The national bourgeoisie and more particularly tactical allies and other potential allies will not enter into an alliance with us when we are weak. So long as we constantly develop our strength, we shall

be prepared for anything that unreliable allies may do. When they betray or abandon the alliance, the revolution will not be derailed.

In this context, we must be alert when dealing with elements from the ruling and reactionary classes who become our allies. We should never lose sight of their class which dictates their interests and their relationship with us. We should not make the mistake of regarding them as motive forces of the revolution, even if they have long been relating and cooperating with us.

All our efforts in the united front are for advancing the basic interests of the people. We should not run after bourgeois personalities merely to ride on their prestige and thus lose grasp of our basic principles and policy on the united front as well as of our task to develop and advance the basic revolutionary forces and work. At all times, we must grasp as our priority the strengthening of the basic forces of the revolution. United front work must serve to advance the revolution, not to hinder it.

Another principle is unity and struggle within the united front. Every united front defines its basis for unity. In our national united front, the basis for unity is the struggle for national freedom and democracy against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. We must constantly clarify and grasp the basis of unity so as to keep the united front intact as far as we can.

However, the forces and groups participating in the united front have varying interests and objectives based on differences in class origin, standpoint and orientation. Thus, struggle within the united front is a certainty. Differences should not be slurred over.

Unity within the united front is maintained through struggle. Without struggle, unity cannot be strengthened and will be eroded because harmful actions and tendencies of various forces can neither be corrected nor prevented.

The Party's policy with regard to struggle within the united front is to wage it on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint. The Party struggles to assert the correct line and policies, combat

erroneous lines and policies, develop and strengthen unity of the majority of friendly forces and thus strengthen and advance the united front.

The principle of unity and struggle within the united front particularly involves maintaining vigilance towards the dual character of the national bourgeoisie and towards tactical allies from sections of the reactionary classes. We unite with them for as long as they side with or support the revolution and we struggle against their tendency to betray the revolution.

An example of unity and struggle is that of advancing the workers' movement in factories owned by the national bourgeoisie. Here we take caution that the workers' struggles do not unduly damage the legitimate interests of the national bourgeois entrepreneurs. When the latter struggle against the interests of the revolutionary forces, we do not consider them as entirely counterrevolutionary; we persist in criticizing and winning them over, except when they incur blood debts.

Another example is our relations with enlightened landlords. Their lands are subject to revolutionary land reform but our method is that of persuasion. When we say that a landlord is enlightened, we mean that he does not oppose the agrarian revolution and the armed struggle, and he is willing to have his lands subjected to revolutionary land reform.

Still another example is our relations with rich peasants. While we persuade them to join the anti-imperialist and antifascist struggles or to support the agrarian revolution or to stay neutral and we do not unduly harm their interest, we also persuade them to lower interest rates on loans and raise farm workers' wages. We take caution that they do not dominate the revolutionary peasant movement and other revolutionary forces in the barrio and that they are not allowed to join the peasant association. However, they may be encouraged to cooperate with the peasant association.

Still another principle is independence and initiative within the united front. This means that the proletariat, through the Party, maintains leadership within the united front and does not get tied down to it in carrying out the various revolutionary tasks. The Party asserts its right to act independently of the united front and maintain bilateral and multilateral relations with other friendly forces. It will not agree to have all its plans subject to approval by all other organizations in the united front before implementation.

This means that the Party maintains its independence and initiative ideologically, politically and organizationally. It will not agree to lay aside its ideological and political principles or dissolve its independent organization, if only to maintain a united front.

As much as it asserts independence and initiative, the Party also recognizes and respects the independence and initiative of other groups and organizations within the united front. These groups and organizations can act independently and take initiative within their own spheres.

Another condition operating within the united front is that of making concessions. This means making concessions to legitimate demands in the interest of other forces, groups or classes within the united front so long as such demands do not harm the basic interests of the working class and the peasantry.

The Party respects the legitimate interests of all the middle forces, and at the same time makes concessions to them so long as these do not harm the basic interests of the working masses and do not work against the leading role of the Party.

Concessions in line with the Party's principles facilitate unity on more important or fundamental issues and tasks. Through these, the Party can demonstrate open-mindedness with regard to legitimate demands of allies. Concessions must also be of mutual benefit and must not collide with the line and principles of the united front.

We have earlier shown the appropriate place of tactical alliances within the entire framework of our united front work. We have learned that although tactical alliances have a certain degree of importance, these cannot be put at par with the far more important tasks of strengthening the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry, winning over the urban petty bourgeoisie and attracting the national bourgeoisie.

We have also seen that tactical allies belong basically to the less reactionary sections of the ruling classes. We cannot expect that they will be able to keep in step with us throughout this stage of the revolution. They unite with us when they see the strength and power of revolutionary forces. And they are obliged to unite and cooperate with us in order to preserve or advance their own economic and political interests.

To better grasp the class interests of tactical allies, it is important for us to review the explanation in *Philippine Society and Revolution* regarding the nature and standpoint of the ruling classes to which these allies belong:

"The landlord class represents the most backward and reactionary relations of production and hinders the development of the productive forces. It is the main obstacle in the political, economic and cultural development of the Philippines. It is the main social base of imperialist rule and it exploits the greatest number of people in the country today. At the same time, it is a mere appendage of the international bourgeoisie, depending on imperialism for its survival and protection. It resists the people's democratic revolution violently and is, therefore, a target of the revolution. It supports and uses the Catholic Church as a feudal institution to protect its interests and it has political representatives in the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian Social Movement and other reactionary political organizations from the national level to the barrio level.

". . . .

“For tactical purposes, we may classify the landlords in several ways. ... Although the landlord class as a whole is a target of the Philippine revolution, landlords who are big, who are in authority and who are despotic are the chief targets. ...

“The landlords who are closest to the imperialists and who are most powerful in the national center of the reactionary government are involved in the export of such agricultural products as sugar, coconut, hemp, tobacco, banana and the like. They are tied up with the imperialists through loan agreements on their mills or machine equipment and also through marketing agreements. They are a decisive force in the outcome of reactionary electoral contests because they are big campaign financiers and they themselves vie for seats in the reactionary government. ...

“The comprador big bourgeoisie controls the present political system as it serves as the biggest financiers in political campaigns conducted by the reactionary parties ... and such political organizations as business chambers, civic organizations and clerical movements. The comprador big bourgeoisie is a target of the Philippine revolution and its political attitude is violently opposed to the national and democratic aspirations of the Filipino people. It is a class that is most virulent in promoting every political, economic, cultural and military measure for the perpetuation and aggravation of imperialist dominance in Philippine society.

“The bureaucrat capitalists are closely bound up with the compradors and landlords. These corrupt government officials provide immediate armed security to comprador rule in the cities and landlord rule in the countryside. Under such kind of rule, they can perpetrate graft and corruption and at the same time protect their own comprador and landlord interests. The reactionary state in the Philippines is essentially the joint dictatorship of the compradors, landlords and bureaucrat capitalists.”

Most of our tactical allies belong to the abovementioned classes.

Lessons from our conduct of tactical alliances

We have long been relating to tactical allies belonging to the landlord class and the bureaucrat capitalists. We have drawn valuable lessons from this experience. We must grasp these lessons and strive to improve our handling of tactical alliances.

One lesson is that we should not get carried away by the fleeting enthusiasm and agreeableness of tactical allies in dealing with us and that we should not categorize them as belonging to the ranks of the people nor should we classify them as progressive or as national-democrats. If they have long-standing relations with us but their class status remain, it is but proper that we categorize them as temporarily neutralized reactionaries and we deal with them as such.

Another important lesson is that we must make a distinction between enlightened landlords and unenlightened ones who should be categorized as class enemies. Enlightened landlords are those who cooperate with us in revolutionary land reform and support the armed struggle.

They differ from simply neutralized landlords who are obliged to agree to the peasants' demand for land-rent reduction and to pay taxes to the revolutionary movement. Landlords who have been merely neutralized deal with the revolutionary movement only because they are aware of our revolutionary strength and have no choice. But at every step in the implementation of land reform and taxation, they always seek to get themselves exempted and almost always they cannot conceal their antipathy towards the peasant masses and the rest of the basic masses.

Regarding the local bureaucrats who deal with us, especially during elections, we must be good at identifying which class each of them belongs to and deal with each accordingly. We should also analyze how the people regard them on the basis of their record as bureaucrats and/or as members of the ruling class.

We should not be misled when they tell us that they are against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and that they are for the program of the NDF and the revolutionary movement. Very often they express adherence to anything we advocate merely to win our goodwill and convince us to help them in winning in the elections. But before the public, they express the most reactionary ideas and they are extremely difficult to mobilize in defending the rights of the masses.

Our electoral support is reserved for candidates with a clearly progressive standpoint. We should not go out of our way to support tactical allies. At the most, tactical allies can benefit from our unilateral efforts to expose and oppose worse reactionaries and die-hards who may be their political rivals.

It is also extremely wrong for us to be drawn into openly supporting tactical allies in bourgeois electoral campaigns, no matter how long their dealings with us. It is even worse if, in the desire to secure the victory of a tactical ally, some of us are drawn into the antipeople practices of corrupt officials—such as intimidating ward leaders of rival candidates, ordering our Red fighters to consort with any politician's armed groups during the election campaign—or call on the Comelec and public school teachers to desist from electoral fraud and to ensure clean voting and polling.

Another important lesson is to have a good grasp of the relation of the actual value of our efforts at tactical alliances to the entire revolutionary effort. We should not overestimate the role of tactical alliances and commit the error of building a political party of the working masses to use as a magnet for politicians with whom we wish to ally or whom we wish to win over. Aside from unwittingly allowing the bureaucrats to use our organized forces, this also dissipates our efforts and resources which should be focused more on strengthening our own revolutionary forces. Another form of overestimating the role of tactical alliances and of bourgeois elections is to allow our cadres to become preoccupied with them for

long periods to the neglect of far more important tasks in consolidating the mass base.

Another important lesson is that we must cast away the notion that landlords with whom we relate can cooperate with us in administering abandoned lands and in solving the problems concerning *palitik* (clandestine extracontractual sharecropping authorized by the peasant association) with tenants in their land. This violates the antifeudal line of relying mainly on the poor and lower-middle peasants, winning over the middle peasants and neutralizing the rich peasants in order to isolate and overthrow the power of the diehard landlords in the countryside.

What we have mentioned above are the lessons that we have drawn from Right opportunist tendencies in conducting tactical alliances. Our main problem in the past was Right opportunist tendencies. However, we must also be alert to and correct "Left" tendencies.

There is the error of overstressing struggle with tactical allies or those whom we wish to become tactical allies and not recognizing the need to make concessions that neither violate our principles nor undermine the strengthening of the basic alliance. This is reflected in the tendency of some of us to indiscriminately confiscate some landlords' produce in order to create a leverage when they do not immediately come to an agreement with the people's army unit and even if they have not committed any counterrevolutionary crime against the movement.

We have also seen the same error in the setting of extremely heavy taxes on landlords as a result of the desire to finance large continuous coordinated mass mobilizations, to appropriate funds for initial Party branches in the barrios, to accumulate medical funds and operational expenses for the people's army in the midst of the premature regularization of the people's army and intensification of the war.

As we rectify errors and improve our conduct of tactical alliance, our relations with tactical allies will become more fruitful and we will be able to further consolidate the strength of the basic revolutionary forces, with more and more allies joining in various aspects of our revolutionary work. #

On the Nature of National Democracy and Socialist Construction

By Wesley Fiore, CNL
July 1996

CNL's *Renmin Malaya* has never advocated the view that the new democratic revolution is for the building of capitalism in the main or making it dominant in "national democratic society". He has never taken the position that the "freak" situation of competitive capitalism sans the corresponding political and cultural superstructure peculiar and particular to capitalist formations in the strict sense "follows the national democratic revolution" (words of *Rebolusyon's* editors). He is definitely not of the opinion that a national democratic society shall be set up after the revolutionary seizure of political power, to last indefinitely before socialist construction could ever begin. This does not mean that a national democratic society *with* a socialist perspective cannot/will not exist. *Renmin Malaya* has simply articulated CNL's traditional views on the nature of national democracy and socialist construction.

I am of the opinion that a national democratic society is being built in the course of the new democratic revolution, and that this society-in-formation shall last well after the seizure of political power *until* socialist relations of production and their corresponding superstructure shall have become *dominant*, and dominant enough to articulate within its mode whatever pre-socialist modes have yet to give up the ghost. There is therefore a definite life to national democracy *before* the dominance of socialism.

But socialist construction is to begin after the seizure of political power. As a matter of fact it can already begin in the base areas, conditions permitting (where political power may be said to have been seized on a micro level?) Socialist construction is a process of laying down the conditions for the dominance of socialist relations and superstructures. Socialist construction upon seizure of political power is, in my view, not yet socialism in the strict holistic sense of the term.

There are two (among others) basic conditions for socialist construction which I would like to stress here, namely: the destruction of semifeudalism-semicolonialism (seizure of political power) and competitive capitalism in the course of the new democratic revolution. Destroying semifeudalism and semicolonialism is giving freedom to the forces of competitive capitalism to fulfill their historic role in social development before they succumb to the persuasive power of socialist forces. Competitive capitalism is immediately dominant after the destruction of semifeudalism and semicolonialism simply because the national bourgeoisie, the rich peasants, the poor and middle peasants who have been benefited by the revolutionary land-to-the-tiller program will already be at an economic advantage over their socialist rivals. It must be emphasized that, ironically, the peasants to whom land has been given constitute the biggest single block to socialist construction. It will take much time and patience to convince bearers of the capitalist paradigm to take to socialism. The persuasive instruments shall be socialist education, correct political guidance and, above all, successful socialist experiments such as cooperatives, workers' councils, worker-run state enterprises, etc. Indeed, this is the competition that one expects in "national-democratic society"; socialist construction versus features of capitalism.

I predict that it will take a very long time after victory when socialist construction shall immediately begin (if it has not begun before this) before socialist relations shall be dominant and deter-

minant in Philippine society. What do we call a society that has ousted the landlord and big comprador classes from power, that is patient with capitalist features of temporary character (promoted by a vast number of peasant owner-cultivators, rich peasants, national bourgeoisie and their allies), and is engaged in socialist construction where conditions are not yet favorable to dictatorship of the proletariat as a unique form of state? Why not a "national democratic society with a socialist perspective"?

Socialist construction shall be done within the framework of a national democratic society, to eventually subvert this through social demonstration of socialist instruments of change. Central to this construction, and therefore to the transition to socialism, is the People's Democratic State with its coalition government. This is the state before the socialist state or dictatorship of the proletariat (in Lenin's sense as expounded in *State and Revolution*).

I believe the editors of *Rebolusyon* err in stating that proletarian dictatorship is at the core of the people's democratic state or coalition government ("The proletarian dictatorship is in fact at the core of the broad form that it takes, which is the people's democratic state or coalition government"). The correct statement should be: people's democratic state under proletarian leadership or hegemony. This leadership may be exercised in various ways and not necessarily through communists being actually at the helm of government.

Proletarian dictatorship/dictatorship of the proletariat is a qualitatively new type of state and is designed for socialist society and not for national democracy even if this has a socialist perspective. And of course, dictatorship of the proletariat is not to be equated with dictatorship of the Party. If my reading of *State and Revolution* is correct, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, the popular proletarian organs of power are, so to speak, at the foreground while the Party moves to the background. The Party does have political power and is capable of leading the people to socialism, but it is

clear that it is not the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies celebrated by Lenin.

For the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at the core of the people's democratic state or coalition government is to have a state within a state. This situation aggravates the anticommunist "Red scare" propaganda of counterrevolution. The people's democratic state is a dictatorship of the democratic classes, and this state is under the leadership of the proletariat. This state is not proletarian but is liberal democratic in nature with a strong bias for socialist construction!

One of the many duties/tasks of proletarian leadership in national democracy is to see to it that socialist construction is done and is done at a reasonable (politically, socially, culturally) pace. Rightists (like national democrats of the old type) may want capitalist features to remain forever. Leftists (perhaps including some impetuous communists) may want to fast-track socialist construction. Proletarian leadership should be able to convince the people on which ways and means and schedules towards socialism are most reasonable. It can do this in many ways such as through the 1/3-1/3-1/3 apportionment of seats in organs of political power (remember the model?) where proletarian leadership should be able to muster a 2/3 majority political power for a correct political line if consensus is not achieved.

Proletarian leadership should also be able to guide the coalition government to take a bias for the development of the peasant cooperatives, the workers' councils and the state enterprises which have not been leased by the state to the national bourgeoisie. These economic instrumentalities should not be disadvantaged in their social demonstrations or experiments in the face of competition from the national bourgeoisie, the rich peasants and the independent owner-cultivators. It is envisioned that as socialist features develop the economic bases of the capitalist class would be eroded with little or no violence involved. The peasant cooperatives and the work-

ers' councils must be privileged over state enterprises (which Soviet revisionism failed to do). Proletarian leadership must see to it that the people are not fast-tracked into socialism.

The coalition government and local communities under proletarian guidance should also be able to develop culture and values and social relations conducive to socialist construction and international understanding and cooperation.

Socialist society does not begin with socialist construction upon seizure of political power. Even with all the strategic enterprises under state control. One must not equate the state's full control of the entire economic and financial system with socialism. There are a lot of things to be done in the new democratic revolution before full-fledged socialism is named in the Philippines. #

On the Stages of the Philippine Revolution

We think that our article, "On the Question of Stages in the Philippine Revolution" (Series 1995, No. 3, July-September), adequately covers the points raised anew by the foregoing article of Wesley Fiore of the Christians for National Liberation.

But we are publishing his article to allow us to make a rejoinder in an effort to encapsulate, reiterate and emphasize those points that we have already made in the abovementioned editorial article in the light of the theory and practice of scientific socialism and in accordance with the concrete conditions in the Philippines.

1. We are now in the process of a national-democratic revolution against the semicolonial and semifeudal ruling system. This revolution is of a new type because it is no longer led by the bourgeoisie but by the proletariat and it has a socialist perspective.

Under semicolonial and semifeudal conditions, we cannot do socialist construction. In the course of the new-democratic revolution, however, we can prepare and develop certain factors for socialist revolution and construction in the consequent stage.

Such factors include: the class leadership of the proletariat through the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the building of the people's army as the main component of state power under the leadership of the CPP, the fulfillment of the peasant demand for land and other bourgeois-democratic measures, education in Marxism-Leninism for the leading force and development of national, scientific and mass culture and so on.

Short of winning political power nationwide, the only conceivable situation in which socialist revolution and construction can be started is when the proletariat and the people win political power in so large a part of the Philippines that may be comparable to the

northern parts of Korea or Vietnam prior to national reunification. Also consider how the imperialists react with something like the Korean War or Vietnam War.

2. The new-democratic revolution is basically completed when the proletariat and the people seize political power nationwide. Only such a political power, won through protracted people's war, can make the next stage of socialist revolution possible.

The New People's Army is the main component of the new state power. It is under the absolute leadership of the CPP, which is the advanced detachment and the instrument of the proletariat as leading class in the Philippine revolution. Therefore, the proletarian dictatorship is at the core of the people's democratic class dictatorship.

There is no self-contradiction between the expressions "proletarian dictatorship at the core" and "the people's democratic class dictatorship". The latter expression reflects and emphasizes the democratic basis of the new state power, especially the worker-peasant alliance.

Under the current conditions of the Philippines, there is also no self-contradiction in calling the reactionary state as either the joint class dictatorship of the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class or simply the dictatorship of the comprador big bourgeoisie to focus on the most powerful class at the core and leadership of the Philippine bourgeois state.

3. After the basic completion of the new-democratic revolution through the nationwide victory of the armed revolution led by the proletariat, the two requisites for starting the socialist revolution and construction shall exist:

First, the proletariat wields political power because the CPP exercises absolute leadership over the people's army and is in a position to adopt and apply a socialist policy, including transitory bourgeois-democratic measures, to suppress the class enemies of the new state and to oppose imperialist intervention.

Second, the proletariat begins to make dominant the socialist character of the economy and to develop the socialist economy by taking over the existing strategic industries, main sources of raw materials and major lines of distribution and communication, by promoting production in the socialist state sector and cooperativization among the peasants and by keeping within the socialist framework and giving a socialist direction even to such transitory measures as the joint state-private enterprises, industrial and agricultural cooperatives and whatever temporarily permissible private enterprise.

4. When we say that we struggle for national democracy or alternately say that we strive to complete the struggle for national liberation and democracy, we mean to do so in the current stage of the Philippine revolution.

We do not mean to say that upon the basic completion of the national-democratic revolution we shall have to build a "national-democratic society", restrain ourselves from making the radical rupture from the old economy and society and allow competitive capitalism to flourish before launching the socialist revolution and making dominant the socialist transformation of the economy. The proletarian leadership must see to it that the socialist transformation of the economy and society is given full play and bourgeois right restricted.

As Marxist-Leninists, we must recognize both the distinction and continuity of the new-democratic and socialist stages of the Philippine revolution and show qualitative changes in the character of the mode of production, state power and culture from one stage to another.

We can also alternately describe the Philippine socialist state and society as people's democracy, in the early period of the socialist stage, or to describe it generally and continuously as national, independent, democratic, free, just, prosperous, progressive,

peace-loving and internationalist, without emphasizing but also without denying the socialist transformation and construction.

The aforesaid descriptions are valid but should not interpose the building of a "national-democratic society" as a bar to the commencement and development of socialist revolution and construction or to becloud the necessity and reality of proletarian dictatorship, the leadership of the communists and the socialist character of the revolution after the basic completion of the new-democratic revolution.

5. If the CPP is capable of leading the new-democratic revolution to victory as the advanced detachment of the proletariat, it necessarily follows that it continues to lead the socialist revolution and construction for so long as it is the genuine revolutionary instrument of the proletariat.

There is no class other than the proletariat that can lead the socialist revolution and construction. There is no other party that can represent the revolutionary proletariat but its own advanced detachment, guided by Marxism-Leninism.

To give up the principle of proletarian revolutionary leadership and proletarian dictatorship and concede that communists are not necessarily at the helm of government after the stage of national-democratic revolution is to deliver the state to the big bourgeoisie directly or indirectly through the mediation of the revisionists and the petty and middle bourgeoisie, as it has happened in the former socialist countries.

At any time that the communists lose the leadership on behalf of the proletariat or the Party loses its proletarian character in the long period of transition from socialism to communism, the big bourgeoisie seizes political power and changes the character of the state and society, under the cover of supraclass petty-bourgeois slogans and with the active assistance of an anticommunist petty bourgeoisie.

The proletariat has the historic mission of building socialism in various countries until imperialism is defeated on a global scale and communism becomes possible. In the long historical epoch of socialism, the main contradiction will be between the proletariat striving to accomplish the radical rupture of mankind from the institution of private ownership of the means of production and the bourgeoisie ever trying to resist social revolution and recover its lost political power by any possible means. #