

LABOR ACTION

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State Dep't Acts To Deny Passport For Shachtman

After almost a year's silence, the State Department has finally gotten around to a decision in the application for a passport made by Max Shachtman, national chairman of the Independent Socialist League, in February of 1953.

The department came through with an official communication stating that the passport had been denied. While this had virtually been certain, the lack of any official statement had made impossible, up to now, any further steps to press the case.

Readers of LABOR ACTION will recall that for a period of ten months the Passport Office either failed to acknowledge Shachtman's application, to grant a passport, or to reject the request. Correspondence from Shachtman failed to elicit any response until, on the assumption that the application for a passport had been rejected, he requested a hearing where he might appeal the action of the State Department.

The informal hearing last November with Ashley Nicholas of the Passport Division failed to produce a decision from the State Department. The hearing merely established that the basis for the failure of the Passport Division to act in the matter was the fact that as chairman of the ISL, Shacht-

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Palaver in Berlin: The Big Four Are Going Through the Motions

By GORDON HASKELL

The Big Four conference now meeting in Berlin has one distinction. No one, literally no one, even claims that there is the slightest possibility that it will achieve the purpose for which the governments pretend they are meeting. Almost no one believes that it will achieve even a small part of this purpose, or that it will open a road along which further progress might eventually lead to its accomplishment later on.

Even the most ardent advocates of "coexistence" between the Stalinist and capitalist worlds do not pretend that if there is good faith on both sides, real progress can be made toward the settlement of a long-term agreement. At least, this time, there are no illusions to be dispelled.

But then, why have the governments of the most powerful countries in the world agreed to go through with this meeting? And

especially why have the Russian and American governments agreed to it, when it is pretty clear that, of all the participants, these want the conference least?

The answer is that neither of them could afford to dodge it any longer. The weaker governments in the American bloc want to trade with the Stalinist empire, and they want a tapering off of the cold war to a point where they can cut down on their armaments and get a little more freedom of economic action. They have put the heaviest pressure on the

American government to agree to this meeting.

And the Stalinists, for their part, must keep alive the illusion that they are a "peace-loving" government, for both internal and external purposes. They could not afford, for too long a time, to evade the urgings of the reluctant State Department without rubbing the veneer of that illusion dangerously thin.

The alleged purpose of the conference is to seek a settlement to the partition and occupation of Germany and Austria. It is generally agreed that some deal on the latter may not be impossible. But the key to Europe is Germany, and neither the United States nor Russia are willing to let go of its half of

it at the risk that the other may eventually get the whole key in his hands.

Even though neither side sees the possibility of winning the unification of Germany on its own terms, both are looking for some way to come out of this conference in a better position, or at least in a no worse position than they occupied when they entered it. The Russians hope to drive a wedge between the United

States and her allies. The Americans hope to demonstrate to more of the doubters that the Russians, and they alone, are responsible for the continued partition of Germany and thus for the cold war which cannot end so long as Germany remains divided.

DUBIOUS ALLIES

As the Russian objective is a more active and positive one, they have a better chance of success. The French government is particularly open to the Russian tactics. The promise of a face-saving deal in Indo-China, plus the neutralization of Germany (which they are not at all anxious to see rearmament and not too anxious to see reunited), could have a strong appeal. Important circles in Britain, too, are doubtful about the blessings which would flow from a united Germany. They also want to open up as much trade with Russia and China as possible.

Yet, dubious as they may be about the State Department's insistence on a rearmament Western Germany at all costs, and a rearmament united Germany if possible, they are still too dependent on the United States to make it likely that either of them could swing over to back the Stalinist position at this conference. What Dulles has to fear, at the worst, is that they will show such a degree of softness in the negotiations that it will be difficult to make it appear that Russia alone is responsible for their failure.

(Continued on page 3)



MOLOTOV



EDEN



DULLES

DJILAS AND THE CRISIS OF TITOISM: The Program of the Democratic Opposition

By HAL DRAPER

The crisis in Yugoslavia over the Djilas case is the most important development in Titoism since the break with Moscow in 1948.

It is not simply a power fight of leaders or cliques, not even in the sense that the Malenkov-Beria scrap was. In fact, the role of Djilas, while the most dramatic element, is not the most basic.

At bottom, the crisis is one which we (and of course not only we) pointed to in anticipation some years ago, which we expected and looked forward to. It is here, and it has broken out into the open around Milovan Djilas.

After 1948, in its efforts to consolidate itself after reeling from the effects of the break with Moscow, the Titoist bureaucracy entered on the road of placating and making concessions to the mass of people. One important element in this was a campaign of talk about democratization, and some steps of loosening up politi-

cally, all of which was designed to convince people that there had been a break not only with Moscow but also with the Stalinist system of bureaucratic totalitarianism.

In every essential respect, this remained a show, and no basic concessions were made concerning the political monopoly exercised by the ruling party. But the real loosening up which accompanied this effort was, from the start, a danger for the regime. The pattern was one that is familiar to history.

There was not going to be any "democratization from above," as many believed; but the easy talk and loose promises and demagoguery that came from the top was bound to convince wide sectors that something should be done to implement the talk.

The Titoist regime remained what it was, a national-Stalinist type of regime in social system and political structure, though not one subordinated to Russian Stalinism. But, if democracy was not going to be handed down from above by the bureaucracy, the pro-democratic elements were bound to be encouraged to win democracy against the bureaucracy.

Such a movement turned up, as its leading spokesman, the man who has up to recently been the No. 3 top dog,

Milovan Djilas. This indeed was unexpected in the development, but the very stature which Djilas possesses in the regime, taken in connection with his fate now, has served to underline the fatuity of expecting fundamental democratic reform from above in such bureaucratic Stalinist-type systems.

As we shall see, as far as Djilas personally is concerned, this has been a very recent and apparently sudden development on his part. This has been testified to by both sides.

There is now sufficient documentation* before us to answer the most important questions about what has just been happening in Titoland.

What were the views which Djilas put forward, which led to his disgrace?

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*Specifically, our information is based on the texts of seven of the articles which Djilas published in *Borba* during Dec.-Jan., presenting his views, and on the text of the reports and speeches at the Jan. 16-17 Central Committee plenum by Tito, Djilas, V. Dedijer, Kardelj and a dozen other CC members.

NEWS AND VIEWS FROM THE LABOR FRONT

ON THE MICHIGAN SCENE

GM Stunt...The Un-Americaners... Wayne Morse's Bombshell... Reuther Shooting Case

By M. J. HARDWICK

DETROIT, Jan. 24—Labor and political news continued to dominate the Michigan scene last week, as major developments on all fronts provided big headlines:

- (1) Further layoffs contradicted General Motor's adroit publicity stunt about an alleged billion-dollar expansion program.
- (2) The House Committee on Un-American Activities sought to stifle any criticism before its February return engagement in Detroit.
- (3) Senator Wayne Morse electrified a state-wide unemployment and legislative conference of the Michigan CIO by his brilliant plea for political independence.
- (4) A painfully embarrassing disclosure of the United Auto Workers' independent maneuvers in the so-called Reuther shooting case added to the tragic comedy of errors in this absolutely incredible fantasy.

GM PULLS A STUNT, FORD PULLS A BONER

Nothing could quite guarantee Page 1 publicity for GM's Motorama as much as the kind of speech Harlow Curtice, GM president, made in New York last week. His vague "program" of a billion-dollar expansion for GM in 1954-55 not only assisted the Eisenhower administration but also gave GM the spotlight for its 1954 car demonstration.

In contrast, Henry Ford II made a real faux pas in ridiculing unemployment in Detroit as "not amounting to a hill of beans," a statement carefully expunged from all newspaper, magazine, and radio publicity, after the Ford publicity department got the terrific kickbacks in Detroit.

And in Detroit, 8,000 more auto workers were laid off indefinitely at Chrysler. And a cutback took place in many feeder plants.

The contradiction between the glowing publicity statements and the facts of life are so sharp that even Michigan's timid professors of economics are publicly disagreeing with GM's optimism—and that is an act of courage in this auto-industry-dominated state. Both Professor Gardner Ackley of the University of Michigan and Professor Gilbert Goodman of Wayne University challenged Curtice's estimate of 6,300,000 vehicle production for 1954.

As a matter of fact, the industry, in spite of overtime at Ford and big schedules at GM, will produce almost 100,000 fewer cars in January than were predicted one month ago. And 84,000 auto workers in the Detroit area alone are jobless.

The prod that Walter P. Reuther, CIO president, gave to the Department of Labor this week helped expose the statistical distortions that are prevalent in unemployment figures. He challenged the department's scheduled report for Monday, January 25, on Detroit unemployment, pointing out it would be based on reports made in November. As a result, the government is making another survey to bring its report up to date. It will show Detroit as a "distress area."

UN-AMERICANERS TRY INTIMIDATION

"We definitely criticized the purpose of the hearing and said the subcommittee might serve the public better if it looked into the Detroit unemployment situation," said part of a resolution passed unanimously by former Briggs Local 742, in denouncing the return of the House Committee on Un-American Activities here in February.

Republican Congressman Clardy, of Michigan, who will direct the probe here in an attempt to get headlines and aid the 1954 Republican congressional contests, took the attitude that the criticism meant openly defying the authority of Congress (a neat way of twisting the argument) and threatened to subpoena the president of the local, James

Cichocki, a long-time leader in the anti-Reuther caucus.

Of course, the action of Clardy is calculated to intimidate any other UAW locals from going on record against the committee activities.

Cichocki told the press, "We definitely criticized the purpose of the hearing, but we didn't say anything about refusing to appear before the committee or refusing to answer legitimate questions."

"I didn't know I was to be subpoenaed at the time the resolution passed, but I can say now that if I am subpoenaed I will appear and answer reasonable questions. I have nothing to hide. I am not a Communist and have signed the affidavits required by the Taft-Hartley Act." The Local 742 resolution was based on the civil liberties resolution adopted at the 1953 UAW convention, and called on the international union to take the lead

in devising some over-all program of effective opposition to the House committee. It remains to be seen what the UAW does this time.

WAYNE MORSE AND THE DEMOCRATS

The dangers of McCarthyism and the need for political independence were the twin themes of an exciting talk by Senator Wayne Morse before 1,000 delegates to the Michigan Unemployment Conference of the CIO. He was given a ten-minute ovation after finishing.

Every CIO leader applauded Morse's penetrating analysis of the inquisition which Senator McCarthy is leading. Again, it remains to be seen if the CIO here follows up its enthusiasm for Morse with a stand on the Republican witch-hunt in Michigan.

Morse also reminded the audience that since 1938 a coalition of conservative Republicans and Democrats ran this country. He explained why he could never join a Democratic Party headed by a minority leader like Lyndon Johnson of Texas.

"There has been only one political party in control of the Senate since 1938—a coalition of reactionary Republicans and Democrats. I am no longer a Republican, but there is a great difference between my position and joining the Democrats in the Senate.

"How could I follow the reactionary leadership of Democratic Leader Johnson of Texas?"

Morse praised Governor Williams and

former Senator Blair Moody, and this brought up another point in Michigan politics that deserves mention.

During the course of the conference, Gus Scholle, Michigan CIO president, asked the audience if they would support Governor Williams for re-election. The response was terrific. But since Governor Williams would like to run for senator, and he was present, Scholle then asked the question, "How many of you would support him for senator?" The response was equally enthusiastic.

"I guess we'll support you for any office," Scholle declared, and that's a sign of the independence the union movement has within the Democratic Party.

The CIO apparently wants Moody for senator and they want Williams to run for governor again. The decision will be Williams' and the choice will be based on "which can I win for sure."

UAW'S FACE IS RED OVER SHOOTING CASE

The three-ring circus on the Reuther shooting case found the UAW cast in the role of a fool by developments in the past two weeks; and an object-lesson in the need of a co-ordinated, cooperative effort by all concerned in this case was spelled out.

The latest part of this painful event began when Donald Ritchie, the key witness, escaped.

It turned out that after he escaped, his common-law wife collected \$5,000

(Continued on page 3)

Un-Americaners to Bring Another Witchhunting Orgy to Detroit—

WILL THE UAW SPEAK UP?

By H. W. BENSON

Representative Velde's House Un-American Activities Committee is scheduled to arrive in Detroit for a return visit.

Where the sinister red trail leads him now is not quite clear. Is he on the prowl for teachers in Wayne University, unionists in the UAW, socialists and ex-socialists, former presidents of the United States, Protestant ministers, Harvard professors, or newspaper headlines?

Regardless of where the focus of his interest lies, the visit will present the UAW leadership with a choice: Either to apply in action the vigorous resolutions of the UAW and CIO on civil liberties, or to side off into a shady corner and close its eyes—hoping that he will go away and no harm done.

ABOUT THE SILENT

It is hardly necessary to inform politically thinking militants of the UAW that Velde and his committee symbolize the growing spirit of enforced conformity which is paralyzing free thought and democracy in this country. The last UAW convention, in its civil-liberties resolution, said:

"Such men as McCarthy, McCarran, Jenner and Velde could not prevail in their anti-democratic purposes if they did not have help from others. But they have help. They are helped by all who remain silent in the face of their attack. They are helped by the political cowardice of those leaders in both parties who, by remaining silent, give their consent."

And it called for a campaign "to fight back," adding "We urge the members of our unions to cooperate with . . . others in their communities in order that together we may take positive action to reassert and recapture our civil liberties and the true meaning of our democratic way of life."

At the CIO convention in November 1953 Velde was denounced for subpoenaing Truman, and a resolution was adopted which stated in part: "We record our continued opposition to any laws or ac-

tivities of congressional committees which restrict freedom of thought, press, assembly or association, or impose conformity of thought and deed, and thereby stifle the independent views and experimentation which have in the past contributed so substantially to the progress and greatness of our nation."

Now Velde arrives conveniently enough in Detroit, center of the UAW and home of CIO President Reuther.

Velde's committee last appeared in Detroit in early 1952. His reception by the top leadership of the UAW had none of the fiery hostility later incorporated into resolutions. He called many UAW members before him to testify, including at least one on its appointed paid staff. He manufactured a big red scare at Ford Local 600, where the Stalinists had in fact been reduced to a shattered handful.

An atmosphere of hysteria was created in UAW plants. Union members who were simply accused, or half-accused, at these hearings of sympathy or near-sympathy for the Stalinists were driven out of the plants by hopped-up workers or fired by the companies.

The leadership of the UAW said nothing. It was frightened into yielding to Velde's pressure. An administratorship was abruptly placed over Local 600 and extraordinary measures taken to remove a half dozen minor local officials, accused of membership in the Communist Party, from office. Later, at a UAW convention, it was revealed how they had plotted: on Stalin's birthday, a tiny group crouched behind machines in the Rouge plant and sang in muffled tones, "Happy birthday, dear Joe, happy birthday to you."

FORD LOCAL ACTS

UAW leaders did go to the aid of workers who had been fired or run out of the plants. The UAW membership was informed that the union defended the right of workers to their jobs even if they were Communists and locals were instructed to get the victimized men back to work.

But Velde and the witchhunters had won their victory. No campaign of publicity and action was carried on against them. On the contrary, the UAW leadership by its silence and by its nervous move into Local 600 gave the impression of men afraid to meet their enemies.

In the two years that have passed, the

labor movement has become more aware of the danger to civil liberties. A Republican administration holds office; the witchhunt that began under the Democratic Party seemed tolerable in the hands of "friends"; but now it looms as a danger in the hands of open enemies. If a former president can be smeared as a protector of spies, can labor leaders be safe? These thoughts run through the minds of union men.

On the eve of Velde's visit, the General Council of Ford Local 600 called for action by the UAW. In a resolution adopted on January 10, it called the committee "the tool of these reactionaries" who seek "to destroy liberal thought in these United States." In its proposal to the UAW it points in the right direction: calling upon the International Executive Board "to implement the resolution on civil liberties adopted at the 14th UAW-CIO convention and . . . in cooperation with all other labor organizations and representative clergymen, educators, minority groups, etc., to hold meetings and use all other means of publicity available to acquaint the community with the evils of these investigating committees. . . ."

Orwell's personal account of the Spanish Civil War

HOMAGE TO CATALONIA

by George Orwell

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LONDON LETTER

Electrical Strike Enters 3rd Round

By DAVID ALEXANDER

LONDON, Jan. 19.—Round I of the battle between the Electrical Trades Unions and employers over wages finished last week. Sporadic strikes took place all over the country. The employers claimed that they had largely failed, and so they would not retaliate. The ETU said that they had gone according to plan, and would continue. Nevertheless, Round I was definitely indecisive.

This week began with Round II. All electricians belonging to the ETU, numbering about 20,000, were called out; they took part in mass meetings, at which only 53 workers voted against the Executive.

The strike was practically completely supported, except for workers in a few small plants. For instance, 8,000 electricians came out in London, 1,600 went on strike in Merseyside, 1,500 at Leeds, etc.

The employers were on the spot. W. H. Smith threatened to sack anyone who took part in Monday's strike. Morgan, area organizer of the union, said that the union would bring out the 1000 men employed in the 60 different factories throughout the country belonging to this company. So far, neither side has taken the action threatened.

On Tuesday, the employers reacted to the strike by a one-day lockout of all workers in the electrical industry who had taken part in the strike the day before. Some employers did not observe the lockout, but they were alleged not to be members of the National Federated Electrical Association, although Stevens said that it was because they had broken solidarity.

In Scotland, the lockout was only about 40 per cent, as the ETU has held its hand there so far, and so the employers have not threatened reprisals.

SLAP AT U.S.

Round III came today when the ETU called out 8,000 electricians on contract work in Greater London; they are on strike until January 25, when the situation will be reviewed. Meanwhile also, the sporadic strikes continue according to plan.

The strikers are in a particularly strong position. Much of the work they are doing is for the government, which would not dare to retaliate, even if it could. As the public is not directly affected by the strike because of its sporadic nature, and because of the kind of work on which these electricians are engaged, the union has plenty of time.

In Parliament yesterday, Sir Walter Monckton, the minister of labor, reported that the NFEA had informed him of the strike under the Industrial Disputes Order. Much to the consternation of the Tories, he did not think it was opportune for him to intervene in the dispute at present.

Sir Waldron Smithers, an arch-reactionary Tory, asked Churchill if he would make strikes illegal, except when a secret ballot was held by the workers

Court Decision On Steve Nelson Case in Penna.

By a vote of 4 to 1, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has reversed the sedition conviction of Steve Nelson, former western Pennsylvania Communist Party chairman, and has quashed the indictment against him.

The court's ruling nullified a 20-year sentence passed on Nelson by a lower Pennsylvania court on conviction for violating a state sedition law, originally passed in 1919.

The State Supreme Court's action was not taken on any grounds which might have a generally easing effect on the witchhunt, at least beyond the borders of Pennsylvania. The majority opinion upheld Nelson's contention that the federal Smith Act of 1940 superseded the Pennsylvania law.

Nelson has been convicted under the Smith Act, and sentenced to a five-year prison term. He is now appealing his conviction. The irony of the legal situation lies in the fact that previous appeals against Smith Act convictions have maintained that this law is unconstitutional, yet it is by a claim based on it that Nelson has escaped the most savage sentence yet imposed for a political "offense" in recent times.

under government auspices. Churchill replied that he "had no intention of departing from the established tradition in this country under which the trade-union movement is left to manage its own affairs . . . without government interference."

KOREA SCANDALS

Two very interesting points arose out of a television broadcast by Major General West, ex-commander of the Commonwealth Division in Korea.

The first one related to the trial of a private accused of "cowardice." In the course of the interview, the major-general let slip the remark that there had been other trials for cowardice in that theater of operations. This remark was carried by all the newspapers next day,

and they all wanted to know why the press had not been informed of them.

Hutchison answered that the press had been informed of the trials, but had not turned up. In Korea, he said, there had been 25 serious cases of desertion, and 11 convictions for mutiny. Shinwell said that the people of this country had heard little of the matter. He was not satisfied with the government reply, and would bring it up again in Parliament.

Major General West made another slip. When he was asked a question about the necessity for conscription if we withdraw from the Suez Canal, he revealed the views of the army brass hats. Naturally, he said, the army did not want to leave the Suez Canal, so that he thought that a question on the contraction of our commitments as a result of such a withdrawal was premature.

State Dep't Acts — —

(Continued from page 1)

man represented an organization on the attorney general's list of "subversive organizations."

After this informal hearing, Joseph L. Rauh, of Washington, counsel for Shachtman, unsuccessfully endeavored for several months to obtain some decision from the Passport Office. Plans were made for taking the case to court to force some action on the State Department. As a result of this and the pressure of another case, the State Department finally set up its Board of Passport Appeals.

One week ago, Shachtman requested a hearing from the Appeals Board. Under the date of January 22, the Appeals Board rejected the request for a hearing on the grounds that it had no knowledge whatever of any case involving his application for a passport and, having nothing before it, it could not act otherwise.

This would appear astonishing indeed if we did not know standard operations in Washington. Under the date of January 21, 1954 Shachtman's application for a passport was denied by R. B. Shipley, director of the Passport Office. However, the Appeals Board had no knowledge of this whatever.

Our readers, we know, will be interested in Mrs. Shipley's letter, which we print below:

"Reference is made to your informal hearing at the Department on November 3, 1953, in connection with your pending application for passport facilities.

"It appears that you are the head of the Independent Socialist League (formerly Workers' Party); that you desire to go abroad on behalf of the aforementioned organization; and that the organization has been listed by the attorney general as both Communistic and subversive. Despite the fact that the Independent Socialist League has no connection with the Communist International, and is hostile thereto, the department feels that it would be contrary to the best interests of the United States to grant passport facilities to the actual head of an organization which has been classified by the attorney general as subversive, especially when the applicant desires to travel abroad on behalf of such organization.

"When and if there should be a change in the classification of the organization by the attorney general, the department will give further consideration to the question

of granting you passport facilities."

Needless to say, this decision will be appealed to the Board of Passport Appeals, and failing there, to the courts; just as the case of the ISL against the attorney general will be pressed in connection with the "subversive list."

One significance of the Passport Division's letter of grounds for denying Shachtman's passport is the fact that it makes explicit something that the government likes to deny. Legally the attorney general's "subversive list" is supposed to be only a device to regulate government employment. It was not gotten up (theoretically) as a guide, say, for the issuance of passports; and, from the other side, the passport regulations say nothing about the "subversive list."

The case therefore shows concretely that the government has generalized the use of the list beyond even its formal purpose. Naturally, everybody knows this, but the State Department has put it into writing.

Michigan —

(Continued from page 2)

from the UAW under the terms of a secret agreement between the union and him, which the police and prosecutor's office did not know about!

Certainly, if the UAW had known that Ritchie had fled, they would have held up payment of the \$5,000. Furthermore, he could have been caught easily, simply by trailing his wife even after she received the money.

Of course, the prosecutor's office blew their collective tops when the role of the UAW came out. How could the testimony of a paid witness stand up in court, the assistant prosecutor asked.

Then a manhunt started for Ritchie in Canada: it failed to uncover him. Finally, a drunk at a bar convinced a cub reporter that he was Ritchie, and the witness was recaptured. The very nature of this phase of the story cast doubt on his reliability as a witness.

Next, Ritchie denounced his confession, agreed to it again, and in the last minute, just before crossing the border, repudiated it and decided to fight extradition!

Meanwhile, another part of the secret contract between Ritchie and the UAW came to light, while the UAW maintained an embarrassed silence: he had been promised an additional \$25,000 and also been given a \$10,000 life insurance guarantee for the next two years.

Under these circumstances, only a miracle can save the UAW's case against the men charged with the attempted murder of Walter Reuther in April 1948.

Meanwhile, Sam Perrone remains in hiding, although Detroit papers print the fact that he was tipped off in advance of the warrant against him, and he was seen twice at his home in recent weeks by competent witnesses. In each case, by the time the police arrived, he was not there.

Palaver — —

(Continued from page 1)

Actually, either side could put the other one on the spot by a simple demand: withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany at once. Then let the two German governments negotiate the terms of their unification.

If the American government made this proposal, nothing could be lost from the standpoint of democracy. Since the June rebellion in East Germany, it is perfectly clear that without Russian troops in East Germany the Stalinists would have the utmost difficulty in hanging on to political power. In any event, they would have no possibility of extending their rule over Western Germany. They would be forced to come to terms very quickly with the West Germans in the hope of salvaging some shreds of power out of the situation.

Further, a united Germany would be as safe from Russian attack as Western Germany is now, if not safer. Of course, the United States would lose her control over Germany and it is quite possible that the Social-Democrats would come to power. But from the point of view of democracy, no objection can be made to that!

But the Americans are not going to make this proposal. And the only reason one can even imagine that the Russians might make it is that they would be so confident that it would be rejected by the Eisenhower government if they did.

BEST PROSPECT

The fact is that despite the propaganda line of both sides, neither of them is concerned with democracy, the right of the German people to live in their own united country, justice, or any of the other terms with which they hope to catch the unwary. They are both interested in power, keeping their hold on as much of Europe as they can for the struggle which they see reaching into the indefinite future.

Reports from Berlin indicate that both sides have taken massive precautions for the "security" of the conference. The Americans have brought an additional 200 military police into the city to make a total of 500, plus their regular garrison of 7,000 troops. The Russians have ordered in some 3,000 additional police for East Berlin, and have strengthened their troops in the area.

It is doubtful that this many men are needed by either side to protect the conference from some would-be assassin. What they are worried about are major demonstrations for an end to foreign occupation, for a free and united Germany.

It is not at all likely that the Social-Democrats in the Western zone of the city would mobilize the workers for such a demonstration. They are far too timid, and far too dependent on the alleged good will of the occupying powers. But the workers of East Berlin and Eastern Germany have shown themselves to be less restrained in striking out for their political objectives. The best thing that could happen to this conference would be a series of mass demonstrations of the workers in both parts of the city for unity and freedom.

That is the only way in which the voice of democracy could be raised at the conference of the Big Four.

READ ABOUT SOCIALISM

The Fight for Socialism cloth \$2 paper \$1
by Max Shachtman

Socialism: the Hope of Humanity10
by Max Shachtman

Marxism in the U. S.35
by Leon Trotsky

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by Ernest Erber

The Principles and Program of Independent Socialism10
(LA Special Issue)

Independent Socialist Press
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DJILAS AND THE CRISIS OF TITOISM:

(Continued from page 1)

Does he have any broader program than the one he publicly presented?

Does he lead a faction, or a tendency, or what?

What was the reaction to his articles in Yugoslavia? How could he have gotten his heretical articles published in *Borba*?

Why did he publish the article about the snubbing of the "young and beautiful actress" by the wives of the "inner circle" and what had this to do with his political ideas?

Is it true that Djilas has been converted to Western social-democratic ideas?

How far does he go in calling the Tito regime "Stalinist"?

Did he recant at the Central Committee meeting? Is there going to be a purge?—And some others.

Central Demand

Let us start by explaining just exactly what were the ideas which Djilas presented to his somewhat startled comrades in a sudden spate of articles which began pouring from his pen, beginning especially in December and lasting until January when Tito hurried home from his Slovenian retreat to hit him over the head with an Executive Committee decree.

He poured out "three articles a week" (as the jibes at the CC plenum later kept repeating, as if this sudden flood of literary activity was itself the prime suspicious circumstance, as it was). By the time the CC plenum was gotten together, he had put 19 articles on the books—or rather, into *Borba*.

The central idea of all of these articles was: **We need FREEDOM FOR DISCUSSION, FREEDOM FOR NEW IDEAS.**

It would be false to give the impression that Djilas's articles were either very clear or very systematic in their exposition of his viewpoint. The Djilas article which is reprinted in *LABOR ACTION* (see pages 6-7) is by far his *clearest* effort; it was also his last in *Borba*. Most of his other articles are far more turgid, wordy, fuzzy and, especially, filled with a very muddy kind of philosophizing which sounds like an effort to be very "profound" without any equipment to be so.

There may be two or three reasons for this: (1) Djilas always had a tendency in this direction, anyway, as his previous writings show. (2) Djilas was undoubtedly, at least to some extent, influenced by the desire to pretend that his "deviations" were not on political questions but on theoretical-philosophical ones and therefore more permissible. His defense at the later CC plenum takes this line in part, at least in hindsight; perhaps it was also planned.

(3) Without being really too mysterious about it, in many places Djilas uses a kind of "Aesopian language" of his own to soften some of his sharpest jabs; thus, for example, in some places where the bureaucratic party cadres are most trenchantly denounced, he uses the term "subjective forces" to stand for the objects of the attack. However, and on the other hand, since he explains what he means by "subjective forces" no interested reader could fail to understand what he was saying.

Oppositionist Tone

But while our summary and selected quotes will inevitably make his ideas out to be more sharply defined than they were in print, there can be no doubt that the central ideas were clear enough.

"There is no other way out but more democracy, more free discussions, more free elections of social, state and economic organs, more strict sticking to the law. . . . [What we need is] the creation of an atmosphere for freely stating ideas. . . . The first task of a socialist and true democrat is to make possible the presentation of ideas, to make sure that nobody will be persecuted for his ideas. New ideas, hitherto the property of individuals, of a minority, will come out into the open only in such an atmosphere. . . . What is important at this moment are not new ideas and new thinking, but the liberty of ideas and thought. . . . This means in practice: to fight for freedom of discussion everywhere and every place. . . . In short, legality and the struggle of opinion, and, again and again, democracy." (*Borba*, Dec. 22.)

The particularly new thing about Djilas's articles was not the praise for democratic forms which they contain—such lip-service is standard for Titoists as for the other Stalinists in their own way—but the fact that all this is put in the framework and with the tone of a criticism of a regime, of a demand for a fundamental change, etc. The tone is that of an **OPPOSITIONIST**.

In more than one place, Djilas tries to explain to his readers, in an ABC elementary fashion, just why freedom for discussion and ideas is a good thing. (It reminds me of the debate which I had in 1951 with a Yugoslav government office representative at Brooklyn College, when I tried to do the same thing, in the face of the sharp realization that the mind before me seemed almost incapable of grasping the very thought.)

"Liberty for New Ideas"

He explains that a single man cannot solve all problems, etc. He explains (*Borba*, Jan. 1-2-3) why hospitality to new ideas is so important. "Everything would be fine and simple if new ideas, in their first stage, were also the ideas of the majority." But that can't be; "new ideas are always the ideas of a minority"—otherwise they're not new ideas. . . . "So new ideas must be heard. . . ."

What I want to emphasize is the exceedingly elementary level at which Djilas (no doubt with reason) pitches his discussion of democratic forms. He also, of course, knows just what the majorityites will say. He cogently refutes in advance the main arguments which are later going to be made against him at the CC plenum.

At the CC plenum, Tito is going to argue: Democratic freedom for new ideas? Certainly, but only for progressive ideas, naturally! (That is, ideas which we consider "progressive.")

Djilas explains in advance: "Nobody can know in advance whether an idea is new and progressive, and to what extent it is. Only experience can prove that. Experience can be gained only if the idea gets around, if people gather around it, if they fight in its name. That is why the old forces of resistance always try to have new ideas 'banned,' in order to put a stop to the spreading of them. . . . Only in a free struggle of ideas is it possible for us to discover, without a major social upset, not only whether some ideas and concepts are old and others are new" but also, he says, which are in conformity with life and which are not. Only through a free struggle of contending ideas can we discover whether the truth, perhaps, does not lie in the middle, or where it is to be found.

Combating Totalitarian Concept

We need democratic rights for all and not only for "the socialist forces." He writes: "The socialist forces cannot claim democracy for themselves [only], for it is not easy to determine what is socialistically conscious and what is not. . . . To find such a dividing line is difficult, for the bureaucratic forces justify their arbitrariness and their sway over the people very often by the danger of counter-revolution in spite of the discontent by which broad masses respond to oppression."

So he is perfectly aware of the argument that democracy is not feasible "just yet" because of the danger of counter-revolution. This is the idea which we too used to have to polemicize against at length in opposition to the once-widespread illusions of socialist pro-Titoists. What he is combating is the implicit idea, typically totalitarian, that democratic freedom is a source of weakness and not of strength for genuine socialism.

Such is the level of his approach, once he gets away from the philosophical-sounding obscurities that infest his articles.

Another frequent emphasis is: *We must govern in accordance with the law! Stick to the law! No actions outside the law! If you want to do something, adopt a law to that effect and then obey your own law!* So he insists.

A Glance at Secret Police

There are several examples of this stress in the Djilas article translated in this issue; but in his *Borba* article of Dec. 31 he became vividly concrete on the point:

"A struggle against the bourgeoisie (reactionaries) exclusively on the basis of theory and 'line' instead of on the basis of law must today deviate into bureaucratism, into conflict with ordinary people because of some particular opinions they have or because they sometimes justifiably mutter against or defend themselves against artificial and imposed forms of labor."

And he cites an example:

"Not long ago all papers reported on the trial of the worker who listened to the London radio and did not want to participate in the work-brigades [which are supposed to be voluntary—H. D.J. The court acquitted him, but with an explanation that made no sense, namely, that more political work was necessary with him. Is it up to the court to weigh the people's consciousness? How long are we going to keep reading about ideological sentences instead of lawful sentences? How long will sentences be given on the basis of dialectical and historical materialism and not of the law? . . ."

(For years now, there have been poor misguided apologists for Titoism in the West who would point to incidents like the acquittal of this worker as "proof" of the new democracy in Titoland. It is no small thing that Djilas is able to go to the heart of such an incident. He puts his finger on the system which the incident represents, quite apart from the fact that the individual victim was acquitted in this case. And then he does something more—he points behind the case to the forces responsible, not even refraining from mentioning the UDBA itself, the Titoist secret police.)

"The duty of the state organs (courts, UDBA and police) is not to sharpen the class struggle but to preserve and execute the law. In my opinion, these organs—especially in the districts where this happens—must get rid of the interference of the party in their work; for otherwise, in spite of the best intentions to the contrary, they cannot help being undemocratic and working on the basis of invented ideological and political patterns. . . . They must become organs of the state and of the law, that is, of the whole people, and not of one party's political interest and opinion. Such is the unavoidable consequences of legality and democracy, and it is a step forward. If these organs go on sharpening the class struggle on the basis of by-passing the law, they will inevitably treat in a different and more privileged way those who are of the same opinion as they or those whom they consider more trustworthy and sympathetic."

Transform the Party!

How does Djilas propose to implement this demand for freedom of ideas and discussion?

His key proposal is for a fundamental transformation of the ruling party.

Some background: at the 6th Congress of the party in November 1952, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) changed its name to Communist League (CLY). At the same time, the Peoples Front, the "broad" political organization, had its name changed to "Socialist Alliance of the Working People." The setup continued to be essentially that the Titoist party (now called a League) still controlled political life by controlling the only official channel for all political life, which was now called the Socialist Alliance. But although the name had been changed, the term "party" continued to be freely used to refer to the CLY even in the general press. Djilas uses "party" and "league" in his articles often interchangeably, and so did the speakers at the CC plenum.

But the change of name at the 6th Congress from "party" to "league" was accompanied by language which purported to loosen up the party's monopoly of politics. In hindsight, it is clear that this language was even then a concession to pressure from below; and indeed a hint in one of Djilas's articles claims it as such. But the language remained on paper. Meanwhile confusion mounted in the ranks of the party-league with regard to just where they stood. This mounting confusion was openly spoken of in the official press.

In 1953, the second plenum of the Central Committee met at Brioni and launched a line to reassure the ranks that there was no intention of giving up the political monopoly of the party, that any more of this sort of thing was going to be combated. The top bureaucracy had decided that all the democratic talk had gone as far as it should; it was time to put a halt to "misunderstandings."

Break the Monopoly!

According to the facts that transpire now, it was in reaction against the line of this Brioni plenum that Djilas's critical attitude began to flower. (There is also reference to a critical article which he published at the time, the contents of which we do not know anything more about.) Then, in December (as we have already related) he started going to town in *Borba*.

In fact, the title of the article of Jan. 4-6 which is reprinted in this issue is "League or Party?" What Djilas wants to say by that is that the decisions of the 6th Congress, which changed the party to a "league," should not merely be formal but should be implemented to bring about a deep-going and fundamental change in

From Our Resolution

Summarizing an extensive discussion and analysis of Titoism from 1948 on, the ISL's resolution on the subject in 1951 took up various phases of the question. Following is the section which bears particularly on the Djilas crisis that has broken out in the country:

"[It is a] fact, of great importance in understanding the forms of the Yugoslav Titoist phenomena, that the break with the Cominform naturally gave rise to (though it was not decisively motivated by) an upsurge of feelings, hopes, aspirations and illusions on the part of the people, of elements of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and even perhaps of the lower reaches of the new bureaucracy itself.

"These were hopes and illusions that the regime's break with Moscow meant also a break with the Stalinist system at home, and with totalitarianism.

"At the same time, the regime's break with the Russian power deprived it of that support which shores up the satellite regimes—the weight of the armed force, or the threat of the armed force, of the Kremlin; the break put the regime on its own, vis-à-vis its own people, dependent on its own repressive apparatus and institutions alone, and therefore weakened; while, at the same time again, the Cominform blockade, in the context of Yugoslavia's adventurist economic plans, caused and stimulated increased economic pressure and want among the people, especially among the peasantry who constitute the overwhelming proportion of the people.

"The immediate internal task of the Titoist bureaucracy, on the heels of the break, therefore was double: to mobilize the support of the people behind it, as against the Cominform, by refraining from exacerbating and indeed by placating them (the peasantry in particular); and at the same time to make clear that while a very important change had taken place, no fundamental social change was due in the internal regime, to swing the helm as quickly and skillfully as circumstances permitted toward the quelling of all maverick tendencies to make or demand fundamental changes in the political system (particularly in the CPY's monopoly of politics and in the monolithism of the one-party state) whatever other concessions might be made in forms or in words.

"While, therefore, before the break Tito's power in the country had already been thoroughly consolidated, under Russia as big brother, the break itself—its circumstances and its consequences—unsettled that power and poised it on a knife-edge.

"In terms of stability, the regime was hurled back to a stage having much in common with the earlier years of Stalin's rise to power, a stage then too marked by tactical shifts and changes, zigzags, experimentation and improvisation. . . ."

(From *LABOR ACTION*, June 11, 1951)

The Program of the Democratic Opposition

the character of the organization. It should in truth no longer be a party at all.

Above all, what he proposes and spells out is the abolition of its role as the monopolistic guardian of politics and controller of the "line." It is no longer to adopt the line in advance. It is to be merely a propaganda-education-discussion group for the ideological advancement of the vanguard. The *practical-politics* organization, the effective party, is to be the broad Socialist Alliance (ex-Peoples Front), where there will reign a wide-open conflict of views and opinion wherever necessary, a free-for-all for discussion before deciding a line.

Much of this proposal can be read in Djilas's article on page 6-7 and need not be extensively quoted. Djilas there says that "the Communists need no longer discuss current problems outside the Socialist Alliance, that is, need no longer first discuss [policies] in the Communist League and pass them on only after they had been debated there." The regular meetings of the CLY's basic units (local branches) are no longer to take up "daily political activity." Their "internal life" is no longer to be organized on an "obligatory" or compulsory basis. In this way the League would become simply a group of people with the same ideas, not a power group. The careerists would drop away, and only the "pure" Communists would remain in a smaller organization.

The key to the totalitarian structure is the political monopoly of the ruling party. Djilas attacks the concept of political monopoly explicitly, vigorously and repeatedly.

Strong Words

Djilas, of course, officially denies that he is for the liquidation of the party. Formally he is not. What he is for is the liquidation of the party as the keystone of a totalitarian structure and its transformation into the kind of political organization which can fit into a democratic structure. But when Tito and the Titoists accuse him of proposing liquidation, they are essentially both sincere and correct—from their own point of view. Djilas's setup would liquidate their party.

In this connection, we should point also to Djilas's fairly open attacks on the careerist composition of the party bureaucracy (also to be found in the article reprinted here). He is talking about a well-known state of affairs. The further down one goes in the Titoist bureaucracy the more its character becomes predominantly that of the opportunists and bandwagon-jump-

ers (not rarely even ex-fascists and ex-collaborators of the Nazis and Ustashi or Croatian fascists) who went along with Tito when he seemed to be becoming the winning side.

Here then we have the difference in views which Djilas continually refers to as the difference between the "old forms" or "old concepts and methods" and the "new forms (concepts, methods, etc.)." And quite plainly—considering everything—Djilas lets it be seen that in his consideration the difference is this: between really breaking with Stalinism (Cominformism) and its "methods" or failing to do so.

His favorite words about the party regime and its "methods" or "concepts" are: outmoded, outlived, obsolete; he even calls it reactionary and an obstacle to further development. In his December 22 article, after attacking "every restriction on thought, even on behalf of the most beautiful ideals," he refers directly and meaningfully to the burning of Giordano Bruno in the name of fighting "heresy," to the decimation of millions in the Hitler death camps in the name of fighting "Communism"; and to the millions "decaying in Siberia" because they do not believe in the "orthodoxy of Stalin's doctrines." His comparison of these horrible examples with the concepts of the Titoist bureaucracy is not even subtle.

In his December 27 article, he inveighed against the notion that the Communists must be "separated from society . . . [and are] predestined in advance to lead others, because only they are 'conscious of the final aims' . . ." Such a theory conceals "the tendency toward a special privileged position in society, toward such positions on the basis of political and 'ideological' adherence and not on the basis of experience and capability."

He goes on to say: "This theory and practice must separate Communists from the masses and transform them into priests and policemen of socialism (as is true in Soviet Russia; such tendencies have existed and still exist with us)."

"Bureaucracy More Dangerous"

The bureaucracy, he implies, has only pretended to change its concepts from the good old Cominform days. "Achieving the position from which they have centralized and regulated everything—from ethics to philately—many Communists did not succeed, when the democratic spirit came so quickly [after 1948] in changing their opinions and even less in changing their practices,

their habits and their manners. Democracy has revealed and still is revealing not only who the true enemies of socialism are but also that bureaucratism is more dangerous than the old capitalism."

That last statement is a first-class heresy. The concept behind it is exactly the reverse of the official rationale of the Titoists. According to the latter, the bureaucratic practices (which must of course be done away with, to be sure, eventually) can be eliminated only in proportion as the "capitalist reaction" ceases to be any threat; as we shall see, this happy time is now officially interpreted to be due to arrive about the same time as the last stages of complete communism, that is, in the dim future.

Djilas says "bureaucratism is more dangerous than the old capitalism." Whether he realizes all the implications of this statement is highly doubtful, but that's another matter.

In Djilas's formulations about the preservation of Stalinist methods in the Tito regime, there is sometimes a formal contradiction, but only a formal one. Thus, sometimes he seems to be saying that we have broken with Stalinism and the bureaucracy is pulling us back; and sometimes he seems to say that no real break with Stalinism ever took place but that it must take place now. The fact is that the two statements do not seem to be too distinct in his own mind.

Thus (in the section of his article which he published last week) he says that "formerly" the party apparatus "kept everything in its own hands," etc., whereas, he says, "this is not so, or at least this must not be so."

There is quite a difference between those two tenets; and in fact, in a preceding paragraph Djilas had directly stated: "The present forms of work in the Communist League . . . have not developed but have mostly remained the same as before the 6th Congress: the apparatus plans and fixes everything in advance. . . ."

"Yugoslav-Stalinism"

But these contradictions are merely formal. It is after all the No. 3 man of the regime who is writing, and in Yugoslavia itself, and it is not an article by a LABOR ACTION observer from abroad that we are discussing. Djilas's constant references to "Stalinism" in connection with the Titoist regime ought to be enough to convince anyone of what went on in his mind. We are absolutely sure that the Titoists understood it in exactly the same way that we do.

In his December 24 article there is an amazing passage in which he shows that he not only tends to identify the concepts of his Titoist colleagues with that of Stalinism, but that he also understands that this Stalinism of theirs is (what we have called) a national-Stalinism, a Yugoslav adaptation of Stalinism as distinct from Russian Stalinism. Considering the number of presumably advanced socialist thinkers in the West who have not even been able to grasp the idea of a Stalinism which is not the same as Russian Stalinism, it must be said that the insight displayed by Djilas is outstanding. (But then, of course, he is right on the scene. . . .)

The whole of this passage goes as follows. He is replying in advance to the argument that "reaction" would exploit his articles—an argument which, sure enough, was the mainstay of the attack on him at the later CC plenum:

"I did not think that reaction would exploit my articles. But the real socialist forces could also do so. It is not my fault that reaction has been using them, but it is the fault of the way-things-are; or better, it is the fault of those who, with their bureaucratic illegal actions and despotism, give the reaction the halo of martyrdom, give them the opportunity to compare, before the masses, their words with their deeds, and thus reveal the discrepancies; in a word, the guilty ones are above all those who mock at democracy and its laws in practice, by their own decisions.

"And if the greatest emphasis is put on the fact that the reaction has been exploiting my articles, that itself reveals the unprincipled, if not Stalinist, bureaucratic character of such 'criticism' [of my articles], even though it may sound democratic in words. The following should not be forgotten: Stalin in the beginning falsely accused the socialist opposition in the USSR of helping reaction; later, of acting subjectively; and finally, of betraying the country and socialism; he established an official 'truth' and 'unity'—the worst dictatorship in history. It is true that he won temporarily, but he thus destroyed socialist relations in embryo. Our bureaucratism also, because it is 'socialist,' cannot avoid being a little Stalinist, to a certain extent Yugoslav-Stalinism. Therefore it stinks with the same ideological smell, and it uses the same 'civilized' and 'peace-loving' methods clearly and aloud, but not directed at us who are 'up' but those who are 'down' [in the hierarchy, I suppose—H. D.]."

"Old Ideas Live On"

This "Yugoslav-Stalinism," this national-Stalinism of the Titoists (Djilas rightly says), stinks with the same ideological smell as Moscow's brand; but of course he is not equating the two any more than we must do.

In his January 1-3 article, Djilas wrote again, though a little more circumspcctly: "There are old ideas among us that are still dominant, more than one would suppose. . . . Our experiences and the struggle of ideas had broken Stalinist ideology as a whole but had not destroyed it. It still lives in the heads of people, not as Stalinism, of course, since Stalinism among us has become synonymous with Cominformism (that is, with betrayal of the country and socialism), but as 'Marxism,' 'Leninism,' etc., as a sum of inherited and in-

(Continued on page 6)

What Underlies the Djilas Crisis?

Back in 1950 we discussed, in LABOR ACTION in terms which are worth giving today as a basic explanation of the Djilas crisis, "the effect of the Tito break on the Yugoslav workers, including rank-and-file Communists." The discussion which we reprint below will do today as an explanation of the underlying motive forces of the present split in the Titoist party.—H. D.

Within Yugoslavia, the break with Moscow meant one thing to the Titoist bureaucracy and another to the masses.

The bureaucracy saw only the necessity of adapting the country to a national-Stalinism. The masses saw a road open to an end to the dictatorship and to real "people's democracy" (which means only socialist democracy). Precisely because there was no revolution [in 1948], because the break occurred only on top with the masses as passive if applauding spectators, there was no immediate question of a surge-through from below on the strength of the impulsion. The people waited. They are still waiting. Their leaders' speeches provide them with democratic demagoguery aplenty, but not with workers' democracy.

Meanwhile, as we have explained, the urgent crisis of the regime, political and economic, impels Tito to the dangerous expedient of seeking to fashion a "whip against the bureaucracy" by limited appeals for action from below. Stalin in Russia went through such a stage also. Time and again, in such situations in past periods, the Russian bureaucracy appealed to the people to be vigilant against the bureaucrats and to write letters to the newspapers to "expose" flagrant acts, went on a spree of purging "bad" ones, set up controlled "control committees" to control the bureaucratic controllers, made heart-rending speeches about the evil effects of bureaucratism and called on the people to report "bad examples."

THEY GET "IDEAS"

Well, no matter how the leaders intend it, don't such speeches give the people "ideas"—that is, stimulate the people to act themselves, and set them in motion against the real bureaucracy?

Of course! The Stalinist dictatorship cannot control the gangrene of bureaucratism from above. It must either suffer the gangrene to spread and devour it, or appeal below for help. Either way it digs its own grave—and most of all when it shuttles between the alternatives.

In a discussion article in LABOR ACTION, Comrade Paul Roberts asked: "Do you really believe those [Yugoslav] leaders are stupid enough to think they can safely continue to tell such things to the workers while planning to do the opposite? And if by a miracle they are that stupid, do you think they could ever get away

with it? . . . the effect of such words would be a tremendous blow at the stability of any Stalinist regime."

Comrade Roberts has hold of an important idea—by the wrong end . . . Stalin, in his time in Russia, told "such things to the workers" and much more; and under cover of precisely such demagoguery consolidated his power. In the early stages, he could not have consolidated himself without doing just what Comrade Roberts thinks is out of the question!

And he got away with it. Other rulers have trodden on the edge of precipices and gotten away with it, right up to the very last time they tried it. It was not guaranteed, and it is not guaranteed for Tito. The important idea in Comrade Roberts' naive question is that Tito is playing with fire, like so many others before him.

ILLUSIONS CAN BE A FORCE

The latest occasion when Stalin played with the same fire was 1936 when the new "democratic constitution" was introduced, with "universal secret suffrage" and everything. One way of describing what happened is to say that the step created illusions among the Russian people. It would have been better, certainly, if the Russian workers had had no illusions, had been able clearly to see through the maneuver, and had fought the regime. But in many a situation, even active illusions can be a danger to the regime that creates them.

This is exactly what Trotsky pointed out about the new Russian constitution. It was a maneuver to exorcize the danger of an open political crisis, he wrote:

"In introducing the new constitution, the bureaucracy shows that it feels this danger and is taking preventive measures. However, it has happened more than once that a bureaucratic dictatorship, seeking salvation in 'liberal' reforms, has only weakened itself. While exposing Bonapartism, the new constitution creates at the same time a semi-legal cover for the struggle against it. The rivalry of bureaucratic cliques at the elections [which never materialized in Russia—H. D.] may become the beginning of a broader political struggle. The whip against 'badly working organs of power' may be turned into a whip against Bonapartism. . . . There is no peaceful outcome for this crisis. No devil ever yet voluntarily cut off its own claws. The Soviet bureaucracy will not give up its positions without a fight. The development leads obviously to the road of revolution." (*Revolution Betrayed*, p. 287.)

I would repeat this word for word, for Yugoslavia—with Tito's workers' councils specifically in mind, among other things—with the obvious qualification that no progressive outcome of any ensuing ferment is possible without the creation of a socialist vanguard.

(From Article 20, "The Positive Outcome of Titoism," in series on *The Pro-Titoism of the Socialist Left*, LABOR ACTION, Dec. 11, 1950.)

By Milovan Djilas: On Democracy,

Here is the rest of the main article which Milovan Djilas published in the Yugoslav Borba, before the leadership cracked down on him. The first part appeared last week. It was entitled "League or Party?" and appeared in Borba in a series over January 4 to 6. In some respects this was a summing up of the previous articles which Djilas had printed in Borba since December.—H. D.

By MILOVAN DJILAS

II

"DISSOLUTION" OF THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE

Of all the absurd suggestions I have heard these last few days, this one is the most ridiculous. Who could "dissolve" the Communists? Who could do this in the very country whose youth and beauty was returned to it by the Communists? As long as the Communists wish to have their organization, they will have it. That's the way it has been in the past and so it will be in the future.

The question, therefore, is not whether the Communist League should continue or not, but what its organization should be like and how it should work. In this respect, however, the old Communist Party did not always remain stagnant either. It changed the forms of its struggle and of its technical setup. The question now, I think, is not one of carrying out a "conjunctural," minor, tactical and organizational change, but rather, again, of changing something more deep and essential.

The problem is this: whether the Communist League is to remain the party in the old, pre-war, pre-Cominform and pre-Sixth Congress sense, or not. This, however, would mean an incomparably greater and much more fateful change than the changes in the style of activity of the old Yugoslav Communist Party. Such a change, therefore, requires a much more cautious approach, imposes much more careful thinking and discernment, and demands much more courage than all the changes we carried out under the party in its time.

Facts and experience tell us this: First, the Communist League is no longer the old Communist Party, not only because everything is no longer centralized in its own hands and it no longer rules everything and everybody, but also because its membership is different

in that it is much wider with respect to its social origin and inherited principles.

Secondly, the burden in the battle against the Cominform was carried by the old Communist guard, ideologically and morally steered and faithful to principles, and by the masses of people, while one part—by no means a small part—of the party membership remained silent, on the one hand outwardly agreeing with and slowly and mechanically accepting the new doctrines and the new criticism of the Soviet Union and of bureaucratism, while on the other hand remaining stuck in its conservative Cominformist ideology; this section put the brakes on the arrangements for the supply of Western arms, which is a vital question for our country. (Mention should also be made at this point of the fact that among the arrested Cominformists there were no ordinary citizens but only party members and, though rarely, some so-called sympathizers.)

Thirdly, the Trieste crisis has demonstrated beyond our expectation the unity [of our people] in the defense of the country. This means nothing more or less than the fact that this Yugoslavia—that is, socialist Yugoslavia—has been internally and externally consolidated and that her further progress and external strength depend on whether she remains true to herself, on the degree to which she remains socialist and democratic. (From this it follows that we no longer can apply the epithets "enemies," "traitors," etc. to those citizens who voluntarily and conscientiously defend and stand up for their country, nor treat them against and outside the law.)

Fourth, the last elections proved that the Socialist Alliance, with the Communists as its core (and not as a political fraction!) can successfully fight the current political battles. The elections showed further that the classical bourgeois reaction in the towns remained passive and impotent, while, on the contrary, the consciousness and self-reliance of the political apparatus (among which I count especially the party apparatus) very much asserted itself.

PARTY IN CIRIS

Fifth—and this is most important—socialist consciousness is no longer the exclusive domain of the Communists and their speeches and writings and it is no longer represented exclusively by these. Together with them it is held and voiced also by the broad masses of society

Djilas and the Crisis of Titoism — —

(Continued from page 2)

vented concepts, rules, as well as of corresponding organizational, political and other forms."

In this connection the fifth paragraph of Djilas's article on our page 6 in this issue, is very interesting.

Kardelj (who did the "theoretical" hatchet-job on Djilas at the CC plenum) complained, indeed, that Djilas "simply transferred the schema of the Stalinist state to our case."

"Not from the Top"

Djilas understood perfectly that the Titoist bureaucracy has done (and had to do) a great deal of talking about democratization, but that the time had come to ask: When is something really going to be done that changes the "old methods" essentially?

On Dec. 27 he wrote that too few are concerned about questions like "the role of authority and social organizations, freedom of culture, real freedom of criticism, a real and not only a theoretical and oral fight against bureaucracy, etc. I cannot see any zeal to find answers to these questions. But if the answers do not exist in the heads of leaders and authorities, that does not mean that these questions do not exist and that there are not other people who are looking for answers and finding them. But with us everything is too limited; we have too much prescribed truth, truth which has to come from the top."

One of the Titoists' prize exhibits to prove their "democratization" was their decrees establishing "workers' councils" in the plants. [For analysis, see LA for Nov. 27, 1950.] This was supposed to make possible "economic democracy" in spite of the fact that no "political" democracy existed—as if the one could be separated from the other. In any case, Djilas apparently failed to be impressed by the paraphernalia of "economic democracy" which was set up. So we gather from the criticism by Kardelj (at the CC plenum) that "Comrade Djilas never really understood" the whole business of workers' councils, people's committees, etc. that was supposed to be a substitute for political democracy—and which, of course, could not be.

Furthermore Djilas states (in the article printed in this issue) that the party did not take its clear-cut anti-bureaucratic stand until its transformation into the Communist League—that is, not until the 6th Congress in 1952. This is quite a commentary on the claims that were made from 1948 on, by socialist pro-Titoists of various sorts in Europe, that the Tito regime was already on the road to socialist democracy. And of course, Djilas has now discovered, if he did not know before, that the 6th Congress and the subsequent Brioni plenum inaugurated something quite different from what he thought.

"Bevanite"?

One last comment is necessary before we leave the subject of Djilas's views.

Those views are important only insofar as they re-

fect the thinking that is going on in Yugoslav circles about the necessity of opposing the regime in the name of socialist democracy. It would be quite beside the point to look upon them as any theoretical contributions.

On the contrary, from the ideological standpoint they are chock-full of weaknesses and mistakes, which are worth noting mainly because the bureaucracy has used them to make hay for its own side.

Djilas says quite clearly that it is necessary to revise "all our ideas," on practically everything except the elements of Marxism; and it is hard to say just what is percolating in his own thinking as a replacement. There are quite a number of indications that his rethinking is taking place under the main influence of Western social-democratic ideas—and we mean reformist ideas.

At the CC plenum it was said by one speaker that Djilas was getting known by everybody as a "Bevanite," and a great deal was made of his trips to the West, influence on him from Western socialists, etc. All that may well be true.

Theoretical Weakness

Thus, in the article reprinted in this issue, as well as in others, the reader will note that, more or less clearly, Djilas is advocating the rejection not only of Stalinism, or "the Stalinist version of Leninism," but also Leninism itself. Sometimes he seems to make a distinction, sometimes not. To be sure, his understanding of what a presumably non-Stalinist Leninism is, does not seem sharply differentiated in his mind from "the Stalinist version of Leninism."

More important, because more concrete, is his tendency toward a completely non-class approach toward democracy. This was the main theoretical point of attack on him at the CC plenum, and here they had him by the short hair, even though it was only a means of evading the important issues he had raised. Tito and Kardelj kept emphasizing at the plenum: In none of his 19 articles has Djilas even mentioned the working class once. . . . And this is true.

Nor does it seem to be an oversight on Djilas's part. Without taking the time to detail the evidence, our own impression is that Djilas does in fact keep his discussion of democracy on a completely abstract plane.

This theoretical inadequacy weakens him badly for a struggle inside his movement.

Naturally, there is a vast difference between an abstract-democratic approach in a capitalist state, where the problem is precisely to stress the social content of democracy, and such an approach in a state where the economy is satisfied and the central problem is the democratization of society. In the first case, an abstract-democrat becomes quite futile. In Yugoslavia, even an abstract-democratic approach automatically has a social meaning and a social and political impact.

But it is a weakness that has not helped Djilas's fight.

(Continued next week)

and find its expression in many different ways and degrees of intensity—beginning with the struggle for the country, a determination which is shared by the immense, I say immense, majority of the citizens; to the education of the children of this, and for this, country; ending up with the writers, painters, scholars and Marxist ideologists. The time is past when we were alone, when only we Communists were convinced socialists.

In short, one can say that before and during the war the Yugoslav Communist Party was the revolutionary party of the workers and revolutionary intellectuals. But during the war and after the war the party more and more took on "peasants' and office clerks' garb," so to speak. In the same measure, also, its internal life has changed.

By this I do not mean to say that the Communist League is "better" or "worse" than the Yugoslav Communist Party, but only that they no longer are or can be the same organization.

Regardless of these things, one fact stands out beyond any doubt, namely, that the Communist Party, up to the time it took its clear-cut anti-bureaucratic stand (which approximately coincides with its transformation into the Communist League); was attractive to many people because it was the ruling party and therefore membership in it, though it did not secure special privileges, was a certificate of trustworthiness and a recommendation with which it was easier to find better jobs. The same thing could not have been said about the Communist Party, either before or during the war. In those days few aspired to membership in the party. During the so-called "bureaucratic era," however, membership increased overnight.

What is the situation today? Today we see that the membership is not only not increasing but that it is decreasing. Of course, it is not important whether this phenomenon is "good" or "bad." What is clear to me is that in view of the present trends our methods of work cannot remain the same, and that, alas, many of our inherited and newly acquired ideological and political doctrines must share the same fate.

AGAINST OLD FORMS

The old pre-revolutionary and revolutionary Yugoslav Communist Party no longer exists. What has survived is its positive revolutionary heritage, and its old cadres, its Communists, and the people. No matter how nostalgic we may be about the old Yugoslav Communist Party, we must reckon with facts, that is, the people, and we must think about what to do in the changed conditions, and how to do it.

The battle for democracy and against the outmoded social forms and antiquated ways of thinking must be fought by the Communists, by those trained and experienced cadres who, through sleepless nights and by efforts beyond human endurance (physical and mental collapse and even death), shouldered and carried through the heaviest burdens during the period of reconstruction (I include here such projects as compulsory collection of food from the peasants, the building of industry, struggle with the Cominformists). Only such people, disinterested, imbued with the spirit of sacrifice, modest and discreet, as we know them from the days of the revolution, are fit to carry on this battle. Only people who do not look at democracy and socialism through the prism of their own personal interests, but who see in the achievement of socialism the fulfillment of their own personal happiness, are capable of being and remaining the pillars of and the motive force in the process of our democratic re-education and transformation.

There can be no democracy in our country without Communists and without their active and leading collaboration. This, their leading role, must somehow be manifested also in the organizational setup of the country. Without Communists there would be no Yugoslavia. This, however, does not mean that the Communists should be organized and work according to the old pattern. For neither organizational forms nor methods were, for the Communists, anything but means to achieve their final aims: to destroy the power of the bourgeoisie, to expropriate all exploiters, etc. Socialism, and democracy can be built only from the building material which we have acquired in our revolution. This material is not bad. It has withstood terrible pressures and devastating fires. Well, these pressures and fires are no longer worrying us; they are past.

III

NEW FORM OF WORK

The conditions under which we have to work have changed. The socialist economy is more or less free. Socialist consciousness is on the increase in the towns. Against the enemies of socialism we can now use the law as a sufficient physical means of enforcement, while on the political field propaganda and campaigning seem to be powerful enough to achieve their ends. On the other hand, Stalinist ideology and practices, including the monopoly of the party apparatus over men's ideological, political and other activity, are breaking up everywhere.

Under these changed conditions the basic [party] organizations of the Communist League in the towns have nothing more to do along the old party pattern, since no longer do they directly control either the political or economic life. There is hardly anything to do for the old professional party members, not to speak of the younger officials of the League. It would be untrue and inhuman to deny today the enormous value of the old party officials in the past, or to say that we could have achieved all our democratic aims without them. No, without them all our democratic songs would be empty dreaming and threshing of empty straw. But one must agree that salaried party officials are a thing

Bureaucratism, Party Discipline

of the past. By this I do not mean to say that society has no moral obligations to take care of them. They have sacrificed much—their youth, their health, their training for a living—in order to enable us to achieve the form of society we have now.

Yes, Communists—real Communists at that, who are revolutionaries and democrats—will be more and more needed in the future. But what I think is no longer necessary are certain precisely circumscribed forms and functions, or the limitations of these forms and functions within the Communist League and outside it. The roots of the evil are in the present organizational forms and in the style and methods of work; in the fact that the old concepts and methods continued to be used under the new conditions when the masses of Communists, and of the people for that matter, can more directly influence the decisions.

That is why the present methods of activity in the basic [party] organizations of our towns are not only unfruitful but we have also become a direct obstacle to a more productive and creative activity of the Communists themselves, an obstacle to shaping and perfecting their own personalities, an obstacle in the Communists' struggle for democracy, an obstacle to their useful collaboration in the political and national life of the country. The present methods are a handicap for the Communists, for they waste their precious time, kill their will to work, and are a source of confusion for their conscience.

The final aim for a true Communist is not some kind of abstract party, catering exclusively to Communists. The aim should be the people and the lifting up its socialist consciousness, the education of the people for democracy, and the establishment of concrete means of fighting for democracy and preserving it within the framework of respect for law, of the rights of citizens, etc.

CHANGING THE PARTY

That is why I think that the Communists need no longer discuss current problems outside the Socialist Alliance, that is, need no longer discuss first in the Communist League and "pass them on" only after they have been debated there. This need does not exist for the majority of the urban centers. In rural areas the transformation can follow a slower pace. I emphasize that we are now talking about a "course of events," about "orientations," and no longer about something that has to be done overnight. We have reached a stage where we have no longer need to be precipitate in our decisions.

The purpose of my discussion is not to propose forms of activity. But since we are dealing with that problem, let me give my opinion on that also. Meetings of the basic [party] organizations of the Communist League are neither necessary nor useful if the only problems on the agenda are those of daily political activity, except for some special problems (important political changes or political dangers). However, it is necessary and useful that Communists join the Socialist Alliance as simple members and work.

After that, what then remains for the basic organizations of the Communist League? The election of a leadership and delegates and the above-mentioned—exceptional—political activity. And something very important, more important than anything else: the internal political life. This is the most sensitive aspect of the question, because people will not stand for it and cannot be imbued with enthusiasm when they are ordered around and treated as immature beings. This political life can be organized only on the basis of personal inclinations and complete free will. It cannot be obligatory for anyone. There is only one form possible, that of lecture plus discussion, because it is voluntary and fitted to the inclination and intellectual level of the audience. But it should not be restricted only to Communists; it should be public and open to all those who are interested. The lectures may be various, from the most abstract theories and analyses of current political events up to cultural, scientific and educational subjects. In this way we would overcome the ideological differences between the Communists and the other citizens, granting no privileges to the former or to the others. However, it is most important that the Communist personality remains respected.

THE NEW LEAGUE

In this way the Communist League would change from the old party into a real living League of ideologically closely linked men. The careerists and opportunists would lose their interest in party membership overnight. Likewise the struggle for its purity, for the image of a pure Communist, would cease overnight. The one who is not "pure" will quit by himself and become "inactive," because there would be no personal advantages for him—except ideas, except Communist idealism; but that could be so only for real Communists. The Communists would be active wherever they live and act as citizens. The number of Communists in the organizations will be smaller, but the Communists and their ideas will be spread all over. No one will "control" their activity and "line," and no one will give them "directives." Moreover, on the basis of already discussed theses and lectures they will adopt their standpoints on local problems, on social life, and on unsolved problems of their life and activity.

The present Communist League would "weaken," "wither away" as a classical party, and on the other hand the conscious role, ties and real discipline of the pure Communists would be strengthened. The Communist League would gradually take on the character of an ideologically strong and far-flung core but lose its party character. It would merge with the Socialist Alliance, and the Communists with the ordinary citizens.

Why should this be bad for the Communists or for socialism? On the contrary, the Socialist Alliance would

become a socialist factor and would not be a self-elected elite of Communists. The role of personality would grow—on the basis of an individual's quality and role among the masses and not only on the basis of his position in the party committee or administration. The direct political role of the masses would also grow, and likewise that of the people, who would decide most political problems by themselves and without imposed, patented and enforced leaders and formulas. Thus the good Communists who have talent would become the ideological and political leaders, although not so quickly and easily. Very quickly—without regular attendance at dull and meaningless meetings and without ideological education—it would be clearly known just who are the Communists *de facto* and who prefer the people, democracy and socialism more than their own personal advantage.

THIS ISN'T RUSSIA!

By the way, I add that book-grinding, and the repetition of this or that statement that some functionary wisely made, or "book knowledge" about some theses, are widely considered to be ideological activities. In the same way the Church looks upon its faithful and endeavors to infuse them with faith and to save their souls with apostolic sophistry.

Ideology is more or less everything that has its roots in society and enters the mind through man's activity in society. Education, music, literature, radio, movies, theater, social and family ethical norms—all come under this head. It would seem that the real struggle for ideology would be only the struggle that raises the cultural and scientific level in all spheres of intellectual life in the society, or which does the same thing for the individual in an ever-greater and unimposed degree. As for theories and practices which teach outmoded rules and change living socialist ideas into a non-existent socialist religion, neither of these is ideological. Socialism and the struggle for socialism is all of life here, in the cities, in all regions and in all forms, and not just one of its political branches.

The present imposed, dull, outmoded and bureaucratic forms of ideological activity here remind us of those existing in Soviet Russia. However, we are not the Soviet Union, and our Communists are not servile officials of Stalin. There they teach and are taught what Stalin said, what Marx and Lenin preached—but there the shedding of innocent human blood, despotism, famine and backwardness still exist. This ideological activity in the Soviet Union has no connection with science and life. Its goals are not science and life. Such forms of activity are very good tools for keeping the people in their backwardness. These forms of activity are like anesthetics for consciousness, by means of which the consciousness is operated on for the benefit of sinister bosses and despotic masters.

In this case it would be useful to check history and take a look around. Except for the Stalinist movements there are no other workers' movements in the world which have forms of activity like those we have in our Communist League. In spite of that, these anti-Stalinist movements live and develop, although they have no police, no courts and no press behind their backs. Lenin's party had no such forms of activity (obligatory education, led by committees and the professional apparatus, obligatory attendance at meetings of the basic party organizations). These forms of activity and these organizational principles became the forms of the authoritarian apparatus after Lenin.

Although we are able to explain why this exists here and to justify it, it is not clear why it should still be so.

IV

THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM

Yugoslavia is the only country in the world possessing men and movements that claim to be Leninist (the Stalinists and Trotskyists are evidently not). We have no reason to be ashamed of that; on the contrary. But there is no reason for it. We must be consistent to the end—if we really want to be socialists.

No one would be more astonished than Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin] if he could see what has become of his ideas and works in his country. Vladimir Ilyich did not propose to create a new ideology (a higher phase of Marxism), as Stalin said he did, at least not one that established everlasting and unchangeable forms. As he said, the principal element of his teachings was his teaching on the state (on the struggle for power and revolution), and, in this connection, his teachings on the party. However, his teachings and his forms (a party of a certain kind) were fitted to a certain period, that is, to the period of preparing for the struggle for power, the destruction and expropriation of the bourgeoisie.

We built our Leninist party and later our state with our own forces, but under the influence of Lenin's ideas and Stalin's interpretation of Leninism. Many theses in our theory and many forms of our practice, which we consider to be genuine products of Marxism, are a heritage from Stalin. If they fitted into our open revolutionary struggle, they do not fit today. This is true not only for our Leninist-Stalinist forms and ideas, but also for pure Leninist forms and ideas (except in the most general form).

No one can diminish the great world-historical importance of the October Revolution and of Lenin, for socialism in general and for us in particular. But in the best case, it was only a step in theoretical and practical development, and cannot be of exclusive value today. Reality has changed; the Soviet Union has become state-capitalist, and monopoly capitalism has turned into state-capitalism.

Among these outmoded forms and ideas belongs, as

the first and most important one, also our party, our Communist League. The Yugoslav Communist Party was good—such as it was—for the preparation of the armed struggle and for the armed struggle itself. But if it remains as it is, it will stand in the way of development. Its present forms, which formerly were revolutionary, are changing into undemocratic forms and despotism, because they do not fit into the socialist trends of a socialist society.

No one is thinking of being against the Communist League. We are only against the Stalinist remnants within the party, or to put it better, against Stalin's version of Lenin's party, because this delays development, especially the development of democracy.

That isn't all. The basic question is the work of the basic party organizations and their ideological activity. This involves mainly the question of the old trends and the struggle for new ones. The old Communist Party had many of these trends. If we do not renounce the old forms, we cannot speak about changes in the main role of the CPY and stress that the Communist League is something different from the CPY, or from Stalin's version of Lenin's party. Because centralized and obligatory ideological activity was the basis of the old CPY (and of every revolutionary party), some comrades, accustomed to the old principles, consider that the gradual weakening of these principles means a liquidation of the Communist League and a renunciation of Communism and Socialism.

Lenin's form of party and state (the dictatorship based on the party) has become obsolete, and must become obsolete always and everywhere as soon as the revolutionary situation is past and democracy begins to come alive. It is understood that we are referring to the Leninist form in a most general way, because this form is variable and could be different from that of Lenin. Our form of party and state was also different—sometimes it was more Leninistically centralized and ideologically uniform—and expressed the practical needs of revolution or the influence of Stalinism.

NO DEAD DOGMAS

Our progress can develop in two directions: toward a Leninist form of state and party, which today cannot be democratic, or toward a renunciation of that form, in favor of others that are more democratic, free and decentralized forms of political life and political struggle. The more flexible and free the forms of political and ideological activity that appear, the less dogmatism and the more democratic and human relations among the comrades and citizens of our country. At present these forms are just trends. We can delay that choice, but we cannot avoid it.

The democratic changes that we are discussing will have enormous results in the further development of our social-intellectual and political progress. The reason for and the basis of these changes lie in economic development and economic relations. However, obsolete political and intellectual forms are able to delay economic development. Social development and movement in society mean the unity of conscious elements and unorganized masses—unity of contradictory elements which constantly reinforce each other or push each other forward in order to be more linked together and bound to each other.

These changes, of democracy and a free struggle of opinions, cannot provoke deep social repercussions and troubles. Development and reform are creative and revolutionary. This has become possible in our country today, after the revolution, on the basis of social ownership in industry and commerce, and at a time of developing democracy and growing independence.

All of our present theories—esthetic, philosophical, ethical, as well as political, economic and social, the last three especially—will be shaken or already have been shaken in everything except fundamentals by the social changes that have taken place with us. The basic materialist theses and discoveries (Marx's and the Marxists') will remain. But it is also true that they will remain only if they develop; otherwise they will remain as dead truths, dogmas, truths that used to be truths but are no longer, because a truth can survive as truth only if it develops.

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Youth and Student Corner

Racist Frats on the Campuses

By BOGDAN DENITCH

All observers note that racism in America is on the decline—that is, official racism. As evidence of this trend it is only necessary to cite the policy of inter-racial integration in the armed services, as distinct from the racist policy still followed under President Roosevelt during World War II, and the increasing success of the court cases against discrimination and segregation itself in the school system.

There are many reasons for the advances in this field: for one thing, there is the American need to fully utilize its manpower now that it is the world leader of one of the two camps; and the effect of the trade-union movement, particularly the CIO, and the effects of years of education. As a result, cases of outrages and lynchings (which many Europeans seem to think are daily occurrences in the U. S.) are becoming rare.

As a matter of fact, only the Stalinists

claim that there is an increase of racism in America. They do this in order to tie in the "increase of racism" with the American war drive, as a matter of propaganda—whereas it is precisely the war drive (and the resultant manpower shortages) which has been one of the forces militating against racism in the U. S.

It is not odd, therefore, that the campuses, reflecting this trend, are cracking down on the last hold-outs of racism in the Northern colleges—the fraternities.

The question of fraternities and their discriminatory practices has been debated on many campuses and even in the National Student Association. This latter organization, which represents pretty much every college in the U. S., has taken a very weak stand on the question, "recommending" that discrimination be abolished.

Some campuses have taken more concrete steps. The best known is the so-called "Michigan Plan." The Michigan

Plan, put into practice at the University of Michigan, is very simple: all fraternities are given a specific amount of time (usually one year) in which to remove all restrictive sections of their charters or be denied campus recognition. Faced with this choice many local fraternities comply with the student government's demand, only to find themselves expelled by their national fraternity.

Right now the University of Chicago is involved in a hassle with one of its fraternities which refuse either to remove the restrictive provisions or to leave the national fraternity. The University of Chicago, which long used to be a pioneer in questions of this type, seems reluctant to take any specific steps against the fraternity in question. This seems to be an unfortunate side result of the university's recent drive toward respectability.

Of course, from the point of view of a socialist student, fraternities as such are a reactionary and undesirable influence on the campus. The healthiest policy with respect to fraternities is the policy Antioch College follows: not to permit any to be formed. However, as long as the fraternities do exist, the trend toward democratizing these citadels of snobbery and class prejudice should be welcomed and supported.

The fraternities base themselves on exclusive membership—that is, they exclude or take in whomever they wish. On the contrary, it is a good policy for student governments to insist that all school organizations be open to all students without discrimination on any ground.

The question of discrimination by campus organizations has long been a very touchy one in most of the Northern colleges. Many of the more liberal ones will not charter a campus organization if it has clauses in its constitution which make it racially exclusive. Many, while forbidding fraternities, allow religious and social organizations to be inclusive of only one group—for example, the Hillel Foundation clubs which on most campuses are exclusively Jewish, formally or in practice. This often raises difficult questions.

In the opinion of this writer, such organizations (while often formed primarily for Catholic students or Negro students or Jewish students, etc.) should be required to make their membership open to all interested students, if they are to be legally recognized, given school funds and facilities, and so on.

Needless to say, the question is very clear in the case of the racist fraternities, which refuse to admit Negro students or Jewish students or other categories. Such racist fraternities often use civil-libertarian arguments to prove that they should not be banned. They say: "You liberal students disapprove of discrimination. We on the other hand disapprove of Communists. If you allow groups on campus which spread totalitarian un-American ideas, why ban us?"

Liberal student leaders avoid this dilemma by answering: "Yes, we are for banning Communist organizations too! We are consistent."

But I do not believe that a student political organization should be banned for any reason that is based simply on its views (including racism), but only for overt actions which are properly to be banned. Thus, let a fraternity "advocate" racism all it wants; but if it practices discrimination, it should be denied school recognition.

Reynolds at Forum On Puerto Rico

The joint forum of the SYL-YPSL in New York heard the noted pacifist fighter for Puerto Rican independence, Ruth Reynolds, speak on February 22. Miss Reynolds, although a pacifist, had been arrested by the island authorities, charged with "conspiracy" to overthrow the U. S. government in Puerto Rico. In her talk Miss Reynolds outlined the long struggle for Puerto Rican independence and the terrible conditions on the island.

She pointed out that the famous "referendum" (a) did not include the choice of independence and (b) was deliberately boycotted for that very reason by a large proportion of the population in response to the urgings of the Nationalist Party. Under the present status Puerto Rico still is liable to all U. S. tariffs, its young men are drafted into the U. S. armed forces and its Court of Appeals sits in Boston—otherwise Puerto Rico is "almost" free.

An interesting sidelight on the industrialization of Puerto Rico is the method the island government uses to attract American capital. The corporations receive tax exemptions for twelve years and a free plant (built by the government)! With these inducements it is no wonder that capital is flocking to Puerto Rico—although it must be noted that for a decade Puerto Rico had been built up with state-financed planned development which took place under a New-Dealish governor who had been in touch with the American socialist movement. Today this friend of Norman Thomas, Clarence Senior, etc. is not for independence.

New Bulletin

The third issue of the joint-SYL-YPSL Discussion Bulletin is now available. This issue includes the draft program and draft constitution for the projected Young Socialist League, in view of the proposed merger of the two youth organizations. A copy is 10 cents, and may be ordered from either the SYL or YPSL national offices.

THE LAST WORD

Comrade Richard DeHaan writes in, apropos of the letter by Victor Howard in our Jan. 18 issue:

"Contrary to Comrade Howard, the proposal to hold the Third Camp Conference in Des Moines or some other Midwestern city was 'a part of the instructions given to its delegate to the planning conference' by the Libertarian Socialist Committee, and was not 'his personal idea.'"

REMEMBER

The Young Socialist Unity convention takes place February 12-14 in New York, as scheduled.

YOU and SCIENCE

Some Fallacies of 'Parapsychology'

By CARL DARTON

Parapsychology and "psi" continues to be with us. In fact its vogue appears to be on the upsurge again. Rhine's latest book *New World of the Mind* has just been published. Now we have a favorable article in *Life* magazine (January 11) by Aldous (*Brave New World*) Huxley.

At the risk of starting a literary feud, which we do not feel is warranted by the subject, we will comment on the *Life* article. You will recall that "psi" generally refers to a paranormal human faculty which can foresee events (precognition), be aware of the contents of other people's minds (telepathy) and manifest other phenomena which indicate the ability of "mind" to influence "matter."

We believe that for each paranormal experience outlined in the *Life* article a naturalistic explanation can be given and for each personal account of an unusual experience can be given a comparative personal incident which cancels out the paranormal explanation of "psi." Paranormal means "besides" and "beyond" the normal faculty. We realize that parapsychology is more than an accounting of personal experiences, but such experiments as Rhine carries out are an attempt to prove "scientifically" that they are evidence of the existence of "psi."

Let us take incident in Huxley's article. The first is the classic one of precognition: a woman dreams of her soldier-son's death overseas. It develops later that her son did die, within a few hours of the time of her dream. This is a personal incident; let us be equally personal. We believe that most of us can recall many incidents of "precognition" which never worked out, that is, where we thought something was going to happen but it never did. The writer, for instance, as many of us do, travels to and from his daily work in a state of reverie, or thoughtfulness if you wish, to counteract the boredom of the passing scene which seems to change little from day to day.

THE PATTERN

During this period many thoughts pass through his mind and it is difficult to control the range of this introspection. Repeatedly, over the years, the writer has approached his home with the thought flashing through his mind that some accident (most precognitions are about accidents) has happened to a member of his family. Mostly this is a mere fleeting fear but occasionally, particularly after a "bad" day, within the five minutes before he approaches his front door, the fear of an accident becomes an obsession. By the time he rushes into his house he is convinced that something has happened this time. Fortunately, over the years nothing has happened seriously, and really very little or nothing which matches his fears.

We do not believe that these personal trepidations are unusual and literally thousands—yes, millions—of such inci-

dents occur throughout the world's population. Practically all of these "match up" with nothing and are forgotten. Is it strange that of the millions of such forethoughts, a few "match up" with real-life incidents such as are described in the *Life* article? When they do, what is to be gained by looking for "psi" in such "unexplainable premonitions"?

Take a second account in Huxley's article. This is the well-known "fire-walking" practiced by Indian mystics. How can this be accounted for other than by the "triumph of mind over matter"? At the risk of writing too personally in this column, we will give an account of the writer's faculty for "fire-walking," not with our feet but "on our hands" yet.

SIMPLE MAGIC

In pursuit of livelihood, we often have occasion to inspect hot objects, which will be nameless, as they came off a production line. They are so hot that the workers who normally handle them wear heavy leather gloves. It gives this writer considerable amusement to walk up to the line, pick up the hot product and hold it in his bare hands. The onlooker's facial expression changes from expectation that the hot object will be dropped to one of amazement as it continues to be held in the bare hand.

The explanation is very simple. The hot object is held with the very tips of the fingers and in such a manner that the area of the hand on the hot surface is kept at the very minimum. In addition, the article is shifted from finger to finger, almost unperceivably, so that the tips are air-cooled as fast as the heat is transferred. This "art" has been learnt over the years and the point is that what appears to be an impossible faculty has a perfectly naturalistic explanation.

This we believe to be true, ultimately, of all "psychic" phenomena. Not that this can be proved to "believers." Nor do the writer's personal accounts have much scientific standing. However, it is probable that "psi" can never be disproved scientifically for it poses questions which by their very nature are unanswerable. On the other hand humanity, and science, have made their progress by framing questions which are meaningful enough to have answers.

Further, we believe that parapsychology can find credence only in an age which is half-scientific. In times of frustration like ours it is nice to believe in the impossible, not the "impossible" which can be brought into being by work and effort but that of the mystical and the irrational. It is true that science has made many "miracles" possible, but they only look like miracles from the outside. To the workers who have produced them they are merely the artful combination of hard work, rational thinking, human imagination and aspirations which have naturalistic foundations.

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to speak your mind in the letter column of Labor Action. Our policy is to publish letters of general political interest, regardless of views. Keep them to 500 words.