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Industrialisation, the Grain Problem, and the Situation in the C. P. S. U.

Speech delivered by Comrade STALIN at the November Plenum of the
C. C. of the C. P. S. U.

(Full text of speech.)

We have already published a telegraphic summary of the following speech by Comrade Stalin.
Ed.

Comrades, I shall deal with three main questions raised in the theses of the Political Bureau. First with the question of the industrialisation of the country, and with the circumstance that the ruling factor in this industrialisation is the development of the production of the means of production, accompanied by measures for securing the most rapid possible tempo for this development. Next the question that in Russia the speed of agricultural development is much less than that of industry, so that the most urgent inner political problem of the present moment, therefore, is the question of agriculture, especially the grain question, the problem of how agriculture can be furthered and reconstructed on a new technical basis. The third question, finally, is that of the deviations, the struggle on two fronts, and the establishment of the fact that the chief danger with us at present is the Right danger.

1. THE QUESTION OF THE SPEED OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

The starting point of our theses is the realisation that the rapid development of industry in general, and of the output of means of production in particular, form the foundation of all foundations, the key to the industrialisation of the country, and to the reconstruction of our whole national economy on the basis of socialist development. But what does a rapid rate of development mean? It means: More capital invested in industry. And this brings us to the fact that all our plans, both those included in the state budget and those outside of it, are plans demanding the intensest exertion. Truly the characteristic feature of our control figures during the last three years, the period of reconstruction, is the fact that these control figures have been compiled and carried out under the highest tension. If we consider our control figures or our budget estimates, or if we speak with Party comrades engaged in Party

organisation work or in the work of developing our Soviet, economic, and co-operative organisations — everywhere and in everything we find this same characteristic feature of high tension. The question arises: Is this tension really necessary for our work? Is it not possible to do without it? Could we not carry on the work at a slower pace, in a more "peaceful" atmosphere? Is the rapidity of development in our industry not perhaps to be explained by the restless character of our Politbureau and Council of Peoples' Commissars? Of course not. The members of the Politbureau and of the government are sober and steady people. Regarded abstractedly, without reference to the external and internal situation, we could of course advance more slowly. But in the first place it is impossible for us to abstract ourselves from the external and internal situation, and in the second place we must admit that precisely this situation in which we find ourselves at present demands a high speed for our industrial development.

External conditions. We came into power in a country in which technics are extremely backward. We have a few great industrial units based more or less on modern technics, but besides these we have hundreds and thousands of small undertakings whose equipment can stand no criticism from the standpoint of up-to-date technical achievement. We are, however, surrounded by capitalist countries enjoying the advantages of industrial technics much more highly developed than in our country. A glance at the capitalist countries suffices to show us that here technics do not merely advance, they rush forward, overtaking the old forms of industrial technics. Whilst, on the one hand, we possess in our country the most advanced power in the world, the Soviet power, on the other hand, the technics of that industry which forms the basis of socialism, and of the Soviet Union, is exceedingly backward. Surely you cannot believe that the final victory of socialism can be attained if this contradiction continues to exist? What must we do to liquidate this contradiction? The first necessity is to catch up with and pass the advanced technics of the developed capitalist countries. We have caught up with and passed the advanced capitalist countries in that we have established a new political order, the Soviet order. This is good. But it is too little. In order to secure the final victory of socialism, we must catch up with and pass these countries technically as well. We have either to accomplish this or be crushed. This is true not only from the standpoint of the building up of socialism. It is equally true from the standpoint of the defence of the independence of our country under the conditions given by the capitalist surroundings. It is impossible to defend the independence of our country without having at our disposal a sufficient industrial basis for this defence. It is impossible to create this industrial basis unless we have at our disposal the latest achievements of industrial technics. This entails the necessity of rapid industrial development, and therefore this is forced upon us.

The technical and economic backwardness of our country is not our invention. It is a backwardness already some centuries old, bequeathed us by the whole history of our country. This backwardness was already felt to be an evil in former times, both in the pre-revolutionary period and later, in the revolutionary period. When Peter the Great, who had to deal with the more highly developed countries of the West, ran up works and factories in feverish haste for the provision of army supplies and for strengthening the defences of the country, he made a remarkable effort to leap beyond the confines of this backwardness. It is, however, easily understood that no one belonging to the old classes, either the feudal aristocracy or the bourgeoisie, was able to accomplish the task of liquidating the backwardness of our country. More than this: These classes were not only incapable of accomplishing this task, they were not even capable facing up to this task, in a satisfactory manner. The century-old backwardness of our country can only be removed by successful socialist construction. Only the proletariat can liquidate it, by exercising its dictatorship and holding the reins of government in its hands.

We should be foolish were we to console ourselves with the thought that the backwardness of our country is no invention of ours, but has come down to us from the whole history of our country, so that we are not and cannot be responsible for it. This is wrong, comrades. Having once taken over power, and having once undertaken the task of reorganising

the country on the basis of socialism, we are and must be responsible for everything, good and bad. Being responsible for everything, we must liquidate our technical backwardness. This is our imperative duty if we want to catch up with and pass the advanced capitalist countries. Only we Bolsheviks can accomplish this, and nobody else. And if we are really to carry out this task, then we must provide systematically for the rapid development of our industry. That we have already commenced with the acceleration of the speed of our industrial development is obvious to everyone today.

The question of catching up with and passing the advanced capitalist countries with respect to technics and economics is not new or unexpected to us Bolsheviks. These are questions which were raised by us as early as 1917, in the period before the October revolution. Lenin had already put these questions in September 1917, on the eve of the October revolution, at a time when the imperialist war was still being fought. In his pamphlet: "The approaching catastrophe and how to combat it", he wrote:

"The revolution has accomplished this, that Russia has in a few months outstripped the advanced countries with respect to its political order. But this is too little. War is inexorable; it propounds the question with relentless directness: either be defeated or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically as well... Defeat or full steam ahead. That is how history puts the question."

We see that Comrade Lenin put very sharply the question of liquidating our technical and economic backwardness.

Comrade Lenin wrote this on the eve of the October revolution, in the period before the conquest of power, at a time when the Bolsheviks had not yet the power in their hands, nor a socialised industry, nor a widespread network of co-operatives comprising millions of peasants, nor collective and Soviet farms. Now that we have many essentials already at our disposal for the thorough liquidation of our technical and economic backwardness, we might rearrange Lenin's words as follows: "We have caught up with and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries politically, by our establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But this is too little. We must make use of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of our socialised industry, of our transport and credit services, etc., of our co-operatives, our collective undertakings, Soviet farms, etc., for the purpose of catching up with and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries economically as well."

The question of the rapid pace of industrial development would not be so acute as it is today had we such highly developed industries, or such highly developed technics, as for instance Germany, or if the proportion of industry to the total national economy were as high as it is in Germany. Were such the case, then our industry could develop more slowly without running the danger of falling behind the capitalist countries, and could feel secure that it could overtake these at one stroke. But to be in this position we should have to have another inheritance than that of our technical and economic backwardness. In actual fact we are behind Germany in economy and technics, and have not by any means overtaken it.

Nor would the question of the rapid development of industry be so acute were we not the sole country under a proletarian dictatorship, were we one of several countries in which the proletarian dictatorship existed, were the rule of the proletariat not confined to our country alone, but prevailed in other advanced countries, such as Germany and France. Were this the case, the capitalist surroundings would not constitute that serious danger to us which they do today. The question of the economic independence of our country would then drop into the background; we could regard ourselves as a constituent in the system of more developed proletarian states; we could obtain machinery from these other states for the promotion of our industry and agriculture and give them our raw materials and foodstuffs in return; and we could permit ourselves to develop our industry at a slower pace. But as you are well aware, these conditions are not yet ours. We are still the sole country under the dictatorship of the proletariat; we are still surrounded by capitalist countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically and economically.

Therefore Comrade Lenin treated the question of catching up with and passing the economic status of the advanced countries as a vital question for our development.

These are the external conditions demanding a rapid pace of development of our industry.

Internal conditions. Besides the external conditions, there are internal conditions which again demand that our industry should develop rapidly if it is to fulfil its part as a leading and fundamental factor of our whole national economy. I refer to the immeasurable backwardness of our agriculture, its technical aids, its culture. Nor must we forget that in our country the small producers of goods, scattered, each producing on the most backward of systems, form the overwhelming majority. Compared with these our whole socialised industry is but an island in the ocean; an island whose base extends from day to day, but which is still only an island in the ocean. We are wont to say that industry is the leading and fundamental factor of all national economy, including agriculture, that industry is that key with whose help our backward and scattered agriculture can unlock the gate to collective reorganisation. This is perfectly correct. We must not deviate by a hair's breadth from this standpoint. We must, however, remember that if industry is the leading fundamental factor, agriculture, on the other hand, is the basis upon which industry is built up, both as the market absorbing the products of industry, as the supplier of raw materials and food, and as the source of those export reserves required for obtaining means of production for the needs of national economy. Industry cannot advance so long as agriculture is carried on under entirely obsolete technical conditions, or so long as the agricultural basis of industry is not secured, agriculture not reconstructed and not raised to the level of industry. This sets us the task of supplying agriculture as liberally as possible with machines and means of production enabling the work of reconstruction to be carried on on a new technical basis. The fulfilment of this task involves the acceleration of the speed of industrial development. The reconstruction of agriculture, scattered and disunited, is of course a much more difficult task than the reconstruction of a united and centralised socialist industry. But the task is there, and must be accomplished. And the only way of accomplishing it is by a rapid pace of industrial development. It is not possible to go on for ever, that is, for too long a time, with a socialist construction and a Soviet power based on two different foundations: on the foundation of a great and actually socialised industry on the one hand and on the foundation of a scattered and utterly backward peasant small production. Agriculture must be reorganised, gradually but systematically and determinedly, on a new technical basis, the basis of collective production, and adapted to socialised industry. Either we shall accomplish this task, and thereby ensure the final victory, or we shall fail to accomplish it, and then the return to capitalism may become inevitable.

On this point Lenin observed:

"So long as we live in a small-peasant country, capitalism has a firmer economic basis in Russia than communism. We must remember this. Anyone who has observed village life carefully, and compared it with town life, knows that we have not torn up the roots of capitalism, nor undermined the foundations of the inner enemy. This latter leans on the small peasant undertaking, and only one means is at our disposal for undermining his position: to transfer the economy of the country, including agriculture, to a new technical basis of up-to-date large-scale production. Only electricity furnishes such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country."

You observe that what Lenin understood under the electrification of the country was not the isolated erection of separate power stations, but the gradual "transference of the economy of the country, including agriculture, to the technical basis of up-to-date large-scale production", a process bound up directly or indirectly with electrification.

This speech was held by Comrade Lenin at the VIII. Soviet Congress in December 1920, before the introduction of the N. E. P., at the time when he was substantiating the so-called electrification plan. Some comrades are of the opinion that the statement made by Lenin in this quotation are no longer applicable to present realities, for the reason, as they say, that much water has flowed under the bridge since that time. It is of course true that much water has flowed under the bridge since

then. Today we have a developed socialised industry, collective farms are a mass phenomenon, we have old and new Soviet farms, we have a ramified network of developed co-operative organisations, we have loan centres where the peasant farms can hire means of production, we make use of the system of purchase contracts for future crops as a new form of co-operation, and we can set all these and various other levers in action for the gradual reorganisation of agriculture on the basis of modern technics. All this is quite true: But it is equally true that nevertheless we are a small peasant country with a majority of small producers. And this is the main point. And so long as it remains the main point Lenin's thesis remains in force, that "so long as we live in a small peasant country, capitalism has a firmer economic basis in Russia than communism", and consequently the danger of a restoration of capitalism is no empty phrase.

Lenin said the same, but in an even sharper form, in his draft of his pamphlet on "Taxation in Kind", written after the introduction of the Nep. (April 1921):

"If electrification is carried out within 10 to 20 years, then we have nothing to fear from the individualism of the small farmer and his local trade. If there is no electrification, then in any case the return to capitalism is inevitable."

And further, in the same pamphlet:

"10 to 20 years of the right relations to the peasantry and the victory is assured on an international scale (even if the proletarian revolutions now developing should be delayed), or otherwise 20 to 40 years of White-Guard Terror."

Lenin put the question bluntly. Either electrification, that is, "the reorganisation of the whole economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the basis of up-to-date large-scale production", or return to capitalism.

This was Lenin's conception of the "right relations to the peasantry".

It is not a question of pampering the peasant and seeing in this the maintenance of right relations, but a question of helping the peasant to reorganise his farm "on a new technical basis, the technical basis of up-to-date large-scale production"; this is the main path towards the emancipation of the peasant from want and poverty.

It is, however, impossible to reorganise the country on a new technical basis without the rapid development of our industry, especially of the production of the means of production.

These, then, are the internal conditions necessitating a rapid rate of development of our industry.

We have seen the external and internal conditions determining the strained character of the control figures of our national economy.

Therein lies the reason why our economic plans — both within and without the limits of our state budget — show evidence of intense exertion, and involve serious expenditure for capital investment, aiming above all at the maintenance of a high speed of industrial development.

It may be asked: Where is this stated in the theses, in what passage of the theses?

A voice: Yes, where is it stated?

Stalin: The theses state this when they tell us the total sum of the capital invested in our industry in 1928/29. The theses state that in 1928/29 we invest 1650 million roubles in industry. In other words: This means an increase of 330 million roubles compared with last year, showing that we are not only maintaining the speed of industrial development, but are going a step further by investing more capital in industry this year than last, that is, by increasing our industrial capital investment both absolutely and relatively. This is the essential point of the theses on the control figures of our national economy. But some of our comrades cannot see the wood for the trees; they criticise here and there among the petty details of the theses on the control figures, but fail to observe the most important point.

2. THE GRAIN PROBLEM.

So far I have dealt with the first of the most important questions of the theses, the question of the rate of industrial development. Let us now pass to the second important question, that of the grain problem. It is characteristic of the theses that they lay special emphasis on the problem of agricultural development in general and on the grain supply question in particular. Are the theses right in this respect? I believe they are. As early as the July Plenum it was stated that the extreme backwardness of our agriculture in general and of our grain supply organisation in particular, represent the weakest point in the development of our economics. When we say that our agriculture is not keeping pace with our industry, and deplore this circumstance, that is in itself not such a serious matter. Agriculture always does remain behind industry and always will. This is especially true for us, since our conditions induce a maximum concentration of industry and a maximum splitting up of agriculture. One can quite understand that industry, being concentrated, can develop more rapidly than scattered agriculture. One natural result of this is the leadership of industry over agriculture. Therefore, the fact that agriculture normally lags behind industry would not be any reason for speaking of a grain problem. The problem of the grain supply, does not become serious until the speed of agricultural development is abnormally exceeded by that of industry. The distinguishing feature of the present status of our economy is, however, precisely this abnormal out-distancing of our grain production as compared with our industrial development, accompanied by an enormous increase in the demand for grain from the growing cities and industrial centres. It is not our task to reduce the rate of industrial development to that of the development of our grain production — this would throw everything into confusion and reverse our development — but to increase the rate of development of grain production to a level providing a secure basis for the rapid advance of our whole national economy, both in industry and in agriculture. Either we solve this problem, and with it the grain problem, or we fail to solve it, and face the inevitable breach between the socialist town and the petty bourgeois village. Comrades, this is the question as it really stands. This is the essence of the grain problem.

But does this not mean that our present position is one of "stagnation", or even of "retrogression" in the development of our grain production? This is the form in which Comrade Frumkin puts the question in his second letter on the subject, which we have distributed today at his request to the members of the C. C. and of the C. C. C. He states openly that our agriculture is "stagnating". "We cannot", he observes, "and must not speak in the press of a retrogression, but within the Party itself we must not conceal the fact that this lagging behind is tantamount to retrogression". Is Comrade Frumkin's assertion correct? It need not be said that it is not. We, the members of the Politbureau, by no means agree with such an assertion. The theses of the Polit-bureau differ radically from this view of the status of our grain production:

Let us first endeavour to form a clear idea of what retrogression really is and how it would be expressed in agriculture. It is obvious that it would mean a retrogressive and downward movement in agriculture, an abandonment of the new forms of cultivation and a return to old and mediaeval methods. It would be expressed in retrogression from the three course system back to the fallow system, in the return from machinery and iron ploughs to the wooden plough, from high grade cleaned seed to uncleaned low grade seed, from up-to-date methods of cultivation to obsolete ones, and the like. Are any such facts recorded? Is it not universally known that thousands and thousands of peasant farms are advancing yearly from the three course to the four and multiple course systems, from inferior seed to high quality seed, from the wooden plough to the iron plough and to machinery, from the lower to the highest forms of cultivation?

It must be said that Comrade Frumkin is fond of hanging to the coat-tails of some member or other of the Polit-bureau when seeking to substantiate his standpoint. It is extremely possible that in the given case he will attempt to cling to Comrade Bukharin, and to prove that Comrade Bukharin says "the same" in his article: "Notes of an Economist". But what Com-

rade Bukharin says is by no means "the same". Comrade Bukharin deals in his article with the abstract theoretical question of the possibility or the danger of retrogression. To put this question in the abstract is entirely possible and allowable. But what does Comrade Frumkin do? He transforms the abstract question of the possibility of retrogression into the fact of the degradation of agriculture. And this he calls an analysis of the status of our grain production! Comrades, is this not ridiculous?

It would be a fine Soviet government which accomplished no more for its agriculture within eleven years than retrogression. Such a government would deserve to be driven from its position, and not to be supported. A government which had led agriculture into retrogression would have been overthrown by the workers long ago. The song of retrogression is being ground out by a number of bourgeois experts, who dream day and night that our agriculture retrogresses. Trotzky, too, dinned retrogression into our ears at one time. Truly I did not expect that Comrade Frumkin would fall into this doubtful line.

What is Comrade Frumkin's substantiation for his assertion on retrogression? Firstly, that the area under grain cultivation has diminished this year in comparison with last. How is this fact to be explained? Is it due to the policy pursued by the Soviet government? Certainly not. Its explanation is the destruction of the winter corn in the steppes of the Ukraine, and in part in North Caucasia, and by the drought in these same regions of the Ukraine during the summer. Were it not for these climatic accidents, upon which agriculture is entirely dependent, the area under grain cultivation would have been greater by one million dessiatines this year than last. Comrade Frumkin further refers to the circumstance that the gross yield of the grain crops for this year is only slightly higher (70 million poods) than last year, while the wheat and rye crops are 200 million poods less. And what is the explanation of this? The same phenomena, the drought, the destruction of the winter crops by early frosts. Were it not for these unfavourable climatic conditions, this year the gross grain crops would have exceeded last year's by 300 million poods. How is it possible simply to ignore such factors as drought, early frost, etc., when these are of decisive importance for the crops of the various districts? We now set ourselves the task: Increase of the cultivated area by 7 per cent., of the crop per land unit by 3 per cent., and of the gross yield of grain crop, I believe, by 10 per cent. There can be no doubt that we shall take every measure necessary for the accomplishment of this task. Still it is possible that in spite of all these measures there may be partial failures of crops in this or that region, due to drought or early frost, resulting in a diminution of the gross harvests of grain as compared with our estimates or even as compared with the harvest of this year. Would this mean that agriculture has "retrogressed", that the policy of the Soviet government is to blame for this "retrogression", that we have "robbed" the peasant of economic incentive and "deprived" him of economic prospects?

A few years ago the same error was committed by Trotzky, who maintained that "rain" was of no importance for agriculture. He was refuted by comrade Rykov, who was supported by the overwhelming majority of the members of the C. C. Now Comrade Frumkin falls into this same error; he ignores those climatic conditions upon which agriculture depends, and casts all responsibility upon the policy of our Party.

What are the ways and means to be adopted to accelerate the rate of development of agriculture in general and of grain production in particular? There are three such ways or channels: 1. Increase of crops per land unit and extension of cultivated area in the individual middle and small peasant farms; 2. further development of the collective units; 3. extension of the old Soviet farms and establishment of new ones. These points were already mentioned at the July Plenum. The theses repeat the statements made at the July Plenum, but in a more concrete form, and give definite figures for certain investments. Comrade Frumkin finds here another occasion to make objection. He believes that if the first place is given to the individual economic units, and the second and third to the collective and Soviet undertakings, this signifies nothing more nor less than the victory of his standpoint. This is simply ridiculous. If the matter is regarded from the standpoint of the relative importance of this or that form of agricultural unit, then the first place must of course be accorded to the individual units, since their production of grain for the market is six times the amount of that of the collective and Soviet farms.

But if we take the standpoint of the type of land cultivation most highly valued by us, then it need not be said that the collective and Soviet farms, representing the highest type of agricultural undertaking as compared with the individual farm, naturally take the first place. Is it really necessary to prove further that we are capable of accepting both these standpoints?

What must be done to begin work in all these three directions, to the end that the rate of agricultural development may be actually accelerated, above all the rate of grain production?

In the first place it is necessary to draw the attention of our Party cadres to agricultural questions, and especially to the definite problems of our grain supply. We have had enough of platitudes and talk about agriculture in general; it is high time for us to work out practical measures for our grain production in accordance with the multifarious conditions obtaining in the various districts. We must go forward from words to deeds, and tackle the practical question of how the production per land unit is to be increased and the seed area of the poor and middle peasant farms extended; how the collective and Soviet farms are to be improved and developed; how the aid given to the peasantry by the collective and Soviet farms, in the form of better seed and breeding live stock, is to be organised; how the loaning of machinery and other implements is to be handled by the loan centres; how the system of purchasing future harvests by contract, and indeed the whole system of agricultural co-operatives, etc., is to be extended and improved.

(A voice: But that is practicisim!)

Stalin: It is a kind of practicisim which is imperatively necessary, otherwise we run the danger of the extremely grave problem of grain production being drowned in the flood of agricultural generalisations. The C. C. has set itself the task of submitting to the Council of the People's Commissars and to the Polit-bureau concrete reports, to be drawn up by our leading comrades in the most important grain regions, and dealing with questions of agricultural development. At the Plenum now sitting Comrade Andreyev will report on the necessary measures for solving the grain problem in North Caucasia. I am of the opinion that we shall find similar successive reports necessary from the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth district, the region on the lower Volga, Siberia, etc. This is urgently needful in order to draw the attention of the Party to the grain problem, and to accustom our Party cadres to adopting a definite standpoint with regard to the questions involved in this problem.

It is further necessary that our Party functionaries, in their practical activities in the village, differentiate strictly between the middle peasantry and the kulaks, and take care that the blow intended for the big peasant does not hit the middle peasant. It is time to put an end to the errors committed in this direction. Let us take for instance the question of individual taxation. We have the decision of the Polit-bureau, as well, as a corresponding law, providing for the individual taxation of at most 2 to 3 per cent. of the big peasants, i. e. of the richest section of the big peasantry. But what is actually taking place? There are numerous districts in which 10, 12, and more per cent. are taxed, so that the middle peasantry too are subjected to individual taxation. Surely we must put a stop to this crime. But instead of taking actual steps for abolishing this and other evils, our worthy "critics" employ their time in hair-splitting, and propose that the words "the richest section of the big peasants" be replaced by "the most powerful section of the big peasants", or the "topmost stratum of the big peasants". As if these were not all precisely one and the same! It is an established fact that we have, in round numbers, 5 per cent. of big peasants. It is an established fact that only 2 to 3 per cent. of the peasant farms, that is, the richest section of the big peasants, are individually taxed. And it is an established fact that in actual practice this law is not observed in numerous districts. The "critics" inundate us with wordy tirades, but do not appear to grasp that they do not thereby alter matters in the least.

(A voice: It has been proposed to tax all big peasants individually.)

Stalin: Then we must demand at the same time the cancellation of the law individually taxing 2 to 3 per cent. of the big peasants. I have, however, not yet heard that the repealing of the law on individual taxation has been demanded by anyone. We are told that the arbitrary extension of individual taxation is to serve the purpose of swelling the communal exchequers. But we cannot fill our communal treasuries by violating the law, and by setting aside the directives of the Party. The Party exists, it has not yet been liquidated. The Soviet government exists, it has not yet been liquidated. If the municipal treasuries are running low, the budget question must be raised, but laws must not be broken nor the Party line deviated from.

It is further necessary to give greater incentive to the individual small and middle peasant farms. The measures already taken, the raising of the prices of bread corn, the practical application of revolutionary law, the practical aid given the middle and poor peasant agricultural undertakings by the system of buying up the harvests on contract beforehand, etc. are a great economic stimulant. Comrade Frumkin is of the opinion that we have completely, or almost completely, crushed this incentive. This is perfectly absurd. Were this the case, then it would be impossible to comprehend upon what the union, the alliance between the working class and the decisive masses of the peasantry is based. It cannot be maintained that this alliance is a moral one. We must surely see that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an alliance calculated on the mutual interests of two classes, a class alliance between the workers and the decisive masses of the peasantry, having as its object their mutual advantage. Had we crushed, or almost crushed, all economic incentive, and deprived the peasants of all economic prospects, then the alliance between the working class and the peasantry would have ceased to exist. Obviously there is no question of the "creation" or "destruction" of economic incentive for the masses of the poor and middle peasants, but solely a question of developing and strengthening this incentive in the common interests of the working class and the decisive masses of the peasantry. This is the subject matter of the theses on the control figures of our national economy.

Finally, the village must be better supplied with commodities, both for consumption, and for purposes of production (machines, fertilisers, etc.), enabling agricultural output to be increased. We cannot maintain that everything is as it should be in this respect at present. The commodity shortage has not by any means been overcome, and it is not probable that it will be within a short time. There are, however, circles in our Party which cherish the delusion that we are already in a position to abolish the commodity shortage. Unfortunately this is not the case. We must not forget that lack of commodities is the consequence of 1. the growing prosperity of the workers and peasants with its resultant enormous increase in the effective demand for goods, which are being produced in greater quantities from year to year but still not to an extent satisfying the demand; 2. the present period of industrial reconstruction. The reconstruction of industry means that means must flow from the sphere of the production of commodities for consumption into the sphere of the production of the means of production. Unless this takes place, there can be no real reconstruction in our industry, especially having regard to our conditions, the conditions in the Soviet Union. What does this mean? Money is invested in the building of new works and factories; at the same time the towns are growing and the number of consumers is increasing, but the new undertakings will not supply the required amount of goods for two or three years. It is easily comprehensible that this does not tend to lessen the goods famine. Does this mean that we are to fold our arms and confess our impotence to cope with the commodity shortage? Not at all. There are definite measures which we can and must take to alleviate and limit the commodity shortage. This can be done, and we shall now do it. We must accord special attention to those branches of industry most closely bound up with the promotion of agricultural production (for instance the tractor factory in Stalingrad, the agricultural machinery trust at Rostov, the factory for grain cleaning machines at Voronesh, etc.). A further prerequisite is that where possible we give additional support to those branches of industry which enable those goods for which the demand exceeds

the supply to be produced in larger quantities (cloth, glass, nails, etc.).

Comrade Kubyak has stated that, according to the control figures of our national economy for the individual peasant undertaking, a smaller sum has been set aside for this purpose this year than last. That does not appear to me to be correct. Comrade Kubyak evidently does not take into account that this year we are granting credits to the value of 300 million roubles in the form of advance payments for future crops (almost 100 million roubles more than last year). When we take this into consideration — and this we must do — it will be seen that this year we are expending more than last for the development of the individual peasant undertaking. As to the old and new Soviet farms and collective agricultural units, the sum invested here this year will be approximately 180 million roubles (or 75 million roubles more than last).

Special attention must be devoted to the collective and Soviet farms, and to the methods of contracting for future harvests. These things may not be regarded solely as means towards the enlargement of our resources in market grain. They are at the same time a new form of alliance between the working class and the decisive masses of the peasantry. We have already reported in detail on the system of purchasing the crops beforehand, and we need not enter into this again. It is a self-evident fact that the method of wholesale crop-purchasing contracts greatly facilitates our task of gathering the individual agricultural undertakings together, of lending permanency to the reciprocal relations between town and peasant farm, and of thereby strengthening the alliance between town and country. The collective agricultural undertakings, and especially the Soviet farms, must be especially emphasised as levers greatly promoting the reorganisation of agriculture on a new technical basis, they bring about a complete revolution in the minds of the peasantry and help them to throw off the lethargy of traditional routine. The appearance of tractors, great agricultural machines, and tractor gangs, in our grain regions, cannot fail to have an effect upon the peasant farming undertakings. The aid given the peasants in the neighbourhood, in the form of sved, machines, and tractors, will certainly be appreciated by them and taken as a sign of the power of the workers' state and of its intention to open up fresh possibilities of progress for agriculture. Hitherto we have not taken this into consideration, and even today we are probably not accordng it sufficient consideration. But to me it seems that at the present time it is the most important contribution which the collective and Soviet farms can make towards the solution of the grain problem.

These are the chief ways and means to which we must turn for the solution of the grain problem.

3. THE FIGHT AGAINST DEVIATIONS AND AGAINST THE CONCILIATORY GROUP.

We now come to the third main question of our theses, the question of the deviations from the Leninist line.

The social basis of these deviations is the fact that small scale production predominates in our country and that capitalist elements grow out of small scale production; the fact that our Party is surrounded by a petty bourgeois ocean; and finally the fact that some of the links in our Party chain have been infected by these petty bourgeois elements. This is, in principle, the social basis of the deviations. All these deviations are petty bourgeois in character.

To what is the Right wing deviation, with which we are particularly concerned here, tending? It tends towards yielding to bourgeois ideology, to the adaptation of our policy to the tastes and needs of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

What dangers would the Right deviation bring, were it to carry the day in our Party? It would mean the ideological collapse of the Party, the unfettering of the capitalist elements, an enhancement of the chances of the restoration of capitalism, or, as Lenin put it, of a "return to capitalism".

Where has this tendency to a Right wing deviation chiefly crept in? In our Soviet, economic, co-operative, and trade union apparatus and in part in our Party apparatus, especially in the subordinate village organisations.

Are there members in the Party who represent the Right deviation? Undoubtedly there are such comrades. Comrade Rykov has adduced the case of Comrade Schatunovsky, who

has opposed the building of the Dniepr power station ("Dni-prostroï"). There can be no doubt that Comrade Schatunovsky has here lapsed into a Right deviation, a deviation in the direction of open opportunism. But still I am of the opinion that Comrade Schatunovsky is not a typical example of the Right-wing deviation. I rather think that here the palm must be accorded to Comrade Frumkin (Laughter). I remember his first letter (July 1928), and again his second letter, distributed here among the members of the C. C. and the C. C. C. (November 1928).

Let us examine these two letters. We may first take the "fundamental theses" of the first letter.

1. "The village, with the exception of a small section of the village poor, is prejudiced against us."

Is this true? It is obvious that it is not true. If it were true, then not even the memory of the alliance would remain with us. But since July (when the letter was written) almost half a year has passed, and anyone who is not blind can see that the alliance between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry exists and grows stronger. Why does Comrade Frumkin write this nonsense? For the purpose of giving the Party a fright and rendering it compliant towards the Right deviation.

2. "The course pursued of late has resulted in the main mass of the middle peasantry being left without a ray of hope, without any prospects."

Is this true? Absolutely untrue. It is clear that if the middle peasant had been left at the beginning of this year without a ray of hope or economic prospects, he would not have increased his spring sowings in all the chief grain-producing regions. Our spring sowings take place in April and May. Comrade Frumkin's letter was written in July. Who is our chief grain buyer under the Soviet power? The state and the co-operative connected with the state. It is clear that if the middle peasants had deemed themselves bereft of all economic prospects, if their alliance with the Soviet power had been dissolved, they would not have extended their spring sowings for the benefit of the state as the main purchaser of grain. Comrade Frumkin's assertions are obviously inconsistent. Here again his object is to "frighten" the Party by depicting the hopelessness of the prospects, in order to induce it to accede to his standpoint.

3. "It is necessary to return to the 14th and 15th Party Congresses."

That the 15th Party Congress has nothing whatever to do with the matter is beyond doubt. It is not a question of the 15th Party Congress, but of the slogan: "Back to the 14th Party Congress". And what does this mean? It means renouncing the "sharper attack on the kulak" (cf. resolution of 15th Party Congress). I do not say this in disparagement of the 14th Party Congress. Nothing of the sort! I say it because Comrade Frumkin, in calling for a return to the 14th Party Congress, denies the step forward accomplished between the 14th and 15th Party Congresses. The July Plenum of the C. C. pronounced its judgment on this question. It declared openly in its resolution that those who seek to evade the decision of the 15th Party Congress — "Further development of the attack against the kulaks" — are seeking to "express bourgeois tendencies in our country". I may tell Comrade Frumkin candidly that the Polit-Bureau, when formulating this point of the resolution of the July Plenum, had in mind Comrade Frumkin and his first letter.

4. "Maximum Support of the Village Poor who join the Collective Agricultural Undertakings."

We have always granted a maximum amount of support, to the utmost extent of our powers and possibilities, to the village poor, whether they have joined the collective undertakings or not. There is nothing new in this. What was new in the decisions of the 15th Party Congress, as compared with the 14th, did not lie in this, but in the fact that the 15th Party Congress placed in the foreground the forced development of the collective undertakings as one of our most urgent tasks of the moment. Comrade Frumkin, in speaking of a maximum amount of support to be accorded to the village poor joining

the collective undertakings, evades the actual task of the Party, the forced development of the collective undertakings, as laid down by the 15th Party Congress. Comrade Frumkin is essentially opposed to intensified work for the strengthening of the socialist sector in the village along the line of the collective undertakings.

2. "The Soviet farms should not be extended too precipitately and over hastily."

It should be known to Comrade Frumkin that we are just beginning with serious work for the development of the old Soviet farms and the establishment of new. It should be known to Comrade Frumkin that we are expending much less on this task than we should if we had reserves at our disposal for this purpose. The words "too precipitately" and "over hastily" are again only used to "frighten", and thereby to conceal the fact that Comrade Frumkin regards even any serious extension of the Soviet farms as undesirable. Comrade Frumkin here actually opposes the strengthening of the socialist sector in the village by means of the Soviet farms.

If you gather together all the separate assertions made by Comrade Frumkin, you will find in your hands that bouquet which symbolises the Right-wing deviation.

Let us now take the second letter. What is the difference between this letter and the first? The sole difference is that the errors of the first letter are intensified in the second. The second letter has already got as far as a "retrogression" of agriculture. The first letter demands a return to the 14th Party Congress in the sense that the attack on the kulak is to be weakened. The second letter states that we "should not hinder the kulak undertakings in their production. The first letter does not mention industry. But the second develops a "new" theory to the effect that less should be expended on industrial development. On two points the letters agree with one another; Both letters oppose the development of the collective agricultural undertakings and of the Soviet farms.

It is clear that the second letter intensifies the errors of the first I haven't already dealt with the theory of "retrogression". There can be no doubt that this theory is an invention of bourgeois specialists, who are ever ready to announce the decay of the Soviet power. Comrade Frumkin has permitted himself to be intimidated by the bourgeois specialists surrounding the finance commissariat, and now seeks to intimidate the Party in order to persuade it into compliance towards the Right wing deviation. The collective and Soviet farms have also been dealt with in sufficient detail here, and a repetition is unnecessary. Let us pass on to the two remaining points; the kulak undertakings and the investment of capital in industry.

With reference to the kulaks, Comrade Frumkin says: "We should not hinder the kulak undertakings in their production". What does this mean? It means that we must not prevent the kulak from developing his exploiting undertakings. And this means the development of capitalism in the village; it means that we are to give the reins to capitalism, to set it at liberty. It is a return to the old slogan of the French Liberals: "Laissez faire, laissez passer." In other words: Do not hinder the bourgeoisie in its work, do not hamper the freedom of action of the bourgeoisie. This was the slogan of the old French Liberals at the time of the French revolution, at the time of the struggle against the feudal power which had oppressed the bourgeoisie and hampered its development. And now we are told that we are to drop the socialist slogan: "steadily increasing restriction of the capitalist elements" (see theses on the control figures) in favour of the bourgeois liberal slogan: "do not hinder the development of the capitalist village." Why should we? Have we any intention of transforming ourselves from Bolsheviks into Liberals? What can there be anything in common between this liberal slogan advanced by Comrade Frumkin and the line of the Party?

Frumkin: Comrade Stalin, read the other points too!

Stalin: I shall read the whole point:

"We should not hinder the kulak undertakings in their production, but at the same time we must combat the feudal methods of exploitation on their part."

How are we to understand this, Comrade Frumkin? Do you perhaps suppose that the second half of the sentence improves matters instead of worsening them? What is meant by combating the feudal methods of exploitation? The slogan of the fight against serfdom is a slogan for a bourgeois revolution against the feudal or semi-feudal methods of exploitation. We ourselves made use of this slogan when advancing to the bourgeois revolution. At that time we differentiated between the exploiting methods common to the serfage system and the so-called "progressive" form of exploitation, which we could not at that time limit or remove so long as the bourgeois state of society continued to exist. But at that time we were moving towards a bourgeois democratic republic. Now, if I am not mistaken, we are in the midst of a socialist revolution aiming at and bound to aim at, the abolition of every form of exploitation — of the forms common to serfdom as well as every other form. Surely, Comrade Frumkin, you do not want us to turn back upon the road to socialist revolution, along which we have already made such progress, and go back to bourgeois revolution? How can anyone talk such nonsense, Comrade Frumkin? And further, what is meant by: Not hindering the kulak undertakings? It means that the kulak is to be allowed his will. And what does allowing him his will mean? It means giving him power. At the time when the bourgeois Liberals of France demanded that the development of the bourgeoisie should not be hindered, they formulated this demand straightforwardly by requiring that the power be given to the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, to develop properly, must have power. To be consistent, therefore, power must be given to the kulak. It is certain that we cannot but hinder the development of the kulak undertakings if we deprive the kulak of all power and concentrate this in the hands of the working class. Such are the logical conclusions forced upon us by the perusal of Comrade Frumkin's second letter.

Capitalist investment in industry. The debate on the control figures had to deal with three different sums: The People's Supreme Economic Council demanded 825 million roubles. The State Planning Commission proposed 750 million. The People's Commissariat for Finance was only prepared to give 650 million roubles. What was the decision come to by the C. C.? It fixed this sum at 800 million roubles, that is, 150 million roubles more than was proposed by the Finance Commissariat. There is no cause for wonder in the wish of the Finance Commissariat to give less. The Finance Commissariat is notoriously miserly, and must be miserly. This is not the question. The point is that Comrade Frumkin defends the sum of 650 million roubles not from motives of parsimony, but on the basis of the freshly baked theory "on the possibilities". Both in his second letter and in special articles published in the press organ of the Finance Commissariat, he maintains that we should certainly worsen the position of our economy were we to put more than 650 million roubles at the disposal of the People's Supreme Economic Council for purposes of capital investment. And what does this mean? It means that Comrade Frumkin is opposed to the maintenance of the present speed of development, and does not grasp the fact that a retardation of this speed would involve a real worsening of the position of our national economy.

If we sum up these two points of Comrade Frumkin's second letter, the point referring to the kulak undertakings and the point on capital investment in industry, and add the theory of "retrogression", we find that we have reconstructed the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

Do you want to know what the Right deviation is and how it looks? Then read these two letters from Comrade Frumkin, and the study will inform you sufficiently.

This is the true physiognomy of the Right wing deviation.

The theses refer not only to the Right deviation. They also mention a so-called "Left" deviation. What is the "left" deviation? Is there really a so-called "Left" deviation in our Party? Do anti-middle-peasant tendencies exist in the Party, as stated in the theses, overindustrialised tendencies, etc.? Yes, this is the case. To what do they tend? They tend towards a deviation in the direction of Troitzkism. The July Plenum has already dealt with these. The well known resolution passed by the July Plenum on the grain supply policy speaks of a fight on

two fronts: against those who seek to drag the Party back from the XV. Party Congress — these are the Right — and against those who are anxious to convert emergency measures into the permanent policy of the Party — these are the "Left", these are the tendencies, in the direction of Trotzkyism. We see that elements of Trotzkyism, and trends towards Trotzkyist ideology, exist in our Party. I believe that about 6000 persons voted against our platform at the time of the discussion before the XV. Party Conference. (A voice: Ten thousand.) I believe that if there were ten thousand votes against our platform, there were twice ten thousand Party members, sympathising with Trotzkyism, who did not vote at all, because they did not come to the meetings. These are those Trotzkyist elements which have not left the Party, and have not yet — as we are obliged to assume — emancipated themselves from Trotzkyist ideology. I, too, am of the opinion that a number of Trotzkyists, after separating themselves from the Trotzkyist organisation and returning to the Party, have still not been able to break completely with Trotzkyist ideology, and are therefore still ready to spread his views among the members of the Party. Finally, we observe the fact of a certain revival of Trotzkyist ideology in some of the organisations of our Party. If you take this altogether, you will find it supplies every necessary element showing a deviation towards Trotzkyism existing in the Party.

That this is so is easily comprehensible: Since the petty bourgeois element exists and exercises pressure on our Party, it is impossible that there should be no Trotzkyist tendencies in the Party. It is one thing to arrest and banish the cadres of the Trotzkyists, and another to clear away every trace of Trotzkyist ideology. That will be more difficult. But where there is a Right deviation there is also a "Left". The "Left" deviation is the shadow of the Right. Lenin said — he was thinking of the Otsovists at the time — that the "Left" too are Menshevists, but Menshevists turned upside down. That is quite right. The same must be said of the present "Left". People who incline to Trotzkyism really belong to the Right; they are Right elements turned upside down and enveloped in Left phraseology.

Hence the combat on two fronts: against both the Right deviation and the "Left".

It may be asked: If the "Left" deviation, in its essential nature, is a Right opportunist deviation, what, then, is the difference, and where are the two fronts? Truly, if the victory of the Right means better chances for the restoration of capitalism, and the victory of the "Left" would lead to the same result, what, then, is the difference between them, and why is one called Right and the other Left? And if there is a difference between them, of what does it consist? It is a fact that both deviations have the same social roots; they are both petty bourgeois deviations. It is a fact that either deviation, if victorious, would yield the same result. Where, then does the difference between them lie?

The difference consists of the fact that they have different platforms, make different demands, work with different methods. The Right will say, for instance: "The Dniiprostoi should not have been built", whilst the "Left" announces: "What is the good of one Dniiprostoi, give us a Dniiprostoi every year" (Laughter.) Here we must admit that a difference exists. And when the Right say: "Do not touch the kulak, give him free possibilities of development", whilst the Left reply: "Strike not only at the kulak, but at the middle peasant as well, since he is just as much a private owner as the kulak", then we must again acknowledge the obvious difference. If the Right say: "Difficulties have arisen, is it not high time to yield to them?" and the "Left" answer: "What do we care for your difficulties, difficulties are nothing to us, we soar up into higher spheres" (Laughter), again we must admit that a difference obviously exists.

This is the picture of the specific platform and the specific methods of the "Left". This explains at the same time why the "Left" sometimes succeed in luring some of the workers around them by their bombastic Left phraseology, and are even able to pass themselves off as the most determined opponents of the Right, although the whole world knows that the "Left" have the same social roots as the Right, and not infrequently

come to an understanding with the Right, and form a bloc with them against the Leninist line.

Therefore, we Leninists are bound to carry on the struggle on two fronts — against both the Right and the "Left" deviation.

But if the Trotzkyist tendency represents a "Left" deviation, does this not mean that the "Left" stand left of Leninism? No, it does not mean this. Leninism is the most Left (without inverted commas) of all the currents in the international labour movement. We Leninists were in the II. International up to the time of the outbreak of the imperialist war, and there we were the most Left fraction of the social democrats. We did not remain in the II. International, and we advocated the split in the II. International precisely for the reason that, as the extreme Left fraction, we would not remain in one and the same party with the petty bourgeois betrayers of Marxism, with the social pacifists and the social chauvinists. These tactics and this ideology were later adopted by the Bolshevik parties of the whole world. In our party we Leninists are the sole Left (without inverted commas). Therefore we Leninists are neither "Left" nor Right in our own Party. We are a Party of the Marxist-Leninists. And in our Party we combat not only those whom we designate as the representatives of the openly opportunist deviations, but at the same time those who maintain that they stand "Left" of Marxism, "Left" of Leninism, and conceal their true opportunist Right character behind a cloak of empty Left phrases. It is clear that when people who have not freed themselves from Trotzkyist tendencies call themselves "Left", this must be taken ironically. Lenin called the "left communists" the Left, sometimes in inverted commas, sometimes not. But it is clear to everyone that Lenin was speaking ironically when he referred to them as the Left, and thereby stressed the fact that they are only apparently Left, and in reality represent petty bourgeois tendencies. The nature of the Left character of the Trotzkyist elements has been plainly enough demonstrated by their recent alliance with openly opportunist elements in one anti-Leninist bloc, and their direct and immediate collaboration with the anti-Soviet strata in the country. Is it not a fact that only yesterday we had an open bloc of the "Left" and the Right against the Leninist Party, one indubitably supported by the bourgeois elements? And does this not go to show that this "Left" and this Right could not have joined in one bloc had they not possessed common social roots, and if they had not possessed the like opportunist character? The Trotzkyist bloc collapsed a year ago. A section of the Right, of the type of Comrade Schatunovsky, left the bloc. In consequence the Right members of the bloc will from now onwards come forward as Right, but the "Left" hide their Right nature in Left phraseology. But what guarantee have we that the "Left" and the Right may not be happily united again some day? (Laughter.) It is obvious that there is no guarantee for this, nor can there be.

If we are in favour of the slogan of combat on two fronts, does this not mean that we are proclaiming the necessity of Centrism in our Party? What does the combat on two fronts mean? Is this not Centrism? You are aware that the Trotzkyists represent the situation as follows: There is a "Left" composed of "we" Trotzkyists, the "true Leninists"; there is a Right, composed of all the others; and finally there is a "Centrism" vacillating between the "Left" and the Right. Can we regard this view of our Party as correct? Obviously we cannot. The only people who can talk in this strain are those who suffer from a general confusion of ideas, and have long since lost contact with Marxism. This assertion can only be made by people who do not grasp the difference in principle between the Social Democratic Party of pre-war times, a party representing a bloc of proletarian and petty bourgeois interests, and the Communist Party, the uniform party of the revolutionary proletariat. Centrism is not a special conception to be represented somewhat as follows: On one side sit the Right, on the other the "Left", and in the middle the Centrists. Centrism is a political conception. The ideology of Centrism is the ideology of adaptation, the ideology of the subordination of proletarian interests to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie within a joint party. This ideology is foreign and revolting to Leninism. Centrism is a manifestation characteristic of the pre-war II. International. At that time there was a Right (the

majority), a Left (without inverted commas), and Centrists. The task of these last was to adorn the opportunism of the Right with Left phraseology, and to induce the Left to submit to the Right. And what was the policy pursued by the Left, the germ of the Bolsheviks? Their policy was determined combat against the Centrists, struggle for a split from the Right (especially after the outbreak of the imperialist war), and the organisation of a new revolutionary international of really Left and really proletarian elements.

How was it possible that the comparative forces within the II. International, and the policy of the Bolsheviks, could have reached this point at that time? Simply for the reason that the then II. International was a party of the bloc of proletarian and petty bourgeois interests, in favour of the petty bourgeois social pacifists and social chauvinists; for the reason that at that time the Bolsheviks were obliged to concentrate their fire against the Centrists, in order to frustrate the attempts of these to exploit the proletarian elements in the service of the petty bourgeoisie; for the reason that the Bolsheviks were at that time forced to proclaim the idea of the split, or the proletariat would not have been able to organise its own revolutionary Marxist party.

Can it be maintained that our Party offers the same picture of conflicting forces, and that a policy must be pursued in it similar to that of the Bolsheviks in the Parties of the II. International before the war? It is clear that the contrary is the case. Such a policy cannot be pursued, for it would signify that the difference in principle between a party representing the proletarian and petty bourgeois bloc, and a uniform proletarian party, had not been comprehended. Here (among the communists) the Party has an entirely different basis from that existing at that time (among the social democrats). Under the then circumstance Centrism was a natural phenomenon, for a party composed of a bloc of varying interests cannot manage without Centrists, and the Bolsheviks were in a position which compelled them to steer for a split. Here (among the communists) Centrism is superfluous, and incompatible with the Leninist party conception, since the Communist Party is a uniform party of the proletariat, and does not represent a bloc of differing class elements. And since the dominant force in our Party is the extreme Left current in the international labour movement (Leninists), a split in our Party can find no justification from the Leninist standpoint.

A voice: Is a split in the Party possible or not?

Stalin: It is not a question of the possibility of a split, but of the fact that in our united Leninist Party a splitting policy cannot be justified from the standpoint of Leninism. Those who cannot grasp this fundamental difference are the opponents of Leninism, and have broken with Leninism.

Therefore I am of the opinion that only people who have lost their reason, and have thrown aside the last remnants of Marxism, can maintain seriously that the policy of our Party, the policy of the struggle on two fronts, is a Centrist policy.

Lenin always conduct the struggle on two fronts in our Party, the struggle against the "Left" and against the openly Menshevik deviations. Read Lenin's pamphlet on the "Infantile maladies of Communism"; read the history of our Party, and you will understand that our Party, in its combat against both these deviations — the Right and the "Left" — has developed and steered its powers. The struggle against the Otsovisks and the "Left communists" on the one hand, and the struggle against the openly opportunist deviation before, during, and after the October revolution, are phases through which our Party has passed in its development. You all know Lenin's words, that the struggle must be carried on against both opportunism and "Left" doctrinarianism.

Does this mean that Lenin was a Centrist, that he carried on a Centrist policy? It is clear that it does not mean this.

What, under these circumstances, do our Right and "Left" deviations represent? With respect to the Right deviation, it need not be said that this is not the same thing as the opportunism of pre-war social democracy. A deviation in the direction of opportunism is not opportunism itself. We know how Lenin defined the conception of a deviation. A Right deviation

is something which has not yet developed into opportunism, and can still be corrected. Therefore, we cannot identify the Right deviation with consummated opportunism. With respect to the "Left" deviation, this represents exactly the contrary of the extreme Left of the II. International of the pre-war period, that is, the Bolsheviks. Not only are they not Left without inverted commas, but they are at the same time actual representatives of Right deviations, only with the difference that they involuntarily veil their true nature in Left phraseology. It would be a crime against the Party to fail to observe the whole profundity of the difference between the representatives of the "Left" deviations and the real Leninists, the sole Left (without inverted commas) in our Party.

A voice: And the legalisation of the deviations?

Stalin: If open combat against the deviations is legalisation, then Lenin "legalised" them long ago.

You, the representatives of these deviations — both Right and "Left" — recruit your ranks from the most multifarious elements of non-proletarian strata, reflecting the pressure exercised by petty bourgeois elements on the Party and the disintegration of some parts of the Party. Some of those comrades who have come over to us from other parties, people with Trotzkyist tendencies, fragments of the former fractions of the Party, the bureaucratising (and bureaucratised) Party members in the state, economic, co-operative, and trade union apparatus, who join forces with the openly bourgeois elements of this apparatus; the well-to-do elements among the Party members in our village organisations, who combine with the kulaks, etc. — this is the soil on which the deviations from the Leninist line thrive. It is obvious that these elements cannot generate anything either really Right or really Left. All they can do is to feed either the openly opportunist deviation, or that so-called "Left" deviation which masks its opportunism behind Left phrases.

Therefore the struggle on two fronts is the sole correct policy for the Party.

Further: Were the theses right in stating that the main method of the struggle against the Right deviation in our ranks is the method of broadly organised ideological struggle? I am of the opinion that they are right. Here we do well to remember the experience gained in the struggle against Trotzkyism. How did we begin this struggle? Was it with organisational measures, expulsions, and the like? Of course we did not. We began the struggle with an ideological struggle. This struggle we carried on from 1918 till 1925. As early as 1924 our Party passed resolutions against Trotzkyism as petty bourgeois deviations, followed by similar resolutions at the V. World Congress of the Communist International in 1925. Trotzky was, however, still a member of our C. C. and our Polit-Bureau.

Is this a fact or is it not? It is a fact. Consequently, we have "tolerated" Trotzky and the Trotzkyists in the C. C. Why did we permit them to remain members of the leading party organs? Because at that time the Trotzkyists, despite their differences of opinion with the Party, still submitted to the decisions of the C. C., and were still loyal. When did we begin to take organisational measures on any extensive scale? Not until the Trotzkyists had organised themselves into a fraction, had founded their fractional centre, converted their fraction into a new party, and appealed for anti-Soviet demonstrations. I am of the opinion that in our struggle against the Right deviation we must follow this same path. The Right deviation is something which has not yet crystallised and solidified, although it is becoming stronger in the Party. It is just about to solidify. Have the representatives of the Right deviation are bound to organise think so. Can it be asserted that they do not submit to the decisions of our Party? I believe that so far they have given us no cause for complaint on that score. Can it be maintained that the representative of the Right deviation are bound to organise a fraction? I doubt it. Hence the conclusion. The chief method of struggle against the Right deviations, at the present stage, must be the method of broadly organised ideological struggle. This must be the more stressed as there are some members in our Party inclined to reverse the process: They do not want to begin the struggle against the Right deviation with an ideological struggle, but with organisational measures. They say: Show us about 10 to 20 of such Right deviators; we shall

expel them at once and thus make short work of the Right deviation. I believe, comrades, that such views as these are wrong and dangerous. And it is just because we must avoid being carried away in the current of such views, and must guide the struggle against the Right deviations into the correct channels, that we must state clearly and decidedly that the main method of our struggle against the Right deviation, at its present stage, is the ideological struggle.

Does this entail refraining from all organisational measures? No, it does not. But it means that here organisational measures must play a subordinate rôle, and so long as the representatives of the Right deviations do not violate the Party decisions, we should not expel them from this or that leading organisation or authority.

A voice: And the practice in Moscow?

Stalin: In my opinion we had no Right elements among the leading comrades in Moscow. What we had there was wrong relations to the Right trends. Perhaps it would be most correct to say that there we had to do with conciliatory tendencies. But I cannot say that a Right deviation existed in the Moscow Committee.

A voice: But there was an organisational struggle!

Stalin: True, there was an organisational struggle, if a subordinate one. It took place because new elections were held in Moscow on the basis of self-criticism, and the district functionaries have the right to change their secretaries.

A voice: Were new elections of secretaries prescribed?

Stalin: Nobody prohibited the new election of the secretaries. The June proclamation issued by the C. C. states clearly that the development of self-criticism may decline into an empty phrase if the lower organisations do not secure the right to change every secretary, every committee. What objection can you make to such a proclamation?

A voice: Before the Party Conference?

Stalin: Yes, even before the Party Conference. I observe a knowing smile on the faces of some comrades. That is not good, comrades. I see that there are some of you who cannot restrain their wish to depose this or that representative of the Right deviation from his post. But that is no solution of the problem, my dear comrades! It is of course easier to dismiss someone from his position than to carry out a broad and thoroughly thought out campaign against the Right deviation, and to deal with the whole Right danger and how to encounter it. The easiest way is not the best. But try to organise a broad and enlightening campaign against the Right danger, do not grudge the time devoted to this, and you will see that the broader and deeper your campaign, the more the Right deviation retreats before you. Therefore I believe that the ideological struggle must form the central point of our campaign against the Right deviation.

With respect to the Moscow Committee, I do not know what more can be added to what was said by Comrade Uglanov in

his concluding address at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and of the Moscow Control Commission.

He said:

"If we look back a little into history, if we remember how I fought against Comrade Zinoviev in Leningrad in 1921, we may well say that at that time the "battle" was more severe. At that time we were the victors, for we were in the right. Today we have been defeated, because we have erred. It will do us no harm. It will only be useful to us."

We see that Comrade Uglanov has now fought a fight similar to that against Comrade Zinoviev some years ago. Against whom has he been fighting of late? Apparently against the policy of the C. C. Against whom or what can it otherwise be? On what basis could this fight be carried on? Obviously on the basis of conciliation towards the Right deviation.

Therefore the theses emphasise, very rightly, the necessity of fighting against the tendency to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the deviations from the Leninist line, especially against the conciliation of the Right deviation, and place this necessity among the most urgent tasks of the Party.

And now the last question. The theses state that we must stress the necessity of combating the Right deviation at the present juncture. What does this mean? It means that the Right danger is at the moment the greatest danger threatening our Party. A struggle against Trotskyist tendencies, indeed a concentrated struggle, has been carried on by us for decades. The result of this struggle is the shattering of the chief cadres of Trotskyism. It cannot be maintained that the struggle against the recent openly opportunist deviation, has been carried on with anything like equal intensity, for the reason that the Right deviation is just beginning to take a definite and solidified form, and is just in process of being strengthened and developed by the reinforcement of the petty bourgeois elements resulting from our difficulties in the grain supply question. Therefore the main blow must be directed against the Right deviation.

In concluding my speech, Comrades, I should like to touch upon one fact not mentioned here, though in my opinion, it is of no little importance. We members of the Polit-Bureau have proposed to you our theses on the control figures. In my speech I have defended these theses as unconditionally right. I do not speak here of certain corrections which may be made in theses. But that they are essentially correct, and make it possible for us to follow the Leninist line properly — of this there can be no doubt. And I must tell you that in the Polit-Bureau we passed these theses unanimously. I believe that this fact possesses a certain importance in view of those rumours circulated by various hostile elements in our Party, and by the opponents and foes of the Party. I refer to the rumours that there are Right deviations among us of the Polit-Bureau, besides "Left" deviations, conciliators, and goodness knows what else. May these theses serve as further proof, as hundredth or thousandth proof, that we in the Polit-Bureau are agreed down to the last member, and shall continue to be so. I should be glad if the present Plenum would with equal unanimity accept these theses as a basis.

The Shattering of the Ruhr Front by the Reformists.

The Ruhr Workers Sacrificed to the Great Coalition.

By Paul Merker (Essen).

The social imperialist trade union leaders have accomplished their work. Their betrayal of the metal workers of the Ruhr district is absolutely without parallel.

Without having gained anything, the workers are driven back to work under the old conditions. Not only the original demands of the metal workers: 15 Pfennigs an hour increase etc., but even the arbitration award was surrendered by the leaders of the metal workers' Union. The social democrat Herr Severing, Minister for the Interior, who springs into the breach in every situation critical for the employers, is to pronounce a new award after he has "examined" the books of the foundry and metal undertakings. It has now become known that this shameful manoeuvre was agreed upon at the recent negotiations at Duesseldorf between the representatives of the metal workers union and the employers organisations. Already on the 28th of November it had been agreed that the government should instruct a representative to pronounce a fresh arbitration award, an arbitration award favourable to the employers. The declaration of the leader of the Reichstag fraction of the German People's Party, Herr Scholz, that there could be no negotiations regarding the re-formation of the government until the struggle in the Ruhr was settled, did the rest. The plan was agreed upon jointly by the government, the leaders of the metal workers' union and the metal industrialists. The workers are defrauded, their fighting front is shattered, and they are being driven back to work.

The Central Committee of the German metal workers union played the main part in the immediate throttling of the movement. The President of the union, Herr Reichel, declared at a conference of the employees of the German metal workers union, that the movement must be ended for economic and political reasons, even if the old arbitration award had to be altered to the disadvantage of the workers. He further stated that it must be prevented that a vote of the functionaries of the union and the members be taken on such a settlement.

This plan was most carefully carried out. Even in the last few days the union leaders deceived the workers by making out that they were fighting with great energy for the upholding of the award. In spite of the fact that already on Friday, November 30th, the bourgeois press was in a position to state that the employers had arrived at a complete agreement with Severing as arbitrator and unconditionally submitted to an award pronounced by this social democratic agent of the heavy industrialists, the leaders of the German metal workers' union still spread the news that they were fiercely opposing the government which was attempting to arrive at a settlement ignoring the existing arbitration award.

The government press wrote that everything depended upon the decision of the district conference of the metal workers which was convened for Sunday 2nd December in Essen. This district conference, however, turned out to be the so-called **Wages Commission** which has existed for years and which includes about 40 persons. Only a few members of this commission were elected by the members of the German metal workers union. The greater part of them obtained their function from the district officials. But even at this Conference the statements of Herr Brandes, President of the union, made the treachery so clear and appear so monstrous, that numerous speakers, under the pressure of the masses of metal workers, attacked Brandes and the government. Various reformist factory councillors declared quite openly that they would not dare to go to their workmates with such an offer. The decision which was finally adopted, and by which the mediatory action of the government is supported, because, it was declared, the Central Committee of the metal workers union had unbounded confi-

dence in Severing, could, even in this out and out reformist body, be passed only against a strong minority — 25 votes against 14. A number of functionaries of the metal workers union, some of whom were not entitled to vote, declared themselves against the decision.

Brandes was compelled to declare openly that the coalition government would be overthrown if the Conference rejected Severing as mediator and refused resumption of work. The metal workers have been sacrificed by the reformists to the great coalition.

This decision, which is a blow in the face of not less than 95 per cent. of the fighting metal workers, was the first step towards energetic measures in order to shatter the fighting front of the metal workers. The employers published huge advertisements in the press calling upon the workers to resume work. The engaging of workers is to take place "according to the possibilities of the works". This means that many workers, especially the old and the revolutionary inclined, are to be victimised. In order to stimulate the readiness to work of the metal workers, the directors of the firm of Krupp agreed with the reformist factory councils that every worker who reported for work on Tuesday, should receive 30 marks pay in advance.

The mood among the locked-out workers in face of this boundless treachery is everywhere extremely bitter. At all meetings the workers are fiercely attacking the reformist leaders. At Bochum there took place a well-attended meeting of the G. M. W. U. The chairman could not venture to submit his resolution, containing an expression of confidence in Severing and the metal workers' union leaders. At the staff meetings of the Krupp factories the greatest excitement prevailed. In Oberhausen, where the revolutionary opposition was very weak, a demonstration of about 5,000 metal workers took place. Social democratic workers spoke alongside of supporters of the revolutionary opposition against the agreement.

The Central Strike Committee will decide its attitude to the situation on the 5th December. As in this fight it has been impossible to elect strike committees in all important foundries and metal works, and as a portion of the staffs still had too much confidence in the reformist and christian leaders of the metal workers unions, and as therefore the attempts of the reformists and of the employers to create confusion have not been without success, it will be impossible to conduct the movement further firmly and unitedly.

The workers are therefore returning in a body to the works and factories. The strike committee has addressed an appeal to the workers to begin at once in the works the fight for putting through the wage demands and shortening the working time and against any victimisation. It further calls upon the organised metal workers to conduct, together with the revolutionary opposition, the fight to purge the union of the reformist traitors and to prevent the expulsion measures against leading members of the opposition on account of their activity in the metal workers' movement. At a confidential meeting of the Enlarged Advisory Council of the German metal workers union the Central Committee demanded that material regarding the activity of the trade union opposition should be delivered as soon as possible in order that measures could be taken against members of the strike committees etc.

The central strike committee calls upon the unorganised metal workers to enter the metal workers' union in order there to strengthen the forces against the reformists.

The Ruhr workers, it is true, have been betrayed, but they have not been beaten. They are rallying under the leadership of the Communist Party and the revolutionary trade union opposition for fresh struggles.

POLITICS

The Result of the Elections in Czechoslovakia.

By Viktor Stern.

Prague, December 3, 1928.

The reports which have come to hand up to the present regarding the results of the elections to the Provincial and district Councils in Czechoslovakia are still far too vague and incomplete to enable an even approximately correct survey to be made. It is only possible, at present to record a few essential and noteworthy features of the result of the election. It is difficult in view of the peculiar election procedure to work out any comparative figures.

Nearly all the government parties, with the exception of the Czech agrarian party have sustained severe losses. The losses of the Slovakian Hlinka party, the German government parties and the Czechish Clericals have been particularly severe. The elections have shown that only a minority of the electors are behind the present government parties. The German bourgeois parties which did not participate in the government, have also suffered losses. The reformist parties have, in general, to record an increased vote. The greatest gains have been made by the Czech national socialists, while the German social democrats show the least gains, having even sustained losses in several districts, e. g. in Reichenberg.

A significant feature of the issue of the elections is undoubtedly the decline in the Communist vote. It is true, in many districts, we have even gained votes, and have maintained our positions in others. We have to record a loss of votes in important Czech industrial centres, chiefly in Brünn, Prague, Kladno. In Slovakia the result of the election has, in general, been not unfavourable for the Communists. In Carpatho-Russia our loss of votes has been greater. In the German districts, as for instance in Karlsbad, we have even achieved some brilliant successes.

On the whole we can say that, in comparison with the recent senate elections, which, it is true, showed a poor participation, the Party has gained several thousand votes and remains as before the second strongest Party in the country. In spite of the unheard of campaign of terror, in spite of the suppression of the Party papers and of the confiscation of election literature, in spite of wholesale arrests, prohibition of election meetings etc. and in spite of the narrowing of the franchise, by which precisely the young workers were deprived of the vote, the Party has maintained its position and is still the leading Party of the working masses.

Nevertheless, we must admit that, the objective conditions, provided our Party had had a correct policy, would have been bound to have led to a considerable advance of the Communist Party. The wrong policy, which led to the failure of the Red Day, the failure to correct the opportunist mistakes after the Red Day, are in part responsible for a loss of votes. In the election struggle there was again revealed, through a number of errors which must be carefully examined, how extraordinarily great is the social democratic heritage, how great is the Right danger and how deeply rooted are the opportunist traditions in our Party.

The main lessons and chief tasks arising from the elections for the Communist Party are obvious. The line of the Open letter must be carried out with all means in a ruthless fight against all who seek to oppose it. The Communist Party must be politically and organisationally capable of leading the masses into the fight with such means as are demanded by the intensification of class antagonisms. The Communist Party must, by active participation in the daily struggles, restore connections with the masses, make use of these struggles in a proper manner in order to revolutionise the masses, and must concentrate its whole attention on fighting the imperialist war danger. The Party must make clear to the working masses the full seriousness

of the situation and the significance of the government's fascist policy in connection with the war danger and the economic offensive, and mobilise the masses for the fight against this danger. The Party must know how to supplement the legal by illegal work and must be prepared for complete illegality.

There is no disputing that the masses are becoming more revolutionary. This is shown by the rising wave of wage movements, and the Communist Party must make use of this circumstance in order to become the real leader of the fighting masses.

IMPERIALIST WAR PREPARATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

Anti-Soviet Plans and their Inner Contradictions.

From the Leading Article of the "Pravda" of 24th Nov. 1928.

The debates in the British House of Commons on the question of extending export credits to the trade with the Soviet Union have demonstrated two indisputable truths; firstly, that the Baldwin government continues to be inaccessible to considerations of reason and to the language of facts, and secondly, that dissatisfaction is growing among the British bourgeoisie with the foolish policy of the conservative government in closing the Soviet markets against British exports.

Statistics prove that whilst in the business year 1927/28 the turnover of our trade with Germany increased by 102 million roubles and with the United States by 43 millions, the turnover with Great Britain has fallen off by 97 million roubles. This is the logical consequence of the cancelling of the trade agreement and the breaking off of diplomatic relations which took place on the initiative of the British government.

The German press is thoroughly capable of estimating the importance of such facts as the increased trade turnover between the Soviet Union and the United States. The agreement between the American General Electric Co. and the American Trade Department of the Soviet Union, including the grant of a five years' credit of many millions to the Economic Organs of the Soviet Union, has aroused more lively comment in Germany than anywhere else.

In France the capitalists "injured" by the Russian revolution protest obstinately against an extension of commercial relations with the Soviet Union. The Poincaré Ministry, with a zeal worthy of a better cause, endeavours to surpass even Baldwin's government in worsening relations with the Soviet Union. Viewed from the standpoint of the interests of the industry and trade of France (apart, of course, from the munition manufacturers), Poincaré's "Russian" policy is obvious nonsense. The question of foreign markets becomes more and more urgent for French industry from month to month, and an adverse trade balance is a chronic state of affairs in France.

Czechoslovakia offers an especially interesting example of the struggle between contradictory interests. A huge stream of German goods flows toward the Soviet Union, and even little Austria, Czechoslovakia's next neighbour, finds it necessary to place guarantee credits at the disposal of its manufacturers for the purpose of trade with the Soviet Union, but the highly developed Czech industry, so greatly in need of foreign markets, cannot penetrate the Soviet market for the simple reason that the representatives of inner reaction and the imperialist "protectors" of Czechoslovakia raise objections to the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Soviet Union and to the restoration of diplomatic relations. There are, however, certain Czechoslovak business circles whose opinion is as follows:

"So long as we refuse to recognise Russia, German textile goods and American machinery will gain a firm foothold there, whilst we can only look on." (Lidové Noviny.)

The British and French imperialists are obviously becoming more and more inclined to the idea of putting an end to the economic and political growth of the Soviet Union by force,

before its industrial development has extended over a broad basis, and before its trade relations with the capitalist world have become firmly established.

The Anti-Soviet forces of imperialism are being divided among themselves by their inner antagonisms: Great Britain and France against the United States and Germany, Germany against Poland, Poland against Lithuania, the United States against Great Britain and other European states. The European imperialists must reckon with the fact that their most dreaded competitor — the United States — would observe without any special dissatisfaction the difficulties into which fresh adventures would plunge them. This circumstance, as well as the fears for their hinterland in the working class, might be expected to restrain the British and French imperialists from taking dangerous steps, unless indeed the last remnants of their reasoning powers are finally swept away by their blind hatred of the Soviet Union.

CHINA

The Anniversary of the Canton Insurrection.

By Tang Shin She.

I.

The Canton Soviet formed by the rising of 11th December last year, although it only existed for three days, was none the less a signal given to all non-capitalist countries, that is, to all colonial and semi-colonial countries. Therefore this December insurrection may claim to be of historical significance not only national, but international.

Today, on this first anniversary, we may turn in imagination to the days of this rising, and judge whether the objective factors required for the seizure of power really existed at that time. The economic situation in China, and especially in Canton, which had the money to supply for the Northern expedition of the southern troops, had become catastrophic by the end of the year. The transport service was completely shattered. The railways were laid idle for the most part. In many regions there was a frightful famine. The capitalists sabotaged the government by refusing to subscribe to loans and by closing down their undertakings. In spite of the extensive extra taxes, imposed on the population by the then Kuomintang government, exceeding those imposed by any other government, and in spite of the great revenues accruing from the opium tax, the soldiers and officials could not be paid their wages. The minister of finance of the Nanking government at that time, Sun Fo, found himself obliged to resign; the Canton ruler Chang Fa Kui played a double rôle: on the one hand he made advances to the communists, and on the other he assured the bankers and merchants that he was the enemy of the communists. But the capitalists would not give him any money. On the contrary, they boycotted the banknotes which he issued, hoping thereby to overthrow the "Left Fa Kui regime", and to reinstate the old rule of the bourgeoisie and landowners.

With respect to the political position, the economic catastrophe plunged the whole of the apparatus of the Kuomintang government into a profound crisis. Chang Kai Shek, returning from Japan, joined Wang Ching Wei in an attack upon the then Nanking government of the Chisan and Kwangsi group, under the slogan of "restoration of party power". On 17th November Chang Fa Kui carried out a coup d'état against Li Dji Chin in Canton, and another general, Chen Tien, threatened General Li Tsung Yin in Hankow (the two attacked generals were the pillars of the Kwangsi group). The Kuomintang politicians and generals, under the cloak of preparations for a Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, instigated a sharp political struggle in Shanghai. Chang Kai Shek speculated on the aid of both the Kwangtung group, headed by Wang Ching Wei, and of the Kwangsi group. The latter was not averse to supporting Chang Kai Shek, but demanded from him a punitive expedition against Chang Fa Kui in Canton, and a warrant of arrest against Wang Ching Wei, alleged to be the

originator of Chang Fa Kui's Canton coup d'état and to be under orders from Moscow. The manoeuvring to and fro, the bargaining and chaffering, reached such a culminating point at that time, that the outbreak of open war for Shanghai and Nanking seemed likely at any moment.

The military situation of the Kuomintang generals was equally unfavourable. The attacks made by Feng Yu Hsiang in Shantung, and by Yen Shi San against Peking, were doomed to failure as a result of the unreliability of the leaders of the troops, and the constant advance of the "Red Lances" and other peasant organisations. In the Yangtse valley Tang Sen Dji had ceded the towns of Hankow and Changsha to the Kwangsi group, but a large section of his troops were still in South and West Hunan, and had no intention of capitulating. The position was worst of all in the province of Kwangtung, threatened by the Kwangsi group from North, East, and West, and insufficiently protected by Chang Fa Kui's inadequate defence troops. From every standpoint the war of the generals, both within and without the Kuomintang, had attained its acutest stage. The slogan issued by the Communist Party in October 1927: "Conversion of the generals' war into a struggle of the working masses against the reactionaries and imperialists", was eminently suitable at this juncture.

II.

Meanwhile, what progress had been made in the subjective efforts of the working class, the advance of the masses, and the leadership of the masses by the Communist Party? At this time a rising tide was observable everywhere in the strike movement, especially in Shanghai, where a traffic strike among the tramway and omnibus employees had already been carried on for some time. During the harvest risings the peasants had occupied numerous districts in Chekiang, Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Honan, and especially in Hunan and Hupeh. The fighting situation was most favourable of all in the province of Kwangtung.

On 14th October a mighty demonstration was held in Canton by 20,000 workers, at which Kuomintang flags were torn to pieces, and red flags with the sickle and hammer unfurled. The overthrow of the Kuomintang regime and the establishment of a Soviet power were demanded, two leaders of yellow trade unions were sentenced to death by a public labour tribunal, all illegal trade unions were declared to be legal, and the Soviet of Canton workers deputies, which had existed from 1925 till April 1927, was called into life again. The workers were again defeated however, and not only by General Li Dji Chin, but by the severe reprisals of Chang Fa Kui after his coup d'état on 17th November. This last general not only organised trade unions of his own against the revolutionary trade unions, but prohibited and suppressed every institution and privilege achieved since 1925 in favour of the strikers of Hong Kong and Canton. The result of his measures left thousands of workers' families without means of subsistence, and without a roof over their heads, on 26th November. Small revolts now became daily occurrences in Canton. By the beginning of December the situation was so strained that the seamen had already proclaimed a strike, the post officials had resolved to strike, and the omnibus employees had commenced sabotage action.

The peasants' risings in the province of Kwangtung had assumed vast dimensions. By 1st November five Soviet districts had already been organised in the East. About 2 divisions of Red Army soldiers, with up to date equipment, stood ready, their numbers swelled by the remaining troops of Yeh Ting and Ho Lung. The fighting troops proceeded in two directions, one part going to Canton, the other to Swatow.

On 28th November the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the Communist Party issued a proclamation in preparation of a rising, stating that: "Chang Fa Kui, finding himself in an extremely critical position, has applied to the Communist Party, and proposed that the workers should join him in the defence of the city of Canton. The Communist Party makes its consent dependent on the following conditions: 1. immediate release of all revolutionary political prisoners; 2. immediate restitution of the premises of the revolutionary trade unions, 3. restoration

of all rights to the strikers in Hongkong and Canton, 4. restoration of the liberty of the press, and of the right of assembly and striking, for the workers. Legality for the Communist Party and the trade unions, 5. arrest and punishment of the persons threatening the working class with terrorist methods, 6. immediate armament of the Canton workers under the leadership of the Soviet of the Canton workers deputies. Comrades, it need not be said that Chang Fa Kui and Huang Chi Chang, as militarists, will not accept these conditions. Therefore we must defend Canton with our own forces against Li Dji Chin and against Chang Fa Kui."

A revolutionary military committee had been formed on 26th November in preparation of the insurrection, as also a Red workers' guard of 2000 persons, and two battalions of shock troops. A Soviet of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies had also been formed in all secrecy. Special numbers of the "Red Flag", and of the workers' and peasants' newspaper, were printed in advance for the rising.

On 11th December, at half past three in the morning, the rising began. Comrade Chang Ta Lui, the War Commissary of the Soviet, held a great speech at this hour before Chang Fo Kui's guard. 15 reactionary officers were shot at once, and the red flag hoisted. The Red workers' guards and shock troops occupied the police headquarters. In the course of the day they took possession of the post offices, the telegraph office, the wireless sender, the police stations, the government buildings and the Kuomintang party offices. All that was left unconquered, owing to the intervention of the imperialists, was Chuan Chi, the embankment street by the river.

On 11th December, at two o'clock in the afternoon, a conference of the workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies was held in the Central Park of Canton, proclaiming the Soviet government and electing its members under the slogans of "Rice for the workers", "Land for the peasants and soldiers", and "Peace for the working masses".

III.

After the Soviet government had been proclaimed, immediate preparations were made for its annihilation in the foreign quarters of Canton, Samen, and Hongkong, and by the diplomatic corps in Peking. All the imperialist warships lying before Canton were mobilised. The crews of the English cruiser Moreon, of the American cruiser Sacramento, and of a Japanese man-of-war, went on shore on the Chuan Chi embankment and hastened to the aid of the troops of the counter-revolutionary General Li Fu Lin, stationed on the opposite shore of the river. All foreign steamers were placed at the service of troop transport. By the morning of 13th December three divisions of counter-revolutionary troops under the generals Chang Fa Kui and Li Fu Lin had surrounded Canton. There was not sufficient revolutionary fermentation among these troops to permit of their disintegration from within. In the Canton fleet there was not one single "Amur" or "Habicht", every ship was against the Soviets. The Red workers' guards knew nothing of the manipulation of the up-to-date cannon and machine guns, and had not even an idea how to build barricades. The Red Army soldiers in the East of the province were prevented by the bad traffic service from arriving quickly enough in Canton.

On 14th December the Canton Soviet was defeated, and the Black Week of Canton began. In this week 5700 communards were massacred by the generals Chang Fa Kui, Huang Chi Chang, and Li Fu Lin. To their everlasting shame 2000 members of the mechanics' union permitted themselves to be used as murderers by the generals. The Soviet Russian consul was shot by Chang Fa Kui. The Nanking government broke with the Soviet Union, which consistently supported the struggle for emancipation of the Chinese people. Chang Kai Shek capitulated completely to the Kwangsi group, and declared himself ready to join the foreign powers in fighting against the Ill. International and the Soviet Union. His ally Wang Ching Wei was banished from the country. Not only did the Canton bourgeoisie now organise guards of their jeunesse dorée, but the Shanghai bourgeoisie too issued their first official manifesto against the communists on 14th December.

IV.

The Communist Party had not only organised the rising in Canton, but similar risings in Hankow, Changsha, and Shanghai. These actions could not be carried out, being discovered before they were ripe. Here again the most frightful white Terror raged, to which hundreds of workers and students fell victims.

The Soviet government of Canton was crushed. But its brief existence brought with it one conspicuous success... the Chinese workers and peasants have realised that the Soviet government is their sole salvation. In every place, even in the smallest villages in the interior of China, the work of creating Soviets is being pursued with the greatest eagerness. In February of this year Soviet administrations were established in more than 30 districts of the province of Hunan, the land confiscated and divided among the peasants. Apart from the provinces of Kwangtung and Hunan, Soviets have been formed in varying numbers, since last December, in the provinces of Hupeh, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, Yunnan, Szechuan, Shensi, and Honan. The total of district Soviets formed in China during this one year is no fewer than one hundred. To the Chinese workers and peasants the Soviet system is no longer an unknown phenomenon but extremely popular and desirable.

Further valuable service was rendered by the rising in Canton in that it completely exterminated all opportunism in the Party. There is no communist left who would dream for a moment of working in common with a Left Kuomintang group. The Canton rising showed at the same time the true countenance of the aspiring third party of Deng Janda and of the Tangpinsan group. These offered no resistance to the massacres perpetrated by the murderous generals (one of these, Huang Che Chang, is still a member of their party) but maintained slanderously that the communists organised the Canton rising in order to sacrifice the petty bourgeoisie.

AGAINST COLONIAL OPPRESSION

Ten Years of "Liberated" Arabia.

By J. B. (Jerusalem).

"The goal toward which France and England have striven in their war in the East, unchained by German ambition, is the complete and final liberation of the peoples hitherto oppressed by the Turks, the formation of national governments and administrations deriving their power from the initiative and free choice of the native population."

This was the announcement made by those proclamations which were spread broadcast ten years ago, in November 1918, over those districts of Arabia which had just been conquered by the combined arms of British battalions, Australian cavalry, and Arabian volunteer troops. "National liberty", "Equality and justice for all", "Free self determination" these were the hopes for which hundreds and thousands of Arabs fought and fell on the side of the Allies. They dreamed of a free and united Arabia; of independent development; of their own government, democratic administration, popular education, economic progress.

Scarcely ten years have passed since then but today there is no one left in the "liberated territories" who does not realise that in 1918 the conquerors of the country sought no other goal than the establishment of their own dominion under a pretence of national emancipation, and that the old oppression remains, the only difference being that the new oppressors belong to more "civilised" nations than the former Turkish rulers.

National liberty has been curtailed step by step in Arabian territory, and today, after the lapse of scarcely ten years, there is no trace of it to be found.

Syria, dismembered and mutilated by the French, has undergone in succession the driving away of the national Feisal government, the bloody suppression of the national insurrection of 1925/27, and the dissolution of the Constituent

Assembly convoked by the French themselves in 1928. The brutal force of 30,000 bayonets rules and subjugates the country, and the population, already suffering severely under the economic crisis, has to pay for this occupation in addition.

In Palestine the Zionist adventure forms a welcome excuse for simply depriving the population of their right to take part in their own government, and the whole legislative and executive power has been appropriated by half a dozen British colonial officials.

In Transjordan the Emir Abdallah was dispossessed of the last remnant of independence by the treaty concluded in March 1928, and the country was converted into a British colony, without having regard to the protests and resistance of the overwhelming majority of the population.

In Iraq in 1920/21 the English held a bloody settling day with those tribes who strove for real independence. Since this time the country has become more and more a British dominion. The power of the vassal king Feisal and his ministers has been reduced to the execution of British decisions, and to the preparation of advantageous conditions for the penetration of British oil and cotton companies.

Hussein, once king of Hejaz, to whose address a very considerable part of the British war promises was directed, has long been a prisoner in Cyprus. And now feverish preparations are being carried on for robbing his successor on the throne of Hejaz, the Wahabite Ibn Saud, of what is left of his already limited independence. In the extreme south of Arabia the persuasion of shells and "punitive expeditions" is being applied to the Yemenite Iman Jihje, the second ruler of the Arabian peninsula.

In every Arabian country in which the victors of the great war have found a footing, war preparations are being carried on with intense energy: war harbours and military bases are being constructed, railways forming strategic connections laid down, fortified centres erected and all this chiefly at the expense of the "liberated" native population.

Arabia, after its ten years of enslavement, is to form a favourable base for the coming war. Once this has broken out, then fresh proclamations on "complete and final liberation", "national governments and administrations", and so forth, can be issued, and the most friendly of intentions asseverated.

But the experiences of these ten years have not been quite in vain; it is very doubtful whether the population will fall for a second time into the snares laid by Anglo-French ideals. It is very probable that a fresh war in the countries of Arabia will be the signal for a great movement for "liberation from the liberators".

THE BALKANS

Persecution of the Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia.

Belgrade, 26th November 1928.

The Yugoslav government is continuing its campaign against the independent Trade Unions. In the last few days numerous searches have been carried out in the homes of trade union officials in Belgrade. The aim of the police was to find communist literature in order to be able to place the trade union officials on trial for violation of the "Law for the Protection of the State". In Belgrade twelve workers were arrested, some of them were sentenced to imprisonment and the others banished. In Valievo in Serbia the authorities have suppressed the local organisation of the shoemakers on the ground that the section only permitted its members to work eight hours a day and that it was prepared, if necessary, to grant them strike support.

The Ministry of the Interior has prohibited the newly founded organisations of the miners and the building workers in Slovenia. The official reason for the prohibition is that the organisation "might carry on an activity likely to violate the

Law for the Protection of the State". In a public protest to the Ministry of the Interior the organisations in question demanded the immediate repeal of the completely illegal and baseless prohibition. The interesting point is that the prohibition is an obvious attempt of the authorities to favour the reformists at the expense of the revolutionary unions, for up to the present, the reformists had practical monopoly of trade union organisations in Slovenia, but the Independent Trade Unions also commenced to develop and in face of the danger the government has prohibited the revolutionary unions and thus re-established the reformist monopoly.

IN THE INTERNATIONAL

On the Regulation of the Growth and the Social Composition of the C. P. S. U.

The following is taken from the leading article of "Pravda" of November 23rd. Editor.

One of the favourite calumnies employed by our enemies, one of the worst methods of the fight against us is the attempt to minimise the importance of the fact that there are at present in our Party more than 800,000 workers, about 600,000 (42 per cent. of the membership) of them being workers in the factories. These figures and facts prove that since the death of Lenin some hundreds of thousands of workers have entered the Party; that the number of factory nuclei have increased by 121 per cent. since January 1924; that their absolute strength has increased by 505 per cent. and that the extent of the individual factory nuclei has increased two and a half times (from 24 to 66 members on an average); that a network of 5076 factory nuclei has been set up; that the number of workers in the Party has increased threefold in these years; that the percentage of Communist workers among all other workers in the factories and works has increased to 12.

These facts and figures prove that the influx of workers into the Party of Lenin is not diminishing. But a number of reasons in particular the promotion of workers from the factories to administrative positions, to various leading economic, Party, trade union and administrative posts — have brought about that, although 61 per cent. of the Party members are workers, only 42 per cent. are workers in the factories.

It is not a question of recruiting for the Party a further 8 per cent. or about 120,000 working men and women from the factories. It is a question of recruiting for the Party within the next two years 200,000 to 250,000 workers in order to make up for the voluntary resignations and the expulsions from the Party — when one considers that also other sections of the Party — peasants and "miscellaneous" — do not remain for two years on the same level, and when one further bear in mind that ten thousands of workers from the factories must be promoted to leading posts in the Party and in the trade unions, to the economic and administrative organs etc. This means that we have to make a decisive turn in the work of our nuclei in the big and biggest factories of the Soviet Union, in which the Communist strata is on an average smaller than in the middle and small factories (with less than 3000 workers).

This means that we must increase the percentage of workers in the Party by purging the Party of all inefficient, degenerated and declassed elements. This means to get hold of the still untouched reserves of workers and especially working women, who, owing to the mistakes and omissions of various Party members, which sometimes have not been made good and remained unpunished, have been kept from entering the Party.

It is no less important to strengthen the sector of the Communists who are working in agriculture by supplementing our ranks from the agricultural workers.

This means at the same time the carrying through of a firm Bolshevik Leninist line which does not permit of any deviations or distortions. This means that the Party — both

the whole Party and the Young Communist League — shall organise and educate new cadres of workers on the basis of experiences of the struggle against the capitalist elements in the country, of overcoming the capitalist forces both in the town and in the rural districts, of overcoming the Right deviations. Only then will these cadres be able to gather the whole masses of workers round them, to draw with them the main mass of the peasantry on the path of the construction of Communism. Only such a Party will be able to cope with the tremendous international tasks with which our Party as a section of the Communist International is faced.

Resolution of the C. C. of the C. P. of Poland against the Right Danger in the C. P. of Germany.

Warsaw, End of November, 1928.

The Communist Party of Poland follows with intense interest the revolutionary struggle which the German proletariat is conducting under the leadership of the C. P. of Germany against the new German imperialism, against the government and its social democratic agents. We have followed with special interest the stages of the recent powerful campaign of the C. P. of Germany against armaments, for the defence of the Soviet Union, and the heroic efforts of the Party to break the treacherous arbitration policy of the opportunist leaders of social democracy and the trade unions.

The Brandler-Thalheimer group, supported by the Ewert group, has initiated a decisive struggle against the political line which has been established at the Congresses of the Comintern and of the R. I. L. U.

The Right fraction in the C. P. of Germany (Brandler, Thalheimer, Walcher, Frölich, Galm and Hausen) is now already conducting an open fight against the general political line of the Communist International and of the Red International of Labour Unions and is attempting to divert the Party from the path of the proletarian revolution on to the path of social democratic reformism. In these efforts this fraction is not shrinking from any lie and insinuation in regard to the C. P. of Germany in order to blacken it in the eyes of the working masses; it is not shrinking from availing itself of the support of social democracy, of making use of the Wittorf case for the overthrow of the present Party leadership which enjoys the confidence of the Comintern. All this proves that the Brandler group has already broken with Communism.

The group of the centrists, headed by Comrades Ewert and Gerhard, who assert their fidelity to the line of the Comintern, is attempting, to change the present inner Party course in favour of the Right fraction and to make use, just as do the Right group, of the Wittorf case against the C. C. of the C. P. of Germany. The political and organisational standpoint of the centrists means nothing else but the cloaking and underestimation of the Right danger and the hampering of the Party in its fight against this danger.

The C. C. of the C. P. of Poland fully and entirely approves of the decision of the Comintern of October 6th, 1928, regarding the questions of the C. P. G. and welcomes with satisfaction the energetic course which the C. C. of the C. P. G. is adopting in the practical carrying out of the line of the VI. World Congress. It welcomes the decisive fight which the C. C. of the C. P. G. is conducting against the Right danger and the conciliatory attitude towards this danger.

The danger of Right deviations from the line of Bolshevism is at present the greatest inner Party danger in the sections of the Communist International, including the C. P. of Poland. The Party must concentrate the attention of all its members upon the struggle against these deviations and the conciliatory tendencies, as this is the necessary pre-condition for a real carrying through of the political line of the VI. Congress of the Communist International.

PROLETARIAN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

To the Working Women of the Whole World!

Appeal of the Moscow Working Women.

The functionaries of the Moscow working women and the leading comrades of the Communist women's movement in the Soviet Union who have assembled together for the festive celebration of the tenth anniversary of the First Congress of the working women of the Soviet Union, appeal to you:

Dear Sisters!

Today we are celebrating the anniversary of the First All-Russian Congress of working and peasant women, which has shown the practical ways for drawing the working women into the Communist movement not only in our country but in the whole world.

Ten years ago we suffered from starvation, cold, blockade, intervention, the assaults of the bestial capitalists of the whole world, who endeavoured to sweep from the earth the power captured by the working class.

The working women have, together with the working men, beaten back the enemy, restored industry, fought against illiteracy, privations, hunger and cold.

Hundreds of working women have perished in the glorious struggles of the working class and have shed their blood for the victory of labour over capital.

In the ten years the Soviet country has grown, has consolidated itself, has built many factories and works, has improved the standard of life of million of toilers, has established a network of schools, clubs, creches, dining halls all over the country, has changed the life of the working women.

In the ten years the Soviet country has drawn into the administration of the State thousands of working and peasant women and promoted women to leading State positions.

But not all is yet done. We are still faced by tremendous tasks for improving the life of the toilers. Were it not for the new dark clouds of attacks and interventions which are gathering against the Soviet Union, we would settle all difficulties of our construction a dozen times more rapidly.

The preparation for new wars, for new attacks upon the Soviet Union, is not only affecting the life of the working class of the Soviet Union but also the life of the toilers of the west and the East. Every day brings a further deterioration of the conditions of life and work of the proletariat. Capitalist rationalisation is based upon an increasing participation of unskilled women and children in production, whereby they have to work under the most difficult conditions with a lengthened work day and reduced wages. The army of unemployed is growing, starvation and misery of the working class are increasing.

In reply to the offensive of capital a strike movement has arisen in the West and in the East. Broad masses of proletarians in Germany, Poland, France, India have, as a result of the lessons of the recent strikes, become convinced of the treacherous role of the reformist trade unions, of the treachery of social democracy.

The influence of the Communist Party is growing from day to day, for only the Communists are really defending the interests of the working class. Only under the leadership of the Communist Party were the working women of the Soviet Union able to achieve their complete emancipation and to participate in the work of socialist construction. Only under the leadership of the Communist Party have the working women of the Soviet Union been able to obtain the seven-hour day.

Working and peasant women of the whole world!

Unite under the banner of your Communist Parties for the fight against the common enemy, capitalism!

Unite under the leadership of the Communist Parties for determined defensive action against the new war being prepared by the imperialists!

Unite in the Communist Parties against the assaults of the imperialists on the Soviet Union!

Closer under the banner of the Comintern!

Closer and nearer to the Communist Parties, the actual Parties of toilers!