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Session of the Enlarged E. C. C. I.

(Detailed Report.)

Fifth to Tenth Session.

Continuation of the Discussion on the Report of Comrade Zinoviev.

(Fifth Session, February 22, 1926.)

Comrade Ferdi, Chairman, declared the session open and called upon Comrade Bordiga to speak.

Comrade Bordiga (Italy):

Comrades, I think it is absolutely impossible to limit our discussion to the scope of the draft theses and of the report.

We have a situation in the International which cannot be considered satisfactory.

In a certain sense we are in a state of crisis. A summary review of the history of the C. I. will show that there is a consensus of opinion concerning the existence of a crisis.

After the disaster of the Second International the formation of the Communist International was accomplished on the strength of the slogan: Formation of Communist Parties. Everyone agreed that there existed objective conditions for struggle, but we were minus the organ of this struggle.

At the Third Congress, after the experience of many events and especially of the March Action in Germany in 1921, the International was compelled to admit that the formation of Communist Parties alone was not sufficient. Fairly strong sections of the Communist International had been formed in all the most important countries, but the problem of revolutionary action had not been solved.

The Third Congress had to discuss this problem and had to place on record that it is not enough to have Communist Parties, even if all the objective conditions for struggle are there, that it is essential that our Parties be able to exercise influence over the masses.

I am not at all against the conception of the Third Congress of the necessity for mass solidarity, as a premise to the final offensive, but I would like to say that such a conception, namely as expressed by the Third Congress, does not by any means include the idea of united front tactics: the latter corresponds to a defensive position created by a capitalist offensive against which endeavours are made to bring out all the workers on the basis of immediate demands.

The application of the United Front led to errors after the Third Congress and especially after the Fourth Congress. In our opinion, these tactics were adopted without making their real meaning perfectly clear. We were all in agreement when it was a question of making the economic and immediate demands the basis of these tactics, demands which sprang up owing to the offensive of the enemy. But when there was an intention of making the new formulae of a Workers' Government the basis of a United Front, we opposed this, declaring that this slogan made us exceed the limits of effective revolutionary tactics.

After the October defeat in Germany in 1923, the International recognised that the mistake had been made.

But instead of introducing a thorough change into the decisions of the Fourth Congress, all that was done was to hit out against certain comrades. Scapegoats had to be found. And they were found in the German Party. There was an absolute failure to recognise that the entire International was responsible. Nevertheless, the theses were revised at the Fifth Congress and a new formula of the Workers' Government was issued.

Why did we disagree with the theses of the Fifth Congress? In our opinion, the revisions were not adequate. The theses and speeches were very Left, but this was not enough for us: we foresaw what would happen after the Fifth Congress and that is why we are not satisfied.

I will deal now with Bolshevisation, and I assert that its balance sheet is unsatisfactory from all viewpoints. It was said: We have only one Party which has accomplished a revolutionary victory — the Russian Bolsheviki Party. Hence we must follow the path pursued by the Russian Party in order to achieve victory. This is quite true, but it isn't enough. The Russian Party carried on its struggle under special conditions, that is to say, in a country where the feudal autocracy had not yet been beaten by the capitalist bourgeoisie. For us it is essential to know how to attack a modern, democratic bourgeois State which on the one hand has all the resources to corrupt and mislead the proletariat and which on the other hand is even more efficient on the field of armed struggle than the Tsarist

autocracy. This problem will not be found in the history of the Russian Communist Party and if one interprets Bolshevism in the sense that the revolution of the Russian Party provided the solution for all strategic problems of the revolutionary struggle, the conception of Bolshevism is inadequate. The glorious experience of the Russian Party is precious to us from the viewpoint of the revolution, of tactical problems, but apart from this we must have something else. It is only in the domain of doctrine that the lesson of the Russian Revolution and of the restoration of Marxism by Lenin are conclusive.

Much of the problem of Bolshevism will be found in the question of the reorganisation of the Parties. In 1925 it was said that the entire organisation of the Sections of the International was wrong, that one had not yet applied even the ABC of organisation. Very strange that one should not have noticed this before. Eight years after the victory in Russia we are told: The other Parties are impotent because they are not organised on the basis of factory nuclei. Well, Marx and Lenin are there to show us that organisation is not everything in the revolutionary struggle. To solve the problem of revolution, it is not enough to issue an organisational formula. These are problems of forces and not of forms.

I contest that the Communist Party must be necessarily organised on a factory nucleus basis. In the organisation theses brought forward by Lenin at the Third Congress, it is repeatedly stated that in questions of organisation there can be no solution which is equally good for all countries. We do not contest that the situation in Tzarist Russia was such as to justify the Russian Communist Party to organise itself on a factory nucleus basis.

But we believe that nuclei present certain disadvantages in other countries. Why?

Above all, because a group of workers organised as a nucleus cannot have the opportunity for discussing all political questions.

You will probably say that we demand what is demanded by all Right elements, that is to say, the organisation of workers into sections where the intellectuals lead in all discussions. But this danger will always exist and one must bear in mind that the working class cannot do without intellectuals, which, whatever one may say, are necessary to it.

The movement needs organisers and agitators who must be recruited among the deserters of the other classes or else among advanced workers. But the danger of corruption and demagoguery inherent to these elements once they become leaders is as great with them as with the intellectuals. In certain cases, ex-workers have played the most ignominious role in the labour movement. Moreover, does organisation on a factory nucleus basis put an end to the role of the intellectuals? They constitute at present, together with ex-workers, the entire apparatus of the Party and their role has become more dangerous. Then you cannot be ignorant of the fact that there is a complete technical solidarity between the state apparatus and the employers, and when a workman endeavours to organise the others, the employer calls in the police. This makes the activity of the Party in the factories much more dangerous. It is an easy matter for the bourgeoisie to find out what work is done in the factory and that is why we propose to have the basic organisation of the Party outside the factories.

In Russia the relations between the capitalist employers and the State were different. Moreover, the problem of power was bound to arise and the danger of non-political "labourism" which we see in the nuclei was not so great.

Does this attitude of ours mean that we will neglect Party work in the factories? Certainly not, one must have the Party organisation in the factories, but it must not form the basis of the Party. It is essential to have Party organisations in the factories to carry on the policy of the Party. It is impossible to be in contact with the working class without a factory organisation.

Therefore, we are for a network of Communist organisations in the factories but political discussions must take place in the territorial sections.

I will deal now with another point of view: that of the internal regime of the Party and of the Communist International.

Another discovery has just been made: what we hitherto lacked in all the Sections is iron Bolshevik discipline, of which the Russian Party is setting us an example. It must be forbidden to form fractions, and all Party members, regardless of their opinion, are compelled to participate in the common work even in the Central Committee.

It is a fact that we must have a Communist Party which is absolutely united, a Party without divergencies of opinion and different groups within it. But how is this to be achieved? How are we to arrive at an effective and vital unity and not at the paralysation of the Party? At the first signs of crisis within the Party one must find out its causes. Our view is that they cannot be found by means of a kind of criminal code of the Party. Lately a certain kind of sport has been indulged in in the Parties, a pastime which consists in hitting out, intervening, breaking up, illtreating and it very frequently happens that very good revolutionaries get hit. I think, that this terrorist sport within the Party has nothing in common with our work. We must hit and break up capitalism, it is on this field that our Party can show its prowess and I believe that on this field we will witness the defeat of many of our internal terrorists within the iron fist!

The real merit does not consist in crushing rebellion but in preventing it. The best proof of unity is its results and not a regime of threats and terror. Those elements who deviate in a decisive manner from the common path must be hit hard. But if the application of the criminal code becomes the order of the day in a society this means that this society is far from perfect.

Sanctions must be applied in exceptional cases, they must not be the rule, a pastime and an ideal of the leaders of a Party. It is all this which needs changing if we are to form a solid block.

By the by, there are very good paragraphs on this subject in the theses before us. A little more freedom will be given. But will this be put into practice? The fact is that we need a healthier regime in the Party, it is absolutely necessary that the Party should be able to form an opinion of its own. One must pursue this aim in order that the rank and file of the Party should have a common political conscience.

I will deal now with fractions. I take the view that to raise the problem of fractions as a moral problem, as a problem of criminality is utterly wrong. Is there a historic example showing that any comrade has ever formed a fraction for his own amusement? Such a thing has never happened. Experience has shown that opportunism makes its appearance among us always in the guise of unity. Moreover, the history of fractions goes to show that if fractions do not honour to the Parties in which they have been formed, they do honour to those who have formed them. The history of fractions is the history of Lenin.

The formation of a fraction is an indication that something is wrong, and to remedy the evil one must not strike but one must rather investigate what was the historic cause of the disease which necessitated the formation of the fraction. Fractions are not the disease, they are only the symptom, and if you want to cure a disease, you must first of all discover it and understand it.

Let us take for example, the crisis of the French Party. What was the procedure in this Party against the fractions? A very bad procedure, for instance, with respect to a syndicalist fraction which is on the point of formation. Certain comrades, expelled from the Party, have returned to their former affections and are publishing a periodical to explain their ideas. They are, of course, wrong, but what has caused them to do so. The naughty boys, Rosmer and Monatte, did not act on the impulse of a caprice. The causes for their action are to seek in the errors of the French Party and of the entire International.

These fundamental errors threaten to reappear within the proletariat because the International and the Communist Parties have not been able to demonstrate by deeds the enormous difference which exists between a policy conceived in a revolutionary and Leninist spirit and that of the old Social Democratic Parties.

It is the fault of the erroneous policy of the International if the idea still prevails among us (so completely eschewed by us in theory and on the field of action) that the Party and political work are things not fit for the working class and that the latter must follow the saner and safer path of purely economic action through the trade unions. It is a fact that our policy lends itself to being confused with the vulgar art or technique common to all who come into touch with politics.

The Right Fraction in France, I do not hesitate saying so, is a healthy fraction, it does not in itself represent the permeation of petty bourgeois elements.

It is the reflex of the healthy discontent of the proletariat with the unsatisfactory internal regime of the Party and with the contradictions in its policy, in spite of the utterly false rectifications which it proposes on the tactical field.

To correct errors it is not sufficient to chop off heads, one should rather find out and eliminate the initial errors which cause the discontent and determine the formation of fractions.

It is said to us that the system of bolshevising is based upon the fact that the action of every central committee is directed by the Communist International, by which the minorities in the Party are offered a security. On this occasion it is sufficient to repeat the criticism which already has been made several times to the kind of connection between the International Executive Committee and the sections; it is artificial enough and is based upon considerations of an inner diplomatic character as well as on the necessity of parliamentary manoeuvres inside our international meetings. The intervention of the International Executive Committee comes nearly always unexpectedly and hits those elements with which a general solidarity of the International has been brought about, in a thoroughly compromising manner. It was not different with the Open Letter to the German Party which was published in a moment when the Left leadership of the C. P. G. was regarded everywhere as the authentic representative of the Comintern, of Leninism, of the V. World Congress and of the victory of the bolshevisation.

Yet we are told: even if there are some shortcomings in the kind of the international connections, the leading role of the Russian Party offers us a good way out. Yet here also we must make some reservations. I shall in my later exposition return to the question of the Russian Party and its problems. In passing, it is observed that one must ask where the leading factor of the Russian Party is to be found. Is it the old Leninist guard? But after the last events it is clear that this can split and that both sides can with the same energy claim the right to speak in the name of bolshevism and accuse each other of deviating from true Leninism.

I draw the conclusion from it that this search for a point of support of the system of bolshevising leads to no fixed, undisputed result. The correct solution is to be found elsewhere. We must base ourselves upon the entire International, on the entire advance guard of the world proletariat. Our organisation can be compared to a pyramid. For all its sides are striving to a common summit. Yet this pyramid places itself upon its top and its centre of gravity is therefore too unsteady. It must be turned upside down, the top must be the other way up in order that it can stand on a firm basis.

Having thus summed up the past action of the International, it is essential to give an appreciation of the present situation and of our future tasks. The general statement concerning stabilisation has been accepted by everyone. There have been certain vacillations with respect to the development of the general crisis of capitalism.

We have before us the perspective of the definite decay of capitalism, but in my opinion certain errors of appreciation have crept in with respect to the perspective.

If we proceed like a scientific society for the study of social events we can arrive at objective conclusions of a more or less optimistic or of a more or less pessimistic character, and this is a manner which does not take events into account. But such a purely scientific perspective will not do for a revolutionary Party which participates in all events, which is in itself a factor. It is essential to have always in readiness a second perspective in accordance with Lenin's formula which Zinoviev mentioned here (examples of Marxist forecasts regarding the revolution of 1848 and Lenin's forecasts regarding the Russian Revolution after 1905). The Party cannot renounce its final task, its revolutionary will, even if the cold, scientific perspective is unfavourable. I cannot accept the formula: "The situation is now unfavourable, we no longer have with us the situation of 1920, and this justifies the internal crisis in certain Sections and in the International".

A changed situation can produce a quantitative but not a qualitative change in the Party. If the Party enters upon the stage of crisis this means that its tactics have been guilty of opportunism. Otherwise, the struggle against opportunism in 1914 would be devoid of meaning.

The epoch of capitalism which had reached its full development before the war has objectively contributed to the explanation of social-patriotism, but from the viewpoint of the revolutionaries of that epoch it could not and should not lead to its justification or even its toleration as something inevitable. If we consider the state of crisis in capitalism to be favourable, not only to a revolutionary attack but also to an adequate preparation of our Party, this means that in order to be able to

accomplish our task we expect from history a development particularly adapted to exigencies which originate in a wrong scheme of perspective which must be rejected and fought against. This will be the same in the case of the bad solution of the problem of leaders as criticised by Trotsky in his preface to "1917", in an analysis with which I agree completely and which does not appertain to the unfavourable situation, but to the general political and tactical errors which have impeded the process of the selection of the revolutionary General Staff.

There is another scheme of perspective which must be fought against and which confronts us when we turn our attention from the purely economic analysis to an analysis of the social and political forces. It is generally accepted that we must consider the fact that a Left Bourgeois Party is in power as a political situation favourable to our preparation and to our struggle. This wrong perspective is first of all a contradiction of the first because it most frequently happens in the state of economic crisis favourable to us that the bourgeoisie organises a Right Government for a reactionary offensive, which means that objective conditions become unfavourable to us for a Marxist solution of the problem.

Generally speaking, it is not true that the fact of a Left bourgeois Government will be favourable to us: the contrary may be the case. Historical examples have shown us how absurd it would be to imagine that in order to lighten our task a so-called middle class government with a liberal programme would make its appearance, a government which would enable us to organise an effective and united struggle against a weakened State apparatus.

In 1919 we witnessed in Germany the access of a Left bourgeois bloc to power. We witnessed the management of affairs in the hands of the Social Democrats. In spite of the military defeat from which Germany had just emerged, the State machine had not been shaken to its foundations.

After we shall have promoted by our tactics the access to power of a Left Government, will we have obtained more favourable conditions for ourselves? No, this is not at all the case. It is a Menshevik conception to imagine that the State machine will be different in the hands of the lower middle classes to what it is in the hands of the big bourgeoisie, and to consider such a period as a transition period leading to the epoch of the seizure of power. Certain parties of the bourgeoisie have an appropriate programme and bring forward appropriate demands with the object of attracting the lower middle classes. Generally speaking, this is not a process in which power passes from one social group to another, it is only a new defensive method of the bourgeoisie against us, and when this takes place we cannot say that this is the most propitious moment for our intervention. This change can be utilised but only provided our preceding position has been perfectly clear and has not coincided with the demands of the Left Bloc element.

For instance, in Italy, can it be said that Fascism is the triumph of the Right bourgeoisie over the Left bourgeoisie? Certainly not, fascism is something more than that, it is the synthesis of two methods of defence of the bourgeois class. The recent acts of the Fascist Government have clearly shown that the semi-bourgeois and petty bourgeois composition of fascism does not prevent the latter being a direct agent of capitalism. As a mass organisation (the fascist organisation has a million members) it is endeavouring not only to strike down ruthlessly its opponents, especially the adversaries who dare attack the State machine but also to mobilise the masses by means of Social Democratic permeation methods.

On this field fascism has suffered evident defeats. This bears out our point of view on the class struggle but what is most forcibly shown by all this is the absolute impotence of the middle classes. During the last few years they have already accomplished three complete evolutions: in 1919-20 they crowded our revolutionary meetings; in 1921-22 they formed cadres of "black shirts"; in 1923 they went over to the Opposition after Matteotti's assassination; today they are coming back to Fascism. Always with the strongest is their motto.

The wrong conception of the advantages which we could derive from the access to power of a Left Bloc Government consists in imagining the middle classes capable of an independent solution of the problem of power. In my opinion, there is a very serious error in the so-called new tactic which has been applied in Germany and in France and with which the proposal made by the Italian Party to the Aventino anti-fascist opposition

is connected. I cannot understand how a Party, so rich in revolutionary traditions as our German Party could hesitate in the face of the accusation of the Social Democrats that it was playing **Hindenburg's game** by bringing forward an independent candidature. Generally speaking, the strong point of the bourgeoisie with regard to the ideological counter-revolutionary organisation of the masses consists in offering a political and historical dualism in opposition to the class dualism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, supported by the Communist Party not as the only dualism possible in the social perspective and in connection with the changes of parliamentary power, but as the only dualism historically capable of bringing about the revolutionary rupture of a class State machine and the establishment of a new State.

But we cannot bring home this dualism to the consciousness of the masses merely by ideological declarations and abstract propaganda. We can only do so by our actions and by the evidence and the clarity of our political position. When it was proposed to the anti-fascist bourgeoisie in Italy to constitute itself as an anti-parliament in which Communists would have participated — even if it was stated in our press that no confidence should be placed in these Parties, even if a pretence was made to expose them by this means — in reality we contributed to encouraging the masses to expect the overthrow of fascism by the **Aventino**, to make them believe in the possibility of a revolutionary struggle and the formation of anti-State not on a class basis but on the basis of collaboration with the petty bourgeois elements and even with entirely capitalist groupings. In view of the failure of the **Aventino** this manoeuvre did not result in bringing the masses into a class front. This new tactic was not only alien to the resolution of the Fifth Congress, it was in my opinion even alien to the principles and the programme of Communism.

Under what aspect can we view our future tasks? This assembly could not consider the problem in all seriousness without considering the fundamental question of the historic connection between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world. The most important problem for us apart from the problem of the revolutionary strategy of the proletariat, of the world movement, of the peasants and the oppressed colonial peoples, is the problem of the State policy of the Communist Party in Russia. This policy will have to solve the problem of class relations in Russia, it will have to adopt the necessary measures with regard to the influence of the peasant class and that of the budding semi-bourgeois sections of the population, it will have to contend with the pressure from outside, a pressure which today is purely economic and diplomatic but might be military tomorrow. In view of the fact that world revolution has not yet developed in the other

countries the entire Russian policy will have to be carried on in close contact with the general revolutionary policy of the proletariat.

I do not propose to enter into details concerning these questions but I assert that the main base for this struggle is certainly the working class of Russia and its Communist Party, and that it is also of the utmost importance to have the support of the proletariat of the capitalist States whose class consciousness and the fact that it is in constant contact with the capitalist adversary are indispensable to our movement. The problem of Russian policy cannot be solved within the narrow precincts of the Russian movement, the entire proletarian Communist International would have to do its share in this.

Without such effective collaboration there are dangers ahead not only for revolutionary strategy in Russia but also for our policy in the capitalist States. There is every possibility for tendencies to spring up which would mean an attenuation of the character and the role of the Communist Parties. Already we are attacked on these lines. The attacks certainly do not come from our ranks but from the ranks of the Social Democrats and opportunists. This is connected with the manoeuvre for international Trade Union Unity and with the attitude towards the Second International. All of us here agree that it is absolutely necessary to preserve the revolutionary independence of the Communist Parties. But it is necessary to point out the possibility of a tendency to replace Communist Parties by organisations of a less pronounced character with semi-class aims and neutralised and attenuated political functions. In the present situation it is the bounden duty of us all to defend the strictly Communist organisation of our International against any liquidatory tendencies.

After our criticism of the general lines of policy, can we consider the International, such as it is, sufficiently prepared for this double task of strategy in Russia and strategy in the other countries? Can we expect from this assembly the immediate discussion of all the Russian problems? Unfortunately, the answer must be in the negative.

What we need at once is a serious revision of our internal regime and discussion in our Parties on the problem of tactics throughout the world and of the problems of State policy of Russia. But such an undertaking requires a new course and utterly different methods.

Neither the report nor the theses give us a sufficiently strong basis for all this. What we want is not official optimism, we must realise that we cannot prepare ourselves for the accomplishment of the formidable tasks which await the General Staff of the World Revolution by having recourse to such inadequate means as those which we only too frequently see applied in the internal process of the life of our Parties.

(Sixth Session, February 24, 1926, morning)

Continuation of the Discussion on the Report of Comrade Zinoviev.

The Chairman, Comrade Geschke, opened the session at 11 a. m. The first speaker was

Comrade Pepper:

The discussion carried on so far has been pretty one-sided. Only the internal party problems were discussed and chiefly in connection with the application of the tactic of the united front. One of the roots of the conflicts in our sections, however, certainly lies in the uncertainty in the analysis of the world situation. Comrade Bordiga is the crassest example of this; he reduces the whole world situation to two factors — here the Soviet Union, and there the capitalist environment. It is of course no accident that Comrade Bordiga adopts a wrong tactic on the basis of this "simplification" of the world situation; his analysis is wrong and it naturally follows that his tactic must be wrong. With the exception of Comrade Bordiga, no one states any more that he is against the tactic of the united front; even Comrades Ruth Fischer, Scholem, etc., do lip service to the united front tactic here in Moscow. Of course, it is an entirely different question how their deeds look in Berlin.

Less harmony exists in the conception of the question of the analysis of the world situation. Comrade Zinoviev has already touched upon the differences as to the perspectives. He has opposed himself to those who demand simply one perspective. The tactic of the united front must naturally be supplemented by a political slogan summing up all the other demands. The theses solve this task by setting up the slogan of the United States of Socialist Europe as the general all-comprehensive political slogan. This slogan, strangely enough, has not been touched upon in the discussion so far. But in conversation, some of the comrades have expressed themselves very sceptically about it. Some of the comrades recalled the fact that Comrade Lenin had expressed himself against the slogan "United States of Europe" in 1915.

Is this slogan correct or not?

I believe that the question must be investigated whether or not this slogan is correct, by analysing the concrete situation itself.

The concrete situation is, firstly, the economic and partially political domination of America over Europe; secondly, the in-

creasing antagonism, daily growing more acute, between the United States of America and Great Britain.

The first factor of the domination of America is the tremendous accumulation, the tremendous concentration of capital in America, the formation of the greatest Trust of the world. The second factor of the situation in the United States is the purging of the dominating Republican Party of the Lefts, the splitting off of the petty-bourgeois and farmer elements, the transformation of the Republican Party into the avowed Party of finance capital. A third factor is the slogan expressed by Coolidge: a clear field for the sound trusts, the complete abandonment of the Anti-Trust legislation, in other words, the open break with the traditional policy of Roosevelt and La Follette. A fourth factor of the analysis, which is not yet a reality, but at present only a tendency, is the fight which American finance capital is beginning against the high protective tariff policy of the United States. Finance capital is supported in this fight by the farmers and the growing section of small investors. Finance capital is turning against the policy of high protection, because Europe can pay off the growing interest on the growing investments and loans of America only in the form of export of industrial goods.

The following is the fifth factor — America is trying more and more by loans and by the investment of capital to dominate Europe not only economically, but also politically by attaching openly political conditions to the loans of American bankers.

These factors in American development mean an ever extending economic and political intervention of America in the affairs of the European countries. At the same time we can say that in connection with these changes in the American situation, a partial change is also taking place in Europe.

I would like to characterise this with one word — **Locarno**. I believe that Locarno is not only a bloc against Soviet Russia; it is not only directed against the continental hegemony of France under the leadership of Great Britain; it is not only a guarantee of the investment of capital in Europe for the benefit of America; — it was the first attempt to establish a **West European bloc** under the leadership of Great Britain against the United States of America.

The picture therefore appears as follows: America is intervening in Europe to a greater degree and Europe is beginning to defend itself against this intervention.

That shows that the antagonism between America and Europe is increasing and that within this general antagonism, the antagonism between America and Great Britain is becoming more acute. Great Britain has a remarkable role in this play. Great Britain is the leader of the international conspiracy against the Soviet Union, and at the same time Great Britain is trying to form a bloc against the United States of America.

From this situation we draw the following conclusions — on one hand, as a result of the antagonism between America and Europe, a certain parallelism of interests is crystallising between Europe and the Soviet Union. It is no mere chance that while America is plaguing the nations of Europe who are in debt to her, certain countries of Europe are compelled to negotiate with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, however, and again in consequence of the antagonism between America and Europe, a certain parallelism is crystallising in the policy of the Soviet Union and that of America.

In this situation, where the antagonism between Europe and America is the chief characteristic, the theses have set up the slogan of the **United States of Socialist Europe**. And on the basis of this analysis we must state that it was absolutely correct to set up this slogan.

You will remember that Comrade Lenin declared himself quite clearly and sharply against a similar slogan in 1915. Is the setting up of this slogan, at the present time, a revision of Leninism? I believe not. Why not? 1) because the content of the old slogan in 1915 was entirely different and 2) because the world situation today in 1925/26, is entirely different from that of 1914/15.

The old slogan was a slogan on a capitalist basis. It was: **United States of Republican Europe**. Our slogan is: **United States of Socialist Europe**. The fundamental conditions have changed. We are no longer fighting Monarchism in Russia, Germany and Austria, against which the old slogan was directed. The Socialist Revolution is on the agenda of the most important states of Europe. Lenin did not oppose the old slogan on political grounds. He even said: politically the slogan is untouchable. But

he opposed the economic content of the slogan, and for the following reasons: he declared that the slogan is either impossible to carry out or otherwise it is reactionary. A lasting union of the imperialist countries of Europe is impossible because the balance of power is continually changing, and on a capitalist basis there is only one method of deciding — force. But if a temporary union of the European capitalist countries were to arise, it would be reactionary since it would be directed against European socialism, against the colonies, and against the young developing capitalism of Japan and America.

But our new slogan does not speak of the union of the capitalist but of the socialist countries of Europe. Therefore its economic content is also different. Socialist countries can scrap the question of power and will not unite against the colonies.

When Lenin fought against the old slogan, the European countries had the hegemony of the world and their union would have meant simply the strengthening of this hegemony. The leadership also was of an aggressive character. Today the United States of America have the hegemony of the world, and the slogan of the Union of the European countries has therefore a defensive character.

Lenin also opposed this slogan because it would have stifled the possibility of the victory of the socialist revolution in one single country. But since then the socialist revolution has conquered in one country. The slogan is correct today because we are already in a situation today to link up the slogan of the United States of Socialist Europe with two other very important slogans:

1. Solidarity, alliance with the struggle for freedom of all the oppressed colonies.
2. Solidarity, alliance with the Soviet Union.

In 1914 that was impossible because 1) Soviet Russia was not yet in existence, and 2) the great fight for the independence of the colonies did not yet exist in mass form.

A very important argument for this slogan is that the idea of **Pan-Europe** already exists independently of us in the form of **Locarno**, the **Dawes Plan**, **League of Nations**. It must not be forgotten that the official ideology of the II International as well as part of the European bourgeoisie is Pan-Europe against Pan-America. It must not be forgotten that millions of workers believe in this ideology. It is very important that we have not only a negative critical standpoint toward this bourgeois social democratic slogan, and that we destroy the pacifist swindle of this slogan, but that we have a positive slogan at the same time, which can really be the comprehensive slogan for our transitional demands.

But it is also necessary that every slogan be supplemented by suitable tasks for our **Communist Party in America**.

The **Communist Party of America** is not yet in a position today to win over the great masses directly. The theses give the analysis of the swing to the Right of the American labour movement sufficiently clearly. Therefore, we must construct various bridges between our Party and the masses of workers. The first bridge is the **Labour Party**. The second bridge, and in the present situation perhaps even more important to a certain extent than the Labour Party, is the **organisation of the Left Wing in the trade unions**. The fourth bridge is the creation of a broad platform which must combine the fight against the State power and against the trusts, so that it can unite not only the labour elements, but also the farmer masses and the petty-bourgeois elements. It is very important that the centre of gravity of the Party be transferred from light industry to heavy industry. The theses of the C.C. of the American Party which were adopted at the end of December have already clearly and concretely shown this task.

The last and most important task of our Party is the **fight against Imperialism**. The Communist Party of America must become the defender of the **oppressed peoples of Latin America**. The time is no longer distant when Latin America will become the China of the Far West and Mexico the Canton of Latin America. The Gompers trade unions have set up the slogan of the "Monroe Doctrine of the Workers", in other words, this is a protest against the penetration of any revolutionary propaganda into America. The American Communists must oppose this slogan with the slogan of the "**Open Door Policy**" of America for revolutionary ideas.

Comrade Stefanski:

Comrades, Comrade Zinoviev, in his speech on the International, has pointed out that the Plenum, on the basis of its experiences of the last year, must emphasise the uncertainty, the relativity and instability of the stabilisation, rather than the stabilisation itself. The situation in Poland is also a proof of the fact that the stabilisation of capital is only relative and has absolutely no solid foundation.

It is absolutely clear from the present situation that there are elements in Poland which in the further development of the situation can transform it into a directly revolutionary situation. With regard to the new task confronting the Party, I will merely point out the new phenomena which places great tasks before the Party. First of all there is Fascism in Poland, which is undoubtedly strengthening and is developing broad agitation and propaganda work. Besides, Fascism is organised in the industrial centres, such, for instance, as the Dombrov coal fields, there are Fascist trade unions which are in the service of the employers and against which the workers there have now had to fight. Another phenomenon which must be taken into account is the swing to the Left in the attitude of mind of the masses of workers; this is an international phenomenon, which has appeared in Germany, Great Britain and Poland recently. The circumstance that the P. P. S. not only joined the coalition in fact, but is formally supporting the policy of the bourgeoisie, results in the fact that an opposition exists which provokes a swing to the Left, which in turn gives the Party special opportunities for applying the tactic of the united front to wrest the masses from the influence of the P. P. S. This opposition made its appearance in the trade union sections. A proposition was made by the Lefts to the Central Committee of the Trade Unions, which is the organ of the compromisers, to start the fight against a government to which the friends and sympathisers of the P. P. S. belong. Not only the members of the "Bund" are voting for the proposition, but also the three respected leaders of the P. P. S.—Grylowski, the representative of the railwaymen; Adamek, the representative of the miners; and the representative of the chemical union. Naturally this is only a matter of voting, but this fact points to the possibilities offered our Party for wresting the masses of workers from the P. P. S.

The third circumstance characteristic for the situation in Poland is the peasant movement. A sharp line of demarcation is being drawn between the rich peasants on the one hand and the poor peasantry on the other, which during the last years has undergone a decided swing to the Left. The slogan "the land to the peasants without compensation", which was only a Communist slogan two years ago, is now the slogan of all the peasant parties with the exception of "Piast" the party of the rich peasants. This is evidence of the great ideological victory of the Party. The Party has also, in spite of all the great crisis, been able to further the alliance of the workers and peasants.

Comrades, you know that the Party liquidated an ultra-left crisis at the Fourth Conference. The experiences we went through during the period of the ultra-left leadership must be imparted to the other sections to a certain extent. Comrade Domsy, who has for a long time represented the ultra-left line, and who in general has the courage to say openly what he thinks, wrote an article in 1923 in which he rejected the united front tactic as an opportunist tactic. Only the C. P. of Russia, as a ruling Party, may apply this opportunist tactic.

The main characteristics of the ultra-lefts are: Separation from the masses. A shining example of this was last year's May Day demonstration. Whereas in former years our fight with the police was carried on under the eyes of the P. P. S. workers, the First of May in 1925 was to have been celebrated independently, on other streets; thus we had no opportunity for speaking among the broad masses under the influence of the P. P. S., we had separated ourselves from these masses. In reality we had no central demonstration in Warsaw — the smaller local demonstrations were dispersed by the police.

Another characteristic may be termed revolutionary gymnastics. The Party had exerted all its energies in conducting several campaigns and meetings, but only Party circles and those near to them took part in them; the broad masses were not reached by them.

Moreover, the ultra-lefts did not understand how to isolate the leaders from the masses by their tactics.

A further mistake of an ultra-left character, which is, however, of international significance, is the underestimation of the

role of the trade unions and the overestimation of the factory committees, which resulted in the fact that in the factories and the great industrial districts where factory committees existed, they were put in opposition to the trade unions. During this period we did not do the work necessary for drawing the masses again into the trade unions and for winning over the trade unions; we even lost the influence in those trade unions which we had before.

Comrades, our Fourth Conference which took place recently took these mistakes into account and liquidated the ultra-left policy. But that does not mean that the Party has removed all possibilities of ultra-left errors; they have struck pretty-deep root and obstinate struggle is necessary to do away with them. But the ultra-left policy has been liquidated. The fact that the crisis was chiefly a crisis of leadership resulted in the fact that the course of the crisis was difficult, but on the other hand it made it possible for the Party to do away quickly with the ultra-left mistakes.

The situation in Poland has grown very acute. You know of the events in Kalisch which prove what ferment there is there. What extent and what forms the movement is assuming are shown by this circumstance: in Kalisch three divisions of troops refused to fire on the workers; the workers assembled before the prison and demanded the release of the political prisoners, during several hours when the workers had the town in their hands, there was not one single anti-Semitic or any other kind of excess. That proves that the whole movement was on a high revolutionary level; the masses took the right path in the fight for the workers and peasants government. Everything points to the fact that the revolutionary mood is growing, but the last Plenary Session of the C. C. emphasised that the Party is not active enough. The last strike of the tramway workers in Warsaw took the Warsaw organisation by surprise. Now we are reaping the harvest of the separation from the masses which had been going on for several months. The last Plenum of the C. C. emphasised that the labour movement is on the ascendancy in Poland. But there is a great danger that the unemployment movement may separate from the movement of the employed workers. It is the task of our Party to connect the movement of the unemployed with the movement of the rest of the workers. This is possible because the employed workers are manifesting a revolutionary mood, because they are preparing for the strike of the railwaymen which is ready to break out in spring, whose wages are to be reduced by 20 to 30%; further, the strike of the agricultural workers is growing.

But the course of events can also take another turn. It is not all impossible that Poland will obtain the support of British-American capital, though under heavy conditions; this will naturally transform Poland into a semi-colony of this capital. Such a course of events might check the development of the revolutionary development for a short time.

The possibility of a fight with the fascists for power is not out of the question, and it is quite possible that fascism will be the first step in the development of the fight for the workers' and peasants' government. The rift which has made its appearance in the P. P. S., and the radicalisation of the P. P. S. workers prove that with a skilful application of the tactic of the united front by the Party, this split in the P. P. S. can be widened by us and great masses can be wrested from the P. P. S. This is all the more so since the opposition represents the best proletarian part of the P. P. S. Our Party has taken the right course for the fight of the masses and for the isolation of the treacherous leaders from the masses. The last Plenary Session was of the opinion that the Party, after overcoming the crisis, took the right road for the fight for the great masses.

Comrades, the state of affairs in Poland places great tasks before the Party, and the Party will be able to cope with them if it and the C. I. remain in closest contact with each other, and if it is possible to apply the experiences of the C. I. and the C. P. of the Soviet Union.

Earl R. Browder (America):

Comrades, in the Theses of Comrade Zinoviev we find that America plays a great role. This is of course proper and the picture that is drawn of the role of American imperialism is a correct one. However, it seems to us that there is some danger of a one-sided estimation of the development of American imperialism and American social and economic life, if we allow the picture as it stands to go without any further elaboration.

In addition to all the factors which demonstrate the upward line of American imperialism, there are other factors at work which we consider of great importance. These are the factors which are revealing the basis for a renewed development of a broad left wing in the American labour movement; factors which give our Party in America a broader basis for activity. It is our opinion that these factors should be specifically mentioned in the Theses. Among these should be mentioned the transformation going on in the international structure of American economic life, which is a reflex of the new role being played by America among the world forces, to the fact that America has ceased to be a debtor country, importing manufactures and exporting raw materials, and to America's present position as the greatest creditor nation, a nation exporting manufactures and importing raw materials. Due to this we have almost a permanent crisis in agriculture. As a result of this change in the role of America in world economics we have drastic curtailment of agriculture.

Further, while the American working class is being sustained at a level high above the level of European workers, yet the trend of real wages is downward. This is a revolutionising factor in the development of the working class of America.

In addition, partial crises exist in American industry which press heavily upon certain groups of the working class. The further development of technique, mass production and super power, which is increasing production far beyond the increase in the number of workers required, is creating a permanent army of unemployed and is decreasing the specific gravity of the skilled workers of the labour aristocracy.

All these are revolutionary factors and should be included in the Theses without changing the broad outlines as they stand at present. This is necessary in order to prevent the formation of two sorts of errors. On the one hand there will be a tendency of comrades in America, to feel hopeless, to use the objective situation as an excuse for pessimism and lack of activity. On the other hand, without this more balanced picture, there would arise a tendency to revise the broad outlines of the picture contained in the Theses of Comrade Zinoviev.

One word re the downward trend of wages in America. Comrade Varga said yesterday that it is not the absolute standard of real wages which determines the mood of the working class; that with the working class on a low standard, a slight upward tendency is sufficient to develop false hopes and illusions. On the other hand, even with workers receiving high wages, a downward tendency has a revolutionary effect. We believe this is correct. In spite of the fact that the workers in America have a higher level of wages than workers elsewhere, the tendency of wages is downward and this is having a revolutionising effect upon the workers. This downward course of wages is not only seen over a long term of years but is also observable at the present time. Professor Douglas, an American bourgeois professor, in his book on the course of wages from 1890 to 1923 states that in 1923 the real wages of American labour compared with real wages from 1890 to 1899 had declined by 5%. What is true of the American workers as a whole is also true of the unionised workers, that is of the labour aristocracy. Their wages have also declined during that period by 3 or 4%. According to the figures of the Labour Office of the League of Nations, in Philadelphia a typical American industrial city, the index of real wages, comparing with the London real wages as a basis of 100 steadily declined from 213 on July 1st, 1924 until on October 1st, 1925, they were 176, a decline of 16% in the course of 15 months. This comrades, in our opinion has a very decisive influence upon the development within the working class in the United States.

With regard to that portion of Theses which describes the new orientation of the American labour movement, the development of Company Unions and distribution of stock among the workers, the development of trade union capitalism, B. & O. plans, etc., we think that the Theses very properly describe this development and can be accepted with a few minor amendments which will be presented in the Commission.

One word in conclusion regarding a point made by Comrade Pepper. Comrade Pepper reproaches the American Party because it has won victories in light industry. The fact that we have won these victories is not sufficient ground for reproaching us. We must take our victories where it is possible to win them. It is in the garment industry that we had the conjunction of circumstances which rendered these victories possible. It seems to us that it is a mistake to take such a fact as a basis for declaring that the American movement is orientated towards light in-

dustry. The American movement has had its greatest struggles in heavy industry. It has had its victory in light industry because circumstances were more favourable for victory. The forces opposing us were weaker and our forces were stronger. There seems, too, much of a similarity between Comrade Pepper's complaint and the reproach made by the social democrats against Russia: that the revolution should not have taken place in a country so industrially backward as Russia. There is no contradiction between our orientation and our victories. Our orientation is towards heavy industry, and it will continue to be such.

In conclusion with these few additional points, we are in complete agreement with the Theses of Comrade Zinoviev.

Comrade Ruth Fischer:

The Plenum of the Enlarged Executive is being held in a situation which presents far more favourable conditions for the development of Communist mass Parties than was the case at the last Plenum and the V. World Congress. This objectively favourable situation must be taken advantage of; we must have Parties which know how to combine the correct tactics for winning the masses in the present transition period, with a correct inner Party course, with an inner consolidation and with a real fight against Right and ultra-Left deviations. The report of Comrade Zinoviev, with which I declare myself to be in full agreement, as well as the Theses have clearly outlined these tasks and shown the means for solving these tasks. Today doubts are being cast on this solution from two sides, from the ultra-Left and the Right. According to the ultra-Left moods, every mass tactic leads into a morass, the real application of the united front tactics is impossible without sliding over to the Social Democracy; one must wait, keep the Party pure, do nothing until a revolutionary situation comes, and not swim against the stream.

It would be absurd, however, to overlook, even if only in a single country, that we have Right dangers in the International, which have remained over from the time of the V. World Congress. This Right is, of course, just as much a by-product of the temporary relative stabilisation of capital, as is the relative resistive force of the S. P. G. in spite of its betrayal of the working class.

In Germany there has been a great deal of moralising in the question of the Left. I call upon the numerous Rights who are here to show a little character and honesty to say what they want. The revision of the 5th Congress. That they are running about here and are discontented is nothing new. After the great flood of 1923 they sought refuge in an ark, when the rage of the workers at that time drove them away. Now they are sending a dove in order to see whether the flood is still rising. They hope they will soon be able to go on dry land. But they will become a very morsel for those who have to eat it.

Comrades, the course of the Communist International was up to now an unavoidable struggle against the Right and Left deviations. And it must remain so in all decisive questions. The German question, the question over which the struggle before and at the V Congress, the fight against the liquidators, broke out, is still today one of the most important questions. You see today how the French Rights are already making use of the open Letter to the German Party and are demanding a Right Policy as the General Line for the whole Comintern. In order to understand the situation of the German Party one must know a little of the history of our Party. We have in Germany 10 Party Conferences behind us, and each Party conference has, so to speak, pulled the Party round to another line. Our Party rose from the revolutionary groups in the labour movement, of which the most important were the Left Socialists and the group of the Spartacus Bund.

A whole number of important questions: The question of theory, of the relations to Bolshevism, of the role of the Party, of imperialism, etc. were only put much later in the course of development, and I will not maintain that they are yet perfectly clear to the Party. This is the reason why the Party vacillated between Ultra-Left and Right states of fever. The way of the German working class to Bolshevism is a very instructive chapter. This should cause those to think who dismiss the German question with a few eloquent phrases. If it has not succeeded after a revolution, after so many experiences of struggle, after so much material which has practically impressed the principles of Communism on the workers in forming a firm kernel, this is a

lesson which is of the greatest importance for all the Parties of the Communist International.

Now I come to the question, why is the Left "wrecked" as a "group", why was the Open Letter right and necessary, what was the lesson of the Open Letter and how has it been carried out? why was the Left, which before Frankfort displayed a whole number of weaknesses and deviations from Bolshevism, able to capture the Party? The entire apparatus with its higher functionaries was opposed to it at the time. They were able to capture the party because the October defeat was the collapse of a policy and a theory, which has led us to the abyss, which had almost brought the party to ruin. This taking over of the party by the Left at Frankfort showed that the Right had played out its historical role as leader of the party.

Frankfort was ideologically and, in fact, a split without being a split outwardly and organisationally. The decisive mistake of the Frankfort Party Conference, from which arose the mistakes of the whole year, was that we did not say right out what we ought to have said and what was necessary. We were captives of the mood of the workers, captives to the mood in the united front tactics, in the will not to lose contact with the Ultra-Left minded workers.

We might perhaps have avoided many an exclusion had we been able to put forward the trade union question. (Interjection. Walcher: "Yet in February you brought forward the resolution for withdrawal from the unions!") We have all committed errors in the trade union question, from Left to Right.

The second decisive mistake in Frankfort was that we had not spoken clearly regarding the question of the united front tactics. It is true, we did not formally reject it; that we have never done, but the feeling in the Party was absolutely against even the formulation of the united front tactics. I still remember the fight of Maslow in order to introduce only a little sentence. (Interjection, Braun: "And I remember how at Dusseldorf you spoke against the united front tactics!") Yes, at Dusseldorf I was also a captive of the Ultra-Left feeling. (Braun: Yes, one should not lie to the International!") That's all right.

We had another occasion when we could have made a turn in our course. The idea of the Open Letter was the call to the Left: Purge yourselves from the Ultra-Left errors, from a Fraction, become a party, retaining at the same time what is good from the past.

Comrades, many will recollect the V Congress and the mood of the German Delegation. I will say here quite plainly that our delegation at the V Congress had had a serious Ultra-Left crisis, not only in the trade union question, but in the decisive questions of the V Congress, in the question of the Theses on tactics, which a section of the German delegation wished flatly to reject.

And who was the leader of the opposition, who declared that under no circumstances would he accept, and with whom we had to use the greatest energy in order to "persuade" him. No other than Comrade Thälmann was the leader of this opposition, who absolutely rejected the tactical theses; and so you will see that when such a good fellow as Thälmann acts in that manner, it is evidence of the strength of the Ultra-Left mood. Now we committed a second fatal error. We covered up the first error by means of discipline. We ought to have fought out the conflict openly before the Party. This is the explanation of the wrong treatment of the Ultra-Left at the May meeting of the C. C.

In the question of the relations to the "People's Bloc" there were errors, Right deviations and exaggerations.

We attempted to dodge the main problem of winning the social democratic workers, and again out of fear of the Right. Of course, the Ultra-Left minded Party reacted with open indignation. At the May meeting of the National Committee the state of affairs was such that I was asked: "Will you have the majority?" I knew that we had the majority, but it was a very weak majority that had resulted without any ideological preparation, which was half forced into the new tactic. I signed the Open Letter because I knew that this Letter was correct in essence, that it expressed openly that which we had been struggling through for two years, unfortunately without success; that it contained what was necessary in order to bring the Party out of its isolation. But I knew at the same time: If the Open Letter was not carried out, at the same time retaining and extending the Left as the basis of the Party, then the Party would pass through a crisis more severe than any before. If the objective situation gives us many more possibilities than during the time of the Dawes illusions to increase and to strengthen the influence of the Party among the masses, the intervention of the C. I. has

been a helping factor. One must recognise and speak of this effect of the Open Letter and also say to the Party wherein the effects consist. On the other hand, it would be foolish to deny that the Open Letter has also had its bad effects. Disintegration, mistrust, personal things. Instead of openly examining the history of the past two years and drawing the balance, personal questions were raised. Typical of this was the immediate attitude against the old Berlin District Leadership, which was never against the political import of the Open Letter, but only feared that the Open Letter would serve as an instrument for destroying the Lefts and for the reappearance of the Rights. Instead of convincing these comrades to the contrary by the appropriate inner Party course, "fire was concentrated" upon them immediately, as a result of which, of course, many comrades were only strengthened in their convictions.

Comrades, no one can deny that after the dispersal of the Dawes illusions the situation has become better. But the favourable situation renders it incumbent that the German question be solved in such a way that we become a really sound, strong Party which is capable of coping with the new difficulties.

The referendum campaign is undoubtedly a success for the Party. There is certainly a new mood among the working class, another mood towards Soviet Russia, another feeling towards the Communists than formerly, a mood among the broad masses of the non-Party and Social Democratic workers to place themselves under the leadership of the Communist Party. We shall have to develop the united front tactic on all fields, purged of the Right and Ultra-Left errors of the past. With this we shall be faced with certain questions in a very concrete form: 1. the relations to the Left Social Democracy in Saxony. There we have yet no dissolution of the Diet. But we can reckon on an election this year, in which it will be the task of the Communist Party to render impossible the further great coalition policy of the S. P. Difficulties will arise regarding our total relations to the Social Democracy. I do not know whether there exists a theory of this kind anywhere, but I believe one must in no event play with the idea that a split on a national scale is possible in the Social Democracy. Certainly, whole local groups of Social Democratic workers will come over to us, before all there will take place a broad rapprochement in the trade unions. But to speak of any serious signs of disintegration in the leading groups of Social Democracy seems to me to be a dangerous tendency. Such a tactic demands of us that we draw a clear balance in the Party and do not repeat the error of the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group who did not draw the balance. When one speaks plainly and clearly over the situation in the Party one must say that we have committed far too many errors against the Right in the question of administrative measures, without discussing principles whereby the Right could have soon been liquidated. It still exists as an ideological tendency, as a fraction. And I say openly that today some scattered Ultra-Lefts still exist organisationally in the Party, who can drive the workers to stupid acts, stir up confusion and sow mistrust on a large scale.

Let us take the position of the C. C. in the German Party. This position is not too strong. A C. C. that has not arisen by means of its own strength, should be very cautious in the inner-Party struggle, in the employment of administrative measures. The C. C. should create a basis (and extend this not only to the Right) with which the Party can lead.

In the present political tasks there are no serious differences of opinion. Many, it is true, desire greater activity in the unemployment and economic questions, but at present there is no serious difference of opinion regarding the tasks of the Party.

In the question of the inner Party course the question is put in a mathematical form. What is the greater danger: Ultra-Left or Right? Against whom shall the fight be taken exclusively? Comrades, with such a metaphysic one arrives at nothing but stupidities and a worsening of the atmosphere. The Ultra-Left danger is at the present moment the greater as it threatens our tactics, for we must escape from our isolation. But comrades, this Ultra-Left danger can only be really fought if one at the same time sees the great Right tendencies and groups and opposes them. If we conduct a united fight against the Ultra-Left that will be a weak repetition of Heidelberg and endanger the revolutionary character of our Party.

I am not at all pessimistic in regard to the possibilities of the C. P. G. I am convinced that if we face the Ultra-Left as well as the Right comrades with the question of concentrating forces on a correct political platform, that the process of ren-

dering the Party sound will advance more rapidly and thoroughly. I believe that if the Plenum of the Executive proceeding from this line, raises the problem of the German Party, that there exists the possibility of holding within a reasonable time a **Concentration Party Conference** which will be neither a **Berlin**, a **Frankfort** nor a **Leipzig Party Conference**, but will fill the workers with confidence in the Party, will purge the atmosphere of all deviations and give a foundation to the Central to conduct the work in the right line with the entire force of the Party. The German question will today be one of the most important questions of the International. At the V. Congress this

question raised the question of other Parties. Do not believe that this question will not have its effects upon the other Sections. The Ultra-Lefts and Rights will everywhere raise their heads if the German question is not solved in such a way that we really escape from the present situation.

Comrades, I believe that precisely now, when the objective situation in many countries is so favourable for us, this Plenum should be a milestone on the way to overcoming the errors of the past and in laying down a correct policy towards the masses, a rallying of the forces from all sides in the struggle for the Communist Party, in the fight for the Communist International!

(Seventh Session, February 24, 1926, evening)

Continuation of the Discussion on the Report of Comrade Zinoviev.

The chair was occupied by Comrade Smeral.

Comrade Rosenberg (Germany):

There is only one possibility of handling disputes among tendencies so that the Party and the whole International may derive benefit from them. One must ascertain with the greatest sincerity what disputes as to principle exist. It must also be ascertained how far the various groups and tendencies differ from one another. Or it may turn out that certain groups have no principles at all. We have in the course of this Session of the Enlarged Executive heard two great speeches dealing with principles. The speech of Comrade Zinoviev in which he laid down the line of the Presidium and of the Russian C. C. and then yesterday the speech of Comrade Bordiga. Comrade Bordiga may have been quite right in regard to many individual questions, but one must openly say that his whole principle is impossible for a labour policy. One cannot construct a labour policy by thinking out a metaphysical theory and seek to determine the life of the working class from the point of view of this metaphysic.

When we endeavour, in the sense of the Theses of the Presidium, to frame a labour policy, and when from this basis we consider the European situation, we must say that the European situation gives us the very best possibilities for the future, the firm conviction of the decline of capitalism and that the working class in West Europa will come to power in the not distant future. We must admit, however, at the same time that the situation is very serious, that we have a fairly firm united front of big capital from America to Berlin, which includes the S. P. G. leaders. On the other side we have the imperialist differences of the Great Powers. But one must not exaggerate these differences between the capitalist powers. One must be quite clear that, in really serious situations we shall have to deal with a far-reaching unity of the capitalists.

In order to be able to solve our task on a European scale a very serious, clear and concrete policy is necessary. I am of the opinion that we must give a more practical content to our international work in the trade unions. We must give slogans to the working class in all spheres. We must, as the Communist International, have certain proposals for the miners of Europe. We must not leave it to the League of Nations to convene economic conferences, but we must demand of the Amsterdam International, and conduct a campaign for this purpose, that a proletarian economic conference be called in order to say to the workers in what way economic cooperation between the West European proletariat and Soviet Russia is to be realised.

In the campaign for the expropriation of the Princes in Germany it is highly important that we penetrate into the middle classes, and attract to our side a considerable portion of the middle class, who up to now have been under black-white-red ideology.

Coming now to the German situation we find there a peculiar contradiction. We have on the one hand three million unemployed, but on the other hand no barricade situation. Our task consists in widening the breach that has been made by the question of the expropriation of the princes, to attract ever larger sections of social democratic workers, to revive the idea of a workers' government, to come forward on the trade union field, to put forward the economic problem and thus to push the enemy

ever further back and strengthen ourselves for the moment of the decisive blow.

Now I come to matters of Party theory in the narrow sense. The great unemployment existing among our Party members and many historical circumstances have resulted in that there are strong Communist Labour Party dangers in the Party. On the other hand we have the fact that, as a result of the temporary partial stabilisation, Right moods are again making their appearances.

The C. L. P. tendency is very strong among the group which is usually characterised as ultra-left.

I must record a certain difference with the comrades of the C. C., on the one hand they say that one must proceed strongly against the ultra-left and on the other hand it seems that they do not see the real C. L. P. dangers, but they nevertheless exist.

But I see another danger regarding which I must speak quite openly and in so doing I must refer quite briefly to the statements which Ruth Fischer has made here. I will not put forward questions regarding personal character, as that would be useless. But in spite of that, when anybody claims that he is desirous of leading the workers, it is at least expected that he maintains a certain degree of accuracy in his statements. I am quite convinced that the many objective untruths contained in the speech of Ruth Fischer are to be attributed solely to a bad memory. But I will mention something more serious. Nobody has the right to appear here as a Lefter who is affected with the most serious Right deviations that are to be seen in the history of the International. The theory in the question of the people's bloc policy was nothing else than a modern edition of Millerandism. But there is another matter: In my opinion everybody can stand up for his political view in the Party, but the Party cannot tolerate a group which changes its opinions every four days. And that which the Party has experienced with Ruth Fischer compels one to be cautious. I remember the unworthy comedy that was played in the Berlin Central Committee after the appearance of the Open Letter, and one cannot blame the Party leadership if it did not tolerate that. Every Party and every leadership must defend itself against absolute lack of principle, especially in the present time.

I will here say quite openly, and also in the name of Comrade Scholem, I have the impression that the line which the C. C. is now pursuing is correct and if the Central Committee continues to work in this sense, to continue to employ the united front tactic as hitherto, as a broad mass movement in order to draw the masses away from Social Democratic influence, then I will in the future work together with the Central so far as lies in my power, just as will Comrade Scholem. But I will say quite openly, nobody can tell what may happen and nobody can demand that binding promises be given for the future. But if the Central continues to work as in the last few months, then I believe that cooperation is possible.

Comrade Domski:

Comrades: I heard with great regret that the Polish Commission is not to meet, for the situation in the Polish Party is not so simple as might appear from the speech of Comrade Stepanski. The matter is not settled by removing Domski from the C. C. and sending him to Moscow. The political situation in

Poland is a very difficult one, about which I will speak later. I agree with the draft theses, but still I find that the characterization of the work of our Party contains a great injustice. When it is said that our Party leadership almost brought the Party to ruin, then this does not agree with the simplest facts. Even the Party conference, which liquidated the ultra-left crisis in our Party, did not state that our whole Party activity meant the decline of the Party. It stated on the contrary that our Party Leadership drove the Party very strongly forward, and that great achievements were made during this period. I do not wish to deny that great ultra-left mistakes were made. That is a fact. The first great mistake was our June Resolution which criticised the tactic of the German Party, and in part also the tactic of the French and Bulgarian Parties. The Executive, in its letter to the German Party, set up the correct perspective. It corrected the serious mistakes which were made by the German Party. And it became clear to us after this letter, and even earlier, that the very perspectives which we had considered Right and ultra-left deviations in the German Party, were false. We have also observed a great deal more — the fight of the French Party against the Right danger, the Putschist danger in Bulgaria. It is also a fact that in our own practice we committed ultra-left errors. Especially in the first stages of our activity, we over-estimated the role of the factory councils, and under-estimated the role of the trade unions. The independent demonstration on May First was a mistake. In spite of the mistake we have still achieved a great deal and even the Party Conference did not deny that.

Our present task is to create an alliance between the working class, the peasant masses and the oppressed nationalities. It is a fact that in this regard we have made great progress. But it suffices to state that, when we were placed at the helm of the Polish Party, we had only two Communist deputies in the Parliament, who were isolated. Now we have a bloc of workers and peasants, counting 17 deputies. No one can claim that that is a defeat. We have made great progress among the masses of peasants.

With regard to the oppressed nationalities, it is sufficient to mention the great mass action of the boycott of taxes which was instigated by our Party and which brought us a great increase of power among the White Russian and Ukrainian masses. And within the working class, in spite of ultra-left errors, we also achieved a great deal. In the municipal elections in Zmaosc, Czenstochowa, Bendzin, Piotrkow we achieved great results. That is a real achievement for an illegal and persecuted Party. We were at the head of every great strike movement. We have recently overcome our mistakes in the trade union question. We forced a united front of all the trade unions in the great metal workers' strike in Warsaw and moreover, the III Trade Union Congress in Warsaw, the Congress of Free Trade Unions, showed even earlier that in spite of all persecution, in spite of all measures against us, we have asserted ourselves in the trade union movement.

If it is said that we nearly brought the Party to ruin, then that is really a boundless under-estimation of what our Party achieved under these difficult conditions.

At present we have in Poland a situation full of responsibility. The situation in Poland has become so acute that political and social convulsions are not only not out of the question, but are even quite possible in the near future: and the same is true of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary convulsions. The situation of the Polish Republic is critical, one might practically say it is catastrophic. I must state that it seems to me that our Central Committee, which at the last Party conference carried correct decisions in general, does not quite correctly estimate the situation. What is the situation within Poland? We are confronted, if not immediately, then in the near future, by a left-fascist Putsch. We have Pilsudski, his organisation, which has strong roots in the army, and which is looked upon by the bourgeoisie itself more and more as perhaps the only possible escape from the proletarian revolution should the hopes for foreign loan come to nothing. A considerable development is observable in the camp of Polish fascism. We are always told that we have a Left fascism and a Right fascism. Left fascism is represented by the Democrat and Ex-Socialist Pilsudski, backed by great military circles, but also by parts of the peasant and working class, intellectuals, proletarian youth, etc. On the other hand we have the "Black Hundred", the reactionary danger, the fascists, monarchists, etc. Now a certain rapprochement between these camps is beginning. Pilsudski is moving seriously towards the fascist camp. It is true, that the great majority of the Right

fascists remain embittered enemies of Pilsudski. But there are monarchist elements who are rallying behind him. The monarchists of the Vilna District, the fascist Peasant Party, and other fascist elements, are beginning to realise that Pilsudski is not so bad for them after all and are beginning to say so. I am afraid that our Central Committee does not sufficiently estimate the dangers arising from this situation. We must direct our efforts against Pilsudski. It is well known that there are many elements in Pilsudski's ranks who really believe that their leader is a revolutionary and that under certain circumstances they must proceed together with the Communists. This situation must be exploited in order to expose Pilsudski by a correct application of the tactic of the united front.

Now a few words on the foreign policy of Poland. We see that matters are getting more acute between Germany and Poland. Relations are becoming more strained from month to month and day to day. Only a week ago, the Germanic League was arrested in Poland. That is a great blow against the German Irredentists in Poland. And now there is a fight between Germany and Poland for the seat in the Council of the League of Nations.

What is the significance of this?

The whole fight is about the western frontier of Poland. In Germany great mass meetings are taking place, especially in East Prussia, where it is stated every day that they must get back Pommerania, Danzig, the Corridor, Upper Silesia, even Posen, one way or another, peacefully or by force, with arms in hand. In the Polish bourgeois circles there is a panicky mood. A direct war development after Locarno does not yet exist, but it will come, whether the loan is granted or not. Poland will somehow or other be compelled to swallow the bitter pill of having to return its Western districts to Germany. If it does not do this peacefully, then it will be compelled to do so by the armed bands of German fascists.

Of course the general European conflict of interests, the Anglo-French antagonism, come into play here. But one of the chief points here is also the question of the Western frontier of Poland. The most important thing is that this is felt to be a national danger by the large circles of the Polish people, especially by the petty bourgeois intellectuals. Now we have the opportunity of using the defense of Polish independence, proclaimed by our Conference, for a great campaign. We must tell these elements that the danger of war on the Western frontier is a consequence of the whole Versailles policy of the Polish bourgeoisie, the policy of national treachery. The alliance with French Imperialism, the fight against the Soviet Union, the services as bailiff rendered against Germany — this whole policy is now bearing fruit in the form of the menace of the integrity of the Polish nation.

It is naturally our duty that if war developments should arise, to oppose, together with our German comrades, the national war hysteria on both sides by the slogan of civil war. But to find the right resonance in the masses, in order not to be looked upon as traitors and Prussian agents, we must even now begin to permeate the masses with our teachings that it is the bourgeoisie which betrayed the national interests of the Polish people.

To overlook these perspectives completely would mean a tremendous misunderstanding of the serious political situation.

It is often said that the application of the tactic of the united front always involves the danger of Right deviations. If in the present situation the Party were to confine itself to the perspective of the gradual winning over of the masses and moreover declare that the main thing now is the fight against the Left, then I see no guarantee against Right deviations, in fact, that would mean a guarantee for Right deviations.

I find it surprising that the "Pravda" publishes an article by Valetsky which is actually a blow against the present C. C. of the Party, and not only against the Left. Comrade Valetsky claims in this article that not enough has been done in the fight against the Left. The tactic of the Party is correct, it is true, but it is being applied by the Party, the majority of which is ultra-left and Left. What a misfortune that the Party is Left! Well, this must be counteracted. Valetsky also immediately mentions the means, that is, he gives it to be understood that still more Left elements must be thrown out of Party work and the Right elements must be put in. He does not say "Right elements", for there are none such in Poland, there are only elements that were "considered Right", and these elements must

be drawn into Party work, and into the C.C. if possible, otherwise there would be no protection against the ultra-left and Right danger. Well, if this sort of thing is driven further, then it may easily come about that we will again have a catastrophe in the revolutionary movement such as we had in the autumn of 1923.

I take this opportunity to declare in my name and in the name of Comrade Helene: We wish to help this Central Committee, we want to work with it, as we have already worked with it at the last Party Conferences. We do not want to go into the C.C., but we do want to get into Party work, and we want to get into it there, where our comrades are fighting, in Poland, where bullets are flying and prison sentences are showered down. There is our place, there our revolutionary duty is calling us. The comrades who wish to work illegally are none too numerous in our movement. It is not right in the present situation to keep the Left comrades from the work.

Comrade Thälmann (Germany):

We are of the opinion that the German Question is not a German Question, but, like all other questions, is also a serious international question which is bound up together with the various stages of development of all the other sections, and with the general tactic of the C.I. Only in this way can there be achieved a uniform world policy of the Comintern, only in this way will it be possible to guarantee a really collective carrying out of Comintern work. In this connection I wish to mention the most important factors. Let us take only the five most important sections: the Czech, the Polish, the Italian, the British and the German; compare their situation at the last Enlarged Executive with that of today. The Czech Party was in such a position that one might have believed it was on the verge of collapse. We saw that at that time not only the opposition, but also the C.C. had made really serious mistakes. Today, we see that, after conducting an earnest political fight ideologically, we have in the Czech Party a consolidated leadership, an unbroken Party, which has already achieved serious results recently.

The Polish Party, which was badly disorganised under the Domski leadership with its ultra-left course, and which in an extraordinarily favourable situation in Poland completely isolated itself from the masses, is already on the path to a gradual internal consolidation.

It must be stated that this development was possible only because of the help of Comintern.

The Italian Party, which at the Fifth Congress was still represented by Bordiga, who at that time still enjoyed a strong influence in the Party, has now shown by experience that the tactics and the policy of Bordiga in Italy were wrong, and the last Italian Party Congress has already shown that 90% of the members stand by the C.C. and only 10% represent the Bordiga policy. That is a really serious ideological and political process of recovery of health, which we greet with great joy.

The British Party, in spite of its small membership, has made very great progress under a really proletarian leadership — and one can say that this leadership is composed exclusively of proletarian elements. What is characteristic about it is that it is the only Party, except for a few very small parties, which has no differences with the Executive.

I will speak later about the German Party. I wish only to point to the fact that the development of our own Party is one of the greatest internal successes of the Comintern in the course of the last half year.

In international trade union unity, the left movement of the world proletariat has spread beyond Great Britain into the other countries. We see definite results in Norway and Finland. The recent favourable progress of the Swedish Party must not be forgotten nor the consolidation of the Italian Party, which, in spite of the measures of fascist terrorism, has achieved results in the factories and trade unions.

The French Party has given us an example of the fact that, certain results were limited because the comrades were not in a position, in consequence of the internal party disputes to carry out the tasks in such a way as a consolidated Party ought to do in such a financial crisis as France is in now.

But we have had not only positive results; we have also had reverses.

In Germany I remind you of the Hindenburg Election, before the Open Letter, and the great decline of Communist work in general, especially in the trade unions. The main tendency, however, is that the Comintern will soon have made real progress everywhere. The difficulties which crop up here and there must be done away with in order to accelerate the general forward march of the Comintern in the various sections.

The policy which Bordiga expressed in his speech was undoubtedly anti-Communist through and through. I will try to pick out two important tendencies from his policy which prove this: the Leninist Theory of the State, which he wishes to replace by an anarchistic destruction of the State apparatus down to the factory nuclei, which he wishes to replace by the Social Democratic residential organisation. In these two theories Bordiga shows himself to be not only deviating from but actually opposing the policy of the Comintern.

Comrade Bordiga also spoke about the role of the Communist Party. This part of his speech was the first serious attempt to set the R.C.P. against the Comintern and the idea of his speech was to dispossess the R.C.P. of the leading role in the Comintern. The German Delegation is convinced that the R.C.P. will remain the leader of the Comintern, because it is the only Party in the world which has established the dictatorship of the proletariat and which was in a position to retain this dictatorship firmly in its hands for eight years and really to build up Socialism, even though under certain difficulties. We believe that in view of the development of Comintern and its significance for the world proletariat in the whole international situation, Comrade Bordiga, with his conception must be fought sharply and stubbornly, since he is opposing the policy of the Comintern with a system.

If Comrade Neurath — I do not know whether on behalf of the Czech Delegation or not — declares with a wave of the hand that the enemy comes from the Right, then I must say that his conception is very one-sided and undialectic besides. At the Rathenau Demonstration, Wirth, from the Left Centre, also declared in Germany that the enemy comes from the Right. In a Bolshevik Party it is necessary to determine, according to each situation and political necessity, where the enemy comes from, just as Comrade Zinoviev has expressed it here. In the French Party the enemy at present comes from the Right, in the German Party the chief enemy is the ultra-left, naturally this can again change in every situation in Germany also, and we must change our fighting front according to the situation.

With this I conclude my general remarks on the international situation and proceed to Germany.

Before going into the course within the Party itself, I wish to describe briefly the development in Germany, and how it will proceed in the next few months. At the moment the dispute is in the first place about what are the reasons for our recent successes. The ultra-lefts declare that the reasons for our success are to be sought only in the objective situation. We believe, on the contrary, that our successes are explained by two fundamental factors: firstly, by the change in the objective situation, and secondly, by the correct tactic and the correct inner-Party course of our Party as laid down in the Open Letter.

Germany is just now in a generally favourable situation, which makes it possible for us to win over broad masses, and create real bases of support along the road of organising the revolution.

The present economic crisis in Germany, which is a permanent crisis, is a very serious phenomenon. About 1 to 1½ millions, that is 10% of the entire proletariat, will remain as a standing army of the unemployed even if there is an improvement of the economic situation in the next few years. Besides this general economic crisis and the difficulties the bourgeoisie has to overcome, we see at the same time certain attempts at stabilising capitalism, in which connection I would mention the increasing capitalist monopolisation, which shows itself in Germany by the formation of potassium syndicates and by the union of many syndicates in the steel trust. Then there are other difficulties, such as the agrarian crisis. This crisis facilitates for us our establishing contact and winning over of the rural proletariat and poor peasants. The Party is already starting a great campaign in this sphere.

We also see that capitalism in Germany is contemplating a serious attack on wages.

In this connection it is necessary that especially the trade union position of the Communist Party be strengthened, so that we can play the leading role in the economic fights.

An important question is our attitude toward the government. The present government was elected with a strong minority, and has already announced its reactionary programme against the proletariat. The big business wing of the Centre and of the Democrats has its representatives in this government, and at the same time the social Democrats, by withholding their votes in the Reichstag, will be greatly burdened the next few months and will be responsible for the measures of the government.

Another important factor in Germany is the fact that the fascist organisations are threatening more and more to begin serious business, and on the other hand close cooperation is already beginning between the Red Fighters League and the Reichsbanner which is finding expression in determined action against the fascist organisations in various localities. The most important mass movement is that which developed on the basis of the agitation for expropriation without compensation of the princes in Germany. This is a really serious popular movement, which clearly showed:

1. That the possibility was there to guide this popular movement under the hegemony of the proletariat;
2. That the anti-monarchist tendency in Germany has become stronger;
3. That the antagonisms within the bourgeoisie are becoming more acute in the democratic and Centrum Party, especially in the latter, where the Centrum workers stand for expropriation of the princes, while the wing of big business is in favour of some agreement.

4. That the relations between the bourgeois and the Social Democratic Parties are getting slack, which already finds serious expression in the basis of negotiations which was created in the matter of the expropriation of the princes.

5. That the class basis of the proletariat is thus generally strengthened.

6. That in various districts of Germany, Bavaria, Thuringia, etc. we are finding organisational points of contact with the peasants, which formerly was impossible.

I come now to the tactic of the Party. Our tactic since the publication of the Open Letter has contributed to the fact that the red class front of the proletariat is strengthening itself, and that the difficulties of the bourgeoisie are thereby increasing.

We have seen that it was possible in the campaign for the expropriation of the princes to compel the S. P. G. and the A. D. G. B. to come to the negotiating table with the Communists, without thereby infringing Communist principles.

The first result is that the demand for expropriation without compensation had to be accepted by the S. P. G., and secondly that by the formation of unity committees in the factories, every barrier was broken down which had stood between the social democratic and Communist workers.

Our trade union tactic also showed that with the publication of the open letter we are in a position and will be in a position, in connection with the important decisions of the Org Conference, to make serious steps forward. If, at the beginning of the strengthening of our trade union work we issued the slogan: "Ten Million Members in the Trade Unions!", we issued it in order to bring the non-Party workers into the trade unions, in order to strengthen the revolutionary fighting front.

I will now proceed to the inner Party section, which to me is the most important. It is not only a question of the inner Party course, but I wish also to sketch the various deviations in our Party.

The chief enemy in Germany at present is the ultra-left. Scholem declares here that he does not agree with the Open Letter, endorses the general political line, however, and believes he has found a way along which joint work is possible. But we must state here that in the last few months when the new policy was being carried out, the ultra-lefts had various other attitudes. The first serious political step in the line of the Open Letter which the Central Committee had to carry out, was the attitude to the Berlin municipal elections, to deprive the bourgeois majority of the bourgeois bloc. The slogan was issued of getting a majority of Communists and Social Democrats. Then we raised the question of joint lists with the S. P. G., not in the spirit of the S. P. G. but for the distribution of the

surplus votes between Communists and Social Democrats. That was the first point on which the Ultra-Lefts, including Ruth Fischer, represented a different standpoint, which proved to be completely wrong, as was seen by the later effect on the whole working class. We have also seen that certain Ultra-Left comrades were very pessimistic at the beginning of the campaign for the expropriation of the princes and even spoke of parliamentary cretinism. We also had some differences in the Saxon Question. Had we followed the tactic of the Ultra-Lefts, we would have gone from one defeat to another and would have obtained no results. We had to dissociate ourselves from tendencies within the Party which attempted to put the Party under the diplomatic leadership of Ruth Fischer, who was absolutely not in a position to carry it through against the Ultra-Lefts. It is incomprehensible to me that Comrade Scholem rejects the Open Letter here at the Plenum, and declares the tactic of the Party is successful. That is a complete contradiction, for the Open Letter was the starting point of the tactic of the Party. When Comrade Scholem declares here that he stands on the basis of Leninism, then he showed in his practice in Germany that he stands on the basis of Leninism just as Stresemann stands on the basis of the Weimar Constitution (Laughter). Scholem declares that perhaps a common basis can be found which will provide the possibility of joint work. We declare that this basis already exists. The only basis is the tactic and inner Party course of the C. C., the only basis is the Open Letter which Scholem still rejects today. Any other basis is impossible.

Comrade Scholem gets excited because the Open Letter speaks of corrupt elements. Is Katz no corrupt element? Of course he is! He is really one of those of whom one can say that he is already an agent of the bourgeoisie. At that moment when he attempts to organise a new Party, he is an agent of the bourgeoisie who stabs Communism and the revolutionary movement in the back.

It is necessary, since Comrade Scholem and Ruth Fischer have mentioned a certain splitting tendency, to say the following. The C. C., with full deliberation and consciously recognised that the Katz question does not stand as an isolated case. It was unfortunately necessary to expel 12 workers with Katz from the Party, but our own instructors, who are already in Hanover today, have received instructions, to win back these 12 workers when they have really recognised their mistakes and are ready to work with us in the Communist Party. We will resort to no critical measures in order only to evoke the danger of a split. But, on the contrary, in an ultimatum of seven comrades, there were contained tendencies which unfortunately played with the idea of a split.

Comrades, in taking an attitude on the question of the Ultra-Lefts, we must distinguish between the Ultra-Left leaders and workers. Many workers were driven into the arms of the Ultra-Left by the demagogic and to some extent incapable policy of Ruth Fischer. In Wedding and in other districts as well, there are differences already.

In three out of a total of four nuclei group meetings of the administrative district of wedding, the members have already endorsed the tactics of the C. C. We have received a number of declarations in the C. C. in which the comrades are already dissociating themselves from Scholem and Rosenberg. That shows that the Ultra-Left has crumbled, that in the ideological sphere and because of its results, the Central Committee really has some progress to show. Scholem declared that he wants to dissociate himself from the C. L. P. (Communist Labour Party). Ruth Fischer has already dissociated herself from Scholem, Bordiga dissociates himself from Scholem and Ruth Fischer, and where Domski remains, I don't know, but all the Ultra-Left groups are dissociating themselves jointly from the Comintern, and as far as the Germans are concerned, from the policy of the C. C.

I wish now to proceed to a group which, in my opinion, has gained some significance here by the speech of Comrade Ruth Fischer, because she understood, by her rhetoric and in continuation of her old methods of double entry book-keeping, to bring things to expression before the Plenum which are absolutely contrary to the facts. In the Open Letter not only the Scholem Group was branded as an Ultra-Left group, but also the Ruth Fischer—Maslow Group. I do not believe that Comrade Ruth Fischer has altered in the three or four months she has spent here. Her performances here at the Plenum show

that she is continuing her old tactic as usual. We heard Comrade Ruth Fischer say in her speech that she defends the standpoint of Comrade Maslov in all questions. It is necessary to show here how the ideological basis of the Ruth Fischer—Maslov Group really looks. Two days ago a letter was handed to us, the members of the PolBureau present here, which was sent by Comrade Maslov to Ruth Fischer. In this letter it is stated that the C. C. is steering for a second Nürenberg. What does that mean? To steer for a second Nürenberg means an attempt to amalgamate the Communist Party with the Social Democrats, that means an absolute slander, a deliberate accusation against the C. C. that it consists of Mensheviks, and it also means an attack and an accusation against the Comintern. The second fact contained in this letter is the liquidation of the Communist Party, and thirdly, the aim of an improved C. L. P. is signalled in this letter. This is the Maslov policy, and for Ruth, who continually shields him, it means a continuation of the double-entry system of bookkeeping.

The measures contained in Maslov's policy signify a serious danger for the development of the Comintern.

Comrades, Comrade Ruth Fischer's speech is nothing more than the continuation of her old practice. When in the negotiations with the C. I. the representatives of the German Delegation formulated the letter which Comrade Ruth Fischer signed, everyone believed that perhaps it would be possible to work together with Comrade Ruth Fischer. But the moment she was in Germany she continued her double entry bookkeeping system and began to carry on her old tactics in Germany. In the Berlin District Committee Comrade Ruth Fischer did not fight for the letter, but left that for others to do. The following weeks, when the tactic of the Party on the policy of the Open Letter was on the agenda, she consciously sabotaged on various points and placed herself outside the line of the Party. And now when she stands here and with a certain sort of love rhapsody approves of everything in the Open Letter, we are convinced that when she returns to Germany she will continue to carry on the same practice as in the last two years. Comrade Ruth Fischer also opposed the combination of lists, in spite of the fact that on other occasions, when she still had the leadership in her hands, she several times supported such a tactic. She was opposed simply because she knew that at the commencing stage we would have internal Party difficulties in Berlin and not because she was politically convinced! The question of Ruth can be death with in connection with Maslov. The Maslov Question, his behaviour before the court, is not a personal question, but a serious political one. The fact of the matter is that Ruth, just as in her attitude to the Open Letter and the combination of the lists, at the same time decided on absolutely personal grounds in the question of the Maslov Trial, and politically applied the policy of double-entry bookkeeping.

We must also draw the conclusions of our new inner Party course:

1. Corruption is done away with.
2. Inner, firm Bolshevik clarity.
3. Sharp procedure against all those who did not represent revolutionary principles in court, which is necessary and which we demand from every revolutionary worker.

As far as the behaviour of Comrades Maslov is concerned, this question can be brought before the German Commission; we believe that whoever, as leader of a Party, does not by his behaviour before class justice, act as an example for the whole Party, has no right to be at the head of the Party.

I must still mention certain things in connection with Comrade Ruth Fischer's ideas with relation to the questions she has raised. She declared that the Open Letter is correct, but it contains mistrust and leads to disintegration, and she said that has already been shown in Lower Saxony, where 12 workers were expelled together with Katz. The attitude of Comrade Ruth Fischer practically means that she is still trying to save Katz because she is the one who always recommended Katz in all functions and contributed to his coming into question at all as a representative of the Executive.

With regard to the accusation of incorrect dealing with the Ultra-Left by the C. C., Comrade Ruth Fischer really ought not talk of incorrect dealing with the Ultra-Lefts. She, who in reality dealt badly with the Ultra-Lefts; everyone knows that, especially

with regard to the workers; here she represents herself as the attorney of the Ultra-Lefts. In Germany it will be just the Ultra-Left workers who will look upon this gesture of Ruth Fischer as merely a deceitful demagogic manoeuvre.

Our attitude toward the Ultra-Lefts is absolutely clear, and when Comrade Ruth Fischer declares that we are fighting only against the Ultra-Lefts, then that is false, for the practice has shown that we are fighting against Right deviations equally hard. The expulsion of Schönlink was naturally a measure against Right liquidation tendencies. The removal of Comrade Karl Becker from office on account of his letter was a measure against the Right. We see, of course, that in every tactic which we are carrying on in Germany, dangers exists not only in the lower membership, but also among the officials, that certain Right deviations will manifest themselves in the developments in the near future.

If in two or three months the Right tendencies should grow, then the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany will proceed just as sharply against them as they are compelled today to proceed against the Ultra-Left.

When Comrade Ruth Fischer declares that I took a stand at the V World Congress in the discussion on the tactical theses, which practically meant a split in the delegation, then I believe that there are representatives of the German Party present here, and other comrades as well, who were in the Political Commission at that time, and who can witness the fact that I may have adopted a different political standpoint in the various questions of the tactical theses, but that in the final vote in the Plenum as well as in the Political Commission and in the German Delegation, complete unanimity reigned and thus her declaration about a split of the delegation is a deliberate lie.

And when Comrade Ruth Fischer dares to come forth here as the representative of the sound elements of the old Left, and accuses us of not representing the standpoint of the Left to a greater extent, then the development of the Party contradicts this claim. We declare that the sound elements, the workers who fought in Hamburg, our organisation in the Ruhr District and the greater part of the Berlin membership are with us and against Ruth Fischer. I specially point to the last Conference of Secretaries and Editors which unanimously adopted our resolution on the political situation and which disapproved of Maslov's behaviour before the court.

We are consolidating our internal front by trying to draw new proletarian elements from the various factories and districts. Our present basis is still too weak for us to fulfil all our tasks conscientiously. Our cadres are still small, but just as at the beginning of the fight in the C. C. we grew in the fight against the Ultra-Left as well as against the Right, the process of consolidation will also be a process which one can see only dialectically and which must be successful.

In conclusion, I wish to say that we expect that in the Plenum, in the German Commission, the problems will be raised, that the inner Party course will be correctly decided, and the basis created for a further forward march of the Party. In the present development we have real possibilities of strengthening the inner and outer front and the periphery of the Party. We have already carried out the first stage and the second stage means inner consolidation, strengthening of the mobilisation, activation for the task of the present and of the future.

Had the Party been stronger, had the staff of functionaries actually had a really Bolshevik basis, had we had points of support in the factories and trade unions, we might have used the results of our politics to much better advantage than was the case during the last few months.

But we believe that in the slow consolidation of the leadership by drawing in proletarian elements, so that we will be the workers' party not only in theory but also in practice, the opportunity will be created for the Party in this development, in this favourable political situation to carry out serious measures for the victory of the German Workers' Party.

We are on this path, we must strengthen this basis, we must extend our fighting front and strengthen the Red class front outside the Communist Party as well, so that we will be able to fulfill our future tasks in the revolutionary struggle. (Stormy applause.)

Comrade Brown (England):

On behalf of the British Delegation introduced the following resolution dealing with the latest events in China and which was adopted unanimously:

"The British Government has declared a blockade of Canton and has sent through its Mission in Peking to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs a note with threats against the Southern Revolutionary Government in Canton, demanding that the Central Chinese Government compel the latter to stop the strike of the seamen and the dock-workers."

"The strike of seamen and sevedores has already lasted eight months. The protracted nature of this strike is accounted for not only by tremendous tenacity and solidarity of the workers themselves, but also by the support and deep sympathy of the democratic population of all China. The Kuomintang Government of Canton, supported by the popular masses of the Kwantung province and the National Liberation Movement throughout the whole country cannot, of course under instructions of the British imperialists, suppress the labour movement.

The British Governor-General in Hongkong, at the very beginning of the strike last summer, demanded military intervention in Canton with the object of ending the strike. But at the time, even the British Conservative Government did not decide on such a step, comprehending that the Canton seamen's strike was a part of the anti-imperialist movement in the country, and that an armed attack on Canton would have inspired unprecedented indignation on the part of the whole Chinese people.

At the present time, the British Government, encouraged by the reactionary movement in China, supported by the Japanese military cliques and by the new attempted offensive in Central China by the counter-revolutionary general, Wu-Pei-Fu, evidently considers the present moment opportune to fling itself against the workers and peasants of Southern China.

In order to delude public opinion in its own country and the working masses in other lands, British imperialism puts

forward as a pretext for the already begun blockade of Canton the alleged seizure of foreign cargoes by strikers and, in general, the infringement of Anglo-Chinese agreements on the part of the Southern Government.

The lying statements of the British imperialists should not deceive anyone. The Canton Government cannot be compelled to suppress the strike movement for the benefit of the British capitalists —, not by means of any robber treaties foisted on China by the British imperialists as a result of the shameful opium war 80 years ago, and after the bloody vengeance of the united imperialist forces against the rebellious Chinese people in 1901.

The insolence of the British imperialists distinguishes itself in the form of an open attack on the Chinese liberation movement. Jointly with the Japanese military clique, the British Government, during the last few months, has supported and consolidated by all measures and means the Chinese militarists who had received incurable blows from the National Movement.

The revolutionary workers of the whole world, in particular the workers of Great Britain, should raise emphatic protest against the invading imperialists. The liberation Movement in China should be supported by all revolutionary workers and all sincere supporters of the equality of nations.

The Enlarged Executive of the E. C. C. I. calls attention to the danger threatening the basis of the liberation movement in China — revolutionary Canton and urgently calls upon the workers of all countries to protest against the new bloody conspiracy of the imperialists.

Hands off China!

Hands off Canton!

Long live the Liberation Movement in China!

Long live the solidarity of the workers of the West with the struggle for emancipation of the toiling masses of the East!

(Eighth Session, February 25, 1926, morning)

Continuation of the Discussion on the Report of Comrade Zinoviev.

Comrade Smeral in the chair.

The following declaration was read by

Comrade Domsky:

"One sentence of my speech has given rise to misunderstanding. Some comrades understood me to mean that in case of an attack on the western frontier of Poland, the Communists must also come to its defence. Naturally, the very opposite is correct. In case of an armed struggle on frontiers, just as during the time of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, we must, on our side, fight hard against nationalism. But in order to make that possible, we must even now brand with the blame the Polish bourgeoisie who, by their alliance with the imperialism of the Entente and of France, by their fight against the Soviet Union and against the proletarian movement, have betrayed the national interests of the Polish peoples to the powers of foreign capital". Domski.

Another declaration was handed in by the Czech Delegation which reads as follows:

"The Czechoslovakian Delegation has made the following decision with reference to the remark in Comrade Thälmann's speech:

"Comrade Neurath spoke in the name of the whole Czechoslovakian Delegation. The Delegation is completely in accord with the standpoint of the theses presented that it is necessary to conduct the fight against the Right and the Ultra-Left deviations, which was also stated in Comrade Neurath's speech."

Comrade Konrad (Germany):

Comrades, As a member of the German Delegation, and as a representative of the largest Administrative District of Berlin, I make the following declaration. I stand by what

Comrades Scholem and Rosenberg have said here at the Enlarged Executive. I must say that yesterday's speech of Comrade Thälmann took me somewhat by surprise, after Comrades Rosenberg and Scholem had constantly tried to find a way to make joint work possible in the interests of the Communist Party. Comrades, Comrade Thälmann attacked the Right in his speech with only one sentence and attacked the so-called Ultra-Left at least ten times as strongly. Comrade Thälmann, in going into the international situation of the various Parties, did not so sharply point out that there is a Right group especially in the French Party which will also have its effect on the International. One must see these things and must not be afraid to fight them. If Comrade Thälmann here expected us ultimately to accept the Open Letter, then he must not distort the reason why we rejected it. I emphasise once more that the political line of the Open Letter is correct, and Comrade Thälmann will not be able to dispute the fact that we always emphasised this in the debate on the Open Letter. Why we rejected the Open Letter is already known by everyone, and I must emphasise, once more, that I also will not permit thousands of workers, members of the Communist Party of Germany to be stamped as Party enemies. Thälmann's statements with reference to the inner Party course will, I hope and expect, be corrected in the German Commission. We opposed the Open Letter for the very fact that its inner Party course was wrong. We must not deceive ourselves about this and we must not work with such methods as were employed by Comrades Braun and Comrade Thälmann. A dozen declarations are at hand, a dozen declarations which neither Comrade Braun nor Comrade Thälmann have read, and the contents of which neither Braun nor Thälmann have gone into thoroughly. What do these declarations state? These declarations state clearly that in Germany there is a Korsch Group, a Katz Group, and that this group must be fought because they are not in the interests of

the Party, not in the interests of the International. (Very good). Yes, when one shouts "very good" here, then I wish to ask above all things, why nothing is done about these declarations. Comrades, the danger of the Kapd (Communist Labour Party), which has nothing to do with a Left, is greater than the German Central Committee dreams of. Therefore, it is very necessary that one does not make this distinction between the workers and Scholem. Yes, comrades, this game of distinguishing between the workers and Schoiem, between workers and the leaders, has been going on for some time. That must stop: Either Scholem, Rosenberg and I and other comrades in the German Party are anti-Bolshevists, and in that case we do not belong to the Party, or we are not, and in that case that must be openly and freely declared and such a game of separating the workers and the leaders must not be carried on.

I declare here clearly and unmistakably that the majority of the largest administrative districts of Berlin stand by the theses and statements of Comrade Zinoviev.

Comrades, I will close. We will again declare with all clearness that the present policy of the German CC is absolutely correct, but — and no one can gainsay us that — that we do not give the German C. C. any carte blanche for the future. As long as the policy of the C. C. is based on the concrete decisions of the Fifth World Congress, we will support the C. C.

We want to get to some work which is of advantage to the Communist Party and the C. I. Hence, one must not speak so violently as Comrade Thälmann spoke here yesterday, against Party comrades. That was not the tone with which the confidence of the members can be won for the C. C. In this manner thousands of members will be repelled. This tone which Comrade Thälmann chose to use here yesterday will not secure for the C. C. the confidence of the members of the German Party.

Comrade Ercoli (Italy):

Comrades, the Italian Party fortunately, has the advantage of having Comrade Bordiga in its midst. I say fortunately, not by way of a joke. In the discussion that has already taken place at the Plenum some comrades have spoken in the name of the extreme Left, but there is a fundamental difference in the position adopted by these comrades and Bordiga which permits us to say that in our opinion Bordiga's position is more favourable for a successful development of our discussion than the position adopted by certain comrades who have spoken on behalf of the extreme Left or of a so-called extreme Left. Why is this? Because we believe that in the discussions with the extreme Left, and generally speaking in the discussions which effect our ideology and our tactics, there can only be a good solution on the basis of complete clearness of thought and complete political and ideological precision, and Bordiga's position allows us to arrive at this end, whereas the other positions do not permit us to get there.

We are in agreement with the general line of the theses.

I want however, to deal with four points: 1) the perspectives, 2) the general tactics, 3) the problems concerning the organisation of the Parties, their constitution and their internal regime, 4) the problems which effects the internal regime of the Comintern.

With regard to the perspectives, all comrades are in agreement with the theses and speech of Comrade Zinoviev. But it is no doubt useful and necessary to discuss how to connect up these perspectives with our tactics.

We think that this liaison is correct in the situation we are passing through today and which makes it necessary for our Communist Parties to conquer the masses, and to apply integrally the united front tactics.

Bordiga said that the movements of the Social strata had not been studied sufficiently, nor the worth of the various methods of government adopted by the bourgeoisie in different countries.

This study was made in the theses of the V Congress and we think the experience of this year permits us to demand corrections to these theses. The analysis made by the V Congress of the Left and Right methods used by the bourgeoisie in defending itself is revealed as being thoroughly correct. A revision of this analysis cannot be demanded without demanding a revision of the whole of our tactic. In Italy, it is true, we have had the experience of the third method of bourgeois defence, which consists in uniting the two methods of defence of the

capitalist regime which the bourgeoisie uses, i. e. the Left method of seeking to group the middle-class masses on the basis of the defence of the regime, and the Right method of seeking to hit at the broad masses of workers and peasants in order to prevent them taking up a fighting position against the capitalist and Bourgeois society.

We have had this experience, but what must be concluded therefrom? Are the perspectives we give on the general situation false? Are we, on the basis of the Italian experience, going to reject the estimations of the relative stabilisation of capitalism given by the Communist International? No, decidedly no.

The fundamental point is as follows: The tactics adopted by the bourgeoisie, the tactics of concentrating all bourgeois forces in the economic and political field to which a concentration in the military field also corresponds, have not been adequate to resolve all the economic and political problems of our country. On the contrary.

We must therefore say comrades, that the three methods have not solved any of the fundamental problems confronting the bourgeoisie after the war.

I will now turn to our general tactics.

I think that we should firmly oppose all revision of the decisions of the V Congress, but we should deal clearly with the question of extreme Left deviation, the Bordiga question.

You have all heard Bordiga and it appears that you have a certain sympathy for him. He presents his questions in a sincere manner and seems to have the power of a leader. But we do not think that he is a big revolutionary leader. Why? Because if for two years we had followed in Italy the policy Comrade Bordiga advised us, we would have smashed the Communist Party. We think that a tactic liable to destroy the Party is a bad tactic and not that of a revolutionary leader.

In the present historical situation a Communist Party can only be built up if we take up the standpoint of the Communist International.

We therefore ask this Plenary Session of the E. C. C. I. once more to take up an open standpoint against the deviations of Bordiga and once more to condemn unequivocally his ideas. Also even if he has not completely developed his conception here, we have become conscious, in the discussion which took place before and during our Congress, of the fact that between the International and Bordiga there are differences on all fundamental questions affecting the structure of the Party, its organisation, its functions and its tactics. On all these questions Bordiga has conceptions which cannot be accepted and against which the Bolshevik Party has fought since the first days of its formation, and we also should openly continue the fight.

In the theses presented to us the integral application of the line of the Third Congress is correctly alluded to. It is just this line which Bordiga rejects when he rejects the united front tactics, the slogan of the Workers' and Peasants' Government. In other words, all the fundamental things.

Another point which we should shed light on is the new tactic. I think that it was a bad thing to speak about a new tactic. For example, the tactic we used in Italy to combat the Aventino bloc is not new; we think that it is the old and traditional tactic of Leninism, of Bolshevism. Let us examine the problem in its general aspect. There exist bourgeois Left parties. Should we make a distinction between these parties and the parties of the bourgeois right? There exist Social Democratic Parties. Should we make a distinction between them and the parties of the Left? If we are Marxists, Leninists, we should know how to make this distinction. And when we will have seen that behind these parties there are masses whom we must lead with us we will determine our tactics and we will achieve political action such as will allow us to draw these masses away from those parties.

We think that this point is the fundamental point of difference between the Communist International and Comrade Bordiga, i. e. between the ideology and tactics of Leninism, of Bolshevism, and the ideology and tactics of the extreme Left. We must renounce, say these extreme Left, this flexibility of tactics which is alright in the Russian Party, because a different situation exists in Western Europe from that which existed in Russia before the revolution. On this question the Russian comrades will be able to reply more extensively, but our experience permits us to say that today in Western Europe there is no situation which makes it necessary for our Parties to abandon this

flexibility, and this facility of manoeuvring which is proper to Leninism. On the contrary, as long as a labour aristocracy and Social Democratic elements exist within the working class of Western Europe, we should change nothing in the policy of the International with regard to this tactic of flexibility, of ease of manoeuvring which the Bolsheviks have elaborated.

The third point I would like to deal with and which affects our general tactics is that of the Left and Right deviations and how they should be combated. It would appear that the fundamental problem is as follows: which of these deviations is the most serious? But it is not a question that can be presented in a general and abstract fashion. The Left dangers and the Right dangers have not the same seriousness in all situations and they cannot always be combated with the same methods. They are closely bound up with the objective situation, with our perspectives and with the tactical line which perspectives advise us. Today, on the basis of the analysis of the situation which we have made, it must be concluded that the most serious danger is the danger of the extreme Left, the tendency of which is that our Party shuts up shop, and which prevents it accomplishing its work of rallying the workers and integrally applying the united front tactics. It is obvious that there is also a Right Wing danger.

In the Italian Party we have no sympathy for the Right. We have always come down heavily on it every time it raised its head, and we will continue to do so in the future. But on a general International scale the danger of an extreme Left deviation which faces us in the work of winning the majority of the working class masses is now a political danger and it should be considered in this manner.

We have seen comrades of the extreme Left making their confessions here. We think that precisely we, who in our Party have extreme Leftists who have not made any confessions can reply concisely. There must be collaboration with all those who wish to collaborate; but in the leading cadres of our Central organs and Parties we should have comrades who make no reservations, either open or hidden, to the correct Leninist tactics.

During the trend of the debate which has taken place we have also spoken of the German and French Parties. I say that these two problems are profound and serious, but they should be linked up with another fundamental problem, that of forming leading cadres of our Parties.

To solve this problem we must conduct an open ideological struggle and the leading groups of our Parties must pursue a policy which binds them up in the closest manner with the proletarian strata of the Party.

Let us now examine the third group of problems, i. e. problems concerning the structure of the Communist Parties and their "Bolshevisation."

I would like to present three questions: the organisation of the Party, fractions and internal Party democracy.

First of all the factory nuclei. Is this a problem of principle, or a problem of secondary nature? We agree with Comrade Bordiga: The revolution is not "only" a problem of organisation, and the "form" of our organisation is not a problem of principle according to a certain point of view, but is an absolutely fundamental problem for the preparation of the revolution, for having Parties which will be in closest connection with the masses; the organisation of nuclei will enable us to achieve this end.

In objecting on this point Comrade Bordiga says: "With this transformation you create labourism, you bind up the Party to the labour aristocracy which is forming in the factories. That is absolutely wrong. We have a definite experience in the history of the Italian labour movement, an experience of the factory nuclei movement. This experience permits us to conclude that it is precisely the organisation on a factory basis which brings about a liaison between the labour aristocracy and the wide masses of unskilled workers.

A second objection is that the nucleus increases bureaucracy within the Party. Just the opposite is the case.

I would like to ask those Parties who have had experience on the transformation of our organisation on the basis of nuclei: Have we more bureaucracy today? Are the leaders more, or less linked up with the rank and file? Our experience is absolutely favourable. In our Party we have formed that intermediary stratum of Party leaders which is in contact with the working class.

They also say, and here the extreme Left is in agreement with the Right: The nuclei cannot be the basis of the Party, but only "working organs". We say that the nucleus solves the essential problem of the Party: the linking up of the Party with the masses, and for that reason the nuclei should be the "whole" Party. Moreover, we have also tried that experience in Italy, we formed factory organisations as organs of work. In the places where these organs have done anything they have become the whole Party because, in contact with the working masses, they accomplish all the work the Party should do to lead with it the working class masses.

But what is most important of all is that when the situation became unfavourable the organisations which best resisted are those in which the transformation on to the factory nuclei basis have been accomplished to the largest extent.

The second question which concerns the structure of the Party is that of fractions. Is the question of fractions a moral or a political question? Should it be considered from the disciplinary point of view or from the historical point of view: I will endeavour only to consider it under the second aspect.

Obvious there is no Party that is perfect. We have deviations and failures which have to be corrected. But what is the way to combat these faults? Is it by means of fractions, or is it the "Bolshevik" method of collaboration in the C. C. and of never forming fractions? Bordiga is for the first solution and he says: "I agree with Lenin, the history of Leninism is the history of fractionism". But why did Lenin form fractions? What perspectives had Lenin as to the Parties of the II International. He thought that these Parties were stricken with a grave malady which could only be cured by a crisis of scission of these Parties; and he worked to form the basis of a new International organisation of the proletariat. Has Bordiga the main perspective with regard to our Parties and our International? Perhaps he does not say everything he thinks, but we judge from what he does, and what he does in the Italian Party corresponds to this view. It is not only a question of tendencies when we get to a point to which he arrived, when he made a declaration at the end of our Congress in which he said: "It is repulsive to me to remain in this Central Committee and to collaborate with the leaders of this Party"; when we get to such a pitch there is something much more profound than what he has just said here, something that we should endeavour to throw more light on.

Comrades, we think that the formula of workers' democracy contained in the theses is a little too wide. As a political line, it is evident that in certain parties of the International and above all in the French Party, errors of mechanical application of Bolshevisation have been committed. But, comrades, when the problem of internal Party democracy is presented, it must be presented in a complete way, stating that it is a problem relative: 1) to the general political situation of the country, 2) to the general political situation of the Party; 3) to the ideological and political training of the Party itself. Today we want our Parties to apply the system of democratic centralisation in a wider manner than in the immediate past. But it should also be said that this is not an absolute principle, but is relative to all the points I have just outlined.

I will now turn to the problems which affect the Communist International in general. It was stated that from certain aspects there was a crisis in the International. We would like to present the following question: What is the extent of this crisis, what is its significance. It is bound up with the present objective situation. It cannot be said that it is the fault of Zinoviev, etc., that is putting the question in an absolutely abstract and infantile fashion. The question must be presented in relation to the degree of development in the Western Labour Movement. It should be concluded that perhaps a few years later we shall have a crisis. What then should be our guide? We say that our guide is the experience of the Russian Communist Party.

We agree that there must be an extensive collaboration of the Western Parties with the leading centre of the International, and we think that Bordiga will no longer maintain the attitude he adopted at the V Congress where he did not wish to work with the Executive Committee of the International.

We think that all Parties should collaborate with the leading centre of the International and come here to obtain at first hand the experience of the Russian Party, an experience which is still elaborating today in the construction of the Socialist State.

Comrade Bukharin:

I would like to make here a few remarks of a general nature, and also in connection with the speeches which we have heard. I will also deal with questions of principle, particularly because Comrade **Bordiga** touched upon these questions in his speech.

To begin with a general remark on the necessity to analyse the objective situation. From the standpoint of Marxism it is perfectly clear that our task consists in giving a scientific basis to our policy, namely, to base it on the analysis of the objective situation, for the latter is the point of issue of our tactics. Comrade **Zinoviev** was quite right when he mentioned in his report two perspectives. It is perfectly clear that if we have two perspectives before us that we, as the subjective factor in history, should always endeavour to fight for the revolutionary perspective. There can be no doubt whatever concerning this point, but there are two utterly different methods of struggle for this revolutionary perspective. One is the Marxist method which consists in conducting our struggle for the revolutionary perspective in connection with the perfectly concrete reality, even if this may be momentarily unfavourable. The other method of struggle is that adopted by Comrade **Bordiga** who eliminates the Marxist consideration, the analysis of the situation and the tactic dependent upon it, and merely asserts that we are revolutionists, that we are for the revolution and that we should fight for it. It is no mere chance that in his long report we have not heard a single word about the specific characteristics of the present situation. This is of no importance to him, for he looks upon everything from the abstract revolutionary standpoint and is satisfied with the declamation of the word "revolution". This leads to the vulgarisation of our tactics, which is absolutely non-Marxist.

The second remark which I would like to make is the following: In his report Comrade **Bordiga** protested that some comrades — probably only in the imagination of Comrade **Bordiga** himself — are mechanically taking over the Russian experiences to the Western European countries. We are accustomed to hear such a plea advanced by all non-Marxist or doubtful Marxist elements. We heard similar protests already in 1921 from the renegade **Paul Levi**, who always maintained that we mechanically transferred the "Russian experiences" to West Europe. If **Bordiga** had only asserted that it is inadmissible to apply the Russian experiences mechanically to Western Europe he would have been perfectly right. We all of us would protest against such a mechanical application of specific Russian experiences to the West European countries. It is self-evident that Leninism does not consist in ready-made prescriptions but in a certain method which must be applied with due consideration to all the phenomena peculiar to the country in question and the given period. Comrade **Bordiga** says that before the revolution the Czarist regime in Russia was feudal, and that this was not the case in the West European countries. In the February revolution the entire feudal State apparatus was destroyed, whilst in West Europe such a destruction or dismemberment of the State apparatus did not take place. This remark of Comrade **Bordiga** is quite correct, and so is his remark that the Left bloc governments are not Kerensky governments. But he is fighting against an imaginary enemy, for is there anyone among us who is going to assert that, for instance, the Left Bloc government in France is a Kerensky Government?

But I do think that Comrade **Bordiga** fails to see what is most important. He fails to see that what is specific, and for us of the greatest importance, consists theoretically and also practically in the fact that there are in Western Europe strong and in some countries very powerful Social Democratic Parties and Social Democratic trade unions. Therefore the development of the labour movement there is somewhat different than with us in Russia. Naturally this phenomenon is connected with the imperialist character of most of the West European States, with the Social Democratic moods within the working class. It is the expression of a certain community of interests between the working class and the bourgeoisie, based on the imperialist policy. That is the basis of the strong opportunist labour parties and of the strong opportunist trade unions which function as the most efficient support of the capitalist regime. We had nothing of the kind in Russia and therefore our working class and our Labour Party i. e. the Communist Party had a different development. How can such a fundamental fact be eliminated from the analysis of the specific factors? This is inadmissible and it is just Comrade **Bordiga** who wants these specific factors, who speaks

against the mechanical transference of the Russian conditions, who has not noticed these elements.

Practically Comrade **Bordiga** protests against united front tactics, against the specific tactical forms which are necessary for the development of the West European labour movement. You probably understand now what Comrade **Bordiga's** struggle against the "mechanical transference" of Russian experience means.

And now a few words concerning the analysis of the present situation. There is no doubt whatever that after a period of comparative storm and stress we had a relative consolidation of the bourgeoisie. This is a fairly general phenomenon. I will not repeat what Comrade **Zinoviev** has said as to the relative stabilisation of capitalism. We are all in agreement with the estimation of the situation. Comrade **Neurath** was wrong when he said in his speech that he had noticed nothing of the stabilisation of capitalism in Czechoslovakia, for the contrary of stabilisation is the strong revolutionary wave, a revolutionary situation, and we can claim that such a situation in Czechoslovakia is absolutely non-existent. Perhaps Comrade **Neurath** sees it, but I unfortunately do not. The relative stabilisation of capitalism means, however, also in a certain sense stabilisation of the Social Democratic Parties and of the trade unions. On the other hand the relativity of this stabilisation finds its expression in a veering to the Left of the working class and in various processes within the trade unions and in the Social Democratic Party. Europe's retreat before America has found its expression in this process of Left orientation within the working class.

Hence the attempt of the Amsterdam International and of the Social Democratic Parties to counteract this swing to the Left of the West European working class by trying to get the Reformist leaders of the American trade unions into the Amsterdam International.

It is not at all astonishing that especially in Great Britain — in the country where the process of retreating before America is particularly prominent, we have this gigantic and world-historical process of revolutionisation within the trade union movement.

We have in addition the effect of the strengthening of Soviet Russia, whose growth and development in the direction of socialism is driving a further wedge in the process of stabilisation of capitalism. Such is the general situation. Naturally all the bourgeois parties and also the Social Democratic Parties are doing everything possible against this process which is so unfavourable for them. They want to work as a disturbing force to prevent this process bringing any benefit to the Communist Party. I think that our session should pay special attention to the manoeuvring of the Left Social Democratic leaders. Comrade **Zinoviev** made in his report remarks concerning this with which I fully agree. But I should like to mention here a new tendency, a "Left" tendency, viz. the Social Democratic "Left" in Austria, especially **Otto Bauer**. There are already now various proposals intended to establish closer economic collaboration between the Russian economic institutions and the cooperatives of the Austrian working class. To a certain extent it is quite possible to realise this end. But already the theory is making its appearance that by such ways and bye-ways one can eliminate the process of revolution in America, viz. that without revolution socialist methods of production can be peacefully established in Austria with the economic help of Soviet Russia. It is already beginning to be asserted that because the cooperatives are growing in strength, the Austrian workers will be able to secure real control over production without revolution, without proletarian dictatorship and without sacrifices on the part of the Austrian proletariat. In connection with these plans we read the following statement in an organ:

"Everything depends now on Russia. If Russia were really willing to help us we would already be able to control production in our country. But with regard to Austria Soviet Russia has the same imperialist policy as America. Soviet Russia is the disturbing element, it plays a counter-revolutionary role."

Workers delegations who have returned from Russia tell of the reconstruction of economic life in our country. From this the opportunists draw the conclusion that just because of this Russia must help to make revolution without revolution. We should pay special attention to this manoeuvre of the opportunist

Social Democrats and their consorts, which plays an objectively counter-revolutionary role.

Comrades, we must draw the conclusion from the analysis of the present situation that the main tasks of our Party are as follows:

1. The united front.
2. Work in the trade unions.

These are assertions which have become commonplace, but nevertheless we are confronted with problems and real tasks, which are determined by the concrete situation and the changes within it. After a period of comparative storm and stress, at the beginning of the period of the relative stabilisation, these questions are confronting us as questions of the modern West European labour movement. Like every tactical step, these tasks and the eventual steps which our Party will have to take bear within them certain possible dangers.

I must mention here that our tactical wheeling round was initiated in the Communist International by dealing hard blows in the direction of the Right.

The fight against Right deviations was the first step of the Comintern at the commencing stage of the application of the united front tactic. Our memory should not be so bad as to forget this. Towards the end of 1923 the Norwegian *Tranmaelites* left the Communist International, that is to say, the present "labour party of Norway". At the V. Congress there was a sharp attack on the German Right and on the entire Brandler group. At the V Congress we also fought very energetically against the Polish Right and the then Right Polish Party Executive. In the Swedish Party we practically expelled Höglund, Ström and other former comrades, and it came to a split within the Swedish Communist Party. The Russian Party expelled our former comrade Balabanov. This was the expression of the general struggle against the Right. At the last Enlarged Executive we expelled the Bubnik group in the Czechoslovakian Party. We have also expelled the French Right — Souvarine, Rosmer, Monatte, etc. Through this struggle the Comintern was purged of the outspokenly opportunist elements, and some of these elements are today in the camp of our enemies and are even forming their own international as you probably know, with Balabanov at its head. Just imagine to yourselves Balabanov as a "leader" of the world proletariat! (Laughter.) Was this struggle justified or not? It was absolutely justified. This has been proved by facts. The *Tranmaelites* are carrying on now a big struggle against us, and also against Soviet Russia. As Comrade Zinoviev has already mentioned, Höglund is now editing Branting's work. He has become a real Social Democrat. Balabanov makes common cause with the Russian Social Revolutionaries. Souvarine & Co. carry on a decidedly counter-revolutionary struggle against us. When we discuss our present tasks we must not forget that the Communist International bears a slightly different aspect than before these expulsions, before these struggles which we carried on against the Right peril. After all these events are there Right elements left in the Comintern? Certainly, but this is not the way to judge the situation. Are there still Right deviations in the Comintern? Certainly. They will have a fairly long lease of life. We will always have in the Comintern deviations to the Left and to the Right, at least during this whole epoch. Why? The ground is objectively propitious for such deviations in the entire labour movement, and therefore also in the Comintern. Does there exist, for example, a certain Right danger in our German Party? Yes. Must we combat this danger? Of course we must do so. There is also a certain Right danger even in the form of a central danger in some Parties. If we consider, for instance, the most recent events in the French Party we can see perfectly well that the central peril in France is precisely the Right peril. The letter received lately from several members of the Communist Party of France, who, together with Souvarine have made a declaration to the Comintern, shows very vividly that this Right peril is very acute for our French brother Party. I believe that various potential Right perils are also latent in other Parties. Any change in the situation and any neglect of our task to fight against this Right will become acute. I am perfectly certain that for instance in Germany, in connection with the present crisis in the German Party, some Right elements are already aspiring to take the leadership of the Party into their hands. But it depends on us to see this peril and the method of fighting against it is to see the peril at the right time and not to delay fighting against it.

On the other hand there are also ultra-Left dangers. What is the main characteristic of these ultra-Left perils? I would like to characterise these perils from the standpoint of their specific features somewhat as follows: It is the failure to understand the problems of the capture of the masses and of tactical tasks, namely task of the united front and energetic and self-sacrificing work in the trade unions. What is the explanation for this ultra-Left peril? Inasfar as there can be any theory about it it can be found in Comrade Bordiga's arguments. Comrade Bordiga is not a dialectician, he remains as fixed as the poles in the general movement. He will always deliver the same speech and bring forward the same arguments, whatever course world history may take. As these comrades are generally speaking revolutionary, their errors can be formulated somewhat as follows: they apply mechanically the methods and means of struggle which were correct in an epoch of storm and stress and which will be correct under certain conditions in the epoch of a decidedly revolutionary situation. They apply these methods today, when there is no immediately revolutionary situation, in the former manner, in such questions as the relations to the Social Democracy and the Social Democratic workers, the relations to the workers organised in the opportunist trade unions, in the treatment of the question of partial demands, etc.

We are justified in saying that during the entire recent period ultra-Left tendencies were very prominent. Many Parties and not only those of secondary importance, but first class brother Parties were infected with ultra-Left errors.

In this connection I should like to give a few examples. Let us take for instance the period of the Frankfurt Party Congress. The most interesting thing in Germany at that time was the wholesale withdrawal from the trade unions. Comrade Ruth Fischer said here yesterday that we adopted wrong tactics out of fear of the masses. Comrade Ruth Fischer says that the letter of the E. C. C. I. to the Frankfurt Party Congress proposed correct tactics, but I should like to remind the comrades present here that Comrade Ruth Fischer demanded at that time of our "Imprecorr" editor that he should not publish this letter. But he published it nevertheless. (Interjection by Piatnitzky: but it was not reprinted in the German press!) At the Frankfurt Party Congress there arose such a situation that the delegation of the E. C. C. I. met with a direct refusal to discuss together the question of united front tactics and the trade union question.

Now all the groupings recognise that our intervention at that time was perfectly correct. I mention this to show that even the best Parties found it rather difficult to understand the new factors in the situation. It was only under the permanent pressure of the C. I. that our brother Parties recognised the correctness of these tactics which were in keeping with the new phenomena in the labour movement in general.

Then there is the example of the V World Congress. At that time we discussed for the first time the question of trade union unity on an international scale, and I should like to mention here again that even the delegations of the best Parties levelled against the Russian Party the accusation that the so-called Kaiser manoeuvre, namely the formation of the Anglo-Russian Committee was employed by us from the standpoint of State necessity. This was stated quite openly. We fought against this accusation, at first unsuccessfully, and it was only gradually that comrades came to the conclusion that what we proposed to them was perfectly correct. Even the conclusion that what we proposed to them was perfectly correct. Even in the German Delegation everyone was against us. All the comrades were ready to accuse us of the intention of betraying the Comintern just a little but (laughter) in the interest of the Russian State.

Let us now take another country: Poland. Out of the same considerations nothing was done on the political field in Poland with respect to the united front. Work in the trade unions was almost entirely neglected, and nearly all the posts in the trade unions were occupied by P. P. S. people. We had under our control only very small trade unions without any particular importance to the labour movement. Because our comrades had failed to understand the problem of the capture of the masses, there were also wrong tendencies in the peasant question. For instance, Comrade Domski asserted that the revolutionary peasant movement in Poland is nothing but anarchy. Thereby, he, so to speak, placed himself on the basis of law and order.

If we are also to include Italy into our catalogue, we can say that as far as Bordiga's influence prevailed in the Party, the main tasks were not understood.

If we sum up here all our interventions, persuasions, etc. we obtain approximately the following picture: in Great Britain our successes are considerable as a result of the correct tactical support of the Left movement in the trade unions.

The turning point in the development of the German Party, when the falling off of the membership ceased and the Party began to develop, is the acceptance of the open letter of the Comintern. I am of course far from asserting that the growth of the German Party was brought about exclusively by the letter of the E. C. C. I. This would be a gross over-estimation of the interventions of the C. I. There was of course also the change in class relations, the change in the orientation of the entire working class and so on.

But I am convinced that the Open Letter of the C. I. has been a fairly big factor which has promoted the revival of the German Party. On the whole, the improved situation with the C. I. and the successes of its sections are connected with the correct application of united front tactics, with the carrying out of the campaign for trade union unity and with the workers' delegations. These are facts which we must not leave out of account.

I should like to deal now with the problems before the present session of the Enlarged Executive of the C. I. The fundamental demand of the ultra-Left comrades who have spoken here is the general demand of an amnesty. All are in agreement with the theses and arguments of Comrade Zinoviev. Everything is for the best and there is no more danger anywhere. I am in this respect somewhat mistrustful and believe that I have reason to be so. Comrade Scholem, who represents a whole group, says that the Open Letter and the directions issued lately by the C. I. are perfectly correct. The policy is correct. But the letter contained glaring mistakes and was therefore rejected. First of all I must say here that the words uttered here by Comrade Scholem do not exist in the text of the Open Letter. No one has ever asserted that Scholem or Rosenberg are elements who have sold themselves to the bourgeoisie. You underestimate us, Comrade Scholem. If we had said that you have been bought by the bourgeoisie you would not be sitting here in this hall.

But let us consider this affair from the standpoint of so-called "high" politics. We have an intervention on the part of the C. I., an important document recognised by everyone. This document expressed the will of the entire International. Comrade Scholem asserts that the general policy is correct. In what does the organisational policy consist? It consists in inner Party democracy. Nothing can be said against this. Comrade Scholem is of course for this democracy, therefore, the general organisational policy is correct. But Comrades Scholem and Rosenberg do not like some parts of this document. Therefore, they are against what? Against the correct political policy and against the correct organisational policy! The Open Letter was a test for every grouping within the C. P. of Germany. The entire internal struggle in the German Party was on the basis: for or against the Open Letter. And where were these comrades? They who pretended to be the leaders of the Party, joined the camp of the enemies of this Open Letter, namely of the camp of the enemies of the political and organisational policy proposed by the Comintern. But they are politicians and not children, they say that here is a word which does not please us. What is of importance? This one little word or the policy? It is in this spirit that the question should be dealt with, and you have sacrificed the correct political and organisational lines. Why? For the sake of prestige, or for what else? Is this not strange? This sounds really comical when it is assumed that the comrades were really in favour of this policy. But in reality they were against this policy, and under the pretext of this little word fought against it. If you are real politicians then your manner of action can only be interpreted as indicating that you were against this policy. Every politician knows that the Party members and the masses outside the Party are not led by the various niceties and shades of opinion. They see only fundamentals — who is for the Open Letter and who is against it. You were almost the only enemies of the Open Letter and the spokesmen against it.

I will deal now with the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group. In her speech Comrade Ruth Fischer described the events as follows: She read the Open Letter. It contained various disagreeable matters, but its general line was correct. She signed the letter immediately and had so to speak a tremendously eager desire to carry out its injunctions. This is entirely contrary to facts. There was in fact a prolonged war between the Executive of the C. I. and Comrade Ruth Fischer, who at first did not want to come. A telegram was sent which was followed up by another. Comrade Ruth Fischer organised various groupings against us. Finally, she came to Moscow and resisted with all her might. There was no end of talk and when in the last resort all the comrades agreed with us, Comrade Ruth Fischer so to speak very bravely capitulated (laughter). The real story of all these struggles was that the Ruth Fischer delegation came to us resolved to disavow the representative of the Comintern in order to make a demonstration against us. We convinced the comrades and sent part of the already convinced comrades to Germany. Then the second delegation arrived. This delegation too was captured by us, so that Comrade Ruth lost every man of her army. Now Ruth comes and says: I immediately recognised the correctness of the letter and therefore signed it immediately. No, Comrade Ruth, you were surrounded on all sides and that is why you signed. If a person signs something under such conditions, we are perfectly entitled to be just a little sceptical about it. I am not particularly well informed concerning the various letters which Comrade Ruth has written or which have been received by her, but I think that way and manner in which she accepted the E. C. C. I. letter itself justifies our scepticism.

We have already had such incidents in the past: some comrades can sign anything and can identify themselves with any document, but in reality it turns out a little differently. These comrades must get over their errors ideologically or we must beat them altogether. You must give us facts to prove that you have overcome your errors.

Some comrades who spoke here asserted that they were isolated mistakes. Comrade Domski said that they were isolated and not a definite policy (Interjection by Domski: It was a definite policy!). And you have given up this definite policy? (Interjection by Domski after a moment of hesitation: Certainly!) Domski, after a certain amount of self-analysis said "Certainly". I am really of the opinion that there is a system and the only person who has shown character was Bordiga. But not Comrades Domski and Ruth. It follows that the way in which Comrade Bordiga puts the question is not correct. It would have been more correct to say, everything depends upon a good revolutionary policy and upon a good corresponding form of organisation.

Comrade Bordiga developed here a whole system of opinions to bear out this policy. He has really no capacity for double-bookkeeping and has honestly defended his viewpoint here.

What are Comrade Bordiga's errors?

He asserts that the tactics of the united front have degenerated, but unfortunately he did not prove in what this degeneration consist. If he had given examples showing that the Communist International has wrongly applied united front tactics, this would have been very interesting and one could argue against it. But the mere statement that united front tactics have degenerated, without showing in what this degeneration consists, does not give an opportunity to argue against it, even when there are people present very capable of arguing.

Comrade Bordiga spoke at great length on Comrade Zinoviev's theses and on Bolshevism. He asserted that Bolshevism consisted of organisational questions. This is utterly erroneous. No one has ever asserted this. But when Comrade Bordiga brings forward the second theses: the problem of revolution is not a problem of organisational form, and not organisation, but policy is the determining factor, I must say that this is erroneous. This is setting matters against each other which are really not opposed to one another. You cannot have a victorious revolution without organisation and if the organisation does not carry on a revolutionary policy you cannot have revolutionary victories. Both are closely connected.

This is also fully set forth in the theses.

But of what does his report consist? It consists of criticism of the organisational form of the Communist International. If

organisational form is nothing, why did you devote three-quarters of your report to the problem of the form of organisation? Is it because it is not important? Comrade Bordiga said: the organisational form is not important, but for the Italian Party the organisational form of the nucleus is so important that it is ruining the whole Party. If it is nothing, how can it cause such ruin. From the negative standpoint we come to the conclusion that the organisational form is something. Your thesis on the importance of the organisational form is contrary to the whole substance of your report.

How does Comrade Bordiga criticise the organisational form of the nucleus? Comrade Ercoli has already spoken on this subject. If for instance, Comrade Bordiga thinks that the chief danger in all the Parties of the Comintern is labourism, he is mistaken. Our Parties are reorganising themselves, and from Comrade Bordiga's viewpoint, this constitutes the great danger of labourism and of a failure to understand the political tasks of the Comintern. I think that there is probably another danger within our Parties, the danger of an insufficient connection between partial demands and the aims and objects of our movement. We have been hitherto unable to draw the masses to us to the extent which is necessary. Bordiga says that in Russia the existence of nuclei was not fraught with danger. Why not? Because the political task was set by history itself, thinks Comrade Bordiga. Are we to assume that history is something outside of human society? On this point I cannot quite agree with Comrade Bordiga.

Political pressure and political necessities weigh so heavily on the workers that they themselves turn their attention to these problems. Comrade Bordiga's words imply that he entirely eliminates the revolutionary perspective. If we are to assert that workers in Western Europe do not feel the great problems of life or do not feel them sufficiently, then we must give up every revolutionary perspective altogether. I think that Comrade Bordiga's viewpoint of the present situation is absolutely opportunist. At a time when the so-called stabilisation is very unstable, quite rotten in fact, when we have a Chinese revolution, a great process of development in Great Britain, two colonial wars, etc. etc., to say that politics do not interest the workers in the least is utterly erroneous. The characteristic feature in all countries is that large sections of workers are drawn into active political life. Political problems in various forms, such as taxation questions, financial crisis, the problem of Soviet Russia, etc. are all of them important questions which confront the workers. May be they confront them in different forms, Social Democratic workers in one form Communist workers in another form, German workers in another form and so on. But to assert that these great questions are not before the eyes of all the workers is erroneous and absolutely opportunist. Only the Social Democrats can maintain that. If having thought deeply you come to the logical conclusion: there is a great development of capitalism, another epoch of a great capitalist revival, hence the workers will have more bread and more butter with their bread and are therefore not interested in great political questions, we say that this is not our perspective but a Social Democratic perspective.

I come now to the question of inner Party matters, the question of blood and iron, of discipline, etc. Mechanical application would certainly not be satisfactory also in this respect, and perhaps there were signs of mechanical application in some Parties. I cannot deny that errors were committed also in this field. But why did we assert and are asserting now that we need iron and disciplined Parties? Because our orientation is in the direction of civil war. None of the tendencies outside of the Communist Party have such a perspective, even the revolutionary syndicalists who believe that power can be conquered through a general strike, etc. and that therefore they do not stand in need of a centralised party. But those whose orientation is in the direction of civil war stand in need of a disciplined Party. I do not think it necessary to revise the theses on discipline within the Parties. Equally false is also Comrade Bordiga's ideology concerning fractions. He says: "The history of Leninism is the

history of fractions. That is why we follow these glorious traditions of Leninism and would like very much to retain fractions in the Comintern." But this is just a mechanical application to rather unsuitable situations. For the history of Lenin's fractions was the history of fractions within the Social Democratic Party. If we were for example to amalgamate with the II. International or were to enter the League of Nations then we would again form a fraction. But I consider such a perspective as completely out of the question. There is a vast difference between forming a fraction in the Comintern and forming a fraction in the Menshevik Party. I should like to know why do you indulge in mechanical application without taking heed of the specific West European Communist International situation?

Now a few words on democracy within the Parties. There are several documents in which the Executive of the C. I. expressed itself for democracy within the Parties, such as in this well-known Open Letter or the theses proposed by Comrade Zinoviev. I must say that democracy within the Party is necessary in order to win new masses, in order to be able to do educational work on a larger scale, to be able to raise the cultural-political level of our Party and in order to avoid friction in the Party, etc. For all these reasons we must proclaim Party democracy. It is also very much needed with respect to relations between the national Parties and the C. I. As far as I know our Party was the first to propose it. Of course in this respect one cannot throw everything overboard at once, this would be too stupid for anything. As regards drawing the various sections into the leadership of the Comintern, Bordiga says: not reforms but revolution. We propose that we shall lead the Comintern together. The resolution of our last Party Congress contains the statement of leading comrades from the various Parties being more effectively drawn into co-leadership in the Comintern. But Comrade Bordiga I must tell you that if this has not been the case hitherto, it was not entirely our fault, but also the fault of the respective parties. They did not want to send us their best leading comrades. If we are to bring forward here compulsory proposals, it will probably be said that this is undemocratic. But nevertheless, we will indulge in just one arbitrary act, and will demand at this Plenum that we will all support the theses of Comrade Zinoviev, that all Parties should contribute to guarantee the international leadership of the Comintern. This is our ardent desire. What have you got to say against this, Comrade Bordiga? You probably think that we make our decisions somewhat in the same manner as Comrade Ruth Fischer signed the Open Letter? (Laughter.)

I come now to the end of my speech. I merely want to emphasise that in view of the complicated state of the present situation in our labour movement, of the complicated situation within the C. I., it would be erroneous to say that we must hit out only to the Right or only the Left. In France the situation is different from that in Germany. In other countries it is again different. We must analyse the specific in every situation and must act accordingly. Such is the true Marxian method. We believe, as Comrade Zinoviev has emphasised, that we have two main points. In Germany special attention should be paid to the struggle against the ultra-Left and in France against the Right. The danger is of construing the danger in one country as it is in another country. But this is also something relative. The Right peril in France does not preclude the appearance of ultra-Left deviations there, and the struggle against the ultra-Left in Germany does not preclude the necessity of the struggle against the Right. What is required here is a sense of proportion. For some comrades sense of proportion does not exist at all. We are Marxists and must show by our actions that we have a sense of proportion.

If we carry on a correct policy, if our orientation will be correct, we will overcome the crisis within the Parties and our International, in spite of all the assertions of our enemies, will in this session of the Enlarged Executive grow still stronger and still more ironlike and not softer than before. (Loud applause.)

(Ninth Session, February 25, 1926, evening)

Continuation of the Discussion on the Report of Comrade Zinoviev.

Chairman: Comrade Dimitrov.

Bela Kun:

Comrades, I will speak on two groups of questions. The first group of questions concerns the situation which has been created, both economically and politically, by the hegemony of America during the period of stabilisation. The second group contains the questions of systematising those partial demands which must form the political content of our united front tactic in this period of partial and relative stabilisation of capitalism.

First, as to the question of America and Europe. In dealing with the question of America and Europe even many Communists oppose these two portions of the world to each other simply as two geographical, and in the best case as two economic geographical, and in the best case as two economic geographical conceptions. The economic hegemony of American and the economic subjection of Europe is confirmed. On the other hand too little attention is given to that influence and those alterations which have been brought about in European economics and politics by the hegemony of America. We cannot at present abolish the fact of American hegemony. We believe, however, that we can best conduct the economic struggles of the working and suppressed masses against America in the first place by commencing the fight against those factors which are making themselves felt in European economics and politics as a result of American hegemony, and which almost completely coincide with the consequences of the stabilisation of capitalism. After the war, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie, who are now striving to fight against the hegemony of America, had fallen into pessimism. Stabilisation has again aroused the will to fight of these ideologists of the bourgeoisie. Many of them who desire to organise the fight against America are now playing with the idea of pan-Europe. When one strips this tendency of its idealistic garb and translates its "higher pathos" into the ordinary language of capitalism, then it is seen that the pan-European movement means the attempt to restore the European markets destroyed by the war and the preparation of the offensive against America. The real politicians of the bourgeoisie, who are less ideologically but more politically orientated, already emphasise at the beginning of this movement that pan-Europe means far less than pre-war Europe, which before the war occupied a world political dominating position. In this time when even various real politicians of the bourgeoisie are flirting with the idea of pan-Europe, the slogan of the "United States of Socialist Europe" is to a certain extent obtaining a central position in our propaganda. This slogan, however, cannot be set up as a parallel slogan against the slogan of pan-Europe. Our slogan, the slogan of the United States of socialist Europe is only the slogan of bringing to an end the fight against American hegemony, in contra-distinction to the slogan of pan-Europe which, so to speak, means the opening demand, the organisation demand of the fight against American hegemony.

On the basis of the thesis, which the delegation of the C. P. of Hungary has accepted as a foundation, I believe that this slogan at the present time is not meant to be anything else than a slogan of propaganda, which must be supplemented by the slogan of concrete agitation and of concrete action. I believe that precisely this slogan of concrete agitation among the broad masses, the slogans for mobilising these masses against the hegemony of America and against the results of stabilisation, which in the main is a consequence of this hegemony, must be sought in the effects arising from American influence upon European economics and politics.

What now are the effects of this American hegemony and of the partial relative stabilisation. I will solely attempt to present these effects in a very sketchy but systematic manner. The first question which would have to be answered is: What does America want to do in Europe? To this we can reply with

the words of an advocate of American capitalist interests, James Speyer. He puts the question: to what countries and to what sort of securities can we, in America, give the preference? He replies as follows:

"Has the country, which is seeking for capital, a firm and stable government — a government which is not disturbed by internal disputes and struggles — a Government which inspires confidence by conscientiously fulfilling its international obligations, and shows that it sees its well-being in peaceful development and not in "exaggerated" armaments or anything else which would create a contrary impression? These are the reasons why not only the inner conditions of a borrowing country, but also its foreign policy must exercise an influence with us in deciding whether to accept its securities."

These words of Speyer give a perfectly clear picture as to the aims of America in the economical and political stabilisation of Europe. They also clearly show that this stabilisation must reproduce the contradictions of capitalism on a far more extensive scale than was the case before the war. For the present, American capital desires class peace and "peoples" peace in Europe.

With what means is European capital realising this programme of America? On the economic and financial field it is doing it as follows: firstly, restoration of state finances with the aid of America, but at the cost of the workers; secondly, it is changing the European economic and productive organisation. The results are:

The reorganisation of market relations, the trustification of industry, establishment of company unions.

Thirdly: rationalisation of production.

According to the opinion of authoritative bourgeois technicians, there is proceeding a large-scale alteration of the technique of production, which is finding expression in Americanisation in Germany and France, and even in conservative England. We must not under-estimate this, it is quite certain that under capitalism rationalisation has its limits. It is impossible to achieve it on the basis of capitalism. Nevertheless, one can see very important progress in the sphere of rationalisation. In order to give a clear example of the effects of this alteration in the technique of production I should like to give two sets of data from Germany:

1. The German Potash-Syndicate formerly employed 22,000 workers, whilst its present staff only amounts to 9,000. Nevertheless production has increased by 50%. Factories and undertakings amounting in value to 600 million gold marks have been closed down in the interests of rationalisation.

2. In the German coal mines, the staffs have been reduced by 80,000 men, nevertheless production has increased.

The results of these economic and financial alterations in European economy upon the working class are as follows:

1. Increased exploitation of the workers in the factories and by the State apparatus;

2. Increase in unemployment.

3. Absolute impossibility of the social welfare keeping pace with the Americanisation, as was recently shown by a very Right Social Democrat. This means the cutting down of social welfare, even in the case where the old laws remain undisturbed.

A further consequence is the abandonment of the policy of class collaboration on the side of the employers and the re-establishment of the old state of affairs where the employer is the absolute "master in the house". It means the restoration of dictatorship in the factories.

In regard to home politics the influence of American hegemony and of stabilisation is expressed in a number of countries in the preference for "legal" means as against open terrorist methods. In other words, in the systematising and legalising of terror. The bourgeoisie is striving to form purely bourgeois governments, Luther, Briand, etc. if possible governments of the

Centre or of the bourgeois bloc. It prefers instead of the direct participation of the social democrats in the government, the support of the government by the social democracy from outside. It expresses itself finally in the efforts to cut down social welfare.

In the sphere of international politics the most decisive factor is the "flourishing" of so-called pacifism in Europe, which finds expression in the Locarno Treaty, in the effort to establish a South-East European Guarantee Pact, in all the talk of disarmament in Europe. Along with this we have the endeavours which have as their object the establishment of greater economic political unity by means of commercial treaties, as for example the Danube Federation. Between the Balkans and Germany there exist these portions of the State of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy which was dismembered by the various peace-treaties. American and English capitalism is displaying very energetic efforts to bring together on the fragments of the late monarchy a sort of federation, or at least a sort of tariff union, and this problem, in connection with the efforts at affiliation of the unfortunate Austrian republic, is awakening the interest not only of the bourgeoisie, but of a fairly large portion of the working class of these countries. In the succession States, and not least in Hungary, there has set in a new and great wave of the workers and peasants' movement. There exist undeniable signs of a Left movement, and these working and peasant masses are demanding an answer to the questions which confront them.

I believe that these questions, which are also a result of the hegemony of American capital, demand that an attitude be taken by the interested Parties under the leadership of the Communist International. The interested parties: Czechoslovakia, Austria, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria, must prepare an appropriate attitude to this question for the VI Congress.

The question now is, how can we undertake something against this influence of American hegemony, against the stabilisation and its results? Can we, upon the stabilisation and upon the ever increasing shakiness of the same, build a revolutionary everyday policy, or must we confine ourselves solely to propaganda and wait until the innate laws of imperialist capitalism bring the stabilisation to an end. I think we can say: we must build a revolutionary everyday policy upon the stabilisation, and we must examine the possibility of drawing up the partial demands for a limited period. And we must consider more closely the question of the programme of action.

It is quite a matter of course that this programme of action must be based on a national scale. We believe, however, that one can and must speak of the principle limits of this programme also on an international scale, because in setting up this programme we can be threatened with two kinds of dangers. The one danger is that the fight against the results of stabilisation, will be regarded as a sabotage of stabilisation in the C. L. P. (Communist Labour Party) sense, as capitalism was formerly sabotaged on the part of the C.L.P. The other danger is, the danger which Lenin in one of his youthful works described as "economic romanticism". This effort means that we are to step from a higher stage of capitalism onto a lower stage, that is, somehow to turn back the wheel of capitalist development. These two dangers are to be seen even in the case of various Communists. The chief thing would be to investigate more closely here the most important questions of this programme and partly of the concrete content. This is all the more necessary as our partial demands and partial actions which form the political content of our united front tactic, suffer from certain sicknesses. The main sickness is, as is shown by the campaign of some of our Parties in various questions, that in the majority of cases the partial demands disappear before they have taken effect and have been embodied in the other demands. A typical example of this is the campaign of the French Party in the Moroccan question and in the financial question, which were only very loosely connected with one another. Of course the partial demands must always be altered according to the situation.

It is equally certain that the partial demands and partial slogans must always waste their effects and their recruiting power among the masses if they do not move in a definite plan in the desired direction. This can be a source of serious opportunist dangers if these partial demands and partial slogans fall apart without connection with our revolutionary aim, and thereby acquire the character of social democratic minimum demands upon the basis of capitalism. The best campaigns,

even such a magnificently conducted campaign as the campaign for the expropriation of the princes in Germany raises the question, what is to come after this campaign, how the slogans can be intensified, how the old slogans of the campaign, which are already obsolete, can be connected, how the successes among the Social Democratic masses can be consolidated not only politically but organisatorily, and be put to advantage. In order to achieve this consolidation of our successes we need a programme of action for comprehending and concentrating the partial demands which form the content of our unity tactics. In my opinion the basis of this programme of action cannot be anything else than the combating of the influence of American capitalism, of the stabilisation phenomena in European economics and politics. This programme of action must provide an answer to three groups of questions, and this answer must also reply to the questions which are being put forward by the masses, who, it has been generally ascertained, are now streaming to the Left.

The first group of questions are: What sort of concrete demands shall we set up against those efforts and measures of the bourgeoisie on the economic field which have brought about the economic stabilisation of capitalism, and which are proceeding further to confirm this stabilisation with the aid of American capital and at the cost of the working class. I understand in this connection the question of the trustification and syndicalisation and the reply, what demands are to be set up against these measures of the bourgeoisie.

In addition I should like to make the following remarks:

The relation of America to Europe must not, as I have already said, be regarded geographically, but as a relation which is determined by definite class forces. The hegemony of America means, in the first place, the extension of the power of the American trusts and the extension of international trustification. On the other hand, the tendency to "Americanisation", to rationalisation in Europe, means the strengthening of the monopolist groups, of the big monopolies, for only these are capable of going over on a large scale to the modern form of undertaking, to the American methods. Of course, the predominance of the American trusts does not exclude either the competition between the American and European monopolist groups on the one hand or the competition between both of these groups. The fight against this domination of monopoly, against the dictatorship of finance capital, must be the central point on which we must base our programme of action.

At the present time when, on the one hand it can be clearly seen that the period of imperialism is merging into a period of proletarian revolution, and when on the other hand there does not exist an immediate revolutionary situation, special attention must be devoted to the question according to the character of our partial demands. Our indications show that it will not do, as for example Maslow has done, simply to warm up the old Erfurt demands, and that in such a manner that all social political demands are thrown out and only those remain which amount to an extension of bourgeois democracy. It is characteristic that it is precisely the so-called ultra-lefts who have fallen into vulgar Social Democratic ways of thought. Thus, for example, Rosenberg in the commercial political questions has adopted a directly nationalist position.

The struggle against the rule of the Trusts is at the same time the basis upon which the working class wins the leadership of the other working and exploited sections of the population. In Russia the question of completing the bourgeois revolution, of destroying the feudal ownership of land was the basis for the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. In West Europe it can, to some extent, be the rule of monopoly, the dictatorship of prices of the syndicates which is ruining all these sections and must necessarily drive them into opposition against the rule of the bourgeoisie. One must, however, on the one hand thoroughly examine the question of the demands for State ownership of the Trusts in certain parties, on the other hand combat the Social Democratic theory of economic democracy, and on the trade union field work out a number of demands for workers control and place these demands in the forefront of the programme.

The second group of questions is what demands are to be opposed to the measures and methods with which the bourgeoisie is endeavouring to confirm the stabilisation in the sphere

of home politics; in other words what demands of a transitional character must be set up against the bourgeois concentration, against the curtailment of social welfare and the growing pressure of taxation. In a number of countries in which the stabilisation will only play a role for a comparatively short space of time we must so direct our policy — in the first place in Germany and France — that the Social Democracy, in entering the Government, if it does not break its neck, will at least lose its influence on the great mass of the working class. We must likewise concentrate much more on our **social-political and taxation demands**. In the time of immediate revolutionary situation we have had too little interest for social politics. And I am a classical witness as to how much trouble one had in order to convince some "Left" Communists that the setting up of a **programme of taxation** is not an opportunist demand. This attitude still prevails among many comrades, and it not only means that no real, so to speak, expert demands are put forward, but that the demands have to be discussed for so long that to a certain extent they come too late. It is one of the reasons why all our daily demands are in most countries not sufficiently concrete. Of course, our agitation is too general and all this — I must repeat that once again — is because there still exist fears that these partial demands must inevitably have a reformist character. We must, in spite of Maslow, repeat what the Third World Congress had to say in this question:

"For this struggle the Communist Parties do not put forward any minimum programme based upon capitalism and which shall strengthen and improve its tottering structure. The shattering of this structure remains their leading aim — remains their actual task. In order however, to fulfil this task, the Communist Parties have put forward demands, the fulfilment of which constitutes the requirement of the working class and which **cannot be delayed**, and they have to fight for these demands in the struggle of the masses, apart from whether or not they are compatible with the profit system of the capitalist class."

That, I think, is a guarantee against every opportunism.

The third group of questions is what demands must we set up against those efforts of the bourgeoisie and of the Social Democracy which strive by means of international political measures, for firmness and stability in the sphere of international politics? We cannot possibly content ourselves by endeavouring to expose by means of pure propaganda the so-called **pacifism of the bourgeoisie and the Social Democracy**. We must set up demands whereby we shall achieve this exposure, because the method of exposure by pure propaganda does not suffice. There are a number of other questions which are closely connected with these measures. The fact that the **international parliamentary conference of the Communists** which was held in Brussels in the autumn of last year was allowed to disperse without any decisions and without any settlement of the important differences between the **French and German Communist parliamentarians**, and that even the C.I. did not adopt any attitude to these questions, shows us that here, in this sphere, is the need for concretising our policy, and that an international co-ordination of policy is absolutely necessary.

Further, in various sections the question of the **military forces** is raised. We remember the case of Krulikowski in Poland where the question of a period of service in the bourgeois army led to a heated discussion. In Germany the question was raised as to whether one should put forward a demand for a **people's militia** as against the **Reichswehr**. In France various questions of the military forces will become topical in the near future. In **Czechoslovakia**, where there is a so-called democracy and where the soldiers still have the right to vote, the democratic constitution of the army is frequently discussed. It is obvious that this question requires to be answered in this programme of action, if we wish to promote and make use of the left tendencies of the masses to such an extent that we can organise them for the revolutionary struggle.

Of equal importance is the question of concretising the policy of the various Parties for the next stage in the question of the attitude to the **Soviet Union**. The period of the recognition of Soviet Russia is already past, almost all countries have granted de jure recognition to Soviet Russia. It is necessary that the various sections concretise the partial demands regarding the policy of the governments of their countries towards Soviet

Russia. It is necessary that these slogans which were given in the theses of Comrade **Zinoviev**, and which support the industrialising of the Soviet Union, shall be rendered concrete in each country. These should be included in this programme of action. It is very important for every case that the Communist parties and the broad working masses be filled with the spirit that the stabilisation tendencies of the bourgeoisie, of misery and of starvation should not only be replied to with propaganda and with the slogan of the united states of Europe, but actively by the setting up of partial demands and carrying out the partial struggles which take into account the results of stabilisation.

I intended originally to speak on the question of the **Right** and so-called **ultra-Left** tendencies. I will however not repeat what Comrade **Bukharin** has said over the left danger. I would merely like to say the following regarding the case of **Maslow** in connection with the letter that was read out yesterday and which shows the true character of the ultra-left; I wish to say that we, by no means, have to fear that a Putsch will be organised by these ultra-lefts, or that they will fall into revolutionary impatience. When I recollect the discussions in the various commissions at the **Third World Congress**, I remember that Comrade **Lenin** said that the Right had a historical justification for its existence as the "warning word". I think that some in the ranks of the **French Party** have gone beyond this role. Comrade **Lenin** said at this time that the historical justification for the existence of the Left is revolutionary impatience. The ultra-lefts à la **Maslow**, have no revolutionary impatience, they have not and never did have any historical justification for their existence. It is the task of the **German Party** to purge from its ranks everything that is reminiscent of **Maslow**, his theory and practice. The stabilisation mood, about which a good deal is spoken to-day and which in our opinion is nothing else than passivity, cessation of propaganda, passively waiting for an immediate revolutionary situation. Against this stabilisation mood there must be placed in the theses the summons to the fight against the effects of the stabilisation promoted by the **American hegemony**. The previous session of the Enlarged Executive concretised the slogan of **Bolshevisation** and confirmed the fact of the stabilisation. The present session of the Enlarged Executive has the task to give impulse to all Sections of the Comintern to concretise and to work out the means and methods of struggle against the effect of the stabilisation, against the influence of American capital. **Bolshevisation** can only be continued in a systematic, united, international, co-ordinated struggle of the broad working masses against the results of stabilisation, against the stabilisation of misery, of the enslavement of the suppressed classes and peoples. (Applause.)

Clara Zetkin:

Comrades; We are used to having our Congresses transformed now and then into scene of heated and passionate fights in the battle on theory and practice. Yesterday, for a time, we experienced something else. Our Congress was transformed into a lyrical scene, but in my opinion, in the style of a sloppy comedy. Comrade **Fischer** appeared here in the role of the politically penitent **Mary Magdalene**, who wishes to show by public acknowledgement of sin that she is ready to be adopted again into the list of Communist saints, and to lead the sinful Communist Party of Germany and beyond it, the **German proletariat**, laden with sin, pointing them the way, and guiding them.

Comrades, those who know the facts say "it makes me laugh". Where is the justification for such behaviour? I will give the facts in the case. Comrade **Fischer** appeared here as an energetic advocate of the E. C. C. I. letter and the policy outlined therein. What are the facts? Throughout long negotiations, Comrade **Fischer** had to be — I will express myself politely — persuaded to agree to the E. C. C. I. letter, and in further negotiations had to allow herself to be persuaded that it should be published — and that is one of the main things. Then she naturally gave her signature to the letter, from the "deeply Marxist discernment" and "profound inner conviction" which characterise her. She returned to **Germany** and immediately, by means of industrious fractional work, proceeded to sabotage the work of those members of the C. C. who really tried to carry out the policy of the E. C. C. I. letter.

The best proof of this is the fact that Comrade Fischer's activity in Germany was considered so fractional, and so injurious to the Party, that she was transferred to the somewhat rarer climate of Moscow in order to allow her fractional temperament to cool down. When I was in Germany the sparrows chirped it from the housetops that her fractionally inclined soul was finding ways and means of carrying on similar fractional work from here. Ad besides, Comrade Fischer tried to warm up the demagogic soup of her fractionalist machinations at the fire of the Russian Party discussion. So much for that series of facts.

And now something else. Comrade Fischer made the sharpest speech here against the so-called Ultra-lefts like Scholem, Rosenberg and tutti quanti. But it is nevertheless a fact that she carried on the same policy as they did and that later, perhaps not openly and formally, but still in reality, she supported the fractional activity of Comrade Scholem and other Ultra-lefts in Berlin and outside of Berlin. Her real attitude to the Ultra-lefts corresponds to Heine's stanze, with which she greets Scholem and his friends:

"Blamier mich nicht, mein schönes Kind,
Und grüss' mich nicht Unter den Linden;
Wenn wir nachher zu Hause sind,
Wird sich schon alles finden."

(Do not expose me, my pretty child by greeting me Under den Linden; when we get home later we'll settle everything.)

Another series of facts. Comrade Fischer appeared here as the historian of the German Communist Party. She gave a concise description here, which I will call by courtesy a mixture of truth and fabrication. I do not wish to make her responsible for what she said in characterising the beginnings of the Communist Party, for at this time she was not to be found on the scene of battle, but was busy in Vienna studying the sex question according to the Freudian theory, a study the fruits of which are incorporated into an immature brochure.

As an historian, Comrade Fischer also touches upon the chapter of the October Defeat, which according to her description, was purely the consequence of the Right derailment. My opinion from the very beginning was and still is that this chapter is explained by an intertwining of Left and Right deviations of the Party. And added to that there is the absolute refusal of the masses. It would be an important task to investigate historically this chapter in the history of the Communist Party of Germany. But to this belongs a thorough collection of economic, political, and social facts, and their illumination from the standpoint of historical materialism. These are all prerequisites which Comrade Fischer absolutely lacks, and she even lacks that primitive sense of facts — I again express myself courteously — which lends such great value and charm to the simple description of the old chroniclers, though they lack every materialistic conception. Remarkably enough, Comrade Fischer went very hurriedly and superficially into two chapters of Party history, which she herself lived through and even helped to shape and which are of enormous importance: the Congress of the Party in Frankfurt, and the Tenth Congress in Berlin. What she had to say about Frankfurt boils down to this: I admit that we did not draw an honest balance, that we drew a false balance against our better reason and conscience. What does that mean in plain language? It is a signed acknowledgement of the greatest dishonesty toward the Party, toward the International, and toward the masses.

Of course, we can all make mistakes — I myself have my share of the burden to bear — I don't deny that. But never have I had to reproach myself with a mistake against my better reason and conscience; if I had, I would rather hang myself than stand here before you.

And now about the Tenth Party Congress. Comrade Fischer complains that instead of clearing up the problems confronting it, it veiled and cloaked everything. Comrades, I ask who contributed more to this than Comrade Fischer in her report, which dealt with none of the Party problems confronting us, but was on the level of a speech at a meeting round the parish pump. Comrade Fischer consciously tried to cloak all the problems. For this purpose she was especially active in preventing the representative of the Comintern from interfering by pointing the way and criticising, in the decisions of the Party Congress. Are these facts or not? I ask the comrades of the German Delegation present here whether these are facts?

Comrade Fischer also appeared here as the guardian of the revolutionary tradition. She gets tremendously excited at the expulsion of the 12 workers in Hanover, along with the mental degenerate Katz, claiming that a sin had thereby been committed against the best revolutionary traditions which had been represented by those workers and which must be upheld. Comrades, Comrade Luxemburg's name and work belong to the best and most glorious traditions, not only of the German Communist Party, but of the whole world proletariat. Comrade Lenin explained on which points his ideas differ from those of Comrade Luxemburg, and he concluded, in spite of all differences of opinion, with the declaration: "Rosa belongs to us". He compared her with an eagle. With what did Comrade Fischer compare certain ideas of Rosa Luxemburg? With syphilitic bacilli. I say, that, apart from the terrible lack of taste and coarseness of this comparison, it is politically so base and vile that — I say so openly — old as I am, the blood boils in my veins. To the best traditions of the revolutionary vanguard of the German Proletariat belong the fights, the activity of the Spartacus League. Comrade Fischer allowed no opportunity to escape her to belittle the traditions of the Spartacus League, to extinguish the memories of its revolutionary significance, or to misrepresent or besmirch them. And she, who gets excited about the disregard of revolutionary traditions as embodied in Katz's followers, she herself who used disciplinary measures against comrades and thereby robbed them of their immunity, as members of parliament, and exposed them to the persecution of the German Courts and police — comrades who had not only been active in revolutionary work during the war but also in the revolutionary months in which are embodied the best traditions of revolutionary battle in the Munich Soviet Republic. I recall only the disciplinary measures against Comrades Paul Fröhlich and Ernst Meyer. Their only sin was to exercise their right of criticism of the policy of the leading Maslow Group, that they demanded a positive taxation programme at a moment of political necessity, which came belatedly afterwards when the situation was no longer quite so favourable.

Still further: Comrade Fischer claims that as leader she especially embodies the highest regard for the unclear but good revolutionary proletarian elements, that her policy is the purest crystallisation of the revolutionary currents, which proceed from the still unclear and, as a result of the treachery they have experienced, still mistrustful but most energetic sections of the German proletariat. I say that Comrade Fischer insults, and dishonours in the same breath these proletarians, the unclear revolutionary elements, by making them responsible for all the mistakes, for all the sins, for all the crimes of the policy of the Maslow-Fischer group. Yes, she says, we are clear about the policy to be conducted, but the revolutionary-minded workers, dominated by the K. A. P. D. spirit, are still so unclear, so dull, so passive, and on the other hand, so putschish, that we were compelled to act against our better insight. What kind of leaders are they who allow themselves to be driven and dominated by the moods of a backward section of the proletariat, instead of driving these elements forward, educating them politically, enlightening them and assimilating them ideologically into our ranks. The moods of the revolutionary K. A. P. D. workers to whom Comrade Fischer refers, vividly recall the needs of the small peasants to which the Junkers refer in order to serve their own interests. In both instances it is playing with sentiments for the same purpose. The revolutionary sentiments were for Comrade Fischer and her group nothing more than a spring-board from which they sprang to their goal, — to obtain the leadership of the Party. The group did nothing to clear up the confused sentiments, to educate politically those who held these sentiments. I claim that this demagogic exploitation of revolutionary sentiments reveals the greatest contempt for these labour elements, reveals the whole incapacity for political leadership.

Comrades, Comrade Ruth Fischer spoke here as though her errors amounted to no more than her negative attitude in the trade union question and in the united front tactic. She did not mention the fact that the E. C. C. I. letter reproached her and her group with other serious mistakes. The E. C. C. I. letter asserted that Comrade Fischer and her group, by their constant undiscerning violent and intriguing personal politics, by their fractional disciplinary measures, by their neglect of the most elementary control, bear the responsibility for the fact that se-

rious corruption and disintegration have eaten their way into the official bodies and into the Party. The E. C. C. I. letter further asserted that the Fischer-Maslow Group misappropriated means and forces, which should have served for the mobilisation and revolutionisation of the German proletariat, for fractional activity in the International. Couriers to other parties were misused for the purpose of building up internationally a Left against the policy of the Comintern. Comrades, I say openly that if one part of the E. C. C. I. letter declared the complete political incapacity of the leading Maslow-Fischer Group, then the other part declared its dishonesty, its double entry book-keeping, its political unworthiness. And when not only Comrade Fischer, but also her nearest friends were openly branded with this by the leadership of the Comintern, Comrade Fischer signed the E. C. C. I. letter and thus made her brand and that of her friends still deeper. Thus she manifested a lack of self-respect which no revolutionary fighter can do without. For the signature in this case was no longer discipline, it was a lack of self-mastery which is still more emphasised by the fact that Comrade Fischer then went back and intrigued against the E. C. C. I. letter.

Comrades, the mistakes of the political leadership and the double-entry bookkeeping of the Fischer-Maslow Group have had disastrous effects in the German Party. During my stay in Germany, where I visited all the large and important districts, I was able to convince myself of this fact in conversations with Ultra-lefts and Rights, with comrades of every tendency, and above all, with the simple rank and file comrades. The membership had terribly declined; our Party had as good as completely lost contact with the large factories; the trade union work was practically null; we had lost almost all our positions in the trade unions, we were isolated from the broad masses; we were not taken seriously by our opponents and not respected by them. And worse still — the Party was filled from top to bottom with the greatest pessimism concerning its own strength and concerning the proletarian masses. What does that mean? That one of the decisive forces were missing for making the Party strong, capable of action, in short, equal to its task.

Comrades: one needs to have become acquainted with the catastrophic condition of the Party in order to realise that under the present leadership, a perceptible even though slow progress is beginning to be made in every direction. Of course the birth-mark still cling to the Executive of the Party. It is not yet an ideal Executive; the leading comrades know that best themselves and are earnestly striving to develop their group in working in solidarity for a better and stronger leadership. In the present situation it is the elementary duty of every comrade to support the endeavours of the Executive, and thus to further the work. What is Comrade Fischer doing in this situation? She is using every opportunity to create difficulties and hindrances for the executive, and still more, she is trying to rob the Executive of the necessary authority in the eyes of the masses.

Comrades: the Party is beginning to rise from the chaos, from the heap of ruins, into which the leadership of the Maslow-Fischer group transformed it. The Party cadres are filling up again, the contact between its sections is improving, trade union work has been begun, the regular activity in the factories, and in all spheres of Party life is moving forwards. The Party did not lead the fight against the Locarno Pact badly. Still more, it has now brought a popular movement into motion on a grand scale on the question of the expropriation of the princes, such as we have actually never had before; and best of all, our Party is the leader and not the led in this movement. By its campaigns among the masses it has compelled the social democratic leaders and the trade union leaders to join this movement. The Party is on the way to plunge forward anew on one of the most important and as good as untouched spheres of work, the sphere of **peasant organisation**. This offensive proves not only that our comrades have a clear conception of their tasks, but much more, they are conscious of their strength; the work has been undertaken in a systematic, consistent and well-planned manner. The Party and its leadership are being consolidated also in the sense of drawing all forces into collaboration who are capable and desirous of working for the Party on the basis outlined by the Comintern and in conformity with the given fundamental and tactical line. The C. C. permits the collaboration of all elements who come under this category, without standing on ceremony according to the practice established by

the Maslow-Fischer Group in the fractional fight. For the Fischer-Maslow Group condemned as "Right" almost everyone who was even suspected of writing German correctly. Even now there is being accomplished that concentration of forces of which Comrade Fischer appeared here as the spokesman, while trying to stigmatise it in the same breath as a swing to the Right of the C. C., of the Party and of the C. I. After the Maslow-Fischer Group, by a shameless campaign, excommunicated Comrades Thalheimer and Brandler and drove these eminently capable forces of the Party into isolation, Comrade Fischer could no longer scare the comrades with the cry: "Brandler is coming!" Now she has found a new bogey, Ernst Meyer has become the bogeyman. Ernst Meyer is coming! That is the new alarm.

Comrades: I know the history of the Party. Ernst Meyer is ten times as good a revolutionary as Maslow and Comrade Fischer themselves are. The comrades in the C. C. are not small children, they will not allow themselves to be frightened by the cry of alarm: Ernst Meyer is at the gates! as the Roman matrons once called to their children to frighten them and compel them to behave. Hannibal is at the gates! No, comrades, it is quite well known in Germany that the enemy Ernst Meyer need not be feared. It is a piece of brazenness to speak of concentration and to raise this cry at the same time, so long as a Maslow, a Comrade Fischer and her companions are sitting inside the fortress with their double entry bookkeeping. Comrades, I believe that the German Party will stride forward on the path it has started on in spite of this senseless and dishonest cry. It will strengthen itself internally and externally. It is the duty of us all to support it!

I must add something more. There still seem to be some comrades who place their hopes on the grave of the catastrophic policy of Fischer-Maslow, that these elements, by penitently admitting their mistakes, might again take over the leadership in the Communist Party of Germany. I say: No! Comrade Thaelmann certainly spoke the truth when he declared yesterday: elements such as Ruth Fischer and Maslow are once and for all done for politically and morally and are impossible for the leadership of the Party. The German workers might be reproached with a great deal, and I myself have reproached them with a great deal and still do so; yet such a fundamental lack of self-respect must not be charged against them, that they would again allow themselves to be led by elements which themselves are lacking in self-respect.

Comrades: I wish to say something also about the general situation in the Communist International. I belong to those who believe the world economic and world political analysis as well as the perspectives developed therefrom, are correct on the whole. One fact gives me food for thought in confirming the analysis and the perspectives. I believe that this fact must give all the national Sections, as well as the Executive of the Comintern, pause: in spite of the correct analysis, in spite of the correct perspective, the C. I. has during the last period experienced a catastrophic collapse of the Party in Germany, the defeat in Estonia, and in Bulgaria, and an extraordinarily difficult and not yet settled situation of our Party in France and in Norway. I believe, comrades, that this fact must give us cause to raise the question whether the line, the tactical line of the Comintern has always been manifested and carried out with the necessary clearness and determination. In Germany it has not been the case. The crisis in France proves that it was also not always the case there. The same holds good for other countries. I believe, that for the sound development of the C. I. as leader and organiser of the world revolution, the firm, clear, tactical line and its application is also of great importance. Marx and Engels, as we know, considerably erred in the perspective of the world revolution, but in spite of this, their line for the proletariat and its fight for freedom has proved itself as clear, certain and absolutely correct. We see, on the contrary, in the C. I., that with a correct analysis and perspective, great defeats have been suffered. I believe, we must investigate whether that is somehow connected with mistakes of our own, with the fact that our line has not been clear, not sharp, not definite enough. Let us ask whether it did not thereby give rise to deviations, to a vacillating and incomplete application. I openly declare that, for instance, a certain contradiction exists in the decisions of the V World Congress, between the demand for trade union unity and certain formulations of the political theses. What Comrade Zinoviev said here about the character and nature of the social democracy on the fascist activity of their leaders is

absolutely correct. I would not only subscribe to it with both hands, but with both my feet and hands. I will advocate it everywhere, and will try to make this clear to the social democratic workers. But it is another thing whether it was wise or correct to express all this at this moment in this manner. Of course the Lasalle principle is: "Speak out, whatever there is." But always in wise consideration of the concrete circumstances of the time. If we had nothing but mature and educated comrades, who knew how to apply the formulation of our theses wisely in their spirit, then a formulation which is not quite beyond reproach would not matter much. But the comrades at our disposal are not all trained, experienced comrades. Our slogans sometimes become caricatures. And thus the sentences in question have given rise to the fact that the honesty of our unity policy in the trade union movement has been challenged and put under suspicion: and still more, that the organised workers in the trade unions have rejected and even combatted our agitation and our work in the factories. We must not forget that in Germany, for instance, the majority of the trade union workers are members of the Social Democratic Party. We must keep this in mind, and must see the difference between the social democratic leaders, with their treacherous policy on the one hand, and the misled masses on the other. In their work in the factories our comrades have often forgotten this difference. Their attitude was dominated by the wording of the theses. And the worker in the factory could not understand the dualism when our comrade says to him as a trade union worker: "Come to my heart, brother proletarian, the united front with you in the trade unions", and when this same comrade declared to him, however, as member of the Social Democratic Party, as our Ultra-left comrades did: "You fascist, you traitor, I will knock your head off." There were nasty scuffles between proletarians in the factories and in demonstrations in Germany, which not only did not strengthen the trade union united front and the idea of united trade union struggle, but on the contrary, injured them. I believe that we must therefore be very careful with formulations, explanations and declarations, so that we do not give the elements of the Left or the Right the occasion to interpret and revise. Rather, the formulation of theses and of our resolutions must be like Luther's Bible "the word you must allow to stand". No interpretation may be twisted or applied to the Communist words, to the Bolshevik words, either to the one side or the other.

Comrades! I want also to emphasise that we must not operate too much with the fractional ideas of the Right and the Left in carrying out our Leninist, our Communist line. There will be deviations to both sides. We must not mechanically stamp all deviations outwardly as Right and Left. The left sicknesses all too easily become devouring opportunist evils, and vice versa, the opportunist deviations easily turn into Ultra-left follies. And even our straight line "the golden mean" does not always protect us from error. Therefore, I believe that, rather than dealing so profusely with labels in every single case the concrete conditions should be thoroughly gone into, and investigations must be made to find explanations for defeats, what causes the slow development of the Communist Party in a country, its weak contact with the masses, etc. Above all things, such a thoroughly detailed investigation, not in a stereotyped form so that we can become clear about how errors and mistakes can be avoided. I wish also to emphasise what we must consider as our future work. I was right to give much space to the economic analysis and to pay it the greatest attention. It is the basis for our stand on policy and work. But I believe that along with it we must more than ever keep in view the subjective factor of historical events, study it thoroughly, and devote the necessary attention to it. Of course this subjective factor, on the side of the proletariat as well as on the side of the bourgeoisie, grows up and develops on the economic basis. But on the other hand this subjective factor also reacts on the economic basis. It is a tremendous historical power, and whoever doubts that under circumstances the subjective factor of the revolutionary will of broad masses, under the guidance of a determined Party, clear in its aims and sure of its road, can remove mountains which capitalism had begun to carry away, has something to learn from the example of the great Russian revolution. In my opinion, in view of the whole economic development, we must not limit ourselves merely to following with the greatest attention the attitude in the various sections of the proletariat. No, we must give much more attention than before to the petty bourgeoisie and the middle class, as well as to the peasantry. Com-

rades, we must not only appear before these social sections today in the role as Marx once expressed it, as the great tribune of the peoples, the defender of all the down-trodden and enslaved and all the humiliated. We must appreciate them as allies in the fight for power. We are the Party which desires the Revolution, earnestly desires it. Because we are preparing the Revolution, we must also devote attention to the block with these social sections. Great sections of the middle class and of the petty-bourgeoisie have been precipitated into the proletariat. In all countries, not only in vanquished Germany, but also in victorious Great Britain, and even in the golden land of the United States. Other sections of the petty-bourgeoisie and middle class are active in the administration and management of factories, are in the service of the municipalities, are State slaves of bourgeois society. Their activity is of great importance for the existence and functioning of this society. It is of the greatest importance that we penetrate into these sections, disintegrate them, and bring them into ferment. Every weakening of our opponent means an increase in power for the proletariat. Comrades, what I have said applies above all to the peasantry; the alliance with it is of the highest importance? Look round in the world! Everywhere there are agrarian crises. Not even in the country of the most highly developed industrialism, the highest technical development — in the United States — has bourgeois society been able to solve the agrarian question, although it has considerably improved agricultural industry there, technically and organisationally. In many countries it is evident that the agrarian question has not even been solved in the bourgeois sense. It is of the greatest importance for us not only to find in these peasants an ally in the fight for power, but as co-workers in the building up of Communism. We must not forget: the peasantry is not a parasitic class like the bourgeoisie. Its attitude after the conquest of power is therefore important for us. It would be a fatal error for us to believe that the agrarian question is solved by the proletarian world revolution. No, at the moment when we conquer power in the various countries, the problem of the peasant arises in all its greatness. A great and complicated problem. Just because we believe in the inevitable and imminent Revolution, just because we are passionately devoting all our strength and all our energy to accelerate its coming, to secure its victory, the more necessary it is that we turn our earnest attention to the peasant question. We must carefully study and examine in the various countries this question which here can only be raised in general. We must consider it in our programme of action as an element for the solution of our problem. **To the Masses, Win the Masses!** Let us keep in mind what our Lenin called to us: "We must not only have the majority of the proletariat, no, we must have the majority of the toiling population!"

Comrades: It is being quietly rumoured through the Ultra-left spirits that the Comintern is preparing to swing to the Right and that it is approaching its liquidation on the hidden path of opportunism. Nothing is more erroneous than this insinuating assumption.

All the efforts made by the Comintern, which were formulated into proposals and slogans, like the red proletarian united front, the building up of a Left Wing, the building up of a Left Block, are not signs of opportunism, or of liquidationist sentiments. Absolutely the contrary! They are proofs of the immortal strongly urging life force of the Communist International. The Comintern will draw greater masses to itself. It is not sufficient for it to lead the revolutionary proletarian vanguard which forms its followers, no, it wants to set in motion and lead the whole class, the broad masses of the toilers. Therefore, it issues the slogan of rallying and driving forward all the Socialist sections which are in antagonism to the great capitalists; all the daily needs, the everyday demands of the exploited and oppressed classes and sections form its rallying slogans.

Comrades, In connection with this so-called "opportunist" attitude and petty work — as the ultra-Left label it — I remember a detail in Lenin's life work, which seems to me to be a symbol of the brilliant revolutionary policy of reality of our leader. Lenin wrote on the question of hot water for tea for the workers in the factories, at the time when his heart and mind were directed toward stirring up the mighty ocean of the social world revolution and setting it in motion. This symbol shows what we must learn from Lenin: consideration of the everyday interests of the toiling masses, working for them with a zeal and with an energy as though it were a matter of conquering power, but at the same time apply our energy every day on be-

half of conquering power, of our final aim, of the social revolution, with the same strength of conviction — I use this term purposely in contrast to pessimism — as though we were to realise it not tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, no, on this very day. Under the banner of such a revolutionary policy of reality, we must work and fight every day, and under its banner we shall conquer. Not as an appendage of the II International, not with the II International, but in opposition to it. We do not want to patch up and improve the world as the II International does: we want to overthrow it and we want to build it up anew. (Great applause.)

Comrade Thorez (France):

Comrades,

The French Delegation is in full accord with the opinion expressed in the theses of Comrade Zinoviev, namely, that in the present situation a correct application of united front tactics must be the basis of the entire activity of the Communist International.

That is why we also agree with him that an earnest and energetic struggle should be carried on against extreme Left tendencies or fractions if they fail to understand the importance of such tactics.

However, we think that if Right perils cannot be kept out of Parties such as the German and Italian Parties, if Left perils cannot be kept out the French Party, as far as we are concerned, we think that in the French Communist Party the essential peril lies in the fractional activity of the Right.

Two months ago at an Enlarged Session of the Central Committee we rectified the errors which we had committed in the application of the united front, in the appreciation of the work in the trade union movement and in the reorganisation of our Party. The next day the Right fraction seized upon the letter of the Central Committee of the Party addressed to the Party and said: "It is we who were right, it is we who indicated the remedies and solutions, and the Party Executive has adopted our platform."

Let me say first of all that the Right certainly did not have the monopoly of correct criticism. The monopoly of the Right is the monopoly of negative criticism and the disintegration of the Party.

There are two branches of activity with respect to which we have introduced rectifications. In the first instance concerning our policy towards the trade unions.

In accord with trade union comrades, we in France, have just placed the problem of trade union unity on its proper basis by closely connecting it with the immediate demands of the workers. The question thus formulated was defended, in accord with our comrades of the Federal Bureau, at the last National Federated Council.

We are already putting into practice that part of the decisions of our conference of December 2, which points out that we must have every consideration for the active trade unionists who have acquired great experience which is indispensable to us for the capture of the workers.

What does the Right do? It protested against the tutelage of the Communist Party, it creates a syndicalist League.

There is another field on which we have committed many errors: the field of organisation. Reorganisation has been mechanical. We committed a great error when we rejected the idea to form street nuclei side by side with factory nuclei. In the factory nuclei there were frequently side by side with 3 or 5 factory workers 30 or so outside members. Thus we were guilty of a great error by not immediately constituting an organ capable of carrying on the local work.

But comrades, from all this criticism we drew the conclusion that it was essential to improve the methods of work. The conclusion drawn by the Right was that the factory nuclei should be done away with and that the old system of sections was to be taken up again.

At present there is no absolute opposition to factory nuclei. Bordiga's example is copied, factory nuclei are tolerated for it is a well known fact that we had in the Party thousands of workers who did not know the old sections and others who knew them and prefer the nuclei.

The main objection is that one cannot discuss matters in the nuclei. This constitutes already a great divergence in the conception of the role of the Communist Party. Is the Party there simply for discussions, is it a local club? Certainly not.

The Party has also work to accomplish, this work must be done among the workers in the factory and for this activity the factory nucleus offers a splendid opportunity.

Having declared that nuclei are a peril, we are all of a sudden told: we tolerate factory nuclei, there will be factory nuclei, but these nuclei must not have the right to discuss and the right to decide. This means that after one changed, the comrades who are in the nuclei and applied the decisions automatically, one will be able to make fine speeches in the Sections.

We are entirely against such a conception with respect to the organisational form of the Party.

Comrade Engler spoke of the 24-hour strike. He said that it was a complete failure, that it disorganised the trade union movement. Comrades, if the question is to be treated in this manner, it requires an explanation from us.

First of all, who launched the slogan of the 24-hours' strike. The workers' congresses, in the resolutions which they adopted, stated emphatically that they took the responsibility for the idea of a 24 hours' strike against the war in Morocco, launched by the Textile Federation and the E. C. of the C. G. T. U.

Did we do our utmost for the preparation of this strike?

It is as clear as daylight that first of all the launching of the idea was belated, our congresses were spread over too long a period. It is also self-evident that the material preparation for the strike was somewhat inadequate. But in connection with all this, one must take into consideration the ferocious attack which the bourgeois government was making on our Party. One must take into account the hundreds of active comrades who were arrested and imprisoned.

One must bear in mind the machinations of the employers.

One must also point out the attitude of the Social Democratic leaders who were urging those workers who are still following them not to participate in our strike movement. Moreover, comrades, there was the campaign of the bourgeois press, which had been silent several months. A few days before the strike it initiated a ferocious campaign of calumnies against us. Then there was also the pessimism with which the Right permeated the Party and trade union ranks.

What were the results, comrades? Almost a million strikers. If one takes into consideration that the most important federations, those where our influence is strongest, such as the railwaymen, postal workers and civil servants did not take part in the movement, one is justified in saying that after all the strike movement was not a fiasco. It is for the first time since the war that we have succeeded in France in arousing part of the population against war. One must also bear in mind the civil war atmosphere which we experienced in the Paris region on the day of the strike.

To emphasise the historical importance of the movement, we have only to remind you that before the war, in connection with the danger for international war at the time of the Balkan War, a 24-hours' strike was decided upon by the old G. G. T. At that time the trade union movement had not been split, but the percentage of strikers was much less than at the time of our strike.

Of course there were repressive measures the day after the strike. Some comrades were dismissed, some were arrested, some were sent to prison, in a word there were victims, but after all what does it matter? Could this stop us in our struggle against the Moroccan war? Evidently not, for if we drive such reasoning to its logical conclusion, we arrive at the well-known saying "one should not have taken up arms".

Comrades, certain members of the Right, even deputies such as Gauchier, whilst neglecting to carry on agitational work for the Party, went off to the Provinces spreading discontent, distributing the Bulletin Communiste and the Revolution Proletarienne, collecting signatures for the letter of the Right.

Comrade Engler said: "Whenever I go to a nucleus or to a district and I am asked my opinion I say that I have nothing to tell, but that people can read . . ."

Comrades, read . . . what? The Bulletin Communiste and the Revolution Proletarienne spread by comrade Engler?

When Comrade Engler tells us: "We were driven out of the Regional Committee because we were in accord with the majority", we say this is not so. The first reason was that Basiliere, a member of the Regional Committee, was supplying the management of the Bulletin Communiste with information on the internal life of the Party. When they were asked to cease collaboration in the Bulletin Communiste they replied that they would continue to collaborate until the re-instatement of Souvarine, because, comrades the real aim of these people is the re-instatement of Souvarine.

We distinguish between those who direct the activity of the Right fraction and the discontented workers whom it had been able to capture for the time being. We are already receiving letters from comrades telling us: "Yes, we were out for mischief, we were out to smash something, but we are not in accord with the Right." Already 8 deputies out of 11 have declared that they had nothing in common with the Right, especially when the latter was opposing fraternisation. But we will fight energetically against the Right fraction because, under the influence of events, when by means of a more adequate application of united front tactics, Socialist workers are looking towards our Party, the Right fraction can constitute and constitutes already a real danger. How are we going to fight against the Right? We must point out here the essential premise for a serious struggle against the Right: we must first of all rectify our Left errors. Comrades, it is perfectly clear that we are resolved to struggle against the Right by means of a serious discussion which has already begun in the Party, which must, however, be kept within the limits of Party discipline. We will not allow the Right fraction to continue to violate the discipline of the Party.

We declare that we are ready for maximum concessions as far as the misled workers are concerned, but that we will be pitiless to the Right fraction. We will go as far as exclusion for those who after repeated warnings persist in violating the most elementary discipline.

The last document of the Right fraction contains signatures of those who were expelled during the last 18 months, such as Guillou, driven out of the Party for editing and publishing anti-Communist pamphlets, Leprince and Leroy expelled from their trade unions, Moligne and also Souvarine.

Comrade Engler asked the International a question. He asked: What are your conditions for the re-instatement of Souvarine? At the V Congress a document was drawn up laying down:

"To leave it to the French Section of the Communist International to propose at the VI. Congress of the C. I. the reinstatement of Souvarine in the Party if in the intervening period his conduct be loyal to the Party and to the C. I."

Comrades, it rests with the Communist International to judge how Souvarine has observed these conditions. It will no doubt endorse the reply which the Presidium recently addressed to Souvarine. For us, the Executive of the French Party, the question does not arise.

Comrade Skrypnik:

This meeting of the Enlarged Executive of the Comintern makes it appear as though the attack, or rather the defense of the Comintern against the extreme Left is meeting with no resistance. All the representatives of the extreme Left declare that they agree with the theses of the Comintern; how they agree with them has been explained by Comrade Bukharin. Comrade Bordiga alone does not agree; men come and go but Comrade Bordiga goes on forever. Bordiga repeated the same words which he has always spoken since the II. Congress of the Comintern. But there is something new; and this is his claim that Leninism is a product of Russian conditions, and cannot be applied to the conditions in West European countries. This claim of Comrade Bordiga must be rejected with the greatest energy. "Leninism is Marxism in the epoch of world imperialism and the beginning of the Proletarian Revolution." What other Marxism can Bordiga offer us in this epoch of the Communist International? What can he offer except his own theory? Is this manifestation of Comrade Bordiga only the theoretical basis, the theoretical foundation for turning the pyramid of the Comintern upside down? His claims indicate that.

The recent Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union realised the necessity of increasing the activity of the Executive of the Comintern, which means a more extensive participation of all West European Communist Parties in the life of the Communist International. Does that mean turning the whole policy and leadership upside down? No. The participation of all the Communist Parties — both of Western Europe and that of the Soviet Union — is for the purpose of forming a Communist leadership of the Communist International. Hence, not placing everything topsy-turvy, not abandoning the results already achieved, but advancing determinedly to victory.

When one looks round further and turns to another representative of the Ultra-Left, to Comrade Domski, one sees that here the mistakes are admitted in words, they are even enume-

rated, but at the same time the attempt is made to carry through certain tactical actions. On the one hand Domski realised his mistakes, but on the other hand, by pointing out the Right danger, he is attempting to minimise the Ultra-Left danger. Domski started here to talk of the services which the Communist Party of Poland had rendered with regard to the working class and the Communist International. But Domski includes gains and things which do not belong to him.

With regard to the danger menacing the C. P. of Poland, one might say that recently a double danger has been overcome with great effort: the Right and the Ultra-Left. With the help of the Communist International, taking into consideration the support of the sound elements in Warsaw, in Western Ukraine and elsewhere, the Left danger was overcome. Besides the Left elements, there are also Right elements which pursue a wrong line. I will now proceed to a problem which formed the subject of the work and discussion of the Polish Commission or Subcommittee of the Political Commission of our Enlarged Executive of the Comintern — the National Question. We know that the resolution of the V. Congress of the Comintern was carried out; that it was accepted by the C. P. of Poland but after the II. Congress of the Communist Party of Western White Russia, essential changes were made in Poland in the policy laid down by the V. Congress in this question. It must be admitted that the situation has changed, that with a stabilisation of capitalism, in a siege in which mines are laid to blow up capitalism, it is necessary also in the National Question, to advocate partial demands. The right of self-determination of the peoples to the point of separation is not sufficient. Every Party must also find some way of setting up partial demands in the question of self-administration of the schools, etc., in order on this basis of partial demands to organise the masses in the fight against national oppression; the way to setting up this partial demands must be taken; but does such a policy mean autonomy? In no way. Naturally any policy must be sharply rejected which consists on proudly adopting the standpoint of revolutionary innocence where there is no self-administration, and refusing to take part in the struggle for autonomous self-administration. We must also turn such a situation to our advantage just as at one time we turned the National Duma to our advantage for the development of the struggle. This is still very far from setting up the demand for autonomy. What does the slogan for autonomy demand? The S. P. P. at its X. Congress apparently put forward this slogan — the recognition of the right of self-determination of nations — the slogan of autonomy. This was done by the compromise parties, the parties of the rich peasants, which were seeking a compromise with the Polish Government. I believe that this question required the whole attention of the Communist International.

If the Ultra-Left and the Right dangers can make their appearance in various forms, then this is all the more the case in the national question; it is the very field where the Ultra-Left and Right deviations can find rich and favourable soil. The ultra-Left deviations on the national question are very dangerous. At present it is necessary to bring the questions before the whole Comintern for discussion, for in this field the Left and Right deviations of very many Communist Parties draw their nourishment. (Applause.)

Comrade Leshchinsky:

Our Party holds fast to its former standpoint in the National Question; it retains the standpoint of the slogan of self-determination to the point of separation and of union with the brother Soviet Republics of White Russia and the Ukraine. The White Russian Communist Party will support all the demands of the peoples and Party groups which demand autonomy. Comrades, we believe that the carrying out of actual autonomy in the so-called Eastern Marks of aristocratic-bourgeois Poland is unthinkable. The former minister Tugut was compelled to hand in his resignation because not one of his projects with regard to Western Ukraine were accepted owing to the resistance on the part of the Polish landowners in Western White Russia and Western Ukraine.

In the interest of the united front tactic, and for the purpose of unmasking the compromising leaders, we support the partial demands put forward by these leaders; we will also unmask them with the aid of the demand for autonomy and draw the masses of peoples away from their influence. We will prove to the masses of peoples that the treacherous leaders who put forth the demand for autonomy, do so only in words, but in reality do

not wish to fight for this demand. The Plenary Session of our C. C. decided to clear up this question, firstly, by starting an extensive discussion in our Party press, secondly by having this question discussed during the session of the Enlarged Executive of the E. C. C. I.

Comrades, we believe that the serious situation in which Poland is now and which Comrade Zinoviev has described in his theses and in his speech, that this serious situation of which Comrade Stefanski spoke, confronts us with a great number of serious tasks which the Party must solve and which demand some preparation. I claim that the standpoint adopted yesterday by Domski means an effacement of our tactical policy. This standpoint conforms with double entry book-keeping. Domski was offended when Comrade Zinoviev asserted that the Ultra-Left had led to the decline of our Party. Domski spoke of a number of accidental errors. But the VI. Congress has proved that it was not a question of a number of accidental errors, but of a definite Ultra-Left policy which ruined the Party by isolating it from the masses. The one example of the First of May demonstration, which was mentioned here, is sufficient to make one realise that a Party which does not mingle with the P. P. S. masses on the streets, which leads only its own members and sympathisers on the streets, which does not try a common tongue on such a day with the P. P. S. masses — that such a Party isolates itself from the masses and is objectively ruined. The former Party Executive, with Domski at the head, declared that they are fighting for drawing the masses into trade unions. But not over much was done in this respect. In reality the Party wandered into the back water of the sentiments of the masses which had left the trade unions. Many members of the Party were not members of the trade unions.

I do not want to repeat what has already been mentioned here — the mechanical methods, the linking up of the partial demands with the chief political demands, the mechanical methods, which are estranging us from the masses; I do not want to say anything at all about economic Khvosticism nor about the fact that the former Party Executive neglected a whole series of political campaigns, for instance, the campaign on the occasion of the Locarno Pact — one of the main questions of vital interest to our people, a question leading to the exploitation of Poland by West European capital. All the mistakes, the so-called mistakes of Comrade Domski, were called forth by the Ultra-Left policy which lead our Party to the brink of ruin.

Domski spoke of the positive successes of the Party, and said that these successes represented a positive balance to his credit. I assert, and this can be easily proved, and was proved by the Fourth Conference — that if there were such positive successes — and there actually were some — then they came in spite of Domski's Ultra-Left policy. If there had been no such policy, to bind our Party hand and foot, our successes would have been much greater.

This gives rise to the chief conclusion from which Comrade Domski wishes to dissociate himself; in what direction must we fight the most, what must be aimed at to rectify these deviations? The Ultra-Left policy, of course. In Poland conditions prevail similar to those in Germany, where the Ultra-Left represents the greatest danger for the Party.

Comrades, we do not, however, forget the Right danger menacing our Party. We do not fail to forget them from an aesthetic instinct for symmetry, but because these Right dangers lie in the objective conditions of our revolutionary movement; because these dangers are bound up with the transition of our Party to a new tactic; because the dangers are linked up with the opportunist remnants and with Ultra-Left tradition which rendered it impossible for our Party to realise that in the principle of this new tactic, of the new tactic of the united front, the Right danger lies in the fact that the former Party Executive fought this Right danger mechanically and not ideologically in a Leninist manner. Our Conference quite definitely declared that in combatting the Ultra-Left danger, the policy of the Party in this connection does not mean a return to the bankrupt policy of the opportunist Right, which was removed by the V. Congress of the Comintern and by our III. Party Congress.

The article by Comrade Valetsky published in the "Pravda" which Domski characterised as a blow against the Party, is not an official article of our Party. The paragraph which is pointed to as an attack on our Party Executive was explained in Valetsky's letter to the Polish Delegation of the Enlarged Executive: in this letter he says that he had not intended to discredit the new Executive; he explains that he considers the new Party

Executive as extremely expedient and will support it in every way. With regard to the policy laid down in the article, I can say in the name of the Delegation, that with the exception of the paragraph mentioned above, the article does not contradict the policy followed by the IV. Party Conference.

Domski proposed here to work in the Communist Party, to become a worker in the C. P. of Poland. The present course of the Communist Party of Poland is directed toward the inner consolidation of the Party!

Every comrade can work with us who unreservedly accepts the policy of the Party. (Applause).

Comrade Priu (Roumanian minority):

Comrade Zinoviev expressed surprise at the opportunist standpoint of one of the best known leaders of the Roumanian Party, Comrade Cristescu. The opportunist policy of Cristescu is nothing new to us, we have known it a long time; his whole attitude against the united front against the right of self-determination of the oppressed peoples in Roumania, against the alliance with the peasants, etc. The climax of his development, however, is that Cristescu has now advocated the unconditional affiliation of the revolutionary trade unions to the Amsterdam International. In Roumania we have not yet a leadership in our Party which would be capable of fighting against opportunist deviations, of leading the Party along a correct Marxist-Leninist line, of Bolshevising the Party. During the period of relative stabilisation, which also in Roumania, so to say, held its own, it is clear that besides the Ultra-Left errors, there exists a great danger of running off the rails into the opportunist abyss, and that in a young party, hardly yet constituted, which in its earliest youth was already forced into illegality, the opportunist derailment is the most serious danger.

Besides its opportunism in the trade union situation the Party has also committed serious opportunist errors in the question of the united front.

We expect from this Plenum that it will not only adjust the line of the Roumanian Party, but also assure the political and organisational measures which will allow the Roumanian Party in the future to develop in proportion to the possibilities it has.

Comrade Radu (Roumania):

In the name of the Delegation of the Roumanian Party, I declare that we consider the estimation of the situation and of the perspectives which Comrade Zinoviev developed here as absolutely correct. We also agree that the situation in the Balkans is less stable than in the rest of Europe. And the situation is still less stable in Roumania, since there the bourgeois democratic revolution has not yet finished. Hence the C. C. of the Party was of the opinion that the tactic of the united front would have to be applied in our country to a greater extent than in other countries, and this tactic was applied not only in the sense of a united front of workers, not only in the sense of a united front with the poor peasants, but also towards petty bourgeois masses and the middle peasantry.

The C. C. followed the correct policy in the trade union question.

When the liberal government put through the changes in the Constitution and in the suffrage, we issued slogans which rallied large masses.

In the application of the united front tactical errors were certainly made. Right errors as well as Ultra-Left. There are Right and Ultra-Left groups in our Party, but in the C. C. there is one group, which follows the policy of the Communist International. The undisciplined behaviour of Comrade Cristescu injured us a great deal.

The Right danger is very great, since it leads to the standpoint of liquidationism. This danger cannot, however, be overcome by administrative measures, but only by an ideological fight, which naturally is somewhat difficult under our illegal conditions. The Ultra-Left danger is greater, however, since it isolates the Party from the masses and leads to an adventurous policy.

In the National Question we did not commit the errors mentioned by Comrade Skrypnik.

We hope that with the help of the Executive, we will succeed in formulating a clear Bolshevist line, which will liquidate the Right as well as the Left deviations.

Comrade Bordiga (Italy):

Comrades, in my speech I dealt with the general questions of the policy of the International. But several of the speakers did not only speak in reply to my contentions, but also dealt to a certain extent with Italian problems which I had almost left aside. I am compelled to reply very briefly to what has been said here. One hears continually the expression: "Bordiga's system, Bordiga's theory, Bordiga's metaphysics", and it is always asserted that I am always alone in supporting my ideas and my criticisms. There is an endeavour to represent my attitude as an entirely personal phenomenon. Well, although it happened recently that the Italian Left was officially defeated, I must declare once more that I have come here not to entertain the Congress with individual lucubrations, but with what represents the conception of a group of the Communist movement in Italy.

Bukharin dealt with my speech in a very friendly and cordial manner. Well, although it isn't necessary to say here that Bukharin is a good polemist, you will allow me to declare that he presents the problems in his own manner and according to the alleged legend concerning Bordiga's theories.

He attributes to me certain formulae, makes a spirited attack on them and reduces them to smithereens. In his speech he told us that the international regime of the C. I. will undergo a change. But by the very methods of his polemics, he gives us every reason to be pessimistic concerning this regeneration of the international regime.

Bukharin simplifies ideas. It is a great merit to be able to simplify positions and to make them clear in a few words. It is also a very difficult problem to simplify them, not for the sake of pure agitation but by doing one's share of the serious work which is of interest to all.

Simplification without the demagogy of agitation, such is the great revolutionary problem. Such simplifiers are very few and far between.

In order to show up Bordiga's contradictions Bukharin places the following argument before us: I had said that the revolution is not a problem of organisational forms. After that I am supposed to have presented the problem of Bolshevisation from the only viewpoint of organisation, proposing for the entire problem merely a change of organisation: the upsetting of the famous pyramid. All this is not true. When dealing with Bolshevisation, I commenced my criticism from the viewpoint of theory and tactics, that is to say, I said that I considered Bolshevisation not only as organisational work, but as a political problem connected with the actions and tactics of the International. Moreover, you must admit that our entire opposition was with respect to the tactical problems, and it is above all concerning these problems that we have been for a long time past proposing various solutions. It is self-evident that a simple change of organisation is not sufficient to solve the problem. That is why we are awaiting tactical action to see if we have really a sound revolutionary leadership.

Another of Bukharin's arguments is: Bordiga is against the mechanical application of the Russian experience in the other countries, but in his attempt to deal with the problem in the other countries he is guilty of mechanical application, inasmuch as he does not specify the character of the Western movement; that is to say, the existence of big Social Democratic Parties and trade unions. Well, this is not my formula. I say: generally speaking, the entire Russian experience is useful, we must always bear it in mind, but apart from it we must have something else. This means that I do not reject the application, but I say that the experience of the Russian Party alone will not provide the solution. What is the specific character of revolutionary strategy in the West as formulated by me? Bukharin says that in my exposé it was not the existence of big Social Democratic Parties! Well, this is precisely the difference on which I dwelt. After showing the difference between the State apparatus in the Russian and Western revolution, I said that in the Western countries there exists a bourgeois-democratic State apparatus established long ago, a very stable apparatus such as does not exist in the history of the Russian movement, and also that the problem of the possibility of the mobilisation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie is presented in an opportunist sense. Is this anything but the problem of the role of the trade unions and Social Democratic Parties?

My analysis concerns itself exactly with this point. Bukharin cannot say I am contradicting myself.

Now I will say a few words on Italian affairs. Comrade Ercoli spoke against the criticism of the tactics of the Party towards the Aventino, using the argument that I am not in favour of taking the situation into consideration whilst the Central Committee based itself on a complete and exact analysis. Well, without repeating myself, I will say that not only the tactics but also the analysis of the situation were utterly erroneous. There is a report of Comrade Gramsci to the Central Committee in September 1924 which proves that an Aventino success was expected in the autumn when Mussolini was to be superseded in Parliament! The formation of an anti-fascist Government based on the middle classes was, in fact, considered possible: thus the opportunist error is with respect to the estimation of forces and with regard to policy.

Neither is it that the tactics of proposals to the Aventino has proved satisfactory by its success. We maintain that the colossal defeat of the Aventino opposition was not accompanied by a decided movement of the working classes in the direction of the Communist Party because of the lack of clarity in the policy and the attitude of the latter.

As to the assertion that the Left suffered a complete defeat wherever the Party can report progress in the federations with the most successful activity, I must deny it. Milan and Turin have been set against Naples: well, it is these three centres which have provided the Left with a maximum of forces in an equal degree.

I will not enter into the details, although there is no Italian Commission here. I limit myself to saying that at the Congress of our Party we had to make a declaration which called in question the validity of this assertion by appealing to the International.

The preparation of the Italian Congress occupies a rather prominent place in the disreputable internal regime of mechanical compression within our Parties. By means of a deplorable campaign, an accusation of factionism and secessionism was launched. At the subsequent discussion very peculiar methods were applied. To name one of them: my vote, Bordiga's vote, member of the basic organisation, was given for the theses of the Central Committee. Just a trifle like this!

But we do not attach much importance to all these stories. The alleged internal defeat has not weakened our attitude. We submitted to everything to save the unity of the Party and faced with the compulsory inclusion into the C. C. we gave in, making at the same time a political declaration which has even reinforced our oppositional attitude.

I maintain, and this has been partly recognised here, that this oppositional attitude which concerns the very substance of questions and has nothing to do with the mean struggle for power and posts in the Party carried on under a pretence of loyalty to the International, is certainly more loyal and useful to the development of the world Communist movement.

Comrades, with respect to the international regime and the upsetting of the pyramid, I do not pretend to reply here to Bukharin's objections concerning the question of fractions. But the question I am asking myself is: will there be in the future a modification of the International with respect to our internal relations? Does this plenary session prove that a new path will be adopted? On this subject, the declarations of the French and Italian delegates have not done anything to dispel our incredulity, although the theses deal with the realisation of this regime of democracy within the Party. We will wait to see it in operation.

I think that the fraction-hunt will continue with the same results as before. We see this very thing in the German Party. I must say that this method of humiliation is a deplorable method, even when applied to certain political elements against whom I have fought most energetically. I do not think that this system of humiliation is a revolutionary system, particularly as recent examples have shown that attempts were made to apply to it elements who not only have a great past but who are valuable for the future of the revolution. I think that the majority so intent to show its orthodoxy, is probably composed of former oppositionists who suffered humiliation at some time or other. This mania to demolish ourselves must cease if we really mean to lay claim to the leadership of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

The spectacle presented by this session of the Plenum makes me very pessimistic with respect to the forthcoming changes in the International. I will therefore vote against the draft resolution which has been presented.

(Tenth Session, February 26, 1926.)

Report of the C. P. of Great Britain on the Experiences of the Work among the Broad Masses.

Chairman: Comrade Geschke called upon Comrade Ferguson to deliver the English Report.

Comrade Ferguson (England):

Comrades,

In dealing with the British position it is as well at the outset to take into consideration the objective factors that exist in Britain. It has been stated in this Plenum that there is a great relative decline of British capitalism. That relative decline can be observed very clearly in the dislocation of the heavy basic industries of Britain: coal mines shut down by the hundred, ship yards shut down or run with a skeleton staff, iron and steel industries at a standstill. We must take into consideration these factors when we are considering the work of the British Party. We have got to take into consideration the fact that there is a large unemployed army ranging from 1 1/4 million on the live register to possibly 1 3/4 and 2 million unemployed workers, and we have also got to take into consideration the fact that in Britain at the moment the employers are pressing ever more strongly for further reductions in wages and further extensions of hours.

In addition to a large unemployed army, in addition to the non-possibility of many of them ever getting a job again, there is the stern reality that the British employers are threatening still to further reduce the wages of those who are working down to the starvation coolie level. There is also the fact that British capitalism has passed the stage when it is able to give any further concessions to the workers of Britain. Now they can no longer afford to do so. In the past they were able to give them various benefits, various social services, various little advantages which were not enjoyed by the workers in other countries; they were able to give them these advantages out of the plunder which they managed to obtain from the exploited colonial areas, but to-day you have the position in Britain that the employers are endeavouring not only to reduce wages, not only to extend hours, not only to worsen the conditions of the workers, but they are endeavouring to take away all the social service advantages they have been obtaining in the past, endeavouring to break down or curtail the expenditure on such social services. In education, for example, they are preparing to cut down expenditure. There are no more concessions for child welfare and the blunt fact is that they are not able at the moment to afford the British worker any possibility of relief in any direction whatever. I think these factors taken together constitute a very potent force in determining the objective reasons as to why in Great Britain the Communist Party was able to initiate and to carry through such policies as they have.

I want to mention another factor which is also of considerable importance in revolutionising the minds of the working class, and that is the deliberate creation on a national scale of a blacklegging apparatus which is not only going to break the strikes of the workers, but is going to deprive the workers of Great Britain of all their customary rights.

Further, there is no possibility of deceiving the workers that there is any equality before the Law. The case of the kidnapping of our Comrade Harry Pollitt, in which the kidnapers were discharged and exonerated by the Court, and such like things are opening the eyes of the workers to the fact that there is no equality before the Law, that there is no possibility of Democracy in Great Britain, and is driving them along the road to direct struggle against capitalism by every means in their power. I think that in this connection, in dealing with the Report of the British Party, considerable amount of attention should be given to the objective situation which the Party faces, as being among the most potent reasons for its success.

In regard to the Party itself, I want to say at the outset that there are no fractions in the British Party. In Great Britain we are fortunate in having a well-developed, consolidated central leadership which functions as a team. The central leadership is engaged in the task of getting the policy and line of the Party understood by the membership as a whole, and it is in pursuance

of this aim that we have been able to avoid anything in the nature of fraction struggles. For example, we had to consider in the Party leadership the best ways for resisting the attack of the employers, and we were anxious that not only should a lead be given to every district and to every locality in the country, but that the lead should be actually discussed as a lead and should be understood and criticised. We called a conference of leading trade unionists and members of the Party in regard to the question of capitalist offensive. At this conference there was such practical and helpful criticism and suggestions brought forward, such as induced the Party leadership completely to revise its programme in a certain direction when dealing with a particular trade union.

In the tasks in which we are engaged of endeavouring to mobilise the entire working class of Great Britain against the employers, and while still inside of that movement we must mobilise the progressive movement in the trade union and labour world against the reactionary leadership, we have to be very careful that we do not pursue one of these aims to the exclusion of the others.

I think that this policy of consulting the whole membership, of placing all the problems which confront the central leadership before the membership as a whole, is resulting in giving us a consolidated Party in which there is no trace of dissension, is giving us a Party which understands the politics and the reasons which are behind the central leadership. I think that this is one of the factors which has contributed to the success of the British Party in its work among the masses.

I want to make a point regarding the Party press in Great Britain. Three years ago, before the reorganisation of the Party was decided on, we had a Party journal with a circulation of something like 18,000 copies per week. We were not satisfied with this. One of the reasons was the lack of political control of this journal by the Party leadership. The editor was more or less left to do as he pleased, with the result that it was not always on the dead line of the Party policy. We changed that and now have a journal with a circulation of over 60,000 copies a week — a circulation which is held entirely by the Party membership. There is no wholesale news agent in Great Britain who handles the paper. It is the members of the Party who go round and distribute the journal from door to door. One of the main factors of the success of the Party organ is that the political leadership has paid ever increasing attention to the contents of the Party paper. This constant concentration upon the Party paper results in giving us an organ which is lead on the Party line every time, and which makes an appeal to the workers of Great Britain, to their desires and needs and aspirations.

The principle of constant consultation with the Party has been followed in the sphere of the trade unions. It is not a question of looking upon the trade union branches as a debating platform where one can score points. In the British trade union movement we have been engaged in that for years. I believe that many of the positions in the trade unions of Great Britain could have been won by Communists if they had understood what revolutionary activity really is. Today it is an obligation upon every Party member not only to be a trade unionist but an active trade unionist; to work in the trade unions. It is necessary to take up the immediate practical problems, the things that deal with the daily life of the workers. I will give an example in this connection. We formulated a programme which we placed before the meeting of railwaymen, and it was amazing the volume of criticism which came from these workers. It involved a complete change, and adoption of amendments relating to little items of daily life which we had never thought about, with the result that the programme that was finally adopted by the NUR, contained a very large number of our demands and our suggestions.

In several parts of the country the Communists have become an actual menace to the old I. L. P. for leadership of the Labour movement. At a recent Conference of the I. L. P. in Glasgow the question was asked by John Wheatley M. P. why the C. P. is able to win such an influence in the trade union movement and he

replied that the C. P. is the only Party in Great Britain which has a trade union policy which appeals to the sentiments and needs of the workers, and so long as this was so they will be the only one getting a larger and larger following.

In regard to the question of the textile workers. Three years ago we had no influence among these workers. The unions were in the hands of the most case-hardened reactionaries and were looked upon as the backbone of reaction. The party set out to change that. It was the work of the Communist fractions, especially among the wool-combers union, which was responsible for the textile workers refusing to agree to the wage reductions in 1925, and a lock-out of 250,000 was the result. It is not a question only of forcing the reactionary leaders to agree to certain measures, but of actually following this up by getting a firm hold in the textile unions themselves.

In the South Wales Miners Union we have been so successful in working in the lodge, in gaining the support and sympathies of the miners, with the result that the most important miners' union in the Miners Federation of Great Britain has expressed itself as desiring to join the R. I. L. U. It is because the ordinary worker says: these Communists are the people who represent us, who work on the unemployed committees, in the trade councils, etc., and it is the constant work in these spheres that enables us to get into the organisations themselves and to orientate them along the line we desire.

I think it will be agreed that the biggest thing we have achieved is the creation of the Minority Movement. We have by this movement been able to move the workers. Since last July there has been carried on a campaign not only external to the labour movement, but by the trade union reactionaries who wish to destroy the solidarity which the trade union movement achieved on the 31st July last year. J. H. Thomas and Co., have succeeded in preventing the railwaymen from joining the Workers Alliance. There has been a tremendous propaganda to prevent any question of trade union solidarity against the proposed reduction of the wages of the miners. Everybody agrees that the Communists and the Minority Movement are responsible for what is known as "Red Friday". The workers are beginning to understand that this, the first victory over the masters since Black Friday 1921, was due to the adoption and carrying out, step by step of the policies of the Communist Party and of the Minority Movement.

As regards the Minority Movement, I think the Communists are responsible more than anyone else for its organisation. At the same time the Minority Movement is making an appeal to ever wide masses of non-party trade unionists in Great Britain. As we are beginning to gain a stronger and stronger grip of the union organisations as a whole, so the reactionaries in the trade union world are beginning to fight back ever harder.

In 1924 we issued a programme which included the fight against the Dawes Plan and also against the alleged Zinoviev letter. When the Party first opposed the Dawes Plan it was completely isolated. It was regarded as heresy to say anything against this plan that had been carried through by J. R. MacDonald. Nevertheless, we continued the fight and at the Scarborough Congress last year a resolution was passed condemning the Dawes Plan. There is hardly a responsible trade union leader in Great Britain who would not now admit that the C. P. were correct and that our policy has been justified up to the hilt. At Liverpool MacDonald did not defend the Dawes Plan. He apologised for it and promised that a commission would be set up to enquire into its workings. We have gained considerable prestige because it was the C. P. alone which in the early days fought most against this.

In England we have a labour movement that is soaked in Imperialism. This even applies to the Left Wing, and the struggle against imperialism has to be conducted against a constant stream of prejudice. Yet, at Scarborough a resolution was passed specifically condemning British Imperialism and demanding the withdrawal of the troops from China. And that represents a great deal. It represents that we have succeeded in stemming this imperialist stream in the labour movement and getting the workers more and more united against the imperialist manoeuvres.

In regard to the Zinoviev letter, we started out to get the workers to repudiate it and to get an apology from MacDonald to Zinoviev. We got the first point carried. The Trade Union Congress at Scarborough described it as a forgery, but we did not carry our second point and obtain an apology from MacDonald. But throughout the country there is hardly an intelligent worker who would not state frankly that this letter is an open forgery; and the reason for this conviction has been due to our campaign in the country.

As regards the question of trade union unity. At the time of the return of the British Trade Union Delegation from Russia the position seemed hopeless. There was an absolute conspiracy of silence. We called a conference on January 25, last year which was mainly the means of breaking down that conspiracy of silence, and the result is that now the Amsterdam International looks askance at the British movement and support is increasing steadily for the Anglo-Russian Unity Committee.

The reason for that is, that while there are objective factors operating, there is a general swing of the whole trade union movement to the Left, the main driving force in crystallising this, has been the efforts of the C. P. and of the Minority Movement in Great Britain. In the basic industries things are getting worse and worse and the working class is getting the idea that they can get no satisfaction of their demands by politely asking the employers, and are more gathering round the C. P. as the Party which is able to give them a direct lead. Another reason for our success is the correct application of the united front tactics. It is not a question only of going to the leaders of other organisations, but of actually bringing before the whole of the workers the necessity of united action on certain definite issues, and it is these things which the workers understood and are following and forcing their organisations to follow them. The I. L. P. application to Moscow regarding uniting the two Internationals represents an attempt on the part of the I. L. P. leaders to sidetrack the increasing demand among their own members for united action with the Communists in England.

Our great task is that of mobilising the whole working class movement against capitalism as rapidly as possible. Inside of that we have got to mobilise and to organise all the progressive elements in the Labour Party for the purpose of fighting against the reactionary leadership of the Party. The time has arrived for the definite organisation of a left wing in the Labour Party and of bringing it into closer relations with the Left Wing in the Trade Union Movement, of which the Minority Movement is the chief expression.

Another task is to continue our work in the Cooperative movement. We must unite the trade union and cooperative movement more thoroughly than ever.

Although we have much to look back with pride upon, we have still greater tasks for the future. We have got to go forward without hesitation, without secessions or splits and we shall be able to build up in Great Britain a solid, well-disciplined Bolshevik organisation, which shall not only be able to maintain contact with the working masses, but to get them into action for the establishment of Communism and the overthrow of capitalism in Great Britain.