

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN **SPAIN**
THE UNITED FRONT IN BRITAIN
(SPEECH OF H. POLLITT TO E.C.C.I.)

WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE



December 5th, 1934

VOLUME XI

COMMUNIST
INTERNATIONAL

No 23

THREEPENCE
CONTENTS
OVERLEAF

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Number 23

Published fortnightly in Russian, German,
French, Chinese, Spanish and English.

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THE STRUGGLE AGAINST FASCISM FOR POWER, AND THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' REPUBLIC IN SPAIN

THE revolution in Spain has been developing for more than three and a half years. During these years general strikes have occurred time and time again, in both the towns and villages. "Armed insurrections" have broken out in Spain on more than one occasion, sometimes semi-spontaneously, sometimes "organised" by the anarchists.

But the events that took place in Spain in the autumn of 1934, represent something NEW in the development of the Spanish revolution. In these heroic days the Spanish revolution grew higher by a head, matured and GAINED A NEW STARTING POINT FOR ITS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ON THE PATH TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER IN SPAIN.

For the first time the question of POWER was decided in open battle; the mass struggle, the general strike against the capitalist offensive, fascism and reaction, grew into a MASS ARMED REVOLT (IN ASTURIAS, BISCAY, ETC.), FOR THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' REPUBLIC, FOR THE POWER OF THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' ALLIANCE, THE SOVIETS AND A WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT.

The Alignment of Class Forces at the Moment of the General Strike and the Armed Uprising.

The development of the revolution led to a situation where the very course of events raised the alternatives: either the power of the working class and peasants, or else the naked dictatorship of Spanish fascism. This is clearly shown by the entire ALIGNMENT OF CLASS FORCES in Spain on the eve of the events, and the CHANGE in the tactics of the ruling bourgeois-landlord bloc.

The November elections to the Cortes in 1933 showed that the influence of the Right monarchist-clerical parties (and especially of the fascist parties) had grown stronger in Spain. The fascists and the Right parties in general received about two-thirds of the votes in the Cortes, to a great extent from the religiously-minded women,* who were participating in the elections for the first time, and a section of the peasants, disillusioned in the republic which had not fulfilled a single one of the promises made to them. But as further events showed, the results of these elections were by no means a sign of the ebbing of the revolutionary wave in Spain. On the contrary, the revolutionary movement of the working class and that of the nationally oppressed peoples of Catalonia and Bis-

cay ASSUMED TREMENDOUS PROPORTIONS AND ADVANCED AHEAD during the last year.

A characteristic feature for Spain during the last year was the PREVALENCE OF GENERAL POLITICAL STRIKES and sympathetic strikes. It is sufficient merely to call to mind that in Asturias alone there were five general political strikes from the beginning of the year until September, 1934; in Biscay four political strikes, while from April to September, 1934, there were four general-political strikes in Madrid alone.

In addition to this, mention should be made of a number of economic strikes which frequently grew into political strikes. The frequent REPETITION of general political strikes is a clear indication of the militant nature of the strike movement and the tremendous stubbornness of the strikers. This is also shown by the LONG DURATION of the strikes. For example, the general strike in Saragossa at the beginning of this year lasted forty days, the Madrid metal workers' strike three months.

It is not sufficient to simply note the enormous growth of political strikes. An important place was occupied this year by strikes directed right against the offensive of fascism (and not only Spanish) and the fascist policy of the government. It suffices to indicate the February strike of solidarity with the Austrian proletariat, who were carrying on an armed struggle against fascism. This strike affected 125,000 persons, mostly in Asturias and in Zamorra. It should be borne in mind that this solidarity strike was declared and conducted by the Communist Party of Spain alone, in spite of the socialists and anarchists.

We should further note the strike of April 21, 1934, in protest against the fascist march on Escorial, near Madrid. About 100,000 young bloods were expected at this first fascist meet, but the plot proved a fiasco, due to the general strike in Madrid, organised by the Communist Party. The fascists had the greatest difficulty in gathering 4,000 to 5,000 people at the rally. The second rally was called for September 8, 1934, in Covagonda in Asturias. Thanks to the general strike in Asturias and on the railways, the fascists were able to gather a mere 500 persons, who came along in their own automobiles in place of the 10,000 who had been expected. A clear political and impressive character was also possessed by the general strike in Madrid on September 8, 1934, in which about 200,000 participated, against the rally of the Catalanian landlords.

* 55% of the electors were women.

Since the end of the summer of 1934, the situation in Spain began particularly to intensify. After a short breathing space (after the June agricultural workers' strike) THE CURVE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TURNED SHARPLY UPWARDS from August onwards. The movement of the industrial proletariat grew rapidly, the national revolutionary movement and that of the urban petty-bourgeoisie developed, and the anti-fascist front was strengthened.

In the towns on the eve of the general strike, despite the increased activity of the fascists, SOME OF THE PETTY-BOURGEOISIE BEGAN TO LEAVE THE RIGHT PARTIES AND TO PASS partly into the camp of the revolution, partly into the "Left" bourgeois parties (the unification of the Left petty-bourgeois groups into a single party, led by Asana, the split of the chief government party, the Radical party, in the middle of 1934, and the formation of a Republican Party, under the leadership of Martines Barrio, the growth of the "Catalonian Left" Party, etc.).

A still more important indication of the decline in the influence of the fascist Right wing parties in the town, an indication of the SWING TO THE LEFT which had taken place among the petty-bourgeoisie, was the extensive participation of the urban petty-bourgeoisie in the anti-fascist front (in demonstrations, meetings and campaigns for the liberation of Comrade Thaelmann, etc.).

After August, the working class movement developed mainly in the form of big general strikes, solidarity strikes (Asturias, Madrid, Cadiz, Leon, Jeres, de la Frontera, etc.), and large demonstrations, meetings, gatherings, etc. All this activity began to be conducted increasingly on the basis of the UNITED FRONT of the Communist Party and the Y.C.L. with the Socialist Party and the Young Socialists, while the anarchist leaders fought sharply against the united front.

Thanks to the policy of the Socialists, anarchists and bourgeois nationalists, the scope of the movement among the peasants and the national emancipation movement lagged far behind that of the movement of the proletariat.

After Autumn, 1932, the villages began to undergo a rapid process of revolutionisation and there began the seizure of the landlords' estates. Beginning with Autumn, 1933, the actions of the peasants in the struggle for land grew spontaneously into a struggle against the organs of the government, and turned in a number of cases, into armed resistance to the gendarmes and the troops. In the villages the ferment was mainly spread by the farm labourers. In June, 1934, a tremendous general strike of agricultural workers took place in which 500,000 people took part. The movement, however, was spontaneous in character. The anarchists, who were very influential in the Spanish

villages (especially in the South, in the main peasant districts) acted as strike-breakers and hindered the development of the agrarian revolution in every way. The Socialist Party, which had formed part of the government coalition with the bourgeoisie and the landowners' parties and operated the policy of the Spanish bourgeoisie, thereby clearing the way for fascism, not only did nothing at all for the peasants, but helped to crush the peasant movement. In June, 1934, the socialists, together with the anarchists, refused to support the proletariat (through solidarity strikes) by organising a general strike of agricultural workers, as the Communists demanded. As a result, a certain section of the villages began to turn its back on the republic.

As for the national emancipation movement in Catalonia, Biscay and Galicia, which was closely interwoven with the agrarian movement, the basic weakness here was also the fact that THE PROLETARIAT WAS NOT AT THE HEAD OF THIS MOVEMENT. The leadership of the national movement was in the hands of the parties of the national small and middle bourgeoisie, and to some degree, in Biscay, the party of the big bourgeoisie. The socialists ignored the national-liberation movement, while the anarchists took up a sharply antagonistic position on the question of the independence of Catalonia. It is true that, in spite of the socialists and the anarchists, the workers supported the national-liberation movement. On the initiative of the Communist Party, the workers of Madrid prevented the meet of Catalonian landlords in Madrid by their September general strike. The conduct of the socialists and anarchists on the national question, however, had its effect. Since the national-liberation movement was not led by the proletariat, it did not respond to the October call for a general strike in the degree one might have expected, while the bourgeois-nationalist Catalonian government at once made a cowardly capitulation to the country-revolutionary generals.

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As the result of the growth of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, a process of DIFFERENTIATION took place in the camp of the bourgeoisie. The Radical Party, the chief party of the industrial bourgeoisie, came nearer to the chief fascist "national action" party. The "Left" bourgeois parties, although in an extremely timid manner, nevertheless, took up a more definite position under the pressure of the masses against the bloc of the Radical Party with the party of "national action."

The fascists, on their part, carried on increased activity and were plainly in a hurry.

In the autumn of 1933, especially after the

November elections to the Cortes, a CHANGE IN TACTICS could plainly be noticed in the leading fascist party of the ruling bourgeois-landlord bloc, the "party of national action," led by Gil Robles.*

Up till then the party of "national action" had systematically refused to participate in the government.

The party of "national action" (otherwise the fascist-clerical party) considered that it should set up a MASS BASIS among the broad strata of the population before seizing power. The party of Gil Robles, with a view to widening its basis, now made use of the discontent of the peasants (and to some extent of the farm labourers) who suffered from shortage of land and had not received anything from the republican socialist government.

The closer the moment came for the unleashing of the events which had matured, the more the fascist front became consolidated. The basic fascist party—the party of "national action" at the end of summer, 1934, openly raised the question of ENTERING THE GOVERNMENT and of the necessity for a keener struggle against the revolution. From the summer of 1934 onwards the bourgeoisie adopted a course aiming at unloosing civil war amongst the proletariat.

The Lerrox and Samper government increased the repression against the revolutionary movement and the workers' organisations day after day.

The leaders of the Spanish counter-revolution, however, saw that Samper was unable to cope with the ever-growing wave of revolution. Then Gil Robles stated that his party wanted to take power into its hands immediately "so as to PUT AN END TO THE REVOLUTION FOR EVER." It was precisely with this aim that the Lerrox government, into which three ministers from the fascist party of "national action" entered, was formed on October 4, 1934.

Thus, in face of the REVOLUTIONARY UPRISING WHICH WAS ALREADY MATURE, fascism raised point blank the question of power. The proletariat were IMMEDIATELY forced to fight or else permit the establishment of an open fascist dictatorship without a battle. The working class of Spain ACCEPTED the challenge, though the choice of the moment was FORCED ON THEM by Spanish counter-revolution.

* * *

The Organisation of the United Front.

At the moment when the recent events took place, the majority of the working class followed the SOCIALISTS AND ANARCHISTS, and, moreover, the SOCIALISTS WERE THE BASIC FORCE IN THE WORKING CLASS, with 50,000 party members, 25,000 Young

* Along with this party, there are two other fascist parties in Spain—the "Spanish Falanx," led by the son of Primo de Rivera and using social-demagogy on a particularly wide scale, and the monarchist party "Renovacion Espanole," led by Gopcochea.

Socialists and 700,000 to 900,000 members of the reformist trade unions.

The influence of the Socialists grew rapidly, mainly at the expense of the anarchists (who rapidly lost their influence, especially during the past year) and among the petty-bourgeois masses who were leaving the Right parties, or being drawn into the political struggle for the first time.

After the Socialist Party left the government in 1933, the "Left" wing, led by Largo Caballero, obtained decisive weight in the Party. Taking the sentiments of the leftward swinging masses into account, the socialists, led by Largo Caballero, advanced the slogan of the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the violent overthrow of the government."

At the same time, however, the RIGHTS (led by Besteiro, De los Rios, etc.), REMAINED IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY.

The Spanish Young Socialists have recently begun to occupy an ever more left position.

The influence of the Communist Party, which on the eve of the general strike had about 20,000 members, INCREASED mainly at the expense of the Socialist Party and new strata previously unorganised. The growth of the Communist Party, not only in numbers, but above all in its influence, became particularly plain at the end of summer this year. The SPEED, however, at which THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY GREW, WAS ABSOLUTELY INSUFFICIENT. Before the development of the events that followed, a MASS swing-over from the Socialist Party and the Young Socialists to the Communist Party was only just beginning. This process applied mostly to the Young Socialists. After the end of August, 1934, the entrance of GROUPS OF WORKERS into the Communist Party (including both socialists and members of reformist trade unions) took place ever more frequently.

In the winter of 1933-1934, the Socialist Party organised the Workers' Alliance ("Allianza Obrera"). This included the Socialist Party, the Young Socialists, the reformist unions, the "Trentists" (who had left the anarcho-sindicalist organisations), the Trotskyists, some autonomous trade unions and individual anarchist organisations.

At first the Workers' Alliance met with strong criticism from the Communist Party. Formed according to the ideas of the Socialist Party, it was undoubtedly calculated on destroying the united front with the Communists. For this purpose the socialists drew into the Alliance the renegade Maurin group and the counter-revolutionary Trotskyists (who have no mass influence).

The "Allianza Obrera" was a combination of leaders. But the urge towards the united front found expression in the growth of the influence of the Alliance. Then the Communist Party of Spain

made the correct decision—to enter the Alliance to DEVELOP ITS PROGRAMME AND TACTICS THERE SO AS TO CONVERT THE WORKERS' ALLIANCE INTO A REALLY WIDE ORGAN OF THE UNITED FRONT. The Communist Party set itself the task of reconstructing the Alliance from below on the basis of elected delegates from mills and factories, from mass organisations, and above all from the trade unions. At the same time, the problem was raised from the very beginning of converting the "Workers' Alliance" into a "Workers' and Peasants' Alliance," by drawing in the representatives of the peasants, of the peasant committees. The resolution of the C.C. of the C.P. of Spain, published in *Mundo Obrero* on November 17, stated:

"Workers' Alliances, as shown already by their name, ARISE AS ORGANS OF ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DRIVING FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION, NAMELY, OF THE PROLETARIAT, which is the leading force. BUT THEY DO NOT CONTAIN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECOND FUNDAMENTAL DRIVING FORCE, NAMELY, THE PEASANT—WITHOUT WHOM THE ALLIANCE CANNOT ENSURE THE VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION."

In short, the Communist Party of Spain took the line of CONVERTING THE ALLIANCES IN THE PROCESS OF THE STRUGGLE INTO SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES. The experience of Asturias confirmed the correctness of this setting of the question.

While agreeing to support the slogan of "all power to the alliances," the Communist Party immediately made it a condition that the following minimum programme be carried through:

1. The confiscation of the land (belonging to the land-owners and the church) and its free distribution among the peasants.
2. The disarming of all the forces of the counter-revolution and the arming of the workers and peasants.
3. Control over industry and the banks.
4. The forty-hour week while maintaining the wages paid for forty-eight hours.
5. The introduction of social insurance and unemployment insurance.
6. A fight against the large-scale speculators and usurers, the confiscation of their property for the benefit of the unemployed.
7. The annulment of all debts owed by the peasants and small shopkeepers to the banks.
8. The liberation of the oppressed nationalities of Catalonia, Biscay and Galicia, and the recognition of the independence of Morocco.

It is very noticeable that, at the beginning, the Socialist Party increasingly advanced the slogan of "all power to the Workers' Alliance," as against our slogan of "all power to the Soviets," but when the Communist Party of Spain supported this slogan in the middle of September, the Socialist Party immediately abandoned it and returned to its old slogan of "all power to the Socialist Party."

Thus THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SPAIN SUCCEEDED IN TAKING INTO ITS HANDS THE INITIATIVE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE "WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' ALLIANCES," a fact which greatly strengthened the position of the Spanish proletariat in the October

battles and helped the growth of the authority of the Communist Party among the masses.

The basic force which disrupted the united front in Spain, right up to THE GENERAL STRIKE AND THE REBELLION, and during the rebellion, was the National Confederation of Labour, led by the anarchists. The anarchists REFUSED TO JOIN THE WORKERS' ALLIANCE. They tried to break the political strikes called, and often acted as strike-breakers. They carried on a disgusting campaign against the Communist Party and the U.S.S.R. Some of the anarchist leaders were in direct contact with Lerroux all the time. In some places, however, for example in Asturias, where the influence of the Communists was particularly strong, and where the pressure of the mass movement was enormous, some of the anarchist organisations joined the "Workers' Alliance." In a number of places the anarchist workers took part in demonstrations, strikes and uprisings, despite the prohibition of the anarchist leaders.

* * *

How the Communists and Socialists Estimated the Political Situation and Prepared for the Armed Uprising.

How were the oncoming battles prepared for?

Did the Communist Party foresee how close was the beginning of decisive battles against fascism, battles for power?

It must be noted that since the beginning of 1933, the Communist Party correctly estimated the situation and set itself as its CENTRAL task THE POLITICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL PREPARATION BOTH OF THE PROLETARIAT AND ITS VANGUARD, AS WELL AS OF THE GREAT MASSES OF THE PEASANTRY, FOR THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER. This task, further, was set, not as a prospect for the distant future, but as A TASK OF THE IMMEDIATE PRESENT. In particular, bearing in mind the close prospect of a possible uprising, the Communist Party joined the "Allianza Obrera."

Beginning with the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P. of Spain (September 11 and 12) the Communist Party warned the masses that the time to settle the issue was approaching.

From the end of September the Communist Party called on the masses to prepare for decisive action.

The Communist Party called for a struggle against the threat of a fascist coup d'état, and for a workers' and peasants' government, a workers' and peasants' republic.

On the 2nd of October, 1934, the *Mundo Obrero* wrote the following:

"The toilers are not prepared to tolerate this situation of hunger and poverty any longer. They are drawing the following conclusions from the crisis being undergone: 'The republic promised us the land, but we have received bullets; we were promised work, but we have received hunger and poverty; we were promised freedom, but we

have been given prisons and penal servitude; our press has been closed down, and our legal activities have been smothered; we were promised that an end would be put to the odious privileges of the church, the anarchist officers and the fascists, but to-day we see them at their posts once again. THE TOILERS HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON WITH SUCH A REPUBLIC. The only way out of the present situation is the way which the Communist Party points to the toilers of town and country, namely, the seizure of power, and the establishment of a WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT." (Re-translated, Ed.)

At its September Plenum the Central Committee of the Party correctly directed attention to the necessity for the PROPAGANDA OF THE PROGRAMME OF A WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT, as one of the conditions for the preparations for the overthrow of the bourgeois landowning "régime."

Two days before the beginning of the events, the Communist Party published in the *Mundo Obrero* A PROGRAMME OF THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER, THE PROGRAMME OF THE FUTURE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT, which developed the platform popularised by the C.P. of Spain during the election campaign of October-November, 1933.

Special attention needs to be given to the fact that this historical manifesto formulated in detail the revolutionary measures along with the popular proletarian demands, which a workers' and peasants' government would carry out in connection with the peasantry and the toiling nationalities (Catalonia, Biscay, Galicia and Morocco).

In estimating this document as a whole, we must note that in it we see a clearly formulated programme of THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP OF THE WORKING CLASS AND PEASANTRY IN THE SHAPE OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' ALLIANCES (SOVIETS), a programme which the workers' and peasants' government would immediately proceed to operate. This is still not the programme of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the struggle to OPERATE it will inevitably lead to the SPEEDY PASSAGE TO THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT. In the manifesto we read of the confiscation and nationalisation of enterprises belonging to LARGE-SCALE TRUSTIFIED industry, about the control of the Soviets over production and consumption, and of the organisation "of a workers' and peasants' Red Army, which will defend the interests of the toiling masses and the revolution."

The manifesto clearly stipulates THE CHARACTER of the workers' and peasants' ALLIANCES (SOVIETS) AS REVOLUTIONARY ORGANS OF POWER.

"The delegates of the Alliances," the document reads, "who will be freely elected by the toilers themselves, will finally smash the power of the exploiting classes, the capitalists and landowners; they will completely do away with the unpopular and bureaucratic apparatus of force belonging to the state and municipalities, and will replace them by popular bodies in which the broadest masses of workers and peasants will participate in the management of the state. The body (Soviets) thus set up will ensure them bread, work and freedom and will represent them

and defend their interests and their everyday needs." (Re-translated, Ed.)

Finally, we note the following point as one of the most important political tasks in the programme:

"PROLETARIAN SOLIDARITY WITH THE OPPRESSED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND A FRATERNAL ALLIANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS VICTORIOUSLY CONSTRUCTING SOCIALISM AND IS A MIGHTY BULWARK OF THE WORLD PROLETARIAT AND THE OPPRESSED PEOPLES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL FASCISM AND THE REACTIONARY FORCES OF CAPITALISM." (Re-translated, Ed.)

The document concludes with the call for:

"THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALIST WAR AND FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION." (Re-translated, Ed.)

While the Communist Party, in moving forward to the struggle for power, developed a programme of Soviet revolution, the anarchists openly declared that they had nothing in common with this movement of the "politicians" and the general strike which was being prepared. The leaders of the anarchists acted as the open and basest betrayers of the working class and the revolution. At the price of this treachery they sanctified their open alliance with all the dark forces of the Spanish counter-revolution.

The position of the Spanish Socialists was a different one. We have in view the majority of the Socialist Party, which was headed by the Left leadership, and which we separate from the Rights, headed by Bestiero, who openly declared against developing the struggle and did everything possible to serve Spanish reaction and fascism.

The fact that the time for a fascist coup d'état had ripened when the Spanish socialists were already faced with the terrible example of the Hitler dictatorship (which had dealt its blows at the socialists as well) and the still more important fact that the revolution has been developing in Spain for several years, explains why the official majority of the Socialist Party of Spain, which had previously participated in the coalition government, cleared the way for fascism and itself assisted in the fascisation of the state, now occupied a different position in the struggle against fascism from German and Austrian social-democracy. But while they took up a position different from that of the German and Austrian social-democrats, and one which was completely counter to that of the Spanish anarchists, it was at the same time FUNDAMENTALLY distinct from that of the Communists. The aims which the Socialist Party, headed by Largo Caballero, set itself, were conditioned by the desire to scare the bourgeoisie at the prospect of an armed struggle, and were in any case, LIMITED TO THE DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC. The Socialist Party really did call on the working class, long before the events that followed, to display watchfulness and to prepare for struggle against the fascist onslaught. It really prepared this struggle from a technical point of view, but

its banners bore the slogans of the defence of the republic, and the slogan of power advanced by the Socialist Party meant nothing other than the struggle to democratise the existing republic. There can be no doubt that a definite section in the Socialist Party counted on the bourgeoisie being scared by the mass movement and bringing the Socialist Party to power. At least, it counted on succeeding in forming a Socialist Government in a bloc with Left Republicans.

The majority of the Socialist Party of Spain, headed by Largo Caballero, went to the defence of the republic. But the whole course of events placed the question of the conquest of ANOTHER republic on the order of the day. It raised the struggle to establish the democratic dictatorship of the working class and peasantry in the shape of the workers' and peasants' "alliances," IN THE SHAPE OF SOVIETS, THE STRUGGLE FOR A WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT. But the Socialists neither wished to nor in fact did they place this on the order of the day. And it was no accident that the Socialist Party did not issue clear slogans. The slogan of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" which the Socialists repeatedly issued, after they had left the coalition government, lived a peaceful existence side by side with their slogan of the defence of the existing republic as the central task facing them. It is no accident that the slogan, "all power to the Alliances," ceased to be displayed, and that even the slogan of "all power to the Socialist Party" began, as a rule, to be missing. The Socialist Party feared the further advance of the fascists. But at the same time IT WAS AFRAID TO GO FORWARD ITSELF, However, as further events showed, the struggle of the Spanish proletariat passed over the head of the Socialist Party right from the very beginning.

The Socialists CARRIED THROUGH CERTAIN PREPARATIONS for the struggle against the oncoming fascist coup d'état, and for the defence of the republic, and fought to democratise the republic AND THEN TOOK PART IN THE GENERAL STRIKE, AND IN SOME PLACES IN THE ARMED UPRISING AS WELL. The Socialist Party had large means at its disposal, and also counted on support from the officers in the army. The Socialist Party, as well as the Communist Party, had a working class militia, but the armed Socialist militia (with the exception of Asturias) were, as a rule, numerically superior to the militia led by the Communist Party.

But while the Socialists carried on certain military-technical preparations for an armed struggle, they completely failed to carry on any POLITICAL PREPARATIONS for it. More, they disrupted it. THE SOCIALISTS AND ANARCHISTS DID EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN OPPOSITION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIETS. THE "ALLIANCES" ONLY EXISTED

IN A FEW DISTRICTS. THEY DID NOT EMBRACE THE MAIN MASSES OF THE INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT on the eve of the October battles, and actually during them the Socialists did all they could to disrupt the organisation of workers' alliances, or tried to remove Communists participating in them.

THERE WAS AN ALMOST COMPLETE ABSENCE OF FACTORY COMMITTEES AND PEASANT COMMITTEES. BOTH THE ANARCHISTS AND THE SOCIALISTS DECLARED AGAINST THESE BEING ESTABLISHED.

It goes without saying that the Socialists paid no attention to the peasantry and national-revolutionary movement, but rather offered decisive resistance to their being drawn on to the side of the revolution. All this proved that the Spanish Socialists, headed by Largo Caballero, did not for a single moment seriously set themselves the question of the struggle for power and of the preparation for this.

As distinct from the Socialists, the Communists prepared the armed uprising POLITICALLY. But the Communist Party was far weaker than the Socialist Party, and the trade unions which supported it were six to seven times weaker in numbers than the reformist unions. The contacts of the Communist Party with the village were very weak. THE SENTIMENTS OF THE MASS OF ADVANCED PROLETARIANS IN FAVOUR of the armed uprising, and the preparation of Robles for a fascist coup d'état OUTDISTANCED THE POLITICAL PREPARATION OF THE MASSES FOR THE UPRISING BY THE COMMUNISTS. ESPECIALLY WEAK WERE THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARMED UPRISING MADE BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY. The Communist Party correctly estimated the situation, correctly set the tasks to be fulfilled, and indicated the programme needed. It issued the only correct slogan, but was not in a position to retrieve the points it had missed. And the counter-revolution was clearly in a hurry.

* * *

The Progress of the Revolutionary Battles.

On October 4, a Lerroux government was established in which the fascists took part for the first time. On the night of the 4th and 5th (as far as we can judge from police reports) a general strike began, which soon embraced all the most important districts in Spain (Asturias, Biscay, Catalonia, Madrid, Leon, Galicia, Salamanca, San Sebastian, Alicante, Valencia, Valladolid, Andalusia, from the centre of Seville, Cadiz, Aragon, Cordoba, etc.). From the very beginning the strike assumed a general ALL-SPANISH CHARACTER. A characteristic feature of this general strike was the fact that it was accompanied by ARMED STRUGGLE almost everywhere. In the North (Asturias and Biscay) the general strike DEVELOPED INTO A MASS ARMED UPRIS-

ING in the most important centres of heavy industry.

That it was not a question, in these instances, simply of an armed struggle accompanying the general strike, BUT OF AN ARMED UPRISING is proved first and foremost by the very character of the struggle, the main point of which consisted in the struggle FOR POWER, FOR SOVIETS. Alongside the two main centres of the armed uprising we must note a series of local outbreaks of armed uprisings, which although they did not display a development analogical to that in Asturias and Biscay, still led to the establishment of Soviets in some localities. Thus, for instance, in the Leon province, a number of towns were seized by the insurgents; in the town of *Prado del Rey* (in the province of Cadiz) the workers seized power and set fire to the law courts and the municipal hall; the city of *Granole* (Catalonia) was taken by the workers; the city of *Logroño* was in the hands of armed strikers; the city of *Renoson* (in the Santander district) fell completely into the hands of the Communists; in *Villa Robledo* the workers proceeded to establish Soviets; in the province of *San Sebastian* the workers seized power; an uprising was organised in *Estramod*, with the aid of a section of the troops, etc. It is characteristic that in a number of places where there was a comparatively weaker development of the struggle, fierce armed struggles took place (*Saragossa* and *Seville*) none the less, and the workers disarmed the gendarmes. In *Seville*, where our Party organisation has been very much weakened in the recent period, the events did not develop to the necessary extent, although strikes broke out and conflicts took place with the police.

If first place in the heroic struggle of the Spanish proletariat in the October days belongs to Asturias and Biscay, then the next should be allotted Catalonia and Madrid.

In *Catalonia* the general strike began to extend from the morning of the 6th of October and was immediately accompanied by armed conflicts. The workers of *Barcelona* armed themselves and occupied several strategic points in the city. On the evening of the 6th of October, under the pressure of the masses, a free Catalonian republic was declared, but by reason of the indecisiveness and the waverings of the Escer Party and its leader, the head of the Catalonian republic, Companys, government troops, numbering 10,000 men, were enabled to attack the palace, and on the morning of the 7th of October the Catalonian government capitulated. The radio in *Barcelona* called the populace to the armed uprising until six o'clock in the morning of October 7. The forces of the insurgents were mainly composed of the youth of the Catalonia Left Republican Party, and of Socialists and worker-Communists. The workers made

an attack on the naval aviation base, but were beaten off. The troops were compelled to bring artillery into action. A number of towns near Barcelona were in the hands of the workers (*Sabadell, Ripallet, Sandonola, Manres, Salson, Bardalona, Materro, Lerida, Tarragona*). In a number of localities in the provinces THE PEASANTS ROSE UP in support of the workers. In *Lerida* the workers seized the radio station. In *Sabadell* the strikers took possession of the municipal hall and hauled up the flag of the autonomous republic as well as the Red flag.

The movement in Catalonia, as far as can be judged from materials to hand, was headed by the "Allianza Obrera," in which the Communists did not play a decisive rôle. This explains why the movement in Catalonia had no united plan, why there was an absence of a firm leadership of the armed struggle which had begun, and why in the long run Catalonia did not play the part in these events that might have been expected.

A general strike was declared in *Madrid* from the first day of the events. In the working quarters of *Quatro, Caminos, Tetuan*, etc., armed conflicts began between the workers and troops. The workers set up barricades. At first, the troops were helpless to cope with the workers. The workers undertook the offensive and attacked the centre of the city. They attacked the parliament buildings, the offices of the Ministries of Home Affairs, Agriculture and Education, the police headquarters, and also the central telegraph station, barracks, and railway stations, and began to fire on the palace occupied by Lerroux. The Communists succeeded in organising a few radio transmitters. Up to the 12th of October armed conflicts with government troops continued to take place at a number of points in *Madrid*. A section of the Air Force, stationed at the central aerodrome in *Madrid*, refused to take action against the workers. Not only were government troops sent against the workers, but so also were all the storm detachments of Gil Robles, Primo de Rivera and other fascist organisations. In *Madrid*, where there was a tremendous concentration of government troops, the masses apparently were not sufficiently mobilised.

Let us repeat that first place in the heroic struggle of the workers in revolt belongs by right to Asturias and Biscay. On the night of the 4th and the 5th of October the uprising began in Asturias. On the 5th and 6th of October already THE WHOLE OF ASTURIAS WAS IN THE HANDS OF THE WORKERS. The most important towns near the capital of Asturias, *Oviedo*, were seized by the workers, and Soviets were set up there. The miners surrounded *Oviedo* with a ring of steel. It is

characteristic that the insurgents immediately proceeded to take the offensive. They occupied the main strategic points and began to direct artillery fire on the town. At the same time powerful armed detachments of miners moved forward from different ends of the town.

From the very beginning, not only were miners drawn into the movement, and they constituted the most powerful detachments there, but also the whole of the proletarian population and peasants of Asturias. Tens of thousands of workers participated in stubborn revolutionary battles. The heroic struggle of the Asturias workers was developed under the slogan of "STRUGGLE FOR THE POWER OF THE SOVIETS." SOVIETS OF WORKERS AND PEASANTS WERE ESTABLISHED IN EACH TOWN, IN EACH VILLAGE AND IN EACH PEASANT DISTRICT. The Soviets organised the struggle and revolutionary order. Decrees and orders were issued in the name of "the workers' and peasants' government" or of "the revolutionary committee." Private property in the means of production and land was abolished. The Soviets in Asturias organised the supply of the workers with arms and provisions. What strikes one's attention is that as soon as the workers seized the arsenal and other military enterprises, they immediately set them going full blast to produce military supplies. The workers of Asturias organised a Red Army which fought against the government troops, and held Oviedo, the capital of Asturias in their hands until October 18th. And the only thing enabling the government troops to drive the workers out of the positions they occupied was that motor detachments, aviation, and poison gases, etc., were brought into action against the insurgents; naval forces were directed against the workers—the cruiser "Liberta" and the Foreign Legion was called in post haste. Even after this, fighting went on in the streets in Oviedo for three more days. The troops had to fight for every house. And it was only on being hard pressed by the enemy that the workers beat a fighting retreat from *Oviedo*. The basic mass of the armed workers left the city in full order. The insurgents left with arms in their hands and fortified themselves in *Mieres* and *Turbi*, and later retreated to the hills.

From the very beginning of the events in Asturias, the Communist Party and the Y.C.L. did not lose a moment and rallied all the members of the organisations for action. The Communists and Y.C.L.ers were organised in groups of ten, with commanders. Due to the unexampled heroism of our comrades, the workers very often elected them as commanders of the red guard. From the very beginning of the uprising the Communists fought in the revolutionary committees against the socialists with the demand that points

of support for the uprising be established in the factories, and among the peasantry, and that the peasants, unemployed and urban petty-bourgeoisie be drawn into the struggle. At the same time the Communists pointed to the weak military-technical organisation (liaison with the front, etc.).

From first to last our Party was in the leadership of the armed uprising. IN THE COURSE OF THE EVENTS, THE COMMUNISTS ATTAINED ABSOLUTE PREPONDERANCE, NOT ONLY IN THE WORKERS' REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES, BUT ALSO IN THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH WAS RENEWED DURING THE UPRISING; AFTER THE DESERTION OF THE ASTURIAN SOCIALIST LEADER, PENYA, AND HIS ADHERENTS, THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE WAS ALMOST COMPLETELY IN THE HANDS OF THE COMMUNISTS. No sooner did the Communists begin to occupy the leading posts than the fighting enthusiasm increased. The workers flung themselves into battle, and themselves demanded that the Communists lead them. This was specially manifested on the day when Oviedo was stormed. THE SOVIET REGIME LASTED FOR 15 DAYS IN ASTURIAS.

Another centre of the mass armed uprising was Biscay. In Bilbao bloody struggles took place and all the factories were occupied by the strikers. At the same time a stubborn struggle took place in Arboledo, Sessatto, Erandio, Baracaldo, Gallarta, Pucetta, Ortullia, Galdames.

In *Portugaleto* the struggle assumed the character of a real uprising from the very first moment. On the 5th, a revolutionary committee of the local Alliance was set up on the initiative of the Communist Party, in which Communists, socialists and anarchists participated. The Civil Guard was surrounded and all arms were requisitioned from the bourgeoisie. So, also, were big stores of arms. The workers were masters of the city until the 10th.

In *Sessatto* power fell into the hands of the workers. The socialists prevented the setting up of the Workers' Alliance and the participation of other workers' organisations in the leadership of the struggle.

Baracaldo. A Workers' Alliance was set up, with the socialists in the majority. The workers were masters of the city until the 10th.

Erandio. The united front with the socialists was established, but no revolutionary committee of the Workers' Alliance was established. The workers were masters of the situation here from the 8th till the 10th.

Gallarta. A WORKERS' ALLIANCE WAS ESTABLISHED. But this Alliance kept to the tactics of the Socialists, and our comrades, in spite of the fact that the majority of the Socialist workers themselves were against their leaders, were unable

to prevent these tactics being operated. The Socialists' and Communists' armed detachments were led by Communists. But they did not undertake an offensive against Bilbao, for they were deceived by the Socialist leaders.

In *Puceta* a Workers' Alliance was set up with the Communists in the majority. The unemployed were successfully linked up with the movement by the issue of a decree for the distribution of food-stuffs among them. A Red Guard was established and arms were requisitioned. In the process of the struggle the Alliance was transformed into a Soviet. Being without leadership from the regional centre, the comrades were held up by the expectation of instructions to assume the offensive on Bilbao, together with other towns in this region. Although they bombarded the city from the air, the government troops only succeeded in entering the city on the 14th instant.

In *Arboledo*, a Workers' Alliance was established, but the Socialists were in the majority there. A Red Militia was established to undertake a march on Bilbao. When the Socialists, in their treachery, succeeded in getting about 600 armed miners to return, although they were but six kilometres from the town of Bilbao, the Communists committed an error in not taking the leadership of the struggle, in spite of the decision of the Socialists.

When characterising the process of the struggle in Biscay as a whole we must stress the point that especially in those places where the Communists were not in a position to head the struggle, or where in certain instances our comrades made mistakes, the Socialist organisations opposed the setting up a united centralised leadership of the uprising (the Socialists particularly hindered the establishment of a united regional leadership with the workers' organisations of various political trends, and even the Socialist youth organisation was not represented in the leadership, etc.). Further, they did not organise workers' and peasants' Alliances or openly committed treachery (e.g., in *Arboledo*, etc.). The Communists showed that they were the real vanguard of the fighting workers. They undertook the initiative in the process of the struggle in setting up organs to lead the uprising (revolutionary committees of Workers' and Peasants' Alliances) and gave the socialist and anarchist workers the following instructions:

Immediately organise Workers and Peasants' Alliances, having in view their transformation into Soviets in the course of the struggle.

Confiscate all arms and take hostages. Organise armed detachments to undertake an offensive on the capital.

Confiscate printing presses and the banks.

The local Alliances to connect up with one another, and establish district Alliances.

In a number of cases, as the situation became more intense and the forms of struggle sharpened, the leadership of the struggle passed out of the hands of the Socialists into those of the Communists. This was conditioned by the growth of the authority of the Communist Party and in a number of cases was due to the fact that the Socialists wished to relieve themselves of the responsibility for the further course of events.

In spite of all the weaknesses in the organisation of the uprising in Biscay, to which we have referred, the movement none the less attained such a range that **THE GENERAL STRIKE IN THIS REGION LASTED EIGHT DAYS, AND FOR SIX DAYS THE WORKERS WERE MASTERS OF THIS INDUSTRIAL MINING REGION AND REPULSED THE ATTACKS OF THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS.**

As distinct from the defensive tactics applied by the Austrian proletariat during their armed struggle in the February days, the Spanish workers as a rule passed over to the offensive right from the very beginning, and seized the main strategic points (munition plants, arsenals, barracks, telegraphs, radio, etc.). There can be no doubt that the main mass of the arms with which the Spanish workers fought against the government troops were seized by the workers themselves, and were not received from the Socialists in the course of their military-technical preparations. The insurgents, where they received leadership, carried on a purposeful offensive and did not allow the enemy to collect his forces, and what is also very characteristic—immediately took hostages from the camp of the bourgeoisie and the landowners.

In the district seized, **SOVIET POWER WAS IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED.** In the process of the struggle, the worker-peasant Alliances grew into organs of Soviet Power.

As soon as the power of the Soviets was established, **THE LATTER IMMEDIATELY PUBLISHED A SERIES OF REVOLUTIONARY MEASURES AND PROCEEDED TO CARRY THEM OUT.**

Such were the characteristic features of the struggle of the Spanish working class in the October days.

* * *

The Basic Lessons of the Struggle, and Prospects.

The Spanish proletariat displayed miraculous heroism and a firm will to victory. All this refers, in the first instance, to the really heroic proletariat of Red Asturias.

Why, however, is it that the Spanish proletariat was not victorious? The main reason was **THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE ORGANISATIONAL AND POLITICAL**

PREPARATION FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY UPRISING, AND THE WEAKNESS IN ORGANISING THE REVOLUTION. "The organisation of the revolution," as the question is correctly put by the Communist Party of Spain in its manifesto, "is not only the mobilisation of a group of persons who are filled with a strong will and are 'prepared for everything,' but is THE MILITANT MOBILISATION OF ALL THE CLASS FORCES AND OF ALL THE DIRECT ALLIES OF THE REVOLUTION, AND PRIMARILY OF THE PEASANTRY."

Firstly, the organisation of the revolution presupposes, first and foremost, the organisation of the basic revolutionary force, namely, THE PROLETARIAT. And undoubtedly THE BASIC REASON why the Spanish proletariat was unable to achieve victory, is the fact that at the time of the general strike and uprising, the majority of the working class were under the leadership, not of the Communists, but of the socialists and anarchists.

The proletariat rushed into the battle for power. It is precisely the socialists and anarchists who are primarily responsible for the fact that the proletariat was not victorious in the heroic October days. The two parties which had most influence among the working class of Spain, the socialist and anarchist parties, either did not set the proletariat the task of conquering power — or else fought against it. And if none the less the Spanish proletariat fought for power under the banner of the Soviets in a number of most important districts in Spain (especially in the industrial North of Spain, mainly in Asturias), this implies THE TREMENDOUS HISTORIC VICTORY OF THE IDEA OF THE SOVIETS, THE VICTORY OF THE COMINTERN AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SPAIN.

Secondly, the PEASANTRY. The peasantry were not inclined to defend the republic which had given them nothing, while the question of a new power was not set before them. Hence, the peasantry, in their majority, did not enter the struggle. And organised preparation was also missing. No peasant committees were set up to seize the land. It was only the Communists when they entered the *Allianza Obrera* who raised the question of drawing the peasants into the "Alliances" (Soviets) as organs of the uprising. It was only the Communist Party which developed a programme of the revolutionary measures in the village which the workers' and peasants' government put into operation. But our programme and our slogans did not succeed in penetrating into the very heart of the revolutionary villages in Spain. The historic responsibility for the fact that the peasants did not support the proletariat in the October days, lies on the socialist and anarchist parties. That the toiling peasants could support the proletariat at the time of the uprising, is shown by the example of Asturias, where the Communists

exerted decisive influence over the whole course of events, where they were able to draw in and to unleash all the forces of the heroic miners of Asturias, and where, as a result of this, the peasantry joined in the struggle. In the Asturias soviets were established in the villages and armed detachments were set up there which assisted the workers in their struggle against the government forces, etc.

Thirdly, the hegemony of the proletariat was missing in the national revolutionary movement. The national revolutionary movement was headed by the bourgeois parties of the oppressed nationalities. The masses still had faith in these parties, and believed that the declaration by the Catalonian government (October 7) of the establishment of a Catalonian independent republic was the beginning of the struggle. But in actual fact, this was the END of the struggle as far as the "Catalonian Left" was concerned. Their cowardliness and half-heartedness was especially clearly revealed in the proposal made to General Batet, the commander of the garrison in Barcelona, to "think over" for an hour, whether he would come over to the side of the Catalonian republic or not. This was enough for General Batet to issue the necessary instructions and to surround the palace. In fear of a revolution, which set itself the task NOT ONLY of national, but also of SOCIAL LIBERATION, "the Catalonian Left," the Catalonian government, headed by Companys, capitulated to the Spanish counter-revolution. Thereby the national revolutionary movement turned out to be without leadership and was disorganised.

Fourthly, one of the most important reasons why the Spanish workers did not achieve victory is that in the main they did not succeed in drawing over the army to their side, and that the army in great part remained on the side of the government, although there was a noticeable ferment in the army and there were a number of cases of soldier mutinies (in Lerida, Camno, Cicon, Estramadura, on the outskirts of Barcelona, and in Madrid). A great responsibility for the position taken up by the army lies on the Spanish socialists, who limited the sphere of their influence to the army's officers. They counted on the Republican leaders of the army, and not on the masses of the toilers in soldiers' uniforms. But the main reason why THE ARMY DID NOT PASS OVER TO THE WORKERS IN REVOLT, WAS THAT THE NECESSARY MEASURES WERE NOT TAKEN TO ENSURE POLITICALLY AND ORGANISATIONALLY THAT THE PEASANTS UNDERTOOK ACTION AT THE SAME TIME AS THE WORKING CLASS.

FIFTHLY, BODIES TO LEAD THE STRUGGLE WERE NOT ESTABLISHED EVERYWHERE. And apparently NO UNITED CENTRAL LEADERSHIP ON AN ALL-SPANISH SCALE WAS SET UP OVER THE GENERAL STRIKE AND

ARMED UPRISING. This was the biggest mistake in the organisational preparation of the uprising. If a single party, the Party of the Communists, had led the struggle, a single purpose would have been in being. And if such a body had been set up, it would have taken on itself the organisational leadership over the whole process of the struggle, and the functions of provisional revolutionary government, and would have issued the most necessary decrees, for instance, regarding the handing of the land to the peasantry, etc. Had such been the case, events would undoubtedly have developed in a different fashion. It was only in Asturias and partially in Biscay that the Communists HELD A LEADING INFLUENCE in the revolutionary committees, although the decrees appeared over the signatures of the representatives of the two parties. And it must be added that the leading influence of the Communists was only won in the course of the uprising. In Asturias and Biscay, SOVIETS and a RED ARMY WERE ORGANISED WITHOUT DELAY. It was precisely Communist influence which aided in the organisation of the scope and level of the struggle, which we had in Asturias. This was assisted by the fact that as the result of stubborn activity, the Communists were able in Asturias to secure powerful positions in the ranks of the working class, and succeeded in organising cells in the factories and were able to build up the workers' and peasants' Alliances on a mass scale.

The supreme importance of the events that have taken place in Spain lies in the fact that the Spanish proletariat took the only correct path, namely, the path of the open struggle for Soviet power, for a workers' and peasants' republic, and that the experience of Asturias and Biscay, etc., showed that it is possible to bring about the mass arming of the proletariat in the process of the uprising, and smash up the state machine of the bourgeoisie (with the police, army, etc.).

* * *

It is still early to make a final summing up of the results of the heroic story of the Spanish events. But the events that took place represent not the end of the developed struggle for power, for Soviets, but only its BEGINNING. The main seat of the uprising, Red Asturias, has STILL not been completely overwhelmed. The struggle waged by Red Asturias continues to be the symbol of Spain in revolt in the past and present.

The Spanish proletariat did not achieve victory over fascism and did not succeed in establishing a workers' and peasants' republic. But although the Spanish counter-revolution has achieved a TEMPORARY OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT STRUGGLE, which is in its own favour, yet it has not achieved

a decisive victory. The régime of military fascist dictatorship established, is on the edge of a volcano. The gang of clerical fascist hangmen is by no means master of the situation. The whole of the clerical fascist dictatorship is extremely unstable and shaken. At any moment we may expect such a turn of events as will explode the domination of the brutal counter-revolution. The Spanish bourgeoisie itself senses this, and does not believe in a bright future. The bourgeoisie wishes by means of terror, military field tribunals, the gallows and the arrest of tens of thousands of revolutionary workers to postpone the day of its inevitable doom.

THE SPANISH PROLETARIAT HAS NOT BEEN SMASHED. NO DECISIVE TURN has taken place now in the situation which has lasted for years, where neither the camp of revolution nor the camp of the counter-revolution have been in the position to destroy each other.

The first general militant offensive of the Spanish proletariat has been beaten off. But the idea which the Spanish proletariat has been lacking for years has penetrated at last into the minds of the masses of the proletariat in the process of these struggles. Namely, that THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER CAN BE THE ONLY AIM OF THE STRUGGLE—AND ONLY THE SOVIETS CAN BE THAT POWER. This idea, which has taken a hold of the masses has become a tremendous material force. Herein lies the guarantee that new decisive battles are NEAR, but on the basis of a realignment of forces, on the basis of the masses taking into account the extremely rich revolutionary experience of the October events.

The experience of the masses themselves, assisted by the energetic influence of the Communist Party, will help them not only to appreciate the rôle of allies in the revolution (primarily the peasants and the oppressed nationalities), but will also help the proletariat, headed by the Communist Party, to become their real leader. Thereby will the task of the abolition of the gap between the proletarian, the peasant and national revolutionary movements be solved.

The experience will also not be in vain for the army as well, which will continue to become more unstable. But this will not take place of itself. THE WORK OF THE COMMUNISTS AMONG THE PEASANTRY, THE TOILING NATIONALITIES AND IN THE ARMY, IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CONDITIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE MATURING NEW ALL-POPULAR UPRISING.

THE CONQUEST OF THE MAJORITY OF THE WORKING CLASS BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY is the main decisive condition for a victorious armed uprising against fascism, and in the struggle for soviet power. The

October battles have created all the conditions for the speedy conquest of the majority of the working class under the banner of Communism.

The Confederation of Labour, led by the anarchists, has been exposed as the "Black Hundreds" of the Spanish counter-revolution. The working class in Spain will never forget that in the days when the general strike and armed uprising took place, when not only the whole of the revolutionary, but also the "Left" bourgeois press were prohibited, the central paper of the Spanish anarchists appeared in Barcelona, alongside the fascist monarchist newspaper, and that it spattered the fighting communards of Spain with dirt. And if the December putsch of 1933, organised by the anarchists, was a turning point in the development of their movement, if a fall in their mass influence began to take place at that time, then the October battles will be the beginning of the END of the influence of the anarchists in Spain. And in Spanish conditions this is a most important point.

On the other hand, the programme, tactics and slogans of the Socialist Party of Spain have gone completely bankrupt. Only the tactics and slogans of the Communist Party have withstood the test. This now becomes clearer to ever wider masses. There can be no doubt that a deep process of differentiation will take place in the Socialist Party of Spain. The Right section, headed by Besteiro, etc., will attempt to purchase legality and become the official leadership of the socialist party. On the other hand, there will be

a process of differentiation among those socialist workers and organisations which followed the Left majority, headed by Largo Caballero. OUR PARTY WILL BE ABLE TO FACILITATE THE MASTERY OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE HEROIC STRUGGLE. Our Party must mobilise all the hatred of the masses against the anarchist and socialist leaders who betrayed the cause of the revolutionary workers who rose in the struggle for power. And now more than ever before, the workers concerned will become convinced of the incorrectness and of the bankruptcy of the programmatic and tactical line of the socialist party.

This is why we shall see a rapid process of the radicalisation of the socialist and anarchist workers in Spain, and a rapidly increasing pace at which the C.P. of Spain will become transformed into the only MASS PARTY of the Spanish proletariat. The speed and depth of this process, however, depends on the activity of the C.P. of Spain.

DECISIVE BATTLES ARE NEAR IN SPAIN. THE TASK FACING OUR PARTY IS TO PREVENT THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE POWER OF THE VICTORS FOR A SINGLE HOUR, BY AN UNINTERRUPTED TIRELESS PARTISAN STRUGGLE IN ALL ITS FORMS. THE TASK FACING OUR PARTY IS TO SPEED UP THE REALIGNMENT OF FORCES WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR A VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE FORTHCOMING NEW UPSURGE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAVE. THE TASK FACING THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ALL COUNTRIES IS TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL PROLETARIAN SOLIDARITY ACTION WITH THE HEROIC SPANISH PROLETARIAT, IN SPITE OF THE SABOTAGE OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL.

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THE UNITED FRONT IN GREAT BRITAIN*

COMRADES, I want to deal with some questions in connection with the united front, the fight against fascism, the Trade Union Congress and the trade union work of our Party.

The United Front.

In July, after the Austrian events, the Central Committee of the Party issued a united front appeal to the Labour Party, the Trade Union Congress and the Co-operative Party. Fifty thousand copies of the appeal had been printed and we arranged for its distribution at the key factories in some of the most important industrial towns. In addition, copies were sent to every local Labour Party and Trades Council.

This appeal received a very good reception from the masses of workers. The Labour Party replied to our letter, saying "there were now no new circumstances to justify any change in policy on the part of the Labour Movement." We answered this and again distributed another 25,000 copies of our reply. It was quite clear that a very favourable situation was developing for the united front, especially after the news of the united front agreement between the French Socialist Party and the French Communists, which has had very important reflections in the ranks of the working class in Britain.

We reviewed the situation in the August Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. The C.C. Plenum recognised, firstly, that the outstanding feature of the situation in Britain was the passionate desire for the united front on the part of the workers. Secondly, that unless our Party can organise this unity, the working class movement faces the possibility of terrible defeats. Thirdly, that what has been done in France can be done in Britain. Fourthly, that if the British working class could force the National Government to withdraw its charges against Pollitt and Mann, the British workers can bring such pressure to bear on the Labour leaders as will force them to change their policy towards the united front. In reviewing the situation in the Party, we stated that in the Party as a whole, there was not the serious interest in developing the united front which is necessary, and that when the Labour leaders rejected our appeals there was an attitude in the Party of "Thank goodness, that happened, we don't have to bother with that." We had to end this attitude once and for all, and make it clear that when we made an appeal for unity it was a serious appeal and not a paper document, that it was our intention to really organise concrete united front action, and that the appeal must be realised in practice.

(* Speech by Harry Pollitt at the meeting of the Presidium, E.C.C.I., Evening Session, October 11th, 1934.)

The Central Committee meeting resulted in some good changes taking place throughout the Party and in a number of districts we have excellent examples of the beginning of united front activity in earnest. For example, in Liverpool, 29 trade union branches endorsed the Central Committee appeal. One trade union branch circulated a resolution, appealing for the united front, to every other trade union branch affiliated to the Trades Council, and demanded that the Liverpool Trades Council call a special conference at which every working-class organisation should be represented to organise a united front against war and fascism. The Manchester Trades Council is to organise an all-in anti-fascist demonstration, including the Communist Party and the Independent Labour Party.

In Walthamstow, an important area in the East End of London, the Trades Council decided to support the Party's appeal by a vote of 14 to 11. The officials of that Council appeared to be worried about the decision and they therefore called a special delegates' conference of all trade union branches in Walthamstow affiliated to the Trades Council. Forty-four delegates were present. After the case had been put for the Communist Party's letter 13 speakers asked questions and 13 took part in the discussion. The general line of the questions in the discussion was as follows: "Is the Communist Party really sincere this time in the united front?" "If we come to an agreement would the Communists abide by the decisions of the majority?" "How can we ask for the united front in the fight against war and fascism and fight the Labour Party in the elections?" "What would be the attitude of the Communist Party if it should be decided to make a war upon Germany in order to free it from fascism and make it safe for democracy?" "What was the attitude of the Communist Party to the question of bringing the unorganised workers into the united front?"

Finally, at the end of the discussion, 42 delegates voted for the united front and 2 delegates voted against.

One of the best examples of local initiative was in Bilston, a small town in the Midlands, where we have a comparatively new local. Immediately we issued our appeal, the local mobilised its members and sent a personal delegation to every trade union branch secretary in the town and to every local Labour Party secretary. In this way they not only gained sympathy, but ensured that a discussion took place in every working-class organisation in that town. It is true that we did not win any decisive victories for the united front in that town,

but the important fact is that the united front was discussed in every local workers' organisation. On the Birmingham Trades Council, big discussions have taken place; as also on the London Trades Council, Glasgow Trades Council, and Bradford and Manchester Trades Councils.

After the September 9th anti-fascist demonstration in Hyde Park, the Central Committee again decided to approach the Labour Party. We stated: The September 9th action has shown that the Communist Party can bring into Hyde Park against fascism 150,000 workers. What could be done if the organised labour movement had taken part in this counter-demonstration to the fascists? Therefore we propose a discussion without any preliminary conditions or restrictions, to hear what, in your opinion, are the obstacles in the way of the united front, and for you to hear our answers.

This has had a very good effect in the labour movement, and many resolutions have been passed by the local organisations demanding that the Executive Committee hear the Communists, hear what they have to say, and discuss their proposals. But both at the Trade Union Congress and the Southport Labour Party Conference, that have recently terminated, the question was debated and defeated by a very big vote. This, however, does not represent the feeling of the rank and file of the Labour Party and the trade unions, but is the bloc vote of the trade union bureaucracy.

What are the arguments advanced by the Labour Party and Trade Union leaders against the united front? First, that it is impossible to have a serious united front with an organisation that believes in dictatorship and revolution. Secondly, that the Labour Party, Trade Union Congress and Co-operative Party are the mass organisations of the workers and represent the united front, and that therefore nothing else is necessary. Thirdly, why should such big, powerful organisations like the Labour Party be expected to take up united action with such small organisations as the Communist Party and the I.L.P., and finally, the old argument is put forward that the Communists are not sincere in the proposals they are putting forward.

The Labour leaders have been able to give those answers simply because we, as yet, have been unable to organise the mass pressure from below that will compel them to change their line.

In the recent period the Labour Party leaders have used a further argument against the united front in what they describe as the "splitting tactics" of the Communist Party in the elections. The experience of the development of the united front over recent months has shown that it is necessary that we should work out a clear line of united front tactics both in relation to the municipal elections in November and March, and in the preparations for the general

elections. Such a line will not mean the abandonment of our policy of "class against class" or the withdrawing of the independent rôle of the Party. On the contrary, we must discuss a line which will strengthen the policy of class against class and bring the Party forward as a real political force in the country. Therefore, we are now proposing an extension of united front tactics in the immediate municipal elections to take place.

It may be stated that what is proposed is a revision of the 9th Plenum resolution on the British question,* so far as our electoral tactics are concerned, but if we read the 9th Plenum resolution we will find that we never made a serious attempt to operate the exceptionally important clause in the resolution in regard to united front tactics in elections. For example, in the 9th Plenum resolution on Britain, it states:—

"In some districts, active support to Labourites, who pledge themselves to work for the elementary demands of the working class, and for accepting the Communist Party into the Labour Party, is admissible.

"Voting for Labour Party candidates in the remaining districts must be definitely decided upon only after all possible preliminary work has been done in the matter of putting up our own and Left worker candidates."

We are proposing nothing to-day that means a rejection of the decisions of the 9th Plenum, and if we look back over the period since the 9th Plenum was held (September, 1928), I cannot remember a single election campaign where we really made a serious attempt to develop united front tactics either with the Labour Party or the I.L.P. in the elections.

And yet we are bound to take note of the fact that one of the biggest barriers to our getting into closer contact with the reformist workers is the fact that they deeply resent what they call "splitting the vote" in the elections. This resentment has become stronger since the German and Austrian events. At the present time, in connection with the forthcoming elections, it is naturally stronger in the districts where there is a Labour majority in the Councils. We have to work out a line which takes this card out of the hands of the Labour leaders. The Labour leaders in the speeches they make, and the conferences they organise, when they meet with opposition because of their refusal to take part in the united front, declare that the Communist Party is "splitting" the vote. Despite the fact that we can show with truth in many examples that not the Communists, but the Labour leaders have split the working class, have disrupted the ranks and now are preventing the united front by their policy, nevertheless we are confident that we can work out a line which will take that card out of their hands. This will lead to further unity of the masses in the struggles against the National Government and the fascists

* See *Communist Policy in Great Britain*. Proceedings of British Commission, C.P.G.B.

and will strengthen the Communist Party and bring us nearer to the masses.

Therefore, we are proposing to come forward with our own independent municipal election programme, and to make the question of the united front the biggest issue in the municipal election campaign, extending the demand for unity of action among the Labour Party and trade union members. What is our election programme? The following are our main demands: Refusal to operate the Means Test, increased winter unemployed relief scales, increased children's allowances, general demand to operate work schemes of social value at trade union wages and conditions, free meals for necessitous school children, free milk to all school children up to five, extension of crèches, welfare centres and clinics, restoration of all economies imposed on municipal employees in 1931, reduction of workers' rents, no support for slave camps, the closing of fascist barracks and against the Unemployment and Sedition Bills.

We shall put forward our candidates and carry the campaign for our programme in all localities where the Party has mass influence and can gain results, with increased prestige for the Communist Party. This means that in the November elections we should put forward our candidates in all areas where the Party has influence among the workers and where this influence can be expressed either in the return of the candidate or where we can get a really significant vote. In localities where the Party has no serious chances of winning either a significant number of votes or a seat, or where we do not contest the election, we propose to the Labour Party that they support measures aiming at achieving some of the demands in our platform, with a declaration that they favour the united front against fascism and war. If the Labour candidates give satisfactory guarantees we will give full support to these candidates, take part in the election meetings and not only explain why we give them support but popularise our policy in our own independent election meetings which we will simultaneously organise.

Wherever there is a locality where our Party would get a big vote or where our Party has a chance of winning, then under no circumstances do we withdraw our candidate, but propose to the Labour Party that they support our candidate on the same basis that we would be prepared to support theirs. We shall immediately approach the I.L.P., both at the centre, and in the districts, to discuss with them the question of an electoral bloc, and we should try to aim at getting agreement on the basis that each Party support the candidate who received the highest vote in the last municipal elections. This is of chief importance in Glasgow where a number of I.L.P. and C.P. candidates stood and were fighting each

other, and, on the basis of the last election results, we believe we can reach an electoral arrangement.

We are also proposing that, in places where the C.P., I.L.P. and Labour Party are all putting forward candidates, that an attempt be made to reach agreement on the candidate who can best express the united front desires of the workers. For this purpose a Workers' Selection Conference should be held; let the three candidates be voted upon at that conference, and a workers' candidate be selected on the basis of the united front. Should the Labour Party refuse and we have reached an agreement with the I.L.P., and if the Labour candidate has the least chance in the election, we should propose to them that they withdraw their candidate from the field. This will be one of the most effective means at present for consolidating the demand for unity, extending the united front, and bringing forward new measures to combat the recent decisions of the Weymouth Trades Union Congress and the Southport Labour Party Conference.

We must also discuss the possibility of cases where there is a fight between the capitalist and Labour candidate, and where there exists a danger of the victory of the capitalist candidates. In these circumstances, where the Labour candidate rejects our proposals for a united front, even then we will consider the possibility of the Party leadership in each separate case, deciding whether to withdraw our candidate if his going forward would mean the victory of the capitalist candidate, and thus to recommend to the workers to vote for the Labour candidate. Where we recommend to the workers to vote for the Labour candidate, this will be done on class issues that the C.P. will carry into the elections in order to prevent the return of a class enemy of the workers to any of the existing Town Councils. If the Labour Party refuses our offer, and we are still recommending to the workers to vote for their candidate, we will of course continue as usual to organise our separate election meetings, we shall criticise the policy of the Labour Party and put this issue to the workers, and ask them to endorse our demands and the united front tactics we are operating. This will enable us to reach many thousands of Labour Party workers and win their support for the united front.

Finally, I believe the C.C. should publish immediately a manifesto explaining that the situation at home and abroad demands that this line be carried out in order to build up the unity of the working class. We can formulate this declaration and carry it out in such a way as will show to the working class that the C.P. is a Party of serious political importance and that these proposals are a still further attempt on our part to strengthen the united front against the workers' enemies. We are convinced that this

policy will then become the medium through which we can remove many objections to the united front that at present exist amongst the Socialist workers, and will undoubtedly draw our Party much closer to them than we are at present.

If, therefore, we take careful note of the experiences and arguments, the character of the negotiations that will take place in the coming November elections, we shall then have a basis for extending a wider discussion on the whole question of the Party's line in connection with the coming general elections. Particularly we will be able to get important experiences and material that will enable us to work out a clear line in our Party Congress in January, in connection with the coming general election.

Thus, at the very moment that the Labour leaders are attempting to make it more difficult for Communists to work in the trade unions and Trades Councils, when they threaten to expel from the Labour Party all their members who are identified with the united front—at this moment our Party comes forward with new proposals which will not weaken but strengthen the class struggle, I am certain that this policy will be accepted by the Labour Party workers and will compel the leaders to revise their present attitude towards the united front.

The Fight Against Fascism.

In April, already it was clear that the opposition to fascism in Britain was exceptionally strong and gave us the best opportunity to develop the united front.

In the resolution of the E.C.C.I., it stated that the Communist Party must set itself then as one of its central tasks, the organisation of the masses against fascism. I think we can say here that we have endeavoured to fulfil this task. There can be no question about it, that until June 1934, Mosley was making progress in England, holding big meetings, getting the support of a powerful group of newspapers. He organised a demonstration in Albert Hall, holding 10,000 people, last May. The Communist Party made a great mistake in allowing that demonstration to go by unchallenged. Over 10,000 people attended, but 2,000 people went to the Hall to demonstrate against him, without leadership or preparation. At this meeting in the Albert Hall, Mosley announced that the fascists were going to conduct the biggest political campaign England had ever seen, that they would organise in June a meeting in the Olympia, holding 50,000 people and another in one of the biggest stadiums, White City, holding 150,000.

At once the Communist Party issued a call to prepare to fight Mosley at the Olympia on June 6th. That call was answered in a magnificent manner by the working class. In order to make a fight inside

the Hall effective, the Party took measures to ensure a counter-demonstration. We were able to organise processions to Olympia, and, as everyone now knows, that meeting marked a turning point in the development of fascism in Britain. Mosley was compelled to resort to unparalleled scenes of brutality and the effect of it was tremendous on the public opinion that had been neutral at first, but which now definitely came out against him. Then he had a series of meetings all over Britain where the workers turned out in thousands to demonstrate against him. At a meeting in Sheffield, 25,000 demonstrated outside the hall where he had his meeting, a demonstration such as had never been seen there before. There were similar scenes in Bristol, Newcastle, Swansea, etc., and all the time the Party endeavoured to keep this anti-fascist feeling going.

The Labour Party came out very strongly with the demand for free speech for Mosley, and the government was compelled to organise a debate in the House of Commons on the question of the Olympia events. As a result of the debate, the government announced that it would hold a conference of the Liberal, Tory and Labour Parties to discuss the question of future political meetings and their conduct. This conference took place.

It was stated that Mosley would hold a mass demonstration in the East End of London on July 22nd. The C.P. called for a counter-demonstration, and it was clear, weeks before July 22nd, that Mosley would never be allowed to march down the East End. Our Party organised a demonstration on July 22nd that was the biggest demonstration seen since the general strike in 1926. Then the proprietors of the big stadium at White City got the wind up and refused Mosley the use of the Stadium. Mosley announced he would hold his fascist demonstration in Hyde Park on September 9th.

A meeting of Labour Party workers, comrades of the I.L.P. and trade unionists was called. Over 80 turned up at this meeting and the question was put: are we going to organise a counter-demonstration against Mosley on September 9th? Everyone was unanimous and a number of Labour Party leaders, I.L.P. leaders and C.P. leaders then signed a joint manifesto, and we commenced the campaign for our counter-demonstration. So far as our experience is concerned, it was a model of the way a campaign should be carried out. The Party distributed over one million leaflets and resorted to forms of publicity which, while the demonstration took place in London, brought it right home to millions of workers all over England. Some of the forms of anti-fascist activity were as follow:—

At a big classical concert in the West End of London, a concert was being broadcast, and com-

rades were able to shout anti-fascist slogans to call upon the workers to come to Hyde Park. At a big restaurant in London, where dance music was being broadcast, a comrade was able to get to the microphone and made a splendid appeal against the fascists which millions of people heard. Similar events took place in picture halls where music was being broadcast. Slogans were painted everywhere in London. It was impossible to go anywhere without meeting anti-fascist slogans and the call to Hyde Park.

The nearer we came to the actual day itself, the more the press became full of stories about "the Communist blood bath battle," "the Communist provocation." Everywhere the Labour leaders came out and told the workers not to go to Hyde Park. A big meeting was called, 1,500 workers attending, to discuss the question of who is right, the anti-fascists who say "Fight Mosley," or the Labour Party which says "Stay away." This was really a splendid meeting. It was absolutely unanimous for the line of the anti-fascist struggle.

September 9th, comrades, was a triumph. We have never, in our experience, witnessed such scenes and no one in London ever remembers such a demonstration in Hyde Park. It was not merely the fact that 150,000 people were in Hyde Park, that the Mosley demonstration was an absolute fiasco, but it was the fighting spirit of the workers, the discipline, the splendid anti-fascist banners they had made, and it was really a tremendous victory for our Party. It is interesting to quote the opinion of the "Manchester Guardian" because the "Manchester Guardian" for a week before had been saying our demonstration would be a fiasco and it was also calling upon the workers to stay away. This is what the "Guardian" had to say the day after the demonstration: §

"The point for Sir Oswald Mosley to ponder over is that if this counter-demonstration which outnumbered his by about twenty to one, could be gathered from such a small party as the Communists, with large numbers of Londoners acting on their own initiative, on what scale would the opposition have been had it had the whole force of organised labour behind it."

We have made tremendous use of that quotation because that was what the workers in Hyde Park were saying—that if we could do this acting against the Labour Party, with the Labour Party we could have brought a million workers to Hyde Park. One result of this demonstration is that at the Southport Labour Party Conference, a suggestion was made that they organise an anti-fascist demonstration on the same day in all the principal towns in England.

The "Daily Herald" stated that 500 Communists marched to Hyde Park, and such a scandalous write-up of the proceedings had a boomerang effect, because never has the "Daily Herald" received so many thousands of protests from its readers.

The committee that was responsible for organising

this demonstration met the following day, and we came to the following conclusion so far as the weaknesses were concerned: that we had failed to draw in sufficient trade unions and the local Labour Parties, and that we were late in issuing a statement that the intention of the demonstration was not a demonstration of violence against Mosley, but a mass political demonstration of anti-fascist opinion. It is quite clear that if we had issued the line a week earlier, we could have brought another 50,000 workers with us that day.

It was decided to carry out the following next steps:—

(1) To assist the comrades in Manchester to organise a counter-demonstration against Mosley there. That was done, and the same success we had in London on the 9th, we had in Manchester on the 29th of September; (2) to prepare opposition to the Mosley demonstration in Albert Hall in October; (3) to organise an anti-fascist demonstration in Albert Hall in November; (4) to do everything in our power to get the local Trades Councils to call anti-fascist conferences which would include every section of the working class movement; (5) to make a special effort to influence the London Trades Council Conference on September 26th; (6) to develop the anti-fascist trade union movements that are springing up all over London, for instance, amongst the busmen, railwaymen and printers, there are now really strong anti-fascist movements; (7) to bring out a weekly anti-fascist paper; and, finally, to prepare a memorandum as a basis of discussion by a number of leading people in the labour movement, to discuss the questions of fascism, and to issue a call for a national anti-fascist congress, either at the end of this year or the beginning of 1935. All these steps have been taken in hand and already we can see some results coming in from the localities. The Bradford Trades Council is going to call an "all-in" united front conference, and the Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow Trades Councils all have this question on the agenda.

It will be interesting also to report the proceedings of the anti-fascist conference organised by the London Labour Party and Trades Council.

Immediately after the Olympia events, the London Labour leaders tried to canalise the anti-fascist opinion by promising to organise an anti-fascist conference, which took place on September 26th. Only those could attend who were prepared to sign the constitution and policy of the Labour Party and Trade Union Congress. 1,220 delegates took part, 577 from trade unions, 502 from local Labour Parties and the League of Youth, and 141 from the Co-op. Guilds. The chairman allowed no amendments, and, as he thought, carefully picked the speakers.

Nineteen speakers took the floor, 15 were against the resolution and against the platform. Of these 15, 5 were from Labour Parties, 4 from trade unions, 5 from the League of Youth and one from the Co-operatives. And in spite of the fact that Clynes, Morrison, Williams and Clay tried their very best to down this opposition, every opposition speaker had a great reception, and many of their speeches were models of the way the case ought to be put. Only

the Social Democratic Federation supported the line of the platform and their speaker was Montague, who was a member of the Labour Government. Montague said this conference was alarming, that it showed how far the Communist poison had penetrated the London Labour movement and that the time had come to stop the Labour Party speakers from making Communist speeches. That was as far as he got because the delegates did not allow him to finish. When the resolution was put, over one-third of the delegates voted against it. We consider this as important as September 9th. We proposed immediately the following steps, that the London District Party Committee and our locals in London should immediately make a new approach to the local Labour Parties, that we should try to get four divisional conferences called in London called by the Trades Councils, and that we should aim to get the trade union district committees all over the country to call special anti-fascist meetings of their members.

* * *

Now, comrades, some conclusions from this brief review. First, it is absolutely clear to us in Britain that the main task is now to give leadership and organisation to this wide, broad anti-fascist feeling. To not only bring in the working class but other sections of the population that are anti-fascist. To go ahead with this drive for local trades councils to initiate united front conferences and demonstrations and also for the preparation of a national anti-fascist congress. We are confident that to this anti-fascist manifesto we can get signatures of people who really matter, of people who have mass influence. We must more effectively combine the fight against Mosley with the fight against the National Government, linking up our slogans of "Close down Mosley's Barracks," and "suppress his fascist army," with the fight against the Sedition Bill and Section 2 of the Unemployment Act.

We believe it is necessary to maintain the greatest flexibility in the development of this movement, that there should be no talk of cards, membership dues, but let the movement develop and encourage it to develop and extend in every way possible, particularly in the localities and in the trade unions. To extend the work now of the co-ordinating committees to the whole of the country. We are convinced that along these lines we are going to make a decisive break, both in the trade unions and in the local Labour Parties. Therefore the connection now of our tactics in the elections with the leadership of this anti-fascist fight without any doubt at all, gives our Party perspectives of coming into closer touch and of contact with reformist masses than we have had any time since the formation of the Party.

The Trades Union Congress.

Some remarks about the recent Trade Union Congress at Weymouth. This took place in September and there can be no doubt that it was the most reactionary Congress since the end of the war. It is useful to remember that at the time the Congress met, over two million workers were demanding wage increases, and yet no time was spent at the Congress in discussing this vital question. The main discussions were carefully formulated in such a way as not to touch the basic issues for the workers of wages, hours and the general class struggle in England. Seven of our comrades were there and worked exceptionally well, despite the big obstacles, particularly in the debates on fascism and war, and were supported by a number of the delegates.

What are the main decisions of the Weymouth Congress? Refusal to formulate any common plan of action on the wages and hours questions; refusal to take any mass action against fascism in Britain; dropping of the general strike against war. Here, we must take note of the fact that there has been tremendous opposition throughout the labour movement to the proposal of dropping the general strike against war, and also to the proposal that the British labour movement should support its government in any war against an aggressor nation. We must also take note of the arguments used both by the labour leaders at Weymouth and also at the Labour Party Congress. What is their main argument now? It is this, that if it is right for the Soviet Union to build up a system of collective pacts and to agree to participate in action against an aggressor, then it is right for the British labour movement to follow such an illustrious example.

This is the line they put and this is the line that carried with the delegates at the Trade Union Congress. The Trade Union Congress rejected the united front and gave instructions to all local trades councils to find ways and means whereby they can prevent the Communist delegates coming from the trade union branches. The rôle of the bureaucracy was strong throughout the Congress.

It was also reported that there had been a special meeting of the General Council of the Amsterdam International and proceedings of the General Council were reported to the Weymouth Congress as follows: on the question of war the Brussels resolution still stood and that it was necessary to do even some more hard thinking in this respect; that the best way to fight fascism was to revive the belief in parliamentary democracy; on the question of the united front, that a united front was not possible until the Red unions have been dissolved and gone back to the reformist centres, and finally to make a serious effort to bring in the American Federation of

Labour. To achieve that objective Citrine is going to America to open up negotiations.

What are the next steps the Party has to take in regard to the trade unions?

First of all, to improve the trade union work and now compel every member eligible to belong to the trade union to get into the trade unions. Of course, this is not a new thing, in some districts we have made very good progress in this, particularly in South Wales, but in other districts such as in London and Scotland, our activity must be intensified.

To bring about much better organisation of our fractions in the unions, to prepare a campaign for winning of elective posts in the coming trade union elections in December and January and for the next annual trade union congresses. To develop and extend the existing rank and file movement among the busmen, railwaymen and miners, and to extend them to other industries, especially the docks, seamen, metal and textile, that we have to make clear the driving force for this work must be the Party fraction and individual members of the Party who work in the unions, to try to get a better form of co-ordination between the rank and file movements on a national scale, and to at once begin to co-ordinate the activities in the miners' rank and file movements that exist all over the country, to carry out a wide reporting campaign on the Weymouth Trade Union Congress, and to publish a pamphlet giving our opinions on that Congress. Tom Mann has issued a memorandum on the trade union question. What does this memorandum propose? It proposes a common platform on the question of united action on wages, hours, workers' democracy, united front against fascism and war, etc. It is a very

simple, popular document and has been received with very big support all over the country, and we believe that we must win local trade union officials for support of this document, and also the official endorsement of branches and district committees. We believe that this shall become the platform which can be put before all trade union conferences and should be popularised in preparation for the next Trade Union Congress. We believe it forges an opportunity for overcoming the decisions of the Weymouth Congress.

The commencing of the experiment of regular meetings of active trade unionists to discuss the existing situation, get suggestions, check-up on the weaknesses of the campaign and in this way strengthen it as a whole must be continued, and finally, we must again emphasise that the success of the campaign depends upon the activity of every member in the trade unions.

We can say without any hesitation at all that under the leadership of our Party in the last two months we have been responsible for taking thousands of non-unionists into the South Wales Miners' Federation and the authority of the Party has gone up very strongly as a result.

Our Party's influence was never as great as at the present time; there was never a bigger interest in all the Party says and puts forward than at present, and if we now make a correct combination of the united front tactics in regard to the fight against fascism and war and the tactics in the elections and the mobilisation of the Party membership to recruit into and build up the Party, then I am confident that we will be able to make a very big advance in all fields of our work.

“PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION MOVEMENT.”

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Supplement to No. 22.**

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED PROLETARIAN FRONT IN POLAND

By J. LENSKY.

I

THE united proletarian front is becoming a most important factor in the growth of the revolutionary forces in Poland. Despite enormous difficulties, the Communist Party of Poland has been able to obtain important successes in carrying out the united front, and has changed its tactics in accordance with the new conditions. The tactical line of the C.P.P. was determined by taking the new processes in the working class and the peculiarities of revolutionary development in Poland into account.

The events of June 30th in Germany had a great influence on the alignment of class forces in Poland.

They shattered the legend of the monolithic character of the fascist dictatorship, and the August plebiscite upset the notion of its stability, a legend long supported by the Pilsudski government. Even the semi-official *Gazetta Polska* is now compelled to recognise the fact of the disintegration in Hitler's camp and the narrowing of his mass basis.

German fascism, which overawed the Polish bourgeoisie by its scope, "suddenly" disclosed the instability of its system, torn by contradictions which had been driven inwards. The Polish bourgeoisie began to take a critical attitude towards their ideal, which had been the Hitlerite "totalitarian" state.

Both Pilsudski's followers and the national-democrats began to repudiate the methods of the "totalitarian" régime which they had so highly praised a few months previously, a régime which, according to the editor of the *Gazetta Polska*, "turns the inevitably existing contradictions inside out." The Pilsudski government, to use the words of this newspaper, prefers the "free play of political thought" for all Party groups, with the exception of the C.P. of Poland, of course, which cannot be permitted legal existence. The basic line being taken by the Pilsudski government (which wishes to preserve the POLISH VARIATION of the fascist dictatorship) is to maintain a monopoly of power, and restrict the "freedom of the competition of forces" in the bourgeois camp within the bounds of the hegemony of the ruling fascist party. At the same time, it sharpens the terror against the revolutionary masses who are swinging to the Left, headed by the Communist Party. Its originality, however, ends where the struggle against the revolutionary movement begins. Here

the Pilsudski group supplements its own inventions with models taken from Hitler.

The old leader of national-democracy, Roman Dmowski, who quite recently was a trumpeter of Hitlerism in Poland, has still more "determinedly" repudiated the "totalitarian" system.

"The Hitlerites have shown no creative powers, but have displayed complete bankruptcy," he wrote on August 26. "... we should be enemies of civilisation if we saw an example for other nations in this."

Dmowski displayed similar scepticism in respect to the "creative" achievements of Italian fascism.

The "self-exposure" of Hitlerism as the open dictatorship of monopolist capital has helped to disillusion the Polish petty-bourgeois masses, not only in respect to the ruling fascism as personified by the Pilsudski system, but also to the attempts to transfer German "national-socialism" to Polish soil.

Therefore, in trying to maintain its hold over the masses of petty-bourgeoisie drifting to it away from Pilsudski, national-democracy suddenly declares itself to be an "opponent" of fascism. The Pilsudski group gives assurances, however, that the "May coup barred the path to genuine fascism"* (a view shared by the Trotskyites).

Polish fascism, which had placed great hopes in the stability of the fascist régime in Germany, has received a heavy blow. The process of the decay of Polish fascism has been accelerated. The process of the leftward swing of the petty-bourgeois masses has been intensified. THE POSSIBILITY OF DRAWING THEM TO THE SIDE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT HAS GROWN.

Lessons of Germany in Poland.

The growing resistance of the working class to the fascist offensive in such countries as France, Spain and Poland is the most important thing. The beginning of the crisis of German fascism is impelling the proletariat everywhere to rise to the struggle against fascist reaction. This crisis is also undermining the prestige of the fascist Pilsudski government as the ally of the Hitler government. Polish fascism cannot be proud of its friendship with a Hitlerism which has made such an exhibition of itself. The Pilsudski clique, which wants to make Hitlerism popular among the petty-bourgeoisie, is paying dearly for its rapprochement with German fascism. This friendship, which is directed against the Soviet Union, evokes a feeling of hatred among the toilers.

* Przelom, July, 1934.

The appalling experience of the German and Austrian proletariat exposing the bankruptcy of social-democratic policy as a trail-blazer to fascism stimulated the flow of the anti-fascist wave in Poland. The long years of Communist warning have begun to rapidly penetrate the masses following social-democracy. The German example has convinced them that no social-democratic collaboration with the bourgeoisie guarantees them against fascist vengeance, that the policy of the Wels and Bauers actually helped fascism to smash up the social-democratic organisations. Those social-democratic officials connected with the masses have also begun to question the policy of their leaders.

Only the Trotskyite renegades could try to throw the responsibility for the sabotage and disruption of the united front by the leaders of the one-time Social-Democratic Party of Germany on to the Communist Party. Only those who considered that the staff of social-democracy was irreconcilably opposed to fascism ON PRINCIPLE can now endeavour to prove that, after adopting the tactics of the constitutional "domestication" of Hitler and adaptation to the fascist dictatorship, it would undertake a united front with the Communists. This staff has been able to impress its party and trade union officials with the illusion that "constitutional" fascism will preserve the organisational power of social-democracy, which must avoid any contact with the Communist Party.

The big change taking place in the sentiments of the working class has assisted the present scope of the united front movement. Our appeals to the leaders of the social-democratic parties, based on the independent work of the Communists among the non-party masses and the rank and file of social-democracy, have attained a mobilising force capable of surmounting the sabotage of the social-democratic leaders.

This process has spread to the working masses in Poland as well, although in Polish conditions its speed has been less than in France and Austria. In Poland social-democracy has long since been squeezed out of the state apparatus, placed in opposition against its will. When it comes to the masses, it repudiates the policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie in words. The mechanics of this collaboration are very complicated, and not immediately discernible to the inexperienced eye.

Austrian social-democracy has always been exhibited as an example by the leaders of the P.P.S.* and the Bund.† Its lessons have therefore been forceful. The united front with the Communists has found an increasing number of supporters in the ranks of the social-democratic parties. This is

due to the bankruptcy of the social-democratic policy (peaceful "growth into socialism" along the path of "democracy"), and all attempts at peaceful co-operation with the fascist dictatorship.

The capitalist offensive has assumed enormous proportions in Poland. The capitalists estimated the symptoms of economic improvement "with great caution." They have demanded "new sacrifices" from the working class so that, at any rate, they could consolidate the transition to a peculiar kind of depression achieved at the expense of the toilers. On June 2, the central organ of the industrialists, the *Pszegloni Gospodarchi*, drew attention to the "new dynamics in internal policy" which "demand the general decisions of the government" in the sphere of the further offensive on the working class.

At the end of August, Kozlovski, the new premier of the fascist government, stated the programme of "general decisions," when he declared that "no return to pre-crisis relations was possible." The Pilsudski-Kozlovski government has decided to put an end to the last vestiges of the social and political gains of the working class—social insurance, the eight-hour day, the five-and-a-half day week, wage agreements, and trade unions. The last point has a fusion of the trade unions with the state apparatus in view. The "unification" of the trade unions after the Hitlerite manner is intended to make it easier for the Polish bourgeoisie to plunder wages without ceremony. It is to force the fascist arbitration destroyed by the strike wave on to the proletariat, and smash its growing resistance.

The Polish bourgeoisie want to obtain similar successes to those achieved by the German capitalists after Hitler's advent to power by a concentrated blow.

The Strike Movement.

The Polish bourgeoisie are alarmed at the unceasing growth of the strike movement.

"The strike wave is spreading wider and wider," wrote the organ of the Upper Silesian Christian Democrats, the *Polonia*, on September 4, "although the present condition of the market and unemployment should rather frighten the workers away from strikes. The workers, however, seize on such a dangerous weapon. The causes of the strikes are not only economic . . ."

Strikes against fascist license, the privileges of the fascist trade unions, and in defence of trade union representatives dismissed from the factories are becoming more frequent. THE POLITICAL STRIKE STRUGGLE IN ALL ITS VARIETY HAS ALREADY SPREAD TO THE MASSES, INDISSOLUBLY COMBINED WITH A GROWING WAVE OF ECONOMIC STRIKES. And this alarms the Polish bourgeoisie most of all, since it interferes with their robber plans.

"The programme of general decisions," carried out by the Pilsudski government, sharply raises the

* P.P.S.: Polish Socialist Party.

† Bund: Jewish Labour League.

QUESTION OF COMBINING THE FORCES OF THE PROLETARIAT IN A UNITED FIGHTING FRONT.

The social-democratic workers in Poland have been strongly affected by the united front agreement between the Communist and Socialist Parties in France. This country is now the central point in the organisation of unity of action against fascism in capitalist Europe. The working class members of the P.P.S. and the Bund have understood that this step is of great international importance. They know that the united proletarian front in France, by hindering the onward march of fascism, changes the relation of forces in favour of the entire international proletariat.

It was useless for Nedzialkovski (one of the leaders of the P.P.S.), to assert that "a common front with the Communists is impossible," as far back as the middle of June. A few weeks later this same Nedzialkovski made the bitter admission that his French friends "could not reject the Communist proposals owing to the seriousness of the situation in the country."

But as we see, the situation in Poland is equally serious. This cannot be denied even by the leaders of the P.P.S. They understand that the united proletarian front in France, which the French Communists are striving to strengthen and widen, will hasten the establishment of unity of action in other countries. To weaken the influence of this example on the Polish workers, the editor of the *Rabotnik* has been prophesying the inevitable breakdown of the united front all along, giving great prominence to the resistance of the C.G.T. The Communist Party of Poland has made clever use of the French example to penetrate deeply into the ranks of the P.P.S. and the Bund.

II.

A year and a half ago, the C.P.P. stated that it was ready to go forward with any working class organisation which desired to struggle against capitalism and fascism. This aim was followed by a number of united front proposals addressed to the leading bodies and organisations of the P.P.S. and the Bund.

In its June resolution, the C.C. of the C.P.P. emphasised that "the basis of the mass united front must be not only the economic struggle, but the political struggle as well." It declared that a way of approach to the socialist organisations had to be found, that a powerful united front movement had to be set up in the factories, reformist trade unions, in the ranks of the social-democratic party and among the unemployed.

"We must convince the masses," said the resolution, "that our Party is bringing about the unity of the working class in the struggle for their everyday interests, in defence of their social and political gains, and in the struggle against fascism and terror, and the capitalist

system. In our appeals and in the whole of the campaign around them, our Party takes as its basis the demands which the broad masses, irrespective of their party, understand, the demands which excite them, avoiding any action which would reduce our united front tactics in the eyes of these masses to a narrow manoeuvre."

The question of the united front has been raised by whole organisations of the P.P.S. and the Bund, due to the Communist Party undertaking its work in this manner. The leaders of these parties who previously maintained silence, have finally begun to reply to Communist appeals. The leaders of the P.P.S. are doing everything in their power to prevent the formation of a wide united front. They constantly claim that unity of action is only possible within the limits of the socialist parties. All the proposals of the C.P.P. and the trade union opposition have been rejected on various pretexts. On each occasion, the refusal has been accompanied by manoeuvres, for the masses.

The central commission of the reformist trade unions, for example, in reply to a proposal from the trade union opposition to use their joint forces to organise a general protest strike against the abolition of social insurance, promised that they would declare a strike themselves in March this year. This was the end of the matter.

The proposal of the C.P.P. to form a united front in defence of Comrade Thaelman and all political prisoners, encountered bitter attacks on the peace policy of the Soviet Union by the P.P.S. In a circular dated August 22, the C.C. of the P.P.S. stated that it is impossible to talk to the C.P.P. because it

"represents the official Stalinite line in the Comintern, and supports the foreign policy of the Soviets, a policy of agreements even with fascist states."

Under the pressure of the lower organisations, however, the C.C. of the P.P.S. has been forced to manoeuvre. The reply of the Warsaw Committee of the P.P.S., which was dictated by the leaders, added spitefully that "there is no need to specially pick out Thaelmann" if "thousands of rank and file workers are perishing in the dungeons." When the movement from below extended to a section of the social-democratic officials also, the editor of the *Robotnik* began temporarily to talk about the "usefulness of joint action on the part of the socialists and Communists for the liberation of political prisoners." In the following issue, Thaelmann's name occupied the fourth place, after Seitz, Wallisch and Dubois; the day after it disappeared from the slogans of the so-called campaign in defence of political prisoners.

The editor of the *Robotnik*, having perjured himself, suddenly began to assure the workers at the end of August that the Comintern does not permit the united front everywhere, because "*the Japanese danger is not yet urgent enough,*" and

"on the other hand not every country (i.e., Poland—L.) is of the same importance for Russia as France." A week later, the *Robotnik* wrote that the Communists are proposing the united front to the socialists in all countries *on orders from Moscow*.

Unable to find arguments against the united front, and without the guts to openly oppose it, the editor of the *Robotnik* has adopted sabotage tactics, similar to those of the Polish government on the Eastern Pact. "*Go cautiously with the united front! First of all weigh up everything for and against, and then decide,*" stated the central organ of the P.P.S. at the beginning of September.

The Warsaw Committee of the P.P.S. took up a similar position in its SECOND reply on September 4. As can be seen, the P.P.S. workers found the first reply unconvincing. The sabotage of the united front was too obvious. And so the Warsaw district committee pretended that it had only heard of the readiness of the C.P.P. to "put a stop to hostile attacks" during the period of joint activity, a few days previously, although in its appeals during the last year our Party had constantly expressed its readiness in this connection. The Warsaw district committee also pretended that it was unaware of the repeated proposals made by the Communist Party to the Central Committee of the P.P.S. The leaders of the Warsaw organisation consider it disloyal on our part to make a SIMULTANEOUS appeal to the P.P.S. workers. They conveniently overlook that it is only the pressure of the working masses which has compelled them to break their long silence.

Shilly-Shally of Socialist Leaders.

Under the pressure of our campaign in defence of social insurance and the trade unions, the Warsaw district committee promises that the P.P.S. will also carry on a campaign on these questions, but the united front with the Communists can only be formed after a lengthy period of verification of their "good faith." Proofs of good faith, reply the Communists, are to be found in the unity of action of the working class, already being carried out in the working class districts of Warsaw, in spite of the resistance of the P.P.S. leaders.

The leaders of the P.P.S. took advantage of the illegality of the C.P.P. to assure their organisations for a long time that Polish Communists reject the well-known non-aggression pact as a "condition for an honest united front." When this manoeuvre was exposed by the Communists and so ceased to be effective, the P.P.S. invented a new condition, namely, that there cannot be any talk of the united front so long as the Communists regard the policy of the Second International as treachery to

the interests of the working class. Our reply was direct:

"We do not for one moment intend to conceal from the workers that the policy of the Second International was and remains a policy for the salvation of the capitalist system from proletarian revolution, and the subordination, not only of the historical class interests of the proletariat, but of their immediate interests to those of this system. We do not intend to ignore differences in policy and outlook, and we do not suggest that you do either. We advance only those slogans, demands and forms of struggle as a platform for the united front, which can be accepted by the masses of workers, irrespective of their Party loyalty. We are sure that in making concrete united front proposals to you we are carrying out the will of these masses. We want, together with the social-democratic workers (of the P.P.S. and Bund), to overcome the obstacles raised on the path towards the united front."

Thus, it must be a united front without wrangling between the two parties. It must be a united front in spite of all the difference of views, but without the necessity of hiding them during the period of joint activity.

These arguments of the Communists are easily understood by the social-democratic workers. The proof of this is provided by the numerous examples of the united front in the lower organisations. The P.P.S. workers and the Communists acted in the suburbs of Warsaw in a united front against the fascist thugs, members of the National-Democratic Party. Entire organisations of the P.P.S. youth have concluded united front arrangements with the Y.C.L. Thousands of workers and hundreds of officials of the P.P.S. and the Bund have voted for Communist resolutions in defence of Comrade Thaelmann. They have joined in our campaign against the concentration camps introduced by the Pilsudski government.

The Party has carried on an extensive campaign for the united front on a platform of struggle against the programme of the Pilsudski-Kozlovski government in a number of localities in Warsaw and Lodz, and later in the Dombrov Basin, Upper Silesia, and also in many provincial towns. It has become a common thing for Communists to speak at meetings of the district organisations of the P.P.S. Most of the P.P.S. districts in Warsaw have voted in favour of the united front. Some of the districts, after expressing their agreement with the formation of the united front, have referred our delegates to the district committee of the P.P.S. In some districts where the district leaders of the P.P.S. tried to keep our delegates out of the meetings, the district meetings became the scenes of sharp struggles, because a considerable section of the rank-and-file demanded that the Communists be admitted and their proposals accepted. Oppositional groups are increasing in Warsaw localities. Here and there the members of the P.P.S. are beginning to come over to the Communists. One of the area committees of the P.P.S. in Warsaw is

being dissolved for negotiating with the Communists.

The campaign soon spread to Lodz. In the first half of August negotiations were being carried on with four area organisations of the P.P.S. In two areas in the Lodz suburbs an agreement on the united front with the organisation of joint meetings is already being operated. Under the pressure of the masses, the district committees of the P.P.S. have also been forced to surrender position after position.

The Dombrov Basin has also joined in the general campaign for the united front. Our united front appeals have reached all the P.P.S. local groups, but the subordination of the P.P.S. organisations to the line of sabotage adopted by the executive leaders has not yet been broken, due to inner Party discipline. Most of the localities which have agreed with the proposal for the united front are still waiting for the decision of their C.C. **THE PROPOSAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY TO FORM A UNITED FRONT IN DEFENCE OF THE TRADE UNIONS, LEADING TO THE CLASS UNITY OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT HAS MET WITH A WIDE RESPONSE AMONG THE MASSES.** The C.P.P. understands by this unity the organisational amalgamation of the trade unions on the platform of the class struggle and trade union democracy, which means primarily freedom to advocate views and proportional representation in all the leading bodies. In its open letter, the C.C. of the C.P.P. proposed to the social-democratic committees and organisations that they should hold joint protest meetings in the factories, mines, on the landed estates and in the trade unions, and that if the fascists should make an attempt at the unification of the trade unions, street demonstrations and protest strikes should be organised to the point of the general strikes. Simultaneously the trade union opposition proposed to the executive committees of the chief reformist trade unions, the textile workers and miners, which had experienced the severest oppression from the fascist government, to carry on a joint recruiting campaign on the programme mentioned, which is to restore the faith of the masses in these trade unions and turn them into organisations of the class struggle.

The central commission of the reformist trade unions continued to sabotage the united front. Kwapinski, its chairman, referring to the services of the P.P.S. to the state, began to convince the government that the fascist "unification" of the trade unions was "not in the interests of the Polish state," which is the "common home" (of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat).

But the masses in the trade unions, taught by the experience of the German Leiparts, want to fight. They are taking the path indicated by the

Communists, which corresponds to the interests both of the organised and unorganised workers. This is the path of the class unity of the trade union movement as contrasted to the demagogy of the fascists regarding "unification," which fetters the trade unions to the fascist state apparatus.

Trade Union Unity.

As we see, the trade union campaign of the Communists has been closely connected with the concrete development of the offensive of capital and fascism. This explains the force of its influence on the masses who follow social-democracy. The Communist Party has linked up recruiting into the trade unions with the concrete programme of converting them into organisations of the class struggle, in defence of the trade unions which are threatened with unification, in practice. Thus, the struggle of the opposition in the reformist unions to convert them into genuine class organisations, finds support among the workers recruited into the trade unions on the basis of our programme. The left trade unions, and primarily the factory groups of the trade union opposition which concentrate their activity inside the reformist unions, have been drawn into the campaign. By operating these tactics step by step and throwing the necessary forces into the fascist trade unions, the Communist Party has called forth a mass oppositional movement in these unions for the united proletarian front, and considerably extended its revolutionary basis in them, by winning several new sections in the localities. The Communist proposals have received the votes of the P.P.S. tramway workers', municipal workers' and metal workers' trade unions, as well as of several big Bund unions in Warsaw, sections of the textile union in Lodz, the P.P.S. union in Upper Silesia (four branches) and in Dombrov division (divisional conference).

THE LEFT OPPOSITION IS BECOMING A SERIOUS FORCE IN THE CHIEF TRADE UNIONS (with the exception of the railway union). The activity of the left trade unions has also increased. Some of them have taken the initiative for unity. A weak point, however, is still the work in the fascist unions, although some successes have been achieved here as well, showing the possibility of creating our mass basis. This work must be carried on in a shock-brigade manner, not in words, but in deeds.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY MUST PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED WORKING CLASS FRONT against imperialist war, and in defence of the U.S.S.R. Every proposal for the united front must be linked up by the Communist Party with the direct danger of war against the Soviet Union by Pilsudski Poland, supported by the German and Japanese imperialists, the organ-

isers of counter-revolutionary war against the U.S.S.R. The efforts of the Communist Party have been directed towards making the defence of the U.S.S.R. take the form of active support of the peace policy of the Soviet government, by all working class organisations. Such a way of carrying through the anti-war campaign plays a big part in Poland, where the Pilsudski government, together with the Hitler government, have directed their fire against the project for the Eastern Pact. The leaders of the P.P.S. have played into the hands of their "native" and German imperialists by trying to besmirch the initiative of the U.S.S.R. for peace. At the end of August, the editor of the *Robotnik* cynically declared that "*Moscow wants to replace the united front of the masses by pacts of friendship with the fascist states.*" Thus, the P.P.S. leaders have tried to disrupt the anti-war front of the working class, organised by the Communists, in the programme of which the Communist Party included the demand for the conclusion of the Eastern Pact and the abandonment of secret agreements with Germany.

III.

The turn made by the leaders of the C.P.P. in their everyday practical activity is the basic prerequisite for the successful development of the united front. We needed to intensify the struggle against the left sectarianism still rooted in the Party organisations, without relaxing against those who conceal the Party face and reject the independent work among the masses WHICH DECIDES THE SUCCESS OF THE TACTICAL STEPS WE TAKE.

First of all, it is necessary to root out sectarianism in our approach to the social-democratic workers. The most important thing is the method of personal conviction, the rejection of a domineering attitude, comradesly influence, convincing arguments without general phrases, and business-like criticism without abuse. The slogans and forms of struggle must correspond to the fighting moods of the masses. If the leaders of the social-democratic organisations reject one form of struggle, another form must be proposed to them, making it difficult for them to refuse in face of the masses. The chief thing is to begin to act together, so that the joint activity embraces the masses. In the course of the movement, the political consciousness of the masses must be heightened, and the social-democratic and non-party workers must be convinced by fact of the correctness of our programme and tactics.

The attitude of the Communists to the organisational forms of the united front must also be more flexible. We, of course, are in favour of committees of action elected on the basis of the united front by all the workers in the factories and at

labour exchanges. But we cannot FORCE the social-democratic organisations to set up such committees, presenting this condition as an ULTIMATUM for the formation of the united front. We agree also to contact committees, while not refusing to organise united front committees elected by the masses, or trying in some other form to guarantee that the non-party and unorganised workers are able to make their voices heard. In any case, we must not relax our work for the formation of united front committees now at MASS MEETINGS. As many of these committees as possible! Only let them be active. The Lodz comrades are correctly fulfilling this task, by forming a series of united front committees in the factories.

We must pay special attention to strike committees which, thanks to the work of the Communists, have penetrated deeply among the masses and have won formal recognition in the localities, even from the leaders of the reformist unions. BUT STRIKE COMMITTEES IN GENERAL CANNOT BE COUNTERPOSED TO THE TRADE UNIONS. Experience has shown that the success of strikes depends to a great extent on how the organised masses and whole trade union organisations in the localities are drawn into the struggle. Strike committees cannot deprive the trade unions of their rôle in the strike movement, and must not weaken our work in the trade unions, which are a BIG FACTOR in the strike struggle. Our task is to link the strike committees up closely with the trade unions, transferring the questions of the organisation of the strike struggle to trade union meetings and holding the election of trade union commissions for the preparation of strikes. It is clear that if the reformist leaders act as strike-breakers, we shall oppose these leaders by the strike committees, continuing to link the latter up with the lower branches of the trade unions.

United Front Tactic. Manoeuvre or Militant Agreement.

The consistent struggle of our leaders against Right and "Left" sectarian opportunism has helped towards the rapid changing of the tactics of the united front in accordance with the new conditions. But some of our active comrades have seen a narrow manoeuvre in our tactics, and have thought not so much of how to reach agreement with the social-democratic organisations for a joint struggle, as of how to expose the leaders of these parties AT ONCE.

Hence, on more than one occasion, demands, slogans and forms of struggle which run ahead of the moods of the masses have been put forward in the form of an ultimatum, and this has made it easier for the social-democratic leaders to reject these demands. Hence, schematic methods of negotiation with the reformist leaders, devoid of any flexibility, and inability to replace the rejected

forms of struggle by other forms, as well as inadequate concentration of the attention of the P.P.S. and Bund workers are made the concrete excuses for breaking off negotiations. Hence, the use of strong language and empty stereotyped formulas, instead of concrete arguments capable of convincing the P.P.S. and Bund workers. This applies first and foremost to our press.

All these shortcomings were disclosed with the greatest clearness as long ago as the municipal elections in the spring of 1934. At these elections the Party on the whole applied the tactics of the united front quite weakly.

A typical example of the sectarian application of the united front tactics (connected, for that matter, with Right mistakes) was shown during these elections by the anti-fascist election committee, the "Workers' Unity," in the town of Zamostia. Our comrades evidently regarded the united front as a manoeuvre, and so proposed to the local organisations of the P.P.S. and the Bund the acceptance of a programme which, in their opinion, would be absolutely unacceptable for the leaders of the P.P.S. and the Bund. When, however, these leaders accepted this programme, as if deliberately, the authors of it began to discover the betrayal of the interests of the working class in it, and immediately began to seek for forms of struggle with which the P.P.S. and the Bund would not agree. But here they met with a new "unpleasantness," for the leaders of the P.P.S. and the Bund, taking into account the feelings of the masses, also agreed to joint activity. A meeting of many thousands of people turned into a demonstration, which our comrades were unable to utilise because all their efforts were directed towards giving up the joint activity as soon as possible. After this, the representatives of "Workers' Unity," in fright at their own actions, declared that their united front campaign was of a Right opportunist character, because they had not been able to compel the P.P.S. and the Bund functionaries to break off negotiations.

This example is an ultra-"Left" caricature of the tactics of the united front when they are understood not as a method for the organisation of the struggle, together with the social-democratic workers with the possible participation of their leaders on the basis of common demands and slogans, but as a trap serving for the immediate exposure of these leaders. Along with the necessity for eliminating these sectarian "Leftist" tendencies and mistakes, we must maintain the greatest vigilance towards the Right opportunist distortion of the tactics of the united front. This danger was made clear in the course of the negotiations with the Bund organisations and in a few places while carrying out joint activity.

The leaders of the Communist Party have placed THE CHIEF EMPHASIS ON INDEPENDENT ACTIVITY AMONG THE MASSES, AMONG THE LOWER ORGANISATIONS AND THE RANK-AND-FILE OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY. The C.C. of the C.P.P. warns the Party organisations against regarding the open letters and appeals to the social-democratic parties as having IN THEMSELVES miraculous powers for removing all hindrances in the path to the united front. These difficulties can only be removed by a systematic campaign in connection with these appeals, only by the clever organisation of the struggle in spite of the sabotage of the reformist leaders. They will only be overcome by convincing the masses IN PRACTICE of the necessity for the united front, creating confidence in the strength of the Communist Party and its ability to lead the struggle. There can be no return to the Right opportunist, capitulatory methods of the days of the Kostrzewa-Warski group, when the Communist Party dragged at the tail of the P.P.S. and lost its political face (1923).

A characteristic feature in the work of the Communists in the localities for the formation of the united front is the VARIETY OF METHODS OF CONTACT WITH THE LOWER ORGANISATIONS OF THE P.P.S. Every appeal of the C.C. and the leaders to the S.D. parties and to the Central Commission of the trade unions is taken into the local organisations of the P.P.S. and the Bund in accordance with local conditions. Delegations from the revolutionary workers advocate the Communist proposals at the district meetings of the P.P.S. Delegations from the districts and the trade union meetings are sent to the P.P.S. committees, sometimes with the participation of the revolutionary workers. Finally, it is a frequent thing, especially in Warsaw, for the revolutionary workers to take part in the sessions of the district committees of the P.P.S. when discussing the question of the united front.

Summing up the stage which has passed, we may say that ON THE WHOLE the leaders of the Communist Party of Poland have brought about a big change in the practical work of the Party. Some of the achievements of the united front in Warsaw, Lodz, Upper Silesia, Siladov, Chenstokov, etc., speak of the good work of the Communists. THE CHINESE WALL BETWEEN THE COMMUNISTS AND THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC WORKERS IS BREAKING DOWN. A method of approach to the social-democratic organisations has been found. Connections have been organised with their active workers. The initiative of the Communists has found support in a number of district committees of the P.P.S. and the Bund. Some of the lower organisations of these parties have entered the united front with the Communist organisations in spite of prohibition from above.

These partial successes of the Communist Party enrage the leaders of the P.P.S.

"The committees cannot allow Communists to speak at district meetings," says the circular mentioned above, "thus causing unrest in the ranks of our sympathisers" (why only sympathisers?—L.) . . . "Agreements must be made only with the knowledge and consent of the C.C. and not behind its back, as the Communists do when they approach our committees, WHICH MUST NOT ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES."

The successes of the Communists in the lower organisations of the P.P.S. are still more definitely confirmed by Nedzialkovski, who as one of the preliminary conditions for a united front on the French model, put forward the demand that the Communists stop acting from below (*Robotnik*, September 11). But if there had not been this action from below, Nedzialkovski would not have even thought it necessary to reply to the Communists.

A Model Example.

A model of the united front in the localities was provided by the workers of Siladov, where, in spite of the evasive reply of the P.P.S. leaders, an anti-fascist committee was elected at a large meeting, and a delegation appointed which went to the German Consulate with the demand for the release of Comrade Thaelmann. According to the bourgeois press, several hundred workers holding various views signed the resolution which was presented to the Consul.

The Communists, however, have not yet succeeded in overcoming the resistance among the middle officials, in the district committees of the P.P.S. It is very noteworthy that these committees cannot, and some of them do not want, to act against our initiative. But in most cases they refer us to the C.C. of the P.P.S., with the promise of their support.

There can be no doubt that discipline in the P.P.S. is still stronger than in the Socialist Party of France, and the pressure exerted by the central leaders on the local committees is also stronger. In its organisational structure, the P.P.S. is more firmly built than many other social-democratic parties. It was formed under the influence of and after the long school of illegality in the former Tsarist Poland and the Pilsudski military treatment of later years. A decisive feature was the necessity for opposing a firm centralised apparatus to the growing Communist Party. The privilege of legality is not sufficient, because illegal Communism in Poland has thrust its roots deeper than in many "parliamentary democratic" countries. Finally, the leaders of the P.P.S. use the illegality of the Communist Party as a bogey to make it easier to sabotage the united front.

All the more must our tactics be distinguished by still greater flexibility. All the greater must

be the stubbornness with which the Communists convince the social-democratic workers and functionaries that the united front is now a life and death question for the working class. All the nearer must we approach the social-democratic organisations in the factories and districts, the local committees and the trade union executives, making them aware of every open letter issued by the Communist Party.

The united front with the Bund organisations must be utilised to exert extensive influence on the P.P.S. organisations. It should always be remembered that the so-called non-aggression pacts between the organisations which have undertaken joint struggle means an attack on those leaders who disrupt and sabotage the united front.

The extent of the influence of the Communist Party of Poland on the toiling masses of the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie depends on the scope with which it brings about the united proletarian front. Fascism is anxious to break through the revolutionary front of the toilers, to set the village poor against the city workers. It wishes to sow dissensions between the revolutionary proletariat and the exploited peasants, with the help of the "populists." Fearing new explosions in the ruined and starving villages, the Pilsudski government is advocating a rapprochement with the "common people" and is advancing a false programme for the revision of the indebtedness of the peasants. This well-thought-out manoeuvre is intended to make it easier for the bourgeoisie to undertake a new offensive against the working class, and to deprive it of allies in the approaching struggles for power.

The united proletarian front will help to strengthen the struggle of the millions of peasants, oppressed peoples and the impoverished petty-bourgeoisie, against monopolist capital, fascism and imperialism. The united proletarian front creates wide possibilities for drawing these masses into the struggle alongside the proletariat. The Communist Party must carry the methods of the united front into the villages, and display readiness to struggle jointly with every organisation of the poor and middle peasants for the everyday interests of the toiling peasants.

United Workers' Front Impresses Middle Class.

The united proletarian front will increase the radicalisation of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, and will accelerate the transition of some of them to the side of the revolutionary proletariat. This transition is delayed by the social and political demagoguery of the old and young national-democrats, who have very much widened their basis among those strata of the petty-bourgeoisie who are disillusioned in Pilsudski. This is the weakest

place in the development of the revolutionary movement.

In short, the united fighting front of the workers means a big change in the relationship of forces in favour of the revolutionary proletariat, one of the chief tasks facing which is to isolate the bourgeoisie from the toiling petty-bourgeois masses.

In carrying out the revolutionary unity of action of the proletariat, the Communist Party clearly raises the question of power, a question closely connected with that of "organisational amalgamation" or "organic unity" (as the Socialist Party of France usually formulates it), which is given great prominence by social-democracy AS AN OFFSET TO THE UNITED FRONT. The Communist Party exposes the slogan of the "dictatorship of the revolutionary classes" which was advanced at the last Congress of the P.P.S. as a contrast to the genuine dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union.

The nature of this slogan as a manoeuvre was disclosed not long ago by the editor of the *Robotnik*, who stated that "the slogan of dictatorship does not base its calculations on the problems and struggles of the present day," and therefore it cannot be considered as the "orientation of socialism" or "something for everyday propaganda," and, moreover, "it is better for dictatorship itself if less is said about it," and still better—"it should be avoided at all costs."

Like Adler, the leaders of the P.P.S. are in

favour of "co-ordinating the methods of revolution and reform" in the Second International, for, as Adler assures us, "the two methods do not contradict but supplement one another." Thus, the method of reformism or collaboration with the bourgeoisie continues to remain in force. This is why the P.P.S. leaders have even pigeonholed their lying slogan of the "dictatorship of the revolutionary classes."

In reply to the attempts to galvanise the Second International under these slogans, the Communists declare that:

"The organisational unity of the proletariat to which the united fighting front leads, is unity achieved for the struggle for power, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the Soviet government of Workers, Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies."

An example of such a dictatorship is the U.S.S.R.—the only bulwark of the international revolutionary movement. Only the U.S.S.R. ensures and carries out the liquidation of capitalism and the transition to classless socialist society. Therefore, the defence of the U.S.S.R. is a duty of honour for every worker and for every toiler.

There is not and cannot be any other path to the dictatorship of the proletariat than the armed uprising of the workers, peasants and soldiers.

There is not and cannot be any other organisation expressing the international revolutionary unity of the proletariat than the Communist International.

BACK ISSUES.

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URGENTLY REQUIRED.

DISCUSSION ON QUESTIONS FOR THE VII CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

In preparation for the VII Congress of the Communist International the editors are publishing discussion articles and materials connected with the questions on the agenda of the Congress.—Editorial Board.

PREVIOUS ARTICLES WERE :—

PROBLEMS OF THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE WORKING CLASS	-		By Sinani.	No. 20
THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE STRATA OF THE TOWN POPULATION	-		By P. Reimann.	20
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THE QUESTION OF COMMUNIST CADRES*

“In this, the Central Committee was guided by the great thought uttered by Lenin, namely, that the main thing in organisational work is—the selection of people and supervision of fulfilment of decisions.” (Stalin, Report at the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U.)

THE approach of the second round of revolutions and wars, fascism in a number of countries, and the revolutionary upsurge raise the question of rapidly putting an end to the present state of affairs especially sharply before the Parties of the Comintern. The Parties lag behind the political tasks which face them in organisational respects. The struggle for proletarian and supremely devoted Party cadres, trained in a Bolshevik manner and steeled in battle is a decisive element in Bolshevisation at the present stage. The sharpening of the class struggle in all countries has greatly increased the demands made on the leading cadres in all the Party and mass organisations, from the Party cell to the Central Committee, and from the red factory committees to the leaders of the trade unions. The influence of the Party is growing, the united front of the proletariat is extending. The network of mass organisations near to the Party is increasing, and the number of Party organisations and their membership is rising. It is necessary to ensure that the line of the Party and the Comintern will really be carried out by reliable and firm Bolshevik party workers in each of these organisations.

* Cadres: From Latin *quadro*: a square, a framework, the skeleton of a regiment. The permanent establishment or nucleus of a regiment; pronounced to rhyme with larder.—Ed.

Since the 6th Congress† there has been a big increase in the number of countries where the Communist Party has been driven underground. This means that the fascist terror is systematically tearing those Party workers from the ranks who are most valuable and possess the most authority among the masses. It means that we must have sufficient forces, not only to ensure that the work is carried on to-day, but also to provide reserves to replace those Party workers who are arrested, killed, or forced to flee the country. The vast majority of the sections of the Communist International in the capitalist countries have been driven underground. Only 13 sections are still legal, and even this legality is of a very limited character. There is no need to mention the fact that political work in the factories, the army or the navy, is severely persecuted even in the most “democratic” countries where the Party is legal. Twenty-two of our Parties which were legal at the time of the 6th Congress have been driven completely underground. The fascist terror, which can only be compared with the inquisition of the Middle Ages, inflicts such enormous losses on the Party membership and in the leading cadres that the question of extensively promoting, training and preparing new cadres becomes decisive not only for

† 1928.

the successful work of the Party but even for its very existence.

The directives of the 13th Plenum of the E.C.C.I. to all Parties on the necessity of preparing for the most harsh conditions of illegality refer to the need for preparing highly qualified cadres in all Party bodies in numbers hitherto unknown. We will give a few figures to illustrate this. According to the figures of the International Red Aid, the number of revolutionaries killed in 1928 was 192,290; in 1933 the number had grown to 429,722, i.e., the number killed in a single year had trebled, while the number arrested increased 7-9 times, not including Germany where the number of people arrested and killed cannot be determined. The number of Party members in the concentration camps has reached as high as 100,000. It is easy to understand that our leading cadres are the first to suffer.

In Germany the number of members of the Central Committee and the District Committees, and the number of Party officers killed and arrested amounts to two-thirds of their total number. Comrade Thaelmann and a number of prominent Party leaders are in the clutches of fascism. Comrade Scher and tens and hundreds of other Party workers have been killed.

In Japan, China and Poland, several leading Party workers in the Central and District Party committees were arrested and murdered from 1928 to 1933.

The rapidity with which the leading cadres change in countries where the Parties are illegal is shown by some figures collected regarding the Latvian Party. In 1931 out of 16 persons on Party work, 6 were arrested before they had been six months at work and 4 remained at their posts for about a year. In 1932, out of 10 persons, 7 were arrested within six months. We find the same state of affairs in other parties as well.

Demands of New Situation.

Thus the quantitative side of the matter alone raises problems absolutely unparalleled hitherto in the matter of training cadres. Quantity, however, is not the only point. The situation itself makes new demands on these Party workers. In the conditions of legality it was much simpler to carry out our line. We could act through the legal press, and numerous documents, and could speak of the tasks we set ourselves from the Parliamentary tribune, at big meetings, etc. In most countries it is now no longer possible to do this. All activity is illegal. By no means can all questions be answered promptly by the Centre, even the most important ones. The lower organisations cannot always obtain instructions. They have to adopt a course independently. **THUS THE ABILITY TO ADOPT AN INDEPENDENT COURSE IN A COMPLICATED SITUATION, TO BOLDLY CARRY OUT THE PARTY LINE WITHOUT**

WAITING FOR DIRECTIONS FROM ABOVE, IS A MOST IMPORTANT QUALITY REQUIRED FROM PARTY WORKERS. It is much more difficult nowadays to adopt a course oneself. The number of class struggles and their intensity have increased many times, while every question set by life and the struggle demands a rapid and decisive reply.

Circumstances have become much more complex now that the united front is being operated on a wide scale, and the masses of social-democratic workers, anarchists and non-party workers have to be organised into a single class column with the Communists and the Red Trade Unions. The demands which are being made, now more than ever before, are ability to discover all waverings and doubts and carry on our Bolshevik line correctly, to work among the masses and draw the workers prejudiced against Bolshevik tactics over to our side; organising strong contacts.

Finally, cadres need to be established to learn the art of conducting underground and conspiratorial work, who will be able to guard the Party against police terror. The Party workers must display a high degree of vigilance, and be able to awaken it among the masses. Each Party worker has to devote a great deal of work to the task of securing a knowledge of the complicated technique of conspiracy in the Party. He also has to acquire the ability to apply it while maintaining wide contacts with the masses.

The Comintern approaches the 7th Congress solid and united around the Leninist-Stalinist general line, and its leader Comrade Stalin. The time that has elapsed since the 6th Congress is distinguished first and foremost by the unprecedented consolidation of the Parties and of the Party leadership in all the Parties, as well as by the growth of their authority. Since the 6th Congress there has not been any big attempt at oppositional activity against the Comintern on an international scale, no serious factional groups in the various countries. This is an important sign of the growth and Bolshevisation of the Parties. None the less, the occasional attacks on the Party line by prominent Party workers, the existence of renegades and even of provocateurs who have left the Party and betrayed it, raise the question of the necessity of selecting the cadres for the leading organs of the Party more vigilantly and carefully in the future. The actions of Remmele and Neumann in the German Party, of Guttman in the Czechoslovakian Party, and of the Celor-Barbé and Doriot group in France, etc., show that the intensifying class struggle requires a more careful selection of leading cadres.

The exposure of a number of provocateurs by the Parties (Zharsky, Bratkovsky and others in Poland, Kattner in Germany, Celor in France, and Krastin

in Latvia), shows that the protection of the Party cadres, the struggle for Bolshevik conspiracy and control over the actions of the cadres and the members of the leading Party bodies has not yet reached the high level necessary. In spite of great successes in the selection and the consolidation of the leadership of the Parties, there are still many cases in which a frivolous attitude is taken towards the selection of cadres. People are allowed to enter the most important Party bodies without sufficient check being made of them, and then it turns out that their work has helped the struggle of the fascist police against the Party. From this point of view, special attention must be paid to those sections of our Party mass work which are frequently the most vulnerable in the face of the attack of our class enemies.

The experience of a number of Parties, including the Polish Party, shows that elements leaving the nationalist camp frequently come into the Communist Party with destructive aims. While drawing honest and loyal elements into the Party it is nevertheless necessary to watch and check up on them more carefully than hitherto to prevent agents of the class enemy from getting into the Party along with them. On the other hand, particularly strict demands must be made on non-proletarian elements before they are accepted into the leading Party bodies. A case which speaks eloquently enough of this is that of Kuki, an obviously bourgeois type who was admitted into the leadership of the Japanese Party after being a Party member about a year and

a half. This enabled him to concentrate the finances and technical contacts of the Party in his own hands, and he afterwards proved to be a provocateur. Finally, the third point is that of the technical apparatus. It is an elementary rule now that politically colourless and untested people cannot be admitted into the technical apparatus of an illegal party. None the less, cases can still be observed in which the technical apparatus is entrusted to casual people (Latvia, Japan, Finland, etc.). These either prove to be police agents, or betray the Party as soon as they are subjected to police examination.

Workers' Control.

A decisive question in the Bolshevik policy of cadres is the struggle for the proletarian composition of the leading Party bodies. In this respect the Comintern and its Parties have undoubtedly achieved great successes. Material from 19 Parties shows that of 497 members of the Central Committees, 321 or 64.5 per cent. are workers. It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that the proportion of workers in the European parties is much higher than in the Communist Parties of the Eastern countries, where the workers constitute an insignificant stratum.

It is obvious that such results have not been achieved automatically. The examples of some C.C.'s serve to show how the proportion of workers has increased from one election to another. The composition of the C.C. of the C.P. of France shows this sufficiently clearly:—

Members and candidates of the C.C. elected at the Congress in Tours in 1920.

C.C. elected at Marseilles in 1921
C.C. " Paris in 1922
C.C. " Lyons in 1924
C.C. " Lille in 1926
C.C. " St. Denis in 1929
Present C.C. elected at the Congress in Paris in 1932

32 persons of whom 4 were workers and the remainder lawyers, doctors, journalists and professors.
27 persons of whom 3 were workers
32 " 6 "
37 " 11 "
80 " 39 "
69 " 48 "
64 " 49 are "

We see the same in the C.C. of the C.P. of Spain. In 1920, of 10 members 6 were workers; in 1921-24, of 16 members 9; in 1925, of 8 members 3; in 1925-29 of 11 members 8; in 1929-31, of 17 members 13 were workers; in 1931, of 35 members 26 were workers.

In the C.C. of the C.P. of the U.S.A. in 1919 only 7 out of the 22 members were workers, but in 1934 of 35 members and candidates 25 are workers.

In the Communist Parties of the East the manual workers constitute a MINORITY in all the C.C.'s. For example, in the C.C. of the C.P. of Japan of 9 members of the C.C. 4 are workers; in the C.C. of

the C.P. of Turkey of 31 members of the C.C. 9 are factory workers and 20 office workers; in the C.C. of the C.P. of India of 9 members 2 are manual workers and 7 office clerks.

It is quite natural that there are very few manual workers in the C.C.'s of the Communist Parties of the Eastern countries. It is, however, not fitting that the majorities in the C.C.'s of these Parties consist not of peasants, which would be easy to understand, but of office-workers and intellectuals.

The picture in the lower organisations is entirely different. Matters here are as yet not as they should be. Spontaneity dominates, as a result of which

there is not yet a firm proletarian majority in the lower organisations. The C.P. of Italy stands out prominently in this respect, as its lower organisations have no core of leading cadres who are workers. Things are not much better in the other Parties with the exception of Germany, Poland, Great Britain and U.S.A.

The fact that spontaneity is to blame for this is proved by the example of a number of the Eastern countries (Japan, Turkey) where the majority of the lower Party organs consist of workers (e.g., out of 15 members of District Committees and Town Committees, 11 are workers). In places where even the slightest attention is paid to the question of the selection of proletarian cadres, a proletarian majority is ensured.

In the C.P. of the U.S.A. 21 out of 24 of the district party organisers are workers by social position.

The task of bringing about a decisive increase in the proportion of workers in the leading Party bodies must be raised in a most urgent manner. This applies especially to the Central Committees of the Eastern countries, and the medium and lower Party leading bodies in all countries.

The growth of the influence of the Communist Party among the masses, the volume of the work and the network of Party organisations, on the one hand, and the enormous losses as the result of the terror on the other, raise the question of PROMOTING new cadres of working-class origin very urgently.

The majority of Parties do not pay sufficient attention to this task. An indirect proof of this is the fact that among the above-mentioned 436 members of C.C.'s in 19 Parties, only 69 comrades or 16 per cent. joined the Party after 1929.

There is no doubt that the stable backbone of comrades in the Central Committees of the Parties, who joined the Party before 1923, i.e., comrades who took part in the first struggles for the Party, and who have great experience, is a positive feature. Of the 436 comrades, 223 or 51 per cent. come in this category. The attraction of new forces, however, would increase the contacts of the Party with the masses, and would make it possible to widely utilise the experience of these "old" members. Of course, new forces are promoted in the lower Party bodies especially in the illegal Parties, when police raids make it essential to replace arrested comrades by new ones. Unfortunately, this often takes place spontaneously without previous preparations and WITHOUT SERIOUS VERIFICATION AND SELECTION of the individuals concerned. As a result cases exist in which the arrest of our Party committees is followed by their spontaneous replacement by new ones which prove to be police agents specially sent for the purpose (Hungary, Poland, Rumania).

We should raise the question of the need for stubborn struggle to attract workers from the leading industries of the given district or country into the leading Party committees from top to bottom here. Up to now workers in metal, mining and chemical industries have been represented worse in the composition of the leading Party bodies than workers employed in other industries. This shows the weakness of our contacts with such factories to some extent. It cannot be doubted, however, that there is a sufficient number of loyal metal workers, miners, chemical workers, seamen, etc., in the Parties. It would increase the attractive power and influence of the Party organisations if such comrades were brought into the leading Party committees. Another fact shows that special attention should be paid to this side of the matter. At its last Plenum the Y.C.I. stated that in a number of the Y.C.L. Central Committees there is an absence, or very poor representation, of Y.C.L.'ers employed in the leading industries. For example, the C.C. of the Y.C.L. of Great Britain contains no seamen, while the C.C. of the Y.C.L. of Spain contains no miners.

Of all these questions, the decisive one is that of the need for a thorough change in the direction of boldly promoting new cadres. What we need at present is not the haphazard promotion of individuals; we require scores, hundreds and even thousands of new leading workers in all branches of our work. "Where can they be found?" This question is the answer most frequently given to the reproaches made about weaknesses in the promotion of new cadres. We will try to indicate at least a few of the sources.

The Iron Fund of Young Dimitrovs.

The whole world was witness to a classic example of the struggle of a proletarian revolutionary at the Leipzig trial. Comrade Dimitrov demonstrated the strength of a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist outlook, and his boldness in the struggle against the enemy.

At present in the conditions of the fascist regime, scores and hundreds of trials are taking place against Communists, workers and revolutionaries. At each of these trials there are scores of young Dimitrovs who are passing through a stern school and trial for Bolshevik firmness in the police dungeons of the "Gestapo," the "Sigurantsa," the Polish "Defenzio," the Japanese and Chinese police. Every Party should know and widely popularise the personalities of such tried fighters among the masses. It should entrust the fate of the Party and its organisations first of all to them. People who have passed through the modern "third degree" at the hands of the modern police force and emerged honourably from this trial must become the iron fund from which we shall obtain new cadres. The task here is merely to be really sure that the given comrade acted as a

Communist should. The exemplary behaviour displayed by Comrade Dimitrov as to how a Communist should behave in court has found numerous disciples and followers.

In September, 1934, at a trial of 40 workers, all the accused (including 5 women) led by Comrade Vogt behaved steadfastly, boldly accused their "judges," and defended their party. In the court and on the road from the court building to the jail they greeted the workers who had organised a demonstration.

In Berlin six workers were on trial for their work in the International Workers' Aid. Comrade Anne-lore Ache defended the honour of working-class solidarity, and compelled the court to listen to her till the end. In Austria, comrades who took part in the February struggles produced a number of steadfast and splendidly disciplined revolutionaries who behaved dauntlessly in the court, and even in face of execution. For example, the 20-year-old Schutzbundler Joseph Gerl declared: "My ideal is above my life."

In Roumania, the trial of railway workers lasted for 36 days. In its manifesto issued in connection with this trial, the C.C. of the C.P. of Roumania justly refers to the names of the workers' leaders, Doychev, Petrosco, Georgiu, and other "Dimitrovs of the Roumanian working class." Similar examples were to be found at the Lutsk trial in Poland, and the Plovdivski trial in Bulgaria, etc.

In Berlin a 14-year-old boy declared in court: "I distributed the leaflets because the Communists are for the workers, and Hitler is against them."

The class struggle, which is sharpening in all countries, has proved "unexpectedly" how some recognised leaders remain in the shade at the moment of decisive struggles, while rank and file Communist workers, members of the reformist trade unions, social-democratic workers, and anarchist workers, who have hitherto been unnoticed, come out in the foremost positions and fight like lions, at the same time displaying exceptional ability as organisers, and winning the boundless love of the fighting masses. Asturias in Spain, the general strike in France, the miners in Belgium, the textile workers in America, the railwaymen in Bucharest, etc.—such are the sources of hundreds of new leaders.

A serious question is that of decisively promoting those workers who come to the Communist Party from the Social-Democratic Party, the anarchists, etc., to leading work. In some places, owing to the large arrests among Communists, the social-democrats who have recently joined our Party, form almost the entire leadership and frequently they work well. Such leaders, however, frequently suffer from relapses to reformism and relics of social-democracy. In other organisations, on the contrary, there is a

sectarian fear of allowing former social-democrats to get into the leadership. On the basis of the experience accumulated during the last year or two, it is necessary now to establish a definite line on this question. What should be the criterion? We should decisively put an end to the prejudice that a social-democratic past, especially when workers are in question, is an insurmountable hindrance preventing a comrade becoming a good proletarian revolutionary. If an ex-social-democrat has shown his qualities in the struggle, if he has fought well in strikes, in armed struggles and in conducting the united front, and has come to our Party, then he is one of us and he must be utilised, and advanced to leading work according to his ability and authority among the masses. Such comrades must be given great assistance in their practical activity and must be helped to outlive their social-democratic prejudices and survivals by experience if they have not rid themselves of them before joining the Party.

The Austrian Communist Party acted boldly and well when they placed a considerable number of ex-Schutzbund members and social-democrats in the C.C. If the work of the C.C. is correctly organised, such a step can undoubtedly bring about great results in winning the masses of past and present social-democratic workers to our side.

Lengthy Membership Not Sufficient.

Unfortunately, there is a certain stereotyped form used in estimating a worker when promoting and utilising him. This is the length of his Party membership and his political education. Of course, if a long term of membership in the Party shows that a comrade participated in the revolutionary class struggles of the 1917-1923 period, or the period most characteristic as regards the class struggles for the given country, this undoubtedly is of importance. But a long period of Party membership is not sufficient by itself. What is wanted is that the comrade should prove to-day, in practice, that he is really a worthy member of his party. If there are comrades who are more capable and active in the struggle, now, they should be advanced in every way, even if they are younger.

The same applies to political knowledge. The Party contains a considerable number of people who have studied in well-known Party schools. From the 6th Congress to the present time, 3,221 persons have studied at long term schools. These comrades, of course, have a Marxist training, yet nevertheless, when they are placed on to leading work directly after finishing their schooling, in most cases, positive results do not follow. Is it not better that such comrades who have accumulated a big volume of knowledge but who have not been connected with practical work for a considerable time,

should be sent to do mass work in the lower Party organisations, and be promoted gradually to do more important work, in proportion to their abilities, and the authority they win among the masses. An exception may be made only in the case of those comrades who went to study after being on leading work with which they were well able to cope.

A few words about the CHECK-UP OF THE FULFILMENT OF DECISIONS in connection with the problem of cadres. A great deal has been said about the importance of every Party committee and every Central Committee fulfilling decisions taken, and checking the fulfilment of decisions. The majority of Party members are clear on this point, although it is still not carried into practice. But the verification of the fulfilment of decisions can be one of the most important weapons for the education and promotion of new cadres, and can also be a measure for the struggle against stagnation and bureaucracy. If a check is taken on how and by whom every decision is fulfilled, we shall get to know people better, and know them not only from their biography, but from practical work, and shall find those most capable and suitable for promotion. It seems to us that this lever for the education and selection of cadres has so far been very badly used.

Finally, a few words especially on the question of the education of Party cadres. It is clear to everyone that Bolshevik cadres are trained first and foremost, on practical work, in the struggle. To contrast schools to practical work, or to attempt to prove that school training is as valuable as practical experience is an absurdity obvious to everyone. But the school, combined with practical work, may produce very big results. Present day circumstances force us to make a serious change on this question. Hitherto the majority of the parties have, on the whole, organised their work on the basis of long-term schools, i.e., advanced Party schools. In practice this means that the Party sends a worker to study for one, two or sometimes three years. This gives a good effect

in the sense of the knowledge obtained by the comrade, although, of course, even a long-term schooling cannot give a comrade a finished Marxist-Leninist education. On the other hand, a long-term course of study has its negative sides. Firstly, the Party cannot always spare its basic and most competent cadres for such a long period, and secondly, the long term of study results in the comrade losing contacts with the work in his own country, so that when he returns he lags to some degree behind the movement. If we take the last two years, then we see from the example of a considerable number of countries (France, Germany, Spain, Austria, Belgium and even Holland) what is meant by separation from practical work for the years 1933-34. This separation does not allow them to see all the new features that have arisen in the country. This is an irreparable loss. But such a growth of the working-class movement is taking place in all the chief countries. Therefore, we should take a definite line for the mass development of short practical courses, lasting from two to four months, which will help the comrades to some degree to generalise their practical experience and will give them a certain amount of knowledge such as is necessary TO-DAY for the direct struggle. The long-course school should be continued both to prepare leaders of these short-course schools, and to raise the qualifications of various comrades.

The illegal conditions in which our Parties work also show the necessity for such a change in the system of training cadres.

A great deal has already been done in the organisation of the studies themselves, so as to bring the studies nearer to the practical tasks facing the Parties, but only the first steps have been taken in this connection. The content and methods of study must be changed in such a way that every Party member who has passed through a Party school will emerge better equipped for practical work, will be more firm in the struggle than he was before going to the school. Unfortunately, it has not always been possible to achieve this.

CORRECTION.

The article of G. Safarov, "THE CONGRESS SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE NEW MANŒUVRES OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS IN INDIA," was incorrectly included in the Seventh Congress Discussion Section of No. 22. This article was not a contribution to the discussion, and the Editors express their apologies.

A SPEECH NOT DELIVERED BY HITLER

(At the Nazi Congress in Nuremberg.)

By L. MADYAR.

HAD Hitler set himself the task of telling the truth to his adherents at the Sixth Congress of his Party, his proclamation, which was a sort of report, should evidently have taken the following form.

* * *

Fellow Countrymen!

Our National Socialist Party has been in power now for more than a year and a half. During this period we have arranged a few congresses complete with uniform and jackboot, more than a few parades and test mobilisations. A huge quantity of all kinds of stupefying phrases has been issued at our meetings. Efforts were made to make the Weimar Republic responsible for everything. We announced that Marxism would be wiped out. That Communism would be washed off the face of the earth, etc., etc. We have spoken quite a lot about our successes, our gigantic achievements, the unflinching glory of national-socialism which will be dominant in Germany for hundreds and thousands of years and has raised the prestige of our country abroad, a glory which unites the whole of the German people in one state, and unites all classes of the German people in the holy unity of the community of the people. Enough of these empty phrases, let us get down to business, let us sum up results, define the present situation, and indicate the prospects ahead and determine the tasks facing us.

What is the economic situation facing our country? We came to power with the slogan of the establishment of autarchy.* This slogan has turned out to be empty chatter. We have even had to give the slogan itself up, because in practice it has all turned out to be so harmful, absurd and stupid.

We came to power with the slogan of the consolidation of the position of Germany economy on the world market. We came to power with the slogan of the abolition of unemployment, the improvement of the conditions of the toilers, and the promise to keep the trusts and cartels in check, nationalise the trusts and department stores, and hand over the land to the toiling peasants, etc.

What has actually happened?

Nothing has come of this autarchy. The economic position of Germany on the world market has become weakened to a tremendous degree, and we are losing our positions on the world market. Previously we exported 26 per cent. of our industrial production, but now we do not export 14 per cent. Previously Germany's share in world trade amounted to from

12 to 13 per cent., but now it hardly reaches 8 per cent. Previously we occupied a leading position in exports to the U.S.S.R., but now our economic contacts with the U.S.S.R. have weakened catastrophically, and there has been a sharp decline in Soviet orders which used to provide tens and tens of thousands of industrial workers with work. Previously German exporters and importers were able to obtain credit throughout the world, but now sales are made to us only for cash, for we are not in a position to pay even the most urgent promissory notes. Of course, we have important successes in some spheres. We have made a profit of about 4 to 4½ billion marks out of the devaluation of the pound sterling, the dollar and other valuta. Our foreign debts have declined by this gigantic sum. Many people think that this is not to our credit, and that we obtained these advantages without any labour on our part. But, this, of course, is incorrect. For in the person of Doctor Schacht, the Chairman of the Reichsbank, we, the National-Socialist government, handed 600 million marks to our big banks and capitalists, out of our gold and valuta reserves, so that they could purchase their foreign bills at the present ridiculously low prices. Our big banks and concerns made hundreds and hundreds of millions out of this speculation, and I will let you into a secret when I tell you that this speculation alone reduced their indebtedness by more than one billion marks.

Unemployment.

We have begun to struggle against unemployment. You are quite well aware of the methods we have used to cut down the number of people in receipt of unemployment benefit. We have driven them into the labour camps, we are driving them into the villages, to the landowners, to the kulaks. We have driven and continue to drive them on to social works, on to the construction of fortifications and of underground hangars, etc. We simply deprived them of benefits, and handed over hundreds and hundreds of millions to our capitalists in the shape of subsidies and credits so that they may once again "wind up" the economic machine. As the State we have given orders for hundreds and hundreds of millions (I cannot tell you the exact figure because we are dealing here with war orders, and our foreign enemies would undoubtedly get alarmed if they discovered the gigantic sums involved). We have done everything in our power to develop industrial production, but what has been the result? Our gigantic industrial apparatus is to a great extent

* Autarchy: Economic isolation. Ed.

idle. To-day, after all our efforts, there is hardly more than one half of our huge productive apparatus in use, and it is just now that we are being threatened by a new catastrophe, namely, deficiency of raw materials. It is not we, National-Socialists, who are to blame that Germany has no cotton, wool and other kinds of raw material, that with the exception of copper, Germany has no non-ferrous metals, that our superb metal industry has not a sufficient quantity of iron-ore at its disposal, that we have no rubber, that we have to import aluminium and import many more kinds of industrial raw materials. You know that we are threatening our imperialist rivals that we will withdraw Germany from the orbit of world economy, a move which would undoubtedly deal a heavy blow at the other capitalist countries. We are trying to produce substitutes to replace the raw materials which we lack. But I can tell you that all these threats and statements of ours are quite silly. For if we should not be in a position to import raw materials, then a tremendous number of our factories would have to be stopped, for they are adapted to the working-up of foreign raw materials. This would mean that hundreds of thousands and millions of workers would have to be thrown on to the streets and that in the next few months we should have a new wave of millions of unemployed. That's point number one. Point number two. It must be borne in mind that we have not sufficient capital to construct new factories for the production of substitutes. And where could we get this capital, when, as you are well aware, the private capital market has been almost completely paralysed since the time when we came to power, and new issues have almost completely ceased, and the state is practically the only financier compelling the semi-government banks and savings-banks to finance industry, war orders, constructions, etc. Point number three. Our best engineers and experts (including Bergius) tell us that the cost of production of substitutes will be much higher than that of the real raw material, and that only in time of war will our economy be able to withstand the replacement of high-quality cheap raw materials by bad and dear substitutes, and that not for long. Point number four. The use of substitutes would undoubtedly spoil the quality of our products to such an extent that we would lose foreign markets still more.

We are not in a position to continue our famous "fight against unemployment" in its present dimensions. We must gradually cease the state subsidy of private building activity, and we are compelled to dismiss tens and hundreds of thousands of workers from the so-called social works. There is no new industrial construction. We have allocated hundreds of millions for the repair of old houses and for the building of new ones, for which the house-owners

are very grateful to us. We were able up to a given moment, by means of this policy, to maintain good sentiments, courage and hope among the whole stratum of handicraft-workers who received orders and work in connection with this construction. But all this has been cancelled. Our Minister of Finances, Baron Shverin-Krossig, an old bureaucrat and monarchist, will not give us any more money for these purposes. What money he supplies will only be for the financing of the construction of strategic roads, because this is what the General Staff demands, but in any case only 200,000 workers are engaged in this construction work and they under compulsion. In the year 1933 we squandered about 17 millions on the construction of roads and fortifications, and incalculable millions on armaments. This capital has been "frozen," withdrawn from our economy which has been weakened and undermined and will not be able to hold out in such circumstances for long.

Inflation Again.

I will not deal in detail with our other economic difficulties. You are aware that the Reichsbank has a gold reserve in all of 74 to 75 million marks. This is an absurdly miserable amount. When we came to power we found 960 million gold marks in the Reichsbank. In the year 1933 our positive trade balance still amounted to 667 million marks. We received about 400 million marks on Soviet promissory notes. The Soviets paid very accurately. We squeezed 120 million gold marks out of German economy itself. We paid very little on our debts, yet it appears all the same that we have no gold. In the course of 18 months we have expended about 2 billion gold marks. Don't think that we show such a small quantity of gold in the Reichsbank report just in order to deceive our foreign creditors. Of course, we deceive them as far as we possibly can. Some people think that we still have big hidden gold reserves, but this is a mistake. We have hidden gold reserves amounting to about 260 to 280 million marks, and our creditors know it, but for such a country as our Germany, this sum is ridiculously small. We have actually arrived at a position when our paper money has a gold cover of only 2 per cent., whereas when we came to power our mark had a gold cover of more than 20 per cent.

But the stability of the mark is being undermined not only by the decline of its gold backing. You know that our budget is not a balanced one. Our Minister of Finances, Shverin-Krossig, has blurted out the fact that we are expending money to-day which we are hardly likely to receive as income in the year 1938. In actual fact our state finances have a deficit of 8 billion marks. None of us has yet determined where we are to get this money and how we are to pay these debts. But we have had at

the same time not only to disorganise the budget and to spend our gold reserves but even to undermine the bill of exchange cover of the mark in order to finance the war industry, to keep the state apparatus in our hands and to give subsidies to our most powerful capitalists and concerns. In the portfolio of the Reichsbank there still are bills amounting to $3\frac{1}{2}$ -4 billions, but of this amount more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ billions are financial bills of our state which is on the brink of bankruptcy. As you see, in reality we have here already the beginning of inflation. The German mark is not accepted on foreign stock exchanges at its official rates. The cost of living inside the country is going up. We can already see the beginning of the flight of money to material values. And a beginning has been made of the withdrawal of deposits from the savings banks. We are on the eve of the catastrophe of inflation.

But you know the meaning of inflation in our country, which has already lived through one period of inflation which destroyed all the savings of the petty-bourgeoisie, and at the same time reduced wages to a colonial level.

Of course, we can hold up the transformation of hidden into open inflation for a time. Experience shows that it is possible to maintain the rate of the mark and its gold cover for a comparatively long time, if the balance of payments is regulated, if there is no decline in the internal commodity turnover, and if the budget is not disorganised too much. But Schacht himself does not know how long he will be able to continue manoeuvring.

But it must be understood that our economy is threatened by a new attack of the crisis for the following reasons: No new industrial construction is taking place and no serious renewal of basic capital, our engineering industry is not really working at full blast. There are no new issues on the private money market, the expansion of production encounters the under-employment of the productive apparatus. The development of the means of consumption meets the impoverishment of the masses. Exports encounter our own criminal policy and the insurmountable barriers and obstacles raised by our competitors.

In the Villages.

The position in the German village is a very sorrowful one. Last year we raised prices and increased the income of German agriculture by 700 to 800 million marks. I must stress the fact that this sum of money fell into the pockets of the Junkers, kulaks and well-to-do peasants. Of course, we have continued to subsidise the big Junkers against whom we raised such a hue-and-cry previously. We have given, are giving and shall continue to give much relief to the Junkers and capitalists in

the sphere of taxation. You are quite well aware that Darré has not touched a single Junker estate. It is also a fact that the allotment of land among settlers is going on more slowly now, while we are in power, than it did under the late Weimar Republic. Our law regarding inherited homesteads was to have consolidated the kulak, and to have established a German Cossakdom. I don't know whether we shall succeed in this. But the law regarding inherited homesteads has increased the differentiation in the village and introduced the class struggle into the peasant family.

We have raised prices on agricultural products by 20 per cent. on the average. This has been a heavy blow at the town consumer. The basic masses of the toiling peasants have suffered from the rise in the prices of grain and fodder, for they are occupied in cattle-breeding and cultivation of special technical cultures, and are compelled to purchase grain and fodder. This year, our agriculture was affected by the poor harvest. The harvest of grain will, on the most optimistic calculation, be 25 per cent. less than last year's. We are compelled to recognise this decline even officially. Speaking between ourselves I may say that in reality the harvest of fodder will be 50 per cent. less than it was last year. Our peasant has begun to slaughter his cattle, since he cannot feed them. The peasant is not in a position to purchase fodder at ever increasing prices, while the prices of cattle and cattle products are being reduced in spite of our state interference. In connection with the bad harvest, and at the same time the preparations for war, we, the National-Socialist government, have been compelled to introduce an almost complete military regime into the sphere of trade in agricultural products. We have a position when the German peasant at the present time cannot sell his wheat, rye, meat, cattle, butter, cheese, potatoes, grain, fodder and fruits on the open market, and some idiot of a bureaucrat has forbidden even the free sale of flowers. But, as you know, the peasants also cannot sell sugar-beets and hops freely. In spite of all these measures, it is not out of the question that we shall be compelled this winter to introduce the card system for basic products. We are face to face with a hungry winter.

Not only is our agriculture groaning under the weight of military economy. Our industry is, too. To regulate the import and the distribution of raw materials and ensure supplies for the war factories, we have introduced a military order into the sphere of the import of wool, cotton, flax, copper, zinc, tin, rubber and leather, etc.

Schacht has already set up 25 departments after the fashion of the war period. At the same time we have established more than 50 compulsory cartels of

general state importance. This is what has really resulted from the check put on the trusts and cartels which we promised.

Some people think that our dictatorship is operating state capitalism. Certain social-democrats say that we are directly preparing socialism. But it is surely clear to a blind man that our state enterprises, which are preparing industry and agriculture for war, do not mean the subordination of the monopolists to our power. On the contrary we are a weapon in the hands of the monopolists. Our measures weaken certain forms of competition, but they lead not to planfulness and organisation, but to the growth of anarchy, disorganisation and the establishment of new forms and methods of competition.

The Workers.

What shall I tell you about the conditions of the workers? When we came to power, the number of workers, office employees, etc., amounted to 12 millions; now, the figure is more than 15½ millions. Everything would appear to be in order. But the whole point is that the total wages paid to the 15½ million workers, employees, etc., equal what were previously paid to the 12 million workers, etc. At the same time prices of agricultural products have increased on the average by 20 per cent., while the price index has increased by a minimum of 8 per cent. In 1932 our capitalists paid out about 26 billions of marks in wages to 12 million workers, etc., and in 1933, 26 billions of marks were also paid to 15½ millions of workers, etc. The total amount consumed, in value, is being speedily reduced. It amounted to 36 billions in 1929, and now amounts to 21 billions. And since we came to power the consumption of products by the German people has declined not only in value, but also in quantity. The toilers in Germany eat less, drink less beer and wine, smoke less tobacco than they did before we came to power. If my little-revered colleague, Mussolini, can boast that during the course of some 12 years the fascists have succeeded in sharply reducing the general level of the standard of living of the people, we on the other hand, German National-Socialists, can quite justly be proud of the fact that in a period of 18 months we have reached, and in some respects have surpassed, the Italian fascists as regards the reduction of the standard of living of the workers in our country. I will give you one example in the fact that at the present time in Germany every tenth worker among those employed is actually a convict. Two million six hundred thousand German workers are employed in the compulsory labour camps, or driven into the villages as "agricultural assistants," etc. Is this a small success? Is it not an achievement that we have driven more than 200,000 women out of the factory during the course of one year?

Is it not a gigantic achievement that we have given the capitalists the right to drive out of production all young workers under 25 years of age, to replace them by middle-aged people? This means that six million people in Germany have not got the right to work in a factory. Is it not a big achievement that we have forbidden agricultural labourers and the village poor to seek work in the towns, and that the village proletariat and semi-proletariat have been deprived of the right of free movement. Why, even in the epoch of feudalism it was only after bloody battles that the forefathers of our Junkers succeeded in depriving the German serfs of this right.

We used to spend about 5 to 6 billions per annum on various forms of social insurance annuities, pensions, etc. In the year 1933 alone we reduced this sum by from 700 to 900 million marks and at the same time increased the contributions made by the workers. This year we shall reduce this sum by about another million marks. We must put an end to our social legislation. We staved off the revolution with its aid, but now we shan't be able to stave off the revolution by such gifts.

It is quite clear that we are not only losing our foreign markets, but are also suffering from the contraction of the internal market. It is quite understandable that in such a situation we are faced, among other good things, with new economic wars against our imperialist competitors. And what was the task which German monopolist capital set us when we came to power? Our task was to speed up the pace of capitalist investments in Germany, to re-establish and increase the profitability of capital, and at the same time to increase armaments so as to bring about a redivision of the globe in the interests of German imperialism.

We Are Re-Arming.

We have spent many billions of money on armaments, on the construction of fortifications, on the establishment of an air fleet and on the purchase of military supplies. We are expending gigantic sums of money on the adaptation of our economy to the needs of a modern large-scale imperialist war. We shall have to still spend many billions of money on our armaments. You must have in view that about one million to 1½ million tons of steel, and about 1½ billion marks are required to achieve the armament of one million men. We have to arm millions and millions of men, to develop our heavy artillery, our air fleet, and our tank arm, etc. The whole world is crying out that we are arming ourselves. Of course we are arming ourselves. But, for the time being, we have a second-rate army, and so we have at all costs to set up a first-class army, the most powerful one in Europe.

Of course, the adoption of such a pace of armaments construction undermines our economy and has actually led to it becoming shattered. Add to this that we shall have to feed a whole series of big concerns and banks with subsidies. This is the state of things with which we face the hungry winter of 1934 and the threat of economic catastrophe in Germany.

What reserves have we got, what possibilities face us? What prospects lie ahead? We have certain possibilities and certain reserves.

In the first place, Germany has 14 billions of marks of liabilities, and in addition about five billions of long-term foreign capital investments have got stuck in German industry. We have made payments on these debts. We have paid little and we are paying (?) less and less. It is true that when we did not want to pay, the screw was tightened a little on us. If we had ceased to pay, if Schacht had actually declared a many-years' moratorium this would have given us certain relief. This is one of our reserves.

Secondly, sooner or later we shall have to transform our hidden, creeping inflation into open inflation, into the open depreciation or devaluation of the mark. Now, there are about 11 billions of marks in the savings banks belonging to all kinds of small people. Of course, if we depreciate these savings once again, this will also give us quite a big relief. And in so far as German agriculture has liabilities amounting to almost 14 billions and Germany industry has also tremendous liabilities, it is quite clear that inflation would give both the Junkers, capitalists and industrial capital certain advantages.

Thirdly, I have already told you that the workers, office employees, etc., still receive about 26 billion marks in wages. This is why we have declared that our famous labour law must be put into operation by October 1st. You are aware that this law implies the destruction of practically all the social conquests made by the working class since the year 1880. This law implies the destruction of the system of wage agreements, the complete despotism of the employer in the factory, and the unlimited arbitrariness and dictatorship of the capitalists. If the capitalists put this law strictly into operation then we shall be able to squeeze another couple of surplus billions out of the German workers, and we shall also be able to ease the position of industry at the expense of the working class.

Fourthly, we of course are carrying on negotiations with a view to receiving a foreign loan, if only in the shape of raw materials. The question as to whether we can find idiots in America, England, Holland or Switzerland to give us money after we are in fact annulling our old debts is one which I find difficulty in answering. Perhaps we shall succeed, but very likely we shall not.

It should be clear to you that the application of all the four methods mentioned represent a tremendous political and economic danger. The refusal to pay our foreign debts may evoke a further sharpening of economic war against us. It may call forth a kind of economic blockade of Germany on the part of some of our present competitors. Inflation would, in the present circumstances, imply dissatisfaction among the petty bourgeoisie and the working class simultaneously. Further reductions in wages and the destruction of wage agreements may evoke opposition in the factories which we shall be unable to smash by the means at our disposal. But we must take this risk, however heavy and great it is, for there is no other way out. These are the economic prospects facing us.

The International Situation.

I will now pass to the international situation.

What, in its most general features, is our position on the international arena? We are arming ourselves. Only a powerful country can have allies, only a powerful country can carry on war. Our movement westwards is for the time being more or less closed. If we should attack France or Belgium with a programme of conquest, it is hardly likely that England will be in agreement. Our path south-eastwards is more or less obstructed. Our movement forward in that direction is prevented not only by the Little Entente, not only by the French menace, but also by the Italian fascists. And in the long run we get a stupid situation. The first country which mobilised four divisions against us and transferred them to the borders of Austria was fascist Italy. It is absolutely clear that Mussolini himself wishes to transform Austria into his vassal state, and would not tolerate not only the Anschluss,* but also the unification of Austria. This means that there is only one path left, namely the one leading eastwards. Of course, we shall attempt to break through both westwards and south-eastwards, but the main line in which we shall direct our blow is eastwards, that is to say, against the U.S.S.R.

It must be said that capitalist Europe is not favourably disposed towards us. We are proving in every possible way that we have saved capitalism from Bolshevism, that we are the only dam against Asiatic Bolshevism. None the less we are receiving little support. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. has been invited into the League of Nations. We shall have to play for time for a while. This is why we are now declaring that we have no territorial conflicts with France, with the exception of the Saar region. We have surrendered our claims on Alsace-Lorraine for the time being. This is why we made the promise to Mussolini in June to recognise the

* Anschluss: "Unification" of Austria with Germany.

independence of Austria, only to organise a putsch at the end of June against Dollfuss, whom we sent to another world and attempted to forcibly unite Austria to Germany. This is why we are not shouting about Posnania, about Upper Silesia, and the gaping wounds in our eastern borders, and have not only ceased to rail at the Poles, but count on having Pilsudsky Poland on our side against the U.S.S.R. That is why I compel not only myself but also such good airmen-executioners as Goering and Hesse to pronounce quite pacifistic speeches.

It is true that the proletariat and the toilers in all countries are against us and overwhelm us with scorn and hate. As regards political isolation, we cannot, of course, state that we are completely isolated. We have superb relations with Japan, and the more far-sighted Japanese generals are only waiting for us to be ready with our armaments, to make an onslaught on the U.S.S.R. Military co-operation between Berlin and Tokio under such circumstances goes without saying. Things are going quite well in our relations with Pilsudsky Poland. Of course, the Poles have not as yet formally broken their alliance with France, but it is clear that they are trying to kill not two, but three birds with one stone. It is clear that they are calculating on the near prospect of an anti-Soviet war in which they would like to participate, and so we are making them all kinds of promises should such be the case. It seems somewhat strange to me that the Poles do not understand that even a victorious war of Poland and Germany against the U.S.S.R. will be an overwhelming defeat for Poland. We would, of course, gobble them up after such a victory. But it is not our business to worry about the interests of Poland—we are concerned with the interests of German imperialism.

England at the present time does not seem to object to the Eastern Pact although we are against the Pact. But MacDonald and Mussolini have long supported our demands for equality in armaments, and did quite a lot to help us to gain time. Let us hope that England's traditional policy, which is directed against the U.S.S.R., will once again render us the necessary and deserving support. In any case, I must tell you that we have tried to set up an anti-Versailles bloc with a view to the re-division of the globe in our interests. Up to the present nothing has come of this anti-Versailles bloc.

At the same time our activity has been directed towards setting up an anti-Soviet bloc. You see, as I already indicated, that we have some successes in this respect. But the result is somewhat strange. The U.S.S.R. has far greater diplomatic successes than Germany has, in any case. We cannot declare that our international position has improved under any circumstances. In the recent period it has become very difficult for us to undertake war for a

new re-division of the globe in our favour. We cannot enter into an open adventure if we have such a tremendous array of forces against us.

However, what we have achieved at any rate, is that we are arming ourselves and nobody is in any way hindering us in this connection, apart from wordy protests. This is a serious achievement.

The Internal Situation.

As regards our internal position, we have become the monopolists of power. After the death of Hindenberg, externally supreme power has apparently passed into our hands. But I would not say that our internal affairs are in a good condition. I do not speak of the fact, of course, that we have not succeeded in wiping Marxism out. The Communist Party is alive, is active and carrying on the struggle against us. I do not mention the fact that Communism is penetrating the ranks of the Social-Democratic Party, which has organisationally collapsed. I do not wish to indicate that the working class is almost completely against us. For did we not receive an unheard-of vote of no confidence during the elections to the Trustee Councils, when the overwhelming majority of the working class employed in industry voted against us. In many cases we did not have 10 per cent. of supporters in the large factories. Even of office employees a majority voted against us. The dissatisfaction of the workers does not as yet break the bounds of fascist legality which we have established. If we succeed in carrying through the labour law, after a struggle and with great difficulty, it will be a serious success for us, and will raise our authority in the eyes of the big bourgeoisie and Junkers.

Our state secret police regularly circulate reports among you regarding the activity of the illegal parties. You have been able to convince yourselves from these reports that we have succeeded in smashing social-democracy quite thoroughly. It is a fact that during a period of practically two years social-democracy has not been able to establish itself as a centralised organisation. All that exists is separate social-democratic groups of only local importance. The position is different with regard to Bolshevism. The German Communist Party has preserved itself as a centralised mass party, under conditions of fascist illegality. In spite of the unheard-of terror, in spite of the executions, concentration camps and tortures, in spite of the fact that we have arrested Thaelmann and murdered Scher, beaten up and arrested tens of thousands of the best workers in the Communist Party, in spite of all the efforts of Goering and Himmler, the Communist Party has continued to work and preserve its mass contacts. It is said that the membership engaged in industry is on the increase. We are aware that young Social-democratic functionaries, and many active workers

of the Reichsbanner are passing over to the Communists. After the events of June 30th many Storm Troopers are seeking the road to Communism. The prestige and authority of the Communist Party among the masses has grown tremendously.

We have spoken quite a lot about self-sacrifice and heroism, but we have no heroes. But look, they have got Dimitrov. The trial of Dimitrov was a smashing defeat for us. They go to the scaffold shouting slogans about the proletarian revolution. The literature they are spreading to-day is many times more in quantity than the Russian Bolsheviks distributed in the Czarist underground days. We have not coped with Communism. It is growing stronger and developing in the conditions of illegality. It is true that they are not yet able to transform the mass dissatisfaction into mass action against us. But they are now hammering out the proletariat united front. And the unity of action of the German proletariat is the beginning of the end as far as we are concerned. The united proletarian anti-fascist front will draw in the toiling peasants and a section of the petty-bourgeoisie as well. That will be the end not only for us. It will be the end of German capitalism.

The Lower Middle-Class.

I do not refer to the fact that an outburst of dissatisfaction, disappointment and indignation is ripening in the village. We are also losing our influence among the urban petty-bourgeoisie who have received very little from us. Even the artisans who received orders and work in connection with house repairs have begun to grumble since the time when we have dropped honouring our bills. We are speedily losing our petty-bourgeois mass basis in the village and town. This could not but influence the state of mind of our party organisations, of our Storm Detachments. You know that this, so to speak, general popular dissatisfaction penetrated the ranks of the Storm Troopers, and produced a crisis among the people at the top and disintegration among our rank and file, and led to the well-known events of June 30th.

It is very clear that the events of June 30th dealt a heavy blow at our prestige, authority and perhaps our mass influence. The last referendum of August 19th also showed that things are not well with us, especially in the big industrial centres and in the Catholic sections of the country. We ourselves have had to recognise somehow that seven million Germans are against us in one way or another. As to the number of Germans who are really against us, who voted against us during the referendum, well, let us not talk about that. There is no doubt that we are losing our mass basis, and this is understandable. Of the 25 points in our famous programme we have not fulfilled and will not fulfil a single one, of course.

If there are idiots in our ranks who think that you can establish some kind of a third national-socialist system between nationalism and socialism, we can simply send them off to report to Roehm. Of course, nothing has come, and nothing could, of the popular community of interests, and of the abolition of the class struggle.

Have we any political reserves? We have some. The anti-fascist forces are not yet united. The Communists have not yet succeeded in consolidating themselves in our mass organisations and in carrying on work there. The working class has not as yet undertaken mass actions and hence the petty-bourgeois and peasant dissatisfaction is not being crystallised around the proletarian core. We can still make some play with chauvinism, especially among the younger generation who did not go through the war. This is a great force in our hands. We have one other reserve. We can attempt to allow individual social-democratic groups and individual reformist leaders to co-operate with us in the Labour Front or the non-political trade unions. Bruckner and Busch of the Labour Front have already carried on negotiations with Leipart and Leischner. We have, for the time being, dismissed them from the Labour Front, but we can resort to their aid at any moment. Goering also behaved magnanimously with Noske and Loebe—it may be possible to make use of them. Of course, we must not overestimate the importance of this reserve, for the authority of social-democracy among the workers has been undermined very much. Further, we can attract the German Nationalists and members of the Centre Party. But the utilisation of this reserve has its dangerous aspect, for it can threaten the “totality” of our regime.

Internal Discord.

But we have power, we are consolidating the state apparatus and are intensifying the terror, but the trouble is that things are not all well in our own camp. A fierce struggle is going on among the big bourgeoisie. The industrial magnates are in conflict with the Junkers, heavy industry is at loggerheads with the manufacturing industries, the export industry is at daggers drawn with the manufacturing industry, and the export industry is involved in a struggle against the branches of industry which serve the home market. One group of the financial oligarchy is in conflict with the other. We have not succeeded in establishing unity, if only in the camp of the bourgeoisie. We have not succeeded in postponing or even suppressing conflicts, squabbles and disagreements in the camp of the bourgeoisie itself. We have not succeeded in bringing about the real unification of the state power. We have, of course, abolished the old bourgeois parties and their mass

organisations. You are all aware that the monarchists are working at an intense pace. You are all very well aware that political catholicism, the Centre Party, is carrying on very much work. We must understand that the so-called religious conflicts have also got very deep social and political roots. There are still many old officials in the old apparatus, who are not our men and who often sabotage and throw sand in the wheels. But what is very important is that somehow things are not all well with the Reichswehr. You know that we murdered our fellow storm-troopers, Roehm and the others, to a very great degree on instructions from the Reichswehr generals. And in all our speeches now, we have to stress the fact that the Reichswehr is the only bearer of arms in the state.

That is to say, the proletariat are against us, we are losing our influence among the petty-bourgeoisie, and the struggle in the camp of the big bourgeoisie is growing more intense. As you see our internal position is not especially bright. This is also reflected on the position inside our party. On June 30th, we did away with a whole group of party leaders. Since that time we have done away with a whole group of leaders of the Labour Front. The purging of the ranks of the Storm Troopers is going full steam ahead, and we shall dismiss all socially unreliable elements. It is clear that in the very near future we shall have to begin to purge the ranks of our party organisation. Corresponding to this, the crisis is also continuing in the leadership of our party. Goering, Goebbels, Hesse, Himmler and Frick are squabbling among themselves.

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This is how Hitler should have spoken had he wished to give a report of the real state of things in Germany. Instead of this, Hitler, in his proclamation and his speeches, talked about the achievements of National-Socialism and the prospects of establishing National-Socialism in a thousand years. None the less, the Nuremberg Congress was not devoid of all political content. The essence of the National-Socialist Congress consisted in the following:—

Firstly, Hitler once again sharply and decisively stressed that "the national-socialist revolution has come to an end," and that now the national-socialist programme will be put into operation by evolutionary means, which may continue for hundreds and thousands of years.

Secondly, he stressed that the Reichswehr is the only bearer of arms in the state.

Thirdly, he insisted on the National-Socialist Party preserving its political monopoly.

Fourthly, besides bending the knee to the Reichswehr, Hitler stressed that the old state bureaucracy cannot be replaced by the National-Socialists in the near future, that this state apparatus must be spared, and that the National-Socialists are insufficiently educated to replace the old bureaucracy.

If the Storm-Troopers were in the forefront of the Nuremberg Congress a year ago, this year on the contrary, this place was occupied by the Reichswehr. Whereas a year ago Hitler very sharply placed the question of the abolition of different countries, and of the setting up of a centralised state, this year he postponed this question for a long time. Whereas a year ago Hitler was still in a position to convince his supporters about the prospects of improving their conditions in the course of four or five years, this year he indicated a more distant prospect. The programme will be fulfilled and the situation will be improved in the course of hundreds of years or a thousand years. At Nuremberg Hitler declared that there would be no revolution in Germany in the course of the next thousand years. There is no doubt that this was the funniest sentence of all those uttered at the Nuremberg Congress.

The bourgeoisie as a rising class considered capitalism to be eternal, and its domination not as historically passing but as an eternal phenomenon. German capitalism is rotten to the roots, it is dying. And from the tribune of the Nuremberg Congress, Hitler announces the thousands of years of life of the "Third-Empire." Germany is returning to the ideology of the Middle Ages, of bloody barbarism. Rosenberg hurls thunder against the culture of the towns, and praises the narrowness and idiocy of the outlying villages in the foremost industrial country in the world. The mighty civilisation of the bourgeoisie is replaced by praises of the primitive barbarism of the Teutons, while Hitler weaves senseless unconnected phrases about the rebirth of racial culture. Hitler announces the peaceful nature of fascism, but Nuremberg was a military parade throughout.

And here is the main point about Nuremberg, namely that there is no way out except war and violence directed against their own people, and that there is no salvation except a new world bloodbath. War is the last stake of fascism. But this card is a doubtful, fateful and catastrophic one. For the proletariat is preparing its revolution.