

LABOR ACTION

Independent Socialist Weekly

'REUTHERISM' AND THE UAW

... page 2

Who Rules in Czechoslovakia?

... page 6

Ike Cracks Down—McCarthy Wins

... page 3

The FBI and Your Rights

... page 5

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FIVE CENTS

As Moscow Drives Toward a Cold-War Truce — WHERE DOES U.S. POLICY GO FROM HERE?

By HAL DRAPER

The Moscow Mystery understandably grabbed all attention this week, as columnists, correspondents and other miscellaneous "Russian experts" engaged in the guessing-game over the new moves of the Kremlin; but meanwhile too few eyes are fixed on the question marks that hang over Washington.

That capital, which likes to regard itself as the doer and shaker of the world, seems to be frozen in attention on "What will They do next?"

If you take a step back from the world scene and look it over with fresh eye, there could be no clearer dramatic tableau of the emptiness and impotence of American foreign policy, which has nothing to do or say, itself, to make even a pretense of seizing initiative in the situation.

It was the new Russian masters, after the death of Stalin, who warned against "disarray and panic" in their own ranks; but there is no mystery about the disarray—yes, and even something like panic—in Washington, as we shall see.

Just look at it! Here is a new and shakier Russian regime, inevitably weakened as it tries to find its legs without Stalin's iron hand, beset with new internal problems (on almost anybody's theory), forced into concessions to its own people in order to woo their tolerance, in the process of changing lines with a certain amount of unavoidable confusion spreading throughout all classes in its whole domain—and the political strategists of the U. S. stand by in hypnotized futility, while the Kremlin bids fair to play the role of "bringing" peace to the world!

It is not we, socialist critics of U. S. imperialism as we are uncompromising enemies of Stalinism, who are surprised, shocked or confused by this spectacle. We have had every right to expect it from a foreign policy which has distinguished itself throughout the cold war as powerless to make any progressive appeal to the peoples of the world and powerless to take any political initiative against the rival imperialism of Russian bureaucratic collectivism.

But ours has been the opinion of a small socialist minority. What about those others—from rightist conservatives to ex-radical renegades—who express faith in the ability of "the West" (meaning American capitalism) to offer a lead to the world?

We submit that the main reasons for this impotence are not only plain but have been spoken aloud and written down in



EISENHOWER

the last few days. And they do not arise primarily from the incompetence and plain nincompoopery of the Eisenhower crowd as they wriggle under Joe McCarthy's pressure.

The New Kremlin Masters Need Peace

Only one of the reasons, and not a major one, is the fact now exposed to the blindest observer that Washington has little understanding of its Stalinist enemy. What, for example, do they think now of the initial reaction in the capital that Stalin's death removed the "moderating influence" in Moscow?

Those "experts"—like Hanson Baldwin and the editors of *U. S. News & World Report*, not to speak of Earl Browder—who saw the accession of Malenkov under the sign of war have reason to be discombobulated now and start talking wildly about fundamental changes in Stalinism taking place. But there is no reason for such disorientation for those who understood from the beginning that the death of Stalin faced the new masters with the No. 1 task of turning inward to internal consolidation.

As this is written, there is every sign that Moscow is swinging the pendulum hard toward a temporary truce in the cold war—its so-called "peace offensive." Agreement has already been reported reached at Panmunjom on sick and disabled prisoners of war. Before this issue is read, it is not even impossible that an end to the Korean fighting may already be in sight.

THE PENDULUM SWINGS

It has all the symptoms of a thoroughgoing turn in policy as, in addition to the Korean negotiations, the Russians call a four-power conference on air safety over Germany; rescind their move to transfer the U. S., British and Indian embassies in Moscow to new locations; dress up

Molotov for a friendly chat ("courtesy call") with the U. S. chargé d'affaires in Moscow; make arrangements to repatriate British and French internees in Korea; open the Iron Curtain to a group of American journalists to visit Russia; agree with the Western states on a new secretary-general for the UN; mingle socially with Americans at a U. S. embassy affair in Moscow; suddenly return 171 Japanese fishermen captured by Stalinist vessels in the past year; ease controls on the highway between West Berlin and West Germany; issue a statement via General Chuikov (overlord of East Germany) welcoming steps to negotiate a peace treaty and reunification of Germany; etc.

If these "peace" moves are really directed toward easing the cold-war tension while the new Moscow rulers mend fences at home, the internal signs of easement are as relevant to the picture as the foreign-policy moves. We commented on the amnesty for non-political prisoners last week; in addition there has been the latest price cut announced for the Russian people. In this context lies part of the significance of the unusual reversal by the Kremlin on the case of the Jewish doctors.

IMPACT ON WEST

But if the trend is toward internal appeasement it is not only with the masses in mind, though their appeasement is also served by such notification of an easement in the government terror. The other part of the new regime's need for internal consolidation doubtless revolves around rivalries within the bureaucracy.

We need not here follow the various and speculative theories that have put forward with regard to the nature of the precise personal and clique lineups. (No one knows, and more or less informed guesses can take place in other columns of *LABOR ACTION*.) What is most certain now is that such jockeyings for power are taking place, even if it is not the kind of disruptive cutthroat struggle for power which some expected the day after Stalin's death. The best evidence for this is, to date, the dismissal of Ignatiev, the secret-police head fired for "political blindness and gullibility" in the case of the doctors, and removed from the Secretariat on which he was placed only the other week.

It is not, however, with the many remaining Kremlin mysteries that we are concerned with in this article, but rather with the impact on the West of the big FACT that has emerged: Russia's swing of the pendulum toward a "peace" deal.

'Repudiation' of Stalinism?

It is this that has apparently rocked so many pundits of the press off their base—if they had any base. There is now talk of a deal for "lasting peace." There is even more talk, twice as ignorant, of the new regime's "repudiation" of Stalinism.

Truly the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, J. E. Johnson, returning from Asia in the midst of the furor, said that there are "no experts on Russia, only varying

degrees of ignorance"; and speaking of the same type of "Russian expert," which includes himself, columnist Max Lerner wrote that "you are out in the wild blue yonder with only your hunch and your ignorance to sustain you." For example, illustrating what he means by the wild blue yonder, the same Lerner threw out the possibility that maybe "what we are witnessing is the burial of Stalin in a deeper sense"—that is, the burial of Stalinism.

We ourselves look to neither hunches nor special "inside dope" (straight off the boat from that "recently arrived Russian refugee" who must be spreading some of the wild stories which get into print), but to the more prosaic tool of political analysis of the Stalinist system and its dynamics.

In this light it is plain ignorance for so many bourgeois pundits to speak unqualifiedly of the Kremlin's reversal on the Jewish doctors as "without precedent" (the *Paris Le Monde*) or as a "repudiation of Stalin's work" (the *N. Y. Times*). To be sure, it is without precedent in specific respects, but, to correct the prevalent emphasis, it is important to remem-



MOLOTOV

ber that the pattern which it indicates (along with the amnesty) is the same pattern that we saw when Beria first came up to the top as head of the secret police, in the backwash of the Great Purges of the '30s. Then too scapegoats were fired, arrested and denounced for too-zealous purging, in order to announce to the people that a turn was being made toward ending the immediate frenzy of trials, denunciations and fear.

SECOND HONEYMOON?

This is not intended to negate the idea that this dramatic reversal is of first-class importance in indicating the jockeying that must be taking place at the top; it is only intended to scotch the ignorant notion that such a step means a "repudiation" of the system erected by Stalin. Stalin's years saw frenetic purges and also sharp letups, periods of intensified terror and also periods of illusions about "liberalization."

The *New York Post* editorialized on April 6: "The amnesty . . . is nothing less than a repudiation of the all-wise, all-knowing rule of Joseph Stalin." If this is repudiation, then Stalin repudiated himself dozens of times.

Why do these notions crop up now? (Turn to last page)

All Out to the
Anti-Franco Rallies
In New York City!

Mon.-Tues., April 13-14:
PICKET LINES

Wed., April 15:
PUBLIC MEETINGS

See Page 7
for the details.

Auto Workers

Concluding Our Report on—

'REUTHERISM' AND THE UAW CONVENTION

(Continued from last week)

By BEN HALL

The 2,600 UAW convention delegates were elected from among the most active unionists in the shops and provide an accurate cross-section of the present local leadership. Like the composition of the membership, which is changing as hundreds of thousands of new recruits flocking into the union, it too is changing.

New locals are inevitably led by relatively inexperienced men, unaware of old rank-and-file and unacquainted with the democratic traditions of the UAW arising out of internal discussions and caucus fights which they never witnessed. Unlike the veterans of UAW struggles who molded and created working-class public opinion in the shops as active, alert representatives of caucuses and groupings, the newcomers tend to reflect the thinking of the new layers of unionists—not only their legitimate and progressive demands but also their conservative moods.

Here is the source of complaints by the top leadership, at the Cleveland Educational Conference last year as well as at this convention; that its publicly proclaimed social aims and its inspiring ultimate goals somehow never filter down into the shops. The union grows rapidly but its conscious cadres develop slowly. A gap develops between what Reutherism pronounces on top and what actually exists below.

This is the new internal problem of the administration and the more it strives to tighten and unify the union by administrative devices, the wider this gap becomes.

The old local leaders still act as a stimulus and a prod, as they did at the convention, on speedup, on the five-year-contract question and on several organizational matters.

ON SPEEDUP

Local leaders from the Big Three (Chrysler, General Motors and Ford) reminded the union of an ever-present and increasingly intense speedup drive back home. "Management is moving in like it did in 1937," said a GM delegate, "Speedup is worse now than it ever was and we need new language in our agreement to combat it."

From Chrysler Local 7: "We are working harder now than ten years ago. Slowdowns are supposed to be illegal. Men have been fired for fighting speedup and our grievance machinery is inadequate to handle it. The red tape of strike votes cannot grapple with speedup because the men must take immediate action or weaken their case."

And from Ford Local 200 a delegate expressed whole-hearted endorsement of the sentiment from Chrysler, pointing out that 25 men were fired in his plant for resisting speedup.

The convention resolution reiterated the union position: it will give full authorization and support to local strikes against speedup. Reuther said: "The only basic answer is eternal vigilance on every line in every department. Use your power but with a sense of discipline."

Nevertheless, this is one of the "unsolved" issues; it remains a focus of discontent which cannot be eliminated shop by shop and which will arise again and again. Local leaders look for a new approach and none is forthcoming.

LONG-TERM CONTRACTS

An undercurrent of dissatisfaction has been mounting among leaders of large locals against five-year contracts. Their local membership loses interest in the union and grievances cannot be settled when conditions are frozen for long periods.

The convention resolution notes the demand upon big companies for a reopening of negotiations despite contracts which do not expire for several years, and it concludes: "in the event current negotiations do not bring about a satisfactory adjustment . . . the International Union and all local unions are directed not to negotiate any future contracts for a period in excess of two years."

But discontent was so sharp that many delegates were not satisfied; their suspicions were expressed by Stellato, who maintained that the top leadership was preparing to sign new long-term agreements after obtaining minor concessions from the Big Three.

In reply, however, Reuther indicated that the administration was preparing to modify its policy in response to the sentiments of local leaders. He asked endorsement of the resolution as a means of putting pressure on the companies during current negotiations. If they refuse to grant our demands, he said, we announce here and now that we will not sign any more long-term agreements. But if they do concede, he added, that does not mean that we will continue our former policy. We will decide that question when it arises with the expiration of our present agreements, he concluded.

Final action is thus postponed but the misgivings of wide sections of the union are already revealed.

Among the constitutional changes that arose for action were three proposals that would increase the power of the International Executive Board or minimize the influence of local memberships:

TRIAL PROCEDURE

The UAW constitution bars Communists, fascists,

and racketeers from holding office. Reports in the daily press indicated that a new trial procedure adopted by the convention gave the International Executive Board powers to review and alter decisions of local union trial committees in these cases. But this is misleading.

Actually, such a procedure was adopted four years ago, then strengthened and amplified two years ago. At Atlantic City, this year, it was extended further.

The substance of the change is as follows: Previously the clause referred to holding office; now it makes running for office an offense. Previously punishment was simply removal from office; now it allows disciplinary action including expulsion from the union.

The administration was totally unable to justify the harshness of these provisions; in fact, no one but the legal minds who devised them understood just what was proposed. A complicated document with cross-references to unfamiliar and unprinted sections of the old constitution was thrown to the delegates, who had to act within the hour on what Philadelphia lawyers required weeks to hatch.

But it was adopted by overwhelming vote; the delegates only had to know that it was directed against racketeers, who are never popular, and against Communists, whose democratic rights they will not defend.

COUNCIL MEETINGS AND LOCAL UNION ELECTIONS

But the same unquestioning faith was conspicuously absent on questions that aroused real feeling. The administration proposed to restrict council meetings to once a year; and when opposition rose, to twice a year. But a caucus organized by the Agricultural Implement Council campaigned against it and succeeded in defeating it on the floor.

Two years ago an administration move to lengthen the term of office in local unions was defeated by the convention. This year the constitutional committee renewed the suggestion; and once again delegates expressed their misgivings about the piling-up of power at the top and decrease of power below.

"We need local democracy now more than ever," said a Chrysler delegate. "The main problem is to get the ranks to participate not as shareholders in a bank but as a group deciding the destiny of their union. This proposal is another step in the direction of telling the ranks: you pay your dues and let the union deliver the goods."

A representative of Local 113, with 10,000 members in Muskegon, found a discrepancy between the change and "all the pretty speeches about democracy we have heard"; and from Local 287, with 5,000 members, came the request for local autonomy.

The balloting on this question was an example of scrupulous and rigid adherence to all the forms of democracy by chairman Reuther. After a hand vote he ruled that the committee report was adopted; but a rollcall was demanded. He ruled that the required number of hands, 775, was not raised. When he was challenged, he called a teller from each side to the platform requesting them to estimate the count. When one man indicated that he thought the rollcall demand had carried, the chairman organized an actual hand-by-hand count. The rollcall had won—812 votes.

The committee momentarily withdrew its proposal and later announced that it was willing to face a rollcall. (It would undoubtedly have won.) Reuther suggested a compromise: "Let us not divide the union on this issue. . . . It is a mistake to make the change when people feel so strongly. A small majority either way should not decide." An almost unanimous vote went for local autonomy in deciding whether or not to increase local terms of office to two years.

THE PAID STAFF

On these issues, as on others, representatives of big locals, who have grown up with the union and remember its earlier days, continue to inject vigor and life into UAW conferences and conventions. Nevertheless, even at the very heart of the union, in the key centers, local leadership has been weakened.

Many of the most capable men have been drained out of the locals and raised into the paid, appointed staff. These are the men who were once fighting rank-and-file leaders, aggressive, articulate, never intimidated, who brought caucus struggles down to the grass roots.

But they are no longer heard on the convention floor because they remain in the wings, voiceless paid appointees. Their tenure of office no longer depends upon the will of the ranks who once elected them to local positions but upon the whim of International Board members who hire and fire them.

They are comparatively well-paid, above the average industry wage-levels. Where once they participated in deciding union policies, they now simply execute policies enacted by others. Among the qualities which they must now cultivate are: silence when they disagree, and compliance with orders from above at all times.

Local leaders who remain feel the stirring of hitherto unknown ambitions. Yesterday leaders at all levels were inspired by the great goals and ideals of unionism and this sufficed to spur them on. Now, however, they learn from their former colleagues and from their own top leaders that this enthusiasm may be combined with

a quest for perquisites, security, and higher living standards, not only through the union but within it. Many aspire to the appointed staff. Others, more modest in their goals, are satisfied with "lost-time" unionism, the petty advantages that come from paid union activity.

The paid staff of international representatives has grown in size and increased in significance. The men who make it up now have a material stake in their jobs and feel secure, so long as they do not offend their bosses. The power of this staff inside the union was revealed in 1951 when it was mobilized to put over a dues increase.

This year the International representatives campaigned for a salary increase of 25 per cent and were given 15 per cent. The pay scale now ranges between \$95 to \$115 per week plus expenses of approximately \$6.50 per day and \$20 per week for automobile costs. Yesterday paid appointees were derisively called "pork-choppers"; today they are entitled to more respect.

ON PAY INCREASES

Heavy salary increases were voted to the International officers. The president's pay was raised from \$11,250 per year to \$18,000; secretary-treasurer, from \$10,750 to \$14,000; vice-president, from \$9,250 to \$12,500; International Board member, from \$7,750 to \$10,000.

Floor discussion revealed a mood, common enough in other unions, but new to the UAW. Only one delegate opposed the increase: "We're giving only \$5-\$7 per week to strikers; if that's all we can afford, then the top officers should not have an increase."

But a flurry of demands came for even more substantial raises: "Reuther should get at least what Murray was getting," shouted one delegate. "Let's force it down his throat." And another: "What are we, a bunch of cheap bums? We have the best officers in the world." And he demanded at least \$50,000 for Reuther with proportionate increases down the line.

Another: "We've got the biggest union in the world and one of the lowest-paid presidents. Even the smallest company pays its executives \$45,000; do we appreciate our leadership?" Big ovations.

Two years ago Reuther received a first modest salary increase and cautioned the delegates against raising their leaders' pay too high. At Atlantic City he tempered his obvious pleasure in the accolades of acclaim with an even more forceful admonition:

"I am not in this for what is in the paycheck but for what is in my heart," he said. "I feel strongly about it but I agreed not to fight over it. Leaders of unions must make sacrifices with the members. Not because I want to be a hero but because we can build the movement we want only by keeping salaries low. The leadership we need cannot come from people who are just interested in money but only from those who are inspired by ideals. If you try to go any higher, I will not be bound by any commitments and I will fight it."

THE UAW PICTURE

This is the dilemma and contradiction of Reutherism in its simplest form. It is easy to understand why he accepts a rising scale of salaries despite the undoubtedly sincere professions of opposition. His fellow officials want more money; they cannot take it without Reuther.

Also, he is now president of the CIO and must treat his other presidents with proper respect, as dictated by protocol. Low UAW salaries were an interesting curiosity in the past; but when Reuther becomes CIO president they remain a standing public reproach to other union officials.

He calls for a leadership which can "lead crusades" and for men who "believe in the movement." But he has not been able to create it in his own union and relies from day to day upon other attractions and other inducements to weld together hundreds of men needed to man the union staff.

A simplistic conception of the problem of union democracy sees the rank and file in constant struggle for progress against a bureaucratic officialdom which represses it and which adopts a hypocritical militancy only when it becomes necessary to head off rising discontent from below. And, still from this oversimplified standpoint, the officialdom maintains an iron, authoritarian rule to keep the situation from getting out of hand. In some unions, this stereotype is an accurate picture of reality. But not in the UAW.

The Socialist Workers Party, for example, is so busy trying to fit the UAW into the stereotype that it loses all perspective on what is actually occurring and sees a regime of repression where its own supporters are speaking out freely and fearlessly. In the UAW where we meet a socially-conscious labor officialdom—the left wing of the American labor movement—questions of democracy and bureaucracy are posed in a far more complex, more subtle, and more favorable fashion. We find a leadership which is anxious to reinforce its solid control over the union and at the same time seeks in its own way to preserve and protect democracy.

This is not to say that democracy remains as deeply implanted as ever before. Yesterday democratic rights were the common coin of every-day life, asserted in practice by the widest participation of every current in

(Continued on page 3)

Stassen and Dulles Get It in the Teeth—and Grin

Ike Cracks the Whip—on McCarthy's Critic

By L. G. SMITH

Another major victory was won last week by Senator Joseph McCarthy. In the dispute over the "Greek ship deal," both the State Department and the director of Mutual Security were forced to back down ignominiously before the senator as the result of a cabinet decision.

President Eisenhower used the prestige of his office to back McCarthy against his own top officers in an almost incredible press conference in which evasion and doubletalk hit new lows. Following hot on the heels of the Bohlen case, this action by the Eisenhower administration has thrown consternation into the ranks of some of the president's staunchest supporters both in and out of Congress.

The pro-Eisenhower, "liberal Republican" press all over the country had taken up McCarthy's excursion into foreign-policy negotiations as a clear case in which the senator had overreached himself. They were confident that this time Eisenhower had really caught the bum off-base and was going to cut him down.

Their hopes were reinforced by a statement coming from a "high-placed" though anonymous State Department official to the effect that McCarthy's negotiations were "a phoney," and were brought to a high pitch by Harold Stassen's hostile and hard-hitting attitude when he appeared to testify before McCarthy's committee.

Stassen charged that McCarthy's negotiations with the Greek ship owners were "undermining" and "harming" the administration's efforts to stop trade with China, and asked whether McCarthy had promised the Greeks immunity from investigation in return for their pledge.

Throughout this stage of developments McCarthy remained not only serene but on the offensive. He had started his current assault on the State Department by announcing his international coup in a press conference, in the course of which he said he had failed to inform the department of his negotiations because they were "too delicate." He added

that the State Department's efforts to stop trade with China had been a "dismal" failure.

In his exchange with Stassen he blandly told the director of Mutual Security that whether or not he had granted the Greek shipowners immunity from investigation "is no concern of yours." Further, he had told him that "I believe if you can keep a gun out of Communist hands, it is good, even if you and Dulles don't accomplish it."

In short, a more brash and insulting attack on the Secretary of State and his operations would be difficult to imagine, although it is clear that McCarthy will find a way to imagine it. And then, instead of the administration descending with all its weight on McCarthy, the president delivered a swift kick to . . . Stassen. Even more, he forced the man to stand up in public and say that he had enjoyed it thoroughly.

First, there was a private consultation between Secretary of State Dulles and McCarthy. The result of this was a statement in which Dulles said that while McCarthy had recognized the "dangers" of having congressional committees enter the field of foreign affairs, and that actually he had made no "agreements" with the Greek shipowners, he, Dulles, "felt" that the "result" of whatever McCarthy had done had been "in the national interest."

HIGH COST OF MCCARTHY

On the following day came the president's press conference in which Eisenhower answered pointed questions about the McCarthy affair, repeating that since the executive branch of the government has the sole authority to negotiate such arrangements, McCarthy could not have conducted any negotiations.

When asked whether he agreed with Stassen that McCarthy was "undermining" the government's prestige, Eisenhower replied that it took more than an error to undermine that prestige, and therefore he thought Stassen had probably meant "infringing" rather than "undermining." Next day, after a cabinet meeting, Stassen told the press that he agreed with the president's interpreta-

tion of what he should have said, and that he was "happy" over the outcome of the whole controversy.

The developments have been recounted here because they demonstrate that in this case what was in operation was not some "mistake" or "crossed signals" within the Eisenhower team, but a considered policy of the administration not to clash with McCarthy, at almost any cost.

That the cost has been high is indicated by the dismay of Eisenhower's closest "internationalist" supporters as reflected in the editorial as well as news columns of the papers. Unanimously they bemoan the "weakness" of the president's leadership in dealing with McCarthy, and search for the reasons behind it.

THEORY

One interpretation is that Eisenhower is congenitally a man who seeks to keep all factions together and to work out difficulties without any serious clashes. This theory, however, is no longer given much weight even by his most ardent apologists. It might explain a refusal to launch an all-out offensive against McCarthy. It cannot explain an abject capitulation which must have been forced on Dulles, and even more on Stassen, by the sternest exercise of authority.

Another explanation is that Eisenhower and his closest advisers feel that McCarthy is really an invaluable asset to the administration. Now that the "threat of peace," as the joke goes, hangs over America, McCarthy's value in keeping the country on its toes against let-downs becomes greater, as it is going to take some frenzied efforts to keep up the pace of armament and prevent a general slackening of the cold-war spirit in the country.

In this view, Eisenhower may not be altogether happy about everything the senator from Wisconsin is doing, but the circles which he represents, both in the army and in the country at large, feel that he is much more of an asset than a liability: they are attracted by his vigor and recognize that it appeals to a large segment of the American population. They view him as another "Blood and Guts" Patton, a swell guy with some faults.

DELAYED EXPLOSION?

Another theory is that while the administration is appalled at McCarthy's actions, they dare not attack him for fear of splitting their support in the Congress wide open. They know that in the coming period they can rely on a small group of "liberal" Republicans in the Senate to back their foreign policy, and probably on almost all the Democrats. But to operate on the basis of such a grouping would split their own party and give the Democrats a powerful weapon in the elections next year.

Thus — says this explanation — they must seek some way of winning the big majority of Republicans to their side. But McCarthy and the men around him, and those standing next to them, are too powerful a group to meet head-on. They must be given their way until the administration is ready to launch a major offensive on foreign policy. Then, they hope, Eisenhower's prestige and the support he will gain among the people will be so powerful as to force the McCarthyites into line. But if they are antagonized and forced into a hard shell anti-administration position before this takes place, it will be more difficult to catch them up in the tide of a positive Eisenhower foreign policy.

Finally, there is the forlorn hope that Eisenhower is really "laying" for McCarthy, and is only giving him enough rope to hang him high and dry, once and for all. The difficulty with this notion is that it hardly explains why it was necessary to make Dulles and Stassen crawl on their bellies as the preliminary event.

A mixture of the two middle theories in this discussion may come closest to what is actually taking place.

It is quite likely that Eisenhower and his closest advisers find much of "McCarthyism" more acceptable than do their liberal apologists. As an attitude toward Stalinism—and toward socialist and even Fair Deal ideology in the country—McCarthy speaks their language more clearly than does the New York Times. Thus there is no vital clash between the McCarthyite heresy-hunting ideology and their own attitudes.

SHOOTING TOO HIGH

But when he extends his attacks to

open contempt for Dulles and the administration in general, that is going too far. They know that something will have to be done about it in the long run, or it will be impossible for the administration to maintain its prestige either at home or abroad. McCarthy may be regarded as an valuable ally in certain respects; but it is obvious that he and his friends are aiming at far more than an alliance. They are shooting for undisputed leadership in the Republican party, and through that, of the country as a whole.

The difficulty is: what to do about him? With all his crudity, his "fight" against Stalinism is not really different from theirs. His ideas about how to promote "Americanism" are sound. American Legion, Chamber-of-Commerce, National Association-of-Manufacturers and officers' club doctrine.

Eisenhower was elected on the basis of promising a positive policy with which to end the stalemate in the cold war, and to put America on the offensive. His efforts were confined to "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek and putting pressure on the countries of Europe to hasten their rearmament. After that they came to a standstill, only to be completely engulfed by the new Stalinist "peace offensive."

There can be no doubt that the administration will have to attempt some dramatic move to maintain its prestige. It is difficult to imagine what such a move could be, but it is impossible not to believe that it will be attempted. But unless such a move can count on really wide support in the Congress, it is likely to suffer the same fate as the late "repudiation" of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.

As long as Eisenhower has nothing to offer, McCarthy has the chance to make the headlines, and it would be foolhardy to endanger the "big push" by getting involved in a series of side-skirmishes now.

LEARNING THE HARD WAY

This may be the administration's reasoning, even though in the meantime the foreign service is demoralized, American diplomatic prestige sinks to new lows, and the State Department has to continue to eat crow, a diet to which it has become habituated. But what can possibly account for the failure of the Democrats to launch a major offensive against McCarthy, and to get a few good licks in against the administration on the side?

Their explanation for playing dead during the past two months has been that they want to play the role of a "responsible" opposition. From the narrow point of view of partisan tactics, such an approach may have had some merit in the early days of the new administration. At least it was arguable.

But is it not the function, even of a "loyal" opposition, to attempt to safeguard the government from an assault on its prestige throughout the world? Do the Democrats, or at least the Fair Deal Democrats, have no responsibility to the preservation of civil liberties in the country?

Are they, too, biding their time till the day when they can "really" lower the boom on McCarthy? Are they fearful that if they go after him they will simply force the Republicans to close ranks and thus delay the eventual division in the party on foreign policy?

Such explanations may satisfy super-clever political tacticians, but they have an empty and hollow ring. Every victory for McCarthy strengthens him and all that he stands for in the country. It strengthens the reactionaries in the Democratic Party, and weakens its labor-liberal wing.

Is it possible that the real reason for their silence is that they, too, have nothing basically different to offer in the fight against Stalinism both at home and abroad?

While the Democrats in Congress, who have supported the chosen political spokesmen of the labor movement, remain cowed and silent, McCarthyism stands forth as the "American" answer to Stalinism. This is an unpalatable fact for the ex-radicals, the liberals and the sophisticated conservatives to swallow. It makes quite difficult a rationalization along the lines of "critical support" of the war.

But Senator McCarthy will teach them. That's his job, and he is doing quite well at it. Ask Chip Bohlen, or Dulles, or Stassen. They learned the hard way.

UAW Convention — —

(Continued from page 2)

faction fights. No one had to be reminded of its existence for it was taken for granted. Now it has become less of a right that is exercised from below without restraint and appears more as a privilege that is benevolently dispensed from above.

But this shift is only one side of what is happening. Reutherism also wants to maintain democracy, not as a hypocritical pretense, but in actuality. It seeks two mutually contradictory objectives: (1) It strives for a strong, solid, central leadership based upon an obediently reliable paid staff; and (2) it hopes to base its social power upon an alert, progressive, socially conscious rank and file.

In one discussion at Atlantic City, Reuther pondered the vexing questions of democracy:

"How do you keep a union free and democratic with rank-and-file control and yet prevent a small group of people who will hide behind all the democratic slogans, who will exploit all the democratic privileges from tearing the guts out of the organization?"

"It is not easy. That is how unions get bureaucratic. The easiest way to protect a union is to get bureaucratic so you can chop down anybody who raises a voice.

"We don't want that kind of a union. We have got the most democratic union in America. We are going to keep it that way, but while we keep it that way we are going to protect it against the small minority which is unwilling to accept the will of the majority in convention."

From a faulty conception of how to protect the union from "disruption," Reuther leans upon a machine of paid officials, and for lack of confidence in the ranks and in the locals he tends to centralize greater power at the top.

But Reutherism as a tendency requires more than a machine of officials to carry along the ranks of the UAW. Reuther needs what he has not created and perhaps cannot create: a union core of people's

leaders which can arouse the ranks on the big issues of the day, explain social questions, prepare them for more than simple union struggles. It would have to be constituted from aggressive fearless, self-confident men not preoccupied with the small ambitions of petty personal gain but imbued with the great ideals of an inspiring labor program.

The Reutherite staff is composed of men who once were of that type and who might have remained so. But the qualities which they absorb from the present atmosphere in the union are those of obedience to officials above them.

This staff and its following among the local leadership has already failed in dealing with a most elementary union crisis. During the recent negotiations with GM, Reuther threatened to strike if the company refused to yield. He was soon besieged by protests from locals whose members were alarmed by a strike prospect. The staff was unable either to rouse the members to a readiness for strike or to calm their alarm by explaining that the threat was merely a maneuver. Can this staff prepare the union for great sacrifices in the struggle for great gains?

Reuther wants a membership that will be ready to embark upon grand social movements. The same mass of thousands of men who are to be alert and ready to struggle must be kept on tap awaiting the signal from above on each occasion and until then remain in reserve. It is an intricate and almost impossible task.

A democratic UAW becomes a powerful social magnet capable of attracting millions of workers and not only workers. Within the UAW, Reutherism requires that kind of democratic atmosphere which will allow militants from the ranks to speak out to answer conservatives, to do what his own staff is incapable of doing. Even from this standpoint alone, the UAW is the advance guard of American unionism.

The UAW at its 14th Constitutional Convention was marking time, and it still retains all its potentialities as the "vanguard in America."

PRO AND CON: DISCUSSION

Sees New Era in Russia of 'Freedom for Bureaucracy'

By S. HOROSHCHENKO

From this side of the ocean it is evidently difficult to follow closely all the developments in the USSR when they take place with such giddy speed, even if one knows the life of that country from recent personal experience.

One really envies our Soviet comrades in Western Europe [the author is referring here to the comrades of the anti-Stalinist movement, especially the Ukrainian anti-Stalinist underground—Ed.] who are able to maintain first-hand contact with the situation. Recent information which we have received from them indicate developments which are very interesting and historically significant.

Suchasna Ukraina, which is published abroad in Munich, in the very first issue which it published immediately after the death of Stalin, informed its readers that a new era in the development of the USSR has begun. It said that all the information which it has on hand indicates that a total counter-revolution is being accomplished in the USSR. There is now coming a period of weakening of the terror, of "liberalization" of the regime (in the sense that the bureaucrats will now not be afraid of each other, will more freely discuss their differences, and will be more careless in their duties, etc.) and even of a truly peaceful trend in foreign policy.

During the two weeks which followed the publication of these reports, we actually did witness a complete reversal in Soviet policies at home as well as abroad. Stalin's successors moved away from Stalin's line. They established a collective dictatorship, removing Malenkov from the party secretariat. They changed the structure of the government, removing the processes of production below the ministries from the hands of the party apparatus. They changed the structure of the party, radically dividing the Presidium from the Secretariat and placing both of them in different hands. Finally they issued a mass amnesty to at least two million people who had prison terms up to five years.

Every move which they undertook after Stalin's death evidently goes counter to Stalin's policies. The best evidence of this is the above-mentioned amnesty. Two million people freed from prisons and concentration camps, and several millions of their relatives, obviously are more than glad that Stalin died. Not accidentally, the present rulers did not claim in their amnesty that it (the amnesty) "had been planned even while Stalin was alive." No, by this amnesty they simply spat on Stalin's corpse.

The true meaning of all these events, of course, must not be misunderstood. The changes in the government and in the party do not at all mean any participation by the workers or workers' democracy. The amnesty was by no means extended to the political prisoners. The people freed from prisons were exclusively the so-called *bytoviki*, that is, those who were not sentenced for political crimes. But they are also not exclusively simple criminals. There are many criminals among them: for instance, petty bureaucrats who stole "socialist property." But among them are also many ordinary workers and peasants, imprisoned, for instance, for coming late to work, for unintentionally breaking a factory tool or for gathering ears of grain on the collective farms' fields.

There is no freedom of speech or assembly granted in the USSR. But the death of Stalin means freedom for the bureaucracy. The absence of authority necessarily means absence of fear. The bureaucrats have more or less regained freedom of speech, criticism and assembly. This freedom will slowly pass down the ladder of the hierarchy.

In short, the post-Stalin "liberalization" of the regime means a liberalization for the upper classes, and not for the people. But in the longer run such a "liberalization" will lead to the awakening of the people too. The trend is in this direction. A slow process of the defreezing of the class struggle will become evident. At the end of this trend stands an obvious dilemma: either the people will overthrow the bureaucracy, or a new dictatorship (perhaps of Zhukov) will come to power. The victory of the workers will depend on many circumstances, the most important of which may be the following: the organization of the workers; split and "disarray" within the bureaucracy; peace in the outside world and the absence of the danger of foreign

restorationist intervention. The coming to power of Zhukov and his victory will also depend on many circumstances, the most important of which may be the danger of foreign intervention or civil war within the country.

At the present time the "liberalization" of the bureaucratic regime in the USSR is evidently reflected also in the changes in its foreign policy. A slowdown in anti-American propaganda, Molotov's agreement to free the British and French internees in Korea, the order to the Chinese to undertake some steps in the direction of settling the prisoners-of-war question in Korea, the agreement on the UN's secretary-general, the granting of permission to American journalists to visit Russia, a slowdown in the pressure on Berlin, etc.—all these are signs of a change. It is a slow process, but we have no doubt that at the present time Moscow really and sincerely wants some easement in world tension. (By the way, the shooting down of those airplanes should not be believed in precisely the way in which Washington presents the case. American planes in Kamchatka and Czechoslovakia might have been testing the nerves of the new Russian rulers, too.)

A "liberal" counter-revolution in the USSR was evidently inevitable, since, as we have written in a previous article in *LABOR ACTION*, "the umbilical cord with

October has been cut off forever." Further developments in the USSR must be followed as closely as possible. We urge all those who are interested in this development not to judge it by the old schemes which were, or were not, good for the Stalinist period of the history of the USSR.

Comment

Comrade Horoshchenko's main thesis is that the new era ahead in Russia is one of a "liberal" counter-revolution (as he puts it) in which there will be freedom of speech and criticism within the ruling bureaucracy, this being a permanent change in the character of the regime and not merely a bit of loosening up for a temporary period. We see no evidence for this ourselves, and the article does not present any that points specifically in this direction. If "information" along these lines has been presented by *Suchasna Ukraina* (which is the nationalist non-Marxist right wing of the Ukrainian resistance), then we would like to know what it is.

More important, the concept, which is apparently that of a trend toward the acquisition of significant democratic rights within the ruling class, cannot be limited to the bureaucracy for any measurable period: as the article itself

points out it inevitably means heightened class struggle from below and "liberalization" demands for the people too. What does Comrade Horoshchenko expect the rulers to do as such "freedom for the bureaucracy" arouses revolution from below? It seems to be a perspective which expects the bureaucracy to commit suicide for the sake of class freedom of speech. We know no reason to expect this.

Comrade H. evidently also uses his term "counter-revolution" in a peculiar sense; he informs us that he does not mean that a shift in class power has taken place or is taking place now as against the Stalinist regime (which was the result of a counter-revolution against the workers' state of October). Yet we think the article seems to imply that in some basic sense *Stalinism* has been repudiated or at least is in the past. There is some discussion of this in the front-page article of this issue, with reference to ideas being raised by bourgeois commentators today.

As for other points raised explicitly or implicitly: Comrade Horoshchenko has also submitted to LA an article by an editor of *Vpered*, A. Babenko, which will appear in next week's issue, and which raises these points in more detail. We will discuss them a little more after publishing Babenko's views.—Ed.

Second Round on an Issue of War Policy

We are in receipt of a reply by our London correspondent Allan Vaughan to the discussion in the March 2 issue of *LABOR ACTION*, entitled "Some Questions of War Policy." The first part of Comrade Vaughan's reply deals with the questions of war policy, and this part is published below, together with our comments on it.

The second part of Comrade Vaughan's reply deals with "the nature of Titoism" itself and with our views on it. This will be published next week, as the second installment of this "Pro and Con Discussion."—Ed.

By ALLAN VAUGHAN

The editor's comments on that part of my London Letter (in *LABOR ACTION* for March 2, page 4) which deals with the war question indicate not that I failed to think through my position but rather that I am in disagreement with the position of the ISL.

The position I hold is "that the class struggle must be pursued in peace and war, independently of its military consequences for the bourgeoisie." This means that as a socialist I am indifferent to the fate of the world bourgeoisie in the event of a third world war. This goes for the Stalinist bureaucracy equally. It is impossible for socialists to view the outcome of a third world war except from the standpoint of the interests of the working class.

I do not believe there is any disagreement on this score. I certainly agree that "no one's position on a general world war can be determined by the Yugoslav element in it," but the rest of the sentence—"which will be quite subordinated to the over-all character of the global conflict"—is, in my submission, incorrect.

The analogy with the case of Serbia and Belgium in 1914 is also invalid. In the event of a third world war it is highly likely that, with either an American or Russian occupation of Europe, powerful mass Resistance movements will develop on similar, though not identical, lines with the Resistance movements of the Second World War. Not least in importance will be the Yugoslav Resistance movement, whose leadership is least likely to have any illusions in the Stalinist armies.

It would be nothing less than disastrous if socialists were to make the same errors that the Fourth International made in relation to the Resistance movements of the last war. The fact that the Resistance movements were formally allied to the United Nations blinded the Fourth International to the deep social and political stirrings that found their sharpest expression in the Resistance movement. Hence their sectarian, carping attitude to the European national liberation movements.

In this connection it is interesting to read the "Resolution on the International Scene" adopted by the then Workers Party convention in June 1946 where the differences between the "Serbian" position in the First and Second World Wars are brought out:

"In the First World War, the national revolutionary elements played virtually no role [and that is why we were not Serbian defensists—A.V.] and, as exemplified by Serbia, was of no social or political importance. In the Second World War the national revolutionary movements in Europe, from Poland to France and from Norway to Greece, played the decisive role." (*New Internationalist*, Apr. 1947, p. 114.)

The third world war will make these "national revolutionary movements in Europe" more decisive still. And the character of these movements will be such that as revolutionary socialists we will give them our most earnest support. For where in the Second World War the Resistance movements incorporated sections of the bourgeoisie (the shadows in most cases) in their leaderships, and thus were held in rein as far as decisive socialist action was concerned—the Resistance movements under Stalinist domination will be working-class in origin, with peasant support. The bourgeois element will not exist, as it did during the Second World War. The Resistance movements will therefore be able to pose far more radical questions and solve them in a far more radical fashion, than was the case in the Second World War.

It is in this framework that the Yugoslav "element" has to be considered. It is absolutely correct to state that "no one's position on a general world war can be determined by the Yugoslav element in it," or for that matter the "elements" compounded out of the French, German, Italian or Norwegian national-revolutionary struggles. It is absolutely false, however, to put this formulation on its head and state that one's general position on the war can determine one's position on the Yugoslav element in it. It would be just as mistaken as the view that our attitude to the Resistance movements of the Second World War should be determined by our general position on the imperialist nature of the war as a whole.

I take it that the ISL considers that the Yugoslav "element" (the struggle of the Titoist bureaucracy against Russian Stalinism) in a third world war will be wholly merged in the network of the American imperialist camp. I think this attitude is as mistaken as the attitude of the Workers Party to the struggle of China in the Second World War. The Fourth International was certainly correct in establishing a position of support for the Chinese against Japanese imperialism, their correct characterization of the war in general as an imperialist war

being unaffected by their position on China.

Comment

In his reply, above, Comrade Vaughan goes over to the question of attitude to mass Resistance movements in a third world war, Resistance movements which "will develop on similar, though not identical lines with the Resistance movements of the Second World War." He adds: "Not least in importance will be the Yugoslav Resistance movement, whose leadership is least likely to have any illusions in the Stalinist armies." He then warns us against the errors of the Fourth International groups in World War II when they refused to support the anti-Nazi Resistance movement in Europe.

He does not mention, however, in connection with this warning, that it is not we of *LABOR ACTION* and the ISL who need it. Not today in hindsight, but way back in 1942, we took an unequivocal and vigorous stand against this disastrous line of the Fourth International groups, a line which is not the least of the reasons for the impotence of the official Trotskyists in France and Italy today. (Our resolution on the subject, which makes up-to-date reading today, was adopted in 1943 and appeared in the *New Internationalist*.)

Our line in support of the Resistance was detailed back then. But while rejecting the sectarian position of the Trotskyists, we did not fall into the trap of supporting imperialist politics in the guise of supporting the Resistance. The crux of the matter for us was precisely the elements of lack of control over the Resistance movement by Allied imperialism, the possibilities in the Resistance of an independent struggle against the Nazi occupation.

We do not think that Comrade Vaughan bears in mind this all-important part of a Marxist position in support of the then Resistance. The Yugoslav "Resistance" he speaks of seems to be, if we are not misinterpreting him, nothing more or less than the military struggle of Tito's army against the Russians in a general third world war. It does not appear that he is talking about an independent Resistance movement in Yugoslavia in such eventuality.

Now in the latter case, of course we are for having at least the same position toward a Yugoslav Resistance as toward the French Resistance, and we would certainly expect that it would raise the social question even more sharply, as he says.

But behind Comrade Vaughan's use of the term "Resistance" is something else. It is support to Tito's army that he seems to have in mind.

And that is exactly what we discussed in the last exchange with him.

It is apparent, therefore, that his reply

(Continued on page 5)

Youth and Student Corner

Academic Freedom at Columbia: Weltfish Case and Dean Ackerman

The column this week is devoted to recent events of interest at Columbia University with regard to academic freedom. Probably the incident which caused the most stir among those interested in maintaining at least a semblance of academic freedom in the universities was the announcement by Columbia that Dr. Gene Weltfish, well-known anthropologist, would not be reappointed to her post as statutory lecturer for the next year.

The university invoked a recent ruling which limits to five the number of annual appointments a statutory lecturer may receive. It insisted that this failure to renew Dr. Weltfish's contract was not due in any way to her political activities; and this seems indeed true.

Dr. Weltfish has well-known strong Stalinist tendencies, evidenced by her membership in the Stalinist Congress of American Women (she is a past president of the organization) and her speeches in New York and Vienna in June 1952 offering to prove the Stalinist charges of germ warfare made against the U. S. military forces in Korea. But this present action does not stem from them nor her refusal to testify recently before a congressional investigating committee (on October 13 in New York City and on April 1 in Washington, D. C.).

This is demonstrated by the fact that Dr. Corliss Lamont and Dr. Bernard J. Stern, both lecturers at Columbia, have been reappointed. If Stalinist sympathies were in fact the grounds for dismissal, then Lamont, who ran on the Stalinist-controlled American Labor Party ticket last November for senator, would also have been dropped; he is at least as "controversial" a subject as Dr. Weltfish. Dr. Stern refused to testify before the Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommittee on March 27 on his membership in the CP before 1947 (he testified that he is not now a member) and he has, also been retained for next year.

Dr. Weltfish's reappointment would have been automatic had she gained a tenure position (assistant professor, etc.). Thus the real question involving academic freedom here is why a promotion was refused her. This is indeed interesting in light of the comments by Dr. W. Duncan Strong, head of the Anthropology Department, who said: "I've done my darndest to get Gene a promotion for a long time, but if you can't get it what can you do?" (Usually promotions are automatic if approved by the department head, provided there is a vacancy.)

He stated further that several promotions have been made in the past two years in that department to fill vacancies. One might support the university's honor by pointing out that this admittedly popular teacher didn't receive her Ph.D. until 1950; but this is just a formality, for she has a great deal of experience and is best known for her books *The Races of Mankind* and *In Henry's Backyard*. Both of these dealt with the question of race relations and are written on a popular level. The latter is specifically a grammar school book. They have been used by the United States Army and the State Department in their informational services.

Thus the question is: On what grounds has the university administration refused

Dr. Weltfish a promotion? Does she lack the formal academic qualifications (published research, etc.) or is it because of her unpopular political activities? In these days the latter is strongly indicated.

Another matter of interest involves recent statements by Carl W. Ackerman, dean of the Columbia University School of Journalism. Dean Ackerman stated in the current bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors that members of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency "interview professors, public school teachers and references and follow up leads like prosecuting attorneys," that "students are 'tried' secretly without their knowledge and without an opportunity of explaining or defending their

records before employment by any government agencies." Therefore, he said, "I am now discontinuing my practice of cooperating with federal, state and police investigating agencies, except on written request and on advice of counsel."

It would be profitable to students and teachers alike if we quoted without comment some of the dean's words:

"Today the vast majority of teachers in all fields of instruction have learned that promotion and security depend upon conformity to the prevailing community or national concept of devotion to the public welfare."

"Silence on controversial subjects in private conversations as well as in classrooms is becoming so prevalent that it

is dangerous to our liberty. If we have reached the stage in our democracy when fear of investigation becomes universal and the loyalty of college students must be investigated we will be erecting an iron curtain all our own."

"The practical problem which confronts professors, school teachers and students today is political freedom to discuss public affairs in classrooms or at lunch or during a 'bull' session without fear that someone may make a record which may be investigated secretly, upon which he may be tried secretly, and also be convicted secretly, either by a governmental official or a prospective employer."

The dean, we should note, does have tenure.

The FBI and Your Rights

Following is the informative article on the practices used by the FBI for getting "interviews" which appeared in the American Civil Liberties Union News, published by the ACLU of Northern California. The article is initialed by Ernest Besig, the editor of the publication. While Mr. Besig makes some specific references to the San Francisco area, the same remarks would apply throughout the country.—Ed.

What are a person's rights when a couple of FBI agents call upon him for information? Must he answer their questions? Or, can he tell them to go about their business? These questions are prompted by the fact that in recent weeks seven or eight persons have complained to the Union about harassment by FBI agents and have sought information as to their rights.

The Union unflinchingly reminds such complainants that they are free agents. Whether or not they wish to talk to representatives of the FBI is up to them. An FBI agent is no better position than the Fuller brush man or some other salesman who comes to your door. You can do business with him if you wish; that's for you to decide. But the ACLU is concerned in coercion and harassment of people by police officers, whether they be uniformed members of the local constabulary or young, handsome, arrow-collared agents of the FBI. They are all police officers.

These days FBI agents are particularly ubiquitous because they are collecting loyalty and security data about public employees and others, and are also trying to interview ex-radicals. "All we want is some information to complete our files," the person is told. This type of data falls in the field of opinion and association, and, whether the FBI likes it or not, Congress has turned it largely into a political police.

PERSISTENT

No FBI agent may compel a person to be interviewed without himself being guilty of violating the law. Of course, if agents ring your bell, show their credentials and are invited into your home, you cannot complain unless they then misbehave themselves in some manner or refuse to leave when asked to do so. But, even if you invite agents into your home, there is no legal duty on your part to answer their questions.

FBI agents will resort to various means to secure information. One of the commonest devices is the friendly, father-confessor approach. If that doesn't work a little lawful coercion may. Of course, if a person allows information to be wheedled from him, which he later regrets giving, he has no basis for complaint. But it seems to us he may justly complain about such things as implied threats or telephone calls for interviews to his place of employment. Naturally, he does not want the boss to know that he is not "cooperating" with the FBI; the boss might not like it. In order to get rid of the agent without the boss knowing what is in the wind, a person will sometimes make a date for an interview at the FBI office or his home. Some people wouldn't mind such interviews if they could have the protection

of an attorney or representative. But the FBI won't agree. Interviews must be conducted on their terms. They claim the interview is "confidential." It would seem to be ordinary good sense and caution for a person who is willing to talk to FBI agents to have counsel present and to insist upon receiving a transcript of his statements.

FBI agents are not easily discouraged. If a person refuses to give information, they try again. So would you if that were your job. But if the target of the interview says he refuses to be interviewed and the agents won't take "No" for an answer, then there's a civil liberties issue.

Many of the people who consult the ACLU about their rights in connection with FBI agents are former members of the Communist Party. These people are generally not averse to talking about their own past activities, but they do not want to involve other people. Of course, that is precisely the information the FBI is after.

Recently, the Union was consulted by a man the FBI apparently believes is or was a Trotskyite, although the man denies it. No doubt other minority political movements are also under constant surveillance by the FBI.

ACLU RECOMMENDS

Finally, there is the person who is interviewed by the FBI about a federal employee or an employee of the maritime or defense industries. Maybe he was only a neighbor or fellow employee of the person being inquired about. In any case, the agents want to discover the man's political opinions and associations as far as they are known to the informant.

In any of these situations, a person does not have to answer the questions of the FBI. In the past, where a person has complained to the Union about harassment by FBI agents, the Union has conveyed to the particular agents or to the Agent in Charge the wishes of the person.

Recently, the FBI questioned the Union's authority to act on behalf of two persons, a husband and his wife. D. K. Brown, San Francisco Agent in Charge, stated that while no person was under compulsion to talk to FBI agents, they would not respect requests to be left alone that come from either representatives or attorneys, and that such requests would have to come directly from the persons they wish to interrogate.

Accordingly, the ACLU has suggested to persons in this area who do not wish to be interviewed that they should address a letter to Mr. D. K. Brown, Agent in Charge, FBI, Federal Office Building, San Francisco, advising him that they do not wish FBI agents to attempt to communicate with them in any way. (Of course, there's no choice where an agent is making an arrest or is serving a subpoena.) The letter might well be registered and a copy should be retained by the sender.

In any case, if a person is being harassed by FBI agents or his peace is being disturbed by them, he should consult the ACLU.

In an article in the Winter, 1952 issue of the Iowa Law Review, J. Edgar Hoover declared that "The FBI operates on the highest code of ethics, attempting to fulfill its responsibilities yet, in every iota, respecting the civil rights of the individuals involved. This means that Special Agents not only observe the

letter but also the spirit of the law, not only the basic rights guaranteed to the individual by law, but also the rights implied in the American tradition of democracy. . . . We hope that the Special Agents in this area won't let Mr. Hoover down. In their investigations in the political field they will be supporting Mr. Hoover's brave words if they remember in word as well as in deed that the end does not justify the means.—E. B.

War Policy — —

(Continued from page 4)

on the "Serbian analogy" just doesn't meet the point. In World War I there was certainly a "Serbian Resistance" in his sense, that is, Serbian troops fought against Austria. Socialists did not support this "Resistance" by the Serbian government, because the national element in the war (Serbian nationalism vs. the Austrian empire) was subordinated to the over-all imperialist character of the war, as we discussed last time.

As a matter of fact, in World War II there was a French "Resistance" to the Nazi invasion before the collapse of France: this was naturally the war of the French government! If that term "Resistance" is not to be mixed up, Comrade Vaughan would have to reserve the term for a Yugoslav Resistance which springs up after a collapse of the Tito government—and this indeed would be a quite different question from the one he originally presented.

Comrade Vaughan must allow us the right to hold the opinion that he has not thought through the question. That is not the same as his agreement or disagreement on this point with us, which is another matter. If he wishes to use the word "Resistance" for a war by the Tito government against Russia which is part and parcel of a general world war, then we suppose that is his terminological right, but we would suggest that he not identify the political problem of such a war with the problem of a more-or-less independent Resistance movement in a country where the old state power has collapsed.

On the question of China in World War II, since he confines himself to asserting his viewpoint, we would be interested only to bring to his attention our own rather extensive discussions on this question during the war.—Ed.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA An Interpretation of the Zapotocky-Gottwald Fight

Who Rules in Czechoslovakia?

This article by George Benda presents his interpretation of the factional and clique lines of struggle in Czechoslovakia which crystallized around the death of President Gottwald and the accession of Zapotocky. Comrade Benda's view of the Czech scene is based on intimate and close, documentary study of the country. While any such interpretation is necessarily at least partly speculative, Benda's explanation deserves the most interested attention.—Ed.

By GEORGE BENDA

An old-fashioned adherent of fair play would certainly resent it if death interfered to strike his opponent down in the middle of the game. But in the light of Stalinist morals, it is certain that no such feelings fill the breast of the new Czechoslovak president, Antonin Zapotocky, though death did indeed enter to rule in his favor and against his old-time opponent and predecessor, the late Klement Gottwald.

Leaving the office of the premier for the presidential castle, Zapotocky will much more probably have other thoughts in mind, similar to those which Gottwald himself entertained when he was in exactly the same position five years ago, succeeding President Benes.

Gottwald's nomination was considered at that time as a kick upstairs, and so it was understood by Gottwald himself. He worried, for example, whether he would continue to have access to the information and documents he used to see when he was "merely" the premier. Today Zapotocky has even more reason to feel that he is in quarantine, since he left the premiership already reduced to a title-bearer, isolated from the real levers of power. These levers remain tightly in the hands of what we can appropriately call "Gottwald's orphans," namely, people who constituted the Gottwald clique inside the bureaucracy.

TUG-OF-WAR

In a certain sense, it is a pity that Gottwald's death put an end to what seemed to be a promising new round in his year-long behind-the-scenes strife with Zapotocky. The first months of this year—the last months of Gottwald's life—were filled with moves and counter-moves which indicated a flare-up of the inner crisis of the regime.

At stake was, as usual, the complete control of the regime's power machine. The elimination of Slausky's faction left only two contestants. The triangle—party machine (Slansky), state bureaucracy (Gottwald), trade-union machine (Zapotocky)—was simplified, after the purges and shifts of the last two years, to a tug-of-war.

The state bureaucracy fused with the party machine, both solidly under the control of Gottwald's friends and relatives, and only the trade-union apparatus, under the patronage of Premier Zapotocky, claimed the right to an independent role in the state and its economy.

It is seldom that the personal and social fronts are traced so clearly. If Gottwald strongly disliked Zapotocky, his antipathy was matched by the eternal conflicts of competence between the "administration" and the trade-union organs, especially in the most sensitive area—in the country's industrial plants.

NEW TWIST

The situation was therefore rather paradoxical: Zapotocky, the man who derived his power from his command over friends and allies inside the trade-union bureaucracy, headed the government, i.e., the top body of the hierarchy of bureaucrats who saw in the trade unions only a nuisance. The paradox went further: If Zapotocky derived his power from a machine outside the government, the ministers saw their real head outside the office of the premier, their allegiance going entirely to President Gottwald.

A new twist was added to this peculiar situation when Gottwald succeeded in isolating Zapotocky completely from the individual ministerial offices. All this happened during the first two months of this year.

Beginning February, on the initiative of President Gottwald, six new vice-premiers were added to the existing four. Each vice-premier was entrusted with supervision of a group of ministerial offices—and almost all of the new vice-premiers belonged to the Gottwald clique. Qualified observers rightly asked, at that

time, whether the new vice-premiers were not supposed to supervise their Premier Minister rather than the activities of individual ministers.

Whereas Gottwald's offensive was purely administrative and bureaucratic in nature, Zapotocky attempted in response nothing less than to regain his faded popularity among the broad masses. To begin with, he indirectly attacked Gottwald's minister of interior (civil administration) for the forceful expulsion of people from their apartments.

Zapotocky concentrated on this individual, criticizing other unpopular measures for which his department was responsible, and went so far as to hint at a possible involuntary collusion of the man's department with the saboteur activities of Slansky. At the same time, Zapotocky started to address workers cordially; while he did not hesitate, two years ago, to recommend that "lazy workers" be put into forced-labor camps, he now spoke about his "faith in the good will of our miners."

ZAPOTOCKY WOOS

However, the most surprising move to regain popular support was made, under Zapotocky's patronage, in the trade unions. He gave his unreserved blessing to the enlargement and consolidation of quasi-democratic elections of the trade-union officers. The right of secret ballot and the possibility of crossing out candidates from the official voting lists existed since the fall of 1951, but then it concerned only elections of the lowest echelons of officers. Now it was slightly extended and modified. But the main point is that a year and a half ago, Zapotocky angrily attacked the trade-union, top for having introduced secret elections, whereas now he surpassed himself in elaborating on the theme of trade-union democracy.

On balance, however, the attempts made by Zapotocky to appease or to woo the masses was less of a challenge to anybody than an implied admission that his own social support, the trade-union bureaucracy, completely failed in its functions, i.e. in the subduing of the workers.

LONDON LETTER

Labor MP Calls for a General—

BLP Right-Wingers Step Out of Line

By ALLAN VAUGHAN

LONDON, Apr. 7.—The new cold-war developments seems to indicate, at the least, an easing of world tension. The undisguised expressions of relief—perhaps a little premature—in the European capitals only underline the essential differences in the Western bloc of nations.

It cannot be doubted that the European bourgeoisie has infinitely more to lose in a third world war than, say, the capitalist class in the U. S. Not only is the European bourgeoisie more than a little scared by the thought of a Europe devastated and atomized on the Korean model, but it is also a little nervous about the fate of its last imperial domains in Asia and Africa.

This goes to explain differences that have been discerned between the reactions of the Foreign Office spokesmen in Europe and the State Department in the U. S.

Even more sensitive to the cold war than the bourgeoisie either in the U. S. or Europe is the Labor movement. Already Desmond Donnelly, a Bevanite Labor MP, has received a favorable reply from Winston Churchill on the subject of the active interest of the British government in the latest overtures from the other side of the Iron Curtain. Herbert Morrison, the acting leader of the Labor opposition (Attlee being indisposed), has associated the Labor Party with the British government's cautious and restrained optimism in respect to the apparent change of line by the USSR and China.

KENYA DEBATE

But if the cold-war between the Western and Eastern war blocs appears to be entering a new phase, a less violent phase, at least for a period, it is also true, on the other hand, that a more violent phase

This is where matters stood when Stalin and Gottwald died in quick succession. We will therefore never know whether Zapotocky would have succeeded in counteracting the power of Gottwald.

Once in the presidential castle, Zapotocky lost one powerful motive for further strengthening his position, namely the instinct for survival. He can be pretty sure now that he will end his days in bed and not on the gallows. No Stalinist head-hunter will be after a man who wields only symbolic power.

ENTER MALENKOV

The preceding synopsis of the last months of an era still leaves the picture incomplete. The political constellation in post-Gottwald Czechoslovakia is complicated by the fights for succession in post-Stalin Russia.

President Zapotocky, deprived as he is of all direct control of the state power-machine and of the state administration, seemed to enter Prague Castle with at least one tremendous trump-card, namely, presumed backing by Malenkov. In one of his most important speeches made last summer he ostentatiously quoted long passages from Malenkov's writings, a thing without precedent and obviously intended to proclaim Zapotocky's allegiance to the man who at that time still was Stalin's heir-presumptive. A series of other facts corroborated this interpretation.

Thus, the nomination of Zapotocky for successor to Gottwald appeared to be a triumph for Malenkov's clique in Czechoslovakia. The very moment Malenkov stepped into the shoes of Stalin, his man in Czechoslovakia got rid, by a happy coincidence, of his most formidable opponent. Indeed, the timing of Gottwald's death was so amazing, a number of circumstances so suspicious, that we are forced to reserve our final judgment as to the real causes of his "pneumonia."

However, what at first sight seemed to be a point scored in favor of Malenkov turns out to be a poor consolation prize.

For Malenkov, the game was spoiled by the timing of Stalin's death, in the first place. While Gottwald's death might have

come in handy for the Malenkov-Zapotocky axis, Stalin's death came altogether too early for them. It caught Malenkov in the middle of intrigues, before everything was put in place for a smooth and undisputable succession. It caught Zapotocky at a moment when he was at a loss how to solve the situation created by the collapse of his trade-union bureaucracy, which made him helpless vis-à-vis the combinations of Gottwald's "orphans."

NEW TIES IN MAKING

Under these circumstances, instead of reinforcing each other, the Russian and Czechoslovak poles of the Malenkov clique reflect their respective weaknesses on each other. With the Politbureaucrats engaged in an obscure battle, with Malenkov's position unclarified and perhaps shaky, Zapotocky's avowed vassalage may turn out to be a liability for him and an asset for his opponents.

On the other hand, Zapotocky's present domestic weakness is of no advantage to Malenkov either. It is too late for Malenkov to deplore his wrong bet. He cannot cancel it.

Had Malenkov's position in Russia emerged undisputed from the beginning, he might perhaps have counted, in addition to Zapotocky, upon the allegiance of Gottwald's "orphans," inherit them, so to speak, from Stalin who was always Gottwald's patron. In this way, Malenkov's rivals will certainly try to fish for allies among the people who constituted Gottwald's clique.

Thus the new turn provides a new opportunity for them. The new ties between them and the Moscow cliques are still in the making. No personal engagements toward the Moscow contenders limit their maneuvering. Bids for allies in the satellite countries run high. The Prague government, which is by now practically identical with the Gottwald clique, still has enough real power to profit by the situation.

Its latent leanings toward more autonomy will be enhanced since the logic of Czechoslovakia's current economic crisis pulls in the same direction. Unless it is this crisis itself that will convince the Russians to ease their grip voluntarily before they are forced into it...

is appearing in the war between the colonial powers and the colonies.

Kenya is an example. The recent massacre of "loyal" members of the Kikuyu tribe by Mau Mau gangs (with 71 murdered, 51 missing, and 50 wounded) has shaken public opinion here.

Yesterday Reginald Paget, Labor MP for Northampton, opened an Emergency Debate in the House of Commons to discuss the Mau Mau massacre. For the government, Oliver Lyttelton violently attacked Paget's speech as "malicious, mischievous and intemperate." He was, however, forced to admit that the situation was now "of a semi-military character—more like a war than an emergency."

PAGET PAGES THE BRASS

Paget described the massacre as "perhaps the most shocking event that has occurred in the history of our Commonwealth and Empire." He blamed the white settlers for failing to secure African loyalty. (This is surely something of a euphemism in view of the oppressive, imperialist attitude of the colonial British with respect to the natives they exploit.) He blamed the Kenya government for intelligence failure, and the Colonial Secretary for creating an impression of indifference to African interests and African liberties.

And this is what Paget proposed: "Recall General Templer from Malaya and bring him to Kenya. Give him complete power and political officers. Tell him not merely to pacify the country but to build up a proper foundation for native government."

Yes, this is a Labor MP speaking! It is difficult, if not well-nigh impossible, to distinguish between Paget's "progressive" solution to Mau Mau terrorism, and Lyttelton's. How General Templer will be able, with his "complete power," his

police forces and his armed battalions, to build up a proper foundation for native government, Paget does not venture to explain.

BROKE RANKS

The fact is that the only proper foundation for native government can be laid when the generals, together with their troops, are withdrawn from Kenya—and from Malaya too—in favor of an honest settlement of self-determination upon the native peoples.

Only last week we were faced with an equally disgraceful situation in our Labor Party when a right-wing minority led by Patrick Gordon Walker and Richard Stokes broke the ranks of the parliamentary group of the Labor Party by voting with the Tories in favor of Central Africa Federation. There can be little room for doubt that had the 16 rebels belonged to the left wing, they would have been carpeted and hauled over the coals.

Perhaps we do need a little discipline in the Parliamentary Labor Party. The right wing must be told: either carry out the line of the Labor Party as elaborated at the Morecambe conference, or get out.

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to speak your mind in the letter column of Labor Action. Our policy is to publish letters of general political interest, regardless of views. Keep them to 500 words.

LOS ANGELES

Un-Americaners Feature 'Foxy Grandma' Stoolpigeon

By VICTOR SAVAGE

LOS ANGELES, March 31—For the last two weeks the citizens of Los Angeles have had the dubious pleasure of watching the House Un-American Activities Committee in action. The Velde subcommittee had come to our fair city to "ferret out dirty Commie rats" from the motion-picture industry and the local school systems, it said.

As usual, Velde and Jackson made wild accusations, promised startling exposures and eye-opening revelations. And as usual the whole session mainly turned out to be a big fat dud. They told us that John Howard Lawson was a Communist. . . . Really! We even had a further rehash of those familiar stories of Stalinist activity in Hollywood 10 years ago. And instead of hurting the Communist cause it only made it appear stronger than it was.

Watching over television the long procession of witnesses, the obsequious friendly and the haughty unfriendly, one had the feeling of observing an unreal and frightening situation: one that could conceivably belong in a fascist or Stalinist police-state. Yet this was America, which we are told is the bastion of democracy.

The feeling was heightened by the sight of the pompous and smug congressmen sitting in judgment over the fate of their victims. This is especially true in regard to the chairman of the committee, gum-chewing ex-FBI cop Velde. What a portrait of self-righteousness he makes!

It would be useless and uninforming to go into great detail concerning all the machinations and ramifications of the sessions. But there are some things that are of general interest.

CAUGHT IN THE DREDGE

(1) The great majority of the repentant ex-CPers were recruited into the party, during the Spanish Civil War period. This was the epoch of Popular-Frontism, and, as most of the "exes" will tell you, they were only good anti-fascists. The period of their disillusionment came either with the Hitler-Stalin Pact or the Browder expulsion. As a group they were anything but "revolutionists," even in the Stalinist meaning of the term.

(2) The Stalinists in the radio and picture business were none too successful in their ability to inject the party line in their work. As Sylvia Richards, radio and movie script writer, stated:

"Not one word could go over the air" unless it was accepted by the advertising agency that produced the show. The same would go for the picture business. And the people who run these business enterprises are not likely to let any of the Stalinist line get by—unless it happens to coincide with the prevailing official American line at the time.

(3) Of greatest interest, perhaps the testimony of two ex-Stalinist college professors. Professor Lewis stated that the activities of the teacher's "red cell" to which he was assigned were primarily directed towards the problems of tenure, salaries and retirement, and general welfare. "As a small group, we were not a group of revolutionary individuals heading for a revolution," Lewis said, "but a group of teachers working hard for solution of our problems and frustrations." These poor professors were plainly "blunderers" in the CP (in the terms discussed by Cohen's recent, LABOR ACTION articles on Sidney Hook).

(4) The chief agent-provocateur for the committee was a demure 70-year-old grandmother. She had volunteered her services to the FBI over 9 years ago and had spent over 5 years in the CP. During this period she managed to collect the names of 132 men and women who she had known as Communists. It was she who became the hit of the show and the pet of the local press. She was referred to as "Foxy Grandma" Macia. What a show—with a stool-pigeon grandma as heroine!

(5) As is customary in witchhunt affairs like this, those who refused to testify had to take the chance that reprisals would be taken against them. At least two people (a teacher and an actress), as of this writing, have lost their jobs.

ISL FUND DRIVE

Three Weeks to Go!

It's That Last Push That We Need—Now!

By ALBERT GATES
Fund Drive Director

A good week has sent the figures climbing in the Fund Drive. Contributions this week surpassed the week before by several hundred dollars and lifted the total income to date to \$6868.00 or 59.7 per

cent of the total goal. Thirteen of the assigned quotas are now over 50 per cent and while most of these have not yet hit 75 per cent, they are all within easy striking distance of this goal. A little effort will bring them up to a point in the drive which can place us in a position to end the drive with our total goal reached.

New York City, the Socialist Youth League and Buffalo led the branches in payments made this week. New York upped its standings to over 62 per cent, with total payments reaching the figure of \$2500.00. The SYL contributed \$170 and Buffalo \$145.

In round figures, there remains \$4600 to be raised before the goal in the Fund Drive is reached. This is going to be a hard job we know, since by May 1 we will need to average over \$1500 weekly. The reason is that the average weekly payment required to meet the goal easily was not maintained over the past month.

Even though payments have been climbing, they have not yet reached the level demanded by the campaign. Now is the time when the extra effort is needed. All Fund Drive directors, the ISL and its friends and sympathizers are asked to help us make the big push successful!

strike becomes . . . a 'holy cause' . . . reason is dethroned . . . they [the strikers] join in a common endeavor to destroy the company."

It's been some time since such wild strikebreaking railing has been heard from responsible leaders of capitalist interests. Mullendore is laying it on thickly. He gets to the real substance of his slanderous attack with these words:

"The strike is now the only issue. Until it is abandoned, and picket lines withdrawn, there can be no negotiations by the company with Local 47 . . . the company cannot negotiate during the strike free from some coercive influence of the strike, and hence without at least appearing to accept the strike as a legitimate device in collective bargaining."

The union membership has been incensed over this refusal by Edison to recognize a strike as a "legitimate device." They realize what this means. Mullendore wants to have strikes outlawed in public utilities. This they will never accept.

The local, hopping mad, has increased its activity and aid to its hard-pressed membership. But on March 27 it was struck a blow: the Superior Court issued an injunction limiting the picketing activities of the union. Thus the company has succeeded in its objectives of getting at least one government agency involved on its side.

"Edison has also dared to put in a lawsuit against the union for \$1,250,000 in damages, plus \$50,000 a day for each day that the strike continues! The first hearing on this is to be held April 6.

The union is faced with a strong and ruthless corporation, plus a court injunction and the threat of further government intervention, backed by the infamous Taft-Hartley Act. As Bassett stated, it will need every ounce of support from every other section of labor.

New Issue of NI Is Out on the Stands

The new issue of *The New Internationalist* has just come out with important articles on issues of the day. Lead article in the issue is "The Russian Empire After Stalin," by Julius Falk, discussing the variety of questions which have arisen with the accession to power of the new team in the Kremlin.

Gordon Haskell's "Shifts in American Policy" analyzes the Eisenhower administration's new moves in the cold war, taking up the trends within the Republican Party and the "containment versus liberation" debate.

Abe Stein views the history and forces behind Stalinist bigotry in "The Basis of Russian Anti-Semitism," beginning with the question: "What if tomorrow

the Stalinist regime were to turn off the spate of anti-Semitic propaganda and call a halt to the shootings, arrests and deportation of Jews?" (This was written before Moscow's reversal on the case of the Jewish doctors, of course.)

The third installment of Gregory Zinoviev's "Two Eras of War" is also included, continuing Zinoviev's historical study of the wars that broke out before 1914.

Rounding out the issue is "An Open Letter to Zapotocky" by Alois Neurath. Neurath is a former member of the Communist Party's Executive Committee and a founder of the Czech Communist Party, now residing in Sweden; he discusses the Prague trial, as one who knew many of the accused.

Out to the Anti-Franco Rallies!

The anniversary of the Spanish Republic will be celebrated in New York on April 15 at 8 P.M. at Freedom House. The meeting is called jointly by the International League for the Rights of Man and the Committee to Defend Franco's Labor Victims.

Rudolph Halley, president of the New York City Council, has accepted an invitation to address the meeting. James B. Carey, secretary of the CIO, has also accepted an invitation to speak, as did Norman Thomas, chairman of the CDFLV.

The Committee to defend Franco's Labor Victims has called for picketing of the Spanish Government Tourist Office at 52nd Street and Madison Ave., New York City, on Monday, April 13, between 12 noon and 1 p.m., and on Tuesday, April 14, from 5 p.m. to 6 p.m. All readers of LABOR ACTION are asked to come out to the picket lines and the anniversary meeting as a demonstration against the Franco regime and Spanish fascism.

AFL Charges 'Union-Busting' By Edison; CIO Strike Called

By V. S. RIVSON

LOS ANGELES, Apr. 3 — While the strike at Consolidated Edison, by the AFL Electrical Workers here, goes on with increasing bitterness, a second public-utility strike has hit this area. The 2700 members of the CIO Utility Workers Union struck the Southern California Gas Company (which serves some 1,300,000 customers) at midnight of April 2.

The CIO union has already thrown a picket line at all major operating bases of the company. It is asking for a ten per cent wage increase and a union shop. The company offers five per cent and rejects the union shop.

Thus, within three weeks we have seen the two largest public-utility strikes in this section since the Korean war; and the major point at issue in both cases is the union's demand for the union shop.

Meanwhile the Consolidated Edison Company is continuing its vicious drive against Local 47 of the AFL Electrical Workers (see initial story in LABOR ACTION for March 30), which is fighting for a 25-cent-an-hour raise for linemen and the union shop.

'HOLY CAUSE'

The AFL Central Labor Council, through Secretary-Treasurer W. J. Bassett, has assured the strikers that the council will stand resolutely behind them. "The union will need this support for this is likely to be a long-drawn-out battle," he said. He charged Edison's President Mullendore with having "embarked on a union-busting drive in the hope of slashing wages."

Mullendore's new public manifesto laid bare the company's bitter labor-hating orientation. He declared that "the strike is a conspiracy [against the public] . . . its consequences [will bring] fatal accidents, enormous loss of property and eventual paralysis of the community life . . . like war . . . the winning of the

Box Score

| | Quota | Paid | % |
|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------|
| TOTAL | \$11,500 | \$6868.00 | 59.7 |
| Streator | 25 | 30 | 120 |
| St. Louis | 25 | 25 | 100 |
| Detroit | 500 | 400 | 80 |
| Pittsburgh | 150 | 112 | 74.6 |
| Cleveland | 200 | 144 | 72 |
| SYL | 1,250 | 896 | 71.6 |
| Reading | 50 | 35 | 70 |
| New York | 4,000 | 2505 | 62.6 |
| Oakland | 500 | 295 | 59 |
| General | 1,075 | 623 | 58 |
| Chicago | 1,800 | 997 | 55.3 |
| Buffalo | 650 | 345 | 53 |
| Philadelphia .. | 250 | 129 | 51.6 |
| Los Angeles .. | 600 | 252 | 42 |
| Newark | 250 | 48 | 19 |
| Seattle | 200 | 32 | 16 |
| Akron | 50 | 0 | 0 |
| Indiana | 75 | 0 | 0 |
| Oregon | 50 | 0 | 0 |

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Where Does U.S. Policy Go from Here? —

(Continued from page 1)

doubt that ignorance, however real, is the whole explanation. Nor can it be because there has been any real sign of "liberalization" or "democratization" on the part of the Kremlin gang. The very case which is cited as giving hope for "liberalization"—the reversal on the doctors' accusation—was played out in Moscow in the accustomed style: the accused were taken out of prison, and their places were promptly filled with the new purgees, the bureaucrats who had made the "mistake."

Why then do these notions crop up, among people who are not noted for softness on Stalinism but who rather have been yelling that it is unrelieved evil? We may get an idea if we remember the temper in the U. S.—how long ago it seems!—when the late good old Joe was our noble ally and nothing was too good to say about the Russians; when Stalin (who had been a devil during the Hitler pact) was featured in *Life* kissing babies, when Harper's suppressed Trotsky's biography of Stalin out of kindness to "our ally."

If peace does break out for the whole next period, will we witness a return of this "era of good feeling" among our fierce anti-Communists who up to now have been willing to use any stick, no matter how dirty and foul, not only against Stalinism but against civil liberties and democracy in order to "get" the Stalinists?

NEW ATMOSPHERE

The New York Times reported on April 5 about that bevy of journalists in Moscow: "In the contacts that are already beginning to emerge with Soviet officials there was much the same kind of atmosphere as used to be so common in wartime days." And, to be sure, from what we have seen of a couple of dispatches from these U. S. editors about their happy junket in Moscow, the atmosphere is there, as thick as life.

The next day the Times reported on the hot news about the seven Russians who came for cocktails to the U. S. embassy in Moscow: "Listening to the conversations in the ballroom, it seemed to correspondents as if the clock had been turned back to the days of World War II. . . . Tonight one American newspaperman jokingly complained to one of the Soviet guests that the rush of news in the last fortnight had kept him very busy. The Soviet guest laughed and said in good American slang, 'Brother, you ain't seen nothing yet!'"

If AP correspondent Oatis is released in Czechoslovakia, if the Kremlin offers an olive branch to the Vatican (the latter's *Osservatore Romano* has already made a bid for a bit of the new "atmosphere"), if an Austrian treaty is concocted, if the Russians send their ambassador back to Israel, if the Korean war ends, etc., we may find a great many people singing a new tune about Stalinism, or rather humming some snatches of the old tune of the wartime honeymoon days, when anti-Stalinism was unpatriotic.

This talk about a "repudiation of Stalinism," on such fantastic grounds, can well be a preparation for this eventuality, whether so consciously intended or not.

These anti-Communists of this country, for whom nothing was too dirty before! Let only the Stalinists show willingness to make a deal with U. S. imperialism—it will be a temporary deal, of course, and not "lasting peace" but it may be enough—and many respectable American citizens may lose their careers (Louis Budenz, for example).

For the fashionable anti-Communism of America today is not and has never been anti-Stalinism in our sense, but only the reflex of U. S. imperialism's interests. We socialists will remain where we are because we do not take our line on Russia from the needs of U. S. foreign policy. We were "out of line" as consistent, principled anti-Stalinists during the wartime orgy of friendship for good old Joe, and we may be again.

What Happens to U. S. Foreign Policy?

But, as a matter of fact, whatever the symptoms even now, one cannot really expect a full return to the atmosphere of the World War II days, or at least such a return will be much more limited and circumscribed. That history will not quite repeat itself: too much has happened.

Some liberal mushheads (in addition to the Stalinoid types of the *Nation* class who come by such things naturally) may see a change of spots in Moscow

and theorize it, and even many others (not so liberal and not so mushheaded) may find it more discreet to softpedal anti-Stalinism in the era of good feeling, but the more serious representatives of American imperialism are likely to be much more aware of the transitory nature of the period.

Their main problem is of quite another nature.

In this new period which looms, what happens to the U. S. foreign policy which has been so painfully erected under the Truman administration and essentially continued under Eisenhower? What happens to "containment"? What happens for that matter to the supposed alternative of "liberation"?

As long as U. S. policy could represent the Stalinist threat as primarily a military threat, it could make a show of having a policy, however stumbling a policy, but some policy or other. This policy was at bottom the policy of over-awing the enemy with military might, atom-bomb diplomacy. But what happens to it with the new "peaceful" Russia?

The administration is tongue-tied. It has nothing to say now, while the furor is going on, for the same reason that it faces blankness for the next period.

We are promised (by a couple of Washington gossip columnists) that Eisenhower will make a statement on future relations with Russia some time. No doubt. If by that time the Russian moves have "brought peace," no doubt he will welcome it, and come out in favor of peace himself. But is the "crusade" over? Is the "defense of the free world" over? Is the "Russian menace" over?

The men in Washington will not think so, of course, not being complete idiots or *Nation* editors but rather responsible caretakers of American imperialism, which cannot live in peaceful coexistence with the rival imperialist social system of Russia no matter how many bows are made by both sides to that sacred phrase. But what can they do?

UP A TREE

Last Thursday, at a State Department press conference, a reporter asked why "the peace initiative seemed to come from Communist Russia." The department's press officer indignantly denied that this was so, and may even have believed that himself; the reporter later apologized for his too-bland phrasing as "unfortunate," having been educated on its unfortunate repercussions for foreign export.

But if it popped out there, one need not read the papers to find out what the people of Europe or Asia think.

On Friday the Washington Post editorialized: "It is high time for the administration to develop in respect of the Soviet peace offensive the positive foreign policy that General Eisenhower talked about during the campaign." High time, indeed, but out of what will they manufacture such a positive policy?

Eisenhower and Foreign Minister Anthony Eden of Britain have gone so far as to admit willingness to meet the Russians' peace dove "halfway." A bold attitude indeed!

And at his new conference, Secretary of State Dulles, in the midst of silence from the president, managed to get the following words out: "The president said, I think—I haven't actually seen the transcript of his statement—that we are prepared to take up concrete matters, such as peace in Asia, where it is to our advantage to do so [!], and test out the Communist words, in practical operation."

U. S. statesmen seem to be working hard to give the world the impression that the Russian drive finds them with their breeches low, and that their reaction is one of unwilling, reluctant, bewildered agreement to go along with "peace" because they cannot do otherwise.

Is the impression justified? And if it is, what explains it? For an education in the blind alleys of American foreign policy, we strongly recommend the April 5 issue of the *N. Y. Times*, which brings a battery of the paper's top Washington experts to bear on the problem. They agree on one thing for sure: the U. S. is up a tree.

"SHEER PERPLEXITY"

Take the most immediate difficulty: The U. S. has had a hard enough time up to now getting its European allies, with bleeding economies, to make the necessary sacrifices for military strength and militarization. What now? What will happen when the April meeting of the NATO council takes place?

... it is clear that Premier Malenkov chose an opportune time, from his point of view, to embarrass the West by playing upon its very genuine hopes

of peace," writes C. L. Sulzberger, chief European correspondent.

He does not really believe that Stalin purposely died at this "opportune" time. What time in the last couple of years, or in the next couple of years, would be less opportune, given the continuing problems of the U. S. war bloc? Sulzberger continues: "This spring the American budget must be drawn up. . . . This month the NATO Council meets to fix 1953 rearmament goals. Will the maturing peace offensive knock the stuffings from the program?"

So "A suspicious Western world . . . has greeted Malenkov's mounting 'peace offensive' with a curious mixture of satisfaction, anxiety and sheer perplexity."

Among other things, he points out that the French have reason to fear a Korean peace; it may explode their hope of getting more dollars for their own little war in Indo-China, and it will make more difficult the already difficult problem of getting the Europe Army Treaty approved in Paris.

Hanson Baldwin bewails the situation from the military point of view: "This time there was genuine fear [in Washington] of what a truce in Korea, under these conditions and at a moment of Communist choosing, might mean, in the long-term view, to the world struggle. As viewed from here, the Communists have timed their offer with considerable astuteness, and the timing is calculated to do most damage to the United States and East to the Soviet Union. . . . The Communists would, in the long run, however, benefit from a truce without a settlement, just as they have benefited from the stalemate war. . . ."

TRAGIC JEST

And what would the Stalinists not benefit from? From a decisive American military victory in Korea, no doubt; only . . . no one really thinks that possible, not even Hanson Baldwin. He is not lamenting some mythical "clever" timing by Moscow; he is lamenting a blind alley.

Arthur Krock, head of the Times Washington bureau, lays it down on the line, after some lamenting of his own about Eisenhower's lack of firm, forceful leadership:

"Though tragic is the jest that what officials fear more than dateless war in Korea is peace, the jest has a real foundation. The vision of peace which could lure the free world into letting down its guard, and demolishing the slow and costly process of building collective security in Western Europe, while the Soviets maintained and increased their military power, is enough to make men in office indecisive. And the stock market selling that followed the sudden conciliatory overtures from the Kremlin supports the thesis that immediate prosperity in this country is linked to a war economy and suggests desperate economic problems that may arise on the home front.

"That could go far to explain what is rated in some quarters as a lack of strong presidential leadership up to now. . . ."

Read that over again: it is not a quotation from LABOR ACTION.

VIEW WITH ALARM

U. S. policy is geared only to a military answer to Stalinism. Deprived of the military threat, or unable to use it to maintain its policy, it squirms in perplexity, wallows in uncertainty, does not know where to turn, has nothing to say, discusses its own bankruptcy.

It is not that a mere end of the Korean war alone will kick the war-economy props from under the war-born U. S. prosperity. The problem will be how to maintain the sanction for continued large-scale war expenditures without the Korean war and in the face of an easement of the cold war generally. Said Senator Taft:

"An end to the Korean hostilities will make the budget job even harder. People will expect a big cut in spending when actually Korea and the war there represents a very small part of the military spending picture."

Senator Styles Bridges, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee: "We can't be fooled by an end to the fighting in Korea. We all want that, but no matter what happens our over-all program should not be altered. . . . This time we should do the rearming." Senator Russell (Dem., Ga.) chimed in along the same lines.

NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE

These fears and perplexities are founded on this much sound understanding: that, "peace offensive" or no, Russian im-

perialism's orientation in the cold war remains "Neither war nor peace!"—neither invitation to the big shooting war, nor any possibility of making such a settlement of the ineradicable imperialist rivalry as to ensure lasting peace.

This state of affairs is not too perplexing, for the Stalinists. In a world situation of "neither war nor peace," they have a weapon of their own: the political weapon which has already helped them to undermine Western capitalist power in one major country and which helps them to make inroads in Asia and even Western Europe. Their social appeal to the peoples of the world is an anti-capitalist force. (It is only after their victory that the victimized peoples find out that their anti-capitalism, while genuine, merely means that they impose submission to a new ruling class, which destroys the capitalist and feudal exploiters only to subject the people to the Stalinist bureaucracy.)

But the old societies of the capitalists cannot wage "neither peace nor war." They can think only of crashing through by military means or hoping fantastically for some permanent bargain-counter deal with the Stalinists to divide the world up for exploitation in some permanent fashion.

BREATHING-SPELL

In the world of "neither war nor peace" in the old sense, the only meaningful anti-Stalinist foreign policy is one that is based on the political weapon that only socialism can wield, the appeal to the peoples in the name of a Third Camp, which opposes both capitalism and Stalinism.

The conclusion from the *N. Y. Times'* analysts is almost inescapable: It will be embarrassing for the U. S. to stop the Korean war or come to any settlement with Russia. If they do not themselves come to this conclusion, indeed indignantly reject it, it is not for coldly objective reasons at all.

If the signs are right and the now-expected "peace" breaks out, and with it a breathing-spell from the war threat for the peoples of the world, there will be valuable time gained for the people to crystallize their world-wide suspicion of the two war camps into Third Camp movements, into anti-war socialist movements. But it was not the atom-bomb diplomacy that will have gained this breathing-spell for us. At the bottom of it will be the "disarray and panic" which the Malenkov-Beria regime so fears, the threat to Stalinism which arises not in the first place from Western war preparations but from the disintegrative forces within the Stalinist empire itself. Here again only movements divorced from the interests of capitalism can appeal to and hear these forces to strengthen their fight, in all its forms, against the Stalinist tyranny.

LOOK OUT FOR A DEAL

There is a lesson to be learned from this, especially for the small army of shamefaced "socialist" apologists for American foreign policy. These are the people who say that they know that America is "far from perfect," but insist that American policy, and particularly American arms, must be supported because the Stalinist empire is so rock-like in its solidity and strength that nothing but overwhelmingly superior military force can hope to resist it.

These people claim to have gone to the "only alternative" (support of U. S. rearmament and eventual political support of the U. S. in war) because there is no possibility of any other force, either internal or external, weakening and disintegrating the structure of Stalinism. Their theory is delivered a body blow by the present developments, even if these do not lead directly to a disintegration of Stalinism. They demonstrate that the system is vulnerable, and even more clearly, that American policy is incapable of exploiting its vulnerability.

We socialists reject both imperialist war and imperialist peace—and the latter may, in a very short time, take the form of inter-imperialist deals to sell whole peoples over the counter like goods, as the diplomats have done before. The Kremlin, in exchange for a deal, will want assurances of undisturbed control over its peoples; it will want horse-trades on the fate of whole countries. We cannot predict that Washington, even in its own presumed interest, will be willing to go in for another Yalta. But we do know that, even more in the next period than in the last, the only realistic line of struggle against war and Stalinism and the decaying capitalist-imperialist system will be the fight for socialism.