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## CONTENTS

	Page
ON A HIGHER STAGE (The June Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.)	422
UNPUBLISHED LETTERS OF MARX & ENGELS	429
THE FIGHT FOR THE STREETS	437
By L. Alfred	
ORGANISATIONAL PROBLEMS IN UNDER- GROUND REVOLUTIONARY WORK	442
By B. Vassiliev	
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION	446
THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE RURAL DISTRICTS	447
By Hörnle	
THE RED ARMY of the CHINESE REVOLUTION	450
By G. Sinani	

TEN CENTS

## ON A HIGHER STAGE

(Summary of the June Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.)

THE last half year still further strengthened the U.S.S.R. politically and economically. The Party increased the activity of the working masses. Overcoming all kinds of difficulties, the Party started the struggle for the fulfilment of the third decisive year of the Five Year Plan. The tremendous achievements in the industrialisation of the country and in the Socialist reconstruction of agriculture are changing the economic face of the country. The Socialist sector does not only predominate in the city, where the party was long ago able to make it more important than the capitalist sector, but in the rural districts as well. The kulak is being liquidated as a class in the grain and raw material regions. It has already been liquidated completely in some regions as, for example, in the Northern Caucasus. The collective farm peasants have already become the *central figure in agriculture*. The rôle of the poor and middle peasants working as individuals in agriculture is already secondary. Eighty per cent. of the total number of farms are already in collective farms in the basic grain regions, and more than 55 per cent. of those in the U.S.S.R. as a whole; 75 per cent. of all the arable land is collectivised. The U.S.S.R. will very shortly become the "land without peasants." The system on which capitalism grew is disappearing. Thus, the foundation for Socialist economy will be completed this year.

Because of these successes of Socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. at the same time as the growth of crisis, want and poverty in capitalist countries, the workers of capitalist countries are growing more sympathetic towards the U.S.S.R. and are lending it their support. The U.S.S.R. is also growing stronger internationally. The stronger the U.S.S.R. grows, the more clearly is intervention "a stick with two handles." The tempestuous growth of the collective farms—this bulwark of the Soviet power in the village; the revolutionary upsurge connected with the sharpening of the economic crisis in capitalist countries; the exposure of the intervention plans at the trials of the wreckers—Ramzin and Co. and the Mensheviks; and the firm and steadfast policy of peace pursued by the U.S.S.R. which would not allow itself to be provoked by the impudent tricks of Finland, Poland, Latvia, etc., defeated the plans for an *immediate* war against the U.S.S.R., concocted by international imperialism under the leadership of the French. The danger of armed intervention has, however, not

been removed. The fact that intervention has been postponed only means that the bourgeoisie, at the *present* moment has not been able *immediately* to decide on intervention. But Briand's "pacifist" speeches with which the Franco-Soviet negotiations were started were a screen put up for the benefit of the masses who desired peace and behind which the bourgeoisie reorganised their ranks for the preparation of a military campaign against the U.S.S.R. on a wider front.

But in the meantime, the chase for markets and profits has sent the capitalists of different countries to the U.S.S.R. to try to establish trade connections. Industrial delegations to the U.S.S.R. follow, one after the other, trying to outstrip one another. They reason, since we do not have to fight *immediately*, we might as well take advantage of the state of peace still existing in order to earn something out of the "dreadful" Bolshevik Five Year Plan. Capitalist countries are trying to take advantage of the short respite in order to bolster up their contracting industries with Soviet orders. The Soviet Union, striving for peace, for its part, has no objection to using this need of the capitalists for the Soviet market to accelerate the growth of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

That is the political setting in which the Soviet proletariat and its party, the C.P.S.U. is fighting and working to-day.

That is the setting in which the June Plenum of the C.C. of C.P.S.U. took place.

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At the time when the June Plenum was held, the C.P.S.U. was in a position to summarise the achievements for the first half of the third decisive year of the Five Year Plan. There have been tremendous achievements made this half year but at the same time, new difficulties arose which are closely connected with these achievements — *difficulties connected with the need of mastering a new technique at top speed.*

Many important branches of industry showed a tremendous increase in productivity in comparison with the previous half year. New branches of industries have been started. Every day witnesses the beginning of the production of new complex machines in the U.S.S.R. which until now had only been produced in the foremost capitalist countries and even at that, in small quantities. From the experimental production of new machines, we are turning to bulk production, to training new cadres of workers for these tasks.

From a country which did not have a complex machine construction industry, the U.S.S.R. is becoming a country of first rank, newest and most advanced technique and mechanical engineering. From a country importing even the simplest machines, the U.S.S.R. is becoming a country which not only produces machines, but manufactures machines for the production of machines. Only a year ago, at the XVI. Party Congress, it was decided to build a second metallurgical base in the East. To-day this is being realised most energetically and at an unprecedented pace. New districts are being constantly industrialised. The machine is ushering in a new culture. The history of the world sees such a rate of economic growth for the first time.

While industry is contracting in capitalist countries under the blows of a severe crisis, it is continuing to grow at a tempestuous pace in the U.S.S.R. It is enough to point to several examples to prove this. The Auto-Tractor Association showed an increase of 129.4 per cent. for January, 1931, in comparison with the corresponding period of a year earlier; the electrical industry, 42.3 per cent.; the United Metal Goods, 108.5 per cent.; construction of heavy machines, 37.7 per cent.; boiler-turbines, 35.3 per cent.; oil refining, 24.4 per cent.; construction of medium sized machines, 16.7 per cent.; paints and polishing industry, 20 per cent.; chemical industry, 19.4 per cent.; clothing industry, 50 per cent., etc.

Moscow, the capital of the U.S.S.R., is being transformed into the largest industrial centre. Fifty new factories and mills have been built in recent years. From a centre of light industry, Moscow is being transformed into the centre for the metal and chemical industries in conformity with the general plan for the industrialisation of the country. Before the war, the proportion between the light and heavy industries in Moscow was 75.6 per cent. to 24.4 per cent. respectively. Now the picture is changed. Next year the proportion between the light and heavy industries will be 47 per cent. to 53 per cent. respectively. In spite of the predictions of the enemies of the Soviet Government, the Five Year Plan has been completed in two and a half years in a number of large undertakings and for some separate branches of industry, while the majority of the basic branches of industry will complete the plan in three and a half years.

But though we have achieved great success, some important sections (metal, fuel, transport) show a lag and a breakdown in production for the first half year of the decisive year. For example, in Donbas, in spite of the fact that the number

of mechanical drills at work grew by 28.9 per cent. for the year, and the number of coal cutters was doubled, the coal output did not exceed the coal output for last year which proves that the workers have not yet mastered the technique required in this important section.

The Bolsheviks do not conceal these difficulties, these lags and break-downs. On the contrary, day in and day out, we sound the alarm, thus arousing the masses to overcome these difficulties. But our class enemies, and above all international Social Democracy, use this material which is printed daily in the Soviet Press in order to befuddle the workers of capitalist countries with tales of how the Bolsheviks are unable to cope with these difficulties, and that if they do cope with it, say Social Democrats, the result will be, not socialist construction, but "primary accumulation of capital." And in the U.S.S.R. itself and in the C.P.S.U. you find philistines hanging around the party and right opportunists who, having learned nothing, whisper in the corners over and over again that the plan of the decisive year of the Five Year Plan is "unreal." The Party put an end to these whispers. It took a firm course towards the realisation of the plan of the decisive year. Comrade Stalin, speaking at the Conference of Industrial Managers which met on June 23, 1931, explained that this break-down was not the result of objective conditions but the result of "the inability to take into account the *new* conditions, the *new* demands and the *new* setting, created by the development of the Socialist offensive on all fronts, and that it was necessary to work and to administer affairs in a *new fashion!*" Comrade Stalin outlined in this speech what these new paths must be if we are to overcome the new difficulties.

1. The question of securing labour power for industry must be formulated differently. Capitalist countries are suffering from monstrous unemployment. In the U.S.S.R., not only has unemployment been liquidated but we are faced with a *lack of workers*. The rural districts are rapidly being collectivised. The superiority of the collective farms guarantees the steady improvement of the material and cultural conditions of the peasant in the collective farm. Considering these new conditions one can no longer count on a labour force coming from the villages into industry. To-day, undertakings must be very active in selecting workers by making contracts with the collective farms and peasants in the collective farms in which they will undertake to prepare and train workers and attach them to the undertakings. In order to increase the drawing power of the cities, the leaders of industry must completely change their attitude to the way in which they are

taking care of the living conditions of the workers.

2. Industry is now suffering particularly from the *fluidity of labour power*. In order to overcome this evil, and in order to develop further Socialist competition and shock brigade work which have already shown such brilliant results, there must be a resolute *struggle* with "*equalitarianism*," with the petty-bourgeois *equalitarian* system of wage payments of different categories of workers, and there must be introduced the system of *piece work* and bonuses for shock brigade workers. If in capitalist countries, the piece work system is a means of increasing the exploitation of the toiling masses, in the Soviet Union, it takes on a completely different character. It is a means of training for organised and collective labour, a means for separating the more skilled and needed workers in the country from the less skilled and for stimulating those workers who are lagging behind. The Party raised the question of introducing piece work in the collective farms most sharply since the peasant who was yesterday an individual farmer and to-day is a member of the collective farm, has still not lived down his individualist traits. The introduction of *piece work* at the present stage in the U.S.S.R. is not a step behind towards capitalism as our enemies maintain but, on the contrary, a step ahead from individual labour to socially organised and socially controlled labour for the improvement of the common labour conditions, and the food supply for the workers must be even further improved.

3. The third manifestation of a lag in a number of sections is expressed by the fact that the growth of technical equipment is frequently not accompanied by a corresponding growth in the *productivity of labour*. Very often equipment is badly used, wears out quickly, is spoiled, broken, etc. One of the main reasons for this is "*depersonalisation*,"\* that is, workers and brigades are not attached to definite machines, mechanism, instruments and therefore do not regard themselves as responsible for their condition. The Party has already changed this system on the railroads with very tangible results and is now fighting to change it in the factories and mills. This system was introduced in industry as the "*illegitimate companion*" of the uninterrupted working week. One is not necessarily bound with the other. The latest experience on the railroad proves that there can be an uninterrupted work week without necessarily retaining this

system of *depersonalisation*. But certain preliminary conditions must first be created. In those cases where these preliminary conditions were not created, when the proper organisation of shifts was not introduced with the skill more or less equivalent, when the responsibility for every bit of work done was not assigned, when, in a word, the uninterrupted work week was not prepared, it brought harm rather than good and had to be temporarily removed and replaced by the 6-day work week with one day off, as was the case in the Stalingrad Tractor Factory.

4. The fourth cause of this lag is to be found in the lack of an industrial technical intelligentsia in the working class.

5. The fifth cause lies in the wrong attitude to the old *specialists* in view of the great lack of specialists generally. The exposure of the extended system of sabotage aroused a legitimate mistrust of the old specialists. But we do not consider sufficiently, however, that the conditions which gave birth to sabotage have been very largely wiped out now, thanks to the increased strength of the Soviet Government in the rural districts, thanks to the destruction of the wreckers' organisation and finally, to the fact that the international position of the U.S.S.R. has now been strengthened. Due to the changed conditions "a considerable part of the former technical intelligentsia who before sympathised in one way or another with the wreckers have now turned to the Soviet Government." Correspondingly, our attitude to-day to the old technical intelligentsia must change, must express itself chiefly in the policy of attracting it and showing concern for it. "*Specialist-baiting*," as formerly, must be regarded as a "*disgraceful phenomenon*."

6. Finally, in order to make certain that the tremendous pace at which construction is going on will not slacken, the Party raised the question of exploring for new sources and solved it by increasing the *accumulation in heavy industry*, by introducing in it a consistent *business system of accounting* and a more economic management in this branch of industry which enjoys special protection.

That is the general course taken by the Party to overcome difficulties which have appeared in the first half of the decisive year. These difficulties do not affect the realness of the programme mapped out nor the possibility of fulfilling it.

Comrade Stalin finished his speech at the Conference of Industrial Managers with the following words:

"The reality of our production plan lies in millions of workers creating a new life. The reality of our programme lies in living people, with us, our will to work, our readiness to work in a new

\* In Russian *obezlichka*—which means that a worker is not kept at one machine but put on any that happens to be available.

way, our determination to fulfil the plan. Have you this determination? Yes. Therefore our production programme can and must be realised."

\* \* \* \*

The June Plenum of the Central Committee selected three burning tasks out of the whole complex of economic tasks with which the Soviet Government is faced: the organisation of the harvest, improvement of transport and the basic improvement of the Moscow city management, and the development of city management in the U.S.S.R. generally. It decided these tasks in conformity with the general policy of the Party at the present stage formulated after the plenum by Comrade Stalin at the Conference of Industrial Managers.

The question of the *harvest campaign* is closely connected with the question, which is one of principle, of the *new organisation of labour* at the time when large agricultural economy is developing at a tempestuous pace in the U.S.S.R. "As a result of the development of State farms and the fact that the *majority* of the toiling peasantry have taken the path of collectivisation, the U.S.S.R. has become the country with the *largest agricultural farms in the world*. In the spring of 1931, 200 collective farms (uniting 13 million former individual households) sowed, including 4,000 State farms, more than two-thirds of the summer arable land." (Resolution of the Plenum.)

The great development of the collective and State farms has *increased* the productivity of agricultural labour considerably: in one five-day week, in May, 9-10 million hectares were sown in the U.S.S.R. against the 6 million hectares sown for a corresponding five-day week period of the previous May; the machine-tractor stations ploughed more than a third of the summer corn land to be sown by the collective farms (more than 20 million hectares). The area sown by the collective farms with horses was almost double the area sown by the individual peasant using horses. The area sown by each household in the collective farms is twice or three times the area sown by the individual farmer and the quality of the work on the land in the collective farms has improved.

Due to the increased productivity of labour, spring sowing has shown striking results:

"The sowing area of the State farms has more than doubled in comparison with 1930: the Grain Trust, the cattle breeding trusts, and the State farms which cultivate technical crops have sown more than 8 million hectares in the spring of 1931 against the 3.2 million sown in the spring of 1930, which is in excess of the quota set by the VI Congress of Soviets. In most of the districts, the State farms finished their sowing some 2-3 weeks

before the collective farms which were situated in the same districts."

The sowing of the technical crops was particularly successful. Due to this, the U.S.S.R., which until recently had to import a large quantity of cotton, has become independent of the foreign cotton market. The U.S.S.R. is also becoming one of the largest consumers of sugar beets, sunflowers, etc., assuring the powerful development of the corresponding branches of industry.

But these successes did not turn the head of the Party of hardened Bolsheviks. The task does not end with sowing: there is harvesting and the supply of products to the State to be disposed of on the market. Harvesting is even more difficult than sowing since a number of parallel agricultural campaigns must be carried out during the harvest period within a short time. Last year the poor organisation of labour prevented the harvest from being completely collected. The loss in the collective farms was very great and the area of the autumn ploughing was quite inadequate. In conformity with this, the June Plenum of the C.C. worked out a plan for the harvest campaign and pointed out that each collective and State farm must, in conformity with the general plan, work out its own *labour plan*. The June Plenum, taking the mistakes made last year into account, emphasised the need for *distributing the income in time* among the collective farm peasants and distributing this income not according to the *number of people in the family, but according to the labour done*. It did not limit itself to these general principles but gave a concrete rule to be followed in the distribution of income. The June Plenum paid particular attention to the introduction of the *piece work system*.

"All the work in the collective farms must, without exception, be organised on the basis of the piece work system and organised in so simple a way that it will be clear to every collective farm worker. The number of working days credited to the collective farm worker must be written in his labour book without a complicated system being introduced and he is to be credited not only with the amount of work done, but with the *quality of work as well*."

The June Plenum also paid much attention to the harvesting of technical crops and the *mechanisation of this work*. The need to *train the peasant, the former individual farmer, to the new Socialist forms of economy and make him feel responsible for the common work, by utilising the principle of self-interest*, runs like a red thread through the entire resolution on the harvest campaign.

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The June Plenum of the C.C. put the question of transport on the order of the day because transport has become the tight place in Soviet economy and was the reason why the national-economic plan of the first quarter was not fulfilled.

In the years of the revolution, transport grew together with the rest of the national economy. New railroad tracks to a length of 12,800 kilometres were laid down. The number of stations for engines in the country increased by 30 per cent. while the drawing power of the engines increased from 8.4 to 11 tons. The carrying capacity of the railroads was greatly increased by the opening of new junctions and depots. The ruin wrought by the imperialist war and intervention has been restored. Transport advanced considerably but none the less it was behind the demands made upon it by the country.

*The basic reason for this backwardness in transport is the economic growth of the country which demands an equal growth of the carrying capacity of freight.* For the first two years of the Five Year Plan, the freight turnover in the U.S.S.R. grew from 156 million tons in 1929 to 239 million tons in 1930, *surpassing the pre-war level by 80 per cent.* Consequently the freight difficulties on the railroads increased, giving rise to a large number of difficulties in the autumn. At the same time, while freight turnover is being reduced in capitalist countries, there is a steady rise in the U.S.S.R., reflecting the growth of the national economy. Freight turnover in 1930 was already 80 per cent. higher than before the war. But when the number of kilometre tons in 1930 is compared with the pre-war period, an increase of 100 per cent. is seen. The U.S.S.R. is now second in the world as regards the number of kilometre tons shipped. Only the U.S.A. exceeds Soviet transport in this respect. The proportion of Soviet railroad goods turnover in the world railroad goods turnover is increasing. If in 1913 it was 4 per cent., in 1931 it is already 8-9 per cent., i.e., it has more than doubled.

The difficulties encountered in the transport system are also connected *with the rapid growth of the passenger movement* in the U.S.S.R. The fact that the U.S.S.R. has entered the period of Socialism means that the mobility of the working class has increased and that certain branches of industry have ceased to be closed ones. The collectivisation of the village destroys the age-old idiosyncrasy of the peasant way of living. As its culture grows, and it is drawn into Socialist construction, the population of the country becomes more and more mobile. In 1913, Russian railroads carried 185 million passengers. In 1928, the number had grown to 221 million, and in 1930

to 557 million. The further growth of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., the break down of the barriers of the village and the idiocy of the peasant way of living, which was the result of collectivisation, must increase the number of passengers travelling even more. Bourgeois and Social Democratic writers, grasping at those facts which show that Soviet transport has lagged behind, conceal from their readers the fact that freight and passenger turnover have fallen in capitalist countries because of the growing crisis and the impoverishment of the masses while the difficulties on the railroads in the U.S.S.R. are connected not with the inability to fulfil the Five Year Plan but because its quotas have been surpassed.

The C.P.S.U. does not, however, console itself with the fact that the lag in transport is to be explained chiefly by the tempestuous growth of the national economy and does not close its eyes to the shortcomings in the organisation of transport itself. One of the causes of these shortcomings lies in sabotage. *Much more sabotage work and espionage were uncovered in transport than anywhere else.* Many more wreckers were pulled out of the transport industry than anywhere else. The transport industry is one of the sections in which a sharp class struggle is going on. And after the wreckers were removed from the administrative organs, many more foreign, kulak elements were to be found in the technical personnel than in industry as a whole. We must, therefore, carry on a particularly embittered struggle now with bureaucratism, negligence and slackness.

One of the most important reasons for the disorganisation in Soviet transport is *depersonalisation*, i.e., the system under which the engine driver is not kept permanently at one machine and is not responsible, therefore, for the engine. This system, brought over from the U.S.A. and introduced at a time when the technical base here was not prepared for it, resulted in worsening the condition of the locomotive park, in a sharp decline in labour discipline and in a decrease in the productivity of labour. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars had already passed regulations, even before the Plenum met, to liquidate the *depersonalised* run and substitute the double crew run in its place, that is, making two crews responsible for each locomotive. This fact, the recruiting of skilled workers in the transport industry and the increase of wages for the workers holding the most important jobs in the railroad, *has already brought the transport industry on the path to recovery.*

The creation of a number of very large industrial combines, the Ural-Kuznetsky problem, the linking of Central Asia with Siberia, the problem

of linking Kazakstan with the centres of the country, the industrialisation of distant regions—had stimulated the Party to build *new railroads*. The June Plenum outlined a number of measures meant to guarantee that this construction will proceed at a rapid pace and that this pace will be accelerated.

The June Plenum of the C.C. furthermore approved of the decision of the Political Bureau to *reconstruct* the railroads. The capitalist world is electrifying railroads very slowly. The percentage of railroads electrified is—1 per cent. in America; 2 per cent. in England; 2.8 per cent. in France. The June Plenum of the C.C. has given the transport industry a large task for 1932-33—to *electrify* 3,600 kilometres of railroad tracks starting first with the Urals, Siberia and the Trans-Caucasus. And in addition, in order to accelerate the movement, it decided to introduce large freight cars, automatic coupling, automatic breaks, automatic switches and reconstruct the railroad structures, etc.

In view of the increased demands which the reconstruction of the transport industry makes on the railroad proletariat, the June Plenum approved the decision of the Political Bureau to increase the wages for the most important groups of railroad workers. The wage increase will average 13 per cent. instead of the 8 per cent. formerly proposed and is to be applied according to the *quality of the work done*, and the increased productivity of labour. *Piece rates* will be used as far as possible and *bonuses* will be given for model work. Besides this increase in wages, the Plenum has additional measures in view to be taken to improve the living conditions of the workers on the railroads in the distant regions. The June Plenum has approved of the decision of the Council of Peoples' Commissars to change the method of financing the railroads and, *beginning with June 1, to start an accounting system* of the administrative and all constructive-industrial organs of the transport system.

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The communal question, the question of the *reconstruction of the municipal economy* and, particularly of the proletarian capital, Moscow, was raised for the first time at the C.C. Plenum. This question, at the present stage of Socialist competition, has become of primary significance.

Industry has long ago entered the reconstruction period in the U.S.S.R. Communal economy has only now come through the restoration period. The reconstruction of city management has only now become possible for the Soviet Government and has become an urgent task. The entire development of Socialist construction has brought the Soviet Government

face to face with the necessity of improving the sanitary conditions of the cities, particularly of Moscow and with the extensive tasks of the fundamental Socialist reconstruction of the city management of the old centres and of the construction of new cities.

This task has become urgent because the U.S.S.R. has already entered the period of Socialism. At this stage, one must, first, make city management conform with the tempestuous pace of industrialisation, with the increase in the population of the city, with the growth of the cultural and material demands of the proletariat; second, in connection with the liquidation of unemployment and the collectivisation of the villages, it is possible to assure the necessary stream of labour power into industry and industrial centres only if the material and living conditions of the proletariat are considerably improved. This task has become particularly pressing because the high pace at which industrialisation is proceeding demands that the proletariat work intensively, that it improve labour discipline and that Socialist competition and the organisation of shock brigades be successfully developed.

It would be absolutely wrong to affirm that the Soviet Government has raised the question of improving the living and housing conditions of the proletariat only now. It raised this question and started to work it out with the very beginning of the October revolution. All the apartment houses which before the revolution had been in capitalist hands, and in capitalist countries have remained in these hands, have been socialised by the Soviet Government. Workers who lived before in cellars, in barracks, in dark and dirty rooms, are now living in the apartments which had belonged to the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. In Moscow alone, half a million workers and toilers moved into the central district, into the well-built houses.

The Soviet Government is paying very much attention to the construction of new apartment houses. Three and a half billion roubles have been invested in apartment house building all over the U.S.S.R. for the last five years and thirty million square metres of floor space have been built. Almost a million worker families have moved into these new apartment houses up to 1931. In Moscow alone, five thousand new, and mostly large, houses have been built since the revolution into which almost half a million people moved in. Not a single capitalist country has shown so much concern with the extension of the floor space for the workers as has the U.S.S.R. Austrian Social Democracy boasts that it has achieved "municipal Socialism" in Vienna, and

all its achievements amount to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million square metres of new houses built by the Vienna municipal government.

The Soviet Government, in spite of its extremely meagre means, has done very much to improve the housing conditions of the workers but these conditions are, none the less, still very bad and what has been done is quite inadequate. The main reason is to be found in the fact that the Soviet Government received a very miserable inheritance from Tsarist Russia. To prove this it is enough to point to the fact that only one-fifth of all the cities of pre-revolutionary Russia had a water supply system at the time when 75—100 per cent. of all the cities in Europe and the U.S.A. were thus equipped. The length of the trolley car tracks in Tsarist Russia equalled 2,000 kilometres while in Europe they ran into tens of thousands of kilometres. In the second capital of Tsarist Russia, in Moscow, 62 per cent. of the houses were wooden structures, 45 per cent. of them one-storied and 41 per cent. two-storied structures. It is not without cause that Moscow seemed to foreigners to be a large village. And even this miserable inheritance from Tsarist Russia was considerably destroyed during intervention and civil war.

Certain pre-requisites, great success in the restoration of the national economy and in its reconstruction, success in the industrialisation of the country, were essential if the turning point in the housing and living conditions of the toilers of the city was to be reached. These pre-requisites now exist. Therefore, once measures had been taken to improve the supply of food products to the proletariat, to solve the grain problem, to organise cattle breeding and to create a raw material base for the light industries (increasing the sowing of cotton and flax), the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government were able to set energetically about this task.

The June Plenum raised the question of the reconstruction of the management of the city in its entirety and (at Comrade Stalin's initiative) brought the question of the reconstruction of the city management of Moscow, which has means at its disposal and must, therefore, play the rôle of an active communal field and tremendous communal laboratory for all the cities of the U.S.S.R. into the forefront.

This year Moscow is spending eighty million roubles on the construction of new apartment houses. Moscow must build four hundred new houses this year, which will hold approximately 100,000 persons. The programme of the June Plenum further plans to build in Moscow, in three years, enough apartment houses to house half a million persons, and this does not include the

co-operative and other construction work going on or the additional stories built on top of old buildings. At the same time, the organisation of social feeding is progressing and new public restaurants are being opened. The number opened has increased by one and a half times. Two more bakeries have been added to the two that are in the process of construction which means that bread will be baked completely by machines and a number of measures have been proposed which will radically better the sanitary condition of the city.

The second problem which was raised by the Plenum in this field is—the radical *reconstruction of the system of supply of energy* in Moscow and the introduction of a *central heating supply system*.

The third problem is the fundamental improvement in the *water supply* of Moscow. The supply of purified water to Moscow has already been increased threefold since the war: there were 12.7 million gallons, and now there are 40.5 million gallons. The average consumption per person grew since the revolution from 61 litres to 128 litres a day. But this is absolutely inadequate for the satisfaction of the tremendously growing demands and, incidentally, the amount of water in the Moscow river is very limited. Therefore the June Plenum has raised the question of *uniting the Moscow river with the upper part of the Volga*. That will not only mean that Moscow will be guaranteed a water supply, but that Moscow will be made a central port to which large boats will be able to come.

The June Plenum has also made the fundamental reconstruction of the Moscow transport system one of the tasks to be solved. Next year, work will be begun on the construction of a *subway*, which will be a combination of an *electric surface railway and an underground*.

The tremendous plan for the reconstruction of the city management in the U.S.S.R. must be particularly astonishing if it is to be compared with the fact that in capitalist countries to-day we can see everywhere the catastrophic fall in municipal development. The construction of communal apartment houses has been completely stopped in Berlin. The Vienna budget in 1930 had a deficit of  $16\frac{1}{2}$  million shillings. The debt of the Chicago municipal government grew to the tremendous sum of 670 million dollars. By January 1930, the Chicago municipal government had gone bankrupt and 60,000 city employees did not receive salaries for months, and were dismissed.

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Step by step the Soviet Government, in practice, disproves all the lies, all the fairy stories which have been spread by the bourgeoisie and



international Social Democracy about the U.S.S.R., and the falseness of the prophecies. They prophesied that the Soviet Government would degenerate, that the Five Year Plan would fall through. This has been disproven by life. Now, bourgeois business people have been forced to acknowledge that not only the Five Year Plan, but the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan in four years is a very real possibility.

Social Democracy has one trump card left: it is true the Bolsheviks are building, and perhaps will build that which they are planning, but that will not be the construction of Socialism because this is being bought with tremendous sacrifices on the part of the working class. Actually, the material conditions of the Soviet proletariat are steadily improving. To-day the material conditions of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. are being greatly improved. And in this field, as in the field

of industrialisation and collectivisation, the Soviet government will show the world a pace which has not been paralleled anywhere.

The proletariat of the whole world, now undergoing the worst poverty and unemployment, must be thoroughly informed of what has been achieved here, and of the plans outlined by the June Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. But they must know not only of the tremendous achievements of the Soviet Government but also of those difficulties which the Soviet Government is facing and the heroism with which the Soviet proletariat, under the leadership of the C.P.S.U. is overcoming these difficulties, step by step, in the embittered struggle with the class enemies and with the opportunists in their own ranks. They must thoroughly master the truth that without this heroism it would be impossible to bridge the great October pass to Socialism in capitalist countries.

## UNPUBLISHED LETTERS OF MARX AND ENGELS

*The letters published below were written by Marx and Engels to Bebel in the middle of September or the beginning of October, 1879. The writing of the letters was prompted by the growing opportunist tendencies observed in the ranks of the German Social Democratic Party which were particularly revealed in an article written by Schram, Höchberg and Bernstein in the "Year Book of Social Science and Social Politics." This article, entitled "A Review of the Socialist Movement in Retrospect" and signed \* \* \* roused the indignation of Marx and Engels and compelled them to tell the leaders of the Social Democratic Party bluntly that people with such*

*views could not remain in the ranks of a revolutionary proletarian party.*

*In this article, however, Schram, Höchberg and Bernstein merely anticipated ideas which now predominate in the German Social Democratic Party and in the whole of the Social Fascist Second International. Engels' criticisms fully apply to-day and strike hard at the theory and practice of contemporary Social Democracy.*

*Bebel in his reminiscences refers to these letters but does not quote a line from them. These letters are published for the first time.*

*Marx and Engels Institute.*

### LETTERS OF ENGELS TO BEBEL

London, Sept.-Oct., 1879.

Dear Bebel,

The reply to your letter of August 29th has been delayed on the one hand by the prolonged absence of Marx, and then, by several incidents: first, the arrival of the "Richter" Annual, then the one from Hirsch himself.

I must conclude that Liebknecht did not show you my last letter to him, although I definitely instructed him to do so. Otherwise you would not have advanced the very same arguments that Liebknecht used and which I had already answered in my letter to him.

We will go over the several points which are of consequence here:

1. *The negotiations with C. Hirsch.*

Liebknecht asks Hirsch if he will take over the editorship of the newly-founded Party organ

in Zürich. Hirsch wants information about the financing of the paper; what funds are at its disposal and who furnishes them. The first, in order to know whether the paper will not die in a couple of months. The other thing is to make sure who holds the purse-strings and therefore also who is to have the final control over the policy of the paper. Liebknecht's answer to Hirsch that: "everything is in order, you will hear further from Zürich" (Liebknecht to Hirsch, July 28th) is not delivered. Hirsch, however, receives a letter from Bernstein from Zürich (July 24th) in which Bernstein informs him, that "we are charged with the publication and supervision" (of the paper). Further he writes that a conference took place "between Viereck and ourselves," in which it was found "that your position would become somewhat more difficult because of the differ-

ences you had with several comrades when you worked on the 'Laterne'; but I do not attach great weight to this argument." Not a word about finance!

Hirsch replied by return mail (July 26th) and inquired about the financial position of the paper. Which comrades have undertaken to cover the deficit? Up to what amount and for how long? The question of the editor's salary is not in the least important, Hirsch merely wishes to know if "the means are ensured to maintain the paper for at least one year."

Bernstein answers on July 31st: the deficit, if any, will be covered by voluntary contributions *some* of which have been already subscribed. To Hirsch's remark about the character which he thinks the paper should have, to which I will refer again lower down, he replies with disapproving remarks and instructions: "the supervisory committee must insist upon this because the supervisory committee itself is under control, i.e., is responsible. On this point you must come to an understanding with the supervisory committee." He requests that a reply be sent by telegraph if possible.

Thus, instead of a reply to his legitimate questions, Hirsch is informed that he is to edit the paper under the supervision of a *supervisory* committee sitting in Zürich, the views of which differ very essentially from his own and the members of which have not once been named to him.

Hirsch, rightly indignant about this treatment, prefers to come to an understanding with the Leipzig people. His letter of August 2nd to Liebknecht must be known to you, because Hirsch *specifically demands* that you and Viereck be informed. Hirsch is even willing to submit to the supervision of a Zürich committee provided they will give the editor written instructions and provided he can appeal to the Leipzig Control Commission.

In the meantime, Liebknecht writes to Hirsch on July 28th: "Of course, the enterprise is financed, since the whole party and (including) Höchberg stands behind it. With the details, however, I do not concern myself."

Nothing is said about finance in the next letter Liebknecht wrote; instead he gives the assurance that the Zürich committee is not an editorial committee but is charged only with the *management and finances*. Again on August 14th, Liebknecht writes the same thing to me and demands that we persuade Hirsch to accept. You yourself, on August 29th, are so little informed of the true facts of the case that you write to me: "He (Höchberg) has no more voice in the editorship of the paper than *any other well-known Party comrade*."

Finally, Hirsch receives a letter from Viereck, dated August 11th, in which it is conceded that

"the three persons residing in Zürich as an *Editorial Committee* must undertake to establish the paper, and in agreement with the three Leipzig comrades, must select an editor . . . *As far as I remember*, it was also stated in the decisions which were communicated, that the (Zürich) founding committee mentioned in point 2 must assume *political* as well as financial responsibility before the party (!) . . . From the facts of the case it seems to me that . . . without the co-operation of the three in Zürich, who have been commissioned by the Party to establish the paper, it is impossible to think of taking over the editorship."

At last Hirsch got *something* definite, even if only in regard to the relation of the editor to the Zürich people. They are an editorial committee; they also have *political* responsibility; without their co-operation it is impossible to take over the editorship. In short, Hirsch is simply told to come to an understanding with the three persons in Zürich, whose names he has not yet been given.

However, to make the confusion more complete, Liebknecht writes a postscript under Viereck's letter:

"S. from B. was here just now and *reported*:—the supervisory committee in Zürich is not, as Viereck thinks, an editorial committee, but is essentially a management committee financially responsible for the paper to the Party,—*i.e.*, to us; of course, the members have also the right and duty to discuss editorial matters with you, the right and duty which incidentally *every* Party comrade has; we are *not* authorised to place you *under a guardianship*."

The three Zürich people and one of the Leipzig committee members—the only one present at the negotiations—insist that Hirsch must be under the official direction of the Zürich comrades, and a second Leipzig member definitely denies this. Must Hirsch decide before the gentlemen are agreed among themselves? That Hirsch was right in taking note of the decisions taken regarding the conditions to which he must submit, never occurred to anybody, nor did it occur to the Leipzig comrades that they *themselves* should obtain authentic information on these decisions. How else can the above contradictions be explained? But if the Leipzig comrades cannot agree about the authority conferred on the Zürich people, the Zürich people are quite clear on the point.

Schramm writes to Hirsch, August 14th:

"Had you not written that you would in a similar case (as in the Kayser case) have acted in the same way and thus suggested that you would have written in the same way, then we would not have said a word about it. As it is, we must reserve the

right, in spite of your declarations, to the decisive vote in regard to accepting articles for the new paper."

The letter to Bernstein in which Hirsch is supposed to have said this, is dated July 26th, long after the conference in Zürich was held, at which the authority of the three persons in Zürich was established. But in Zürich they were already revelling so much in their sense of complete bureaucratic power, that in reply to Hirsch's letter they claimed the additional authority to *decide* on the acceptance of articles. The editorial committee is already a Committee of Censors.

Hirsch for the first time learned the *names* of members of both Committees when Höchberg came to Paris.

Why then, did the negotiations with Hirsch come to naught?

(a) The obstinate refusal of the Leipzig as well as the Zürich people, to give him any real information about the financial basis of the paper, and about the possibility of keeping the paper alive for at least one year. He first learned the amount subscribed from me (after you had communicated with me). It was hardly possible, therefore, to draw any other conclusion from the earlier communications (of the Party and Höchberg) than that either the paper is already financed mainly by Höchberg, or will soon be wholly dependent on his contributions. Even now this is quite possibly the case. The sum of — if I read correctly—800 marks, is *exactly* the same (40 pfennigs, st.) as that which the local League of Freedom has had to make up in the first half year.

(b) Liebknecht's repeated assurance which has since proved to be totally incorrect, that the Zürich (comrades) have no official control over the editorship and the comedy of errors which flowed from this.

(c) The certain fact, finally established, that the Zürich people not only have control of the editing of the paper but also the censorship, and that to Hirsch falls only the rôle of a man of straw.

We think he is right in rejecting this. The Leipzig Committee, which as we hear from Höchberg has been augmented by the addition of two comrades, not living in the district, can however, only intervene quickly if the three in Leipzig are unanimous. Hence, real control will be wholly centered in Zürich, and Hirsch will no more be able to work with the people there in the long run than any other real revolutionary and proletarian-minded editor. About this, more later.

2. *The intended policy of the paper.* On July 24th, Bernstein informs Hirsch that the differences which he had with certain comrades while

working on the "Laterne," will make his position more difficult.

Hirsch answers that in his opinion the policy of the paper must in general be the same as that of the "Laterne," i.e., a policy which will avoid law-suits in Switzerland and will not unnecessarily frighten anyone in Germany. He asks, who are the comrades referred to, and goes on to say: "I know only one, and I promise you that in a similar case of *breach of discipline* I will deal with this one in exactly the same way."

To this Bernstein answers, conscious of his position as official censor:

"Regarding the policy of the paper, the view of the supervisory committee is indeed, that the 'Laterne' cannot be taken as a model; that the paper in our opinion must be less absorbed in political radicalism than in holding to the principles of socialism. Cases such as the attack against Kayser, which was disapproved by all comrades without exception (!), must under all circumstances be avoided."

And so on and so on! Liebknecht calls the attack against Kayser "a blunder," and Schramm regards it as being so dangerous, that on this ground he hangs a censorship over Hirsch.

Hirsch writes once again to Höchberg that a case like the Kayser case could not occur if an official Party organ existed, for its clear statements and well-intentioned reminders could not be so audaciously thrown to the winds by a member of the Reichstag.

Viereck also writes that the new paper is "instructed to take up an impartial attitude to all differences which arise and as far as possible to ignore them," it must not be an enlarged "Laterne," and Bernstein "at most can be reproached with desiring too moderate a policy, if that can be regarded as a reproach at a time when we are unable to sail under our full colours."

What is this Kayser case, this unpardonable crime, which Hirsch is supposed to have committed? Kayser speaks and votes in the Reichstag for protective tariffs, the only one among the Social Democratic members of the Reichstag to do so. Hirsch accuses him of having committed a breach of Party discipline in that he:—

1. Voted for indirect taxes which the Party programme clearly demands should be abolished;
2. Grants money to Bismarck, and thereby violates the first fundamental rule of our Party tactics: not a farthing to this Government.

In both points Hirsch is undeniably correct, and after Kayser had, on the one hand, trampled the Party programme to which all deputies in the Reichstag are pledged by the decisions of the Party Congress, and on the other hand breaks the absolute and primary rule of Party tactics,

votes money to Bismarck in gratitude for the anti-socialist law. In our opinion at least, Hirsch was perfectly correct in attacking him as severely as he did.

We have never been able to understand why the attack on Kayser roused such violent anger in Germany. Now Höchberg tells me that the "fraction" has given Kayser permission to continue to act as he did and Kayser is considered to be protected by this permission.

If that is the case, then things have gone pretty far. First of all Hirsch could not have known any more about this secret decision than the rest of the world. The disgrace for the Party which formerly fell on Kayser alone, is only increased by this, and therefore the greater is the service Hirsch has rendered in exposing to the whole world Kayser's vulgar speeches and still more vulgar voting and thereby saving the honour of the Party. Or is German Social Democracy really infected with parliamentary sickness and does it believe that through the national elections the Holy Ghost is infused into the elected, the fraction meetings transformed into infallible councils and the fraction decisions into unimpeachable dogmas?

In any case a blunder has been committed, not by Hirsch, however, but by the Reichstag deputies, who have protected Kayser with their decision. And if those, who above all should maintain Party discipline, break this Party discipline so glaringly by such a decision, then so much the worse. But what is still worse is that people go so far as to believe that it is not Kayser by his speech and vote, and the other deputies by their decision, who have violated Party discipline, but Hirsch, who, notwithstanding this decision, which was up to then unknown to him, attacked Kayser.

In addition, it is certain that on the question of tariffs, the Party has taken up the same vague and indecisive attitude that it has up till now taken on almost all practical economic questions, as for example, the question of the national railroads. This arises from the fact that the Party organ, "Vorwärts" instead of discussing these questions fundamentally, prefers to concern itself with the building up of the future social order.

When the question of tariffs, following the anti-socialist law, suddenly became a practical question, differences of opinion of the most varied shades arose and not a single person was found to have the necessary qualifications, the necessary knowledge of the relations in German industry and its position on the world market to express a correct opinion. Here and there among the electorate tendencies in favour of tariffs could not but manifest themselves and these it was desired

to take into account. The only way out of this confusion was to take the question up in a purely political manner (as was done in "Laterne") but this was not decisively followed; thus, it was inevitable that the Party should come forward in this debate for the first time hesitant, uncertain and confused and finally, through and with Kayser, utterly disgrace itself.

The attack on Kayser was taken as the occasion for lecturing Hirsch to the effect that the new paper must not copy the excess of the "Laterne," must be less taken up with political radicalism, and must impartially advocate Socialist principles. And this from Viereck no less than from Bernstein, who appears to the former to be the right man because he is too moderate, because even now we cannot sail under full colours.

But why do we go abroad at all, if not to sail under full colours? There is nothing to stop it abroad. The German Press, Combination and Penal Laws do not exist in Switzerland. There it is not only possible to say things which could not be said at home under the ordinary German laws, even before the anti-socialist Law was passed, but it is our *duty* to say them. Because here we stand before the whole of Europe and not only before Germany, and it is our duty to state openly before the whole of Europe the methods and aims of the German Party in so far as the *Swiss* laws permit. Who ever wishes to bind himself in Switzerland by the *German* laws only proves that he is worthy of the German laws and in fact has nothing to say which was not permissible in Germany before the Exceptional Law was passed. The possibility that the editors may be temporarily prevented from returning to Germany must be ignored. He who is not prepared to risk this does not deserve to occupy such a high post of honour.

Furthermore, the German Party was outlawed by the Exceptional Law because it is the only serious opposition party in Germany. If in its organ published abroad it returns thanks to Bismarck by giving up this rôle of the only serious opposition Party, by acting nicely and tamely, by taking the kick impartially, it will only prove that it deserved the kick. Of all the German emigrant papers which have appeared abroad since 1830, the "Laterne" is certainly one of the most moderate. But if the "Laterne" was too insolent—the new organ can only compromise the Party before the comrades of the non-German countries.

### 3. *The manifesto of the three Zürichers.*

In the meantime we have received the Höchberg Annual, which contains an article: "The Socialist Movement in Germany in Retrospect," which, as Höchberg himself told me, was written

by the three members of the Zürich Committee. Here we have their authentic criticism of the movement up to now and therefore, their authentic programme for the policy of the new organ, as far as they are concerned.

Right at the beginning they say :

"The movement which Lassalle looked upon as being pre-eminently political, and to which he called not only the workers but all honest democrats, and at the head of which the independent representatives of science and all men imbued with a true love of humanity, should march, was, under the presidency of John Baptist Schweitzer reduced to a *one-sided struggle for the interests of the industrial workers.*"

I am not inquiring into the question as to whether and to how far this is historically the case. The reproach that is particularly hurled against Schweitzer is that he reduced Lassallianism, which is here regarded as a bourgeois democratic-philanthropic movement, to a one-sided struggle for the interests of the industrial workers, that he deepened its character as the class struggle of the industrial workers against the bourgeoisie. Further, he is reproached with "repelling the bourgeois democrats." What has bourgeois democracy to do with the Social Democratic Party? If the bourgeois democrats were "honest men," they would not want to join the party; and if they do want to join the party, it is only in order to make a stink.

The Lassallian Party "chose to act as a one-sided *workers' party.*" The gentlemen, who write this, are themselves members of a party, which acts as a one-sided workers' party, and in which they hold office and positions of trust. This is an utter contradiction. If they mean what they say, they should leave the party, or at least give up their office and positions. The fact that they do not do so is a confession that they intend to utilise their official positions to combat the proletarian character of the party. Thus by allowing them to remain in office and positions of trust, the party betrays itself.

In the opinion of these gentlemen, the Social-Democratic Party should *not* be a one-sided workers' party, but a many-sided party of "all men imbued with a true love of humanity." Above all, it should prove this by dropping its crude, proletarian vehemence, and "cultivate good taste" and "learn good form" (p. 85) by placing itself under the leadership of educated, philanthropic bourgeois. Then also the "low behaviour" of certain leaders will give place to respectable "bourgeois behaviour," (as if the outwardly low behaviour, which is meant here, were not the least with which they can be reproached!). Then also "numerous adherents from among the *educated* and propertied classes will make their

appearance. But these must first be won if the agitation conducted is to have *tangible success.*" "German Socialism has attached too much value to winning the *masses* and in this has neglected to work of carrying on energetic (!) propaganda among the so-called upper strata of society." Then, "the Party still lacks men fit to represent it in the Reichstag." It is "desirable and necessary that the Party be represented in the Reichstag by men who have had the opportunity and leisure to become thoroughly familiar with the pertinent matters. The ordinary worker and small master have not, with rare exceptions, the necessary leisure for this." Hence, elect the bourgeois!

In short: the working class cannot emancipate itself by its own efforts. For this it must place itself under the leadership of "educated and propertied" bourgeois, who alone "have the opportunity and time" to become familiar with what will benefit the workers. Secondly, they are to be *won* over by energetic propaganda.

But if the upper strata of society or the well-meaning elements of the upper strata are to be won over, great care must be taken not to frighten them. And here the three Zürichers think they have made a consoling discovery:

"Precisely now, under the pressure of the anti-Socialist Law, the Party is showing that it does *not intend* to go the road of violent bloody revolution, but is determined to travel the road of lawfulness, i.e., of *reform.*"

Thus, because the five or the six hundred thousand Social Democratic electors (one-tenth to one-eighth of the electorate), who, moreover, are scattered over the whole country, are wise enough not to ram their heads against a brick wall, do not try to carry through a "bloody revolution" when they are outnumbered by ten to one, then this proves that they pledge themselves for all time not to take advantage of any great external event, or a revolutionary upsurge suddenly called forth by it or even of a *victory* of the people, won in the conflict growing out of it! If Berlin should prove to be so uneducated as to make another "March 18th," then the Social Democrats, instead of taking part in the struggle like "scoundrels, with a barricade mania" (p. 88) must "take the path of lawfulness," must calm down, clear away the barricades, and if necessary march with the glorious army against the raw, uneducated, one-sided masses. But if the gentlemen declare that this was not what they mean, then what do they mean?

But this is not the worst.

"The more quietly, objectively and deliberately it (the Party) criticises the existing situation and makes proposals for changes, the less likely is it that the

clever chess move (played when the anti-Socialist Law was introduced) with which the conscious reactionaries were able to scare the bourgeoisie with the Red bogey, will be repeated." (p. 88).

In order to remove the last trace of fear from the bourgeoisie, it must be clearly and convincingly proved to them that the Red bogey is in fact only a bogey, that it does not exist. But what is the secret of effectiveness of the Red bogey if it is not the fear with which the bourgeoisie is filled before the inevitable life and death struggle between itself and the proletariat; before the inevitable outcome of the contemporary class struggle? But if we abandon the class struggle, the bourgeoisie and all "honest men" will "not be afraid to go hand in hand with the proletarians"; and the ones to be cheated will be the proletarians!

Let the Party prove by its humble and submissive conduct that it has once and for all abandoned the "improprieties and excesses" which called forth the anti-Socialist Law! If the Party voluntarily promises to act strictly within the limits of the anti-Socialist Law, then certainly Bismarck and the bourgeoisie will be good enough to repeal this law, for it would then be superfluous!

"Understand us correctly," we do not want "to give up our Party and our programme, but we think that we will have enough to do for many years to come, if we turn our whole forces and all our energy to the realisation of definite, achievable aims which must be attained at all costs before it is possible to think of achieving the more far-reaching aims."

Then the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and the workers who "are now frightened away by the far-reaching demands" will line up with us in masses.

The programme is not to be *given up*, it is only to be *postponed*—indefinitely. It is accepted, but not actually for oneself, for one's own lifetime, but posthumously, as an heirloom for one's children and grandchildren. In the meantime, "all forces and energy" must be devoted to all kinds of tinkering and patching of the capitalist social system, in order to make it appear that something is happening, while at the same time nothing is done to scare the bourgeoisie. I prefer the Communist Miquel, who proved his unshakable conviction that the overthrow of capitalism is inevitable, in a few hundred years time, by engaging in intensive speculation, and thus did his best to contribute to the crash of 1873, and thus *really* did something to bring about the collapse of capitalism.

Another procedure, also not in good form, was the excessive attack on the founders, who were "only children of circumstance." "It would

have been better if Steusberg and other such people . . . had not been abused." Unfortunately all men are "only children of circumstance," and if this is sufficient grounds for excuse, then no one must be attacked any more and all polemics, all struggle on our part must cease; we must quietly accept all the kicks of our opponents, because we, who are wise, know that they are all "only the children of circumstance" and cannot act any differently than they do. Instead of paying back the kick with interest we should only pity the unfortunates all the more.

Similarly, our defence of the Commune had the effect of repelling otherwise well-intentioned people, and intensifying the hatred of the bourgeoisie towards us. And further, the Party is "not wholly free from blame for the introduction of the October Law, since it unnecessarily increased the hatred of the bourgeoisie."

This then is the programme of the three censors of Zürich. It leaves nothing to be desired in regard to clarity; particularly for us, because since 1848 we have heard a great deal of phraseology of this kind. These are the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, who are afraid that the proletariat, under the pressure of its revolutionary position in society might "go too far." Instead of decisive political opposition—general collaboration; instead of fighting against the government and the bourgeoisie,—attempt to win them and persuade them; instead of firm resistance to ill-treatment from above—submissive subordination and admission that the punishment was deserved. All historically necessary conflicts are explained as misunderstandings and all discussions end with the declaration: in essence we are all agreed.

Those who in 1848 called themselves bourgeois democrats can now quite as easily describe themselves as Social Democrats. Just as in the case of the democratic republic, the overthrow of the capitalist system is regarded as something in the unreachable future, but having absolutely no significance for present-day practical politics; it is permissible to collaborate, to compromise and to take up philanthropy to one's heart's content.

And the same applies to the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie! On paper the class struggle is recognised because it is no longer possible to do otherwise, but in practice it is hushed up, smoothed over and weakened. The Social-Democratic Party *must not* be a workers' party! It must not bring on itself the hatred of the bourgeoisie or of anyone for that matter; it should above all, conduct propaganda among the bourgeoisie. Instead of laying stress on far-reaching and what are, in our generation, unattainable aims which frighten the bourgeoisie, it would be better if it turned all its forces and

energy to petty-bourgeois, patching reforms which would strengthen the old social system, and thereby, perhaps, turn an inevitable catastrophe into a gradual and if possible, peaceful process of dissolution.

These are the very people who while making a pretence of restless activity, not only do nothing themselves but try to prevent things from being done — except prattling. These are the very people whose fear of every action in 1848 and 1849 hindered the movement at every step, and finally brought it to defeat, who see reaction and are then astounded to find themselves in a blind alley where neither resistance nor flight is possible,—the very people who wish to banish history from their narrow Philistine horizon, but over whose heads history always proceeds in its course.

In so far as their worthiness as Socialists is concerned, it is already sufficiently criticised in the *Manifesto*, 'in the chapter, "German or True Socialism." When the class struggle is thrust to one side as something disagreeable and "raw," the only thing that remains as the basis of Socialism is "true humanitarianism" and empty phrases about "justice." It is an inevitable phenomenon arising in the course of development that members of the ruling classes attach themselves to the fighting proletariat and bring them the elements of culture. We have already clearly stated this in the *Manifesto*. But in this connection there are two things to note;

*First*, in order to be useful to the proletarian movement, these people must bring with them real elements of culture. But this is not the case with the great majority of the German bourgeois converts. Neither "Zukunft" nor the new "Gesellschaft" have contributed anything to help the movement to advance a step forward. There is a complete lack of actual or theoretical elements of culture. Instead of this, there is an attempt to bring the superficially adopted Socialist ideas into harmony with the most varied theoretical viewpoints, which the gentlemen have brought with them from the university or from elsewhere, and each of which is more confused than the other, thanks to the process of decay which the remnants of German philosophy are now undergoing. Instead of first thoroughly studying the new science, each one takes his stand more than ever on the views he has brought with him and with a wave of the hand creates his own private science and comes forward at once with the claim to teach it to others. Hence there are almost as many points of view among these gentlemen as there are heads. Instead of making things at least a little clearer they have only created worse confusion, fortunately almost only among them-

selves. Such educated elements, whose principle is to teach what they themselves have not learned, can very well be dispensed with by the Party.

*Secondly*, when people from other classes like these attach themselves to the proletarian movement, the first thing that must be demanded of them is that they shall not bring remnants of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois prejudices with them, but unreservedly adopt the proletarian point of view. Experience has shown, however, that these people are completely imbued with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas. In a petty-bourgeois country like Germany, such ideas certainly can be justified,—but *outside* of the *Social-Democratic* petty-bourgeois party, they would be perfectly within their rights; one could then deal with them, form blocs with them according to circumstances, etc. In a workers' party, however, they are a corrupting element. If there are reasons why they should be tolerated for the time being, then the duty is *only* to tolerate them, to give them no influence in the party leadership and to bear in mind that a rupture with them is only a matter of time. Moreover, the time seems to have arrived. It seems to us incomprehensible how the Party can tolerate the writers of this article in its midst any longer. But if the Party leadership should fall more or less into the hands of such people, then the party will be simply castrated and this will be the end of proletarian resoluteness.

So far as we are concerned, there is only one way open that corresponds with our whole past. For almost forty years, we have emphasized that the class struggle is the immediate driving force of history, and that especially the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is the greatest lever of the modern social revolution. We cannot possibly march together with people who wish to eliminate the class struggle from the movement. At the inauguration of the International, we clearly formulated the battle cry: the emancipation of the working class must be the action of the working class itself. Thus, we cannot march together with people who openly say that the workers are too uneducated to emancipate themselves and must be freed from above by the philanthropic bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. If the new party organ takes up the attitude, indicated by the ideas of these gentlemen, which is bourgeois and not proletarian, then, however much we may regret to do so, there will be nothing left for us to do but to openly declare ourselves opposed to it and to sever our connection with the German party which we have till now represented abroad. It is to be hoped that it does not come to *that*.

This letter is intended for the information of all five members of the Committee in Germany, as well as Bracke . . .

As far as we are concerned, there is nothing to prevent this letter from being brought to the notice of the Zürich people.

### LETTER OF FREDERICK ENGELS TO AUGUST BEBEL

London, August 4th, 1879.

Dear Bebel,

Since my last letter of July 25th, Hirsch has informed us of his correspondence with Bernstein and Liebkecht in regard to the new paper. According to information, the case differs considerably from what we were justified in deducing from your letter.

In answer to his fully justified inquiry with regard to the arrangements made and the people, who on the one hand are to be found and on the other hand to direct the paper, Hirsch receives no other answer from Liebkecht than: "The Party and Höchberg," and the repeated assurance that everything is in order. From this, we had to conclude that the paper is financed by Höchberg and that the "we," who according to Bernstein's letter are charged with the initiation and supervision of the paper, refers once again to Höchberg and his secretary, Bernstein.

From Bernstein's second letter to Hirsch just received, it transpires that this is in fact the case.

It cannot have escaped your notice that the mistakes against which I warned in my last letter are now almost of necessity to be carried into the

paper. Höchberg has proven himself to be most unclear theoretically and in practical matters to be irresistibly drawn to friendship with anybody and everybody who makes a pretence of being not even socialist but merely *social*. He has shown what can be expected in future. He has theoretically and practically disgraced the party.

The Party above all, needs a *political* organ. And Höchberg is indeed, at best, a wholly non-political person, and not even a *Social-Democrat* but a *social-philanthropist*. Also, according to Bernstein's letter the paper should *not be at all political*, but should concern itself with the principles of Socialism, *i.e.*, in such hands necessarily social-philanthropic, a continuation of "Zukunft." Such a paper can represent the Party only if it is willing to degrade itself by clinging to Höchberg's tail and his parlour-socialist friends. If the Party leaders wish in such a way to place the proletariat under the leadership of Höchberg and his friends, then the workers will not co-operate; a split and disruption will be inevitable; but Most and the local shouters will have the greatest triumph.

Under these circumstances which were quite unknown to us when I wrote my last letter, we hold that Hirsch was quite right in refusing to have anything to do with it. The same holds good for Marx and myself. Our agreement to co-operate referred to a real party organ, and could only hold for such but not for a private organ of Mr. Höchberg's, disguised as a party organ. With such a paper, we can under no circumstances co-operate. Marx and I expressly request that we shall not be mentioned as contributors to the paper.



# THE FIGHT FOR THE STREETS

By L. ALFRED

**A**MONG the forms of revolutionary mass struggle at the present time, street demonstrations are of particular importance. Spontaneous unemployed demonstrations, hunger marches, demonstrations in connection with strikes, joint fighting demonstrations of industrial workers and the unemployed are on the order of the day. In spite of the prohibition of demonstrations, in spite of emergency decrees against "political excesses," in spite of the steps taken by the bourgeoisie to hold in readiness and even to set in motion their fighting forces, equipped with tear gas bombs, rubber batons and "harder weapons," as if for civil war, the masses continue more and more boldly to come on to the streets to express their indignation against capitalist economic failure, against hunger, want and misery, not only in the towns but also in the countryside. More and more boldly they are engaging in battles with the armed guards of the bourgeoisie. Not only is this the case in Germany and Poland, where collisions between the militant masses and the armed forces of the bourgeoisie are an everyday occurrence, but also in countries such as Sweden and Norway, which until a short time ago were regarded by many as the wonderlands of perpetual class peace.

Communists must pay very close attention to these events. Investigations into the size of the masses which have taken part in these struggles, into their composition, whether they were composed of the conscious, organised revolutionary advance guard or whether the demonstrations consist of sections which have hitherto not taken part in struggles, whether they are industrial workers or unemployed, what determination they showed in the fight, what was the strength of their opposition to the police—such investigations yield the most valuable and reliable material for judging the general position of the class struggle and the stage which the crisis has reached.

But the duties of Communists in connection with the fighting demonstrations of the present day cannot be limited to such investigations. These demonstrations must not only be investigated, but in particular must be given practical guidance and leadership. The worst thing that can happen to a Communist is for him only to look on at the fight of the masses and not to fight actively with them. The question of demonstrations is a burning organisational problem of the present day, a question of technique. The use of an elastic tactical method by the revolutionary masses in demonstrations

is urgently demanded by the class struggle as it is developing to-day.

The creative initiative of the masses in their fight for the streets is constantly bringing new experiences, new forms of struggle. It is in the course of these struggles that the correct tactics for demonstrations will be worked out, and Communists must learn them in order to be able to lead the masses who are fighting on the streets. It is only on the basis of a careful study of these recent experiences of struggle that any fruitful discussion of the question of tactics for demonstrations becomes possible.

The necessity of regarding demonstrations at the present time as an art, and of making use of an elastic, mobile tactical method free from any tendency to become stereotyped, has been forced on the workers by their class enemies. When demonstrations are prohibited and therefore have to be carried on illegally, when the bourgeoisie mobilise their guards equipped for civil war against the demonstrators, when demonstrations have to be carried out under the constant menace of attack by police and Fascist murder-troops, then it becomes clear that they must be organised in quite a different way from the more or less peaceful political processions of the preceding years of capitalist stabilisation. It is absolutely necessary to cast aside the usages, traditions and methods of these old demonstrations, because to stick to them under present conditions entails a bloody punishment.

The bourgeoisie now fights the revolutionary fighting demonstrations of the workers and peasants with methods of civil war. In the fight with the demonstrators, the bourgeoisie acts on the principles of the same tactics as it employs for the suppression of an armed revolt. It uses the fight against demonstrations as manœuvres in preparation for civil war, so as to give its State apparatus and its Fascist and Social Fascist "volunteer" murderers practice in waging civil war. But in doing this it compels the workers, who meet with open provocation and attack, to undertake corresponding defensive measures; it makes it necessary for them to answer each new manœuvre of their armed guards with a corresponding counter-manœuvre, to meet the bourgeois tactics in suppressing demonstrations with correct tactics in the carrying out of demonstrations. Through using the methods of civil war the bourgeoisie only succeeds in making the demonstrations into a kind of manœuvres in preparation for civil war on the side of the workers also, in

enabling the workers to gain during these struggles experiences which are of value from the standpoint of the decisive struggle.

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How impossible it is to use old methods in the fighting demonstrations of the present day was shown by the experience of the failure of the anti-Fascist demonstration in Helsingfors on the occasion of the Fascist "march on Helsingfors" on July 1st of last year. A critical analysis of this demonstration was given in the "Proletaari," the organ of the Finnish Communist Party. The Lappo group and other active Fascist elements from the whole country gathered in Helsingfors on July 1st and held a great demonstration on the central square of the town, the so-called Senate Place. The local Communist leadership did not know any better than to try to meet this situation by summoning the workers of Helsingfors, by means of leaflets, to a counter-demonstration at the same time and place. But the workers, who up to then had followed the calls made by the Party, did not turn up on this occasion. There was no counter-demonstration. The Fascists were able to carry on with their insolent counter-revolutionary demonstration without any interference.

The fact that at the time of the Fascist revolution the spirit of the masses was low is not in itself enough to explain the complete failure of the counter-measures against the Fascist coup. The fact that the Communist Party did not succeed in bringing the masses on to the streets is to be ascribed largely to its own passivity and helplessness. The complete failure to understand how a mass demonstration must be organised under present conditions was only an expression of that helplessness.

It was, of course, correct to summon the masses to a counter-demonstration, but everything else that was done was wrong. The whole of the preparations made for the demonstration consisted only in the distribution of a leaflet. That was how they had always done it before, and it had always come off. But the distribution of a leaflet is inadequate as a means of organising an illegal mass demonstration. It was a particularly gross blunder to suppose that without any preparation whatever the workers would assemble on the Senate Place, where the most active and bloodthirsty sections of the Fascists from all over the country were concentrated, armed with long knives and revolvers and ready to fight, and where the police had gathered the whole of its forces. Such an assumption was all the more naïve because the leaflet "honestly" gave the place of the illegal demonstration. It is not to be

wondered at that the workers did not follow this advice, that they did not go one by one into the enemy's camp without first assembling and organising their forces.

Just because of the fact that, as a result of the white terror and the deviations among the Communists, the spirit of the workers was low, the organisers of the demonstration should have set themselves, in the first instance, a much more modest task than a direct frontal attack on the heavily-armed main forces of the enemy. They should have raised the self-confidence of the masses, they should have shown them that a mass struggle under difficult conditions can be carried out, provided that the correct approach is made, provided that the first thing that is undertaken is a relatively easy task, and then, encouraged by minor successes, it is possible to pass on to the solution of the more difficult tasks of the struggle. The following out of this line would have meant, in connection with the "march on Helsingfors," that the first task to be undertaken was real preparatory work in the factories and working-class districts, then the assembling of the workers in the working-class districts, and only then the attempt to push forward into the centre of the town if the strength and spirit of the masses had been such as to justify this bold step.

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The points at which demonstrations first assemble, and from which they march off, must be where the working masses are, where they can be most easily attracted, where the opponents are weakest: in the factories, at the exchanges, in working-class districts. This rule is simple and cannot be disputed, and yet it is often forgotten. It is true that successes have been achieved with surprise demonstrations in the centre of towns, where the demonstrators have assembled in small numbers in the streets near the centre, and then suddenly formed a demonstration under the eyes of the astonished police and the "upper classes." But even such demonstrations are as a rule first prepared in the working-class districts.

Although the working-class districts must be the points from which the demonstrations must move off, this does not by any means imply that demonstrations should limit themselves to the working-class districts. On the contrary, demonstrations in working-class districts are as a rule only justified when the forces are too weak to penetrate the middle-class areas. Demonstrations must start in the working-class quarters in order to bring on to the streets the largest possible number of workers and then to move forward to the real objective of the fight, which generally lies in a non-proletarian quarter. The

fighting demonstration of to-day is not a political procession, but a real means of exerting revolutionary mass pressure. In recent demonstrations the special objectives of the struggle have been town halls and other public buildings. The objectives of the struggle, of course, vary as the political situation changes. But in any case it is right and proper that proletarian demonstrations should tend to be directed towards middle-class areas. A great hunger march from the districts of the poor to the districts of the rich is in our opinion one of the most successful forms of fighting demonstrations at the present time.

It is true that the police do not like the starting points of demonstrations to be in working-class districts, especially if the demonstrators assemble not at one place but at several points, because this compels them to split up their forces and to maintain an extensive service of patrols as well as to decentralise the police reserves. The fundamental principle of the police tactics in suppressing "internal disorders" is the concentration of forces, the avoidance of splitting up the police forces and thus allowing them to be beaten piecemeal. For that reason there can be no more advantageous position for the police, enabling them to attack the demonstrators, than when the masses are called to one central assembling point or a small number of points, as was done in Helsingfors.

The decentralised, "partisan" method of assembly for a demonstration has the further merit of surprising the enemy; there are many possibilities of misleading the police. Of course, a mass demonstration which is not spontaneous but is the result of preparation cannot come as an absolute surprise to the police, because the arrangements and the time of the demonstration must be made known to the largest possible number of workers. But it is not absolutely inevitable that the police should know at what points large contingents are to meet and through what streets the demonstration is to pass.

Of course, the workers at various factories, exchanges, houses or blocks must know where they are to assemble in the first instance, after which they will follow the lead of groups acting under special instructions. But even if these points are known to the police it is impossible for them to post overwhelming forces at every factory, every house and every public house where the demonstrators may assemble. In order to split the police forces still further, in some demonstrations recently special groups have been formed whose task is to make a determined move behind the police reserves and in this way to keep the reserves busy and draw them off, freeing the main mass of demonstrators and gaining time.

It used to be common for a demonstration to march outside the town and to hold the actual meeting there, in some open space or place isolated from street traffic by gardens or parks. When a demonstration has been prohibited such a procedure is not correct. The isolation of the participants in an illegal demonstration from the rest of the inhabitants gives the guards of the bourgeoisie the most favourable opportunity for staging a blood-bath. Moreover, the effect of the demonstration is almost entirely restricted to the participants themselves.

Where the workers have some experience in the organisation of illegal demonstrations, the demonstration is as a rule held at street corners where numbers of people are moving or in squares with a number of ways out which are better suited for elastic manoeuvring and the organisation of mass defence against provocative attacks made on the demonstrators.

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The question of physical resistance against police and Fascists is a particularly burning one in demonstrations at the present time. To preach non-resistance to workers who have been provocatively attacked by the police and Fascists is to abandon the field of the class struggle. Proletarian defence against armed attacks by the State and volunteer murder-columns of the bourgeoisie is not only permissible, but must be consciously organised and led. But at a period when the time has not yet come for the decisive struggle for power by the working class, when there is not yet any question of armed revolt, it is necessary also to raise the issue of how far purely physical resistance should be carried, and at what cost.

In an armed revolt attack at all costs is essential. But anyone who tries to apply this rule also to physical resistance in current class battles is guilty of a sectarian interpretation of the class battle. Lenin emphasised that strikes are a "school of war" for the working class, but not the war itself. That is true also of demonstrations. A demonstration, like a strike, cannot lead to a decisive result: the bourgeoisie cannot be overthrown by a demonstration. The bourgeoisie makes the demonstrations of the present day a "school of war," of the decisive struggle for power, not only for the police but also for the working class.

In militant demonstrations the workers and peasants are hardened. But they are not the decisive struggle. In European countries at the present time it might be possible to lead the advance guard of the working class to an attack at any price, but not the broad masses of workers

themselves. Anyone who does not take account of this fact isolates himself from the masses, and will not be in a position to lead when the broad masses are prepared to fight whatever the cost. What is necessary to-day is not an attack at any price, but the greatest mobility, an elastic combination of attack, defence and retreat, so far as concerns physical resistance against the civil war guards of the bourgeoisie.

After the first illegal demonstrations in Germany, the workers very soon overcame the tendency to non-resistance. It was only at the beginning that the demonstrators dispersed immediately on the arrival of the police. They very soon passed on to showing resistance in cases where they had to deal with weaker police forces, and only when overwhelming police forces arrived would they disperse, only to reassemble at another point. The German workers did not adopt the line of resistance at any price, but in each particular case decided the question of how far they were to carry their resistance, in accordance with the concrete situation and the relations between the forces.

For example, the Berlin organisation of the German Communist Party cannot be reproached for not having called on the masses to offer open physical resistance, in spite of the panic shootings and provocative attacks of the police, on the occasion of the recent great meeting at the Palace of Sport, when the building was surrounded and turned into an armed camp by the concentrated forces of the police.

The question of armed demonstrations is similar to the question of physical resistance. The slogan of an armed demonstration means the same thing as the general slogan of the arming of the proletariat. To raise the slogan of an armed demonstration without any anticipation of a speedy transformation into an armed revolt, and before the pre-conditions for a successful revolt exist, is to be guilty of playing with revolution. If certain impatient elements demand the arming of demonstrators, it is necessary to look carefully to see whether there is not an attitude of panic behind the demand. The demand: Give us arms, or else we will not go on the streets—in many cases has been nothing more than an idle excuse for passivity and unwillingness to undertake revolutionary mass work. It is characteristic that these elements ask the Party for arms instead of themselves finding arms.

During the month of June of this year in many countries there were serious clashes between workers in demonstrations and the police, in the course of which the demonstrators armed themselves with stones, bricks, pick-axes, bottles,

flower-pots and similar objects. Some cases also occurred where the workers disarmed individual policemen and made use of the weapons they took from them in their own defence. To "offer" to arm the workers in this way would be ridiculous. We do not object to individual proletarians arming themselves, but we raise objection to the slogan of arming the workers as a general agitational slogan at a period which is not ripe for armed revolt.

In recent militant demonstrations, barricades have played an outstanding rôle. On June 10, the Hamburg workers erected barricades of ash-buckets in order to prevent the police from entering the working-class districts. On the same day the workers in Mannheim put up barricades of boards, iron bars, dust-bins, parts of lorries, etc., in a number of streets and tore up the pavement. A few days later in Roubaix it reached the stage of putting up barricades on more than one occasion. It is absolutely clear that all these were cases of conscious defensive measures taken by workers who had been attacked. A very typical illustration of this is the following inscription on a red flag on a barricade at Roubaix: "Behind this boundary the people rule. Murderers are not allowed to pass."

Although the barricades in these struggles were consciously defensive measures, we could not accept as correct any formulation of such a question of "principle" as: Are barricades a means of defence or are they offensive measures? If barricades are put up to prevent police from entering the workers' districts, this is, of course, a defensive measure. But if the police forces and the police cars are hemmed in with barricades in several directions, not only with the object of preventing them from forcing their way into the working-class districts, but also to cut off their retreat, then it is very difficult to distinguish where defence ends and a fight with a positive aim begins. It is correct to say that barricades cannot decide a battle, but that they only give a measure of help either in defence or in attack.

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On the question of the cadres, the initiative-groups in demonstrations, we fully accept the views of "K.F." in the April number of the journal "October." He writes:

"The method of also forming groups within the demonstration is by far the best method of giving the whole demonstration a better stiffening, of enabling it to act in a more unified and determined way than hitherto. No new special organisation is required for this. It is quite sufficient if from every cell four to six good comrades, who are physically suitable for the purpose and know each other well,

march together in the demonstration and do not allow themselves to be separated by police attacks, but always get together again, and shout appropriate slogans, making use of suitable opportunities to give short speeches. If by means of such groups we give a framework to the whole demonstration at all points, then it will be much easier to get the masses to stand their ground when attacked by the police and to deliver an appropriate reply to the attack."

Initiative-groups in demonstrations therefore do not constitute any special, independent organisation, but are organs of the Party cells or of the corresponding basic units of other revolutionary mass organisations; they are directed by these organisations, and work within the limits of the organisation. No objection could be raised, of course, to these initiative groups from the various cells, for example, in a single town, being called together for joint discussions on the eve of particular important actions and being given their instructions together. This would not in the least conflict with the correct organisational and

political principle that the organising and leadership of political mass activities, including mass demonstrations, must be conducted by the basic units of the Party and other revolutionary mass organisations and cannot be handed over to any independent and special "demonstration meetings."

The above remarks do not pretend to be infallible or comprehensive. Still less do they attempt to be instructions for the organising of demonstrations, especially as they are based on extremely scanty material of the actual experiences of demonstrations. The writer's aim is much more modest: to open a discussion on these problems. The "theses" put forward by the writer are open to discussion. But on one point there can be no dispute: Communists cannot avoid this issue; they cannot "deny" the militant demonstrations of the working class, because these are historical facts which the development of the class struggle has placed on the order of the day.

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# ORGANISATIONAL PROBLEMS IN UNDERGROUND REVOLUTIONARY WORK

By B. VASSILIEV.

THE conditions for the work of Communist Parties are becoming ever more difficult. By all means in their power, the ruling classes are trying to put a stop to the increasing influence of the Communist Parties and to terminate the very existence of the Communist International. The opportunist elements in our ranks are utilising the growing persecution of the police and the terror of the employers to justify their passivity in the struggle against the bourgeois attack on the working-class. It would be foolish to deny that the terror of the employers and the repression of the police hinders and sometimes even temporarily paralyses the work of Communist Parties and other revolutionary organisations of the proletariat. However, if the police and employers' terroristic methods were an insurmountable obstacle in the path of the development of the Parties, the proletariat should give up the struggle and abandon all hopes of throwing off the yoke of capitalism. The development of the present unprecedented severe and prolonged economic crisis, the sharpening of all the contradictions of the capitalist system, are accelerating the breakdown of capitalist stabilisation and are thus setting an immediate task for the proletariat in capitalist and colonial countries—the preparations for a revolutionary way out of the crisis despite the growing repression of the police, despite the brutalities of the Fascist and Social Fascist police chiefs and dictators.

Under such conditions, the tasks of Party construction become exceptionally important. When Lenin was organising the Bolshevik Party as an underground organisation in Tsarist times, he continually emphasised that the conditions for victory over Tsarism were organisation and organisation, and that talk about the leadership of the movement and the extension of the mass movement without a strong Party organisation was mere claptrap. *Thus, the increasing artfulness of the police apparatus of the bourgeois Governments in the struggle against the Communist movement makes it essential for the latter to have a more complicated, flexible and accurately functioning organisation.* This organisation will inevitably have to rely on a strong conspirative apparatus, supplemented by widely adopted methods of legal Party work. The question of an illegal organisation must now receive the closest attention of all Communist Parties without exception in capitalist countries, and, moreover, the question will naturally take a different form in countries with an illegal Communist movement from the countries where the Parties still find it possible to work legally or at least semi-legally.

As for the second group of countries, it would be a great opportunist mistake to suppose that the legal Communist Parties should reduce their work to the slightest degree in connection with the growing repression by the police, or in particular that we should weaken our mass work. The general international situation, the leftward trend of the masses, the growth of a new revolutionary upsurge, make it necessary for all Communist Parties to increase their activity and especially their mass work to the greatest possible extent. Unless mass work is tremendously increased, it is impossible to solve the central task which was set to the Parties by the Eleventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I.—the task of winning over the majority of the working-class. *With regard to legal and semi-legal Communist Parties, the question of the reconstruction of the Party apparatus and the methods of work under the present circumstances of increasing police depression is therefore—what methods of Party work should be used to increase the work for the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses in spite of police repression?* This task can be solved in the following general directions: the formation of an illegal apparatus alongside the still functioning legal Party apparatus, to take over the functions of the legal apparatus as this is liquidated as the result of police repression, and also to carry out specific functions which arise from the fact of the sharpening of the class struggle, such as the protection of speakers, of Party buildings etc., and to prepare the Party for higher forms of struggle in the future. In proportion as the legal apparatus of the Party is liquidated, the directing functions will inevitably pass more and more to the illegal apparatus. This reconstruction of the work will inevitably require a regrouping of Party forces and a reorganisation of the Party apparatus and methods of Party work. The question of protection against arrest and similar repression against the leading Party activists is an integral and subordinate part of the work. We can imagine a Party organisation so well hidden that the police do not even suspect its existence, but if this Party organisation, while hiding from the police, has become invisible to the toiling masses also, such a Party organisation by this fact alone loses its most important feature as the organisation of the vanguard of the working-class and is converted from an organisation of the Communist Party into a helpless group of conspirators.

The first steps for forming an illegal Party apparatus will be along the following main lines: (a) to find a building for storing the Party archives; (b) to organise an illegal printing plant in which it would be

possible to print the Party organ in case of the suppression and closing of the legal Party papers and journals; (c) to form an apparatus for distributing illegal Party literature; (d) to prepare a definite group of leading Party activists to pass into illegality; (e) to prepare addresses and houses for illegal correspondence, for secret sessions of the leading Party organs and also for housing the illegal Party activists and for conferences between them and the workers who continue to be on a legal footing; (f) to prepare a minimum number of workers who understand the elementary rules of the technique of underground work (running the illegal printing plant, code work, the technique of personal and written contacts, the technique of the defence of the illegal part of the Party apparatus, etc.).

To correspond with this, measures must be taken so that (a) in no case would documents be found in the legal premises of the Party which would give the police an excuse for repression against the Party on the basis of the existing laws and police regulations; (b) all Party members must be warned regarding the keeping of secret Party documents (every Party member must know which documents are confidential, which are not, and what information can and cannot be given to the police); (c) A certain part of the Party activists must refrain from visiting the legal Party offices. These offices on the whole must be converted into legal possibilities for contact between the Party and the masses, so that sympathisers with the Party and non-Party workers in general who have no contacts with the underground Party organisations could establish such contacts at these addresses and hand over the necessary information which interests the Communist Party and also could receive replies to questions which interest them. Among these legal and semi-legal Party institutions we may indicate primarily the following three:

(1) The premises of the Party committee where a representative of the Party committee will be present at definite hours to receive all persons who have business with the Party. With regard to these premises, as a rule the comrades from the leading Party activists should avoid being there and also meetings of the Party committees and Party activists should not, in general, be held there.

(2) Another equally important or even more important legal Party organ which must be widely utilised for open contacts with the masses by a Party which has been driven underground, is the legal Party newspaper, relying on a broad network of worker and village correspondents.

(3) Finally, the third such organ consists of the Communist fractions in Parliaments and Municipal bodies.

The experience of the Russian Bolshevik Party which, while deeply underground, was able to make wide use of the platform of the Duma and "Pravda"

with great advantage for the Party, must be thoroughly understood and widely utilised by all Communist Parties without exception. The Parties must mobilise the broad masses for the struggle against all the attempts of the reactionaries to liquidate such legal and semi-legal possibilities. It is especially important to defend the right to publish a daily legal Party paper. The history of the Russian Bolshevik Party gives many brilliant examples of how to do this—to appoint editors in advance in place of arrested editors, to prepare new names for the paper in case it is suppressed, to have ready new legal printing plants in case it should be impossible to use the regular plant, to collect funds to cover expenses connected with the payment of fines, the confiscation of issues of the paper, etc., to have an apparatus ready for the independent distribution of the Party papers if the official organs of distribution refuse to do this under the threats of the police, etc.

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In view of the attempts of the ruling classes to drive the Communist Parties underground, the work of the Parties in various legal mass organisations is of tremendous importance, especially in the trade unions and also in organisations such as sport clubs, Freethinkers' Leagues, Tenant Leagues, International Labour Defence, etc. By its strong fractions in these organisations, acting on the directives of the illegal or semi-legal Party leaders, the Party will preserve (and increase) the possibility of carrying on mass ideological and organisational work. It should not be thought that this refers only to mass organisations which are under Communist leadership. *It is one of the most important and permanent organisational tasks for the Party to set up fractions in the mass organisations which are under the leadership of Social Fascist and openly reactionary leaders.* This is obviously possible under conditions of the most brutal reaction, for example, in Italy at the present time, where, according to information which is confirmed by the bourgeois press, there have been increasing numbers of cases recently where open sympathy has been shown to the slogans of the revolution even in the ranks of the Fascist militia. By relying on fractions in Social Fascist and other reactionary mass organisations, the Party can commence systematic work for the disintegration of these organisations and winning over the workers and peasants in them, and in addition, can utilise these organisations as one of the species of legal possibilities which can be utilised even during the white terror.

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While struggling by all means for the possibility to carry on open mass work, all legal Communist Parties must even at the present moment make one branch of Party work unquestionably illegal. This

branch of Party work is the work in the factories, the work of the factory nuclei.

The factory nuclei must at the present time without question be formed as illegal organisations and must work by illegal methods. As far as Party work is concerned, this reconstruction of the factory nuclei must be accompanied by the greatest intensification of their mass work in their own factories.

What should be done to achieve this aim ?

First of all, the Party members working in the factories (*with the exception of cases which demand open activity in the name of the C.P.*) must act in such a way as not to let it be thought that they are members of the C.P. In the same way the meetings of Party nuclei should be held as closed and secret meetings, admitting only reliable sympathisers. At Party meetings and in general when carrying on Party business, it is best not to use real names but to use pseudonyms. The basic methods of everyday mass Party work will therefore be : (a) individual agitation; (b) agitational and organisational work with the help of the factory newspaper, leaflets and other Party legal and illegal literature ; (c) for more open mass work, as a rule Party members not working at the given factory should be used ; (d) all kinds of legal and semi-legal possibilities should be used to the maximum degree, forming in the factories, trade union groups, I.L.D., W.I.R. and Freethinker groups, various classes—musical, mathematical, study, etc., etc., and finally not failing to penetrate into the factory organisations of the opponents if they exist. More detailed instructions on all these questions can be found in the instructions of the organisational department of the E.C.C.I., extracts from which were printed in "Inprecorr" Nos. 59 and 60, 1930.

Successful work for the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses under circumstances of the intensification of the crisis of the capitalist system will make it possible for the Communist Parties to raise the struggle to a higher level. Basing themselves on the increasing political consciousness and the better organisation of the masses, and having a Party apparatus which is better protected from the blows of the police and the Fascists, the C.P.'s will be able to break through the limitations of the police State, to overthrow all restraints on revolutionary agitation and organisation, and liquidate them by direct action.

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This same question of breaking through the framework of the police-Fascist dictatorship is now becoming the central organisational task of the illegal Communist Parties primarily in those Fascist countries where the elements of a revolutionary crisis are maturing, as in Poland.

There is a widely-spread opinion in the illegal Communist Parties that the chief shortcoming in the work of the illegal Parties is the lack of experience and of habits in conspirative work. Of course we cannot

under-estimate the importance of habits of illegal work when organising the work of the Communist Parties under present conditions. But along with this it must be firmly stated that, particularly under present conditions, while perfecting conspirative methods and strengthening the illegal Party apparatus, it is necessary at the same time to concentrate attention chiefly on the tasks of utilising semi-legal and legal possibilities, so as to use them for the development of ideological and organisational mass work, so as to organise mass revolutionary activity of the workers and peasants, to break through police restrictions and thus to clear the road for the open mass work of the Party.

There is an opinion which is held fairly widely in the Parties that mass activity cannot be organised under conditions of complete illegality. This is a harmful opportunist deviation which is refuted by numerous recent examples. In addition, if such a statement were true, what would be the use of an illegal Communist Party existing at all ? Some of the Italian comrades from the late Right opportunist group of Santino stated on this point that in countries with illegal Communist Parties, the victory of the revolution would come from the spontaneous movements of the masses. This argument is obviously unsound. There are many cases in history where spontaneous revolutionary movements have rapidly brought down reactionary Governments. A recent example is in the fall of the Spanish Monarchy. However, this very example speaks against the authors of this theory. Although the fear of a growing spontaneous revolutionary mass movement could lead to the replacement of the Monarchy by a Republic in Spain, it was owing to the absence of systematic preparations and firm leadership of this movement by the Communist Party that the replacement of the Monarchy by the Republic was not accompanied by the destruction of the old apparatus of Government and its economic foundations. The Republic itself was intended to play the rôle of a smoke-screen for the counter-revolution, the rôle of a counter-revolutionary barrier against revolution, although this barrier is not in a position to prevent the further development of the revolution if the latter is led by the Communist Party. Here, again, the white terror may serve as an excuse. It is time to abandon this point of view for good. You may take either view—either the white terror excludes all possibilities for the Communist Party to make systematic preparations for the seizure of power, in which case the Communist Party may be dissolved and we may patiently await spontaneous explosions, or the Communist Party can carry on its work for preparing the masses to seize power under any terror and can lead this struggle, in which case this terror cannot be referred to as an insurmountable obstacle for the mass work of the Communist Party, and the work of the



Party must be developed on the principle of preparing the masses for the destruction of Fascism and the seizure of power, in spite of all difficulties.

The Communist Party of Poland has shown that under the conditions of the Fascist Pilsudski, it can prepare big strikes and lead them, can organise strong mass demonstrations such as the demonstrations of May First in Poland this year. The heroic Communist Party of China has given an example of how to work in the yellow Kuomintang Unions and how to use the statutes of these unions, which are reactionary throughout, as legal possibilities for attracting thousands of proletarians to the strike movement (the movement of the postal and telegraph workers). At the same time the Communist Party of China showed that capable work by the fractions makes it possible to use the premises and clubs of the Kuomintang Unions for consistent mass work and political agitation for the overthrow of the Nanking Government and for the triumph of the worker and peasant revolutionary-democratic dictatorship.

Breaches of police restrictions should first of all be organised in the factories informally and directly, by attracting the working masses into the struggle for their immediate demands, and in the course of this work setting up spontaneous organs of struggle elected by the workers (strike committees, etc.). In the future these organs of struggle must be strengthened and converted into permanent elected organs, representing the working masses in the factories.

In all past revolutions, under conditions of a growing revolutionary upsurge when great mass movements were stirring, and during the course of these movements, such factory organs were spontaneously set up to represent the interest of the workers. It is necessary to orientate ourselves on this perspective at the present time and to reconstruct the Party apparatus and the methods of Party work accordingly.

In short, whenever there is no illegal apparatus, it should be formed and where it exists it should be strengthened. But this must be done with very definite and clear principles—to strengthen and increase mass work to the maximum degree, to increase the organisational preparations of the broad masses to the greatest possible extent for the forthcoming struggles. The reply to the blows of the Fascist terror will be the organisation of breaches of the police-Fascist dictatorship and a further systematic, self-sacrificing, Bolshevik preparation for the final victory of the working-class.

These short notes on the tasks of revolutionary underground work under the present conditions of a sharp intensification of the general crisis of capitalism and the growth of a revolutionary upsurge, should be supplemented by a more important note referring to legal and illegal Communist Parties.

It is impossible to fight successfully against reaction or to build up a good revolutionary underground organisation which is connected with the masses without strong illegal factory nuclei, without the reorganisation of the whole work of the Communist Party on the basis of factory nuclei. For illegal Communist Parties, without strong factory nuclei, it is impossible to calculate on the possibilities of organising and leading the mass struggle for the overthrow of the police-Fascist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. These conclusions have been thoroughly confirmed both in the positive sense (the experience of the great October revolution), and in the negative sense (the example of Germany in 1923). The question of the work of factory nuclei has now to be put forward with special force. The discussion on the first point of the agenda at the Eleventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I. proved that the situation regarding factory nuclei in all countries is still unsatisfactory, including the Parties which occupy the most responsible sectors of the revolutionary front—the Communist Parties of Germany and Poland. Why is this? The chief reason is that there has not taken place the necessary change in the Parties and chiefly among the leading activists. The difficulties of work in the factories are very great and will grow still further in the future. But these difficulties simply demand a greater mobilisation of the forces of the Party, and this has not yet taken place. Even the Communist Party of Germany (the best and strongest Communist Party of capitalist countries), which provided brilliant examples of genuinely Bolshevik consistency in the struggle against “left” Trotskyism and openly opportunist deviations which has greatly renewed its leading cadres from this point of view, the question of factory nuclei has not been raised with such insistence. However, weaknesses and hesitations on the question of reorganising the Party on the basis of factory nuclei at the present time threaten all Communist Parties with the most disastrous results, especially the Communist Parties which are fighting on the foremost positions of the class struggle. The Communist Party of Germany is now growing rapidly in numbers, but at the same time, according to the figures of the “*Partei Arbeiter*,” five-sixths of the local organisations had not yet been split into factory and street nuclei in May, 1931. Such a situation testifies to an obviously unsatisfactory fulfilment of the directives of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Germany and the Communist International by the local organisations of the C.P.G. on the question of reorganising the Party on the basis of factory nuclei. It indicates that the local organisations of the C.P.G. are unsatisfactorily instructed by the district committees. At the same time, there is an ever-growing danger that the C.P.G. will be suppressed and also the growing elements of a revolutionary crisis make it more and more urgent for the

Party to raise the question of direct preparations for the struggle for power. Both the necessity of preserving its forces when going underground and the preparation for the struggles for power are impossible unless the whole system of Party work is reorganised and the whole Party apparatus reconstructed on the basis of factory nuclei. The events in Poland, the growth of the revolutionary activity of the masses in Italy and in other countries with Fascist dictatorships raise the question with equal insistence of factory nuclei for illegal Communist Parties and chiefly for the Communist Party of Poland.

Thus, the immediate future for all Communist Parties, both legal and illegal, must be chiefly a period for the strengthening of their work in the factories, a period for the strengthening of factory nuclei. In

this way, the successes of the work of the Party will chiefly be decided by the successes of Party construction which are a necessary factor for overcoming the lagging of the Party behind the growth of the revolutionary activity of the masses, but the successes of Party construction will chiefly depend on successes in the matter of strengthening factory nuclei. Here is to be found the root of the successful struggle against police repression and the terror of the employers, here is the basis for successful preparations for a revolutionary way out of the crisis. The multiplying, strengthening and activation of factory nuclei is the most important method of liquidating the mass influence of Social Fascism and the winning of the majority of the working-class under the slogan of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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## TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY THE EXECUTIVE  
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

*Urga,*

*July 20, 1931.*

*On the X Anniversary of the Mongolian revolution the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the Ulan Bator City Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the Central Committee and the Ulan Bator City Committee of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League, the Presidium of the Small Huruldan and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Central Council of Trade Unions of Mongolia, send warm fraternal greetings to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the leader and organiser of world revolution. The Mongolian revolution fought and was victorious, is fighting and will conquer its enemies only under the Leninist leadership of the Comintern. Long live the Comintern, Long live the X Anniversary of the Mongolian Revolution.*

**PRESIDIUM**

# THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE RURAL DISTRICTS

By HÖRNLE.

**T**HE severity and growth of the agrarian crisis, connected as it is with the aftermath of the industrial crisis, plunged the masses of the peasantry and the agricultural labourers in all capitalist countries into dire need, and changed the social structure of the village completely, making the agricultural masses, yesterday only passive observers, politically conscious and radical.

This process is being accelerated by the methods used by finance capital to combat the crisis (rationalisation and industrialisation, standardisation and the shifting of the burden of debts, regulation of the markets, "stabilisation of prices," tariff walls). The toiling peasant masses are growing poorer on their small patch of land or are being forced out of this patch; the intermediate class of semi-peasants and those who have to hire themselves out to get along is rapidly growing, while at the other pole, the economic and social preponderance of the wealthy peasant (kulak) and capitalist agrarian enterprises is also growing rapidly.

The material condition of these agricultural labourers in purely capitalist large estates is growing manifestly worse. Mechanisation and rationalisation leave tens of thousands of people unemployed. The agricultural labourer, instead of being hired on a yearly contract "with board" can be found more and more frequently, as in Germany these last three years, to be working as a so-called "free labourer," i.e., by the day, on a piece-work basis and frequently finding work only during the "harvest." The methods used to exploit the agricultural labourers approach those used by industry (piece-work, bonus systems) but they have retained intact the semi-feudal forms of slavery (payment in kind, crop sharing system, forced labour for women and children). In addition, the attacks on wages are being made on a larger scale and with more ruthlessness than in industry itself (particularly in Italy and Germany).

The grave crisis in which capitalism finds itself, has left its stamp on the imperialist-Fascist agrarian policy of finance capital which is less and less able to make any vital concessions to the toiling peasantry in spite of the real danger of turning these masses into a reserve force for the proletariat. Those "agrarian reforms," introduced soon after the World War throughout Central and Eastern Europe to ward off a prole-

tarian revolution, are not only not being carried through now but are even being actually changed (Roumania, Poland, the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia).

The programme for the settlement of the Eastern provinces proposed in 1919 in Germany, was not only a step taken against Poland, but against the leftward movement of the peasantry. To-day, in connection with the campaign of "Osthilfe" (help to the Eastern provinces) the plan is being quite openly used to help the large bankrupt undertakings to recuperate. Instead of "land reforms" being instituted, measures are being adopted to exploit the peasant labourer more (control of undertakings, of the upkeep of cattle, forced buying and selling to co-operatives, high taxes on consumption goods, communal and county taxes, compulsory regulations for the introduction of a thoroughbred stock and selected seeds, compulsory use of fodder produced in Germany mainly under the pretence of "raising the quality of production"). Standardisation, in itself a sign of progress in the field of production and the technique of selling, has become, under the rule of finance capital and in the presence of an acute crisis, a method by which the small peasant is ruthlessly exploited and ruined as a competitor.

Spontaneous peasant uprisings, peasant demonstrations, opposition to tax collectors and bailiffs of the court, collective refusal to pay interest and rent, the burning of peasant farms on the day they are to be sold at auction (Westerbald, Germany), the planting of bombs near Government buildings and apartments of former officials (Lower Saxony and Holstein), conflicts at the market, attacks on financial institutions, are taking place more and more frequently. We have information to the effect that since the beginning of 1931, such spontaneous peasant outbursts have taken place in Greece, Bulgaria (Godevare), Italy, Poland, Hungary, Roumania (Karash Committee) Czecho-Slovakia (Carpathian Ukraine), northern, middle and western Germany, Austria (Carinthia), U.S.A. (farmers' movement in Arkansas), and even in Holland, which is supposed to be a country of model peasant farms. In very many cases, as a matter of fact, in most cases, these spontaneous demonstrations lead to conflicts with the armed forces and end in their bloody suppression, in punitive expeditions being sent against them, and in long and dreadful prison

sentences. We need not speak here of the amazingly brutal suppression of the peasant mutinies in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, of the close connection between the agrarian crisis and the peasant uprisings and the increasingly frequent political disturbances and national liberation movements in Latin America, in Spain and in Portugal—that would be too great a digression.

We must realise that the period of the slow radicalisation of the peasant masses, of the gradual awakening of the rural districts and their wavering between Fascism and Communism has for the most part come to an end. Fascism exposes itself as the worst enemy of the poor peasants and the agricultural labourers (Italy, Roumania, Poland). In no country have the spontaneous peasant demonstrations been suppressed so brutally as in those where the open Fascist dictatorship rules. The peasant masses are beginning to take a most active part in the struggle against the Fascist dictatorship.

The situation with which the Parties and the R.I.L.U. Sections are faced presents a number of new and urgent tasks for solution.

1. They must understand clearly the historical significance of the events taking place in the rural districts, must understand the growing, active force which the agricultural labourer and the poor peasant represent in the struggle against Fascism and must explain the significance of these factors to the widest masses of the fighting industrial proletariat. The most active forces of the mass revolutionary industrial proletariat must be mobilised to support, organise and lead the mass demonstrations in the rural districts, particularly the tariff movement of the agricultural labourers, the protest and opposition movement of the poor peasants. The toiling population must by no means be left to themselves in this critical situation or to the influence of the semi-reformist unreliable elements (Thesis of the Second Congress of the Communist International). One of the central tasks of the revolutionary industrial proletariat, under the leadership of the C.I. and the R.I.L.U. is to raise the spontaneous, local demonstrations of the village poor, frequently dying out for the lack of a goal and plans, to a higher, more organised plane, to bind the concrete slogans which are able to mobilise the masses and which voice their daily needs, with the revolutionary, ultimate goal. The agricultural masses cannot do this for themselves. They need the leadership and the support of the revolutionary industrial proletariat.

2. One must study carefully, therefore, the *special forms which the movement takes, the possibilities which the struggle unfolds and those*

*methods for carrying on the struggle* of the agricultural proletariat and the poor peasant masses which develop as a result. The organisation of the revolutionary trade unions of agricultural labourers as part of the R.I.L.U. at the same time that the tariff battles are being prepared and carried out (as well as the repulse to the attack on wages, the winning of higher wages in cash, the abolition of the remnants of feudal slavery) and that bonds between these Red trade unions of agricultural labourers, the demonstrations of the agricultural proletariat organised by them and the struggles of the industrial proletariat are established, is the most important task in most of the capitalist countries and in colonial plantations. This does not exclude but, on the contrary, is closely connected with the work of the Social Fascist, Centrist, Christian and other trade unions. The peculiar conditions under which the strikes of agricultural labourers take place (dependent on the season and the weather, the extent of the area which it includes, the political and organisational inexperience of the agricultural labourers) calls for the use of special tactics. All the local possibilities must be carefully investigated in order to develop the struggles, to establish communications over wide areas, to mobilise unemployment marches of the city unemployed and of all the village poor to help the strikes, to prepare the agricultural labourer for the inevitable conflict with the State power.)

The growth of economic struggles into political ones must be particularly quick and energetic in the rural districts because the Fascist State power in the rural districts is doubly alert and acts even more brutally than in the cities (military and political punitive expeditions, armed detachments of the landlords, the violent breaking up of strikes with the help of armed forces, the disrupting and prohibition of trade unions).

The revolutionary mass organisations—International Labour Defence, Friends of the Soviet Union, International Red Aid, as the second front line, must follow immediately behind the Party and the revolutionary trade union Opposition in the regions where the struggle is taking place. In the city we must prevent strike-breakers from being recruited and sent to the scene of the strike, prevent young people from being compelled to go to the rural districts to act as strike-breakers or to arrange that those sent in fraternise with the strikers.

3. *The movement of the agricultural committees* under the leadership of the district and national revolutionary peasant committees, is an important weapon for the preparing and carrying through of the organised demonstrations of the peasant poor. This is one of the tactics of organising a united

front within the peasant movement in order to wean the wide peasant masses away from their leaders—the landowners in the reactionary trade unions. This movement has grown tremendously since the European Agrarian Congress in March, 1919. The starting point of the movement, for the most part, is some event of a local character, or concerning the region which rouses the indignation of the peasant masses. The primary task of this movement is to muster the growing forces of the peasantry and direct them on to concrete militant aims, but besides that, to bind the given concrete struggle with the continuous and planned peasant movement.

The committees will draw a greater or smaller number of the peasant masses into the struggle, depending on the peculiar territorial or local conditions which play a much more important rôle in the village than in industry (exorbitant rents, levying of taxes, natural calamities). Our task is to see to it that the leadership of the committees is in the hands of the poor peasantry and that the centre of gravity of the whole movement lies with them.

Our next step must be to establish contact between the peasant committees and the proletarian committees of struggle or the committees of the toilers, and to create a permanent delegate organisation on a local scale if we are to raise our work to a higher level, raise it from the purely economic to the clearly political phases of the struggle.

Until now the contact between the committees (loose, organisational form) and the existing Peasant League not under the leadership of the Communists and the functioning of the Communist fraction within these organisations was very weak. But what is more important is that in the local and territorial committees, the danger that the agricultural bourgeois elements and their organisations may draw over, disintegrate or even absorb the poor peasants and the agricultural labourers is ever present. The pre-requisite of every wide demonstration and protracted anti-Fascist peasant movement is the systematic training and leadership of the class conscious anti-capitalist cadres within the mass of poor peasants, the creation of radical *opposition groups* led by the Communists within the existing peasant mass trade unions.

These last months have witnessed a change in many countries. The simple protest demonstrations of the poor peasants (Deputies sent, etc.) which were led mainly by reactionaries, have grown into direct opposition and into an open offensive (organised refusal to pay taxes and rent, preventing the forced sales from being held, violent occupation of the landowners' land—

Bozanchi, Bukovina). The revolutionary peasant committees and the trade unions must take this change of the method used by the masses, as one from the indirect to a direct attack, into careful consideration, and change its tactics in conformity with it.

4. The work of influencing and mobilising the workers thrown out of the factory and back into the village as a result of the industrial crisis, the sons and daughters of the peasants and the unemployed labourers who have but little land, deserves particular attention. The Fascist State power has deprived these semi-proletarian groups of all unemployment relief (extraordinary decree in Germany) although they cannot possibly subsist on the strip of land which they or their parents own (committees of the unemployed in the rural districts, demonstrations in the county city).

Thousands of poor peasants work shoulder by shoulder with the industrial workers at many industrial undertakings and mines. They lay railroads, work in quarries, in brick factories. The Social Democratic trade union leaders set the industrial workers threatened with unemployment and a reduction in wages, against the small peasant in search of work and in this way pushes the peasant into the arms of open Fascism. The most important task before the factory Communist nuclei and the revolutionary trade union movement is to influence and attract these semi-proletarian elements who come from the village, to the various enterprises, and follow them from the factory into their village. And it is a task that has not yet been tackled. The significance of the need to repulse the attack on wages, to fight for the 40-hour week with the old wage level maintained, to repulse the strike-breakers, not only at the gates of the factory but directly in the village, to work on preparing the elections of the Red factory mill committees, does not need to be dwelt upon. The percentage of the peasants who have but little land, or the sons and daughters of peasants are 40-50 per cent. of the total number of workers in Western, Middle and Southern Germany, working in the gigantic chemical, mining, textile and printing industries. Any serious work of the Communists in the rural districts can and must, therefore, start at the factory. If this work will not be undertaken seriously, the fight against Fascism in the factory is meaningless.

5.—The work of the Party in the revolutionary mass organisations among the agricultural labourer, the toiling peasant and the agricultural youth is of particular significance at this time. Fascism regards the agricultural youth as its most important reserve for the selection of new forces.

The close union of the church and Fascism makes it urgently necessary that the women of the rural districts be revolutionised now. There is a particularly wide field here for the work of revolutionary mass organisations, for the Red Sport Leagues, for the proletarian organisations of motherhood, for delegate movement among women, etc.

6. The last resort of the bourgeoisie to prevent the peasant masses from joining the camp of the proletarian revolution is to attack the U.S.S.R. Stories are spread of "collective farm slaves," into which the Five Year Plan transforms the Russian peasant, of the exile and forced labour for all peasants who do not voluntarily join the collective farms, of the "hunger export" of Russian bread—stories meant to fill the peasant masses with aversion for, or at least distrust of, Communism. The export of Soviet bread is given as the main reason for the agricultural crisis in order to create a hostile, aggressive attitude against the country of the workers and the

peasants. The Pope's "crusade" to "Save Christianity" is based on the religious fanaticism which even now binds the petty peasantry, in spite of the need and oppression under which they live, to the ruling classes. The most important task of the Communists in the rural districts if they are to cancel this influence is to disseminate the real truth about the industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture in Socialist Russia, to make clear the absolute hopelessness of capitalism and the rôle which the church plays as the sentinel of the gold bag, to explain that the proletarian dictatorship, founded on a union of workers and peasants following the example of the U.S.S.R., is the only way out. It is precisely the emphasis at the present time on the revolutionary ultimate goal that will attract the wide masses to our side. The revolutionary struggle against imperialist armaments and colonial oppression must be connected with it. We must increase the organisational aspect of this work through the 1st of August anti-war committees, and by sending delegations to the U.S.S.R.

## THE RED ARMY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

By G. SINANI.

### I.

**A**LREADY for more than half a year the Nanking Government, supported by the imperialists, has strained every nerve in order to destroy the Red Army in the Soviet regions of China and to crush the Soviet Union. To this end the best Kuomintang forces were thrown into the province of Kwangsi, which represents at the present time the basic centre of development of the agrarian revolution, headed by the most capable generals. To this end there were concentrated in Kwangsi more than 300,000 troops equipped with all the appliances of imperialist military technique, including even aeroplanes, tanks and poison gas. To this end the forces of the imperialists have participated in the most direct and open manner in the struggle, directly opening fire on the Red forces with the heavy artillery of their gunboats.

And in spite of all this furious attack of the allied forces of Chinese and imperialist reaction, they have not only not been able up to now to break and destroy the Red Army—for which purpose Chiang Kai-shek has again been granted an unalterable three months period—but these forces have even proved incapable of inflicting a single serious defeat on the Red Army.

In spite of inadequate armament, in spite of the serious lack of skilled commanders, in spite of

lack of clothing and equipment, not even having a breathing space sufficient to make it possible to provide footwear for the new tens of thousands of fighters, the Red Army of the Chinese Revolution, instead of being shattered to bits according to the plans of the German Fascist advisers on the Staff of Chiang Kai-shek, has itself shattered one after another the attacking White Divisions.

The imperialist newspapers write, with gnashing of teeth, about the genius of the Red Generals and about the dilatoriness of the Kuomintang Generals, attempting to represent the lack of success of all the punitive expeditions as the result of the pressure of "accidental" circumstances. But they are now also unable to conceal, just as the press of the Chinese Whites is also unable to conceal, that the Red Army enjoys the support of the population (i.e., of the workers and the basic poor and middle peasant masses), and that this population hides itself on the approach of the Kuomintang armies.

The Chinese Red Army is victorious because it is an army of revolution, because the basic source of its strength is the powerful revolutionary movement of the masses. This is beginning to be understood even by the most thorough-paced bourgeois scribblers. But to recognise this means to recognise that the basis of the reaction is not broader than the sharp bayonets of its army, and

that the path of the Red Army will proceed from partial victories to a general destruction of the armed forces of the bourgeois-landlord and imperialist counter-revolution.

Hence it is that, beginning to understand in what lies the "secret" of the victories of the Red Army, imperialism is especially interested in draping the Nanking Government of the Kuomintang and its head executioner, Chiang Kai-shek, in the robes of fighters for the "National" unification and liberation of China in order to crown him with laurels as "also a revolutionary." It is precisely this social command which is being fulfilled by the whole of international Social Democracy—from Vandervelde and Thomas to Trotsky, inclusively—which is foaming at the mouth and crying out about "Communist bandits," carefully concealing the "peaceful tendency" of the White terror, the shootings, the executions, cutting off of heads, punitive expeditions, and triumphant sessions of the Constituent Assembly, nominated not even by the Government as a whole, but by the Chiang Kai-shek clique.

To divert the attention of the international proletariat from the Chinese Revolution, to deprive it of the support of the working class of the capitalist countries, to isolate it and thereby to facilitate the open intervention against Soviet China—such is the inner meaning of the slanders of the Trotskyists, Chen Du-hsiuists and other Social Fascists against the Chinese Revolution and its Red Army. The exposure of these slanders, the unmasking of their revolutionary character and the assistance in every way of the Chinese Revolution constitutes the duty for all Communist Parties and, in the first place, for the Communist Parties of the U.S.A., Britain, Japan and France.

## II.

One of the peculiarities in the development of the Chinese Revolution which has determined a whole number of characteristic features in the development of the Red Army is the inequality in the ripening of the revolutionary crisis and the possibility of the victory of the Revolution occurring first of all in a whole series of districts of the country isolated from one another and not of a decisive character from an economic and political point of view.

This inequality in the ripening of the Revolution is determined by the state of economic and political disorganisation of the country, by the diversity in agrarian relations in the different regions, by the occupation in effect of the chief industrial centres by the armed forces of the imperialists, by the struggle of the militarists' cliques and of the imperialist Powers standing behind them, by the lack of uniformity in the influence of the industrial

proletariat over the poor peasants of the Chinese villages and, finally, by differences in the revolutionary history of the last years.

The association of profound agrarian crisis with the most extreme oppression on the part of the landlords (the largest percentage of land owned by landlords and, correspondingly, the highest percentage of tenant poverty), with insufficiently strong influence of the proletariat of the industrial centres, and with the weakness of the Kuomintang troops of occupation—these factors have created in Southern China the most favourable circumstances for a revolutionary upheaval. At the same time it is precisely here—especially in Kwangsi, Hunan and parts of Hupeh—that the peasant movement was deepest during the period of revolution in 1926-1927, and it is precisely here that the peasantry drew from this revolution the greatest political lessons and the greatest organisational experience. The association of a favourable objective situation with the greatest historical preparation quickly converted these provinces into the most important region of revolutionary struggle.

The great distances and extremely bad roads and means of communication, the mountainous character of the localities, the drawing away of the chief forces of the Kuomintang armies in the militarist squabbles in the North of China and the struggle of the imperialists in the immediate neighbourhood of Canton, hindering their direct interference for armed suppression of the revolutionary movement in the interior of the country—all this gave the possibility for a whole number of peasant risings to achieve a certain military respite literally on the day after their victory. The possibility of a relative breathing space led not only to the rapid extension and deepening of the revolutionary peasant movement, but also to the possibility of rapid organisation of the armed forces of the revolution. Partisan bands with which Kwangsi and Hunan already teemed before the beginning of the open mass outbreaks of peasant revolution, were quickly converted into powerful detachments and increased in size many times at the expense of the peasantry flowing to join them.

The possibility of victory over the armed bodyguards of the landlords (Mintuans) and over the petty detachments of Kuomintang troops, and, at the same time, the necessity of stubborn struggle against the more powerful punitive expeditions, cemented and consolidated these detachments. The growth of the revolutionary movement in the towns strengthened the flow of workers who already, during the first stages of the struggle, frequently came forward as organisers of the partisan detachments. The

leading rôle—politically and militarily—of the Communist Party to a tremendous degree facilitated and hastened not only the development of the mass movement, but also the creation of a firm organisation of the armed forces. In place of the scattered partisan detachments there were organised so-called “corps,” the numerical strength of which sometimes reached 8,000 to 10,000 men (e.g., the IV. Corps of Chu-Teh and Mao Tseh-tung). In 1931 the various Corps in their turn began to be united into armies.

Thus the inequality in the development of the revolution and its initial victories in various regions separated from one another led to the organisation of a Red Army beginning simultaneously in different regions of the country. The revolution could not all at once create a united Red Army. Its nuclei were simultaneously built up in Kwangsi, Hunan, Hupeh, Fukien and Kwangtung. But the further development of the revolution as well as the operative necessity of unification to meet the superior forces of the opponent, raised with the utmost urgency the questions of the centralisation of the army, the introduction of uniformity into its organisation, the co-ordination in action of its constituent parts and the guaranteeing of complete unity in its political line.

The formation over an enormous territory of a whole series of completely independent partisan and semi-partisan Red detachments, their intense struggle with the Kuomintang armies and after that their unification into a single Red Army—this is one of the most characteristic peculiarities in the development of the armed forces of the Chinese revolution, distinguishing its history from the history of the Red Armies of the Soviet Union which basically were formed all at once as a single centralised force.

The second peculiarity in the development of the Chinese Red Army is that it arose first of all in regions far removed from the big proletarian centres as an army of the agrarian revolution. Consequently it could not, from the outset, possess such a strong proletarian kernel as had the Red Armies of the U.S.S.R., from which follow also deviations from the correct political line, great difficulties in the work of centralising the armies and greater persistence of partisan tendencies at the very moment when these were being converted into a brake hindering the rapid growth of the army.

The third feature to which attention must be called is that the Red Army began to be consolidated from separate corps and detachments into a more or less centralised military force before the creation of a central Soviet Government, before the unification of the basic Soviet regions into a

single Soviet State. This circumstance which gives rise to a whole number of difficulties along the path of centralisation at the same time particularly emphasises and strengthens the uniting and organising rôle of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Red Army was created before the victory of the revolution in a great part of the country, in particular, before its victory in the big proletarian centres where the revolutionary activity of the working class was fettered not so much by the Kuomintang terror as by the bayonets of the imperialists and the armaments of their war vessels. But the development of the revolution will inevitably outstrip and is already outstripping the military operations of the Red Army. This determines the rapid collapse of the Kuomintang armies, the huge growth in desertions from these armies and refusals to march against the Red forces, mass surrenders and the growth of military insurrections. It determines the rapid growth of peasant risings and of the partisan movement in the rear of the White armies. It will determine also, as was already demonstrated by the experience of the capture of Changsha in 1930, that the struggle of the Red Army for the towns will be bound up with the strengthening in the towns of the workers' movement, which at the moment of its success reaches the level of open insurrection. The same thing—although in a different historical situation and under a different distribution of class forces—is testified to by the experience of the Shanghai risings in 1927 on the approach of the Canton Army from the South.

Thus the continual inter-weaving of the struggle of the regular Red Army with insurrections and partisan struggle—to a considerably greater degree than was the case on the chief war fronts of the Red Army of the U.S.S.R.—represents one of the characteristic features of the civil war in China. It is precisely this close association of war and insurrection which has determined that the relatively weak Red Armies of Kwangsi have already been successful several times in inflicting serious defeats on the numerically and technically stronger armies of the Nanking Government.

It is precisely for this reason that, in spite of the fact that in a number of regions the Red Army has already become the chief, basic and decisive factor of the armed struggle of the revolution, any under-estimation of the significance of the partisan struggle of the wide peasant masses, which frequently arises spontaneously without any direct leadership or plan, would present a very grave mistake. It was exactly this mistake of non-understanding of the significance of the immediate armed struggle of the masses which was committed by the Li Li-san leadership of the



Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the summer of 1930, when, under the slogan of concentration of weapons, it attempted to disarm the partisan detachments.

The development of the armed forces together with the strengthening of the revolution and the creation of a firm government inevitably demands in the future the resolute overcoming of the partisan character as the form of peasant struggle, but preserving it as a technical weapon of struggle to which even the strongest regular army can and must have recourse in dependence on the situation. But at the present moment any attempt to divorce the Red Army from the whole live fabric of the armed forces of the revolution and to look upon its organised development and fighting history outside of connection with the direct spontaneous struggle of the masses, would mean a non-understanding of the dialectics of the development of the army itself and the non-understanding of the concrete peculiarities of the development of the Chinese Revolution.

All this, of course, by no means lessens the importance of the struggle for the most rapid development possible of a powerful Red Army as the basic, although not the sole, form of military-revolutionary struggle in the Soviet regions of China.

### III.

The regular Red Army began to be organised in China on the basis of the growing agrarian revolution in the middle of 1929. The kernel of the majority of its best sections was provided by those partisan detachments which, under the very difficult conditions of the reaction and destruction of the mass movement, were conducting a struggle already from the autumn of 1927.

The basic region of activity of the partisans in 1927 to 1929 was the mountainous region round the junction of the provinces of Kwangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung and Fukien. It was just here that there operated the so-called "partisan" army" of Chu Teh and Mao Tseh-tung. It was constituted from the relics of the army of Ho Lung and Yeh Tin which was dispersed at Swatow after the unsuccessful march from Nanchang, the regiment of Chu Teh, and which was joined by the so-called "peasant army" of Hunan under the leadership of Mao Tseh-tung. In the composition of this peasant army there entered the most active elements of the risings in Lai-lin and round about Changsha, who did not wish to lay down their arms after the victory of the reaction. Finally, there also entered into the partisan army relics of the instructional regiment, together with workers associated with it, which had formed the fighting nucleus of the Canton Commune, and which col-

lapsed after the suppression of the latter by the ring of armies of the militarist Generals.

Almost simultaneously with the partisan army of Chu Teh and Mao Tseh-tung, there was organised also another centre of the partisan movement at the junction of North-Western Hunan and Hupeh headed by Ho Lung. A whole series of less important partisan detachments also made their appearance from the end of 1927 in many other districts of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan and Fukien.

The bourgeois-feudal reaction, with the support of the imperialists, succeeded in inflicting a serious defeat on the revolution of 1925 to 1927, driving the Communist Party underground, destroying and draining of blood the Shanghai and Wuhan proletariat, drowning in blood the Communards of the Canton Commune which, for the first time in the colonies, raised by the hands of the workers the banner of the Soviets, and succeeded by furious terror, mass murder and the destruction and burning of villages in "pacifying" the peasant movement. But the Kuomintang Government was already powerless to deal with the partisan movement which operated with the sympathy of the wide masses of the poor and middle peasants.

The punitive forces more than once succeeded in destroying isolated partisan detachments and at the end of 1928 succeeded in inflicting serious defeat on the chief kernel of the partisan movement, the army of Chu Teh and Mao Tseh-tung, when it destroyed the latter's base in the mountains Tsinganshan. But, not having settled a single one of the tasks standing before the revolution, not having removed a single one of the basic causes of the mass revolutionary movement, the Kuomintang Government was only able to rule by means of a régime of the fiercest terror. The dissatisfaction of the masses, sometimes leading in desperation even to absolutely hopeless insurrections, could not be destroyed. Precisely this dissatisfaction was the source of the persistence of the partisan detachments which emerged again and again even after heavy defeats.

Being an expression of the revolutionary mood of the peasantry, receiving support from the latter—food, shelter, information about the enemy and a continual influx of the most active elements in the village—the partisan detachments were at the same time an extremely important factor for the activation of the peasant movement. From 1929 the latter began to take an upward course, first of all in the regions which were most permeated by partisan detachments. The Communist Party of China which headed the partisan struggle succeeded in making the partisans, in the eyes of the wide masses of poor and middle peasants, the defenders of the class interests of the latter. The

partisans conducted their struggle under the slogans of the agrarian peasant revolution, along the path of merciless destruction of the landlords and division of their lands, under the slogans of the overthrow of the bloody régime of the Kuomintang and the organisation of Soviets. The Communist Party of China could lead the partisan struggle and put itself at the head of the growing upsurge of the peasant movement only by destroying Right opportunism in its own ranks and only by sharpening the class character of its immediate demands.

Up to the middle of 1929—the date, of course, is approximate—the partisan movement, though enjoying the sympathy and support of the peasantry, did not, however, take on a broad mass character. The new wave of rising agrarian revolution, beginning with the second half of 1929, raised the armed struggle to a new plane. The peasant movement more and more took on the form of open insurrections directed against the landlords and the power of the Kuomintang. Partisan detachments sprang up like mushrooms after rain, their numerical strength multiplied many times, they united for joint action against the punitive expeditions of the Kuomintang troops, they strengthened their internal organisation and from the end of 1929, under the leadership of the Party, the most important partisan detachments were converted into separate, for the time being still independent, “corps” of a regular Red Army.

However, these corps, as a rule, still did not possess their own territory, there was no civil power standing behind them as the organiser of the class struggle of the masses as a whole, they were completely independent from one another—it was the Party and not a united system of military organisation which connected them with one another and directed their struggle. The young corps of the Red Army still bore a semi-partisan character, the birthmarks of partisanship were still comparatively strong. At the same time, however, they were already sections with a more or less firm internal structure, they were already sections fighting for the creation of the Soviet power in definite regions, they were already sections which looked upon themselves as the weapon of the emerging Soviet State order, they were, finally, sections which under the leadership of the Party passed more and more from political unification to military unification. This was not a simple summation of the independent partisan detachments but an incipient organisation, though still weak and incomplete, of the organisation now emerging of a regular Red Army.

The connections between the separate corps of the Red Army are growing along with the further

development of the agrarian revolution, with the extension of its struggle over an ever wider territory, with the growth and consolidation of the Soviet regions, with the growth of class-consciousness of the exploited peasant masses, and with the strengthening of the rôle of the proletariat and of its Communist Party in the leadership of the growing revolutionary movement of the peasantry. The pre-requisites for the unification of the separate semi-partisan corps into a single Red Army are rapidly growing—in the second half of 1930 the urgency of this task was clearly formulated in the decisions of the Communist International.

At the same time the binding of the separate corps into a united monolithic army becomes more and more an operative necessity. The growth of the agrarian revolution, the organisation of Soviet regions, the success of the Red Army (especially the capture of Changsha and the growth of the workers' and peasants' movement over the whole of China) have compelled the bourgeois-feudal Kuomintang Government and the imperialists to attempt to deliver a crushing blow against the revolution. Into Kwangsi—the basic citadel of the Red Army—were thrown almost 200,000 Kuomintang troops, and after the first failures their number was even increased.

The Red Army was faced with a tremendous danger of the most serious military defeat and destruction which would have thrown the whole movement back. But it was precisely the blows of this hammer which assisted the Party in forging the closest unity in the Red Army. It was possible to struggle against the “punitive expeditions”—Chiang Kai-shek did not consider it necessary to humble himself by carrying on a “war” with the “Red bandits”—only after uniting and co-ordinating the activities of the separate corps and only by co-ordinating the struggle at the front against the White armies with the struggle far back in the rear and along the lines of communication. The spontaneously occurring mutual activities of the corps, determined by their common military-political aims, was already insufficient. The threatening danger accelerated their fusion and consolidation.

The pressure of the counter-revolution proved, from the point of view of the development of the military organisation, as effective as the development of the revolution. Paraphrasing the well-known words of Marx, it is possible to say that the reaction consolidated and organised the forces of revolution. In 1931, the basic corps of the Red Army were organised into four armies—the First and Third in Kwangsi headed by Chu Teh and Pin Di-hua and under the general command of Chu Teh (the President of the General Military

Council is Comrade Mao Tseh-tung, a member of the Political Bureau and Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), the Second Army under the command of Ho Lung in Hupeh-Hunan, and the Fourth Army in the new wide Soviet region round the junction of the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei.

It would, of course, be a mistake to think that these new army groupings have already ceased to bear any traces of the past history of the separate corps and that we already possess in all respects a united and centralised army. The tasks of the internal construction of the Red Army and of the strengthening of its organisational unity are still in no way smaller than the tasks of increasing the numerical strength of the Army. For strengthening its fighting capacity there exist still very great "internal reserves" which will be revealed along with the development of the struggle and for the exploitation of which the Party as a whole and the leadership of the Red Army must still carry on much work. In any case, 1931 witnessed an enormous step forward in the building up of the armed forces of the Revolution—the success in passing basically from separate independent corps and from separate "regular detachments" to a unified system of separate armies.

Such in its general features has been the history of development of the Chinese Red Army.

## V.

The basic military kernel of the powerful partisan detachments of 1927-1928 was constituted by the soldiers of the revolutionary sections of the Canton National - Revolutionary Army. As already mentioned above, they were joined by some small detachments of workers from Canton who had fled after the crushing of the Canton Commune and by peasant detachments from Hunan, Kwangsi and Eastern Kwangtung. The workers and peasants, led by the Communist Party, determined the social-political character of the partisan detachments, their composition and their political line. But in consequence of the almost entire absence among them of any military experience it was the ex-soldiers who provided the cadres which united them into a military organisation. At the time when a considerable rôle in the big partisan detachments was played by the relics of the Canton Army, the smaller detachments consisted almost exclusively of peasants and were for the most part connected with the population of particular regions.

Of the defects of the partisan movement of the early period must be mentioned the loss in certain cases of political perspectives, which led sometimes to partial and aimless movements from one

region to another even without pressure from the enemy, and to a certain separation from the peasant masses and connection with ostensibly revolutionary bandit detachments. The latter in their turn had a disruptive effect on the partisan detachments, since they did not possess any strong proletarian or Party nucleus, leading in some cases even to their direct degeneration into bandits.

Such cases were not numerous; the basic mass of the partisan detachments preserved a clear revolutionary line and carried on a decisive struggle, including punishment by shooting, against any phenomena of banditry occurring in their midst. But the question of the relations with the bandits has this interest, that the bandits in China have a mass character—about one and a half to two million persons in the whole country—composed primarily from the ruined small peasants and therefore possessing by no means a criminal but rather a social-political character.

Sometimes the bandits carried on a stubborn fight with the militarists, frequently in this making use of the sympathy and even support of the ruined landlords and peasant generals (Shantung, etc.). But, as a rule, the bandits were headed by criminal or adventurist elements, frequently connected with the militarists. This banditry quickly imposed its mark on the former peasants and remoulded their consciousness, separating their interests from the interests of the wide mass of the peasants and destroying their efforts towards productive labour.

The basic mass of the partisan detachments, under the leadership of the Party, correctly solved this question—by struggle with all attempts at fusion of partisan and bandit detachments, the individual acceptance by the partisans only of separate rank and file bandits and not their chiefs, and by strict supervision of the attitude of former bandits towards the peasants. The correct solution of this question was made easier by the fact that, together with the development of the revolutionary peasant movement, the landowners, gentry and representatives of power more and more frequently succeeded in buying over the bandits for struggle against the partisans. The rapid re-orientation of the bandit cadres in connection with counter-revolution proceeded the more easily in that the development of the mass revolutionary movement provided an entirely different way out for the desperate pauperised strata of the peasantry. Losing connection with the most impoverished peasant masses, which were passing from bandit attempts at individual salvation from starvation to revolutionary struggle for the land, the bandit detachments quickly acquired a criminal character and widely utilised counter-revolutionary

and hired landlord assistance for the petty-partisan struggle with the revolution.

The practice of the whole further course of struggle in the Soviet regions has shown that banditry as a mass phenomenon disappears where the agrarian revolutionary struggle develops, and it is necessary for the Red Army to carry on a decisive armed struggle against the remaining bandit detachments. Basically, the question of relations with the "revolutionary" bandit detachments has already in the majority of Soviet regions been removed by the course of the struggle itself. But it has been necessary to dwell on it in some detail because, with the widening of the territory of the agrarian revolution and with the occupation by the latter of new regions in the mountainous West of middle China and of the Kuan Heh basin, i.e., those regions where the bandits are strongest and most numerous, the question of relations with these will arise again and again. However, its decision will be the easier because it has already been decided not in relation to partisan detachments still inadequately under the organisational leadership of the Party, but in relation to a strong regular Red Army and to a partisan movement which is connected with this and controlled by it.

The tempestuous growth of the revolutionary peasant movement from the end of 1929, which took place basically under the political leadership of the Party so that the latter determined its transition from petty partisan detachments to powerful semi-partisan corps, also led, in the first place, to a decisive alteration in its peasant character and, in the second place, to the strengthening of its working-class nucleus. The latter change has been taking place particularly rapidly since the beginning of 1931. The workers' revolts in Daiyeh and Pinsan are leading to the

recruitment into the Red Army of whole working-class sections.

After the interference of the French troops in the struggle of the Red Army in the Kwangsi province, the workers of the town of Lungchow have formed their own Red detachments. The flight of workers from Hunan, Changsha and other towns into the Red Army has been strengthened. In the summer of 1930, before the surrender of Changsha to the Whites, numerous armed detachments of workers left the city and went into the army. Finally, although by no means on a mass scale, there have entered into the Red Army in spite of the efforts of the White armies, even workers from Shanghai, Canton and other industrial centres. The army is acquiring a strong working-class nucleus, the distribution of which in the different corps still remains extremely unequal. However, precisely this inequality and the preponderance of the workers in the basic corps of the Red Army—led by Chu Teh and Pen Deh-hui—facilitates their internal consolidation to an extraordinary degree, their further growth as the central corps of the Red Army and assists them to collect and organise around themselves other corps and detachments.

It should not be thought, however, that the growth of the Red Army is proceeding everywhere uniformly and smoothly. Alongside of it are growing other mass armed organisations. In the first place it is necessary to mention as a very characteristic phenomenon of the Chinese revolution, dependent primarily on the inequality of its development and because it is victorious earlier in the villages than in the towns, viz., the organisation of the so-called "Red Peasant Guard."

*(To be concluded.)*