Problems of the Bolivian Revolution

Juan Rey

Labor Action, 22nd September, 1952


Problems of the Bolivian Revolution: Trade Unions Press Nationalists for Real Reform

Santiago, September 9th. – Important political changes have been taking place in Bolivia since our last report, altering the political scene and accelerating the processes that have been taking place since the Nationalist coup d’etat.

Since the Paz Estenssoro government showed its vacillation on the problem of mine nationalization and agrarian reform, the bourgeois opposition has raised its head and entered upon political action.

The Falanga Socialista Boliviana, a pro-Franco group, has published a manifesto accusing the government of an alliance with “Communism”. At the same time terrorist acts were attempted against President Paz’s secretary and against other officials in the president’s office. The Nationalists have interpreted this as pressure on the President by the Rosca [the great mining magnates], warning him that his life will be in danger if he moves to nationalize the mines.

On the other side, the workers’ unions, especially the mine workers, evidenced their dissatisfaction with the slowness of the government’s pace on the question of mine nationalization and agrarian reform. They demanded the withdrawal of the “Labour” ministers from the cabinet.

Then the Nationalist leader, Paz, was faced with the question of going along with the Nationalist workers’ unions, which are the mass base of his party, or with the rightists, particularly the Falanga, against his own working class adherents.

Labour Cracks Whip

The Nationalist trade unions answered the terrorist acts with a great demonstration and a half-day strike under the leadership of the Central Obrera Boliviana [the labour federation]. Their chief demand was that the government quicken the tempo of mine nationalization and reform on the land; they suspended their demand for the withdrawal of the “Labour” ministers, and reiterated their support for the government, on condition that their chief demand be accomplished, and that the cabinet be reconstructed with a greater number of “labour” representatives.

The trade unions demonstrated great self – confidence and great strength as the only real political force in the country. Fifty thousand workers demonstrated their will for social revolution, even if in the distorted forms and language of Nationalism. Paz had no alternative but to“accept” the workers’ support against the Right and promise nationalization in short order.

Under threat of his life Paz must seek the support and protection of the Nationalist workers, for the bourgeoisie has lost its strength, and his own party, the MNR, [Nationalist Revolutionary Movement] is nothing without the support of labour. Even though the unions formally support the MNR, they are maintaining their own independence; they are organised through the Central Obrera Boliviana, which is the most important political instrument in the country, and the centre of the giant political and armed forces behind the government.

Big Difference

The declaration by Paz, that he now sees that the mines can be nationalized, corresponds to the real relationship of social forces – that is, the weakness of the MNR and the strength of the unions, who formally support the MNR government and acknowledge Paz as the leader of the “national revolution”.

If it is permissible to compare small things with great, the Bolivian Central Obrera can be compared with the Russian soviets of l9l7, at the time when they voluntarily supported the bourgeois government. The Central is controlled by the Trotskyist party, the POR, but the POR’s delegate there, Moller, calls Paz Estenssoro his “comrade” and the “leader of the revolution”. This is the fundamental difference between the policy of Lenin and that of the Bolivian Trotskyists of the POR.

The latter voluntarily support the Nationalist government as being the “revolutionary government”, and they refuse to raise the slogan of “All Power to the Central Obrera”, or to the workers’ unions; they think that this would help the bourgeois Rosca and put an end to the “national revolution”. They hope to “smuggle through” the nationalization of the mines, smuggle more labour ministers into the cabinet, and smuggle in the entire social revolution and a workers’ and peasants’ government under the leadership of the POR. This is what is grotesque about the Bolivian situation.

Smuggling Revolution

They believe that they can “make” the “democratic and Socialist revolution” in Bolivia because the working class is the only political force, and that if they can get the mines and land nationalized they will be on top of the situation. They do not reckon with foreign intervention because, after the consolidation of Peron in Argentina and of Ibanez in Chile, they feel very confident.

Given the victory of Ibanez in Chile and the support by Peron to the Bolivian Nationalists, United States imperialism has suffered a very serious defeat in Bolivia. This is very true. But what will happen now? Can the government nationalize the mines, and will it do so? Is it enough to say that theoretically it can do it and that practically speaking it must do it, after the labour demonstration and after the solemn promises of the president? Would this mean the social revolution in Bolivia, as the naive members of the POR think?

The Socialist Revolution is not possible in so isolated and backward a country as Bolivia, and the Nationalists know that very well better than do the naive Trotskyists, who are working for the Nationalists and preparing their own downfall. If, under the pressure of the trade unions, the Nationalist government nationalizes the mines and the land, this will add up only to a bureaucratic state capitalist reform and not to the smuggling in of the social revolution.

The social revolution cannot be smuggled in; it must be fought for by the workers in their open revolutionary struggle. It is necessary to tell the workers that they must take the power, that only their revolutionary workers’ power can realize the democratic and socialist reforms that they desire and can transform the exploitative society into a new workers’ social order without exploitation. Only such a workers’ government could push the revolution forward.

The national or democratic revolution in our time is impossible under a bourgeois government; and, in this isolated and backward country, it is impossible also under a workers’ government, which would have to go from bourgeois – democratic to Socialist reforms. The victory of the Socialist revolution would be possible only on a continent-wide and international basis.

Therefore, if the mines are nationalized in Bolivia and agrarian reform is instituted, this will only give an impetus to new forms of state capitalist economy, to new forms of exploitation, to new lords, to a new Rosca dominating over the workers, and not to the workers’ social revolution. It is the obligation of the revolutionary party to tell the workers this truth and not to cheat them with hopes of smuggled revolutions while giving support to the Nationalist petty bourgeois and totalitarian government.


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Updated by ETOL: 26.10.2003