

Fourth International

Revolutionary Socialist Speech in Ceylon Parliament:

Against the Japanese "Peace" Treaty

By Colvin R. de Silva

First Time in English

TAN MALAKKA

On the Struggle of the Indonesian Partisans

The Theory of "State Capitalism"

By E. Germain

Inside the Soviet Union

Interviews With Two Ukrainian Refugees

Cracks in the War Economy

An Editorial

September-October 1951

25c

Manager's Column

The July-August issue of **Fourth International** met with a good response. Cleveland Literature Agent Jean Simon writes that the Cleveland comrades especially liked the article by James P. Cannon, "The Trend of the Twentieth Century." Jean also reports that newsstand sales of the May-June issue were good.

Minneapolis Literature Agent Pauline S. was particularly interested in the article "Women in the Chinese Revolution," by Frances Conway. She writes, "Having followed with interest the effect the revolutionary upsurge had on the women in China, I was glad to read this up-to-date article. It confirmed my belief — that is, once the women in the feudal countries are freed of the old traditions and shackles they become the strongest and most ardent fighters for freedom and equality. And what is true of colonial women is true of the women in all countries."

Katherine Cooper reports that in Akron both the branch and newsstand bundles of the July-August **Fourth International** have been sold out. "Please send us some more," she writes. Katherine says that plans are being made to increase Akron FI sales.

Harry Gold of New York says he enjoyed the articles by Leon Trotsky in the July-August issue on the class nature of the USSR. "Here are the most concise criteria on what is a workers state," he says. "These articles are more to the point than anything I have read anywhere else. Although I was already familiar with the 'Trend of the Twentieth Century,' I think that this article together with 'Three Years of the Yugoslav Experience' by Germain, and Trotsky's articles went to make a very timely and a very valuable issue."

Milton Jonas of New York also liked the articles on the class nature of the USSR. Milton says this material can be read and reread with great profit. "This fundamental Marxist approach to the class nature of a state is a vital question for all serious Marxists," in his opinion. "Warde's articles are also very good.

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They show from Trotsky's own writings that in analyzing the developments in our epoch Trotsky foresaw the rise of American imperialism as the final stronghold of world capitalism, and the important role of the American labor movement in the task of coming to grips with this outmoded system."

to express my sincerest thanks for **Fourth International**? In Britain where it really has no counterpart there is a great need for a theoretical journal to interpret world events. Could we have some articles on Britain in the FI? I think it would be to the mutual benefit of those on both sides of the Atlantic."

R. C. writes from England, "May I take this opportunity

R. S. B., of Colombo, Ceylon, tells us that the popularity of

the Samasamajist movement, which stands on the program of Trotskyism, is growing in Ceylon. "In Moratuwa, a town near Colombo, "the left majority of the Urban Council with its Samasamajist Chairman has established a good record for itself." It has become known for its incorruptibility and the dispatch with which it handles the business before it.

"Recently Samasamaja Youth League volunteers, headed by the Chairman and members of the Council, cut earth and made a new bus stand site for the town," he continues. Council truck drivers contributed a free day's labor. "Food was provided by workers' families in the area. The Youth League saw to it that red banners with our emblem fluttered over the work place. This is the first time such a thing has been done here. No one ever heard of the head of the City Council working with a pick and shovel like any 'common' laborer. The Council with the help of the Youth League intends building a road next, a project that has hung fire for the last 16 years." Such modest actions on a local scale indicate what possibilities for better living conditions would open up for the people of Ceylon under a revolutionary socialist government.

R. S. B. also writes that "the progress of the Socialist Workers Party in America is very encouraging to us. Every step forward in the home of imperialism is indeed a great triumph for the world working class." He would like to see **Fourth International** publish some of Leon Trotsky's writings on Spain, "as some of those lessons are especially important to us over here." He reports that James P. Cannon's testimony at the famous Minneapolis trial in 1941, published as a pamphlet, "Socialism on Trial," is "by far the most popular" of the socialist books available in English in Ceylon. He also reports that Cannon's 1942 speech on the October 1917 Russian Revolution has been printed as a pamphlet in the Sinhalese language. "It was very simple to translate, easy to understand in translation, and at the same time precise and hard-hitting. In one month 1,500 copies have been distributed."

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FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

VOLUME XII

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World in Review

Cracks in the War Economy

The economy of the United States remains the most powerful and most stabilizing factor in the capitalist system. And yet this supreme prop of the entire capitalist world structure has recently disclosed some noteworthy and quite unexpected weaknesses.

It took less than five years after World War II ended and U.S. capitalism resumed production on a civilian basis for the first signs of an oncoming crisis to appear. Only Korea and the arms program enabled America's economy to avert a catastrophic depression since 1949. Fresh testimony on this point was given by Senator George Aiken of Vermont in a speech reprinted in the *Congressional Record* on August 10th of this year.

"Only 14 months ago, the economy of our country seemed headed for a slump or at least a descent to lower levels," the Senator said. "The Korean war definitely warded off serious economic trouble for the United States."

But that is far from the whole story. It seemed to America's rulers that the colossal government spending for the war machine would keep the economy going full blast in all departments. Much to their surprise and consternation, not even the explosion of inflation following the Korean intervention and on top of that the huge arms expansion of the past year have sufficed to keep the economy on an even keel.

Instead of skyrocketing sales and continued scarcities in the field of consumer goods, the bottom dropped out of the civilian market in the second quarter of 1951. This period witnessed a sensational "price war" among retailers. The four major industries which have been hardest hit are autos, radio and television, furniture and textiles. "The reductions in output in April and May as compared with the previous quarter affected *all consumer durable products and ranged from 15 percent for electric ranges, to more than 50 percent for television receivers,*" reported the Department of Commerce in its *Survey of Current Business* for July 1951.

In some cases the drops have actually been more severe. Most conspicuous was the television industry whose prospects were not so long ago touted as boundless. After manufacturing 874,634 sets in March, it had to cut production to 116,000 by July. This was not "more than half," as the Department of Commerce cautiously reported, but less than *one-seventh!*

The *N. Y. Herald-Tribune* ran five articles to explain this paradox of "hard times in the midst of an ambiguous prosperity." Donald I. Rogers, business and financial editor, touched off this series on Sept. 5 by posing the

following questions: "Why, when production is at peak capacity, when personal income is at an all-time high, when employment is highest on record, should there be virtual depression for several key industries?" Why aren't automobiles selling? Why has the furniture business gone to pot? Why is the whole textile industry wobbly? Why have sales of TV sets and appliances nearly dried up?"

Rogers and his co-authors were unable to give adequate answers to any of these questions. They simply consoled themselves with the observation that this was an "unorthodox economic problem," that the "virtual depression" could not endure for more than a few months and that, in the end, as Rogers puts it, "an increasing number of war contracts may solve the problems of many worried executives in these industries."

These writers feared to recognize the economic realities that mass purchasing power has been so slashed by inflation and taxation that the bulk of the people can today afford no more than the bare necessities, and that the productive capacities of the United States are so great that even under current restrictions they cannot find outlets either at home or abroad.

The sharp collapse of civilian production and civilian markets since April of this year provide confirmation that even the strongest sector of capitalism can find no way out of threatened depression except through continually expanding arms production and ultimately — WAR on a global scale.

Localized wars can stimulate the economy, especially through scare buying and hoarding — but cannot sustain it for an extended period. It is not enough to wage a war on the model of Korea which has devoured at least ten billions a year, not to speak of one casualty in every four on the battlefield. It is not enough to have an arms program on the "limited" basis of 20 to 30 billions a year. It is not enough to have conscript armed forces numbering from three to five millions. Nothing short of an all-out arms program and the subsequent artificial creation of shortages in civilian goods can suffice to ward off a new decline and depression.

That is the economic impulsion behind the staggering "peacetime" arms bill of "\$61 billion plus" Congress passed in September which came on top of the already appropriated but still unexpended \$35 billion of last year. This injection of not less than 100 billion dollars — in addition to all the other billions for European rearmament, military construction of bases, camps, etc., here and abroad — marks the longest step yet taken toward shifting U.S. economy over to full-scale war production.

There is no question that such a transition has long been planned and carefully prepared by the capitalist ruling circles. But it is also clear that they never expected to make the transition so abruptly and under such critical circumstances. All of them, from the military down, have been caught off guard by the developments in the economic field where they have felt most secure, just as they have run into one staggering surprise after another in the sphere of international politics.

As proof of this we cite two facts, one, economic; the other, from the record of their highest strategic planning. Economically, the big monopolists have been caught with hugely inflated inventories even more acutely than the small fry. Prior to Korea, they had been reducing inventories which dropped from \$56.6 billion in 1949 to \$51.8 billion in 1950. By the beginning of this year these inventories leaped to \$64.6 billion and by the second quarter had passed the \$70 billion mark.

These increases to the tune of almost \$20 billion suffice to show that not only the little enterprises but the biggest among Big Business have been caught by the sudden slump. Let us add that the recent inventory "reductions" hopefully reported in the press are due as much to recent declines in prices as to the frantic attempts to clear out jammed warehouses by sales promotions and cuts in orders and production.

A similar lack of foresight was evidenced in their arms planning where the Joint Chiefs of Staff represent the highest authority. A little more than a year ago in March 1950, Gen. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and assured them that he personally and his colleagues "never went along with this large figure of \$20 billion a year (for military appropriations) to protect the security of the United States."

Bradley went so far as to say at the time: "If I recommended as much as \$30 billion a year for the Armed Forces, I ought to be dismissed as Chief of Staff."

These words sound incredible today when Bradley and his colleagues have not hesitated to demand, and Congress to blindly pass, appropriations over three times the size

they all previously deemed unnecessary and even impermissible. And it was revealed during discussions in the Senate that the original demands of the various armed forces were actually higher by as much as 40 percent than the staggering sums appropriated.

By this we do not mean to imply that the top militarists are above deliberately lying when it suits their purposes, any more than their "honorable" civilian opposite numbers in the government. But the militarists are not fools. They, least of all, care to have to eat their own words in public. It is hardly likely that Bradley and the other Joint Chiefs would have committed themselves so bluntly in March 1950 if they had any inkling of what they would be proposing by March 1951.

As a rule there can be no painless transition from a peacetime to wartime economy. From the early indications, the abrupt transition, under obviously adverse conditions, that is now in process, will prove the most costly and onerous on record. The full consequences cannot be forecast at this point; but it is already clear that all the costs and hardships are being unloaded on the mass of our people.

Regardless of when the ruling imperialists make the big decision to plunge into all-out war, their arms program is already beginning to spell disaster for the American people in a decline of their living standards. This is part of the terrible price monopoly capitalism is exacting from the American nation for its continued rule.

While the corporations burst with profits and the rich get richer, high prices, heavier taxes and low wages prevent the workers from buying the vast hoards of consumer goods piled up in the warehouses.

At the same time even the stepped-up program of military production which is straining heavy industry does not guarantee stability to the operation of U.S. capitalism. It lurches from one critical situation to the next — testifying to the extremely advanced stage of decay imperialism has reached in our time. Consequently along this road every increase in production brings, not greater prosperity and security to the people, but new difficulties in the economy which drive the imperialists to bring global war that much closer.

Against the Japanese "Peace" Treaty

By COLVIN R. de SILVA

(Speech Delivered During Debate on the Draft of the Treaty in the Ceylon Parliament on August 23, 1951)

At the San Francisco Conference this September which rubber-stamped the Peace Treaty with Japan, the American stage-managers of the Conference featured the approving speeches of Mr. J. R. Jayawardena, head of the Ceylon delegation and Minister of Finance in the Ceylon government. This was obviously done as an antidote to the extremely unfavorable reaction to the Treaty in the colonial world, highlighted by India's refusal even to attend the Conference.

The subservience of the Ceylon delegation was played up to give the impression that it was truly representative of South-East Asian opinion. Actually powerful opposition to the Treaty with Japan exists not only in the rest of Asia but in

Ceylon itself. The debates on this question during August in the Ceylon Parliament saw a strong bloc of members ranging from Independents to Trotskyists and Stalinists stand up — each group for its own reasons — against signing the Treaty.

The elected leader of the opposition in the Ceylon Parliament is Dr. N. M. Perera, head of the Lanka Samasamaja Party, Ceylon section of the Fourth International. This is the second largest party in the Parliament, being exceeded only by the governing bourgeois party known as the United National Party. (The D. S. Senanayake, Prime Minister and also Minister of External Affairs, who participated in the debate, is the chief figure in this party.)

In the parliamentary debates on August 23 Dr. Colvin R. de Silva set forth the attitude of the Lanka Samasamaja Party toward the Japanese Treaty. We reprint herewith the main sections of his speech outlining the viewpoint of revolutionary socialists in Asia on this imperialist agreement. — Editor.

* * *

DR. COLVIN R. de SILVA: . . . In the first place, I wish to make a remark of a general nature. Judging from the news that we have had in the newspapers and in the international press, as far as we know Ceylon is the only Asian country that is going to San Francisco to sign this Treaty unreservedly. It is said that the Philippine Government, too, intends to sign the Treaty on the same occasion but the Philippine Government has expressly let it be known that it has certain reservations and important differences in respect of this Treaty but that it is signing largely under pressure from certain of the greater powers.

In the case of India, Indonesia* and Burma, it is now publicly known that they have not yet — let me put it mildly — made up their mind as to whether this Treaty ought to be signed. I do not propose to go into the reasons — some of them in our view good, some of them in our view not so good — which have motivated these states in Asia and in particular South-East Asia not to agree to sign this Peace Treaty at all or at least without reservations.

I refer to the matter for this reason. It is to me significant that Ceylon is apparently the only Asian state that intends and has announced that it will sign the Treaty without reservation and when we find that Ceylon, one of the states in Asia, is out of step publicly with other fellow Asian states then I think this honorable House would agree that everyone in this country would need to look with care into the question of why our country, our Government, is out of step with other Asian governments on so vital and important a matter. In our view anything that separates Ceylon from her fellow Asian states must be examined with care.

The right honorable gentleman as well as the propagandists of the international press who sponsor this Peace Treaty have particularly recommended the draft to us on the ground that it is not a punitive Treaty. It is said that the proposed signatories to this Treaty have, through the bitter experience of the period after the first imperialist world war, learnt that to impose upon a defeated country a peace which carries with it also the character of being the infliction of a punishment is in the long run only to inflict that punishment on themselves. Consequently it is said that it is intended in this Treaty to treat Japan — that is to say that State of Japan which is going to sign this Treaty, a State about which I shall have some words to say later — with generosity, it would almost seem with the milk of human kindness and even unwonted international forgiveness.

In the first place, I think I would be performing a service to this House and to the country at large if I examine the Clauses of this Treaty from the point of view of that claim to see whether in fact, the claim itself is justified. I shall examine the reason why there is any

* Indonesia also eventually signed the treaty with reservations. — Editor.

relenting on the part of the Allied Powers, as they are called in this Treaty, but more properly that section of the Allied Powers in the last war who are intending to sign this Treaty at San Francisco, the real reasons for that apparent relenting and then indicate the objectives and purposes which are being pursued by those apparently relenting. But I have no doubt in my mind that by referring to the actual Clauses of the Treaty themselves I will be able to satisfy this honorable House that, even in spite of the appearance of softness, the peace that is proposed is, to use language that is rather common, in fact hard, "punitive."

Before I refer to a few articles in the Treaty which illustrate my point, permit me, Mr. Speaker, one little incidental reflection. In the movement to which we belong wars have always been characterised according to, shall I put it, the social structure of the countries which are engaged in mutual battle and according to the purpose which that social structure impresses upon that war. But today in current propaganda and particularly in association with the custom that has grown since the last war of dealing, under cover of legality, often with the utmost of illegality with those who are called war criminals, wars have tended to be analysed or characterised on the footing of moral considerations. Apparently those who have been carrying through a series of trials of various individuals who have been designated "War Criminals" have in their published statements and other publications looked to the question of what is called moral responsibility, and so there is a tendency to talk of good states, and bad, and the like; and that you can treat one group of states who are to be morally characterised in a soft way in the peace and another group who is differently characterised morally in a different way.

For instance, in connection with this Treaty, it has been publicly said in certain quarters that Japan under the administration of General MacArthur in recent times has reformed its ways and become more democratic in its outlook and co-operative with the rest of the world in its ways, and that for such good behaviour — that is again the very term — they should be rewarded. These are terms that are drawn from the field of crime, and from the field of punishment relating to crime. Here, in my view, those are not outlooks that are relevant to the consideration of the question as to what should be done in connection with the war that has taken place.

What Happens to Japan's "Territories"

I said I proposed to point to certain articles in this Treaty which indicate that this is in fact a punitive peace. In fact, if I point to three articles, it would do. First, if you will look at Chapter II of the Draft Treaty — it is very properly headed "Territory" — you will find that the so-called Allied Powers have in fact stripped Japan of all her territories outside the area of the islands which are presumably said to belong to the Japanese. Now I point to this fact not in order to suggest that Japan should have been allowed to hold colonies or to keep countries under colonial oppression in this Treaty, but in order to draw attention to a completely different aspect of the matter.

When Japan is stripped of these territories, the purpose, the entire character of such stripping of these territories could be properly inferred by asking "What is being done to those territories?" And when you look at it that way, you begin to see at once that what has been done in the "territory" clauses of Chapter II is purely predatory. We say that all imperialist wars are robber wars. I will show a little later that we of our Party and movement characterise the war between the Anglo-American imperialist powers and imperialist Japan as an imperialist war and we say that all imperialist wars are predatory wars out of which could flow only a predatory peace. Here we see some straight stealing and a little crooked dealing.

I will explain. Had this Treaty said "Certain territories possessed by Japan are taken out of her control, and the people of those territories are left free in the exercise of their right of national self-determination to decide upon their own future," there may have been something to be said for the point, but what is done here is as follows.

In the first place, certain territories by Article 3 are directly handed over to rival imperialist powers. Japan herself in the period of the last two imperialist wars exposed the sheer mirage of the system of so-called trusteeship. Japan in fact publicly announced at a certain time that there is a tendency in international affairs not to call things by their true names, and that when certain specific islands were handed over to her on a footing of trusteeship to be administered as a trustee power, that was merely the form and manner in which those areas were subjected to her.

If you will look at Article 3, you will find the following:

"Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei State south of 29 north latitude (including Ryuku Islands and the Daito Islands) the Namp Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island."

Note, Sir, the next sentence:

"Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands including their territorial waters."

This is the straight handing over of a group of subject peoples to a new imperialist subjection. I will not elaborate it further.

The other way is the indirect method of subjection known as trusteeship through the United Nations. In particular, one might see Article 2 (d) which reads as follows:

"Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of 2nd April, 1947, extending the trusteeship to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan."

The one thing the unfortunate people of the Pacific Islands are apparently to be denied is freedom. Trusteeship as the form of subjection is one of the things embodied in this Treaty.

Secondly, in order to show from another angle that

this Treaty is in fact punitive while purporting to be soft, I should like to point to another aspect which arises from Article 6. May I for the moment first draw the attention of the House to Article 6? Article 6 (a) reads:

"All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other."

Article 6 is, in form, a provision for the freeing of Japan from military occupation, because the first sentence refers to removing all military forces from Japan within ninety days. But the second sentence completely negates the first, for, once again in the form of a negotiated bilateral or multilateral agreement what is being arranged is that Japan can continue under the military control of those who are militarily controlling her now; only this takes the form not of an occupation as a result of conquest in war but of control as a result of a supposed voluntary agreement. Throughout South-East Asia in recent years we have had ample examples of this kind of indirect military occupation and control under cover of an agreement with a weaker power. I shall later show what kind of a Japan it is that they are making their agreement with, and, therefore, why it is easy to realize that the second sentence is there for no other reason than to open the way to the continued military occupation of Japan by American imperialism.

As to Reparations

The third point is this. I want to refer to Article 14 (a). It is on the basis of Article 14 (a) that the right hon. Gentleman would no doubt say that we have a soft peace. But if one reads Article 14 (a) with some care, one would find that far from it giving up the principle of the imposition of reparations, it reaffirms on the contrary the principle of imposing reparations and then, by leaving vague the extent of the reparations to be imposed, it leaves the road open, if necessary in changed circumstances, as one might say, to turn the screw upon Japan. Article 14 (a) reads:

"It is recognized that, although Japan should in principle pay reparation for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war, nevertheless Japan lacks the capacity, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make adequate reparation to the Allied Powers and at the same time meet its other obligations."

In other words, as between the Allied Powers to whom Japan is undertaking other obligations of an extensive nature, it is understood that Japan cannot bear the further burden of assisting the reconstruction of economies which during the war she devastated. We do not know the extent and nature of these other agreements, but it will be seen again that in terms of Article 14 (a) what is being covered is that heavy reparations have, in fact, already been drawn by certain Powers in political and military terms.

I also want to draw attention, as a fourth point, to Article 12 (b). These three Articles I have already drawn

attention to, together with the fourth, will show how punitive is the complete military, political and economic stranglehold these Allied Powers will continue to maintain, and have in Japan, after the signing of this peace. Here is Article 12 (b):

"Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the coming into force of the present Treaty: — (1) Accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels —

(i) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests — such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property, participation in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities;

(2) Ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese State enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations."

If one looks at this undertaking to give most-favored-nation treatment and national treatment, on the one hand in respect of the taxation structure of Japan, and on the other hand especially in respect of shipping and navigation, it would be easy for anyone who remembers that Japan, just like our celebrated economy, is an export-import economy, to understand what a stranglehold by Treaty these Allied Powers are seeking to maintain over the Japanese economy in the future.

For these four main reasons, I submit that, although there are some other open signs of a certain softening of the terms, basically the peace remains predatory.

Why China Is Not There

I want to raise a different question which also covers the aspects that I have dealt with already but, in fact, raises questions of a far deeper significance. It is a very important question for us to say who is signing this Treaty, and with whom, at San Francisco. The most notable exception so far as we know at present, especially since the Government of the USSR has announced that it is sending a delegation to San Francisco, is the Government of the People's Republic of China. There is no question that the countries called China and Japan and their respective States have long been at war — indeed for a much longer period than the Anglo-American imperialists were at war with Japan. What is the meaning of this alleged effort to pursue peace and security, which is referred to in the preamble, if the most important and today what I consider to be the major Power in Asia is not present at the making of the Treaty?

We know why China is not there. Those who really control the situation in respect of Japan and in fact are imposing this Treaty upon the Japanese people refuse to recognize the present Government of China, in particular the United States of America.

Consequently, a Government which America's own intimate ally, Britain, has accepted publicly as wielding *de*

facto power over the entirety of Chinese territory, outside Formosa, is not to be at the Treaty table, and not to participate at the signing of the Treaty.

This is indeed a queer way of entering into a treaty to settle all outstanding differences from the point of view of peace and security, especially when we know that the Government of China would have had some very important considerations to place before the other powers, and before the world, at the treaty table in respect of the rights of the Chinese Government and people against the Japanese imperialists.

What is the Government with which these Allied Powers are signing this treaty? Is it indeed a Government of the people of Japan, freely chosen by the people of Japan in conditions in which the freedom of choice could in fact be exercised by the people of Japan? Is this Government which at San Francisco is to set its signature to this treaty, in fact truly representative even of the interests of the Japanese people?

There cannot be the slightest doubt—I am keeping myself carefully within the proper limits in referring to a foreign state—that the present Japanese Government with which this Treaty is to be entered into, is nothing but the creature, the puppet, of the Military Occupation Authority in Japan.

Even the most casual readers of newspapers know that the true ruler of Japan is the American General who heads the American Forces which are in occupation of Japan, allegedly on behalf of the United Nations and Allied Powers, but, in fact, largely on behalf of American Imperialism.

Even the Japanese press had come to the stage, in the case of General MacArthur, of referring to him as the American Mikado, and he, it is well known, used to conduct himself in a way that appeared to be a deliberate endeavor to obtain unto him the popular attribution of those very mysteries and qualities which the Mikado traditionally in Japan is supposed to have inspired. MacArthur out-Mikadoed the Mikado in his conduct!

Whatever the Allied Military Government passed on to whatever Japanese Government was allegedly in power, but only in office, that Japanese Government had to and has to do. It is in such a framework that the present Japanese Government, whose representatives are to sign this Treaty, came into existence.

To sign a treaty with your own creature and then to embody in the treaty a statement that it is a treaty as between equals is either to make the word "equal" unreal, or to indulge in diplomatic hypocrisy. Yet you will find in this very treaty that they have perpetrated a tragic diplomatic joke. If you look at the Preamble, line two, you will find this remarkable statement:

"Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan," — not even the "Japanese State" or the "Japanese Government," but Japan as a whole—"are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace."

According to this Preamble, this is a treaty between some Sovereign States. Has one ever heard of a Sovereign

State which is in the military occupation of another? Has one ever heard of a peace that has been imposed by an Occupation Power after victory in war being the subject of a peace treaty which is signed as between equals?

I referred earlier to "political morals." It would be much better for the sake of morals in international political relations, if what I have already characterized as a tragic diplomatic joke had not been perpetrated in this draft treaty. There is a further fact, not referred to in this treaty, which I want to bring out. I have been talking only of the political aspects of Japan and to the fact that the State is not really free but only a puppet of American Occupation Authorities. I want to point out also that the sections of Japanese society on which the present Japanese Government rests, are sections which, since the American occupation of Japan, are known have become interlocked economically in particular with monopoly American capital.

In the days before the war we used to hear of the great monopoly combines of a family character which used to exist in mighty Imperialist Japan. We have heard of Mitsui and Mitsubishi and the rest of them, men who in their own spheres were equivalent to the great monopolists of Germany and America. Today the Mitsuis and the Mitsubishis, in so far as the newspapers and propaganda are concerned, may well be no more, but behind the scenes they are operating actively and working relentlessly and deliberately towards the restoration of their former economic power, even as the great German monopolists worked towards the restoration of their own power which they finally reestablished through Herr Hitler in the period between the two Imperialist world wars.

The fact is that American capital has been steadily penetrating the Japanese economic system, entering into close partnership with old monopoly system in the economy in which however foreign American capital and local Japanese capital of a monopolistic nature now function as partners. I have not seen any figures which would enable me to decide as to who actually is the dominant partner, but, judging from probabilities one has very little doubt, especially after Japan has suffered a tremendous defeat in war and especially after the experience we had in the twenties of this century of the penetration of German industry by American capital, that in fact in considerable sectors of major Japanese industries American capital is now dominant. Whether that be so or not, I have not the slightest doubt that they are in close partnership in that field.

Now let us take that fact with a very significant Article in this Treaty, namely, Article 14 (a), sub-head I, which starts with a "However". After Article 14 has recognized that although Japan should in principle pay reparations nevertheless Japan lacks the capacity to make adequate reparations, it goes on to say:

"However,

I. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan." — Please note these next few phrases — "With a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the skills and industry of the Japanese people in manufacturing, salvaging and other services to be rendered to the Allied Powers in question."

This is one of those subtle provisions which in form appears to be an undertaking that the Japanese people will aid other people in the restoration of their economies, but, when one studies the realities and the relations within the Japanese economy, financial and otherwise, then one sees here that American capital already substantially in control of important sectors of the Japanese economy, has through this article provided itself with a legal channel for joining together with Japan and repenetrating with its own finance the very areas which it had penetrated before the war. The moment one looks at the fact that Japan is a political puppet and economically almost subordinate partner one begins to understand once again what is the meaning of this supposedly soft peace.

Historical Significance of Treaty

I shall now turn to that principle, as I shall term it, of relenting to some degree to a former enemy. What is the significance of the Treaty from that angle? That significance in my view must be sought historically and in the contemporary international situation. I shall content myself with making the following remark. Historically this Treaty constitutes the inevitable imperialist conclusion of what was utterly an imperialist war between the Anglo-American Imperialists and the Japanese. I have already adverted to that matter and I do not want to go into it again; but may I say this:

There can be no doubt that Britain and America on their side were and are imperialist powers. Not even those who disagreed with us as to the character of this war,* during what we called the last imperialist war, will deny that these two powers are today imperialist. There can be no doubt that during and after this war they did not change their character and therefore, that the two powers, Britain and America, who went to war with Japan in 1941, on December the 7th, were imperialist powers. In the same way by any definition of imperialism, including the definition which has always mystified my hon. Friend the Appointed Member (Mr. Pakeman), who I am sorry to see is not here, there is no question that Japan, too, which went into the war, was an imperialist power.

When two imperialist powers clash, in our traditional literature from Lenin onwards, that has been defined as an imperialist war because those who go to war on the basis of that particular socio-economic structure cannot but have imperialist and territorial objectives. Do not be alarmed, as I shall not treat this House to a disquisition on what it is an imperialist war. I stated that for this reason. Now at long last the Anglo-American imperialists who conquered Japan during the last war and came into occupation of that country are imposing a peace which can only flow out of an imperialist war. I say that anyone who characterizes this Treaty as an imperialist treaty imposing predatorily certain terms upon the Japanese people must come to the position that this is also the crowning point, if I may use that rather improper term, of an imperialist war.

I have stated that matter because from the historical point of view that is one more reason why we give a cer-

* The reference is to the Stalinists.

tain significance to this Treaty. It is a completion of an imperialist war. But it is far more important to look into this matter from a contemporary point of view than to delve into the historical past. From a contemporary point of view what is important is to note that the international situation in its development itself has caused American imperialism in particular to soften up the terms of a peace which nevertheless, as I said, remains essentially and basically hard.

The present international situation is characterized not only by growing tension but by the growing open conflict between two power blocs which, though they do not exhaust all the major States in the world, nevertheless, drawing respectively a sufficient number of important States within their respective groups, make a clash almost inevitable in international politics.

There is what is popularly known as the Anglo-American power bloc which has gathered round itself a whole series of its own satellites. There are especially in South-East Asia various important countries which really do not belong directly to either of the power blocs which center round American imperialism and the Soviet Union but which vacillate between the two and are sometimes flung about between the two.

You will find that it is precisely that group of States which thus do not belong, as I may put it, in a straight way to either of the power blocs which found certain difficulties in Asia about this Treaty for various reasons. One factor is however clear, namely, that throughout the world the power group which centers round American imperialism is building its bases and preparing its springboards for an imperialist attack upon the Soviet group, in particular the USSR and China. Incidentally, permit me to say in passing that we do not regard China as being in any manner a mere puppet of the Soviet Union. China we regard as an independent major power which within what is termed the Soviet bloc pursues its own interests. That is by the way.

Now, the whole meaning of this present Treaty, the whole significance of this Treaty, is to be found in the state of international relations. When you look at the military clauses, when you look at the economic arrangements, when you look at the intention to rehabilitate aspects of Japan's economy under imperialist control and to give Japan a certain striking power both economically and militarily, then we can see that clearly the purpose and object of this Treaty is to convert the country known as Japan into an imperialist springboard of attack against the Soviet Union and China. That factor alone would have more than sufficed for our Party, and I think, for the Opposition as a whole, to refuse to endorse the signature of this Treaty.

May I turn to one or two positive matters and end? We say, therefore, that this Treaty is punitive. We say this Treaty is a sham basically in that it is signed between the imperialists and their own creatures. We say that the Treaty, far from aiming at international peace and security as stated in the preamble, actually carries the war plans of the imperialists against the Soviet Union and China an important stage further. For the various reasons I have

given, we say it is an imperialist peace flowing out of an imperialist war and that we cannot, therefore, support the signing of that Treaty. From our point of view, the only peace or treaty that ought to be signed between us and Japan is a treaty which is denuded completely of this imperialist character to which I have been referring in some detail during my speech. That cannot be achieved without certain prerequisites also being achieved. We say that in an imperialist war the demand we make even of the imperialists in respect of peace is a peace without reparations, without indemnities, without annexations, with the peoples of the various countries free to operate the principle of the right of self-determination of nations to achieve their freedom. But in the case of Ceylon and Japan what do we ask them to do? We say, the only thing that the Ceylon Government should do is to refuse to go—pardon me, Sir, if I at this stage use rather a harsh word—to this gathering of the “robber clans” at San Francisco.

THE RT. HON. D. S. SENANAYAKE: Russia will also go.

DR. COLVIN R. de SILVA: With regard to the Soviet Union coming there, it is not yet known whether it is to sign the Treaty. I think the right hon. Gentleman would be hard put to it to announce that the Soviet Union is going to sign this Treaty, and unless and until the right hon. Gentleman can declare to this country that he has been informed by the Soviet Government that it is going to San Francisco to sign this document, he has no right to say what he has said. Whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks the Soviet Union is a “robber power” or not, the right hon. Gentleman, as the Minister responsible to this country for the conducting of the external affairs of this country, has no right to say that when a Government announces its intention to be present at a certain gathering that it is going there to participate in a certain signing.

People of Ceylon Against Imperialists

Certain “robber Powers,” I say, are gathering in San Francisco in order to sign this Treaty. I invite the right hon. Gentleman's Government not to participate in that “robber” process. We say, let the Government of Ceylon negotiate with a free and independent Japan freely and independently a treaty of its own. The only peace that we can expect is a peace without annexations and without indemnities freely entered into by an unoccupied Japan with a Ceylon which enters into negotiations on the basis of complete repudiation of the alliance with and commitments to imperialism both during the war and after. I say that even though the right hon. Gentleman's Government, if it considers itself the heir of the Government that existed here during the war, participated in the last imperialist war on the side of one imperialist group, that the people of Ceylon, generally, showed clearly that they were against participation in that imperialist war. Today, the very people who dragged this country into this war not of its own making and to its own interests are meeting to impose upon Japan a peace which is only in their predatory interests. I say, let our country say, “We wash our hands of you in so far as this Treaty is concerned.” What is it that even from an ordinary material point of view, or

from the right hon. Gentleman's rather favorite recent spiritual point of view, that this Treaty is supposed to give us? I submit, nothing. It brings to the major powers that are imposing this Treaty on Japan certain economic and military advantages, and, by our joining in this signature, we are hitching ourselves into their schemes which are making it impossible for us to develop an independent policy.

For Independence of Small Nations

Finally, I want to make one general point. I have noted—I do not wish to be understood to be basing my remark on any interjection of the right hon. Gentleman—but I repeat I have noted in this House that whenever our Party speaks of independent action in the field of international policy there is a tendency rather to scoff at the idea. There is a tendency to talk of little nations on the assumption that they are bound to be corks tossed upon the waters of international diplomacy with no independent function of their own to perform, with a destiny which can only be defined as the inevitable subordination of themselves to one or other of the major states that exist in the world at any time. There is also a tendency nowadays in many quarters to talk of peace as merely having the content of an agreement between what are known as the Five Great Powers of the world. To neither of these ideas can our Party subscribe. We say that the little nations, individually, can perform an important function in the field of inter-

national relations and the little nations genuinely following the policies independent of power groups can come together to fight for important objectives.

Secondly, we say that it is impossible for any truly independent country to accept the thesis that the Five Great Powers are to be voluntarily accepted as the policemen of the world. The little countries in their struggle for freedom, even the larger countries in their struggle for social emancipation, will not allow any group of powers to intervene in their affairs with a view allegedly to keep the peace.

I want to say this: even in the United Nations Organization's agreement which arose out of the last war and which all these Five Great Powers signed, there is embodied that idea that these Five Great Powers have a special interest and a special right over all the others. So long as that concept is ministered unto there will really be no chance of peace because every time the five policemen fall out and begin to use their batons upon each other's heads, the little ones in between will get their heads battered, too, willy nilly. Therefore it is what we urge upon even this Government that it should in this particular case of a Treaty with Japan seek independent negotiations for an independent treaty. Until and unless such a treaty, born out of such processes as I have sought to indicate, is placed before this House, it will be impossible for our Party to vote for a treaty which is of a nature that is before us.

Tan Malakka

By MAURICE FERAREZ

Ibrahim gelar Datoek Tan Malakka was born in the Northwestern part of the island of Sumatra around 1895. The precise date of his birth is not known. He attended lectures at the government Normal School at Fort de Kock in Sumatra and passed his teacher's examinations in Holland. From that time on he was a Socialist by conviction. The Indonesian Social-Democratic Association (I.S.D.V.), founded by Sneevliet, Brandsteder and H. W. Kekker in May 1914, published the first number of its organ "Het Vrije Word" (The Free Word) on October 10, 1915 and in it we find a greeting signed by "comrade Tan Malakka." From then on Tan Malakka was well-known in Dutch and Indonesian circles.

The whole life of the uncompromising Indonesian revolutionary was thereafter dedicated to the emancipation of the Indonesian masses and, beyond the borders of his country, the emancipation of all the colonial masses. Tan Malakka not only displayed his liberating activities on the political and economic planes. He was long the leader of a revolutionary trade-union organization and conducted numerous strikes. He became a legendary figure through his struggle against illiteracy. He founded numerous schools, called "Sarikat Rajat" schools, and this movement of elementary education for the masses took on such scope that imperialism rightly considered it a weapon against colonial oppression and decided to destroy it.

In truth, the educational movement organized by Tan Malakka had a decidedly proletarian basis. The students were educated not only in reading, writing and arithmetic, but they were also taught to consider social conditions from the proletarian point of view. They learned the basic principles of several trades. The students developed their sense of initiative and several experiments produced highly interesting results. The students themselves manufactured most of the school equipment, such as benches and blackboards. The school was the center of an intensive cultural and organizational life in which all students participated. A magazine for children was published. All the schools were subordinated to a commission and a central office which coordinated their activities. All this was accomplished without the slightest subsidy by the authorities. Expenses were reduced to a minimum raised by voluntary contributions. As was the case with Tan Malakka himself, the teachers were housed and fed by sympathizers or parents of students.

The popular support won for this movement by Tan Malakka became evident when the Dutch authorities of the district banned a "fancy fair" in Semarang, in November 1921. According to newspapers of that period, 4,000 women during the day and 5,000 men in the evening, participated in the protest demonstration which took place on November 13, 1921. In spite of the ban by police, the

"Internationale" was sung at the demonstration. The city of Semarang looked like a city under siege. As a result of these events and of his own activities, Tan Malakka was expelled from Indonesia on March 2, 1922, by secret handwritten order of the head of the imperialist administration in Semarang, the director of the Justice Department and Attorney-General. After his militant activity in the Indonesian Social-Democratic Association (I.S.D.V.), Tan Malakka became one of the founders of the Indonesian Communist Party, on May 23, 1920. After his expulsion from Indonesia, he left on a long trip to participate in the Fourth Congress of the Communist International as official delegate from his party. There he asked the leaders of the International to modify their attitude toward the Pan-Islamic movement and expressed himself in favor of support for this movement. In his view, Pan-Islamism was nothing but a movement of Moslem unity against imperialist oppression.

Attitude to Moslem Mass Movement

Tan Malakka's position must be explained by the special political conditions in his own country. Both the Indonesian Social-Democratic Association and the Indonesian Communist Party found their most fruitful field of activity and recruitment within the *Sarikat Islam*, the Moslem mass organization of a moderate nationalist character and with a strong proletarian basis. In 1916 the *Sarikat Islam* already had 360,000 members. It was at that time in favor of an autonomous Indonesian administration, which was to be achieved gradually and in a strictly legal manner. But in 1917, chiefly because of Tan Malakka's efforts in its midst, it voted a resolution condemning the "sins of capitalism." This marked the beginning of its activity as a mass organization and resulted, in 1919, in a *Sarikat Islam* membership of 2,000,000! At the Sixth Congress of the *Sarikat Islam*, in 1921, the organization changed into a party with its own discipline and closed its doors to Tan Malakka and the other leaders of the Communist Party. Understanding the importance of this organization for the development of the anti-imperialist mass struggle, Tan Malakka renewed his efforts to come closer to it by having the Communist International modify its attitude on the question of Pan-Islamism.

Tan Malakka also represented his party, together with Semdoen, at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International.

During this whole period the first revolutionary vanguard in Indonesia advanced toward maturity. Tan Malakka wrote several works in which he outlined the program of the Indonesian revolution. His book "Toward the Republic of Indonesia," published in 1925, includes a "strategy for the conquest of power." In it he distinguishes between three successive stages in the struggle against Dutch imperialist domination:

Outlined Stages in Struggle

(1) Winning over the majority of the advanced proletarian masses among the population, concentrated in the Valley of Solo, on the Island of Java.

(2) Destruction of the most important Dutch military forces concentrated in the district of Preanger.

(3) Achievement of political power through the destruction of the state institutions of Batavia.

This distinction, testifying to a highly developed understanding of the conditions of the revolutionary struggle, constituted at the same time a warning directed at the putschist tendencies of a section of the leadership of the Indonesian Communist Party. This section wanted to organize an insurrection immediately, before the majority of workers had been won over to the idea. On the eve of the insurrectionary events of November 1926 Tan Malakka declared: "We must not base ourselves on the exaggerated hopes of revolution of these leaders. First of all, we must be sure of the revolutionary spirit of the masses." But the warnings of Tan Malakka were not heeded. The insurrection broke out in November 1926 and was drowned in blood. Afterward 3,000 people were arrested in the Western part of Java, 2,000 in West Sumatra, and 1,308 were thrown into the infamous concentration camp of Tanah Merah.

A study of the conditions under which the insurrection was launched shows immediately how right Tan Malakka was in characterizing it as a putsch for which two leaders of the Communist Party were responsible: Muso, killed in 1948, and Alimin, now leader of the Stalinist Party in Indonesia. Toward the end of 1924 the C.P. had only 1,140 members, and its front-organization, the *Sarikat Kajat* (offspring of the *Sarikat Islam*), numbered about 31,000 members. In Batavia, 300 people armed only with knives and sticks, participated in the insurrection; nor were the insurrectional forces superior elsewhere.

Breaks With Comintern

After the defeat of the putsch, Tan Malakka broke in 1927 with the inept leadership of the Indonesian C.P. dominated by the Comintern and founded a new party, the P.A.R.I., Party of the Indonesian Republic, in Bangkok (Siam). He stated that the aim of the movement was to establish a revolutionary state, including, besides Indonesia itself, the whole Malayan peninsula, New Guinea, the British part of the island of Borneo and the Portuguese part of the island of Timor.

Between 1927 and 1939 Tan Malakka wandered all over Asia and experienced the most extraordinary adventures while remaining in close touch with the revolutionary movements of all the countries he visited. This period of his life is narrated in detail in his autobiography "Dari Penjara Ke Penjara" (From Prison to Prison), of which only a partial translation is as yet available. Back in Indonesia, now under Japanese occupation, Tan Malakka could at last appear before the masses with the beginning of the vast revolutionary tide in August 1945. In November 1945 he founded the Popular Front, aiming at the regroupment of all the revolutionary nationalist organizations on the basis of a minimum program. The subsequent evolution of Tan Malakka's activity has already been described in *Fourth International* (October 1949, J. Van Steen: "Tan Malakka — Revolutionary Hero").

After his break with the Comintern in 1927, Tan Malakka stood alone in establishing his line of conduct on the basis of his revolutionary Marxist convictions. On

many questions he arrived at conclusions approaching, or identical with, those of the Fourth International. On the question of Stalinism, for instance, he wrote in "Dari Pendjara Ke Pendjara" (Vol. II, p. 114): "Stalin is the liquidator of communism, the destroyer of the Communist International. The character of the party of Stalin has nothing in common with the Bolshevik party of Lenin. The Cominform is nothing but an instrument in Stalin's hands."

At the same time, he explains in his pamphlet "Gerpolek" the nature of the class distinctions between the USSR and the U.S.A., affirms the general sympathy of the oppressed with the USSR and sees in the contradictions between the USSR and U.S.A. a special aspect of the worldwide class struggle of the proletariat and colonial people against imperialism. In his autobiography Tan Malakka explicitly states that the liberation of the Indonesian people can be achieved only by that people itself aided by the world proletariat.

Much contradictory information has been circulated on

the subject of Tan Malakka's assassination by troops of the Indonesian government. The latest of such statements was made by Pellanpessy in February 1951 when Mr. Pellanpessy was Minister of Information in the Indonesian cabinet under Natsir. It contains the following passage:

"It is absolutely false to assume that Tan Malakka was arrested after the second military campaign. During the mopping-up action in the region of Blimbing, near Ngandjuk, some people were arrested, one of whom pretended to be Tan Malakka. In the course of this mopping-up operation, a battalion of the Dutch army attacked this region and the prisoners thus managed to escape."

If this news is correct, we can hope to see the reappearance of Tan Malakka, the greatest and ablest of the Indonesian revolutionists, in the struggle for complete *Merdeka* (Freedom) for the Indonesian people.

Amsterdam, May 17, 1951.

The Partisan: His Military, Political and Economic Struggle

By TAN MALAKKA

The editors of *Fourth International* are happy to present to their readers, for the first time in English, an authentic text by the great Indonesian revolutionist, Tan Malakka. This is a first extract from his pamphlet "The Partisan and his Military, Political and Economic Struggle" (Gerpolek). It was written in May 1948, when Tan Malakka was imprisoned by a decree of the Dutch legation in Indonesia, which was servilely carried out by the conciliatory government of the Indonesian republic. The pamphlet was written in the Malayan tongue. Dutch and French translations were made of it, on which the present English version is based. We cannot, therefore, assure our readers that the present translation is strictly correct on every single point.

Tan Malakka's pamphlet was written for the partisan cadres which had been fighting since 1947 against the forces of the Dutch army on the Indonesian archipelago. It explains in detail the author's concepts of partisan struggle. For Tan Malakka, the conduct of military operations, the political orientation to be followed, the diplomatic discussions in which to engage, the economic measures to be taken, constitute a coherent whole with but one aim: the achievement of complete independence for Indonesia and the social emancipation of the Indonesian masses. Written for a movement of colonial national liberation and presenting a program of consistent nationalism for an oppressed people, Tan Malakka's pamphlet arrives at the ultimate conclusions of this revolutionary nationalism, by giving it a clear proletarian class orientation. In this sense, it is entirely in accord with the theory of the permanent revolution, even if it does not mention this theory or employ a similar terminology.

"The working people must have a genuine interest in waging this war against imperialism, and this interest will not exist unless at least 60 per cent of the owners of the means of production are expropriated" — this idea runs like a leading theme through the whole text. Sometimes Tan Malakka expresses himself with even greater emphasis: "The plans, elaborated by dozens of 'brain trusts,' of collaboration with foreign big business, will result only in the exploitation and

oppression of the Indonesian workers and peasants. . . The proletariat must postpone the execution of a comprehensive economic plan until the revolution will have resulted in a victory for the proletariat." To this consistent nationalist, the class interests of the proletariat cannot be soft-pedalled under a phraseology of "new democracy," but must remain the prime consideration, whatever the concrete stage of the colonial revolution or the concrete tasks imposed by this stage.

Brilliant and simple as it is — Tan Malakka displays enormous talent as an educator of the masses to whom he explains the most complex problems of military strategy — Tan Malakka's pamphlet limits itself to the problems of the anti-colonial struggle in Indonesia. International problems are hardly touched upon, and then only in connection with questions regarding the Indonesian revolution. This is why Tan Malakka does not deal with the question of Stalinism and limits himself to a few correct general remarks. . . But every time he sets forth a concrete position he diverges very clearly from the Stalinist position. The revolutionary program he proposes for Indonesia contradicts the opportunist tactics of class-collaboration and conciliation of imperialism pursued by the Stalinists until their criminal putschist adventure of 1949 in Madioen. When he deals with the U.N., he combats all the illusions which attribute to the U.N. the power to guarantee Indonesian independence. Yet, he correctly explains that the Indonesian revolutionary movement must exploit to its own profit the contradictions between the various powers belonging to the United Nations. When he speaks of the danger of war, he points out that this danger will remain as long as capitalism exists. When he speaks of Germany, conquered in the Second World War, he speaks of a people oppressed by its conquerors. Isolated from the world in his prison, cut off from the most elementary sources of information, Tan Malakka orients himself with a remarkable class instinct even on international questions and one cannot but admire the clarity of this instinct.

Since the publication of Tan Malakka's pamphlet, the situation in Indonesia has again profoundly changed. (See the

article by Th. Van der Kolk: "The Independence of Indonesia," **Fourth International**, Jan.-Feb. 1950.) When the Dutch imperialist armies launched a military attack for the second time against the territories of the republic, the Indonesian masses replied with a mass uprising of partisans who almost succeeded in throwing the imperialists into the sea. Threatened by certain defeat, the government of the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia and began to evacuate its troops. In return, the Indonesian bourgeoisie recognized the property rights of the imperialists to all their former possessions and joined the "Dutch Union" under the crown of Orange-Nassau. The strength of the revolutionary tide has since transformed the United States of Indonesia into one single centralized republic which today directly threatens capitalist property. The **Partai Murba** which is inspired by the ideas of Tan Malakka struggles in the forefront of the Indonesian revolution today.

Lack of space prevents us from printing the pamphlet in its entirety. We publish in this issue all of the first section dealing with the political problems of the Indonesian revolution. This section is followed by a chapter dealing with general problems of military strategy which are of no particular interest to a Western reader. In a forthcoming issue of our magazine we hope to reprint considerable extracts from the third and fourth sections of the pamphlet, dealing with the specific military problems of the partisan struggle and economic questions regarding the Indonesian revolution.

Introduction

We stand close to the abyss. Our chances on the political, economic, financial and military planes have been extremely reduced. Thus you have the result of two years of negotiations. The unity of the people in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism has been broken.

A large part of Indonesian territory is isolated, subject to the authority of the enemy, again dominated by Holland. Several puppet states have been created and are pitted against each other. The economies and finances of the states still administered by the republic are in the greatest state of disorder. The army's policy of "reconstruction and rationalization" threatens to transform the army itself into a colonial army, an army brought into existence with the people's money but separated from the masses and destined to maintain them in a state of subjection.

Such is the course pursued since the revolution! When the latter broke out, 70 million Indonesians united in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism. All the sources of authority were under the control of the masses. The whole population took the initiative of forming an army and defense corps which stretched all along the coasts and included all the cities and villages. Solidly united, it organized its own defense and displayed its readiness for any sacrifice.

Could the upsurge of August 17, 1945, occur again? History alone will provide an answer to this question. But even though history determines the course of events, we cannot remain impassive in the face of the dangers that threaten the country with ruin. It is my estimation that one of the measures most likely to contribute to the salvation of the country would be the formation of guerrillas on land and on sea, everywhere. It is with the purpose of expressing my views on this subject that I have written this pamphlet. It is certainly regrettable that the author is no expert in the military arts; however, he has had certain contacts, both abroad and in Indonesia, with the

military and has always been attracted by the science of warfare. The knowledge of which this work makes use originated in conversations with military men and in the reading, begun several years ago, of books and publications devoted to the problems of the army. This knowledge is the fruit of over three years' study. The author's desire, when he was a young man in Europe, to become an officer, encountered many objections and considerable obstacles. But it resulted, during the last world war, in his concentration upon books and reviews devoted to military problems. The training thus acquired was never lost, although certain opinions were altered in the wake of long years spent abroad.

Between four stone walls and behind iron bars, the author possessed no work permitting him to verify the correctness of his ideas. Under such conditions, it is possible that some of his formulations of military rules appear unsatisfactory. I hope, I am convinced, that the experts and fighters will complete them and eliminate error and useless efforts. I hope, I am convinced, that they will forgive my errors and omissions. But the author, in his enforced isolation, does not wish to settle all military problems, essential aspects of the revolution though they are, but exclusively to draw attention to their importance.

I hope that my comrades-in-arms, who know military questions better than I do, will take the initiative in bringing out a work on the art of warfare. Such a work is indispensable to the popularization of the military art among the masses and the youth.

Technical subjects and the problem of instruction are not dealt with. As far as that is concerned, I estimate that the Japanese type of instruction covering 2-3 years, and more specifically, the instruction and technique of waging war developed in the course of 2-3 years of combat on the Indonesian battlefields, are sufficient and well known by tens of thousands of soldiers.

I wish to draw attention only to a few military precepts that appear important to me. It is these principles which, together with other political and economic subjects, must be assimilated by the partisans, both officers and soldiers. The techniques of the Spanish partisans who disorganized the armies of Napoleon; those of the small bands of fighting Boers who held the strong modern British army in check; those of the Russian partisans who completely disrupted the German motorized forces in the course of the recently concluded Second World War. These tactics are among the most important weapons in the struggle of the oppressed and ill-equipped peoples against an enemy disposing of modern weapons.

I hope that this pamphlet, hastily written in very difficult circumstances, will be useful to the young people, the heroic fighters of the Great-Indonesian Republic.

1. *The Indonesian Republic -- Views on its Domestic and Foreign Policies*

Two Revolutionary Periods

From its inception on August 17, 1945, until today, May 17, 1948, the Republic has undergone many changes. During these two and three quarter years of existence it

has continued to retreat economically, politically, militarily, diplomatically and morally.

We can divide the history of the Republic into two periods, a period of victorious struggles and one of diplomatic defeats.

The first period of victorious struggles began on August 17, 1945 and ended on March 17, 1946. Its beginning is marked by the proclamation of independence, its termination by the arrest of the leaders of the Popular Front in Madioen.

The period of diplomatic defeats has continued from March 17, 1946 until today. It began with the arrests in Madioen and still continues, marked by diplomatic conversations.

What is the political aspect of this division into two periods?

The arrest of the leaders of the Popular Front expresses the desire of the government of the Republic to transform the struggle of the proletarian masses into a purely diplomatic action; to replace the diplomacy of "bamba runtjing" (attack with sharpened bamboo sticks) with one based on negotiations; to substitute for the slogan "negotiation on the basis of complete recognition" that of "peace through the sacrifice of sovereignty, independence, economic resources and population"; to sacrifice everything that had been won by the people during the first period. In short, the struggle for the expulsion of the last enemy was replaced by tactics of concession intended to conclude a peace with the enemy.

What is the economic aspect of this division into two periods?

The measures aiming at restoring all the enemy's assets to the Indonesian people who were entitled to them, were replaced by a policy aiming at the restoration to the foreigners, including enemy subjects, of all their possessions. The construction of an independent economy destined to assure the prosperity of the entire Indonesian people (this would conform to the interests of all the other peoples) was abandoned and new efforts were directed toward collaboration with the Dutch capitalists and imperialists

who had been oppressing and exploiting the Indonesian people for 350 years.

What is the military aspect of this division into two periods?

The continuous attacks, patterned on partisan tactics and a war of movement, aiming at the expulsion or extermination of the enemy, were replaced by tactics of "cease-fire" and of the evacuation of strongholds in the midst of enemy-occupied territory.

In brief, the military tactics which permitted weakening and finally conquering the enemy, were replaced by a policy which allowed the enemy to obtain reinforcements while we became weaker.

What is the diplomatic aspect of this division into two periods?

It is evident from the statements by the former prime minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, before the Military High Court dealing with the events of June 3, 1946, that the arrests of the leaders of the Popular Front in Madioen were connected with the policy of negotiations on the diplomatic level. According to Amir Sjarifuddin's declarations, the arrests of the leaders of the Popular Front by the republican government took place at the written request of the Indonesian delegation sent to the Dutch authorities.

This delegation was a republican contact mission which, at that time, maintained relations with British and Dutch representatives. The written request for the arrests did not originate with the government of the Republic. It was consequently inspired by foreigners, either British or Dutch. We deal, therefore, with a "concession" by the Republic to pressure exerted by the British or the Dutch. The government, therefore, actually proceeded to the arrest of citizens at the request of the enemy.

What were the consequences of this new course which substituted negotiation for struggle?

In all of Indonesia, in all of society, in every party, in every military situation, the spirit of initiative, decision, unanimity and offensive has retreated before passive acceptance, weakness, division and mutual distrust.

BALANCE SHEET

If we draw up a political, economic, military and social account of the profits and losses of the two periods, we arrive approximately at the following picture:

FIRST PERIOD	
A. Territory	1. Politics
The whole territory of about 1,800,000 square kilometers of land and 12,000,000 square kilometers of water, was under the authority of the Republic.	
B. Population	
The whole population of 70 million inhabitants was subject to the sovereign authority of the Republic.	

SECOND PERIOD	
A. Territory	1. Politics
According to the <i>de facto</i> recognition of Lingadjatti, the territory of Java and Sumatra subject to the Republic, includes only 550,000 square miles or 30% of Indonesian territory. With the territorial waters of Java and Sumatra we obtained only 600,000 square kilometers or 1/20 of all the Indonesian lands and seas. But the Renville agreement has still further reduced this territory. Six or seven isolated territories on Java and a few on Sumatra include only 2% of the Indonesian lands and waters.	
B. Population	
With the acceptance of <i>de facto</i> recognition for Java and Sumatra, the Republic would contain 50 million inhabitants, or little over 70% of the population. But with the signing of the Renville agreement and the creation of four or more new states. . . there remain no more than 23 million inhabitants, or 33% of the total population, subject to the Republic.	

FIRST PERIOD

II. Economic

A. Production

All the plantations (rubber, coffee, tea, sisal, etc.), all the factories (sugar, metallurgy, textiles, paper), all the mining enterprises (petroleum, coal, tin, bauxite, gold, silver, etc.), whether belonging to enemy or ally, were under the authority of the Republic.

B. Communications

All the means of transportation, both on land and on water, were the property of the Republic and were subject to its authority (cars, trucks, trains for the transportation of people and goods from the country and the cities to the ports). All the ships in service or under construction intended for the transport of people and goods from one island to the other and from Indonesia to foreign parts, were in the hands of the people. The republic thus controlled the main instruments of trade. Through its ownership of a large part of the enterprises, mines, plantations, banks and means of transportation, the Indonesian people could have quickly overcome its economic backwardness and assured a satisfactory standard of living to all.

III. Military

All the mountainous regions and all airfields possessing a military interest, and considerable amounts of weapons, belonged to the people and the youths of the republic, until then equipped with bamboo-pointed lances. The people and youth groups possessed all kinds of weapons taken away from the Japanese and British, from hand grenades to bombs, from pistols to cannon, from warships to airplanes. In the entire Indonesian archipelago, not a single fort, not a single city, not a single dessa (plantation) remained accessible to the enemy.

All the roads were blocked by innumerable obstacles to the enemy by the people or youth groups.

IV. Social Policy

The unity of the parties, organizations and combat groups, disrupted at the outset of the revolution, was reestablished by the Popular Front established on January 4 and 5, 1946, in Paerwokerto. 171 organizations, representing almost all parties, with combined strength and military force, united in the Popular Front to combat the enemy on the basis of a common minimum program.

SECOND PERIOD

II. Economic

A. Production

The Lingadjatti and Renville agreements recognize the property rights of foreigners, whether citizens of a friendly nation or of an enemy state which has invaded the territory of the Republic.

B. Communications

According to the Lingadjatti and Renville agreements, the Dutch possess the right to claim their possessions. They will thus be able soon again to dominate transportation on land and sea. When they will have resumed possession of the plantations, factories and mines, they will again dominate domestic and foreign trade as they did during the period of the Dutch Indies. Already, in the course of the negotiations, the Dutch have assured themselves of possession of almost all the plantations, factories and mining enterprises, as well as of the important ports. This affords them domination over almost all imports and exports. By blockading the Republic, they stifle its economic development.

III. Military

Following the diplomatic negotiations, all the important ports, such as Soerabaya, Batavia, Palembang and Medan fell into Dutch hands. Now the republic disposes of but a few useful airfields. Because of the evacuation of pockets in Western and Eastern Java and of a few in Sumatra, the Dutch have taken possession of territories which months of combat with the aid of tanks, guns and planes would not have given them. By incessant dispatch of reinforcements during the armistice proposals, when they had been forced toward the West, and after having induced the Republic to adopt a policy of "rationalization," the Dutch assured themselves of a position that is much stronger than it was during the first armistice of October 1946.

IV. Social Policy

Hardly had negotiations been started and the Popular Front replaced by the "National Concentration," than profound divergences appeared concerning the Lingadjatti agreement. All the organizations, all the parties, all combat units were divided into advocates and opponents of this agreement. Today we hear of the "Sejaf Kanan" ("right wing" — transl.), the "Sejaf Kerman" ("left wing" — transl) and the "more left than left" tendency. All the parties are split. The P.K.I. (Indonesian Communist Party) split into three groups: the "old P.K.I.," the red P.K.I. and the I.C.P. The P.B.I. and the Partai Sosialis divided into two groups.

How many "fronts" and workers' organizations there are that should be unified! These divisions allow the Dutch 5th column to infiltrate into the organizations, combat units, parties and even the army, administration and government.

Conclusion

The sovereignty, according to the Lingadjatti agreement, belongs to the Dutch crown, a dozen puppet-states have been formed; almost all the plantations, factories, mining enterprises, means of transportation and the banks will be restored to the foreigners; almost all the rich mines are located in territories occupied by the Dutch; the Dutch army occupies a part of Indonesian territory; the blockade against the Republic continues; the fifth column infiltrates the parties, organizations, the army and the administration. As a result of the Renville agreement, the government of the republic will retain no more than 10% of the authority it apparently holds at the moment.

II. Gerpolek

Definition. — The word "Gerpolek" combines the first syllables of the words "Gerilja," "Politik" and "Economi" (guerrilla warfare, politics and economy.)

Usefulness of Gerpolek. — Gerpolek is the weapon of the partisan in his struggle to maintain the proclamation of August 17, 1945 and complete independence.

The Partisan. — The partisan is the young Indonesian, the proletarian who remains faithful to the August 17th proclamation and to complete independence and is ready to destroy all the forces that oppose this proclamation and this complete independence.

The partisan does not allow himself to be influenced

by the duration of the struggle. He will perform his duty with courage, perseverance and confidence, even though the struggle take the rest of his life. He ceases to struggle only when complete independence has been achieved. The partisan will not lose heart if he is forced to face with primitive weapons an enemy disposing of modern equipment. The partisan struggle also taking place on the economic and political plane, the application of "Gerpolek," makes him happy, and he struggles unceasingly, with an indomitable courage which can be broken only by over-rigorous climate, by the enemy or by death. Even as Anoman was convinced that through his own strength and intelligence he could overcome Dasamuka, so the partisan, too, remains confident in the belief that "Gerpolek" will enable him to be victorious against capitalism and imperialism.

III. On Different Kinds of War

According to the objectives of the belligerents, wars can be divided into two categories. This division reflects sharp divisions. The two categories have nothing in common. The division, therefore, is absolute.

First Category: the war of a dominating power against another people with the aim of dominating and oppressing it.

Second Category: the war of the attacked people against the oppressor or the struggle for liberation against its oppressors.

Wars of the first category are wars of conquest, those of the second category are wars of liberation.

Most of the Asiatic, African and European wars during the epoch of feudalism aimed at territorial conquests. These wars, of which we heard in tales and fables, were wars of conquest. The wars of conquest of the capitalist epoch are imperialist wars. The purposes of an imperialist war are:

(1) Control over the raw materials and food products of the conquered country.

(2) Conquest of the market of the conquered country in order to make it available to the industrial products of the conquering nation.

(3) Investment of capital by the conquering country in the plantations, mining enterprises, industries, means of transportation, commercial exports, banks and insurance companies of the conquered country.

These objectives lead to the enrichment and strengthening of the capitalists of the conquering country and to the increase of misery, poverty and cultural backwardness of the conquered country.

But the misery and oppression will give birth in the conquered country to a movement of national liberation aiming at its liberation from exploitation and domination by foreigners. This movement of liberation will result in a war of liberation. It is this kind of war that we have listed in the second category.

Both the feudal and capitalist epochs have witnessed numerous wars of liberation. Wars of liberation can be divided into two categories:

(1) The war of liberation waged by a colonial people against its oppressors in order to free itself from its chains.

Such a war is often called a war of national liberation. The best-known war of national liberation is that of America against the British imperialists. This war lasted about seven years. But this war was not waged between two different peoples, but between Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Saxons.

(2) The war of liberation by one class against another class of the same people. This war is also called civil war or social war. Civil wars can be bourgeois or proletarian. The classic example of bourgeois civil war is the one that occurred in France from 1789 to 1848. In this civil or social war, the bourgeoisie fought against the feudalists and the clergy. It ended in a bourgeois victory in 1848. A well-known example of proletarian civil war is the Paris Commune, during which the workers in Paris held power for 72 days.

In 1917 permanent revolutions, first bourgeois and then proletarian, took place in Russia. At first, the bourgeoisie succeeded in putting the feudalists to flight; in the course of the second phase, the proletariat, forcibly destroyed the feudal groups, the clergy and the bourgeoisie.

We sometimes hear of ideological wars, but these only cover up the pursuit of political and economic advantages.

IV. The War in Indonesia

Analysis of the war waged, since the proclamation of Aug. 17, 1945, against the Japanese, British and Dutch.

The struggle waged by the Indonesian people since the proclamation of Aug. 17, 1945 is not a war of conquest. In the course of the struggle, the Indonesians never intended to occupy foreign territory or to oppress and exploit its inhabitants. The people and "Youth Groups" of Indonesia had but one desire: to liberate their country from foreign domination. It was with the purpose of fulfilling this desire that the Indonesian Republic was proclaimed and constituted on August 17, 1945.

It follows from the above that the struggle of the Indonesians is a war of liberation.

Is the struggle of liberation of the Indonesians no more than a national revolution destined to rid the country of foreign domination and does it aim only at the conquest of political power?

The American national revolution had no economic emphasis and occurred at a time when industry did not yet exist, when modern trains had not yet appeared and when the economy was still in a regional and artisan stage. It is no doubt because America was in that state that the English could so easily abandon it. They did not leave behind them factories, plantations, mines, railroads, shipyards. The country they abandoned was inhabited by Englishmen who took over sovereignty and political authority.

The Dutch, however, who own plantations, mining enterprises, factories, railroads, shipyards, will probably not so easily abandon sovereignty and political authority to the Indonesian people, a people with different language, culture and interests. All the more so since Indonesians are generally not owners of important enterprises, factories, banks and means of transportation. From the viewpoint of

the Dutch, the transfer of sovereignty and political authority to the Indonesian people constitutes a threat to their property and fellow-citizens in the archipelago. They fear that the Republic might place too heavy a taxation on their enterprises or even threaten their property rights. They fear strikes by the Indonesian workers or their own expropriation by the Indonesians. In brief, the Dutch will not abandon all sovereignty and political authority to the Indonesians without struggle.

On the other hand, transfer of sovereignty and political power do not in themselves constitute a victory for the proletariat. If the transfer of sovereignty should result in such people as Professor Hossein Djajadiningrau, Colonel Abdul Kadir and Sultan Hamid occupying all government positions while economic life remained under foreign domination, the national revolution would not have modified the situation in which the masses found themselves during the period of the "Dutch Indies." In brief, national independence alone, political independence alone, mean nothing to the proletariat, the workers, the peasants and all non-owning classes.

In Indonesia the Dutch cannot abandon their political rights without endangering their capitalist interests. The Indonesian people cannot insure its own survival by limiting its action to the achievement of political rights without attacking the economic domination of foreign capitalists. The economic and political questions are closely related.

The struggle of liberation of the Indonesian proletariat is a struggle for political and economic independence, and it is impossible to separate the political, economic and social objectives. The Indonesian struggle of liberation aims not only at the political elimination of imperialism, but also at the eradication of economic exploitation and the achievement of the right to life in the new society. The Indonesian revolution is not merely a national revolution as claimed by certain Indonesians whose sole aim is to maintain or improve their own condition, while they remain ready to abandon all the sources of wealth to foreigners, regardless of whether these foreigners are allies or enemies of the nation. The revolution must combine economic and social measures with measures that aim at the achievement of complete independence. *The revolution cannot be victorious if it does not go beyond the limitations of a nationalist revolution.*

The struggle for the liberation of the Indonesian people must aim at the achievement of social and economic guarantees.

It is only when the Indonesian proletariat will own, besides the whole political power, 60 percent of economic

power, that the national revolution will have reached its full significance. Only then will the continued existence of the Indonesian proletariat be assured. Only then will it actively resist the enemy and sacrifice itself in order to create a new society for its own benefit and that of future generations.

Only when the representatives of the people — elected by the Indonesian people in democratic, general, direct and secret elections — will attain political power, and when 60 percent of the plantations, factories, mining enterprises, transportation facilities and banks will be in the hands of the people, only then will the national revolution have reached its full significance and the future of the proletariat be assured. But if lackeys of foreign capitalists will again govern the country — even if these lackeys are Indonesian — and if 100% of the modern enterprises fall again into the hands of the capitalists as in the epoch of the "Dutch Indies," then the national revolution will signify the negation of the Proclamation and of national independence, and the beginning of the restoration of the capitalists and imperialists.

In reality, due to the aggression by the Dutch, attacking the Indonesian Republic in order to destroy it, independent Indonesia has ever since Aug. 17, 1945 had the right to confiscate all the wealth of the aggressors. The proclamation of independence of the Indonesian people, made on Aug. 17, 1945, is not contrary to international law which grants each people the right to determine its own fate. On Aug. 17 the Indonesian people decided to constitute an independent state and to break all the claims imposed upon it by foreigners.

On the other hand, always in accordance with international law, any people attacked by another people has the right to defend itself and to confiscate the assets of the aggressor. The Dutch attack upon our Republic therefore gives the Indonesian people an excellent opportunity to confiscate, that is, to take without payment, all the properties of the Dutch which have come from the agricultural production and labor of the Indonesian workers over the past 350 years.

The partisan should regard the defense of complete independence and the confiscation of all enemy property as a unique, heaven-sent chance offered the Indonesians to carry through an advanced task and accomplish a sacred duty. Only unintelligent people could overlook such an opportunity as this. Only cowardly and dishonest people could not wish to accomplish a task which, heavy though it is, would nevertheless be basically useful to both present and future society.

The Theory of "State Capitalism"

By E. GERMAIN

(Translated from Quatrieme Internationale)

The prevailing ideas of what exists in Russia today are those of "state capitalism" and "Soviet imperialism." These are the conceptions of the ruling bourgeois class which tries to attribute to the Soviet bureaucracy all of its own sins —

without the saving grace of "democracy." At the same time, they provide the principal pretext for petty bourgeois intellectuals not to "take sides" in the gigantic class struggle developing on a world scale — when and if these ideas

don't serve the purpose of going over bag and baggage into the bourgeois camp. The theory of state capitalism is defended not only by the Social Democracy, whose theoreticians no one takes seriously, and by insignificant ultra-leftist groups, but also by the representatives of a new and victorious proletarian revolution — by the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Milovan Djilas and Edward Kardelj. (1)

Djilas begins his analysis with the phenomenon of the *bureaucracy* within the dictatorship of the proletariat. "The tendency toward domination by the bureaucracy" is, according to him, one of the laws of the transition period (p. 65). He explains this idea only by saying that the bureaucratic tendencies "are strongest where the productive forces are least developed, and the state is obliged for a longer period to retain in its own hands the administration of the means of production . . . and to play the role of mobilizing the small producers and small owners" (p. 67).

Two different questions are obviously mixed up here. The Marxist classics have always been of the opinion — and Lenin assembled most of these opinions, in addition to giving his own, in *State and Revolution*. — that a *bureaucratic tendency*, that *some kind of bureaucracy* would continue to exist on the morrow of the proletarian revolution. Such a bureaucracy, a natural heritage of the capitalist regime, would have to be *immediately* curbed by the introduction of laws for the election and recall of all functionaries, and the reduction of their salaries to that of the average worker. The "workers in arms," as Lenin said, would reduce the bureaucrats to the role of "simple administrators." The bureaucracy would disappear to the extent that the administrative functions come to be carried out by all the producers, each taking a turn. A tendency toward *domination* by a bureaucracy in the transition society was never foreseen either by Marx, or Engels, or Lenin.

Origin of Power of Soviet Bureaucracy

The problem obviously becomes more complicated by the practical experience of the USSR and of Yugoslavia itself, that is, of economically *backward workers' states* isolated in the midst of a hostile capitalist world. Here the question is posed not only of the *survival* of certain bureaucratic phenomena of capitalist origin, but also of the powerful development of a *new* bureaucracy whose material origins have to be determined.

As long as the level of development of the productive forces does not permit man's elementary needs to be satisfied, the "struggle for individual existence," as Engels said in *Anti-Duchring*, will continue to dominate everyday life. Because of this, individual consumption and socialist accumulation must enter into conflict with one another, while the tendency toward primitive accumulation reappears of necessity "within all the pores of the planned economy" (Trotsky). Under these conditions, it is inevitable *in the*

(1) All references are taken from No. 1 of the magazine *Questions du Socialisme*, published in Paris by the Yugoslav Information Bureau (April-May, 1951), reproducing the following works: *Thèmes Contemporains* by Milovan Djilas and *La Yougoslavie dans le Monde Actuel* by Kardelj.

long run that there should appear an *arbiter*, a *regulator* for the distribution of the insufficient rations in the person of the bureaucrat who settles the thousands of daily conflicts between the peasant and the workers, the producer and the administrator, the consumer and the distributor. This arbiter, having enormous powers concentrated in his hands, will tend to utilize them above all else — under conditions of general scarcity — in such a way as to assure himself of the better morsels. It is also inevitable that, *in the long run*, a proletariat which represents numerically a restricted minority in society, and which is itself subject to the same tyranny of need, should lose control over these bureaucrats and in turn be controlled and dominated by them. It is impossible for a class which is inadequately fed and clothed to engage continually over a period of years in political activity of the highest level — and it is only through such activity that the "armed workers" can permanently exercise control over the bureaucracy.

As early as 1845, Marx wrote in *The German Ideology* that a "great increase in the productive forces . . . is an absolutely necessary practical prerequisite (for a socialist economy) for the very reason that, without it, naked want would become generalized, and as a consequence, the struggle for necessities and all the old . . . crap would of necessity reappear."

The Mensheviks based themselves on this truism, generally accepted by all Marxists, in accusing the Bolsheviks of *utopianism* when they wanted to conquer power in Russia in 1917. What did Lenin reply in his pamphlet "*Will the Bolsheviks Keep Power?*" The prime function of the Russian revolution is to unleash the proletarian revolution in the advanced countries of Western Europe. A fusing of the Russian revolution with the victorious revolution in these countries would supply Russia with the material base indispensable for the building of a socialist economy and for the maintenance and development of the workers' state. Otherwise this state would succumb to internal and external capitalist forces. This was the *only perspective* envisaged by all the Bolsheviks in the period immediately preceding and following the October Revolution.

The end of the first postwar wave of revolutionary struggles in 1921 obliged the Bolshevik leaders to re-examine this question. Remaining isolated in the midst of a hostile capitalist world and not possessing the material prerequisites for the construction of a socialist economy, Soviet Russia was obliged to elaborate a new strategy in order to "hold on" longer in this unforeseen situation, until the international revolution would come to her rescue. Lenin correctly turned to the NEP (the New Economic Policy) as the best means of attaining this end. But at the same time he saw clearly and with anxiety the daily growth of the bureaucracy within the country, a problem to which he devoted all the rest of his active life.

The growth of *bureaucracy* was inevitable under the given conditions. Was its *victory* also inevitable? To think so is to isolate the development of Russia from that of the rest of the world. There was a serious revolutionary crisis in Germany in 1923. There was the British general strike in 1926, opening up great revolutionary possibilities in that

country. There was, above all, the great and immensely promising Chinese Revolution of 1925-27. The victory of a single one of these revolutions would have completely reversed the relationship of forces between the bureaucracy and the proletariat in the USSR. That is why the Trotskyist Left Opposition, which from 1923 to 1927 battled for leadership of the party and the country, fought not only on a platonic platform of "struggle against the bureaucracy," but from 1923 on proposed a series of *concrete* economic and political measures, and an international strategy which would give to the struggle against the bureaucracy a solid base, by permitting increasing political activity by the proletariat. The measures for planned industrialization, which the Left Opposition proposed in 1923, had the aim of immediately raising the standard of living of the proletariat, without which it was vain to hope for a revival of a high level of political activity on the part of the masses exhausted by six years of sacrifices.

But under conditions of *prolonged isolation* of the Russian revolution, no political orientation of the leadership of the Russian CP could have prevented the victory of the bureaucracy *in the long run*. The question can be posed no differently for Yugoslavia, nor for any other backward country where the proletarian revolution triumphs. The recognition of the bureaucratic danger by the party leadership is a great step forward and facilitates the struggle against this danger. But, in addition, the material source of this danger must be understood. No legal measures whatever can by themselves overcome this danger *in the long run* (2). It can only be overcome by the international extension of the revolution to the advanced industrial countries. That is why, while greeting the progressive measures to combat bureaucratism taken by the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1950, we have emphasized from the first that only the international extension of the revolution can both economically and socially deliver the decisive blow against the bureaucracy. Economically, it would permit the elementary needs of society to be met and would thus eliminate the "struggle for individual existence" (unfortunately as predominant today in Yugoslavia as it is in Russia) which causes the "old crap . . . to reappear." Socially, it would transfer control over the functionaries to "workers in arms" of an advanced country, thus affording the proletarian forces which have been exhausted by years of sacrifices a breathing spell for a transition period, so as to enable them to resume their march forward with redoubled revolutionary energy. It is utopian to think that ill-fed workers can effectively *direct* the economy *over a*

(2) "In words, the Soviet apparatus is within the reach of all the workers; in reality, as everyone is aware, it is not at all so. Far from it. And it is not at all the laws that constitute an obstacle. . . Our laws, on the contrary, are favorable. But laws alone do not suffice here." Lenin, Report on Party Program to the Eighth Congress of the Russian CP, March 19, 1919. *Selected Works II*, p. 535 (French edition).

period of years without first trying to ameliorate their own individual lot. Heroism is capable of great feats, but not uninterruptedly for decades.

From State Ownership to State Capitalism

Instead of examining such *real* problems as the material base of bureaucratic power, instead of analyzing *concretely* the history of the bureaucracy's rise to power, Djilas prefers to devote himself to a confused analysis of the "contradictory development of the dictatorship of the proletariat" which has no few surprises in store for us.

"The social difference between state capitalism and socialism at the outset. . . is not solely a difference in the tendencies of their evolution (under socialism, toward the complete victory of communism and the withering away of the state; under capitalism, toward the maintenance of capitalist relations and the "eternalization" of the state). Neither is it a difference in their solicitude for the laboring masses, nor a difference resulting from the introduction of a different system of remuneration, of a socialist system; it resides in the very notion and essence of ownership. The first form of socialist ownership is, necessarily, in the beginning state ownership, and is accompanied by corresponding socialist relations (however insufficiently developed they may be). In reality, the whole problem can be reduced to that of the character of the state itself, the one bourgeois and the other proletarian; the first giving an impetus to the strengthening of the bureaucratic forces and state capitalism, the second advancing the importance of the role of the direct producers and the liquidation of the role of the state in the economy. Society as a whole must produce a surplus if it is to expand and go forward. . . And who is it that appropriates and divides the surplus value under the state capitalist regime on the one hand and under the early phase of the socialist regime on the other, while the state still plays an autonomous role? In both cases it is the state. But here also there are essential differences resulting from preceding developments: state capitalism distributes this surplus value to the bureaucrats in large salaries and privilege, and utilizes it for the reinforcement of various enterprises and of capitalism as a whole, while the socialist state employs it to build socialism and to remunerate workers and employees in an equitable fashion. . ." (pp. 19-20).

It is hard to believe one's eyes! First it is claimed that the difference between state capitalism and the "first phase of socialism" *is not to be found solely*, in their different evolutionary tendencies, and ten lines further on the whole problem is "reduced" to these very tendencies! First we are told that the difference between state capitalism and the transitional society *does not lie solely* in the difference in remuneration ("the difference in their solicitude for the workers") and twenty lines further on the whole question is explained precisely by this difference! The difference between capitalist and socialist accumulation is explained solely on the basis of privileges, winding up with the grandiose tautology that "state capitalism advances capitalism" while "the socialist state . . . builds socialism." In this way the circle is closed by *begging* the question. This kind of logic has been reserved until now for theologians to demonstrate the unity of God with the trinity. The sudden appearance of "state capitalism" within the dictatorship of the proletariat is no less deep a mystery than the Immaculate Conception.

While the "saltos mortales" of Djilas' thinking are

unable to give a material base to the theory of state capitalism (3) his thinking nevertheless has a very solid "material base" of its own. Djilas not only has to prove that there *is* state capitalism in the USSR; he must also prove that there is *no* state capitalism in Yugoslavia. Unfortunately for him, the Cominformist faction of the YCP had in fact defined the social nature of Yugoslavia as state capitalist and was answered — by Kidric in particular — with arguments of considerable value. (See Kidric's report to the Fifth Congress of the YCP and his articles in No. 2 of the theoretical review, *The Communist*, 1947.) That is why Djilas is obliged in the last analysis to bring the whole question back to the tendency toward the withering away of the state (4). Also, this withering away of the state must in the first place *begin on the economic plane*. That is what permits him to base the difference between the social nature of the USSR and that of Yugoslavia exclusively on the law concerning the workers' councils introduced in Yugoslavia in March, 1950.

The Withering Away of the State

For the state to wither away on the economic plane, the following is necessary:

1. "Such prerequisites . . . already realized in most of the advanced capitalist countries; then the 'training and discipline' of millions of workers by the socialized apparatus (of production) . . . With such *economic* prerequisites (Lenin's emphasis) it is perfectly possible . . . after the overthrow of the capitalists and their functionaries, to replace them in the business of control of labor and products . . . by the armed workers, the whole people in arms." (*State and Revolution*, Collected Works, XXI, p. 229.) These conditions were not present in the USSR either in 1917 or in 1927, and are only today beginning to come into existence. They are far from present in Yugoslavia.

2. The disappearance of the tendency toward primitive accumulation. That is, a level of development of the productive forces where economic procedure *automatically* favors the stabilization of collective ownership and planning rather than their disorganization and anarchy. Such a degree of development has not yet been attained today in the USSR, not to speak of Yugoslavia, and will probably not be attained in any country without the victory of

(3) In Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1949 the bureaucratic tendencies were strong and showed no inclination at all to disappear, in the opinion even of Djilas. Why was there no state capitalism in Yugoslavia at that time? Because the first stage, the stage when state ownership is necessary and progressive, had not yet ended, Djilas replies. But what **objective** criterion determines the end of this first stage? The development of the productive forces, says Djilas. But in the USSR the productive forces continue to develop. Why then is there "state capitalism" in the USSR? "Because the state is not withering away. . ."

(4) We note in passing that Djilas tacitly assumes that **the same state apparatus** can change its social nature simply as a result of its "evolutionary tendency." He appears not to have the faintest suspicion that the change from "socialism" (in reality, from a workers' state) to (state) capitalism signifies a **social counter-revolution** and necessitates a complete overthrow of the state structure as well as of the mode of production.

world socialism. "With us," said Lenin, "the economic origin of bureaucratism . . . is isolation, the dispersion of the small producers, their misery, lack of culture, the absence of roads, illiteracy, the absence of *exchange* between agriculture and industry, the lack of any liaison or any reciprocal action between them." (*On the Taxes in Kind*, Selected Works, II, p. 873, French Edition.) It is like this in Yugoslavia also, as in any backward country after the victory of the proletariat. This means that for a long time *after* the state begins to wither away in matters of repression, justice, education, etc., it will continue to exercise a directing role on the economic plane. Even today collective property and planning remain in the USSR only due to the coercion of the state. The present level of development of the productive forces in the USSR does not yet consolidate this economic base. On the contrary, it still reproduces constantly tendencies toward individual enrichment.

The withering away of the state, in the true sense of the term, is only possible when there are no longer antagonistic classes in society. That, in turn, requires an end to the conflict between city and country. The contention of the Stalinist theoreticians that the antagonism between the working class and the peasantry has disappeared in the USSR is refuted by daily economic reality. In Yugoslavia this antagonism between the proletariat and the peasantry is all the more real because private property of the soil continues to exist. The beginning of the famine last year was marked by a recrudescence of unmitigated speculation and primitive accumulation on the part of peasant strata. Only the intervention of the state could to some extent protect the worker from this pressure by the greedy. The social character of this state is clearly revealed by this action, and every sincere revolutionist can only applaud the coercion which was required to combat the hoarders. But it was not exactly proof that the state is "withering away."

Djilas quotes a long passage from *State and Revolution* in which Lenin affirms that the workers' state is a state "which is already no longer a state" in the proper sense of the term. "Therefore the workers' state begins to wither away immediately," Djilas concludes. He would have done better to read more attentively the entire chapter on the question.

"Once the majority of the people *itself* suppresses its oppressors a 'special force' for suppression is no longer necessary. *In this sense the state begins to wither away.*" That is what Lenin wrote word for word.

In other words, the "withering away" of the state is effected not through its economic action but *through the replacement of the standing army and the organized police force, that is, of a corps of functionaries completely apart from the people*. On this plane, however, the Yugoslav state is not withering away at all. On the contrary, Djilas is obliged to terminate his work devoted to the withering away of the state with a panegyric on the UDBA, the Yugoslav secret police, "a special force of suppression", if ever there was one. We do not doubt at all that this UDBA has rendered numerous services in the struggle against the bourgeois counter-revolution and against the

cominformists. Nevertheless, its existence, like the existence of the Cheka in Russia, is not a proof of the strength, but of the weakness of the revolution. It proves that under certain concrete historical conditions, where the proletariat is too small a fraction of the entire people, the exercise of the force of suppression by the "armed people" is still impossible, and that forces of suppression detached from the people are still necessary. Only petty-bourgeois moralists can find in this fact a "condemnation" of either the Russian or the Yugoslav revolutions. But all the same we have the right to say under these conditions: please, stop prating about the withering away of the state.

It is clear that in the economic sphere Djilas confounds the development of *socialist democracy* with the withering away of the state, while even his own quotation from Lenin recalls that democracy is *only a specific form of state*. The law on the workers' councils signifies that the management of the factories is becoming "democratized." Instead of being exercised by *appointed* functionaries, it is *beginning* to be exercised by elected workers' delegates, even by workers elected in rotation. It is an important step forward which we heartily applaud. But these workers continue to exercise a *state function*. Without the regulating role of the state, socialist accumulation which as in any backward country, is being achieved above all at the expense of the peasantry, would be unrealizable. And if the Yugoslav communists are *obliged* today by the joint pressure of imperialism and the peasantry to relax this regulating function of the state slightly, to lift partially restrictions on prices, to permit to a certain extent "the free play of economic laws," this represents only a concession to the forces of an enemy class that is undoubtedly inevitable under the present conditions. It would have been more honest to have said so, as Lenin did at the time of the NEP, rather than to speak of the "withering away of the state on the economic plane." (5)

The Yugoslav communist Zarko Stilinovic explains the origin of the recent "liberation of prices" as follows:

"These changes in foreign prices oblige us to make readjustments in our domestic prices. Actually, the prices of articles we import (cotton, linen, paper, for example) have risen much more than those we export (lead, leather, etc.). Experience has shown, on the other hand, that the planned uniform prices could not be maintained under the pressure of the private peasant proprietors, given our limited capacity for the production of industrial goods that are in great demand."

Experience has shown, above all, that measures presented as the "withering away of the state on the economic plane" are really the result of the pressure of hostile class forces. Experience also shows, incidentally, that the theory of building "socialism in one country" is a petty bourgeois utopia.

(5) Let us point out that certain measures which the Yugoslavs describe today under the term "withering away of the state" were introduced in Russia as early as the mid-Thirties and, from the point of view of socialist planning, represent an unmistakable retreat, even if it was inevitable and necessary for an immediate increase in production. This applies to the increased autonomy of local industry, to the separate and autonomous business accounting system of each enterprise, etc.

The Laws of Monopoly Capitalism in the USSR

As we have seen, Djilas is incapable of proving the existence of "state capitalism" in the USSR on the basis of his references to the Marxist theory of the state and of property. There remains one last contention to refute. It is a point of serious import, to be sure, but Djilas is no more capable of proving this point than the others. Namely, that in the USSR the "laws of capitalist monopoly. . . are raging with all their brutality" (p. 23).

The economic categories of "value, commodity, money, rent, etc." appear in "unforeseen" fashion in the USSR. Does this indicate that we are dealing with a capitalist economy there? These categories obtain in Soviet economy *just as they do in any transitional economy between capitalism and socialism*. These "categories" cannot be "abolished." They wither away to the extent that, with the higher development of the productive forces, an economy comes into being, based exclusively on the production of use values to satisfy the needs of the people — an economy without social antagonisms. The "withering away" of these categories accompanies the withering away of classes and of the state. Is Djilas aware of the famous passage in Engels' *Housing Question* which states that "after the working masses have taken possession of all the instruments of labor . . . the suppression of land ownership does not imply the suppression of ground rent but its return to society, of course, in a modified form"? Does not the "struggle for absolute ground rent" in the USSR, to which Djilas refers (p. 26), take place also in Yugoslavia? What else does the compulsory delivery of agricultural products to the state signify?

It is true that Engels adds that ground rent would exist in the transitional society *in modified form*. The same holds true for all the other economic categories enumerated by Djilas. The law of value also applies in the USSR, but not in its capitalist form. Under capitalism commodities are not exchanged in proportion to the "labor time socially necessary to produce them," but rather in proportion to the fraction of the total social capital put into motion at the time of their production. (Law of the equal distribution of the rate of profit.) In the USSR the operation of the law of value, far from being regulated by profit, is modified by the *conscious pressure of the plan*. Money, which under capitalism is a means of exchange as well as the measure of value and potential capital — that is, a means of obtaining a revenue called interest — has lost this last function to a large extent in the USSR. Prices, which under capitalism fluctuate around value in accordance with the blind laws of the market, in Soviet economy become the principal instrument for accumulation, without thereby losing their deep roots in the law of value.

Capitalist economy is an economy based on *profit*. Profit seeking is the sole motive force in all economic life. The accumulation of capital is regulated by the laws flowing from this search for profit. *The law of the falling rate of profit* is the law of development par excellence in capitalist economy. That is the fundamental law which determines the transformation of the economy of free competition into that of monopoly capitalism. This law explains the movement of capital in all capitalist countries to-

ward those sectors where a formidable mass of accumulated capital does not bear down with all its weight upon the rate of profit. This law explains why, in Nazi Germany as well as in the U.S.A., the development of the steel industry during the last war was much lower than the average overall development of industry, in spite of the pressing needs of war industry.

In the USSR, this characteristic law of monopoly capitalism does not operate at all. The accumulation of capital, regulated by the plan, does not flow from the basic sectors to the peripheral sectors as in *all capitalist countries today* (6). On the contrary, it moves from the peripheral sectors to the basic sectors. The rate of development of heavy industry remains greater and shows no tendency whatever to diminish.

Because monopoly capitalism is an economy ruled by profit, it has been characterized for several decades by failure to apply thousands of inventions and technical improvements, which would risk devaluating enormous masses of capital in various monopolized sectors. This law has operated without limits in Nazi Germany as well as in the U.S.A., in spite of the needs of the armament industry. (7) Can Djilas give us a single example of this in the Soviet economy?

The export of capital of the imperialist epoch is the direct consequence of the decline in the rate of profit in the industrialized metropolitan countries. We see immediately how absurd it would be to speak of such a phenomenon in connection with the economy of the USSR which is not ruled by profit at all. In fact, the only example of the "export of capital" which Djilas can find in the USSR is an example of doubtful character, as he himself indicates (p. 52): the seizure of German and Japanese property in the former enemy countries of the USSR (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, the occupation zone in Austria, Manchuria when it was occupied immediately following the war) and the seizure of numerous factories and transport material in Eastern Germany. In reality, the reproach which Popovich justly addressed to the Soviet bureaucracy in his pamphlet on "Economic Relations Between Socialist States" was not at all that the USSR "exports capital" to the buffer countries, but, on the contrary, that it does *not!* These countries, lacking industrial and agricultural equipment, would be very glad to receive it from the USSR. If they complain, it is because instead of "exporting capital" to them, the Soviet bureaucracy plunders their industrial equipment.

To all these arguments proving that *not one* of the laws of development of monopoly capitalism is applicable to the USSR, the reply is sometimes made that the USSR

(6) This is the reason why no backward capitalist country has been able to build an important heavy industry, although several (like Argentina, India and China) possess a well developed manufacturing industry.

(7) The development of synthetic gasoline by Germany and of synthetic rubber by the U.S.A. was greatly limited until 1940 by an agreement concluded in 1926 between the I.G. Farben and Standard Oil trusts, (Wendell Berge: *Cartels: Challenge to a Free World*, 1944 pp. 210-212).

represents a "capitalist" country of a special type in the world today: it is a country which is still in its period of "primitive accumulation," which is "under-capitalized," so to speak, while the other imperialist countries suffer from a plethora of capital. This reply is based on a vulgar confusion between the *physical mass* of capital and its *value*: between use values and exchange values. The "over-capitalization" of the U.S.A. does not at all rest on the fact that there are too many machines, automobiles, and other goods, from the point of view of the *physical* possibilities of consumption in the U.S.A. On the contrary, even today millions of Americans have an income lower than the most modest subsistence standards. The "plethora of capital" signifies solely that from the *point of view of investments bringing an average rate of profit*, this capital is superfluous and seeks a profitable outlet elsewhere. If tomorrow the USSR became a capitalist country integrated as a regular part of world capitalist economy, with its productive forces developed to the present level, the so-called "under-capitalization" of the USSR *on the plane of use values* (physical shortage of machinery, raw materials, finished products per capita) would not in the least hinder Russian capital from inundating China, where a higher rate of profit could be obtained than that realizable in Russia itself.

In reality, the very possibility of building the formidable industrial power acquired by the USSR in 25 years, *unhindered by the pressure of accumulated capital on the capitalist world market*, demonstrates that we are not dealing with a capitalist economy. No capitalist economy could free itself from the pressure of this capital. The monopoly of foreign trade, unrealizable in any capitalist country, is one of the principal conquests of the October Revolution still remaining today. Under its protection planning can develop and the USSR is protected from the laws of development of monopoly capitalism which operate on the world market.

Because capitalist economy is an economy for profit, the contradictions inherent in capitalism — particularly the *inevitable disproportion* between the different sectors of production — periodically provoke abrupt interruptions in the *realization* of this profit which is the *raison d'être* of capitalism. The movement of capitalist economy this acquires the spasmodic and cyclic character which is peculiar to it, swinging abruptly from periods of stagnation and crisis to periods of growth and upswing. This movement, peculiar to capitalism, is valid *for the entire world market*, for all capitalist countries. Not one of these countries could escape the effects of the great crisis of 1929-33. The crisis of 1937-38 was felt by every capitalist country, including Nazi Germany. The "recession" in American economy in 1949-50 provoked analogous movements of varying intensity in all capitalist countries.

By contrast, the Soviet economy did not follow this cyclical curve of world capitalist production at all. As though by chance, precisely the periods of world capitalist crisis have been periods of the most remarkable upswing for the USSR. It is not a question of looking for "concealed unemployment" in the USSR as Djilas does (p. 28). What matters is this: is the Soviet economy subject to the cyclical

movement of capitalism that is *determined by the fluctuations in the average rate of profit.* (8)

In the USSR we have thus a most peculiar "capitalist" economy: it is not an economy for profit; it is not an economy integrated in the world capitalist market; it is not an economy which is subject to the cyclical movement of capital; it is not an economy governed by any of the laws of capitalist development. And in addition, it is an economy *without a capitalist class*; on the contrary, it is an economy born out of the violent destruction of this class and of the peasant layers of society who showed a tendency to want to become capitalists. Indeed, very little remains to justify the designation of this economy as "capitalist."

There remain the enormous differences in remuneration between the workers and the bureaucrats. But these differences *in the sphere of distribution* do not at all justify the designation of the production as capitalist. There remains also the foreign policy of plundering the buffer countries and the counter-revolutionary attacks against proletarian Yugoslavia. But plunder and counter-revolutionary politics do not suffice to demonstrate the "brutal harshness of laws of monopoly capitalism." Doesn't it prove however, that the USSR is not a socialist country? No one but the Stalinist theoreticians and agitators have claimed that — and they only half believe it themselves.

Real Contradictions in the Economy of the USSR

In his vain search for "capitalist contradictions" in Soviet society, Djilas overlooks the real contradictions in the economy of the USSR. Because of this, he is incapable of putting his finger on the real crimes of the bureaucracy. Like any society in transition between capitalism and socialism, Russian society "must necessarily unite in itself certain traits and peculiarities of both these forms of the social economy" (Lenin, "Economy and Politics in the Epoch of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Selected Works*, French Edition, p. 634). Within it, as Lenin said, the forces of capitalism and of socialism are engaged in a constant struggle for supremacy. From Lenin's time up until the forced collectivization of agriculture, this struggle between *two fundamentally antagonistic modes of production* continued to exist in its essentials: small scale production for the market by millions of small peasant enterprises, and production by large industries which were collectivized property. This struggle has today been decided in favor of the non-capitalist mode of production. This doesn't at all mean, however, that no vestige of capitalism remains in the USSR. Quite the contrary. The struggle has simply been transferred to another plane, that of distribution. The bureaucracy defends its privileges on the plane of distribution with remarkable ferocity against the proletariat. These privileges, the historic origins of which we have described above, give a bourgeois, *capitalist* character to the norms of Soviet distribution. There is nothing astonishing in this. It was foreseen by none other than

(8) Naturally, Soviet economy also has its crises, like any non-capitalist economy, but these are crises of a different nature than capitalist crises: crises of the quality of merchandise, of labor productivity, of output, etc.

Marx himself, in the well-known section of his *Critique of the Gotha Program*, and by Engels, in a more general form, when he wrote in *Anti-Dubring*:

"Each new mode of production or form of exchange is in the beginning fettered not only by the old forms and the political institutions corresponding to them, but also by the **old mode of distribution**. It is obliged to engage in a **long struggle** to obtain the mode of distribution corresponding to it."

What is new, what was unforeseen by our teachers, is that these "norms of bourgeois distribution" do not tend to disappear with such a prodigious development of the productive forces like that in the USSR, but, on the contrary, are constantly strengthened, continually accentuating the *social inequality*. This comes from the fact that the state protects and develops the privileges of the bureaucracy, which exercises political power on the basis of the given non-capitalist mode of production (collective ownership of the means of production, planning, monopoly of foreign trade, etc.). Because of this, what should have been a normal evolution, proceeding undeviatingly in the direction of socialism, became a contradictory evolution. The productive forces demand more and more equality, democratic administration, the adaptation of the plan to the needs of the masses. The bureaucratic administration blocking this need is the chief brake on the road of socialist development. This brake must be eliminated by a *political* revolution. Political and not social, because it will change neither the mode of production nor the property relations, but, on the contrary, will assure, for the first time, their full expansion.

In protecting its enormous privileges, the bureaucracy does not confine its reprehensible activity to the plane of distribution alone. The superannuated, retrograde "norms of distribution" react in their turn upon production and introduce a multiplicity of *disorganizing elements* which continually tend to disrupt planning. In order to defend its monstrous privileges, the bureaucracy is obliged to exclude the proletariat from all participation in the administration of enterprises and to introduce a regime of terror and spying. Thus the only effective control, control by the masses, is eliminated from planning. In order to combat the irresponsibility of the individual bureaucrat, the bureaucracy is obliged to return to the control of a pure and simple, strict business accounting (9).

But this system of accounting inevitably introduces into the Soviet economy contractual and bilateral relations between trusts, the tendency to give birth again to a market for the means of production, and the development of

(9) This important reform in Russian economy was introduced after the second five-year plan. Bogolepov, the Soviet specialist on financial matters, explains that the individual accounting system of each factory is the basis of the plan: "The enterprises, which are state property, are administered as juridically independent enterprises. Each enterprise receives from the state equipment and capital (money) for its own exclusive use. It then operates independently, with its own financial accounting system, its own bank account, with credits which are often extended to it, and finally with the right to realize a certain profit." (*The Soviet Financial System*, 1945, pp. 8 and 9).

parallel markets in order to realize targets of the plan recklessly set up by the planners. At the same time, in reaction to the very low real income, this gives rise to thieving among the lower ranks of the bureaucracy, to the flight and migration of the workers, as well as to waste on a vast scale. This is the result of their whole pernicious *economic* activity. This is the only effective criticism of the bureaucracy. For it attributes to the bureaucracy neither the Dniepostroi, nor the mechanization of agriculture, but only the fraud, irresponsibility and violence, odious because useless and disruptive of the march toward socialism.

Djilas (p. 31) does not see what difference there is "in so far as the amount and the nature of the appropriated surplus value is concerned, between the general director of a capitalist trust on the one hand and the formal owners on the other." "Ordinarily there isn't any," he says, "and when there is, it is occasionally to the detriment of the formal owners." But it is necessary to know what is meant by "formal owners." It is true that hundreds of thousands of small shareholders possess infinitely less power and income than the directors of the giant trusts. But the few large shareholders who control these trusts can, by means of the bulk of the stocks in their possession, rid themselves of the directors whenever it suits their purpose. And this happens very often. It is not due to any whim that directors of big capitalist enterprises aspire to nothing more than to become in their turn shareholders and co-owners. Only ownership can *stabilize* their position. The position of the individual Soviet bureaucrat is no more stable than that of his colleague, the American director. He can lose his privileges, which are tied up solely with his function, for the smallest inattention, and join the thousands of Soviet "directors" who fill the work camps in Siberia. That is why he seeks by every possible means to make his privileges secure for himself and his family. That requires the power to dispose freely of the means of production beyond the bounds of what appears to him more and more as *the tyranny of the plan*. Because the state is opposed to this tendency and remains for this reason a workers' state despite its monstrous bureaucratic deformations, there has not been up to the present a reestablishment of private property in the means of production. Yet that is what each individual bureaucrat, by the very *logic* of his position, desires and strives for. (10)

(10) In 1950 Harvard University Press published the work of an American scholar, Harold J. Berman, *Justice in Russia*. This is a work of exceptional interest. For, in reporting the conflicts with which the Soviet judicial organs have to deal, it reveals the contradictory nature of the Soviet economy more clearly than ever. There is a special body called Gosarbitrazh for regulating lawsuits brought against one another by the Soviet trusts and combines (there were 330,000 of these lawsuits in 1938!) or by the state against them. It appears that the trusts are beginning to sell machines that are temporarily idle; that they had attempted to sell entire factories; that after the state's intervention against these deals, they disguised these sales as leases; that they drew up fictitious contracts in order to obtain raw materials outside of the plan; that they utilized numerous subterfuges to avoid applying legislation on prices, etc.

The *form* of the surplus produced by every society and the *form* of its appropriation are determined by its production relations. This profound thought which Marx merely touches upon in the third volume of *Capital*, at the close of the difficult analysis of land rent, is seized upon by Djilas (p. 20). He has no idea of its import. It destroys his theory of state capitalism from top to bottom. For what is the *form of appropriation* specific to capitalism? Does this *form* still exist in the Soviet Union? Under capitalism, the surplus social product is appropriated by the owning class *in the form of money* following the sale of merchandise. In the USSR the surplus product is appropriated by the state *in the form of merchandise* through the realization of the plan; the *financial* bankruptcy of enterprises (which sometimes takes place in the USSR) has no effect either on this appropriation, or on accumulation.

But Djilas should have read to the end of the passage from *Capital* from which he quotes only the beginning. The rest of this passage really makes it possible to understand more clearly that the monstrous degeneration of the workers' state does not at all signify a qualitative change in its internal social structure. Marx writes as follows:

"It is always the direct relation of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden foundation of the entire social construction, and with it of the political form of the relations between sovereignty and dependence, in short, of the corresponding form of the state. The form of this relationship between rulers and ruled naturally corresponds always with a definite stage in the development of the methods of labor and of its productive social power. This does not prevent the same economic basis from showing infinite variations and gradations in its appearance even though its principal conditions are everywhere the same. This is due to innumerable outside circumstances, natural environment, race peculiarities, outside historical influences, and so forth, all of which must be ascertained by careful analysis." (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 919. Kerr edition. Our emphasis.)

These sentences illuminate the problem as though they had been especially written to apply to the "Russian question." The Russian economy is no longer capitalist, for it is no longer the proletariat and the private owners of the means of production who find themselves face to face. The *new form* of the relationship between production and accumulation (appropriation of the surplus product) corresponds to a *new stage* in the development of the productive forces, the stage of transition between capitalism and socialism. This main economic base, in view of the interaction of *outside historical influences* (isolation of the Russian Revolution) as well as the *natural environment* (backwardness of old Russia), appears in one of the truly "infinite" gradations of what the transition society may look like, along with others such as those, for instance, that could arise in the United States or Great Britain, or even that variety which we saw in Russia itself the day after the revolution. But it always remains the same economic base *as far as the principal conditions are concerned*, as long as the relations of production characterizing that society have not been overthrown.

The "New" Tendencies of Capitalism

Every theory has its own logic. Obligated to render his theory of state capitalism coherent by applying it to world capitalism, Djilas is led into distorting the tendencies of capitalist development after falsifying those of the USSR.

In order to show that there is something "new" in present-day capitalism as compared with the imperialism Lenin described in his key work, Djilas starts out with an unproven premise in plain contradiction to the facts: "The transfer of the administration of the economy from the hands of the individual capitalist and the legal and formal owner into the hands of functionaries. . . . The aggressive and enterprising spirit leaves the capitalists and passes over to the stimulated functionaries, in whom . . . becomes incarnated capital, or rather, the struggle for the realization of surplus value." (p. 17.) In his eyes it is because of this that "the measures of state capitalism have taken on enormous proportions" in the capitalist countries.

The reality — at least in typically capitalist countries like the U.S.A., Germany, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy — is altogether different. The whole history of capitalist ownership is indeed the history of the destruction of property in favor of an ever narrower circle of the bourgeois class. This is the very essence of the underlying tendency of capitalism — that of the concentration and centralization of capital. But the dialectical character of this tendency consists in this: that the destruction of the private property of thousands of small and middle capitalists takes place for the benefit of the *private property of the monopolists*. The bourgeois nationalizations, such as those that have taken place in Great Britain, France, Germany, etc., do not by any means show a tendency to destroy the private property of the *monopolists*. On the contrary, they tend to *strengthen* it by the elimination of unprofitable sectors, etc. That is why Djilas' contention (p. 24) that the monopolies under capitalism "have also shown a very powerful . . . tendency to *liquidate* private property" as such, is so false.

Precisely for the very reason that *monopoly capitalism* is based on the *private property of the monopolists*, there is *no tendency whatever* in capitalism toward a *single and absolute monopoly*. On the contrary. As Lenin always emphasized, "it is just this connection of two contradictory principles, *competition and monopoly*, which characterizes imperialism, and it is just that which prepares its bankruptcy." (*Complete Works XX*, French edition, p. 347.) The whole history of monopolies in the United States as elsewhere is at the same time the history of the suppression of competition, and of its reproduction on the plane of the monopolies themselves as well as within the spheres crushed by them.

Djilas has read Bettelheim.* But from this work he has retained nothing other than the not very convincing statistics on "the growth of the number of functionaries from 19.1% in 1925 . . . to 20.4% in 1939" and the creation

* Charles Bettelheim, French radical economist, author of an important analytical work on German economy under the Nazis.

of the Hermann-Goering-Werke! Nothing on the return to private ownership of numerous capitalist enterprises by the Nazis, after the state had helped them to their feet again with public funds! Nothing on the measures of compulsory cartelization under the protection of the state! Nothing on the fact that the "directors of the economy," invested with governmental powers under the Nazis, were the most powerful monopolists in each industrial sector! It is sad to see how an erroneous theory makes one incapable even of reading a book objectively.

When the state intervenes more and more in the capitalist economy, it does so in order to *strengthen* the position, the powers, the profits and property of the monopoly capitalists. In the USSR the state represents a "single economic monopoly" not by *stabilizing* or augmenting the position, power, property and profits of monopoly capitalists, but only after having *destroyed* them. In the capitalist countries, the monopolists as a class, have brought the state under their domination to a degree never before known in the past. They have themselves become the state, with the growing personal union between the state officials, the generals and the big capitalists. (11) In the USSR the state has destroyed the monopolists as a class; it represents an exact dialectical negation of the contemporary capitalist state.

Proceeding from his erroneous premise, Djilas then arrives at some of his "new" ideas about contemporary capitalism. "The outright gifts" offered by the U.S.A. to the less developed capitalist countries appears to him a "new form" of capitalist expansion (p. 43-45). According to him, "the (American) monopolies are hostile to this kind of business" (p. 45) but hope at the end of the process to *recover* their super-profits. The idea that the monopolies are undergoing a decline in profits is also implicit in the remark (p. 18) that the monopolists are sincere in their outcries against the "socialist" fiscal measures of the American and British governments which deprive them of up to 90% of their incomes! But since the Second World War, the net profits of American corporations *after taxes* have reached a peak never known in the past. This kind of "socialism" is evidently cherished by the monopolists!

Is it necessary to remind Djilas that Kardelj, in his report on the international situation at the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party, very accurately characterized these "outright gifts" as *financing the exports of American industry and agriculture by the American taxpayer?* ("The Fifth Congress of the YCP" *Le Livre Yugoslav*, Paris, 1949, pp. 314-15.)

What is "new" in all this? When the state buys the surplus agricultural stocks in the granaries, when it gives huge orders for "public works" to factories threatened with closing, or when it places armaments orders, it is always a

(11) The hypothetical case of "state capitalism" foreseen by Engels in *Anti-Duehring* is likewise the opposite of what exists in the USSR, for the capitalists continue to receive profit, only in the form of revenue from state bonds instead of dividends, from individual stocks. It might even be said that in this case there was only a formal and fictitious suppression of private property, for private property continues to exist as a source of revenue for a class!

matter of one and the same function of the state in the epoch of capitalist decline. Namely, *that of guaranteeing the continuation of capitalist private profit at the expense of the whole nation!* But, of course, Djilas cannot mention this *genuinely* "new tendency" because it doesn't exactly confirm his theory on the similarity between the USSR and the "state capitalist tendencies" of Western countries!

Is it necessary to remind Djilas, furthermore, that there is no difference for a business man between an "outright gift" and an unpaid "loan" on which interest is not drawn? In this sense, the U.S.A. already "gave outright" some billions of dollars to Great Britain, France, Belgium and Italy during and after the First World War. Moreover, as Kardelj correctly told the Fifth Congress of the YCP, American imperialism utilizes these "outright gifts" at the same time to obtain a right to oversee and practically a right to control the whole economy, the investment and foreign trade policy, as well as the colonial domain, of the countries so "generously aided." Can Djilas dare to deny these facts, known to all, and of which the European bourgeois have so openly complained? Why do these *genuinely new facts* abruptly disappear from Djilas' analysis?

Passing over the many contradictions contained in Djilas' other comments on the evolution of capitalism, we come to his most important conclusion. American imperialism can permit itself to seek the road of peaceful penetration in the colonies and capitals of its competitors merely by the sheer weight of its cheap goods in free competition (p. 53). The relations between the metropolis and the colonies, moreover, "become democratized" in the bourgeois sense of the term (p. 50). As against this development, progressive on the whole, there is the USSR, which "is in no condition to withstand normal capitalist competition," and is for this reason obliged to utilize the "old" methods of conquest and of colonialism "by means of arms." (p. 53)

Isn't all this monstrous? Only a year ago, on the eve of the Korean War, the leaders of the YCP and their press declared thousands of times that the revolutionary struggle of the colonial peoples, their *armed insurrections* and wars of national liberation, represent one of the predominant aspects of reality today. All these movements are daily running up against *the growing and unparalleled violence* of the imperialist armies. Where and when have the French imperialists committed so many savage and barbarous actions as in May 1945, in Algiers, at Madagascar in 1947, and in the Viet Nam for the last five years? Today all this disappears completely from Djilas' analysis, is struck from the map of the world by a single stroke of the pen and shamelessly replaced by the phrase on the "democratization" (in the bourgeois sense!) of the relations between the colonies and the metropolitan centers. What would the millions of Indonesians, Malayans, Madagascans and Koreans, their brothers tortured, burned alive, assassinated by imperialism for the sole crime of wishing to be free — what will they have to say about this new theory of Djilas?

Djilas pretends not to know that precisely the *wealth* of American imperialism; the high degree of development

of its productive forces, transform it today into the *aggressive power, par excellence* in this world. This wealth clashes directly with *the shrinking of the capitalist world market*, from which not only the USSR and the "new democracies" but also China, have been withdrawn — and from which a whole series of other colonial countries, successively liberating themselves, will soon be withdrawn. Just as Nazi Germany, precisely because of the high degree of development of its productive forces, suffocated within its Versailles frontiers and headed inexorably toward war, so American imperialism suffocates today within the frontiers of that "half of the world" which remains open to it. American imperialism must conquer the whole world for its capital and goods in order to survive. But before its capital and goods can penetrate the USSR, Eastern Europe and China again, it is necessary to destroy the monopoly of foreign trade, the collective ownership of the means of production, and the planned economy. This is not possible through "free competition," but only by means of cannon fire and atomic bombs. That is why American imperialism is preparing for war, is compelled to do so because of the inexorable demands of its economy. That is what lies concealed behind the fine words about "struggle against Soviet aggression."

Djilas is seeking what is "new" in the capitalist world since 1935 but he fails to mention any of the *truly new* tendencies which reveal the hideous physiognomy of capitalism in decay. He says nothing about the fact that the productive forces are no longer developing on a global scale, that a development in one country or in one sector is paid for by enormous destruction in other sectors. Nothing about the verification of that old prediction of Marx, according to which the productive forces would be transformed into forces of destruction, if they were not subjected in time to the conscious control of man. Nothing about the predominating tendency toward self-financing, which has rendered the monopoly trusts largely independent of finance capital and has resulted in a new relationship among them! Nothing about the characteristic fact, already mentioned, of the "government's guarantee of capitalist private profit at the expense of the nation"! Nothing on the fact that the war economy and rearmament become more and more the "normal" form of capitalist prosperity! Nothing on the fact that the tendency toward the *relative* impoverishment of the proletarians has for some time become a tendency toward their *absolute* impoverishment — not only in the backward countries, but also in such formerly most advanced countries like Japan, Germany and even Great Britain!

And above all, nothing on this fundamental contradiction of contemporary capitalism: that the masses instinctively sense this striking breakdown of the bourgeois "order"; that sudden economic and political crises impel them again and again onto the road of revolutionary struggle; that these struggles have become "normal" phenomena not only in the backward countries but even in advanced countries like Germany, France, Italy, Belgium (and soon Great Britain.) They reappear there periodically, and the instinctive impulse of the masses to seize the factories and the power is the predominating political reality. Yet, this is

the reality upon which every tendency of the workers' movement which is not retrogressive and conservative, must base its whole perspective.

Under these conditions, what does Djilas mean by the need for a "change in the program, tactics, and strategy" of the workers' movement (p. 50) when *for the first time* a world situation is developing which corresponds to the objective premises of the strategy of the first congresses of the Communist International? What is meant above all by that strange remark about "the chaos, distrust, and apathy in the day-to-day activity of the proletariat on our globe," (p. 4) while never before have so many millions of proletarians been in open, daily, revolutionary struggle with decaying capitalism? (12)

The Yugoslav Revolution and the Theory Of State Capitalism

Djilas started out in his analysis to discover the fundamental factors behind the surface phenomena. Alas, never has a theoretician been more blinded by the outward appearance of phenomena and thus rendered incapable of grasping what is fundamental and essential in the world of today!

The *theoretical* origin of this incapacity lies in the pragmatic character of his thinking. He does not try to get at the objective truth. His thinking, exactly like the Stalinist thinking which he justly ridicules for this same reason, strives to justify the "practical" turns in foreign policy (13). This pragmatism is furthermore explained by the fact that in breaking with Stalinism and in seeking — at first in a sincere and "disinterested" fashion, under the

(12) Kardelj went further, saying that "we are living, in fact, in a period of transition from one social system to another, in the course of which the economic factors of the new system have already achieved victory in the world" (*Questions Actuelles du Socialisme*, No. 1, p. 84). He was referring to the high level of the productive forces and to the "state capitalist" measures of the capitalist countries! He should be reminded of that pointed remark of Lenin: "The 'proximity' of such a capitalism to socialism should serve for the real representatives of the proletariat as an argument in proving the nearness, ease, feasibility and urgency of the socialist revolution, and not at all as an argument for tolerating a repudiation of such a revolution or for making capitalism more attractive." (*Collected Works*, XXI, p. 203, *State and Revolution*) Nor, we might add, discovering a "new" strategy for the proletariat!

(13) The internal logic of the theory of state capitalism leads the YCP in its day to day practice to vulgar reformist positions on international questions with astonishing rapidity. The Cucchi-Magnani movement in Italy, to which they have given discreet support, has openly pronounced itself in favor of national defense against "foreign aggression." The Yugoslav press has denounced the assistance given by the Chinese revolution to the Viet-Minh partisans, while Mosha Piyade in his pamphlet "The Myth of Soviet Aid to the National Yugoslav Insurrection" stigmatizes the Soviet leadership for not having given such assistance to the Yugoslav partisans. Finally, the Yugoslav review *World Politics* has just declared in its issue of June 6 (p. 11) that the "reform of the (French) electoral system, whose undemocratic character cannot be denied, can nevertheless be justified for one rather convincing reason (!), that of the common aspiration (of the parties of the majority) to defend democracy!"

shock produced by the sudden revelation of the counter-revolutionary nature of Stalinism — a materialist explanation of the phenomenon of the Soviet bureaucracy, the leaders of the YCP have never assimilated *theoretically* the teachings of the permanent revolution, although they applied in *practice* its essential precepts. This lack of theoretical understanding has reacted in turn upon their practice and has caused it to deviate in an opportunist direction.

The *social* origin of this lack of understanding is, however, to be found elsewhere. Djilas' theory of state capitalism is to the Yugoslav Revolution what the theory of "socialism in one country" was to the Russian Revolution — an attempt at a theoretical justification of the *conservative back-sliding* of leaders of a victorious revolution. Just as for some of the leading layers of the Bolshevik Party after 1923, the defense of this revolution today becomes for the Yugoslav leaders an *end in itself*, regardless of the consequences of certain methods and tactics of "defense" for the international workers' movement (as well as for Yugoslavia). What we have before us, therefore, is a *nationalist deviation of petty-bourgeois origin*, the social roots of which, in Yugoslavia, must be sought more in its peasant character and in foreign imperialist pressure than in the strength of the bureaucratic tendencies which are being combatted by the YCP.

The whole history of the workers' movement shows that in the long run the workers' conquests cannot be *defended* without being extended. That is how the necessity of the *permanence* of the revolution is stated in its most general form. But only those who show themselves capable of defending already existing conquests have the right to speak of the *extension* of the workers' conquests. The attitude of the Fourth International toward the Yugoslav question has for this reason been consistent in all the different phases through which it has passed. It is not by accident that the Fourth International was the first tendency of the international working-class movement — and for months the only one! — to come to the assistance of proletarian Yugoslavia besieged by the Kremlin and its infamous blockade. Nor was it by accident that this same Fourth International subjected to implacable criticism all the words and actions of the Yugoslav leaders that ever since the Korean War have gone counter to the interests of the colonial revolution and, for this reason, also counter to the revolutionary regroupment of the vanguard in the metropolitan countries. Because Trotskyism has endeavored for 28 years to subordinate at each turn of the situation the particular interests of a given layer, a given country or party to the *general interests* of the international proletariat, it is "blacker and more abominable than anything else conceivable in the eyes of the official Moscow circles." (Djilas, *ibid.* p. 9). What a pitiful sight it is to see those who, at their Fifth Congress still designated the Trotskyists as "fascist spies," today characterize our movement as "always dragging along in the tow of Soviet foreign policy." (Kardelj, p. 94)

Djilas declares that the Soviet bureaucracy has concluded from its Yugoslav experience that the proletarian revolution is by its very nature uncontrollable and for this

reason dangerous for the Kremlin. We believe that this realization has been one of the determining factors of Soviet foreign policy for many years. That is why we have based our whole struggle against Stalinism on the international extension of the revolution. That is the only way in which this struggle dovetails with our overall task, that of helping the masses throughout the entire world to overthrow capitalism in its death agony. The communist vanguard of each country comes to this same conclusion again and again by its own experience. Whether or not there is genuine internal democracy within the YCP; whether the revolutionary point of view can be expressed or whether it is

silenced by administrative measures, (14) we are certain that we shall sooner or later find the best Yugoslav communists arriving at this position.

June 10, 1951.

(14) The Yugoslav state has begun to wither away. . . Not yet sufficiently, however, to authorize the publication of Trotsky's works, even at the expense of the Fourth International. When Lenin and Trotsky were in power in Russia they never prevented, to our knowledge, the ultra-left communists from defending orally and in writing the theory of state capitalism. It is true that their state was not withering away. . .

Inside the Soviet Union

Interviews With Two Ukrainian Refugees

The following questions were submitted to two Ukrainian refugees from the Soviet Union belonging to the group of revolutionary socialists who publish the magazine *Vpered* (Forward) today in Germany. A. Babenko represents the elder generation of this tendency who remember the Russian Revolution and the developments during the first two decades of the Soviet Union. A. Wilny speaks for the younger generation which has known nothing but the iron rule of the Stalinist autocrats. Whatever contrasts are expressed in their opinions reflect not differences in political positions but their different ages, experiences and education.

The magazine *Vpered* with which they are associated supports the underground movement of revolutionary socialists called the UPA now combatting the MVD (formerly GPU) within the Ukraine because "the UPA stands clearly against the restoration of capitalism." It is "for the continuation of the revolution in the Soviet Union, for its new stage of development which must destroy the dictatorship of the bureaucracy and establish in its place the new regime of classless democracy based upon the socialization in the means of production and planned workers economy. We exclude now and forever the restoration of private property and private capitalism which is as unacceptable to the Soviet peoples as the restoration of feudalism would be for Western Europe or America."

As against the Trotskyists, *Vpered* characterizes Stalinism as the system of State Capitalism, "the highest and final stage of development of the capitalist system because it brings the concentration of capital and the socialization of labor to the highest possible point." However, as against those proponents of Stalinism as State Capitalism who regard it as more barbarous than Western monopoly capitalism, the *Vperedists* believe that "as the highest stage of social and economic development toward socialism, (the Stalinist system) is the most progressive system in the world. But it is progressive only as monopoly is progressive compared to small business."

Vpered vigorously fights all the reactionary groups amongst emigre circles from the USSR; condemns the Ukrainian and Russian Mensheviks abroad as "restorationists of capitalism" and "interventionists"; and sharply opposes the program of the U.S. State Department's "Voice of America."

"The atomic bomb will never save the Western bourgeois world," its editors wrote in 1950. "It is bankrupt as against Stalinism. The idea of the 'defense of democracy' plays the same role today as the idea of 'defense of the Czar and the Holy Motherland' did in the Russia of 1917. There is only one real way to prevent war: that is to establish real socialism in the Western world. This would immediately dissolve all the imaginary strength of Stalinism. But in the event of war,

if it becomes inevitable, there seems to be only one end for it: it will be concluded like the First World War by a wave of revolutions all over the world."

It is from this general standpoint that both Babenko and Wilny speak. An article by Wilny on the diverse trends in the recent emigration from the USSR appeared in the May-June 1951 issue of *Fourth International*. — Editors.

* * *

(1) *Tell us something about yourself — age, birthplace, education, occupation, how you happened to become a refugee from the Soviet Union.*

BABENKO: I'm 51 years old. I was born in the Ukraine where I graduated from the economics faculty of a university and a Marxist school of literature and art. In the USSR I was a journalist and lecturer in a Communist school of journalism. I fled the USSR because I was repressed as a member of the opposition. I had spent four years in a Siberian concentration camp and been penalized by a two year withdrawal of rights. Strictly speaking, I didn't flee from the USSR but was displaced by the Nazis into a labor camp as an "Ostarbeiter." Then after the war I refused to go back, so now I'm a "refugee."

WILNY: I am 25 years old, born in the Soviet Ukraine. Education — Soviet High School (10 classes). Occupation in the USSR — besides studying, I have been the leader of the school Pioneer Detachment (Communist youth organization). Deported by retreating Germans; until the end of war worked as an "Ostarbeiter" in German industry and agriculture. After the war refused to return to the USSR though the Americans twice tried to deport me by force. I escaped all the "liberators."

(2). *What is life like generally in the USSR today? Is fear universal? Do people come back from the prisons, the concentration camps and slave labor armies?*

BABENKO: According to the Soviet press, living standards in the USSR are worse now than before the war, real income has not reached the prewar level. Before the war people who served their sentences were returning home from the concentration camps and slave labor armies but there was a tendency to detain them. For instance, in a

concentration camp where I was confined, when a prisoner had been released he was examined by guards and when they found something taken from the camp like linen, etc. they sentenced him for two years as a "petty thief." So I was compelled to leave behind my own underwear and other things in order to avoid that kind of trouble. How they do it now, I don't know.

WILNY: Immediately after the war the standard of living was unbearable. In 1946-47, as many indications prove, there was serious discontent in the population, a new famine in the Southern part of the Soviet Union, several revolts in the cities when hungry war veterans and women ransacked the food stores, beat the police in the streets, etc. These revolts were especially reported as taking place in Leningrad and in Poltava. After that life improved considerably though even with the last official roll-backs in prices (in March 1951) the living standard has yet to reach the prewar level by approximately 20%. Fear is not universal, I don't believe that, if you mean by "fear" psychological reluctance to any kind of resistance against the regime. I don't know whether the people are being returned from the concentration camps now. Before the war they were. The majority of those arrested in the purge of 1937 got 10-year sentences; so, if they were still alive, they should have come back in 1947. Some of them really have come back. The Ukrainian humorist O. Vyshnia served ten years at Kolyma and is now writing again. General Rokossovsky, now in Poland, served around 5 years in a concentration camp (having been arrested in the case of Marshall Tukhachevsky). But all those people are broken forever and that's where the above-mentioned "fear" has its roots.

(3) *What are the various attitudes toward Stalinism today in the Soviet Union? In the different levels of the bureaucracy? Among the workers, skilled and unskilled? Among the farm workers and peasants? Students? Intellectuals (scientists, writers, artists, musicians, etc.)?*

BABENKO: In my opinion all of them without exception look at Stalinism through the prism of fear. Even the youngsters recruited from among the homeless and semi-criminal elements and the skilled people in the privileged schools like navy officers, etc., are not reliable. A certain standard attitude is created — not to deny. Shostakovich, the composer, was accused of formalism which he "repented" at once. Of course everybody understood this as a proper formality but in their minds or in a limited circle they know this is merely a demand imposed by the Stalinist regime or a strictly individual disgrace, etc. Deep and theoretically conscious resistance hardly exists because such resistance could be formed only in an atmosphere of opinion which does not exist in the USSR. This is the reason why resistance has a purely practical or better to say an elemental character, mostly in the lower ranks of society. There is some news from refugees that inside the Soviet occupation army in Eastern Germany criticism of the regime has newly appeared without as yet reaching the authorities and no repressions are reported. The same seems to be the case in the USSR.

WILNY: The majority of the population of the USSR hates Stalinism and wishes to get rid of it. But the bureaucracy defends itself by all means. It is its own child and its own source of existence. The workers do not support it any more. In order to disarm the working class, the bureaucracy constantly tries to split it by giving material privileges to individual workers (Stakhanovists) and by sowing hatred among them. But this method of the bureaucracy is known and understood, so it does not help very much. The working class had been constantly weakened by the influx into its ranks of the backward peasantry (particularly "kulaks" who were thrown out of their villages). But now that this peasantry does not exist any more this method of the bureaucracy is also deprived of its strength. It is my firm belief that the working class is constantly recovering its strength again. The intellectuals are also discontented with the régime but at the same time are linked to it by the standard of living the régime gives them. Anyhow, in my opinion, they do not represent any serious force of resistance. Normally one can find among them those who are on the side of the working class as well as those who would defend the bureaucracy. Another part are simple Philistines who are afraid of everything. The students now are in the majority children of the bureaucrats.

(4) *What forms does the opposition to Stalinism take?*

BABENKO: See above.

WILNY: All possible forms. Before the war there was a hidden oral propaganda against the régime and sometimes unorganized sabotage of the régime's measures. Now in addition there are several armed insurrections in the Caucasus, the Baltic republics and the Ukraine, where guerrilla detachments still exist. There are also several organized underground groups which spread written propaganda against the régime.

(5) *Is the general desire in the Soviet Union to go forward on the road to socialism, or to turn back? How strong is the tendency toward restoration of capitalism (a) economically (b) politically?*

BABENKO: See the article by P. Poltava in reply to "Voice of America," in Ukrainian. (The article of Poltava has been quoted by Wilny in the May-June 1951 issue of *Fourth International*.)

WILNY: Words and terms like "socialism," "communism," "democracy," "Marxism," "bolshevism," "soviet," etc., are commonly hated. But Stalinism itself is considered to be capitalism, the bureaucracy is commonly called "magnates," "Soviet bourgeoisie," etc. Therefore one should not judge the ideas of the Soviet people simply by the names and terms they use. The absolute majority however stands for socialism because the people do not want any return to capitalism, to private property in the means of production, to the restoration in power of the abolished classes, etc. They hate capitalism no less than Stalinism. The common "mood" is to retain the present status in economy but to transfer it to the control of workers, that is, to seize power from the bureaucracy, to establish a new democracy with several political parties if needed but only with such parties which would correspond in their programs with the real social structure of the existing society. In

other words, it should be a regime of a classless democracy because the society now under the shell of the Stalinist bureaucracy is a classless one.

(6) *The Soviet workers, guided by the Left Opposition, nearly succeeded in halting Stalin's usurpation of power (1924-28). To your knowledge are the memories of this great struggle, intimately associated with Leon Trotsky, still alive?*

BABENKO: The older generation knows about the importance of Trotsky in the USSR and from it the youth. But the official point of view — modified by the opposition to Stalin — is still in operation. There is in general the basis for correct understanding of history but it is littered by the official propaganda.

WILNY: While in the Soviet Union I did not know the truth about the Trotskyist Left Opposition. For us, I mean the youth, they were enemies and Japanese spies, traitors and counter-revolutionaries. I don't think that such an attitude has since been changed in the USSR. The older generation probably knew something about them but not the young one.

(7) *Under Stalin's orders, Soviet history has been completely rewritten to erase all record of Trotsky's genuine role in founding the Soviet Union. How well has this gigantic falsification succeeded?*

BABENKO: Falsification of history, as mentioned above, has succeeded to a certain extent. The point is that the psychical understanding of human beings depends not only on knowledge but also on habits. The average individual in the USSR is accustomed to regard Trotsky as an "enemy of the people" although knowing that the facts don't prove it. This habit is a component of the mentality of the Soviet people and to change this habit is as difficult as to change the mentality itself.

WILNY: In my opinion, it was an absolute success.

(8) *Is the truth about the real roles of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin in 1917-20 still common knowledge?*

BABENKO: No.

WILNY: No, it is not known.

(9) *A decade and more ago, the main charge levelled against purge victims was inevitably "Trotskyism." In the post-war series of purges the charge has been some form of "bourgeois cosmopolitanism" as well as the usual charge of spying for the countries on Moscow's "hate" list. What do the people think of this shift?*

BABENKO: About the change from "Trotskyism" to "cosmopolitanism" etc., the people think the same as Shostakovich thinks about his "formalism" — this is what is required by the authorities. People don't deliberate too much whether to keep away or not when a car runs on the sidewalk. They have to keep away in order not to be killed although they are aware at the same time that the car isn't on the right road. They have become accustomed for such a long time to such a "method of action" that they don't reason too much about it.

WILNY: The "cosmopolites" have been the Russian non-nationalists and non-chauvinists. They have been in-

ternationalists. But I think the people now pay little attention to what Stalinists say about all the "spies," etc.

(10) *Are the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin still seriously studied in the USSR?*

BABENKO: The works of Marx, Engels and Lenin are not studied seriously but rather "officially," but it is not forbidden to study them seriously. Though there is no real possibility to do that because it is not enough to read something. It has to be thought over and discussed. However, discussion is impossible and to think over such problems is too dangerous. It is dangerous even to let out a secret in sleep. Certainly some people read and think along such lines but there are few of them.

WILNY: I don't know what you mean by "seriously." In the USSR everybody knows what Marxism is, but though many people hate this name they are nevertheless Marxist in their way of thinking, attitudes toward life, and world outlook. In this sense this factor is really a serious one and very dangerous to all those from abroad who want to teach the Soviet people a "democratic way of life."

(11) *How does the younger generation which knows Marxism only from the classics, resolve the glaring contradiction between the Marxist program and Soviet reality under Stalin? For example, what is their reaction to the state becoming more dictatorial instead of "withering away"?*

BABENKO: On this question Karl Radek gave an answer some years ago: "If a power exists, the formula of a justification for it is always available." I'll add: if a power only prevails, the people will believe in the formulas given. The very existence of power is hypnotizing and compels people to believe in its formulas.

WILNY: In the case of the Soviet youth the said contradiction is the main factor determining its way of thinking. Marxism is "in the blood" of the Soviet youth. The youth accepts the program propagandized by Stalin, because there is nothing else to be accepted, but rejects Stalin and Stalinism as liars and falsifiers of reality. For instance, Stalin says: "We have no classes and no exploitation of labor in the USSR." The youth says: "All right, long live Stalin's teachings: down with Stalin, with the bureaucracy, and existing exploitation!" etc.

(12) *What is the feeling of the national minorities toward Russian chauvinism and oppression?*

BABENKO: The general feeling of the national minorities toward Russian chauvinism is one of the accumulation of dull resistance. For example: in the Ukraine the people view with some interest the Russian chauvinist film "Peter the Great" but know at the same time the words of Taras Shevchenko: "this is that 'Great' who crucified our Ukraine." Of course there are people who hate their national oppression most bitterly.

WILNY: The non-Russian republics of the USSR should be separated from Russia once and forever and become independent nations — that is the main reaction to Stalin's Russian nationalism. Confidence in Russian "brotherhood" does not exist any more after the policy of genocide and colonial exploitation that has taken place.

In my opinion, in the future it will be by no means possible to keep this conglomerate of nations together in one state.

(13) *What was the reaction toward the Stalin-Hitler pact?*

BABENKO: Some people hated it; some welcomed it, expecting that Hitler will crush Stalin. The latter were in the majority. It was especially welcomed in the Siberian concentration camps. There the people sympathized with Hitler whose program they didn't know but from the fact that he was Stalin's enemy they expected him to be good. Nobody supported the official point of view and within the Communist Party it was considered as "tactics."

WILNY: I would say the majority of people did not know what Hitlerism was like in reality. They simply did not believe Stalinist propaganda. But the partition of Poland, the annexation of Bessarabia, Bukovina, the Baltic states, the tragic war with Finland, were considered as mere exercises of Stalinist imperialism and as the signs of the coming world war.

(14) *How do thinking workers assess the Stalinist policies of the Thirties which helped pave the way for the German imperialist assault?*

BAKENKO: See 13.

WILNY: I don't know about that.

(15) *Did the big military defeats at the beginning of World War II arouse bitterness toward the Kremlin?*

BABENKO: The people rejoiced at the defeats, especially in the Ukraine; less so in Russia.

WILNY: Bitterness toward the Kremlin existed long before the war. The defeats at the beginning of the war did not arouse bitterness but joy. I repeat that people did not know the Germans. Many hailed the defeats of the Red Army. It was the biggest misunderstanding in history. Only after a couple of months of war, when the situation cleared and the people realized what kind of "liberator" was advancing, did they take up arms to defend themselves. Under German occupation the prevailing "mood" acquired the form of a "third force" idea — against both Hitler and Stalin. This slogan was the ideology of many guerrilla detachments and bands in the Ukraine and the Caucasus.

(16) *During the war, Stalin emphasized Russian nationalism at the expense of socialism. What did the Russian workers brought up on socialist ideology think of this?*

BABENKO: The Russian workers brought up on socialist ideology were mostly repressed. The propaganda tried to unite Russian chauvinism with socialism. For instance the Russian language was held up as the language of the October revolution, or lately of the "socialist nation" and that is why it should dominate all over the world.

WILNY: If you mean the Russian worker as a particular nationality I don't believe he hailed that change. Only the bureaucracy, army officers and generals, and people like them hailed and supported that change. In general this change has been considered as proof that Stalin is not a socialist and internationalist and that the people does not support his "socialism."

(17) *In what way do the obvious preparations of American imperialism to conquer the USSR affect the attitude of the Soviet people toward the Stalin regime? Does the threat of another assault help or hinder the struggle to get rid of Stalinism and revive the democracy known under Lenin? How popular are the "Voice of America" broadcasts to the USSR? Does news get into the Soviet Union from more trustworthy sources?*

BABENKO: American war preparations partly strengthen not only Russian but to a lesser extent Soviet patriotism too and thus fortify the positions of Stalinism. The people listen with interest to the "Voice of America" for "different" news but, as a new ideology, they don't accept it.

WILNY: I am sure that the people have drawn conclusions from the German "liberation." They do not believe any more in "Westerners." Therefore I am sure that the preparations for a foreign intervention strengthens the Stalinist regime. On the other hand one should consider the possibility that the people may try again to adopt the ideas of the "third force" as happened in World War II. They would vigorously defend themselves (but not Stalinism) against the interventionists, trying at the same time to rise in revolution against Stalinism. The analogy with World War I is quite possible as the "mood" for such a way out from the desperate position of lying between the hammer and the anvil is a very strong one. Some people really risk listening to the broadcasts of the VOA but they do not accept the VOA's ideas. That's quite natural, I guess. It is the same as though one would broadcast to the USA the ideas of restoring the British crown and colonial period. The other sources of information are the broadcasts of Tito's Yugoslavia. That's something more acceptable and there is really sense in risking to listen to them. The people get the most trustworthy information from the underground publications (which exist in the USSR) and from reading *Pravda* "between the lines." (This last is a special Soviet art of reading in accord with the dialectical method of seeing the contradictions.)

(18) *What was the popular reaction to expansion of Soviet power to Eastern Europe?*

BABENKO: They consider it positive because of the liquidation of the capitalists, landowners, and kulaks but negative because of the spreading of the bureaucracy.

WILNY: It is considered as Russian imperialism. But the liquidation of private capitalism and the bourgeoisie is hailed. The peoples of the USSR have thus got more allies; real allies among the peoples of satellite countries which will never betray. The spreading of Stalin's empire means the inevitable weakening of its strength.

(19) *What were the repercussions inside the USSR of the break with Yugoslavia?*

BABENKO: The most powerful blow to Stalinism is Yugoslavia because the people think that there is different way to socialism apart from Stalinism.

WILNY: It showed Russian imperialism is not strong any more. It showed also once more that Stalinism has nothing in common with Socialism. Besides, Yugoslavia's revolt strengthened the political and moral positions of

those non-Russian nationalists which wish to separate themselves from Russia. However, the foreign policy of new Yugoslavia could not be considered as the ideal one. Also some attitudes of the CP of Yugoslavia in its inner policies are still vague.

(20) *To your knowledge are there any "Titoist" currents in the Soviet Union?*

BABENKO: No. It is impossible because there is a new stage of revolution, e.g. the struggle is not for the establishment of proletarian dictatorship but for a classless democracy.

WILNY: Yes, there are, especially in the CP's of national republics. In the recent purge of officials in the Baltic republics, they were directly accused of "Titoism."

(21) *What impact has the revolution in China had upon the Soviet people?*

BABENKO: I believe it kills the tendency toward restoration of capitalism but it doesn't reduce the hatred toward Stalinism.

WILNY: It strengthens the morale of the masses. Nobody except the bureaucracy believes that Russia will be able to rule China. The great revolution in the whole of Asia means that the era of imperialism comes to its end. The oppressed colonial peoples of Asia are being considered as potential allies of the oppressed peoples in the USSR.

(22) *What is your estimate of the chances of overthrowing Stalin in the near future?*

BABENKO: I don't believe it is possible in the near future.

WILNY: The near future is a vague term. The new revolution in the USSR is possible and even inevitable. It depends, however, on the consolidation of the masses of working people, on the organization of a strong revolutionary underground organization (party). The revolutionary situation will be created by the general crisis of the regime. The objective causes of such a crisis can't be predicted directly. Economic as well as political factors can play their role. The crisis exists now too, but it is not yet a general one. It affects different parts of the social-economic machinery and the bureaucracy is still able to fight its localized appearances. This question is a subject for a thorough analysis of the whole Stalinist system. I promise to write such an article for you sometime.

(23) *What in your opinion is the best course for workers in other lands to follow in helping to achieve this desirable end?*

BABENKO: The victory of their revolution or even of reformist "socialism" of the Laborist type.

WILNY: To unite themselves, to free themselves from the myth of Stalinist socialism, to create a united revolutionary organization, an International, to crush capitalism in their own countries by their own forces, to support the revolution in colonial countries, to establish a really socialist encirclement of the USSR.

(24) *How does the outside world look to the refugees from the USSR?*

BABENKO: Differently from mine. In general they look with sympathy toward anti-socialist elements.

WILNY: To questions 24-29 you may find the answer in my article in the *F. I.*, May-June '51 issue.

(25) *In the USSR they could not find the answers to many questions that must have disturbed them. What are the first things they want to find out?*

BABENKO: It depends on the kind of refugees they are. Many of them try to find out how to "unite" the positive non-capitalist features of the USSR with the positives of capitalist democracy.

(26) *Are they favorably impressed by capitalism? What proportion look forward to finding a comfortable niche and secure life somewhere in one of the capitalist countries? Do a significant number have a revolutionary perspective?*

BABENKO: Some of them like capitalist "liberty," some are looking for a secure life, some intend struggling for liberty in the USSR either in the ultra-reactionary Vlassov, or in the socialist way.

(27) *Tell us something about the intellectual life of the Soviet emigres. What is their reaction to the various current theories about the USSR and Stalinism? What do they think of Titoism? Of Trotskyism?*

BABENKO: The intellectual life of the emigres is very rich in many different fields except that of sociology. Reactionaries are predominant. They believe that any form of socialism leads to Stalinism. After Tito's split and the political victories of English Laborism they have calmed down a little. The word "socialism" is disgusting to them. Trotskyism even more so, as one of the branches of communism. They sympathize with Titoism more or less. In general they are marked by a political primitivism and incline toward Marxist analysis provided it is presented without the brand of "Marxism" and without such standard Soviet expressions as "class struggle," "bourgeoisie," "Wall Street," etc. Then they are accepted as discoveries.

(28) *Among the refugees who count themselves as genuine followers of Marx and Lenin what is the reaction upon discovering that "Trotskyism" is really revolutionary socialism?*

BABENKO: I haven't met any such refugees.

(29) *Are these refugees giving serious consideration to their relation to the international socialist movement which has kept alive the genuine Marxist heritage? What can workers in other lands do to help the Soviet refugees get oriented and to aid them in working for the overthrow of Stalinism and the revival of Soviet democracy?*

BABENKO: In respect to the Ukrainian emigration support and understanding of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement is needed. In general the majority of the emigration especially the Great Russian, is oriented toward types like MacArthur and not to the workers of other lands.