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From New International, Vol. XIII No. 1, January 1947, pp. 24–27.
Transcribed &; marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.
My article, The Politics of Psychoanalysis, was intended as the first in a series of four which would include a critique of the three prevailing schools of psychoanalysis insofar as they relate to politics, culture, and history, and a summary presenting, what I believe to be, an “historical materialist approach to the theory of neurosis.”
Because I had this arrangement of material in mind I was very careful not to put forward any positive conclusions in my first article which only dealt with the Freudian school of psychoanalysis.
Unfortunately, this was not made clear at the time the article appeared and for that reason much of the critical comment is based on inferences, suggestions, and conclusions which, while they may have been logically drawn, could not possibly have been made had the reader known the direction in which I was aiming my remarks. Since I was writing for The New International, however, I think it was correct to assume that any inferences drawn would be on the Marxist and not the Stalinist side of the ledger. Of the three answers to my article Henry Newman’s and Richard Lange’s both indicate that, in spite of differences of opinion, they understand and appreciate what I was aiming at in my article.
That is why it is all the more astonishing to read James T. Farrell’s comments and to find that he missed the point entirely. On the basis of his misunderstanding he attributes to me a theory which he recognized as characteristic of Stalinists and for which he feels embarrassed. A more careful and objective reading of my article would have spared Farrell the blush and the necessity of polemicizing against a point of view which I do not hold.
Farrell attributes to me the theory that neuroses are a class phenomenon and that, “It is only the bourgeois who becomes a psychoneurotic, or a psychotic.” The basis for this assumption is the statement in my article that Freud arrived at the hypothesis of universal instincts by “assuming that the various characteristics which he correctly observed in the upper middle class in a particular time and social milieu, were inherent in all human beings, in all times, and in all social milieu.” If you take this statement out of context you can also draw the conclusion that not all of the bourgeois are subject to neurosis, but only the upper middle class section of it. That is, if you are looking real hard for an argument. But, if you are interested in an objective scientific discussion you cannot escape understanding that, when I speak of “universal” instincts I do not mean universal in the sense of applying to all sections of society but that I use the word in the absolute sense, applying to all of history, i.e., universal in the sense of time. I think I made it very clear in what sense I used the term “universal instincts” when I wrote, “Freudian psychoanalysis is based on the premise that there exists throughout history an unchanging, universal group of instincts which are constantly seeking gratification.” ... “Essentially the theory boils down to a conflict between the absolute, immutable, unchanging instincts and the environment in which the ego plays the role of arbitrator.” It seems to me the meaning here is obvious. It is rather disappointing that Farrell feels compelled to spend so much of his comment convincing us of the obvious fact that “mental illness knows no class, no race, no creed.” Such profound platitudes are not worthy of Farrell either as a writer or as a psychoanalyst!
At the outset I want to clarify terminology. Farrell’s failure to do this leads to much of the confusion apparent in his reply. We must distinguish between psychoanalysis in general and a particular school of psychoanalysis. When we speak of Freudianism we do not mean all of psychoanalysis. If we refer to a particular school of psychoanalysis it is necessary to mention it by name. Otherwise we will be led into the kind of confusion Farrell gets himself involved in when he says, “Freudian doctrine does not stand or fall on its relation to art or to politics. It stands or falls on its diagnosis of psychoneurosis, and its therapeutic methods of cure.” On the face of it this statement is true. But it leads to confusion. If Farrell would substitute the word, “psychoanalysis,” for “Freudianism” it would help to clarify our thinking on the subject for it is apparent that not only Freudianism, – but Reichism, Horneyism, Adlerism, Jungism – all of them – are able to effect cures. Once we take this important step, we are in a position to arrive at a significant conclusion, i.e., Psychoanalysis does not stand or fall on Freudianism! Or to put it more concretely the basic premise of universal or absolute instincts, the working hypothesis of Freud, is not essential to the psychoanalytical therapeutic method of cure.
Farrell’s failure to recognize this important fact and make this necessary distinction permits him to say that Freud’s observations led him to make a number of other generalizations which compose a series of psychological constructions having a scientific status similar to that of Marx’s abstractions concerning capitalism, i.e., “pure capitalism.” If we understand Farrell to mean the Freudian theory of instincts when he speaks of “generalizations” then the statement is 100 per cent wrong. Marx’s analysis of capitalism was based on the historical materialist premise. No one has succeeded in approaching his successful analysis of capitalism, by rejecting or revising historical materialism. It is indispensable for the analysis of capitalism. The same cannot be said of the Freudian premise and psychoanalysis. Therefore we must reject Farrell’s point of view that both these premises have equal scientific status. If Farrell’s generalizations do not, refer to Freud’s basic premise but the general theory of psychoanalysis, then he is not polemicizing against my article but indulging in a meaningless and unnecessary defense of psychoanalysis in general.
Once we understand that psychoanalysis does not stand or fall on the Freudian premise of absolute instincts and, we reject the theory of instincts as applied to history and culture because historical materialism is a superior instrument for understanding them, we still do not necessarily have to reject the theory of instincts as applied to clinical psychoanalysis. At the same time, since it is a fact that the theory of instincts is not a necessity even for clinical psychoanalysis, it is incumbent upon us to examine the possibility of placing psychoanalysis upon a historical materialist basis, and achieving the same measure or greater success clinically. If that is possible, and I believe it is, then Marxism will have made an invaluable contribution to psychoanalytical theory. Progressive analysts have already begun to do this.
Farrell accuses me of fearing to put my “Marxism to the test by placing it face to face with Freudianism.” It is characteristic of a great many Marxists that they accept Freud and Marx even though they are aware of the contradictions between them. Many live together with both of them and never make a genuine effort to solve or explain these contradictions. I haven’t the space to analyze this peculiar state of mind although I am very familiar with it because I possessed it for a number of years. My new point of view is a result of a re-evaluation; I think the mere fact that I wrote an article for publication, and the contents of that article itself, show without a shadow of a doubt that I am putting my “Marxism to the test.” It is my belief that only so long as you resist putting your Marxism and Freudianism to the test can you live together with such flagrantly contradictory views of history and culture and ignore the obvious reactionary character of some of Freud’s therapeutic views.
I hope in later articles to deal in some detail with these contradictions. For the purpose of this polemic, however, it is necessary for me to indicate here what some of them are.
First, and foremost, there is the contradiction between the Freudian and Marxian conception of human nature. Farrell writes: “Stiler’s article seems to rest on the assumption that there is, in contradistinction to a Freudian human nature a ‘Marxian’ human nature.” We will give Farrell the benefit of the doubt and consider this another misunderstanding rather than a distortion. To pose the question as Farrell says I do is ridiculous on the face of it. The mere wording defeats it. It is so obviously stupid. But if you change it slightly, and restore it to the form in which the assumption can be gleaned from my article, it will read “there is a contradiction between the Freudian concept of human nature and the Marxian concept of human nature.” Now you touch a profound problem and the heart of the difference between Marx and Freud.
The Freudian concept of human nature is based on static, immutable, absolute instincts. Although Marx has never written a treatise on human nature as such there is much in his writings that enable us to form a definite opinion of his conception that there is no such thing as an absolute human nature, there are only “human natures” which must be understood within the context of the material conditions determining their production.
The second contradiction is that between the Freudian and Marxist interpretation of history. For Freud the history of man and the different kinds of society he has developed are but the different ways he has tried to solve the problem of meeting the demands of his immutable instincts. How can one fail to recognize the contradiction between this and Marx’s point of view, “that the history of humanity must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange”? [1]
Farrell speaks of the “aggressiveness which we find so constant in the human animal.” It is a fact that all the recorded history of man shows this aggressive characteristic. If we accept the Marxian interpretation of history and understand why “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” then we can place the phenomenon of aggressiveness in its proper perspective and say, “because of this, aggressiveness has been constant in the human animal.” But if we accept the Freudian view we must stand the above on its head and say, “Because of the aggressiveness which we find so constant in the human animal, the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” I do not think any Marxist can accept that view of history. A Freudian is compelled to.
The third contradiction is that between the Freudian and Marxian view of culture. I am speaking of culture here in the broad general sense of ideology, morals, religion, etc. Again Freud’s view is based on his theory of absolute instincts. Culture to Freud is the result of sublimated repressed instincts. How can this be reconciled with Marx’s view of culture as being related to the mode of production. According to Freud there has not been thousands of generations of religious experience but one generation of experience repeated thousands of times. If anyone doubts that these two views differ profoundly let him compare Freud’s view of the development of Monotheism [2] and the Marxist interpretation given by Kautsky. [3]
I am aware that I have not dealt with culture in the narrow sense of art, and with the corresponding problem of repression which both Farrell and Newman discuss. But it deserves more than a few paragraphs for an adequate answer. I ask my critics to be patient until I can write more fully on this question.
Finally, but by no means least important, is a contradiction involving certain aspects of Freudian therapy, i.e., that the therapeutical efforts of Freudian analysis aim at adjusting the individual to the existing social order. Both Farrell and Newman polemize against this by denying there is a contradiction. Farrell says, “To cure a psychoneurotic by analysis, to ‘adjust’ him to society does not mean that you adjust him to all of the facts of capitalism, to war, to imperialism, to ‘the peaceful warfare of competition.’ It means that you adjust him to himself.” ... Newman repeats this argument in another way when he says, “Comrade Stiler misinterprets the phrase ‘findings and views’ assuming that it refers primarily to the analyst’s social views. It refers rather to views about the personality deformations of the patient. By falsely identifying the narrow social views of Freud with the analyst’s psychoanalytic findings, Comrade Stiler is led to reject what is valuable together with what is valueless.” Both my critics maintain that a Freudian analysis is not aimed at adjusting an individual to society, but to “himself.” That means that a person can be analyzed and still struggle against war, imperialism, capitalism, etc.
It is a strange and yet significant fact that both Farrell and Newman either do not know or do not consider it important that Freud and the analysts who follow him consider revolutionary activity as a form of neurotic behaviorl A person who chooses a career of “professional revolutionist,” or a person who engages in revolutionary activity against the “facts of capitalism, or war, or imperialism, or ‘the peaceful warfare of competition’” is exhibiting a neurotic “revolt against the father” according to Freudian psychoanalysis. This is by no means a social view of a particular analyst but is a view about the “personality deformation of the patient” held by the entire Freudian, school. Consequently, part of the “cure” consists in getting the patient to give up his revolutionary or “neurotic” behavior.
Farrell says I must not, “criticize a psychoanalyst for treating a bourgeois, and helping that bourgeois to become cured of psychoneurosis.” That is true. But I think I have every right to criticize a Freudian analyst for treating a revolutionist and “helping” that revolutionist become “cured” of his revolutionary activity, especially when other schools of psychoanalysis accomplish cures without making this demand.
Another aspect of this question is raised by Farrell’s and Newman’s assumption that I consider the Marxist Party a better cure for psychoneurotics than analysis. I do not think there is any basis for drawing that inference from my article. The Marxist party certainly has its share of neurotics. Anyone with a passing knowledge of psychoanalysis can recognize that. But I do believe that if psychoanalysis were given a historical materialist premise, analysts could not possibly view revolutionary behavior as neurotic and it would enable every analyst to provide his re-educated patient with greater security in the sense of understanding the march of events. But for this, it is necessary to reject the basic Freudian premise of psychoanalysis.
It is my contention that there are three factors responsible for giving the inherently revolutionary science of psychoanalysis its reactionary bias. The first is the characteristic of “immutability” that it attributes to biological human needs (instincts). The second is its failure to understand the correct relationship of the various component parts (the sexual and life preservative) of these needs, to the development of history. Marx enumerates the three aspects or “moments” of human existence which determine the course of history as: the production of material means; the production of new needs; and the reproduction of mankind. The first two relate to the life preservative needs or instincts and it is clear that they play the decisive role in history. The third, the sexual need or instinct, is given primary importance by Freud. You cannot help seeing at once that two different theories of history arise out of the fact that the emphasis in the case of Marx is placed on the struggle for material means and in the case of Freud, on the need for sexual gratification. For Freud the sexual component is the greatest and most decisive factor. Even eating and drinking are brought under the influence of the sexual instinct in the oral stage of infantile sexuality. For Marx, however, “life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of material life itself.” [4] And further, “that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determine the nature of society, hence that the history of humanity must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange.”
A later development of Freudian theory is the placing of a greater emphasis on the aggressive drives of man but these are attributed to the highly dubious death instinct.
The third factor contributing to the reactionary character of psychoanalysis is its failure to understand the relationship between individual psychology and mass psychology. Here, if I may call Farrell’s attention to it, “dialectics” does help. Fundamentally, it is the failure of all analysts to understand the law of quantity changing into quality. For psychoanalysts mass psychology is nothing more than the sum total of the psychology of all the individuals within the mass. It is not only true of the Freudian school, but of Horney-Fromm, and Wm. Reich, as well. Fromm says, “Any group consists of individuals and nothing but individuals, and psychological mechanisms which we find operating in a group can therefore only be mechanisms that operate in individuals.” [5] It is this that leads him from the authoritarian need of individuals to the conclusion that the working class of Germany desired Fascism. It is this that imbues his otherwise progressive theories with a predominately “psychological” view of human history.
I believe that a group or a mass develops psychological laws of its own which are more than the sum total of the psychology of the individuals within it; and that these laws lie in the realm of social science, not in individual psychology. While in a mass strike a great many individuals may participate because of a psychological revolt against the father (Freudian theory), this factor plays a minimum role, and the psychological attitudes of the entire mass are not determined by this but by social factors. These in turn create mass psychological attitudes which are themselves social factors.
I hope to be able to develop the above views further in subsequent articles and show their relationship to the various schools of psychoanalysis. The Freudian school contains all three of the contributing factors giving psychoanalysis its reactionary bias. The School of Reich contains the second and third. Fromm and Horney have freed psychoanalysis from its Freudian premise but have not yet freed themselves from the third factor, the failure to grasp the relation between mass and individual psychology.
Although I am not an analyst and consequently any attempt on my part to make a critical evaluation of the clinical aspects of psychoanalysis would be an arrogant presumption, I believe that it is incumbent upon every Marxist to continually submit to Marxist analysis every science insofar as it relates to social science. Only in this way do we constantly test our Marxism.
1. German Ideology, Marx and Engels: page 18.
2. Moses and Monotheism, Sigmund Freud.
3. Foundations of Christianity, Karl Kautsky.
4. German Ideology, Marx and Engels: page 16.
5. Escape from Freedom, Eric Fromm: page 137.
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