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Editorial:

Lenin's Plan

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The Lines of Development of Modern Persia



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The Historical Verification of Lenin's Plan

1. Leninism or Reformism.

IN the discussion within the C.P.S.U. during the period between the 14th and the 15th Party Conferences the dispute between the Party and the "new opposition" was predominantly a theoretical one concerning the interpretation of Lenin's strategic plan. The "new opposition" interpreted Lenin in the sense that although the Soviet Republic is building Socialism, yet owing to technical backwardness, it will be unable to finish it unless a victorious world revolution comes to its aid. The Party majority interpreted Lenin in a fundamentally different sense: i.e., the Soviet Republic has all the necessary internal resources for the building of Socialism, it has the possibility of finishing its building if the process of construction is not interrupted by interventions, and the very fact of the successful building of socialism in U.S.S.R. is a mighty stimulus to world revolution.

IN the dispute as to the interpretation of Lenin the Party as a whole stood for the point of view of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U., and decisively rejected that of the opposition. In the present discussion the question is no longer one of this or that interpretation of Lenin, but of the practical verification of Lenin's strategic plan. After ten years of existence of the Soviet Government, and after five years of Socialist construction the C.P.S.U. has the possibility of verifying on the basis of experience whether the U.S.S.R. is going forward with confident steps towards Socialism or whether we in the Union are reverting to capitalism.

This is the point over which the Party is at issue with the Trotskyist opposition at the present time, and this dispute has an enormous significance of principle not only for the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. but for all the international proletariat; for the settlement of the question in one way or the other during the present historical epoch will predetermine the road to Socialism taken by the proletariat of all capitalist countries. It is not difficult to arrive at the conviction that behind this dispute is *in the last resort* hidden a dispute between Marxism-Leninism on the one hand, and reformism on the other.

WHEN at the beginning of the 20th century a dispute first broke out in the Second International between the Marxists and the Revisionists, the Marxists, while defending the method of social revolution against the method of social reform, had still an extraordinarily vague conception of the character of the coming social revolution, because for them it was the "music of the future." Consequently they entirely ignored the problem of costs. When at the beginning of the world war the question of the conquest of power by the proletariat became one of the moment, when we passed into the epoch of wars and revolutions, when Lenin concretely indicated the road towards Socialism through the military defeat of the bourgeois governments, through the break-up of the old multi-national States linked together with the chains of national oppression, through the destruction of all the old State apparatus of compulsion, through the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in a word, **through immense economic and social disturbances**, nine-tenths of the former Marxists were frightened by this terrible prospect and fled from the field, acknowledging that in their old dispute with the revisionists the latter were right. Kautsky for example, repudiating his past, set to work to prove that we should pass to Socialism without civil war, that "in the place of a struggle between revolutionaries and government troops will develop a struggle between parties for the winning of adherents by way of the press and meetings, and the struggle of the parties in the division lobbies within parliament itself." He began to declare "that we have need of this **tranquil, unbroken process of production**, without which the workers cannot continue to exist." He began to extol the workers' aristocracy which "forms the rising section of the proletariat." He attempted to demonstrate that, despite Marx, the transition period between the capitalist and the Communist society will be not that of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but of a system "in which the government as a general rule will be cast in the form of a coalition government." While earlier, in his book, "The Struggle for Power" he considered that the social revolution should break out first of all in Germany, he now decided that Germany must concede this honour to others, for "the war with its consequences has ruined

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Germany, and thus has slowed down the tempo of possible social progress. The moral and intellectual decline of the population has had still greater effect in this direction." With these same arguments—the necessity of avoiding **economic catastrophes and the decline of productive forces**—other former Marxists also justified their repudiation of social revolution.

As distinct from the beginning of the 20th century the division between Marxism and reformism now passes along another line. Now the only Marxists are the Leninists, who are not afraid of the road to Socialism lying by way of economic catastrophes and disturbances; while all the former Marxists, who are afraid of these economic catastrophes, have abandoned Marxism, have become renegades from Marxism and have openly ranged themselves under the standard of reformism.

IT is quite obvious that the present dispute between Leninism and Reformism on the international scale is connected in the closest fashion with the dispute within the C.P.S.U., between the Party majority and the Trotskyist opposition on the question whether in the economically backward Soviet Republic, having lived through enormous economic devastation as the result of the world and civil wars, we are moving forward to Socialism, or whether, just because of the backwardness and ruin of the country we are going right back to capitalism. Any leader of the working class movement in a capitalist country who acknowledges that U.S.S.R. is at present steadily moving forward towards Socialism is ipso facto acknowledging that the proletariat of his country must also take the Bolshevik road, that the proletariat of his country also has no justification for fearing the economic ruin connected with a civil war, that they have no justification for fearing a temporary halt in the "tranquil, unbroken process of production." The recognition of the fact of the impoverished U.S.S.R.'s successful progress towards Socialism is the most damning argument against the social-democrats, who, from fear of the Bolshevik road, which they claim to be ruinous for Socialism, have preferred to conclude a civil peace with their native bourgeoisie, whose only gift so far has been fresh chains for the western European proletariat. It is not surprising that the entire international social-democracy should now joyfully take up the declarations of the Trotskyist opposition concerning the Soviet "Thermidor"; it is not surprising that even the Menshevik "Socialist Messenger" (Sozialistichesky Vjestnik) now welcomes the Trotskyist opposition and writes in a leading article concerning them: "Certain of the opposition theories cannot but meet with a **general response**. Its characterisation of the degenerating dictatorship is largely correct and corresponds with actuality. Maybe in certain points it is not new, maybe it is borrowed from **political opponents** [i.e., from the Social-Democrats: Ed.] but is that the point? What is important is that it is correct that the opposition publicly states something which hitherto could only be said in the underground Socialist press. Trotsky is right—that is the true picture, and whither this evolution will lead is a subject about which we shall have to write more than once again."

2. The U.S.S.R. Proletariat has Given its Vote for Leninism

THE international social-democracy, attentively following the discussion in the C.P.S.U., has given its vote for Trotsky, for the Trotskyist opposition. But the revolutionary proletariat of the U.S.S.R. has by an enormous majority given its vote against the Trotskyist opposition and for the Leninist party of the C.P.S.U.

The Trotskyist opposition was and is without any squeamishness in regard to bribing the workers with demagogic promises and demagogic accusations. In its counter-theses, published in the "Pravda" discussion sheet, the Trotskyist opposition expresses its greatest "alarm" for the fate of the U.S.S.R. proletariat. In these theses we read: "Every Communist is anxiously asking himself the question: What is to happen next in regard to unemployment; is it really possible that there is no light whatever in front? . . . Every Communist is asking himself a second, no less important and disturbing question: What will be the situation in the next few years in regard to the goods famine? . . . will the goods famine be "outlived" only in the speeches of comrades Mikoyan and Bukharin, or will the supply of goods really begin to cover the demand?" Further, the theses ask: "And when, finally, will the housing needs of the workers be satisfied? And what is to happen in regard to wages?" "Real wages are this year only very slightly higher than the level of autumn, 1925." "The presumption as to the rise in real wages is unreal." "The rise of wages is lagging behind the rise in productivity of labour." "The intensification of labour processes is increasing, the load on the workers' muscles is growing heavier." The C.C. of the C.P.S.U. has truly given the workers a "jubilee gift,"—a seven hour day, but "nothing definite, clear and categorical has been said as to when it will be introduced." And moreover, if the Soviet Government has resources enabling it to introduce a seven hour day, then "the workers themselves should be asked: To what end should these resources be first directed, to a rise of wages, for housing construction, or for a seven hour day? And why did the C.C. not ask the workers their opinion on this?"

THE opposition deliberately and hypocritically lies. It knows quite well that unemployment in U.S.S.R. has different roots from unemployment in capitalist countries. There it is the product of capitalist development itself, the result of the ruin of the peasantry by trade capital and elimination of the small by the large producer in the competitive struggle. Here in the U.S.S.R. economic policy on the contrary is directed towards the raising of the smaller unit, towards co-operation and its attraction into the Socialist structure. Here unemployment is not the product of Soviet economy, but the heritage of the past, the result of the economic backwardness of the country, the over-population of the village and its ruin as the result of the world and the civil wars. The opposition knows that this unemployment can be outlived finally only as the result of the gradual intensification of village economy and the industrialisation of the country over a number of

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years, and that all the efforts of the Party are already directed towards this end. The opposition knows that the Soviet Government is already spending 120 million roubles on unemployment, that over the last two years unemployed relief has increased by 90 per cent.; it knows or it could ascertain for itself that through the introduction of the seven hour day alone the reduction in unemployment will amount to approximately 600,000 men over five years, that towards the end of the five year period unemployment in U.S.S.R. will be reduced as a consequence by 20 to 34 per cent.—and still it talks of a cul-de-sac.

JUST as hypocritical are its accusations that the Soviet Government does not struggle hard enough, that thanks to its general political direction it is impotent to struggle against the goods famine. The opposition knows that the goods famine is also a result inherited from the past disproportion between the dimensions of industry and of agriculture in the backward Soviet Republic, it knows that the goods famine can be finally outlived only as the country is industrialised, to which end all the efforts of the Soviet Government are being directed. The opposition knows also that the **severe form** of the goods famine which recently manifested itself in queues at the shops is explained by seasonal conditions, and that it is already liquidated; that during the past year 1926-27, with a growth in the purchasing power of the population by 7.3 per cent. the supply of industrial goods rose more swiftly, by 11.6 per cent.; that during the current 1927-28 year the Gosplan Control Figures postulate a further increase in demand for industrial goods of only 5.1 per cent. in face of a rise in supply by 7.7 per cent. Finally, the opposition knows, or could ascertain for itself, that as the result merely of the increase in number of shifts arising out of the seven hour day, industrial production in the one year, the last of the five year period, 1931-32, will give a rise in production to the equivalent of approximately 1.3 milliard roubles. (Comrade Strumilin's statement).

EQUALLY hypocritical are the accusations made by the opposition on the housing question. The opposition knows that the housing crisis is a universal phenomenon, the result of the world and civil wars; that the State's expenditure in the sphere of housing construction in the social sector has increased more than three times during three years: that thanks to this the inroads into the basic housing fund have already ceased; that in the future five years it is expected to achieve an increase in the housing space for inhabitants of houses belonging to industry to 11.5 cubic arshins,* instead of the now existing 10.2 cubic arshins; that simultaneously it is proposed to satisfy the housing needs of about 300,000 new workers in 1931-32. None the less the opposition croaks that the housing needs of the workers will grow more and more severe.

* One arshin equals 28 inches.

PARTICULARLY slanderous are the opposition's statements that the real wage has not increased during the past two years. The opposition knows that the real wage in the U.S.S.R. grows steadily from year to year, that during the past two years the real workers' wage has grown by 18.5 per cent., that at the present time it stands at the level of 111.3 per cent. of the wages of 1913 with a working day cut down by 23 per cent.; that if the additional expenditures and supplementary benefits are added to the wage, the worker's wage at the present time is on the average 34 per cent. higher than in 1913. And all the information it has speaks of an arrest in the rise of wages!

FINALLY, the opposition knows that the introduction of the seven hour day is not being put off for an indefinite period, that it is already beginning to be introduced. It would not have been difficult for it to ascertain in Gosplan that it is proposed to transfer 25 to 30 per cent. of all the industrial workers to the seven hour day during this coming year, that it is proposed to transfer all planned industry to a seven hour day during the course of the next four years, and still they insinuate that the seven hour day is an empty piece of propaganda.

The opposition specifically lies, only its lies are clothed in the attractive form of solely the "love of the worker, exclusively out of solicitude for the workers"; and despite this the working class of the U.S.S.R. have shown themselves completely deaf to the sweet singing of the opposition sirens.

DESPITE all the demagogic accusations which the opposition makes against the Party and despite all its irresponsible demagogic promises to the proletariat, inviting them into their shop, the Party and non-party workers have equally unanimously declared themselves against the Trotskyist opposition and for the Leninist party of the C.P.S.U.

From the beginning of the Party discussion until November 19th, 490,021 votes were given in favour of the C.C. line against 2,993, or 0.6 per cent. of those present at Party nucleus meetings; 1,822 or 0.4 per cent. did not vote. Thus throughout all the Soviet Republic rather more than half per cent. only of the members of the Party stand for the opposition. While if the nuclei of the educational institutions are excluded and only industrial nuclei are reckoned, it appears that the opposition percentage is still smaller. This is obvious from the fact that in Leningrad for example, in the group of workers' aggregates only 0.8 per cent. of those present voted against the C.C. theses, while in the educational institutions only 2.2 voted against. The same holds good of Moscow, where the opposition is stronger; here in the educational nuclei four per cent. voted against the C.C. line, while in the industrial and transport nuclei the voting was only 1.3 per cent. against. Thus even that insignificant section of Party members who vote for the opposition consists mainly of the intelligentsia. Those very workers into whose good graces the opposition are trying to worm themselves, have least confidence in them.

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THE masses of non-party workers are just as definitely against the opposition and on the side of the Party. While the Trotskyist opposition is endeavouring by all means to calumniate the Party and its leadership, the non-party masses have expressed the greatest readiness to enter the Party; and it was sufficient for the C.C. to issue the necessary call for 30,000 non-party workers to hand in requests for acceptance into Party membership during the ten days up to November 18th; while the majority of those workers entering the Party belong to the active section of workers, to qualified workers of a high grade. As for the political attitude of these non-party workers, one can judge of it from the dozens of letters coming from time to time to the "Pravda" office. "We are for the C.C., for the real Leninists against the opposition slanderers and underground activists—so declare all the workers," writes a non-party worker, the concrete-worker, Urin. "Under the direction of the C.C. the non-party worker will defend not only the territorial frontiers of the Soviet Union, but also the frontiers of Leninist teaching. The Socialist train of the Lenin party is driving full steam ahead towards the station "Communism"; it flies past the blockades, wars, and all social-democratic platforms; it will increase its speed still more and drive over those who think to bring it to a standstill." "I am one who has spent a long time at the front," writes the non-party worker Trusov to Trotsky; "one who decorated the corner of my room with your portrait; but now I, a worker in the first mechanical transport battalion, like all the other workers, do not like your 'fog,' do not like your 'printing works,' do not like your 'platform,' do not like any of your 'opposition slander' of our Party. I add one more vote for your exclusion from the proletarian family." In the same tone write a non-party Arzamas worker Agaphonov, the Don Basin worker, Burlakin, a Saratov working woman Shapkin, a Samara worker Konavalov, and the Vetlugan Maximov. The Moscow metal worker, Bekov, writes: "Trotsky, Zinoviev and others like them are at present only weeds in the Socialist field. Those weeds must be pulled up. We workers regard the betrayal of the Party as the betrayal of the working class." In the same tone write a Dniepropetrovsk non-party worker and many others.

The working mass of the U.S.S.R. will not submit to the demagogy of the Trotskyist opposition, because they have become convinced of its insincerity, because they are convinced that it has degenerated and is carrying on a dishonest undermining of the Party which earlier it helped to build up.

3. The Opposition's Unsuccessful Disguise

THE Trotskyist opposition gives a completely false and purely Menshevik evaluation of the U.S.S.R.'s present economic position. This evaluation arises partly out of ill-natured demagogic considerations, partly from the opposition's inveterate pessimism and mistrust. But having become convinced that this mistrust is in the strongest discordance with the bold attitude of the broad Party and working masses, in their last counter-theses the opposition no longer stammers out its favourite theory—that in economically backward Soviet Republic one may certainly begin, but one cannot finish the construction of Socialism. The opposition dili-

gently conceals this secret ailment of theirs. On the contrary, its last counter-theses declare that the position is still quite remediable, that the misfortune does not consist in unfavourable objective conditions but in the opportunist policy of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. If we are to believe these counter-theses, the fundamental disagreement between the Trotskyist opposition and the Party majority consists in one and only one point: the opposition demands an energetic struggle against the kulak and Nepmen, and the Party majority apparently is afraid of this struggle and clings firmly to the economically strong peasant.

Taking note of the declared attitude of the broad masses the opposition is now diligently sweeping away the traces of their former attacks. In vain should we seek in the opposition's latest counter-theses even the hint that the opposition defended the policy of high prices, which inevitably would lead to a lowering of the level of the real wage. In vain should we seek in the opposition's counter-theses its former proposal for taking capital out of co-operation and its transfer to the State industry, which would mean handing over co-operation lock, stock and barrel to the kulak. In the same way the opposition is endeavouring to supersede its most impudent and slanderous accusations against the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.—those which aroused universal indignation. Only quite recently in its illegal "platform" the Trotskyist opposition wrote: "In the circles of the governing majority . . . approximately the following "plan" is now being discussed: (1) the recognition of debts; (2) the more or less complete liquidation of the monopoly of external trade; (3) to clear out of China; i.e., to abandon "for the time being" the support of the Chinese revolution, and of national revolutionary movements in general; (4) within the country, a "manoeuvre" to the right, i.e., a further extension of NEP." And now, caught redhanded in the very act, the Trotskyist opposition in its last counter-theses writes without being at all out of countenance: "The opposition never and nowhere said that the C.C. had decided to repeal the monopoly of external trade, to recognise old debts, etc." If this was ever discussed it was "in the offices of various departments and in narrow circles of business men." And so that which only yesterday was being expounded as the "plan of circles of the governing majority," is to-day expounded as a plan "of narrow circles of business men" and departmental offices, i.e., of "specialists" coming from a bourgeois milieu. So is history written!

BUT the chief item hidden and not spoken of by the present counter-theses is the source of all the present disagreements, the old, fundamental difference of principle between Leninism and Trotskyism, which ran like a scarlet thread through all the previous discussions between the Party and Trotsky and his newly converted adherents. It is the old dispute of the Party against the Trotsky system of opinions, which congresses and conferences of the C.P.S.U., the Comintern and the C.C. of the Comintern have condemned more than once as a "petty bourgeois" and "social-democratic" deviation. The Trotskyist opposition now makes no mention of this, endeavouring to transfer the dispute to another plane; but the whole Party and a large part of the non-party workers have an excellent memory and knowledge of it.

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The whole Party knows well that Trotsky in his articles written in 1905 and republished with a defensive preface by the author after the October revolution, in 1922, attempted to prove that when the proletariat came to power in Russia it would inevitably come into collision with the enormous majority of the peasantry, and that the proletarian revolution consequently could be saved from defeat only with the immediate help of the victorious proletariat of the more industrialised countries. The Party well remembers that Trotsky developed these anti-Leninist opinions, permeated with mistrust of the internal forces of the Russian revolution, during the war also; that in objecting to Lenin's defeatist slogans he wrote: "Under the conditions of a catastrophic defeat of Russia, an even temporarily victorious Russian revolution would be an historical abortion." For the Party it has long since become quite clear that while during the period of the civil war Trotsky entirely and completely went with Lenin, it was to be explained not by his having renounced his Menshevik evaluation of the internal forces of the Russian revolution, but only by the fact that during this time he was reckoning on speedy assistance from the victorious proletarian revolution in the west. And for this simple reason the revolutionary wave in the West had only to decline, the tempo of world revolution had only to slow down, for Trotsky again to fall into pessimism and to begin to prophesy an economic catastrophe in Soviet Republic every few months.

THE Party well remembers also Kamenev's social-democratic deviations during the war, and those immediately after the February revolution, and after the publication of Lenin's April theses. The Party well remembers the social-democratic position that Zinoviev and Kamenev occupied at the moment of the October revolution, when they declared themselves against the insurrection, putting their objections in pure Menshevik fashion: "We do not command a majority of the people; without that the conditions of revolt are hopeless. . . . We are not strong enough to break up the Constitutional Assembly." The Party well remembers that for this reason Lenin accused them of "miserable pessimism" in regard to the proletariat and of "optimism in regard to the bourgeoisie." The Party well remembers that on the eve of October Lenin wrote concerning them: "On a most important fighting question, two 'prominent Bolsheviks' are going hand-in-hand with the bourgeoisie against the workers' party." The Party well remembers that this "miserable pessimism" in regard to the working class dictated all the utterances of the present leaders of the Trotskyist opposition during the first discussion with them. The Party well remembers Trotsky's winged words concerning the "far from proletarian character of our State." It well remembers the analogy which Trotsky made between the present condition of the U.S.S.R. and the Thermidorian epoch of the great French revolution, an analogy which Trotsky himself, when driven to the wall, had previously been compelled to acknowledge as "superficial," "liberal," "Menshevik." The Party well remembers that within two years after Lenin in his article "On Co-operation" had **contrasted** the Soviet system with State capitalism and declared that in the Soviet Repub-

lic there is all that is necessary and sufficient for building Socialism, the leaders of the opposition insisted that we in the U.S.S.R. are living through the epoch of State capitalism. The Party well remembers that despite Lenin they rejected the characterisation of Soviet State industry as industry of a "consequential Socialist type." The Party well remembers that despite more than one of Lenin's declarations, they have carried through a revision of Leninism, demonstrating that we can start to build, but that we cannot complete the building of Socialism in economically backward Russia. The Party well remembers that despite Lenin's categorical statement, the opposition leader, Smilga, only recently in a Plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. denied any difference in principle between the economy of the Soviet village and the economy of the village in capitalist countries. The Party well understands that this is the reason why the opposition in its counter-theses can now make the foolish statement that in the present-day Soviet village the capitalists are squeezing out the Socialist elements at an American tempo (Safronov), and that the specific proportion of State industry in the U.S.S.R. national economy as a whole is falling. (Piatakov.)

All these liquidatorial opinions logically arise from the Trotskyist Menshevik evaluation of the internal forces of the Russian revolution. The source of all the present differences between the Party and the Trotskyist opposition is rooted in this Menshevik, profoundly pessimistic evaluation of the internal forces of the October revolution. That is the crux of the whole matter.

IT is true that simultaneously with their revision of Leninism on the fundamental question of Socialism in U.S.S.R., Kamenev and Zinoviev put forward also the slogans of "equality" and of a more energetic attack on the kulak. But at that time, two years ago, these slogans arose not from a correct evaluation of the tasks of the moment, but from a panic into which persons building Socialism but not believing in the possibility of finishing their building cannot but fall at every fresh economic difficulty. At that time the kulak could be eliminated not by a frontal attack against him, but by an outflanking movement—by strengthening the link with the middle peasant, who had begun partially to yield to the influence of the kulaks. This was owing not to any hypothetical capitalistic dynamic of Soviet economy in the village, but to the fact that in the village remain many unliquidated elements of "war communism." That this is really so the experience of the past two years has confirmed. The C.C., not succumbing to Zinoviev's and Kamenev's panic, concentrated all their work on strengthening the position of the middle and poorer peasant, and during these two years have been able to strengthen the link between the proletariat and the basic mass of the peasantry to such an extent, and to wrest the mass of middle peasants away from the kulak influence so largely, that now it will be possible greatly to intensify the direct attack on the kulak without fear of any disturbance whatever.

This the Party has just decided to do. The Trotskyist opposition realised that they were in a stupid and ludicrous position. As their chief fighting slogan **against** the C.C. they put forward a more resolute

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attack on the peasant and Nepman at the very moment when the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. by all their previous work had prepared the ground for this attack and themselves had put forward this slogan. The Trotskyist opposition realised that they were in such a silly and ludicrous position because they have not the manhood to fight the C.C. on what is the really fundamental question which divides them, i.e., are there in the U.S.S.R. the internal resources for a further steady advance towards Socialism, or is the Soviet economy destined by objective conditions to a gradual slip back into capitalism, in face of a retardation in world revolution, as together with the Trotskyist opposition declare all the Mensheviks of the world, and simultaneously with them all the world bourgeoisie?

4. The "Left" Plan for a Menshevik Trend.

AS we have seen, the Trotskyist opposition does not want openly to acknowledge that it has lost, that it despairs of the possibility of a further advance of Soviet economy towards Socialism, although this mistrust, this despair shows through every sentence of its "platform," in its counter-theses and its other legal and illegal documents. In its counter-theses the Trotskyist opposition writes: "Despite the tension of the situation, intensified by the serious blunders of the present leadership, the position is still retrievable. But the line of Party direction must be changed, and radically changed. . . ." But what panaceas does the Trotskyist opposition put forward? What means of saving the Soviet Government from "destruction" has it? That means is quite simple—instead of the Party's course towards industrialisation a course must be taken towards super-industrialisation, and in order to realise this "super-industrialisation" in the quickest possible space of time it is necessary to draw resources not from the "accumulation" of the working class (for that would connote the "exploitation" of the working class) but from the accumulation of the kulak and Nepman.

AT first glance this strategic plan would appear to be a very radical one. But if it is examined more closely it becomes perfectly obvious that it arises from purely Menshevik premises. Actually, as is not altogether unknown, in Russia ten years ago, there took place an October revolution, which began with the "expropriation of the expropriators," with the nationalisation of industry and the nationalisation of the land, accompanied by an agrarian revolution. Thus the ground was cleared for Socialist construction. Truly, on this cleared ground remained elements of capitalism, which had the possibility of developing and actually did develop in so far as the goods economy of the small producers in the village remained. But the idea of NEP according to Lenin's plan was that the Soviet Government, basing itself on the Socialistic strategic points, should increasingly predominate economically over the surviving and reviving capitalistic elements. Obviously, the more Lenin's plan was put into operation (and so far it has been put into operation very successfully) so the more the specific proportion of the Socialistic sector of the Soviet Republic's economy was to increase, the more the development of the Social-

ist economy of the town had to be perfected at the cost of the internal accumulation of that industry, and the more the industrialisation of the village had to be consummated at the cost of the internal accumulation in the basic mass of village economy, which was gradually by means of co-operation, to be drawn into the Socialist structure. In accordance with this prospect, in the five year plan of Gosplan for the years 1927-28 to 1931-32 the total extent of participation of economic enterprises in the accumulation of the State sector comprises 66.8 per cent., while to the share of the State budget is placed only 24.5 per cent. and to internal loans 5.6 per cent.

THE Trotskyist opposition is dissatisfied. It wishes the chief resources of industrialisation to be drawn both now and in the future from the accumulation of the kulaks and Nepmen. From what does this benevolent desire arise? Only from the position that the Socialistic sector of economy is impotent to develop independently, that the proletariat is impotent in the matter of organisation and development of Socialistic industry, that it is not in the position to draw the mass of the peasantry into the work of Socialistic construction, that the sole economically vital elements in the Soviet Republic's economy are the kulaks and Nepmen, that our Socialistic sector is destined to a parasitic life at the cost of the blossoming kulaks and Nepmen. If this idea is thought out to its end it must necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is worth while in the U.S.S.R. for ourselves to stimulate the kulaks and Nepmen to accumulation, and ourselves to breed them as though they were sheep, so as to shear their fleece from time to time. We see that the premise of the "radical plan" is an utter mistrust in the possibility of successful Socialistic construction in U.S.S.R., that the premise of this plan is a purely Menshevik evaluation of the nature of our Soviet economy.

However, it is necessary to acknowledge that the Trotskyist opposition is distinguished from the Mensheviks in one regard: with the typical Menshevik pessimism in regard to the Socialistic structure in the U.S.S.R. they combine a childish utopian belief in the possibility of in some marvellous manner pumping milliards out of the kulak and Nepman sector, now already eliminated from all their positions, and to hand over these fantastic "milliards" to industry.

In articles published in the "Pravda" discussion sheets all the absurdity of this plan has already been laid bare. Actually what is its concrete proposal? In every case the first proposition consists in drawing from the grain reserve, which is said to be composed of 900 million poods and to be mainly concentrated in the hands of the kulaks, and drawing from it by means of a compulsory loan not less than 150 million poods. What does this actual plan signify in terms of real facts and figures? In the first place, the peasants at present possess a grain reserve not of 900 million, but of only 700 million poods; secondly, as the regional distribution of these reserves indicates, in the enormous majority of cases it has the character of an insurance fund against crop failure; thirdly, 80 per cent. of these reserves is concentrated in middle and poorer peasants' economies—the reserves of the kulaks and the upper stratum of middle peasants comprise only 140 million poods altogether; fourthly, the percentage of kulak economies in U.S.S.R. is not 10 per cent., but 3 to 4

Lenin's Plan—continued

per cent. Thus the opposition actually proposes to withdraw not only all the reserves of the prosperous peasants, but in addition ten million poods from six to seven per cent. of the middle peasants, i.e., from 1½ million peasants' households, depriving them of their insurance against crop failure. This ingenious plan, **if it were seriously thought out**, could only occur to the mind of persons whose purpose is to evoke a series of peasant risings in U.S.S.R. at a moment of oncoming war danger. In so far as this is of course not the intention of the Trotskyist opposition, it is simply the fruits of a distracted imagination and the fantasy of drowning persons clutching at straws.

THE opposition's second proposal consists in the "real taxation" of all forms of super profits of private entrepreneurs to the extent of not less than 150 to 200 millions. The fantastic nature of this plan is evident if only from the fact that comrade Piatakov himself, the chief economist of the Trotskyist opposition, after investigating the position of the private capitalist in 1925, came to the conclusion that the dimensions of taxation per head of the private man reaches 62 to 90 per cent. of his profit and that there is a "limit to which the taxation of the very highest profits can go." To which has to be added that after this a law was passed raising the taxation of the private man by a further forty per cent.

Of course, the Party, as we have already said, intends in the future to intensify its pressure on the kulak and Nepman to an even greater extent than before. But to comfort oneself with the illusion that from this source one can draw the **main** resources for the industrialisation of the country, under conditions in which according to the prospective orientation plan of Gosplan 90 per cent. of the trade and 98 per cent. of industry will be in the hands of the working class itself, is silly and stupid.

Thus the sole means of salvation which the Trotskyist opposition has been able to think of proves under the test to be two enormous soap bubbles. Before the least criticism these bubbles burst. And then what is left? Obviously, an inevitable catastrophe! Fortunately, this catastrophic situation of the Soviet Government exists not in the real world of things, but in the distracted imaginations of the Trotskyist opposition, which has finally lost the ground from under its feet.

5. The Pessimism of the Trotskyist Opposition and the Enthusiasm of the U.S.S.R. Proletariat

THE Trotskyist opposition, irritated and to the last degree blinded, thanks to its disorganising work in the Party, has, beginning with mistrust and pessimism, ended its career with pure Menshevik slanders against the Soviet Government and the C.P.S.U. Its counter-theses are written according to a pure Menshevik recipe. In them is a gloomy, black picture of the Soviet situation, without the least ray of light. A criticism of its illegal economic platform has already been given. The opposition's counter-theses published in "Pravda" are distinguished in no essential from the economic platform, in them the severe expressions are only mitigated as applied to Soviet legal methods, and the series of figures, which

have already been refuted in the discussion, are replaced by a new series of figures, just as little able to withstand the least criticism. These counter-theses have already been subjected to a careful dissection in the "Pravda" discussion sheets, and of all the statistical edifice built up by the opposition not one stone is left on another. Their every least declaration has been pulled to pieces and revealed as deliberate falsification or stupidity.

ONE thing we can say: the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. passed through the fire of civil war, through famine and ruin, then turning up their sleeves, within a few years have restored the Soviet industry and Soviet economy, are profoundly convinced even without a detailed examination of these figures that they are downright slander. The proletariat of the U.S.S.R. know perfectly well that in the Soviet economy and in Soviet life still exist an enormous number of defects and deficiencies and all kinds of useless lumber, but at the same time they know from their own experience that with every year they are advancing towards Socialism, overcoming all obstacles, that with every year the specific proportion of the Socialistic sector increases in the Soviet Republic, that the number and specific proportion of the proletariat increase, their material position is improving, their cultural standards are growing, the participation of millions of workers and peasants in the State structure is extending. Consequently the despondent mood of the Trotskyist opposition is in open and flagrant contradiction to the enthusiasm of the millions of workers and peasants, which was clearly manifested during October.

FOR this very reason the Trotskyist opposition is already politically dead in the U.S.S.R. and presents no danger to the C.P.S.U. But it can still possess a certain danger to other sections of the Communist International. It is true that the workers of capitalistic countries are also becoming more and more acquainted, by means of the Communist Parties and by workers' delegations visiting the Soviet Republic, with what is actually being created in that Republic. None the less, the social-democratic parties, have adequate resources for darkening the intelligence of the working masses, for distributing lies and slanders concerning the Soviet Government among the workers. In this dirty business the refuse of the Communist Parties who are now grouping and consolidating around the opposition in the C.P.S.U. may render valuable service. Therefore we may express the hope that the comrades in all sections of the Comintern will study the materials on the discussion now taking place in the C.P.S.U. in the most diligent fashion. The more they are able, on the basis of this material, to throw a light outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union on how the proletariat of U.S.S.R. live and how they are creating the great work entrusted to them by Lenin, the more will the working masses of the capitalistic countries be convinced that the October revolution has justified itself one hundred per cent., that the strategic plan which was born in the marvellous brain of Vladimir Ilyitch, and which at the beginning appeared "nonsensical," has now been demonstrated to be the greatest of wisdom, as being the sole road to the emancipation of the oppressed classes of humanity from the chains of slavery, and that there is and can be no other road to Socialism.

The Lines of Development of Modern Persia*

A. Sultanzade

IN its development present day capitalism is increasingly taking on a monopolistic character. The concentration of capital in the leading capitalist countries has taken on such gigantic dimensions that often whole spheres of industry are monopolised in the hands of one or several industrial groups.

Parallel with the centralisation and concentration of capital within separate capitalist countries colossal international concerns, cartels and syndicates are being created before our eyes. These industrial giants, having assured their position in their own country, endeavour to avoid costly competition outside it also. The partitioning of the world markets among the largest concerns of this or that sphere of industry has now become a common phenomenon.

But a peaceable, amicable division of the world markets is not a method which can for long eliminate the competitive struggle between capitalist producers.

The limitations of the markets of distribution and the inadequacy of sources of raw materials lead more and more frequently to a forcible division and partitioning of the existing colonial countries. This circumstance is intensified still further by the fact that owing to the inequality of capitalism's development, the industry and economic powers of individual countries, overtaking others and advancing to the leading positions of modern capitalism, find themselves deprived both of markets for distribution and of sources for raw materials. Consequently the temporary lull in the competitive struggle of capitalist giants is swiftly replaced by open hostility, followed by war with the aim of making a new divisional partitioning of the world. In order to gain their ends, at the necessary moment the kings of industry and the banks put into motion all the colossal machine of bourgeois society: the police, the army, the press, bribery, prisons, exile, shootings and all that may assist in the pillage of their own and foreign countries and peoples. All the State power is adapted to the defence of the interest of these uncrowned masters of capitalist society.

Effect of Russian Revolution on Persia

Owing to all this, the independent existence of those backward countries which have not yet found themselves in the tenacious arms of the one or the other capitalist libertine is becoming increasingly difficult. Persia is one such country. Its formal independence was formerly guaranteed by the struggle between the imperialist libertines, Britain and Tsarist Russia. The October revolution put an end to this suspicious game. The U.S.S.R. renounced all its pretensions to enslave and humiliate Persia. But at the same time the pressure from imperialist Britain was greatly intensified.

The tragedy of the Persian people consists also in the fact that their country lies on the road to the greatest of Britain's colonies: India. For more than

a century Britain has vigilantly defended all the approaches to this jewel of the British crown. India is most vulnerable from the direction of Persia, consequently the exploitation and pillaging of this land of 300 millions will not continue for long if it is not fortified from the direction of Persia. But the whole tenor of the British Empire consists not in the possibility of anyone's carrying out an attack on India, but in the fact that she cannot be confident in the war she is preparing on all hands against U.S.S.R. so long as India is not entirely out of danger. But it can be placed beyond danger if Persia becomes a continuation of India, i.e., a British colony. And this is all the more necessary because Persia is also a rich source of oil, a fuel greatly exploited by British capital.

After the fall of the Russian autocracy, Britain occupied the whole of Persia in the hope of further finally consolidating the country for herself. The Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 was to have formally assured to Britain the actual annexation of Persia. But the growth and consolidation of the Soviet Union and the strong development of the national revolutionary movement in Persia forced Britain temporarily to renounce its intentions of immediately annexing Persia and compelled her to seek fresh roads for the achievement of the same end. But a swift annexation was impossible also for reasons of a pure economic nature, for Persia was economically too closely bound to Russia for this association to be broken so quickly. This link with Russia had over a number of years, beginning with the eighties of last century, gradually drawn Persia into the orbit of world economy. The extension of railways from the Russian side to the Persian frontier still more intensified this process, and naturally created advantageous conditions for the export from Persia of industrial raw materials and agricultural produce to Russia's enormous markets. The trade turnover grew with colossal speed, and with it grew the number and influence of the Persian compradore bourgeoisie.

Until the October revolution the compradore bourgeoisie of northern and central Persia and owners of the large land estates orientated towards Tsarist Russia, and in reality were agents of Russian capital. But the liquidation of Russian capitalism, the monopoly of U.S.S.R.'s external trade and the impossibility of restoring the former links with Russia were inevitably bound to lead to a change in the political orientation of these classes.

Anglo-Persian Relations

The Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 represented an attempt on the part of the ruling classes in Persia to transfer to the embraces of British imperialism. And if they temporarily and formally rejected this treaty it was because they were afraid of being carried away by a revolutionary wave and of being deprived of their influence in the direction of the ship of State. This was continued until 1921.

* Editorial Note.—Published for discussion.

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Britain, becoming convinced of the impossibility of conquering Persia by brute force, decided after the pattern of Mesopotamia and Egypt, to put forward its own candidates for the government of the country, and through them slowly but firmly to consolidate its hegemonist position. The revolution of Said-Zia-Ellin (25-11-21) was to have done British imperialism this service. But Said-Zia was quickly compromised as an open Anglophile and was unable to carry out the task laid on him, so Britain decided to replace him by his rival Riza Khan, a person almost unknown to anyone at that time.

On Riza Khan was laid the tasks of breaking up the growing revolutionary movement in the country and of gradually strengthening Britain's economic and political influence, i.e., of putting into operation the treaty of 1919. But Riza Khan could achieve this end by two methods; on the one hand by creating a national army, and on the other by a continual expression of a feeling of friendship for the U.S.S.R., for which purpose he long made himself out to be a republican. But his talk of friendship and of republicanism were merely empty chatter, and actually British influence was strengthened. This clever double-dealing continued till the end of 1925, when Riza Khan, having with Britain's support broken up all the revolutionary centres, threw away his mask of republicanism and ascended the throne of the Shah of Shahs.

Britain and the Landowners

Britain's economic interests insistently demanded the pacification of the country. Under the pressure of the masses Britain withdrew her army of occupation from Persia, for the role of pacifier was to be played by Riza Khan's national army. In order to ensure a successful realisation of this task and a swift liquidation of the revolutionary risings in various sections of the country, and to bridle the refractory feudalists, who refused to recognise Riza Khan's government, almost everywhere the civil governors were replaced by military governors and a centralised police State was created. Riza Khan's dynasty could not have existed for one day without this centralised police machinery.

Only thanks to the specific conditions and the backwardness of our country's national economy could the British imperialists, together with Riza Khan, achieve such "brilliant" results. Our country is one of large landed aristocrats. In many provinces, as in Shiraz, Ispahan, Gilan and others, from forty to seventy per cent. of the land under cultivation is in the hands of a few dozen persons. Altogether three-fifths of the serviceable land is in the hands of about 3,000 landowners. Any revolution or disturbance in the country would inevitably be turned against these parasites first of all, because they are more interested than anyone else in a strong government, which can protect and defend them from the peasants and from revolution. This task can be best fulfilled by a monarchy as being the form of government native to them. For this purpose the Kodzhar dynasty was very weak and decrepit,

and so they decided together with Britain to support Riza Khan against the Kodzhar dynasty.

Thus the class structure of modern Persia is favourable in the highest degree to the designs of the British-Riza Khan reaction. The basic ruling class, the large landowners, are the real masters of the country. Riza Khan himself in a short period was transformed into a large landowner and thus became the chief prop of the new dynasty. The role of the industrial bourgeoisie is insignificant, and the compradore bourgeoisie which has all its roots firmly founded in foreign capitalism, always was and remains, like the clerical element, an instrument in the hands of foreign imperialist reaction. All this rabble with Riza Khan at their head, prepared to betray the interests of the country for any price, are the internal force on which British capital bases itself, while the "national" Medjliss by means of packed elections is the personification of the concentrated will of this rabble.

Riza Khan and Britain

From the very beginning of his career Riza Khan orientated towards Britain and endeavoured in all ways to oblige his masters. But his complaisance was never manifested so plainly as in the matter of railway construction. The trans-Persian railway, the plan of which was confirmed by the Medjliss on February 24th, 1927, is to connect the Persian Gulf at Muhamrah with the Caspian Sea. This law reads:

(1) The national Medjliss gives the government permission to construct a railway between the port of Muhamrah and the port of Bender-Gaz through Hamadan-Teheran.

(2) The government is granted permission to put the construction of the railway into the hands of a foreign or national construction company, with the observation of the principle of economy for the State. The government is granted permission to obtain the necessary construction material from abroad, whenever it cannot be supplied within the State.

(3) The building of the said railway is to be realised according to the plan of a railway specialist, taken into service by the Medjliss.

(4) From the sugar monopoly fund is assigned 4½ million tumans for the construction of an iron foundry, during the first four years up to one million tumans is assigned per annum for the foundry, while in the fifth year 500 thousand tumans is assigned.

(5) The carrying out of this law is entrusted to the Ministry of Social Works and the Ministry of Finance.

The construction of the iron foundry is to be financed by the British Bank of Persia, for which in the form of a guarantee it will receive the receipts from the sugar monopoly. It must be mentioned here that Britain has continually striven to obtain the control of the sugar monopoly in Persia and to increase the excise on sugar, as it is the one kind of goods which Britain does not import into Persia. The British have obtained the doubling of the excise on sugar and thus have made it possible for the British bank to finance this enterprise. Thus the sugar monopoly passes into the hands of Britain, who will collect these receipts with the aid of the British bank; the money will for the time being lie in the bank, for which the latter will pay two to three

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per cent. while it itself receives 12 to 16 per cent. interest on loans.

Oil and Railways

There is nothing in the bill as to where the 150 million pounds for the construction of the railway is to be obtained, when the total budget of the country amounts to 4½ to 5 million pounds. To any literate man, however, the business is clear. The construction of the railway is linked with the giving of new concessions. The Persian Government has already signed an agreement with the Anglo-Persian Company for the transfer to the latter of the south-west oil regions, which later will be united with the Mesopotamia group. A second concession is the northern oil region, and in this case also the matter is almost predetermined. The only question is whether to give the concession to the Anglo-Persian Company, or to Standard Oil. Seemingly it will be given to Standard Oil, who will share with the Anglo-Persian Co. In other words the financing of the railway is exclusively connected with the granting of new concessions to the British imperialists in Persia, and the building of railways has mainly a strategic significance, for according to the plan these railways are to be immediately united with the Irak railway system, and later will be linked up with the Indian system. This is Britain's old secret desire. In his time Curzon dreamed of this plan. What economic advantages will Persia actually obtain if her railways are linked up with India in the first place? From our point of view, almost none. Together with a strongly developing industry India has enormous reserves of raw materials and foodstuffs (rice) and there is not the least doubt that the projected southern lines of railways will confer no advantage on Persia beyond an increased import of goods from India. Persia cannot seriously count on the export of rice, dried fruits, cotton, wool, Morocco leather and raw hides from the north to the south by way of the Persian gulf on to the world market or through Duzdab to the Indian market.

If these railways actually did not possess a purely strategic significance, if in the given moment the masters of Persia, thanks to Riza Khan, were not the British, then it is quite clear that the question would be settled somewhat differently; for from the point of view of the direct development of Persia's productive forces, of a rise in her agriculture, the strengthening of economy in the north-western, the north and the north-eastern, and also of the central regions, lines connecting Teheran with Meshad and a line from Teheran to Ast-ara would have enormous significance.

From the comparative study of the customs goods traffic in regard to imported and exported goods it appears that the northern, north-western and north-eastern roads are roads of Persian export (with the exception of opium going to Bushire); the southern, south-eastern and south-western roads are roads mainly of Persian import.

If the position is indisputable that outside the development of agriculture, outside the growth in cotton and rice plantations, outside the development of silk-production and the carpet industry, outside the safeguarding of a market for disposal of the production of

industrialised orchards and cattle rearing, the national economy cannot be soundly built up, if it is also indisputable that with an ordered economy imports can only be built up in dependence on export, then there can be no doubt that the railways first to be constructed should connect the producing regions with the markets for disposal of their goods. But if to-day Persia, despite its vital interests, decides to unite the Persian gulf with the Caspian Sea by means of a railway line, it is quite clear that this plan has been prompted by the British, who have long been dreaming of linking Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia with India. Consequently in order to achieve this very end, the Persian Government under Riza Khan's guidance is, in addition to the trans-Persian railway, planning jointly with the British the construction of a series of other tracks, to wit: (1) Khanikin-Hamadan-Teheran; (2) Duzdab-Meshad-Sheikrul (the Indo-Persian track); (3) Teheran-Sheikrul; (4) Duzdab-Kerman-Shiraz-Behbahan-Hindian-Muhamrah; (5) Tabriz-Teheran. Thus, besides their political and economic importance these railways would also have an enormous strategic influence, as the British would obtain the following possibilities: (1) a railway to India (Haifa-Bagdad); (2) a successful deploying of forces at great distances from the Indian frontiers; (3) a favourable position for the development of operations against the Caucasian and Turkestan frontiers of the U.S.S.R.; (4) the transformation of the territory of Irak and Iran into a single military encampment (the front line of the Indian theatre of operations.*

If to all this be added also the fact that the railway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea is absolutely indispensable to the concession seekers of the northern oil area, where unquestionably Britain will have the lion's share, and that without this railway the working of the oil lands of the north raises colossal difficulties for foreign concessionaires, the desire of Riza Khan's government to oblige its master Britain becomes quite understandable.

New Roads for a Mechanised Army

That is not all. The British are working also along another line. They are planning the construction of a series of paved highroads. Eight groups of these roads have already been sanctioned by the government. They are intended on the one hand to unite the Mesopotamia roads through Teheran with Tabriz, and on the other a series of roads are intended to link up with the Indian system.

The significance of this network of roads is enormous. (1) It will greatly lighten the projected railway construction (especially in the laying down of the Trans-Persian track—Muhamrah-Teheran-Bender-Gaz and the Bagdad branch Khanikin-Hamadan. (2) It creates a network of approach roads and intersecting roads, foreshadowing an extensive development of motor transport. (3) It creates internal markets by linking together provinces distant from one another. (4) It partially solves the problem of transit through the U.S.S.R. for North Persia, affording the possibility of directing the production of the north to the internal markets and the ports of the Mediterranean. (5) It

* See "Information Bulletin," April, 1927, pp. 118-120, published by the Administration of the Red Army Staff.

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establishes the conditions of a further successful expansion of British imperialism. (6) These roads, being a continuation of the Indian and Irak railways in the direction of the Trans-Caucasian and Turkestan frontiers of the U.S.S.R. will have the importance of strategic roads.

Thus conditions are established whereby at any moment thousands of armed men can be transported by motors from India and Mesopotamia to aid the government to put down the "Bolshevik attacks" in Tabriz, Khorosan and other places.

Finally, Britain is establishing benzine storages in Kasvin and other regions, so as to have an aviation base ready at any future moment of need. And all these measures receive the entire support of Riza Khan's government.

On all hands it is evident that Britain is making ready for something or other in Persia.

Plans for War

Parallel with this the specialists of the British press have recently been occupied with the consideration of questions "of the danger" of the Indian frontiers. This question was first broached in the pages of the Conservative press during the height of the anti-Soviet campaign which accompanied Chamberlain's "warning note" of Spring, 1927. The commander of the British troops in India himself then made his famous pronouncement on the dangers seemingly threatening India from "neighbours." It was absolutely clear that the British military command were preparing the ground for transferring large military forces from the metropolis to India. To-day an organ connected with the British Foreign Office, the "Daily Telegraph," states that between the London Cabinet and the Government of India an animated exchange of opinions is taking place in regard to the question of the mechanisation of the frontier army and the increase of the contingent of British armed forces in the north of India. The ends being pursued by the Conservative Cabinet are simple enough: the British imperialists intend to take the armed forces of India into their own hands and to use them for the realisation of their anti-Soviet plans.

Thus with the aid of Riza Khan Britain is working for the gradual preparation of Persia for the future war against the U.S.S.R.

But the political and strategic plans of the British hard-faces cannot ameliorate the serious economic position of the country.

As is well known the agricultural character of Persia has transformed her into a supplier of raw materials for European industrial centres. The more Persia was drawn into the orbit of world economy, the more swiftly she adapted herself to the demands of the world market, so much the more did she feel her dependence on foreign capitalists. The growth of connections with world economy had the effect of greatly increasing the value of land in Persia and led in many places to a decline of the large feudal States, which gradually came into the hands of trade-financial capital. The financier, who in the dawn of capitalism in Europe

played a certain progressive role and was destined to break up the old feudal system, in Asiatic conditions, as Karl Marx rightly pointed out, on the contrary, rather tended to consolidate the feudal system.

Consequently, to talk of the progressive role of merchant landownership in a most typical eastern country, such as is Persia, as certain "authorities" on the East do, is incorrect, to say the very least. The methods of action of financial capital in Persia are almost the same as those which existed in the ancient world, in Rome and Greece, where the transfer of landownership into the hands of the financiers was regarded as a common phenomenon.

But what is the cause of the transference of trading financial capital to agriculture? To this question Marx gives the following, in our view, exhaustive answer: "In general it has to be acknowledged that with a less highly developed, pre-capitalist method of production, agriculture is more productive than industry, because here nature participates in the work as a machine and organism, while in industry the forces of nature must be almost entirely replaced by human forces."

Thanks to the incomparably cheap peasant labour and the possibility of its unlimited exploitation, the financier finds it more advantageous to place his resources in agriculture than in industry. But when it went into agriculture trade-financial capital resorted to all the methods of feudal exploitation of peasant labour, partially reviving and strengthening the conditions of serfdom in the village.

Ruin of Peasants and Artisans

The management of the agents of foreign capitalism in Persia is reflected with particular severity in the peasant industries and artisanic labour. The import of cheap goods from abroad is ruining them more and more and compels them to drag out a miserable semi-starvation existence. The elementary state of national industry deprives them of the possibility of applying their forces inside the country and compels them to seek their bread beyond the frontiers of their native land. The development of the capitalistic elements and the transformation of Persia into a colonial appanage of one or the other capitalist power must greatly worsen the already serious position of the working artisans and handicraftsmen.

The existing economic system in Persia and the domination of the Sheik and landowner government is the greatest of brakes to the development of the productive forces of the country. The basic producing class in Persia still remains the peasantry and in part the artisans and handicraft workers, on whose labour the parasites live: the Sheik and his court, the landowners of all kinds, the traders and middlemen, the clericals of all ranks and so on. But the class which has to feed this innumerable host of parasites lives in indigence and under conditions of unheard-of oppression. Persia's entry into the world market, the development of external trade traffic, and the introduction of currency and goods relationships has in the highest degree intensified the exploitation of the peasant masses. On the one hand the large and small landowners have begun to expropriate the peasant and communal land by all means possible, on the other the growing need of money

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resources has driven the landowners—the mulkedars—to establish more and more taxes and imposts on the peasant economies. The agents of the Shah's government have in this matter as in all else supported the land barons and their demands. Part of the peasants, wishing to safeguard their existence, have been compelled to make a present of their land allotment to mosques, in order to save themselves from the encroachments of the landowner or *arbab* and from the payment of excessive and insufferable taxes. This circumstance has especially encouraged the extension of mosque properties, the dimensions of which are continually growing. The absence of a national market and of large consuming industrial centres places agriculture in strong dependence on the landowners, the financiers and the compradore bourgeoisie, who like leeches suck out the last drop of blood from the already ruined peasantry.

The Road to Socialism

Consequently, despite Riza Khan's ferocious regime and despite the generous assistance of his British allies in putting down the revolutionary movement, revolts of the working masses against the bloody regime of the new dynasty are continually breaking out in one place or another. The continual outbreaks of revolt in Azerbaijan, Gilan, Khorosan, prove over and over again that the revolutionary mood has reached to the very heart of the working masses of the town and village, and that the peasantry, which until recently stood on one side, is beginning to take a more active part in the struggle against the existing system and against the Anglo-Riza Khan reaction. But that reaction, having obtained a firm hand in putting down the national disturbances, knows no mercy. All revolts are suppressed with unheard-of ruthlessness, and participants and leaders caught alive have been subjected to public torture and execution. (Gilan.) Where Riza Khan's forces were incapable of liquidating the revolt, the British technique came to their aid, with lorries, aeroplanes, etc. (Khorosan.) But economic problems are not to be solved with aeroplanes and shootings. The peasants are demanding the land; the country is in need of development of its productive forces. A national market needs to be created and a national industry. The country cannot feed its own population, even within the limits of those miserable rations on which the working masses of Persia live. Consequently, thousands of people abandon their permanent homes and seek work in Mesopotamia, Constantinople, Baku, Turkestan, etc. Industry is not to be created and the economic position of the peasantry is not to be improved by way of punitive expeditions and ruthless chastisement.

But industry can be created in two ways in Persia; either by developing the private capitalist economies or by a planned organisation of the whole economic life of the country. The first road is pregnant with more than usually serious consequences for Persia, since in the absence of accumulated capitals inside the country it cannot create a normal industry with its own resources. Persia has not yet passed through the period of elemental accumulation. Moreover, the absence of the general conditions for development of capitalism leads to the position that for the present the capital accumu-

lated in the hands of the trading and financing bourgeoisie goes not into workshops, but, as we have seen, tends towards agriculture, where, resorting to the most antediluvian methods of exploitation, it is transformed into a new parasite on the body of the peasantry. Truly, elemental accumulation can be replaced by the import of foreign capital, but for Persia this signifies the sale of the country to foreign capitalists, and to the British in the first place. Britain cannot allow the growth of economic interests without a struggle, especially in the sphere of the influx of another Power's capital; for Persia is too important a point in the world system of British colonies for Britain to agree to yield her hegemony so easily. Consequently, the development of capitalism in Persia under the existing system can only take the lines of Persia's transformation into a colonial appanage in the system of the British Empire. All Riza Khan's colonial enterprises (the construction of railways and roads, the granting of concessions, etc.) are carried on entirely and wholly in the interests of British capital. The appearance of small workshops and factories in one or other of the districts of the country cannot alter this basic process. If to this be added the fact that already the main strategic points of Persian economy, as the banks, the telegraphs, oil, etc., are in the hands of Britain, the direction which Riza Khan is giving to the country is quite obvious.

Workers' Revolt

But there is also another road which Persia can take; i.e., it can and should avoid the long and extraordinarily painful capitalist road of development. To this end the setting up of industrial co-operative societies among the artisans and handicraft workers in the towns, and agricultural societies in the villages, should be one of the basic slogans of the I.C.P. Parallel with this the Party should in all ways assist the organisation and development of co-operation, in order to facilitate the union between the Socialist industry of the country of the victorious proletariat and the working consumers of Persia, as far as possible endeavouring to avoid superfluous middlemen.

Only with the support of the victorious proletariat of the leading industrial countries will Persia be able to pass steadfastly to the road of Socialist development.

*The Weekly Paper for All
Communists*

WORKERS' LIFE

29, Euston Road, London,
N.W.1

The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and the Municipal Elections

IN this year's municipal elections in Czecho-Slovakia all the Parties opposed to the Communists strove for, and expected, a decline in the Communist Party vote. These expectations were based on two things: first, on the success of the policy of stabilisation, and, secondly, on the going over of the Czecho Social-Democrats and National Socialists into the opposition, a change in the tactical position of the Social patriots. From this change it was expected that those workers and petty bourgeoisie who had been adversely affected by the policy of stabilisation and were therefore discontented, and who until then had voted with the bourgeois Parties, would go over to the Social patriots and not to the Communists, and that many working-class electors who in 1923 (last municipal elections) and in 1925 (general election) voted Communist would return again to the Social-Democrats, now in the Opposition. This expectation was not unjustified, and the Communists will not deny a certain consolidation of the reformist Parties as a consequence of their having left the Government, a consolidation to some extent at the expense of the Communists. But the results of the elections showed that the great hopes of our opponents were in vain. The elections did not show a decline, but an increase in the Communist vote, although in many places, particularly in Prague, this was only an absolute increase, while in comparison with the Communist vote of 1923 and 1925 there was a relative decrease. Taking into consideration, however, the votes of the soldiers, whose right to vote has been taken away, and the campaign of calumny of the Trotskyist renegades, which was well utilised by the Menshevik press, and which could not fail to make some impression on a number of our sympathisers, one can speak truly of the Party's success, the more so as in Prague the 1925 vote showed an absolute decrease as against 1923. From various reports, and from the tone which our own press adopted after the elections, it is clear that this success came as a surprise not only to our opponents but also to our own comrades, who had counted, at the utmost, on just maintaining the previous position of the Party. Such a pessimistic outlook on elections signifies an over-estimation of stabilisation and is therefore a mistake, because pessimism can weaken the conducting of an electoral struggle and so prejudice the result.

Failure to Analyse Results Thoroughly

After the elections the changes in the voting of the electorate were not thoroughly analysed in our Czecho-Slovakian Party press. It is not enough to say quite generally that a swing to the left has begun, in which petty bourgeois sections of the bourgeois Parties went over to the reformists and proletarians from the reformists came over to us. As far as the petty bourgeoisie are concerned, such a miscalculation of the leftward swing of these sections would mean admitting something which is exclusively to the advantage of the reformists, that, e.g., the entire work of the Party among the peasantry has been unsuccessful. But that

is certainly not true, for just recently the Czecho-Slovakian section of the Comintern, particularly in the Czech districts, has developed certain activities in connection with the so-called reform of taxation and administration, and with the dispute between the sugar factories and the beet growers, which have certainly borne some fruits. However, such a consideration leaves entirely out of account the question of political changes in that section of the working class which is attached to the electoral spheres of the bourgeois parties. The reactionary policy of the Government coalition, one of extreme hostility to the workers, has certainly alienated many working-class voters. This is expressed in the decline in the votes obtained by the Clerical Party, which has more working-class electors than any other bourgeois party. This question must be examined, although it is clear from the outset that these electors are nearer to the reformists than they are to the Communists.

The Turnover from the Reformists

There is no doubt that the increase in our votes came in the main from the proletarian electorate of the reformists. The policy of stabilisation, at the expense in particular of the working class, has strengthened their left tendencies, and, in the same way, has led many working-class electors towards our Party, and away from the reformists, whose treacherous position, expressed in their refusal to make any serious struggle, and, above all, in their refusal to work for the United Front, was made clear to their class-conscious proletarian adherents in the short time since they have left the Government. But the changes in the voting of the working class are not so simple. We must find out whether the Communist Party has not lost some of its petty bourgeois and working-class votes to the reformists. Until the spring of 1926 the reformists were in the Government, and therefore many workers, particularly in the Czech districts, were with the Communists only because they were disgusted with the Coalition policy of the reformists. The reformists, by leaving the Government, have earned respect in the eyes of these working-class electors who voted Communist, and they have been strengthened in their old illusion that merely an opposition of the working-class parties is sufficient. These working-class electors, voting Communist but fundamentally centrist, no doubt expected great things of a purely parliamentary nature, from the success of the Party in the 1925 elections and the return of 41 Communist members to Parliament. There were also many Communist electors in 1927 who believed in the possibility of the Communists entering the Government; and the Party was compelled, just because such centrist illusions remained among the adherents of the Party, in spite of the secession of the Bubnikists, to arrange a campaign of meetings after the elections on the question of the entry into the Government suggested by the Social-Democrats in the Party.

If discussion on all these questions has so far not

The C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia—continued

been attempted by the Party it has, nevertheless, drawn the correct general political conclusion from the results of the elections. Two days after the elections the central organ of the Party, "Rudé Pravo," wrote quite rightly that the elections proved, above all things, that the majority of the population (more exactly, the working class) is ready to fight against the bourgeoisie. This remark, however, is completely annulled in the same article of "Rudé Pravo," which, in dealing with the going over of petty bourgeois electors from the bourgeois parties to the reformists, makes the following more than extraordinary comment :

"No other way to complete Socialism, that is, to Communism, is open to the petty bourgeois masses. The petty bourgeois elements are a variable, fluctuating element. But it is particularly the duty of the reformists to bind these masses firmly to the working class, to make them allies of Socialism, which they desire to be, and not to drive them back to the bourgeoisie, where they were until now."

Errors of the Press

That is, of course, quite false. It is false to maintain that the petty bourgeois masses cannot be won over to Communism directly, but only by making a detour via the reformists. That would indeed be an admission of the bankruptcy. It is still more incomprehensible for a Communist newspaper to state that within Social-Democracy the possibility exists of making the petty bourgeois elements Socialist. That is a

completely mistaken view of the present role of the Social-Democratic Parties. The task of the Social-Democratic Parties to-day is to prevent the proletariat from becoming revolutionary Marxists, *i.e.*, to make the proletariat petty bourgeois mentally, because only so can Social-Democracy fulfil its task as the left wing of the bourgeoisie. How can a party, whose work it is to prevent the proletariat from becoming Socialists, be qualified in any way to lead the petty bourgeoisie on the road to Socialism? The purpose of our united front tactics is to thwart the Social-Democratic Parties in their aim of bringing the proletariat into a state of petty bourgeois stagnation, and an effective revolutionary united front can only come into existence on the day when the Social-Democratic leaders have completely lost their influence over the masses, an event which will also mean, of course, the end of the Social-Democratic Parties. The central organ of the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party seems, however, to consider the reformist leaders in quite another light, for the article in "Rudé Pravo," containing the paragraph previously quoted, goes on to say :

"This is a duty which the so-called Socialist Parties, the Social-Democrats and the Czech Socialists have taken upon themselves. It is a binding duty. The Communist Party will aid them in its fulfilment."

Reformists will Not Lead to Socialism

This almost gives the impression that we have discovered some stray sheep among the leaders of the reformist parties, who really desire to go along the right road to Socialism but are not capable of finding the way

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The C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia—continued

alone, on which account we must give them a "helping hand." The reformist parties, however, have not the least desire to go along the road to Socialism, they will not hear of such an obligation, and we can only make "allies of Socialism" out of their adherents against the will of these parties and in struggle with them. And the united front tactic is a form of this struggle. An emphatic protest must be made against the action of the central organ of a section of the Comintern, which, at a time of the most intense struggle for the united front, deals with the question in such an un-Leninist, sentimentally petty bourgeois manner.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, in its appeal after the elections, drew the correct inferences from their results, affirming the will to fight of the working masses, expressed in the elections, and calling for a struggle against the capitalists and their bourgeois coalition government. The reformists, who entered the election struggle with anti-capitalist slogans and with fighting announcements against the Government, have already exposed the treacherous part they have played. Their press no longer contains articles on the intensification of the struggle against the bourgeois coalition Government; no word is said of the desire to bring about the fall of the Government and force new elections.

The Communists can bring the adherents of the

reformist parties over to a fight against the bourgeois coalition Government—not to mention the struggle for "complete Socialism"—only against the will of those parties. That proves that our Czecho-Slovakian section will only be able to make use of the advantages won in the results of the municipal elections if they pursue the united front tactics in a Communist manner. The appeal of the Central Committee shows that the leadership of the Party is quite aware of that. But correct tactics and a correct policy must be pursued even in the least important Party organisation.

The most important weakness and inadequacy of many Communist Parties—and also of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia, consists in the fact that they do not yet understand the necessity of pursuing the correct policy—ideologically, politically and organisationally—into its furthest details, and of permeating the entire Party with a correct Leninist policy. The failures of the Party in the municipal elections in Slovakia can certainly be traced back, apart from the organisational weakness of this area, to the Party's inadequate carrying out of a correct policy on the national question. But how can that be attained in the provincial leaflets and in the most remote Party groups when the editors of the central organ of the Party still scatter about such incomprehensibly-false opinions on one of the most important questions—on the role of the Social-Democratic Parties and the united front? We recollect also the deviation on the national question, which we criticised. Immediate Bolshevisation is necessary here.

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The Delegations to Russia

Karl Kreibich

THE October celebrations were not only an obvious occasion for the Russian workers and peasants to extend invitations to their working class comrades of the whole world to visit Russia: ten years of Soviet Power could not be merely the occasion for rejoicing and a holiday. It was a world event, with whose significance the celebrations of any other State cannot be compared. Behind the celebrations were the efforts of the Russian workers and peasants to make their guests acquainted with the results of the ten years' work of the Soviet power. However powerful and deep an impression the mighty march of millions on November 7th may have made, however high the waves of enthusiasm may have risen on that day—such enthusiasm can easily and quickly travel the road from Moscow to Berlin and from Berlin to Paris; but the impression which the delegates from all over the world received, of socialist construction and of cultural progress in the Soviet Union—that impression is more lasting.

Facts remain, and whoever attempts to deny them only succumbs to them still more, and emphasises their inevitable victory. The workers of the Soviet Union know this, and that is why they can lay before the workers of the whole world, like an open book, their State, their life, their work. They know also that with every year that passes, these facts become more powerful, more convincing. But the enemies of the Soviet Union, the capitalist governments and the social democratic leaders, are also aware of this, and that is why their fear of delegations to Soviet Russia increases from year to year, that is why they intensify their efforts to prevent such delegations. The bourgeoisie and the social democratic leaders, conscious of their intellectual influence over the masses, and still relying on their power and force in the struggle against the ideas and principles of the proletarian revolution, are afraid of the powerful influence exercised on the working masses by the contrast between the facts of development in capitalist countries on the one hand, and in the Soviet Union on the other; an influence which must be strengthened with every year of successful socialist construction in the one place and intensification of economic and political crises elsewhere.

The Effect on Colonial Peoples

Not less powerful or significant is the impression which the facts of socialist construction must have made on the colonial and semi-colonial peoples. It has proved to them that economic progress is possible quite independently of the imperialists and that consequently the efforts of the bourgeoisie among these peoples to effect a compromise with the imperialists arise from the class interests of the national bourgeoisie, and not, as is maintained, from the necessities of economic progress. Such efforts have in view the maintenance of bourgeois domination, playing the role of the taskmaster of imperialism.

So the object lessons of the facts of socialist construction not only strengthen the colonial and semi-colonial peoples in their struggle against imperialist foreign hegemony: they also accelerate their ideological and political separation from their own bourgeoisie and

consequently the development of the national into the social revolution. Bound up with this is the animating effect which the realised right of self determination, the national autonomy of peoples which has been accomplished in the Soviet Union, must have on all oppressed nations and parts of nations, not only in Asia and Africa, but also in capitalist Europe.

The Soviet as Example for Workers

It is necessary to estimate correctly the importance of workers' and peasants' delegations to the Soviet Union for revolutionary development in capitalist countries. No Communist holds the childish view that the proletariat of the capitalist world will arise and take up the struggle for power, just because they see the difference between their own conditions and those of their class comrades in the Soviet Union, and desire the former. Apart from the objective preliminary conditions of a successful revolution, there are the subjective ideological prerequisites of the social revolution of the proletariat: the recognition of the danger of their ruin as a class, recognition of the impossibility of finding the road to safety within a capitalist order of society and by the methods of bourgeois democracy—the policy of the social democrats—and finally the faith in their own strength and capacity to exercise political power and to control industry. But just as the very existence of the Soviet Union as a great State system with a socialist economy, sharpens the crisis of capitalism, and so hastens the coming to maturity of the objective conditions for the proletarian revolution in the rest of the world, so the object lessons of socialist construction in the Soviet Union help to form the subjective conditions for the revolution.

This construction proves to the proletariat of the capitalist States, to whom the bourgeoisie maintain the impossibility of socialist economy; and to whom the social democratic leaders preach the prematurity of its construction and the immaturity of the working class, that the time for building up a socialist economy has arrived, and that the working classes are in a position to carry it out. The dissemination of this knowledge among the social democratic and non-party working masses will prepare the ground for the recruiting activities of the Communist Parties, for in the long run such knowledge must lead to the realisation that only the Bolshevik method of the proletarian class struggle can have the desired result.

In every new crisis of capitalism and of the bourgeois State system, in every new intensification of the class struggle, in every great struggle leading finally to the struggle for power, the excellent effect of the delegations to the Soviet Union must bear its fruit. Since, however, every meeting of the delegations with the workers of the Soviet Union is a manifestation of trade union unity, of a united front in the class struggle, the delegations must influence the daily struggle of the proletariat in the capitalist States, working actively, courageously, and in the direction of realising the revolutionary united front of the proletariat.

The Delegations to Russia—continued**The Alliance with the Peasants**

The twofold effect of sending the workers' delegation into the rural areas, and of peasant delegations having been sent to the Soviet Union, is of extreme importance. Firstly, the peasant delegations and their reports prepare the soil for rural agitation in the capitalist countries; secondly, and this is perhaps more important, it helps to set the working class in capitalist countries on the road to a correct understanding of the agricultural question, at the same time destroying that Menshevik idea on this question which was formulated by Trotsky in his statement on the inevitability of a clash between the proletarian revolution and the peasantry. Recognition of the fact that the proletarian revolution, that socialist construction is not necessarily opposed to the masses of the peasantry, that alliance with the peasants is both necessary and possible, is strengthened by the practical experiences of the Soviet Union, and has become a firm conviction, thus creating the most important prerequisite for such an alliance.

Delegations and the War Danger

But all these delegations have their greatest and most immediate significance in relation to the present burning question of the war danger consisting in the first place of the danger of a war of the capitalist States against the Soviet Union.

It is not necessary to emphasise here that it is the task of all Communist Parties to prevent such a war, and in the event of its outbreak to bring about the defeat of the enemies of the Soviet Union. Nor do we need to mention that we rely only on the Communist Parties for decisive revolutionary action. As little as we expect support in the required defence of the Soviet Union from the Trotskyist heroes, so little do we hold the illusion that every non-Communist member of the delegations which have visited the Soviet Union and will visit it in the future will become a steadfast revolutionary fighter against the war. But just as the very sending of these delegations—particularly those which went against the prohibition of parties and organisations unfriendly to the Soviet power of which they were members—brings out the strong sympathy of broad working and peasant masses, non-party or belonging to oppositional parties, for the Soviet Union, so these delegations must result in a strengthening and spreading of this sympathy.

History has already given us examples in which several nations were overrun by a wave of sympathy for another nation. We need only recall the sympathy and enthusiasm which were aroused by the struggle for national liberty of Poland against Russia, Greece against Turkey, the Boers against British imperialism. But that was limited to a small part of the world, a quickly dying down and practically ineffective blaze, in comparison with the deep sympathy which hundreds of millions of oppressed workers and peasants and oppressed nations of the whole earth have brought for ten years, and in an ever-increasing degree, to the people of the Soviet Union, their State power, their struggles and their work. This is not a superficial sympathy, for it is based on the real class and national relations of the sympathisers, it is most vitally connected with their class and national consciousness, with their hopes of the future and their real aims and demands.

With each year of capitalist development, leading to an intensification of imperialist exploitation and oppression and to the destruction of all illusory hopes of attaining freedom without revolution; with each year of progress in the Soviet Union, this sympathy will grow and an ever-increasing part of it solidify into a real and effective union. So there will arise, far beyond the direct sphere of those workers and peasants who sympathise with the Communist Parties in capitalist countries, an atmosphere of mass sympathy, of mass friendship for the Soviet Union. Such sympathy is a grave hindrance to the war plans of the imperialists against the Soviet Union. If, however, in spite of this, the imperialists carry out their plans, this sympathy and friendship of the masses for the Soviet Union will make the task of conducting the imperialist war more difficult, will support the defensive struggle of the Soviet Power and will facilitate the success of the revolutionary action of the Communists in those countries making war against the Soviet Union.

The Intellectuals

In this connection the delegations of "intellectuals" also have their importance, from an over-estimation of which we are protected not only by our class, materialist conception of the role of science and culture, but also by the experiences of the class struggle and of the revolution. The most fundamental reason for the sympathy of the intellectuals towards the Soviet Union lies less in the recognition and more the unconscious feeling of what to us is a self-evident truth, that the crisis of capitalism and of bourgeois society is also the crisis and the disintegration of its science and its culture. The nearer that the intellectuals stand to the masses and the more that they see in culture, not the privilege of a handful of "learned souls" but a vital part of the life of the masses, the more definite that feeling becomes. What prevents the development and operation of the sympathy of the intellectuals for the Soviet Union is the doubt that a dictatorship of the proletariat, based on a materialist conception of the world, is capable of developing science and culture, and the idea that the proletariat is only capable of controlling industry and technique. From this point of view, the delegation of "intellectuals" to the Soviet Union, merely by observing the facts, will be of advantage to the dictatorship of the proletariat. In view of the powerful effect exercised by the bourgeois press and literature on the masses of the workers in the capitalist States, the importance of this must not be underestimated. To break through the united front of hostility, of narrow-minded stupidity and lies and calumnies is something of value. Nor is it without value that within the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie there should be doubt and hesitation as to their belief in the divinity of capitalism and of bourgeois society, and also in their panicky fear of the Communist hell.

The Friends of the Soviet Union

The celebration of the ten years' existence of the Soviet Union brought a deluge of the most varied kinds of delegations from the whole world. Workers and peasants, intellectuals and pacifists, co-operators and trade unionists, representatives of the oppressed peoples and members of political parties of greatly differing tendencies and of non-political organisations of all countries and peoples met together in Moscow and journeyed over the greater part of the Soviet Union. The culminating

The Delegations to Russia—continued

point of this conflux of delegates to Russia was the "Congress of the Friends of the Soviet Union," which was without doubt the most lively and comprehensive world congress which has ever taken place up to the present day. Lively not only because all continents and races, all countries and peoples were represented there, but because it manifested the greatest liveliness of political ideas, of social and organisational adherence and this extremely active and heterogeneous meeting of nearly one thousand persons was united in **one** political idea. For recognition of, and sympathy and friendship for the Soviet Union, and readiness to protect it against the attacks of its enemies, is a remarkable political idea.

The basis of this Congress and the conditions out of which it arose, were correctly enumerated by Henri Barbusse when he called it a "Congress of Witnesses." How seriously and objectively he used this word was shown by the fact that he, the poet, did not make a rapturous, poetic speech during the discussion, which many, in accordance with the general opinion as to poets and litterateurs, might have expected from him, but gave a sober account, punctuated by figures, of the conditions and development of the Soviet Union. That is evidence of the strength of the impression which the delegates received from their visit to the Soviet Union, from the sober objective facts. Comrade Rykov's report to the delegates, and the material added to this report, was not, therefore, received by those of the Congress as something new and startling, but as a résumé, a review and a systematic working out and arrangement of everything included in the report, which they themselves had seen with their own eyes and heard with their own ears. Rykov's speech was a summing up of all the evidence on the Soviet Union given to the whole world by the delegations in their entirety at the Congress, and which they must also give to their own countries. This evidence will not silence the enemies of the Soviet Union; on the contrary, it will certainly increase their rage and their calumnies, but it will also result in this, that the lying campaigns of the enemies of the Soviet Union will, to an increasing extent, lose their hold over the working masses.

The speeches of the Congress delegates alone showed that a comparison of the position of the working class, of the entire State, governmental and economic form of the Soviet Union with conditions in capitalist countries, draws with it as a logical consequence, a comparison of the tactical methods of the class struggle of the majority of the proletariat in relation to the leadership in the one country and in the others. This question was naturally the most critical at a congress where the majority of members belonged to non-Communist and largely to social democratic parties. The speakers for the Comintern and for the C.P.S.U., Clara Zetkin and Bukharin, put this problem forward quite openly and clearly. For although neither the Comintern nor the C.P.S.U. convened the Congress, and although they refrained from directly influencing it, it would be foolish not to say that the methods of the class struggle which led to those results approved of by the delegates, are the methods of the C.P.S.U., and that the Communist International has placed before itself the task of employing these methods in other countries, in order to lead the working classes in those countries by these, the only possible methods, to victory and to the building up of socialism.

It was not for this congress to determine how far the non-Communist delegates were clear on this point. But the delegates at the Congress who formulated and spoke to the two resolutions on the "Results of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and "the necessity to defend them against all attacks of the bourgeoisie," will be compelled, in estimating the results of their journey, to draw the logical consequences and to put and answer, the question of method. In whatever form they may propose the question and answer it, the very fact that they find themselves compelled to bring the question up again will have its effect on the masses of the social democratic and non-party workers. The re-emergence of this problem from such a new and significant cause, will prepare the ground among the masses for a correct answer to this question; particularly if the Communists set about their work of agitation and propaganda in the right place and in the right way. The victory of the revolutionary principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat is expressed in this; that every time the question is raised, its correctness wins new adherents. It is because we Communists realise this that we try to bring the question up continually. But the social democratic leaders also realise it, and therefore make every effort to prevent any discussion of the question.

Social-Democratic Opposition to Delegations

It also explains their fierce opposition to workers' delegations to Russia. They know as well as we do that every new wave of sympathy for the Soviet Union must result in the winning of new sympathies for the Communist movement in capitalist countries, and that every new thousand friends of the Soviet Union means that at least a large fraction of that thousand are friends and adherents of the Communist movement. Fear of this result induces the leaders of parties hostile to Communism to cry out about the so-called abuses with which the delegations were conducted. Our enemies consider it immoral abuse and inadmissible agitation if the Russian workers and peasants show their foreign class comrades the truth and give them their opinion. That merely shows how insecure our enemies feel themselves to be. If they were sure of their cause they would not be content with this outcry and with forbidding their adherents to visit Russia, but would answer the delegations to the Soviet Union with a counter-move—by inviting Russian workers and peasants to visit their "democratic" countries, in order to show them how far advanced the working classes there are on the road to democracy. They would have sufficient opportunity to influence their guests from the Soviet Union by propaganda. None of us would prevent it, or characterise it as "abuse" or as something "immoral." But the social democratic leaders are opposed to such delegations from the Soviet Union, and they are offended because the Russian workers and peasants are curious to see how things are in the countries of "democracy."

The two resolutions give the best picture of the Congress. The resolution on the speech of comrade Rykov is a short and concise, but also clear résumé of what the delegates witnessed. And this sober, simple enumeration of the facts reverberates clearly throughout the Soviet Union.

The second resolution is an appeal to the working class of the world to defend the Soviet Union against all attacks of imperialism. It expresses the readiness

The Delegations to Russia—continued

of the delegates to fight against the war aims of the imperialists. Nor was this decision coaxed out of the delegates in any way. Comrade Tomsy, in his speech on the war danger, made no secret of the Communist attitude towards the imperialist war aims, nor of our criticism of the policy of the social democratic leaders and pacifists on the question of war. Nor did comrades Rykov, Zetkin and Bukharin hesitate to speak of the Communist point of view with regard to the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction. If both resolutions, in spite of the Bolshevik openness with which our speakers approached the non-Communist delegates, were passed not only unanimously, but with great enthusiasm; it expresses the powerful and convincing impression which a comparison of the methods of Leninism and its results, the trial of these methods and the fact of their success, must make on all workers. The rejoicing and enthusiasm with which the world Congress

of the Friends of the Soviet Union closed, was in one respect less, but in another respect—considered in a larger perspective—more than that enthusiasm which the October revolution kindled, even amongst the indifferent masses, ten years ago, in the revolutionary situation existing at that time throughout Europe.

In the present epoch of the relative stabilisation of capitalism, this enthusiasm signifies a real conviction, based on the observation of facts, of the correctness of the road taken by the masses of the workers in Russia ten years ago, under the leadership of Lenin's Party. This enthusiasm of conviction will not start a revolutionary uprising, but when it is combined with the awakening of the revolutionary spirit of the masses in the next crisis of capitalism, in the next convulsion of bourgeois society, then the result, under the leadership of the Comintern, will be different from what it was in 1917-1919.

Therein lies the revolutionary significance of the "World Congress of the Friends of the Soviet Union."

The Polish-Lithuanian Conflict

AT a moment when the main lines of struggle between the hostile camps of "great" imperialist Powers are beginning to be revealed more and more definitely, when preparations for the crusade of the world bourgeoisie against U.S.S.R. are being carried on continuously—at this moment a conflict comes to a head on the Polish-Lithuanian frontier, which with inexorable logic and swiftness is growing into an armed conflict between Fascist Poland and Fascist Lithuania.

It suffices to recall but for a minute the geographical situation of Lithuania, lying between the U.S.S.R., Poland, Germany and the Baltic States, to realise the serious political and economic consequences which a Polish-Lithuanian war, and the consequent inevitable seizure of Lithuania by Poland, will bring with it. Under such conditions a clash between Poland and Lithuania might serve as a signal for a new imperialist war.

The beginning of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict dates back to the end of 1920, in the period immediately preceding the conclusion of the Riga peace treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and Poland. The genesis of the conflict contains so many interesting points, clearly characterising the miserable position of the small bourgeois States in the epoch of imperialism, that it is worth while stopping to consider the genesis of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute in some detail. When in September, 1920, the Red Army divisions were compelled to evacuate the Vilna region, all the territory, together with the town of Vilna, was occupied by Lithuanian soldiers, and thus was united with Lithuania. The armistice between Poland and Lithuania, signed on October 7th, 1920, in Suwalki, left the Vilna region in the hands of Lithuania. This armistice was not to the liking of the Polish militarists, who in the renunciation of Vilna saw a renunciation of those ideas which Pilsudski had proclaimed in 1919, in his celebrated appeal to the inhabitants of the "great principality of Lithuania."

A way out of the situation was found very quickly. On October 10th, 1920, the commander of the Lithuanian and White-Russian divisions of the Polish army, General Zeligovski "revolted" (with the knowledge and consent of Pilsudski and the Great Powers) against his lawful government (i.e., Pilsudski), and "at his own risk" occupied the Vilna region, forming it into an "independent" State, with the name of "Central Lithuania." The territory occupied by General Zeligovski's soldiers swiftly became an asylum for the White Guard divisions of Savinkov and Bulak-Balakhovitch, and the military camp for the preparation of armed attacks on the territory of the R.S.F.S.R., which in December, 1920, concluded an armistice with Poland.

Some months later the Council of the League of Nations decided to hold a plebiscite in the Vilna region to settle which State should own this territory. However, the matter got no farther than a "resolution," and on February 20th, 1922, the Sejm of "Central Lithuania," summoned under the pressure of the Polish bayonets, in the face of a boycott from the enormous majority of the population, voted for the union of "Central Lithuania" with Poland. It goes without saying that the Polish Government accepted this decision "for their information and guidance," and the Vilna region became part of the Polish State.

On April 20th, 1923, the Council of Ambassadors sanctioned this open seizure by the Polish army, and from that time a state of permanent conflict has been established between Poland and Lithuania—now dying down, now breaking out again with fresh force and illumining Eastern Europe with its ominous light. The coming of Pilsudski to power as a result of the May revolution of 1926 was signalled by a renewal of stronger attempts to drag Lithuania into the orbit of Polish influence, with the aim of realising Pilsudski's plans and dreams of a federation of Poland with "free" Lithuania, White Russia and the Ukraine—"from sea to sea."

Polish-Lithuanian Conflict—contd.**The Imperialists Support Poland**

To this end a series of demonstrations was arranged which were to prove to all the world the strength of the bonds binding Lithuania to Poland. In May this year the Polish Government organised a ceremonial funeral for the veteran of the Lithuanian national movement in the Vilna region, Bassanovitchus, and to this funeral were invited certain political figures from the present Lithuania, which has Kovno as its capital. In June the Kovno professor, Albin Gerbachevsky, arrived in Poland, and he made much play with the cultural kinship between Poland and Lithuania, and obviously played the part of an irresponsible "link" between the Polish Government and the Lithuanian circles friendly disposed to Poland. At the beginning of July took place the solemn dedication of the "miraculous" ikon of the Vilna "Ostrobrama" Mother of God, during which ceremony the Polish Government permitted the unrestricted entry into Polish territory of the devout from Kovno Lithuania. All this "audience" arrived to the accompaniment of enthusiastic effusions from the Polish press, written around the theme that "Lithuania will yet return," as she had returned to the bosom of Poland under the Yagiellons in the sixteenth century, "under the influence of Moscow pressure."

Together with this "decorative" aspect of the Polish-Lithuanian "*rapprochement*" secret negotiations were also being carried on with the Lithuanian Government and with the representatives of all the Lithuanian parties, under the immediate direction of Pilsudski himself, and with the "friendly" participation of the ambassadors of the Great Powers in Warsaw. The pressure of the "Great Powers"—of Britain and France in the first place—brought to bear on Lithuania with the purpose of forcing her to go the way of "*rapprochement*" with Poland, went on to an accompaniment of the continual jingling of arms by Poland, who independently of "peaceful" methods of influence, more than once carried out suspicious groupings of military forces on the Lithuanian frontier. Towards the end of September this year the Polish manoeuvres towards a "*rapprochement*" with Lithuania by peaceful methods broke down. The stumbling block was once more the Vilna question, raised by the Lithuanian Fascist Government in a pointed manner. The Valdemaras Government drew up a draft Bill for changing the Lithuanian constitution in the direction of strengthening the Fascist dictatorship, but also added certain clauses directed against Poland. One of these was Clause 4 of the draft Bill, which forbids the alteration of the frontiers of the Lithuanian State by any other method than an all-national vote, and a supplement to this clause stating that the capital of Lithuania is Vilna, and that the capital can be transferred to another spot only by a special law.

The clause in the draft constitution openly declaring Lithuania's claims to territory held by Poland gave Pilsudski's Government the chance to begin a fresh anti-Lithuanian campaign. In answer to the alleged persecution of Poles in Lithuania, repressive measures were taken against the Lithuanians living in Poland. In two days—September 4th and 5th—several dozen Lithuanian schools in Poland were closed, and a number of

Lithuanian public men were arrested. In Vilna took place anti-Lithuanian demonstrations organised by Pilsudski's adherents, to show the whole world the "national united front" which exists in Poland on the Vilna question. The Polish press developed a frenzied anti-Lithuanian campaign, demanding the open chastisement of Lithuania, under the guise of a struggle against . . . the German agent Valdemaras. Thus the Polish-Lithuanian conflict entered on a stage in which any day may see an attempt by Pilsudski to cut the knot of Polish-Lithuanian relationships with the sword.

Poland's Preparations

It is difficult at the moment to foresee what technical methods Poland will resort to for the seizure of Lithuania. Besides the possibility of the direct occupation of Lithuania by two or three divisions of the Polish army, an outbreak from within, which would overthrow the Valdemaras Government and clear the way for Polish-Lithuanian *rapprochement*, is not impossible. The possibility of this second method is confirmed by the information we possess concerning the congress of Lithuanian *émigrés*, which took place in Riga on November 5th last. At this congress in Riga, which was summoned on the initiative of the "Committee for the Defence of the Republic" with the purpose of uniting the efforts of the Lithuanian *émigrés* for the overthrow of the Valdemaras Fascist Government, all the centres of the Lithuanian *émigrés* (Poland, Latvia, Eastern Prussia) were represented; the majority of those who took part in the congress consisted of Social-Democrats and "Laudininkists."

Social-Democratic Support of Poland

The very first speeches of the organisers of the congress, the Social-Democrats Plechkaitis and Poplauskas (who had both arrived from Vilna), and also the disclosures made by the Social-Democrat Vikonis, a member of the congress, immediately revealed the real face of the congress, organised with the closest participation of the Polish consul in Riga, Lukasevitch. The latter even offered the Lithuanian Social-Democrats the moral and material assistance of the Polish Government if they took on themselves the obligation of "regulating" Polish-Lithuanian relationships after the revolution. Vikonis's disclosures caused a split in the congress, as a result of which the minority of the delegates, belonging to the Laudininkists, left the congress, not wishing to become an instrument of Polish imperialism. The majority of the congress, consisting of Social-Democrats, under the guidance of the open Polish agents Poplauskas and Plechkaitis, took the road of open agreement with Fascist Poland, covering this step with hypocritical resolutions about the "struggle" with Lithuanian Fascists. Especially noteworthy is the participation of representatives of the Polish "democracy" in the person of M. Chidze, a member of the Polish Socialist Party, and vice-president of the town of Vilna, the deputy of the Seyma Polyakevitch (a member of the Polish "Emancipation-Wyzwolenie" Party), and the deputy Tseplak, in the work of the congress. They all unanimously assured Mister Plechkaitis and Company of the support which the friendly Polish "democracy" would offer to their designs. The commentary of the Warsaw press on Chidze's and Polyakevitch's state-

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ments leave no doubt whatever that the declarations read by them in the name of the Polish "democracy" reflected the views of the Pilsudski Government. Thus the Riga congress revealed the Lithuanian Social-Democrats and part of the Laudininkists as agents of Polish imperialism. These persons, who did not have the courage and desire to struggle against Lithuanian Fascism when it arose, who put Communists in prison for carrying on that struggle, have become a blind instrument in the hands of the Polish bourgeoisie and landowners.

The participation of representatives of the Polish Socialist Party in the congress also sheds a flood of light on the role of this Party in Marshal Pilsudski's Lithuanian machinations. The leaders of the P.P.S. (Polish Socialist Party), seeing the continually growing hatred of the Polish workers to Pilsudski's Fascist dictatorship and to the P.P.S., the original mother of Pilsudskyism, are now attempting to restore their position by supporting the struggle against Fascism—in Lithuania. In any case, the Riga congress underlines very distinctly the obliging role of the Lithuanian Social Democracy in the matter of realising the usurpatory plans of Polish imperialism. Lithuanian Social-Democrats travel over Poland giving lectures on the Fascist terror . . . in Lithuania; it goes without saying that the Polish Government and the P.P.S. also give them their utmost support in this activity. Under Plechkaitis' presidency a "Committee for the Defence of the Republic" has already been set up in Vilna; this committee regards itself as the government of Lithuania, and only awaits the signal for attack from its Warsaw patrons. If to what has been already said is added the fact that bourgeois opinion in Britain, France and Italy approves Pilsudski's action and condemns Lithuania, it can be concluded that Poland's seizure of Lithuania will not meet with obstacles from the governing circles of these countries. Under such conditions Lithuania's complaint against Poland made to the League of Nations remains a voice crying in the wilderness, and will be correspondingly allowed to "lie on the table."

An analysis of the factors which are driving Pilsudski's Government along the road of enforced preparation for the "union" with Lithuania underlines all the importance of the Lithuanian question for Fascist Poland. In this regard it is worth giving some attention to the evaluation of the significance of the "Lithuanian question" which was given on 8th October last in the journal "Przelom"—the organ of the "Union for Resanitation of the Republic"—which is the central organisation of Polish Fascism. "Lithuania," the article says, "is the key to all our Baltic policy, and under present conditions forms the most painful menace to our strategic position in the event of a conflict with Germany or with Russia. The attraction of Lithuania into the orbit of Polish political influence and an assurance of safety from that side, the possibility of an approach to the sea in this part of the Baltic, or, on the other hand, a permanent menace to and isolation of Poland—all this has decisive significance for Poland's position in the future as a Great Power." The seizure of Lithuania by Poland will afford the latter the chance to exert stronger pressure on Latvia and Esthonia in order to isolate the U.S.S.R. from the West, and is one

of the links in the British plan for blockading the U.S.S.R. The seizure of Lithuania, isolating Eastern Prussia, transforming it into a little island amid Polish territory, will involve a threat to Germany, and cannot but deepen the antagonism which already exists between Poland and Germany over Upper Silesia and the Dantzig corridor.

Poland's Economic Interests

The aggressiveness of Polish Fascism in relation to Lithuania is accentuated also by the presence of Poland's well-known economic interests in Lithuania. The first of these interests is concerned with the question of *transport along the Niemen*, which has enormous significance for the Polish timber industry, and in particular for British industrialists who have laid out large capital sums in timber development in the Bieloviedz Forest. The closing of the Niemen compels the carriage of Polish timber to the Baltic ports (Memel, Koenigsburg, Libava) by rail, which greatly increases its cost and reduces its ability to compete on the Western European markets. Taking into consideration the significance of timber export in Poland's balance of external trade, the struggle for the opening of the Niemen must be recognised as one of the most serious factors in Poland's aggressive relationship towards Lithuania.

At the same time, Lithuania presents a market for manufacturers of Polish industry, especially for textiles. The fact is worthy of note that in textile exports from the Lodz area, Lithuania even now occupies second place, after Roumania, despite the fact that Polish manufacturers go to Lithuania by roundabout roads. At the present time the Lithuanian market is officially closed to Poland, and is hardly likely to be opened during the existence of an independent Lithuania, since the latter, owing to the agrarian character of its economy, has no prospects of export to Poland in exchange for Polish imports, and consequently the possibilities of an economic *rapprochement* between Poland and Lithuania are at a minimum.

A serious factor in Polish aggressiveness towards Lithuania are the interests of Polish agriculturists in the Vilna region, who own large estates in the territory of Kovno Lithuania also. According to the statistics of V. Studnitsky (V. Studnitsky: "Agrarian Revolutions and Reforms in Post-War Europe and Poland"; Warsaw, 1927) 54 per cent. of all the large landed properties in the former province (which to-day is the chief nucleus of Lithuanian territory), and also almost all the great landed estates in those parts of the former Suvalka province which enter into the formation of the Lithuanian State, were in Polish hands; 25 to 30 per cent. of all the territory of the Lithuanian State was the property of Polish landowners.

Lithuanian Landowners for Poland

The agrarian reform in Lithuania, only partially carried out, and that in the interests of the Lithuanian "kulak" or richer peasantry, has none the less struck a painful blow at the interest of Polish agriculturists. So it is not surprising that the Vilna landowners, groups banqueting under monarchistic and Conservative standards, are also skirmishers in the question of the seizure of Lithuania, which would afford them the possibility of restoring their lost landownership. The clearest ex-

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pression of this tendency of Polish landowners is to be found in a brochure with the title "Dotting the i's," which came from the pen of the well-known Vilna monarchist publicist and theoretical writer, Stanislav Matskievitch. Touching on the question of Polish-Lithuanian relationships, Matskievitch writes:

"State unity between the Dvina and the Carpathians conferred on us that force as a great Power of which we are now deprived. Poland's line of development as a great Power must bring us to the thought of Polish-Lithuanian union. And as we do not believe in the 'democratic cohabitation of the nations' our programme must be expressed in the formula: *The seizure of Lithuania by armed force.*" The idea of armed seizure of Lithuania is being systematically propagated by the newspaper "Slovò," the organ of the Vilna monarchists. Taking into consideration the fact that the Vilna monarchist-agriculturists are a government party, having two of their representatives in the present Polish Cabinet (Maishtovich and Niezabitoivsky), they have to be regarded as expressing the true Polish intentions in regard to Lithuania.

Pilsudski's Own Difficulties

No small factor making for a decisive step by Pilsudski in regard to Lithuania is the political struggle being waged within Poland itself. The period for which the present Sejm was elected is expiring, and Poland is on the eve of fresh parliamentary elections. Despite the consolidation of the basic nucleus of the Polish bourgeoisie and landowners around Pilsudski's Fascist dictatorship, despite the existence of such parties composed of 100 per cent. adherents of Pilsudski as the "Partia Truda" (Labour Party) and the "Union for the Re-sanitisation of the Republic," Pilsudski still has to take account of the existence of such old bourgeois parties as the National People's Union (National Democrats), the peasant democracy and the social compromisers of the P.P.S., who although greatly weakened as a result of the discord which Pilsudski has succeeded in introducing into their midst, still retain certain influence on the petty-bourgeoisie and partly (the P.P.S.) on the working masses. The National People's Union cleverly exploits Pilsudski's policy towards the Ukrainians and White Russians as a propaganda weapon in their struggle against him. Basing himself on the idea of a federation with "free" Ukraine and White Russia, with the general institution of war with U.S.S.R., Pilsudski has very intelligently thrown the Ukrainian bourgeoisie a number of sopas, in the form of introducing the obligation to study the Ukrainian language in the first classes of the Polish secondary schools in Eastern Galicia, the attraction of a number of Ukrainians into State service and into organs of autonomous government, in the form of money gifts to individual "trustworthy" Ukrainian co-operative banks and so on. These facts have been exploited by the National Democrats for demonstrations against Pilsudski, and for accusing him of "selling to the Ukrainians the immemorial Polish Little Poland," and in Lvov (Lemberg) and Posen they have gone as far as street demonstrations against Pilsudski's school policy in Eastern Galicia. It goes without saying that these

matters will play a certain role in the forthcoming election campaign, and it is not impossible that in certain parts of Poland the petty-bourgeois fear of any concessions to "other nationalities" may prove to be grist for the National Democrats' mill against Pilsudski. As for the P.P.S. opposition to Pilsudski, as it has no intellectual basis, it is dictated purely by the endeavour to retain influence on the working masses of Poland who are fast going more to the left, and it will not go beyond timorous talks of "Fascism," etc.

Seizure as Pilsudski's Trump Card

A settlement, and a radical settlement, of the Lithuanian question would give Pilsudski a trump card in the oncoming parliamentary elections. The enlargement of Poland's territory, the realisation of the "great idea of the Yagiellons," would deprive the National Democrats of their propagandist argument, and might serve as a further impulse to the consolidation of the bourgeois elements around Pilsudski. From this point of view the anti-Lithuanian demonstrations which took place in Vilna on October 9th are very instructive. In these demonstrations the Pilsudskyites came out in a united front with the National Democrats, and there was a ceremonial blending of the Fascist military organisation of the Pilsudskyites (the Union of Legionaries) with the militarist unions of the Dovborites and Hallerites (former soldiers of the armies of Generals Dovbor-Musnitsky and Haller), which are under the influence of the National Democrats. The settlement of the "Lithuanian question" would create a basis for the organisation of such a "single national front" on an all-Poland scale, and this would tremendously strengthen the position of Pilsudski's Fascist dictatorship in the forthcoming Sejm elections.

The seizure of Lithuania, which at present is governed by the sanguinary Fascist Valdemaras Government, would give Pilsudski the opportunity to come out also in the role of "enemy of Fascism," and thus with the aid of the P.P.S. to accumulate a certain amount of political capital among the Polish working class also; while for the P.P.S. this fact might serve as a justification for this party's refusal to put up any opposition to Pilsudski, as already indicated. Taking into consideration the results of the recent Polish municipal elections, which were unfavourable to the Pilsudski Parties, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that conceptions of pre-electoral character evidently play an eminent role in Pilsudski's aggressive designs towards Lithuania.

Such is the picture of the motive forces behind the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, which has already passed to a stage when every day brings us nearer and nearer to its final issue. Under such conditions the fundamental task of the European proletariat and its Communist Parties consists in struggle with the war danger which the conflict provokes in Eastern Europe. An honourable role in this struggle falls to the lot of the Polish Communist Party; the Polish Communist Party must throw all its influence with the working masses of Poland, won during the municipal elections, into the scale to tie hand and foot the usurpatory designs of Polish Fascism. The Communist Parties of Britain, France and Germany must support the Polish Communist Party and intensify its work of denunciation,

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mobilising the masses against the governments that support the threat of war in Eastern Europe.

And especially responsible and intricate tasks arise for the heroic Communist Party of Lithuania. The hatred which exists among large masses of the Lithu-

anian proletariat and peasantry towards the bloody regime of Valdemaras and Smetona, and which the traitorous Social-Democrats are prepared to direct along the channel of union with Polish imperialism, must be directed by the Lithuanian Communist Party along the channel of class struggle with the Lithuanian bourgeoisie, along the channel of struggle for an independent Soviet Lithuania.

