Seldom has a regime been so securely tied to an economic program as is the government of Boris Yeltsin in Russia.
His program is not just a series of isolated innovations or improvisations meant to smooth the way for a badly needed economic upturn in an economy that has been stagnant or deteriorating. It is qualitatively different.
It is a momentous transfer of the economic foundations of a workers' state into the hands of a new, artificially created bourgeoisie.
History has known all kinds of property transfers. For example, early in capitalism the property of poor, small farmers is transferred into the hands of marauding big land owners and their military formations. Through an economic process as relentless as it is deadly, the bourgeoisie ultimately appropriates the property of the small land owners, leaving the population in the most dire poverty. The expropriation of the poor lays the basis for the wealth of the bourgeoisie.
What we have here, however, is an altogether new phenomenon. It is the robbery of the collective property of the workers' state by a bourgeoisie that is attempting to parcel it out into individual segments. Not since ancient times, when primary communism was overthrown in much of the world, has there been any great conversion of collective property into its individual component parts. But this is precisely what the reactionary Yeltsin camarilla has set as its goal.
Such a conversion would take years to accomplish — even if done in a systematic and organized manner and assuming political conditions favor it. Above everything else, it could only succeed with the complete passivity of the working class. But such a situation is utterly inconceivable.
Even the first steps of Yeltsin's program have unleashed a truly catastrophic drop in industrial production — 17 percent in only the first nine months of this year! And since the so-called free-market reforms of January 1992 — almost two years ago — prices have soared: more than 25-fold in 1992, and 20 percent a month since June. (Associated Press, Nov. 1)
Even if these figures somewhat exaggerate the situation, the economic tendency is of unquestionable decline.
The Yeltsinites assume that capitalist, individually owned production is superior to socialized production based on ownership by the working class (at least in the sociological sense). Yet they must admit that so far it has been a major disaster.
Had such a decline happened to a socialist country, there would be no end of banner headlines here condemning the regime. But the media have downplayed the very serious economic crisis in the former USSR that has followed the attempt to bring back capitalism.
One miscalculation by the Yeltsinite pro-capitalist restorationists is that there would be a tremendous buyers' market in Russia to fill their treasury with ready cash. This has not happened.
It is only one of many factors working against the successful dismantling of the socialist infrastructure. To put the vast industrial, technological and scientific infrastructure of Russia up for sale is not only to sail into uncharted seas but also tests the financial ability of the population as a whole to act as purchasers. History does not provide us with many precedents.
This explains why Gorbachev took a cautious position when, as the principal leader in the Soviet Union, he tried to dispose of the industrial, technological and scientific infrastructure. Gorbachev could not come out openly and clearly for denationalizing the socialist industries and returning them to private property, although Yeltsin pushed him to do so.
As we have said before, this dismantling is the equivalent of trying to chop up a fleet of giant ocean liners in order to try and sell them as small rowboats.
Incidentally, this explains why the professors from Harvard, Yale and other universities — who in the early days of perestroika figured so prominently as cheerleaders of rapidly dismantling the socialist infrastructure — have lately become quite inconspicuous.
What are Yeltsin's prospects? What is he really up to?
An Oct. 30 New York Times article on Siberia described the region's great natural resources and economic infrastructure built up since the October socialist revolution. It leads one to wonder: why the sudden interest in Siberia?
A meeting between Yeltsin and Clinton is projected for early January. Siberia is the part of Russia on which the imperialists have cast the most envious eye. In August 1918, the U.S., Britain, France and Japan formed an anti-Soviet alliance to crush the Russian Revolution. Some of their expeditionary forces invaded through Siberia. This of course meant they had agreed to take over Siberia and parcel it out among themselves, especially its untold riches in natural resources.
The young workers' republic fought back. After suffering many casualties, the imperialist forces were forced to withdraw.
A most interesting point about the young Bolshevik regime's military victory is that its revolutionary, working-class and anti-imperialist propaganda — skillfully executed — was decisive in forcing the imperialists to retreat.
The fate of the first workers' republic had hung in the balance. But mass working-class, anti-imperialist propaganda had turned the tide — not superior weapons or technology. This historical fact ought to be indelibly impressed on the would-be brokers for the Yeltsin administration who appear anxious to sell off the riches of Siberia — the same area that the Red Army fought so valiantly to keep in the hands of the workers' republic.
Hitler's Germany, when it invaded the USSR, was no less anxious to lay its hands on the riches of Siberia, but never got there. Siberia again became the focus of world attention in the 1960s, when the Soviet government, headed at that time by Premier Nikita Khrushchev, raised the possibility of seeking credits, capital and technology from Western Europe and Japan for the joint development of Siberia. The imperialists, however, wanted not merely to advance credits and loans but to have a permanent stake in Siberia.
There was much discussion on how Siberia could be developed. Would the imperialists be able to invest their capital? Would there be loans and credits alone or, as the Japanese and other imperialists wanted, would there be joint ventures in which the imperialists would have a permanent interest in Siberia? The project collapsed mainly because it was believed that the Soviet Politburo at the time was opposed to foreign participation.
The present critical situation in Russia is symbolized by the fact that Yeltsin has no avenue for raising money except through loans from Japan, Germany and the U.S. And the imperialists are looking at Siberia as collateral security for any loans they may advance to Yeltsin after he meets with Clinton in January.
The Yeltsin regime is a form of incipient fascism. He has muzzled the press, crushed by force and violence the parliamentary opposition and the workers who supported it, and imprisoned hundreds if not thousands of progressives of all types — including communists, of course. In early October he closed down 15 newspapers.
But Yeltsin soon realized that he had bitten off much more than he could chew. As a result of pressure from below, he had to rescind his edict on the press and permit most of them to publish again — under conditions, however, which do not allow the press to speak openly and clearly.
Pravda, considered the most widely read newspaper in Russia, proclaimed in its headline, "We're back," and "We'll never abandon socialism." But it agreed to certain conditions, among them Yeltsin's demand that he choose a new editor and that Pravda ease up on attacking the government.
Whether or not Yeltsin imposes full censorship again or eases up, it is a manifestation of the instability of his regime.
To impose a full-fledged fascist regime, certain other conditions have to prevail. Looking at the classical examples of European fascism in Italy, Germany and Spain, it seems the Yeltsin camarilla still has far to travel to establish itself as a full-fledged fascist government.
In those countries, fascism came when there was an upturn in the economy — a singularly significant factor in maintaining the durability of the fascist regimes. When Hitler took over, the German capitalist economy had plunged to its lowest level ever. After several years of a ravaging economic crisis, an upturn was inevitable. No sooner had he put his fascist machinery into operation than the economic upturn helped Hitler retain his hold on the government and to some extent on the masses. This was due especially to his militarization policy as against the pacifism of the Weimar Republic.
In Spain, Franco's bloody suppression of the working class and the peasantry would have made him an easy target for overthrow had not an economic upturn been making itself felt after years of depression. And the economic situation was also a tremendous factor in maintaining Mussolini's stability.
The situation with the Yeltsin camarilla is the very opposite. Dismantling giant industrial and technological enterprises portends not economic growth but, on the contrary, further decline. This is his major problem. If he continues with his promised orientation of dismantling socialized industry, he will inevitably bring about further economic decline.
His solution is to obtain credits and loans from the imperialist powers, principally the U.S. Yet it is entirely questionable whether any of the imperialist governments will advance loans and credits unless there is some benefit accruing to themselves.
It is almost certain the imperialist monopolies will favor a policy of continuous rapid dismantling of the socialized infrastructure of Russia. This portends economic decline, even if the cash Yeltsin hopes to get from the imperialist powers can help him in some projects.
Overall, there is no way to resuscitate the economy except by a vast program of redevelopment.
If that were in a socialist direction, it would certainly be fruitful. But it's not likely to happen on a capitalist basis. There are a great many other areas for capital investment and exploitation, especially in Third World countries, where the rate of profit would be much higher. The most Yeltsin can expect from the imperialists is short-term loans calculated to maintain him in office as a bulwark against the working-class and progressive movement — until the time comes when, in the imperialists' calculation, they can exchange him for another neocolonialist leader.
Here it is necessary to digress somewhat and bring out the difference between these reforms, as they are called, and those in China today.
Many bourgeois liberals are simply beside themselves in describing the success of China's reforms as against the confusion, delay and inefficiency in Russia.
For many years after the victory of the Chinese Revolution, its greatest problem was how to lift the country and the people out of the deepest poverty and devastation, augmented by many decades of imperialist domination and civil war.
In those early days after the Revolution, the problem was how to get the economy moving. The government took over bourgeois enterprises, including some of the imperialist holdings. The issue was ultimately whether everything should be centralized so as to have a uniform plan with which to proceed — no easy matter considering the many problems in such a vast, undeveloped economy — or to decentralize control over the enterprises, both domestic and foreign-controlled. For a period, it appeared the debate was merely over how to manage the economy.
Still, the dispute seemed to center on how to make the historic leap from an undeveloped country, devastated by civil war and imperialist invasion, to a developed, socialist country.
But after a succession of inner political struggles on how to proceed, it became obvious that one group was concerned with transforming the old Chinese economy into a socialist society — while the other really wanted to disregard, disband, or if necessary overthrow the leadership in order to go firmly on the road of building a capitalist social structure in China. The long period of internal struggles had wearied the workers. After a period of time, they fell into passivity.
The defeat of the so-called Gang of Four, and in particular the defeat of the Cultural Revolution after it had lasted a considerable period of time, laid the basis for the victory of the bourgeois entrepreneurial perspective of the Deng Xiaoping regime.
What is now going on in China, therefore, is not just an attempt to reform a social structure. It is an attempt to build a capitalist form of society, beginning first of all in the coastal areas. The current leaders in China hope that the imperialists will continue to invest there and help build up capitalism.
What will happen in the interior is hard to say. For the time being, the imperialist bourgeoisie, whatever their long-term plans to bring this vast land under their control, are willing to contribute to China's economic development plans with loans as well as technological and scientific aid — at a price, of course.
As in all incipient bourgeois societies, there is a lively, progressive development of the productive forces. And if peasants from the interior are not being forced off the land and into the cities, as happened in old England, there is enough voluntary migration from the interior into the cities to develop a considerable proletariat.
This capitalist development in China, although limited, is nevertheless real and formidable. But it is also China's Achilles' heel. Like all capitalist development, it is subject to economic crisis.
For a number of years the Chinese leaders, at least in their writings and publications, seem to have forgotten that capitalist production ultimately leads to capitalist overproduction. Under the conditions of a world capitalist crisis China can be swept up by it as much as any other capitalist country, regardless of its socialist infrastructure.
Suffice it to say that China's efforts at reform, if they can still be called that, are based on expanding capitalist production and making such necessary arrangements with the external world as may be necessary or inevitable.
These reforms are obviously very different from what is going on in the former USSR, which had achieved the level of a developed socialist country. The Yeltsin regime is not intent at all on developing capitalist production. Certainly not at this stage. The entire effort of the bourgeois reforms, particularly beginning with Gorbachev, has been to dismantle and cut down the socialist infrastructure built up by the USSR.
This is where it is at the present moment. A smooth economic road in Russia is impossible. First of all, the latent energies of the working class in Russia have not yet risen to the surface.
The imperialist bourgeoisie is moving very cautiously there, as seen by how it reacts to Yeltsin's alarmist calls to come to the financial aid of his bankrupt regime. The regime badly needs a huge infusion of capital from the foreign imperialists to help dismantle the old socialist structure. But this will not bring immediate profits to either the imperialists or the home bourgeoisie, except in the consumption sector.
It is not likely that the U.S., Germany, or any of the other imperialists would be willing to undertake a huge long-term extension of funds. They may act in a coordinated manner, however, because Russia and its growing economic problems are so vast.
The Yeltsin administration in turn must give the imperialists not merely promises of repayment at high interest rates but collateral security. This unquestionably means giving them a substantial permanent interest in the vast riches of Siberia.
The Canadian author Farley Mowat, an expert on the peoples and ecology of the far north and author of the book "The Siberians," was highly impressed by the significant socialist development in Siberia, especially as it improved the lives of the native peoples. Dismantling all that is a huge problem, not the least of which is that the Siberian leaders are opposed to the Yeltsin regime — not only because he crushed the bourgeois opposition but also because of regional considerations.
They are opting for more decentralization and are raising demands with respect to income, budgetary considerations and other economic issues that indicate a centrifugal tendency in the next period.
So no matter how severe Yeltsin's regime is in meting out punishment to his temporarily defeated opposition, no matter how much he tries to centralize everything in his own hands — the tendency is toward strengthening centrifugal forces, above all in this vital area of Russia.
Last updated: 15 January 2018