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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Hall of Fame

I read with great interest and appreciation the article on Thomas Paine, by Raymond Fletcher of the British *Tribune,* in the July-August issue of the *American Socialist.*

However, I am wondering if our English friends know that Thomas Paine is now a member of that select group of great Americans whose names are enshrined in the Hall of Fame. A bronze bust of this great thinker and patriot was unveiled in the Hall of Fame, with suitable ceremonies, in the auditorium of the Library of the New York University, May 18, 1952.

A bust of that great advocate of woman's rights, Susan B. Anthony, was unveiled at the same time. How suitable to have bronze busts of these two outstanding fighters for human rights placed in the Hall of Fame at the same time!

It is interesting to note that Thomas Paine was voted into the Hall of Fame five years before Theodore Roosevelt, the man who tried to besmirch the character of this great patriot by calling him "a dirty little atheist." I wonder what Theodore Roosevelt would think if he could come back and see the bronze bust of Thomas Paine alongside the one of Benjamin Franklin, and in close proximity to those of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, John Quincy Adams, and James Monroe! I dare say that Theodore Roosevelt would grind his teeth with rage and utter some choice expletives. How good it is to know that the star of Thomas Paine, so long in eclipse, is now on the ascendancy again.

John P. Burke, President-Secretary
International Brotherhood of Pulp,
Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers

Sixty-Forty Split?

Forty years ago, socialists were telling American workers that, out of each dollar of produced wealth, the workers got 20 cents and the employers got 80 cents. And big employers were claiming that they only got "a few pennies" out of a dollar—often not more than three, and not more than an average of five. This is more absurd than the 20-80 ratio claimed by Debs and Fred Warren. However, the employers still claim they get "only a few pennies," and the socialists, having admitted that they were wrong on the 20-80 ratio, have never made the effort necessary to show what the actual proportion is.

When the income tax first began, a ten percent reduction was allowed for "earned income," and with all the incentive to claim as much earned income as possible, it could not be shown that earned income was more than half of the national income. Excluding small farmers and small retailers, it seems probable that the ratio is nearer 60-40 in favor of business, than it is to 50-50.

As long as workers believe that they get as much as 90 cents out of each dollar, they are not going to be greatly fired up about the principle of it. The unions, whose research departments should be telling the workers the facts, are actually helping to hide them. Occasionally, when they are battling one of the big employers, they will expose the profits of that particular employer. But unions are traditionally organized to "gain for the worker a larger share of the product of his toil." After all these years, they are not going to tell their members that the worker is getting a smaller share of the product than they were getting before the union started.

They cannot tell their workers that there is anything wrong with the labor picture that could not be corrected by a ten percent raise in the next contract. The average national per capita income is 3½ times as much as it was in 1939, but only about 3,000,000 of the 50,000,000 people earning wages are getting even 3 times their 1939 wages. And labor was getting only about 40 cents out of a dollar even in 1939.

Instead of learned articles on philosophy that only college grads can understand, socialist literature should be using pay-check and pocket-book language that the workers can understand, and backing it with statistics that will stand up and be counted. We must prove to the workers that they really "have a world to gain," and are not merely haggling about "a few pennies out of each dollar."

Frank Tuttle *Michigan*

I think it appropriate that the *American Socialist* take notice of something new in the radical movement of our times—a socialist publication with a sense of humor. Laugh with *Maverick* at the imbecilities of our economy and the petty differences among the 67 varieties of socialists.

I am sure your readers would like to know about the new progressive impudent, slightly wacky humorous labor publication. A free sample can be had by writing to *Maverick,* 1553 Madison St., Chicago 7, Ill. A 15-issue subscription costs $2.

Don Harrison, N. Y.

I was grateful for your reprint from the British *Tribune,* "Slow Death in Algeria" by Lucien Weitz in your May issue.

There are those of us who would like to contribute to the courageous stand of the Algerian rebels against the French nation's incredible barbarism. Judging from conversations, and from letters I have seen in various newspapers, there may be quite a few. We have at least dollars if nothing more.

You would do a real service, I feel, if you could publish an address through which our contributors might reach the nationalists.

I buy and circulate each issue of your magazine with an increasing appreciation of its value. The general quality of the articles appears to me to be unequalled in the socialist press here in America. Keep it up!

R. S. *Berkeley*

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Return to the Summit

WE are not drug addicts. We don't smoke the weed. Neither are we being sent by the newspaper chatter of a "new Ike" and a "new Nixon." (In an inflationary period, Madison Avenue thinks it can market anything.) But when an administration that is staffed with every mediocrity and Babbitt that can be spared from the front offices of the corporation world, and singularly dedicated to the cold war, for the second time in its career eats its own thunderous rhetoric and moves for an international easement—then we have to conclude that overwhelming forces are at work stronger than men's prejudices and fears. The scheduled Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits mark the second big attempt since the Korean fighting to temper the cold war.

We would like to believe that it was an irresistible and indignant public opinion that forced the palsied hands of the statesmen. But what's the good of taking dope? You still have to face the world when you wake up in the grey dawn. Assuredly, there is a strong yearning for peace throughout the world, and in this country, as well. But it is largely unorganized, leaderless, and disoriented. Even in Great Britain and Japan, the two countries where the peace movement has taken on mass dimensions, the Tories have been able to maintain themselves in office and manipulate policy along the lines of their war alliance with the United States. The inchoate public thirst for peace determines the terminology and public relations of the world's statesmen. It goes further, and affects, limits, and twists their conduct time and again. But it does not and will not formulate basic policy until and unless public opinion gets itself clothed with organizational strength and makes the transition from emotionalism to politics.

The current break in the cold war results from the identical causes that brought about the *détente* at the summit meeting in Geneva in the summer of 1955. The Eastern and Western power blocs are militarily stalemated while remaining politically deadlocked. In the past, such vast differences between armed powers were invariably submitted to the arbitrament of the sword. But despite the bellicose talk and the unprecedented arms race, thus far, at any rate, the balance of terror has held, and prevented Armageddon. Unable to come to a settlement with the Soviets, yet unable to go to war with them, Washington has had recourse once before to public relations, or more accurately, has joined the Soviets in an enactment of public fire-works and displays of ham-handed *bonhomie.*

BUT the laboratory conditions are markedly inferior for Washington in this second experiment in summitry. Although only four years have gone by, the power balance has further shifted in its disfavor. The two military establishments remain checkmated, but the Soviets have leaped ahead in missiles. The United States is twice as rich as Russia, but the latter is cutting the distance with every passing year. For the present, the Soviets have stabilized their difficult position in Eastern Europe: Hungary and Poland have made many concessions, especially to their farm peoples; a common market is in operation with the semblance of an economic division of labor between the countries; the overall economic picture is notably improved since the upheavals of 1956.

In contrast, the Western powers are right now in a state of disunity and disarray. All of them are bleeding from the unending revolutionary thrust in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Moreover, Europe's age-old rivalries have reasserted themselves. Britain is now soft-pedaling its support of German rearmament and claims, as it has grown fearful that Germany is emerging again as its main Continental rival. France wants a membership card in the hitherto exclusive Anglo-American nuclear club as well as a blank check for Algeria. Until these conditions are met, it has decided to do some polite sabotaging of NATO. The Western common market has broken down with Europe split into two hostile camps led by Britain and Germany-France. Certainly, at the moment, the Acheson-Dulles grand alliance makes a rather bedraggled appearance.

But the bilateral form of the coming exchange visits are not designed exclusively to circumvent Western disunity. They are a recognition on the diplomatic scene that world power has polarized in the United States and Russia and that any new agreement will have to be devised, first of all, by

the two behemoths. The erstwhile giants of Western Europe are not relegated to the status of the Soviet dependencies in Eastern Europe, but one of the facts of life of the second half of the twentieth century is that there are no more first-class powers on the old terrain.

The back-slapping and good fellowship at Geneva in 1955 were unable to break the German deadlock or produce any other kind of agreement. Four months later, the attempt of Molotov and Dulles to reduce the spongy summit declaration to political substance broke down, and the era of good feeling evaporated into thin air. After that, the war tensions continued to mount and the recriminations and power maneuvers multiplied. Are there grounds to be more optimistic about the 1959 Eisenhower-Khrushchev encounter?

WERE one to base judgment on a perusal of the mass American press, the conclusions would be black, indeed. The American press lords—as the corporations lords, generally—are a hard-bitten Bourbon crowd. They have enormous vested interests, and they mean to hang on to every one of them. Like all elites of history, they have enrolled morality, ethics, and even God himself behind their banners. The American people have consequently been conditioned by a decade of unscrupulous war propaganda that "we" are virtue incarnate, whereas "they" represent the anti-Christ of our time with whom one cannot even safely discuss without somehow becoming an accomplice in guilt and sin. This thinking in terms of fixed stereotypes is aggravated by the uncanny genius of the propaganda hucksters to trivialize, confuse, and reduce all motivations and problems to the levels of a Western movie.

Reading the newspapers or listening to the newscasters, we learn that Mr. K was in a stew to meet with Ike because of the social status it would confer on him. This probably rang a familiar bell to millions of Americans because they had heard all about status seeking. It was only logical for the newspapermen to suggest therefore that it was up to Mr. K to make some concessions in return for letting him meet up with the country club set.



Here is another piece of foreign policy wisdom which we picked up recently: It's a good idea to let Mr. K come over here, because once he sees us in the flesh, he'll know that you can't get away with threats against the likes of us; or, once he sees our military installations, he'll realize that it is not safe to attack us; or, once he talks to our workers, he'll know they're not plotting social revolution. The accompanying suggestion is that just as soon as we can get "the truth" or "the facts" across to the Russian people, then some big internal changes will take place over there to our benefit.

THE common denominator of all this juvenile so-called "news analysis" is the attempt to sidetrack politics and political interests and conflicts in favor of personalities, tidbits of gossip, small vanities, small talk, and sonorous—and generally empty—catch-phrases. Under this type of public "education," it is hardly surprising that in a recent poll, a majority of New Yorkers questioned declared themselves fully in favor of "standing firm" in Berlin—without the faintest knowledge that the city in question is 100 miles inside Soviet East Germany. It is neither consolation nor justification to be told that the Russian people are also systematically manipulated by means of their party-line press. It only signifies that in this hour of mankind's peril, diplomats, commissars, and generals hold humanity's destiny in their hands.

If we turn our backs on the never-never land of demagogy disguised as folksiness, or overdeveloped communication for the conveyance of underdeveloped thought, and look at the conflict of interests with an informed outlook and a steady eye, we are led to the uncomfortable conclusion that an overall peace settlement between the two contestants is a matter of the far distant future. The kind of differences that divide East and West have never been settled peacefully before. We are up against a new situation in the world's history, where, as has been stated many times before, man's technical wizardry has run far ahead of his social wisdom. So long as the present assumptions prevail, the conflict is unresolvable.

What has happened, as every student of current history is aware, is that the United States occupied positions after the war as the arbiter and overlord—and that with the shift in world balance, a number of these positions are no longer tenable. Our State Department has had to retreat before *force majeure* in the Communist victories in China and Indo-China, in Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal, in Russian economic infiltration of the Middle East and forcible maintenance of her suzerainty in East Germany and Hungary. But these setbacks and the shakiness of their over-extended structure have only frightened our diplomats and militarists all the more and hardened their resolve to hold tight by means of bases, armaments, military alliances and subsidies, and an ideological crusade couched in terms of morality and religion.

Such a forbidding atmosphere has been built up that even many peace advocates, who want this country to extricate itself from its present impasse, dare not breathe the terms which are required in seriously contemplating an end to the cold war. To mention some of the most important ones: 1) The United States will have to give up a good many, if not most, of its foreign bases, particularly those encircling Russia and China. 2) The East European countries within the Soviet bloc will have to be accepted and the attempts to undermine or overthrow their governments abandoned. 3) China will have to be recognized. 4) Both NATO and the Warsaw alliances will have to be disbanded, or at the very least, both sign non-aggression pacts with each other and materially reduce their activities. 5) The arms race will have to be called off and a start made to re-

duce armaments and destroy nuclear stockpiles.

AGREEMENTS along these lines appear impossible to this country's rulers, and seem to them tantamount to surrender of our position as the world's leading power. The going economic and strategic positions have become so dependent on the system of military alliances and giveaways that even the most advanced of our foreign policy analysts have thrown up their hands in despair at formulating realistic terms for any overall peace settlement. They have decided that the only practical approach is to try to settle manageable individual issues in the hope that each settlement will improve mutual confidence and pave the way for a solution of another conflict. The difficulty even in this more modest approach is that every single important conflicting claim forms a link in the larger strategic chain, to shorten which appears to offer the enemy an inadmissable advantage. Consequently, there have been slim pickings for this approach, as well.

The problem of Germany, which is at the center of the conflict in Europe, is further from solution today than it was when the cold war started. As time goes on, it will be as unmanageable as trying to distill self-determination out of a Balkan strip inhabited by sixteen different nationalities and sub-nationalities. The West stands officially on the embattled ramparts of "unity in freedom" for Germany. But this fine-sounding slogan has about as much reality as the "rollback" of Soviet power, and the "liberation" of the East European "captive peoples." Not only does Russia — not unexpectedly — reject the proposition of surrendering East Germany to NATO and shifting the European balance against itself, but the Western powers are against German unity, as well. France and England dread the emergence of too powerful a competitor. Even the Adenauer regime fears the loss of its Catholic-based power with the annexation of the Protestant East German provinces. As a cynical French spokesman put it: "We all pray to go to heaven but not too soon." In another ten years, with East Germany continually integrated into the Soviet-bloc economy, it is anybody's guess whether unification with an Adenauer-type Germany will have any appeal to the East German people. At any rate, the problem is out of the realm of practical negotiations for the immediate years ahead.

THIS being so, it was expected in the world's chancelleries that sooner or later the question of West Berlin would be back on the agenda. All the talk of "standing firm" does not gainsay the fact that the West is in a very poor strategic position here. If no agreement is reached, the Russians can sign a separate treaty with East Germany. The latter, in turn, can initiate a slow campaign of harassment to disrupt Western shipments and movements into the city, which would progressively demoralize the West Berlin population. Each of the individual steps of harassment can be small enough to virtually rule out any response of massive retaliation on the part of the West. In full appreciation of this dilemma, and mindful that Khrushchev has no intention of just fading away, Walter Lippmann has been urging for months that a new compromise settlement must be made with the Russians.

His proposal is that in return for a new explicit statute recognizing the right of the Western allies to access and to keep troops in the city, and the right of West Berlin to remain within West Germany's monetary system, West Berlin be declared politically neutral, with the propaganda and espionage agencies to be shut down. Lippmann thinks this plus a limited recognition of East Germany a price well worth paying for a new statute. Whether the Russians would be agreeable to such a concession at this stage of the game — or whether the Washington-Bonn axis would be reconciled to it — are moot questions. At any rate, it must be presumed that Eisenhower did not invite Khrushchev for a state visit simply to show him some of the "decent" homes of our workers, or to discuss the merits of golfing as a therapy for relaxing from the onerous duties of high office.

Another subject being bruited about by the more informed journals is the resumption of trade. The Russians are clearly anxious for this and might be willing to make concessions in other directions in return for it. But this too is caught in the machinery of the cold war and will not easily or rapidly be resolved. For trade to mean much to the Russians, it would have to be large-scale, it would necessitate considerable long-term credits, it would require a number of legal revisions permitting the export of so-called strategic goods now on the proscribed list and granting Russia "most favored nation" clause status for its exports to this country. If there is any inclination to give way on these matters in Washington, it is not yet apparent. Mikoyan got the brushoff when he discussed the problem with the State Department. Most officials continue to feel, "Why should we help Russia catch up with us when they're out to do us dirt?"

THOUGH the road to specific settlements is a long and thorny one, the outlook may be brighter for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchanges and any later four-power summit conference or conferences than the short-lived good-will accruing from the 1955 Geneva talks. For one, the two main antagonists are more evenly matched today and the risks of a war are more impressively understood by all hands on deck. By the same token, the situation is, if anything, even more dangerous today than it was four years ago. This country is concluding a series of dynamite-laden agreements to nuclearize the armed forces of its NATO allies. Within a few years, Germany will be a member of the nuclear club for all practical purposes. If things continue to drift, Russia will undoubtedly retaliate by entering into nuclear arrangements throughout Eastern Europe similar to those devised by our strategists. Once that stage is reached — and it is hard upon us — the element of sheer control over the far-ranging and dizzying conflict will have appreciably declined.

Withal, it would be a mistake to view the coming discussions as a now-or-never proposition. There will be many ups and downs over the years in the East-West confrontation, and its resolution will neither be rapid nor easy. A new hopeful phase is now opening with Eisenhower's gesture. Let us hope that it ushers in an impressive enough period of good-will, so that a few of the more pressing conflicts can be profitably tackled.

A year ago last May, De Gaulle used the threat of civil war to take over France. In this summary, his policies, pretenses, and vainglorious rhetoric are scrutinized and weighed against the concrete facts.

Balance Sheet of De Gaulle

by Claude Bourdet

IT is now over a year since the Fourth Republic capitulated before the blackmail of civil war and the fear of a united Left, and installed the new regime. What has this regime done? If we listen to its touting of its own merchandise in a pompous tone reminiscent of Vichy, France has been "vindicated," we've entered an era of prosperity and "grandeur." The facts are ample demonstrating the falsity of this optimism. But facts are doubtless of little importance to a system based on a dream; a dream of a France as powerful as she was in the epoch of Louis XIV or Napoleon; the dream of a vainglorious statesman, simultaneously a Joan of Arc and a Saint Louis in direct contact with Providence; dreams of a mystical unity in the Gaullist communion; dreams where problems resolve themselves magically, where difficulties evaporate beneath the conjurer's wand.

But those who prefer not to dream and do not believe in magic must evaluate the regime on the basis of its accomplishments and on the things that it proposes to do. The less ardent of its partisans, and probably the majority of our fellow citizens, recognize in it at least one virtue: Owing to General de Gaulle, a civil war was avoided. We have written it often, but it is necessary to repeat, for this mystique has sunk profoundly into our consciousness: Until he afforded the army the opportunity of playing a new role, there couldn't have been an actual menace of civil war. We also recalled last year that if de Gaulle had come forward as a republican, sedition would have instantly disappeared as a result of his moral intervention on the side of the regime and of the legitimate government. Finally, as a result of everything we have learned about the various conspiracies that preceded May 13—the plot of Cigny Griotty-Snecht-Debre and that of General Faure, the machinations of Delbecque in Algeria and the sabotage of republican defense by General Ely—one can no longer deny that the important Gaullists all participated in the conspiracy against the republic, and it would be presumtuous for General de Gaulle to imagine that this was under his control.

THESE three considerations should excuse democrats from the obligation of any degree of recognition of the current Chief of State. It should also lead us to pose the problems in these terms: If General de Gaulle did what he could to aggravate the crisis of a year ago in order to resolve it in his own favor, he did nothing but use the classic tactics of revolutionaries. It is a mockery to present him as the savior of the republic. But if the regime that he set up is superior to the old one his behavior could be justified. However it has now clearly revealed its true character.

When one has spent twelve years of one's life, from 1946 to 1958, as General de Gaulle has, treating with violent mistrust the men who governed the country and all political forces without exception that were non-Gaullist, in power or not; when one has by sarcasm and insults played upon the anarchistic temperament of Frenchmen and rendered all governing more difficult; when one has never proposed a precise solution to a real problem; when one has confused thinking by oratorical ambiguity and when one has in fact continually strengthened the most deadly forces in the country—colonialism, obtuse chauvinism, a reactionary spirit, clericalism, etc.—one should, since one

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Claude Bourdet is an editor of the prominent French left-wing weekly, France-Observateur.

incarnates the renovation, rapidly find new solutions, better if not perfect. What do we observe?

In Algeria we are exactly at the point we were during the last years of the Fourth Republic. Having by his coup d'etat elevated the army beyond all reasonable bounds, General de Gaulle is now forced to contain it. Here he has succeeded to a certain extent; by virtue of the fact that he imposes his views to a slightly greater extent upon the government. At no time has de Gaulle dreamed of utilizing his prestige to appeal to the people of France in order to put the army in its place; an operation that could be an extremely easy one, for in that case the super de Gaulle could play the seditious role in regard to de Gaulle that he himself played in his relationship with Pflimlin. But de Gaulle does not dream any more today than he did yesterday of cutting himself off from his own party, the army. The horrible experience that was his in 1940 in London, where he found himself denied aid, spat upon by all the men of his thinking and caste with very few exceptions, and surrounded and followed by those that he never ceased to mistrust—liberals, democrats, socialists, communists, idealists, etc.—that experience is one that he will never repeat.

De Gaulle has, therefore, essentially given in to the army every time they made demands upon him. He made contact this autumn with the Algerian FLN but in the face of the instant reaction of General Salan he torpedoed his own gesture in the course of a press conference by throwing out words that could best serve to undermine negotiations; for the same reason he rejected the delaying of the grotesque Algerian election; he has after some hesitation, which now makes his concession piteous, pronounced the words demanded of him: *Algerie-Francoise* at Mostaganion last year, "integration" in an interview accorded to Mr. Laffont.

BUT it is essential to understand that this repeated capitulation, this permanent dependence, is humiliating for a man of his excessive pride. Neither he nor his immediate entourage will ever admit that such is the situation, and it is for that reason that he will never cease to "play at negotiations," to make contact in Tunis or in Cairo, to have it said by his agents "on the left" that negotiations are about to take place and to believe it themselves. But when it comes to the point of forcing the army officers in Algeria to accept conditions indispensable to any agreement—that is to say, on the one hand the right of independence for the Algerian people, possibly in the Senegalese form, and on the other hand the retention by the FLN of its army—we find ourselves once again at an impasse, and de Gaulle would not dream for an instant of imposing upon the military that which they cannot conceive of accepting.

Since such is the true situation consciously understood by all the serious elements of the governing group, the economic policy of the Gaullist regime followed inexorably. For a war slated to last many years, it is necessary to make suitable financial arrangements, and stop trying to pay for it by a game of chance or with Sahara oil.

The financial plans of Mr. Ruiff assisted by Messrs. de Vitry, Pechiney, and Guyot (Lazard Bank), through the use of taxes, the ending of subsidies on basic products, by the cutbacks in social security, by the restrictions on bank credit—all these adding up to the price of the Algerian policy—squeeze the cost out of the salaried workers, the consumers, and particularly the unemployed whose increase is one of the essential elements of the operation. If this policy succeeds, it will constitute one of the most stunning social injustices of the twentieth century. If it fails, as the Laval deflation of 1935, which was also financially promising at the beginning, failed, the French economy will find itself still weaker, and facing a worse budgetary blind alley.

De Gaulle's Algerian policy not only made inevitable the financial and social policies of his government, but also his foreign policy. Having need of America as a diplomatic mainstay in his Algerian course and of Germany as guarantor of financial equilibrium, de Gaulle can no longer dream of that independent foreign policy that he spouted in the past to the nationalists as well as to the pacifists and optimists. In particular, there was no longer any question of "renegotiating" the common market, and the vows in this connection of Messrs. Debre-La Maline were only wind. De Gaulle had to devaluate the franc, and he had to guarantee the dollar reserve in order to guarantee the convertibility of the franc. Thus it was necessary to buy the good will of Adenauer. France has consequently passed from the status of an American satellite to a less honorable one: an American-German satellite. How does one extricate oneself from such a humiliating situation? In a true democracy, it would be difficult. Under the present regime it is easy. A wave of the wand is sufficient. De Gaulle has echoed the extremist anti-Sovietism of Adenauer at the very moment when in Germany the old chancellor is losing his grip as the absolute master. That is why people no longer say "Adenauer-de Gaulle" but "de Gaulle-Adenauer" and the President of the Republic has thereby gained support in sabotaging East-West negotiations, for the objective that he prefers above everything else. The same needs of moral and financial support led to capitulation to the international cartel of Standard Oil—another example of Gaullist "independence."

BUT it is in matters of internal policy that the gaping vacuity is most remarkable. In order to be the slightest bit free, in order to be able to really direct the life of this country, it was necessary for General de Gaulle to go all-out in the maintenance of democracy and re-enforce his urgently needed popular support, apart from all other considerations, in order to have a counterweight to the army and the extremists of Algeria. Without a doubt the democratic forces were weakened by their own errors. But they were also weakened by the *coup* of May, 1958. It was therefore necessary to do everything possible, from the point of view of the interest of the government, to see to it that this process stopped.

However, as Méndès-France remarked, de Gaulle sacrificed everything for the establishment of his monarchy. A man who has inner strength—a Churchill, a Roosevelt, a Clemenceau—knows how to face any situation with the aid of no matter what constitution. But this militarist,

habituated to outside force which establishes uniformity and "rules," felt himself powerless without authoritarian regulations that only reactionary pressure and military menace could impose. Hence the incredible campaign of propaganda and blackmail, the radio delivered into the hands of Soustelle, the referendum without real choices—a repetition of 1851. This has given us an anesthetized republic, where all political life is banished; a rump parliament that talks in a vacuum, the activity of which is less heeded and the utility of which is more debatable than that of the insignificant consultative assembly of 1945.

In losing all really democratic content has the system gained in efficiency? Not even that, for the absence of parliamentary control adds to the irresponsibility of the bureaucracy, most of whom are not even good servants, where good chiefs are required. The renovation of the personnel of the ministerial ranks of the cabinet under the direction of Mr. Michel Debre brought in a number of vacillating jurists who only aggravate hesitancy and routine. The inevitable duality of powers between a chief of state who wants to govern and a government theoretically charged with that function by the constitution creates all sorts of conflict, as we have already mentioned. Finally the regime has rapidly demonstrated that it is no less than its predecessor the victim of compromise and scandal. The affair of Bozookoo, more grave because it was bloodier than any of the scandals of the Fourth Republic, was conjured away because it disturbed too many personalities in high places. The assassination of Commander Radier was the pre-natal crime of the regime.

IN boasting of the unity of the French, there was finally one error to be avoided; for the same reason the regime was forced into committing that error. To the army, the primary pillar of the regime, he accorded the Pinay loan with its enormous privileges for the speculators, and then an anti-social financial policy calculated to take it out of the working class. Then, it became necessary for him to satisfy the "moral" forces whose support is so important to any authoritarian regime: the asphyxiation of public education, an enterprise followed now by the project to aid private education, a Barange operation on a larger scale, designed to return Catholic education little by little to the status it held before the separation of church and state.

What remains of a positive nature from this year-long effort? Something, without a doubt: Article 86, Title VIII of the constitution and the possibility of any state leaving the French colonial community. No matter what its shortcomings, this offers a threat to colonialism should there be established a community based on liberty. But here again, gratitude would be misplaced. De Gaulle, who wished to impose an authoritarian community, but who staked all on a massive "oui" giving plebiscitary support to his monarchy, had to give way before the strength of African parties without whose agreement this "oui" was impossible. It is enough to imagine the shake-up the regime would face if the majority of the African territories had voted "non," to understand that de Gaulle was compelled to give in; such is the logic of plebiscites into which he was thrust. So much the better for that, but no thanks are due him.

The lesson of General de Gaulle's capitulation before the African parties, as that of his capitulation before the army, before the bankers, and today before the papacy, should be grasped by all democrats. General de Gaulle is not an arbitrator—only perhaps in his own dreams. But he is certainly a result. The Left does not have the possibility, that it will have one day, of destroying the regime—and very likely with it the social system of which it is porbably the last guardian in France. But it already has, if it knows how to face up to the situation and undertake a struggle on all fronts, the possibility of pressuring de Gaulle and forcing him to deal with the Left. To do that, it is called upon, not as Mauriac believes, to be suave, but to be energetic and, if it can, united. These are the vows that we formulate in this second year of a "reign" that we wish to be as brief as possible.

George H. Shoaf, "Appeal" Correspondent, Dead at 84



GEORGE H. SHOAF, the famed "war correspondent" of the old socialist newspaper *Appeal to Reason,* died on July 21 in his home at Costa Mesa, at the age of 84.

Shoaf was born in Texas in 1875, the son of a law enforcement officer on the old frontier. At an early age, he was introduced to Populism by his uncle, John "Dirty Shirt" Davis, a radical orator of the old school, but soon thereafter became a socialist.

As a youth, he worked as a cub reporter under the tutelage of W. C. Brann, famous as "Brann the Iconoclast," got a railroad job and led a strike, and then went to Chicago where he worked first as editor of a labor paper and then on a large commercial daily. He was hired by Fred D. Warren, editor of the *Appeal to Reason,* as a field correspondent, and, in this capacity and as one of the *Appeal's* editors, wrote most of the sensational stories that made *Appeal* circulation soar, and came to be known as the "war correspondent" by virtue of being sent into every important class battle in America during those years.

After the *Appeal* years, he wrote for the *American Freeman,* published, like the *Appeal,* from Girard, Kansas, and for Oscar Ameringer's *American Guardian,* as well as many other labor and socialist publications.

He wrote a personal memoir of Eugene V. Debs and the *Appeal to Reason* for the special Debs Centennial issue of the *American Socialist* in November, 1955. Thereafter, as a contributing editor, he wrote regularly for the *American Socialist,* in a column headed "Notebook of an Old-Timer." All of his articles were characterized by a spirited style in the better tradition of American personal journalism, and by an unconquerable confidence in the superiority and ultimate triumph of socialism. Socialists will mourn the passing of one of the grand old men of the Debs epoch.

Why is this steel strike widely advertised by sober and conservative periodicals as the "most important in a quarter-century"?

Steel Labor on the Defensive

by Harry Braverman

NEWSWEEK calls it "the most important labor-management showdown in a quarter of a century." *Business Week* says: "Labor historians may record it as the most important strike of the mid-century." Yet this is the sixth of the postwar steel shutdowns. Union demands are not out of line with the terms of earlier settlements. The industry is more prosperous than ever in its history. The country has become accustomed to routine bargaining strikes, as have the workers in the mills. What is it, then, that sets this strike apart?

Contrary to the deliberately fostered popular impression, this showdown is not primarily over a wage increase or "inflation," though it does involve large national economic issues. With net profits at the highest level in history, the steel companies have made no secret of their ability to give a wage increase without feeling real pain; Labor Secretary Mitchell's opinion that management could have settled for a wage boost of about a dime an hour without raising prices is widely shared in government circles and even in the commercial press. What has prevented a settlement is the companies' determination to push through sweeping changes in the contract provisions having to do with working standards and schedules.

The conflict appears to involve a mass of technical rules and special conditions peculiar to the steel industry and of little general interest. Actually, the issues in dispute are closely connected with the most fundamental trend in American industry today: automation and the rationalization of the work process. The steel strike represents a concerted effort on the part of the twelve major steel producers, with the backing of the dominant firms in the other major areas of the economy, to get a free hand in reorganizing American industry. New conditions of production are coming into being in many industries, and the corporations are trying to get rid of their old relations with their employees, without assuming any substitute obligations.

As the picture shapes up, what the new conditions of production call for is a far smaller work force, divested of craft skills, under the supervision of a technical elite in which will be concentrated the new, more engineer-like skills. Industry wants to be free to distribute and shuffle workers like interchangeable parts. Thus the powerful impetus of present-day corporate policy towards labor is to pare down numbers and strip the remaining workers of traditional rights. This is upsetting the old labor-management balance of the past quarter-century, and throwing the major unions into a crisis. Like all powerful social trends, the present one seizes upon and works through every big new development. A year ago, it was showing itself through the recession, with its crisis of industrial employment, a crisis which still continues in moderated form. And this year, it manifests itself in the contract showdown between corporations and unions in a whole series of industries, but especially in steel.

The crisis, as we will see, is hitting a number of unions, but, owing to the past history of steel unionism, it is taking a far sharper form in the iron-and steel-making mills. The belated organization of much of the steel industry just before the war meant that the union took a host of unresolved problems into the war years, and the freeze on improvements during those years didn't help the situation any. Immediately after the war, therefore, the steel union was confronted with negotiations on a tangle of wage scales and working conditions. The entire steel setup was renegotiated in 1947, at a time when union power was at a high point.

WHAT made the problem especially knotty in steel was the immense variety of jobs and the complicated ball-up of job duties in the many mills. The negotiators worked out a contract containing most of the standard union clauses, but beyond that, they cut through the maze to some sort of standardization by two basic devices. First, they scaled every job in a steel mill, in accordance with agreed standards of skill and responsibility, into one of 32 job classifications. The lowest of these classifications got the basic or minimum pay rate, and each higher class got an additional 3½ cents an hour (a differential which has

since been increased). Second, they agreed that where the contract made no specific provision, "past practices" or "established working conditions" would continue. These two provisions of the 1947 agreement have been carried over in every succeeding contract.

It was not long before these contract terms became extremely irksome to management. The job classification system, which most workers liked because of the clarity and definiteness with which it defined their position and duties, was disliked by the companies for the same reason: It became difficult for them to shift workers around to either more menial or more skilled duties without having an arbitration case—or perhaps even a department shutdown—on their hands. But it was the other provision, safeguarding "past practices," which management found most harassing. Grievance committeemen and local officers soon found that any union gain in on-the-job conditions was protected by the clause, and that the arbitrators provided as the final step in the grievance machinery had no choice, in view of the language of the contract, but to back them up.

Not only were past practices protected, but new practices, such as incentive-pay plans, could not be installed unilaterally, as the union claimed negotiation rights under the contract. Starting around 1950, a prolonged and sometimes bitter conflict has been under way in the mills, in the form of local guerilla skirmishing. Literally thousands of local "quickie" walkouts have made steel the most-struck industry in the country. But the companies have, on the whole, been unable to destroy working conditions in steel as they have been mangled in many other industries.

There were a number of reasons for this. Local union officials, alerted by some among their number to the remarkable virtuosity of the "past practices" clause, worked it to the limit. The steel companies, pursuing their line of "mutual trusteeship" in the not-too-unlikely hope of softening up David J. McDonald and the other union leaders, were reluctant to precipitate a showdown. A showdown in steel would have had more serious implications for the national economy than in most other industries, and was also eschewed for that reason. Technological change was at first slower in steel than in other parts of the economy, and the drive for changes in working conditions consequently somewhat less pressing. And, when all is said and done, the immense profitability of the steel corporations undoubtedly disposed the companies to let things slide for a while.

NOW, however, a showdown is on. The union went into the recent negotiations with its ordinary wage demands, and the companies refused to even talk wages until they got satisfaction on working conditions. They presented eight demands for important contract changes, chief among them the deletion of clause 2B, the "past-practices" clause. On the union side, McDonald has estimated, not unrealistically, that the elimination of 2B could lead to the dismissal of as many as 100,000 workers, some one-fifth of the work force, this on top of the employment shrinkage effected through the recent recession. "The boys told me," says John Mayerick, president of Local 1014 at Gary, "not to come home if I let them change 2B."

How serious are the companies in their take-it-or-leave-it showdown attitude? Well, there are many straws in the wind to indicate that, barring government intervention or other unforeseen developments, they mean this as a fight to the finish. The grim air with which the matter has been discussed in *Business Week* and other publications usually well posted on management intentions is one sign. The little-noticed shipyard negotiations involving the shipbuilding division of the Bethlehem Steel Company is another. An August 12 report in the *New York Times* gave the following astonishing account of the shenanigans:

> *Negotiators for the shipbuilding division of the Bethlehem Steel Company yesterday took steps guaranteed to break the existing contract stalemate.*
>
> *The company told officials of the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America that revised working rules would go into effect at* 12:01 *A.M. tomorrow.*
>
> *Union acceptance of this new "book," which represents Bethlehem's working-rules proposals made a month ago, would amount to an agreement to rewrite the old contract that expired July* 31. *Its only alternative would appear to be a strike. . . .*
>
> *On Aug.* 1 *Bethlehem . . . wiped out "for the present" four contract points necessary for efficient union operation. These were the elimination of clauses providing for maintenance of union membership, union dues check-off, top job seniority for union officials, and arbitration of grievances.*

The significance of these company actions can be better understood when it is recalled that it has been the unvarying practice for the steel subsidiaries and fabricators to continue their old contracts in force, and to keep on working, until a pattern-setting settlement has been reached in basic steel. The sudden disruption of this tradition, in at least this one case, and the attempt to compel a strike in the shipyards, shows the extent to which the steel corporations are on the muscle, carrying the fight to the unions, and trying to deepen the conflict.

Equally indicative were the events leading up to the strike, starting as far back as two years ago. The indications are that the moving spirit in the creation of a nationwide corporate front was Lemuel Boulware, head of General Electric, who had already established in his own dealings with the electrical union a pattern of tough, take-it-or-leave-it negotiations that had come to be known as Boulwarism. *Business Week* reported on July 4:

> *It's no longer news that* 12 *major steel companies are coordinating their bargaining stand. What isn't so widely recognized* ***is the coordination between*** *steel and other industries.*
>
> *In* 1957, *there was a series of round-robin talks among the labor relations officials of the electrical manufacturing, steel, and auto industries. These set the stage for the "tough" bargaining that has come to a climax this year.*
>
> *Talks among these industries are continuing. Within the past week, spokesmen in the electrical manufacturing and auto industries have acknowledged that their com-*

panies are keeping in close touch with the steel talks in New York. One put his hand to his chin, commenting: "We're involved up to here."

Even without these inside tips, the empirical evidence shows a close coordination. How else explain the collaboration of the auto and electrical industries with steel in piling up immense inventories? During the first half of 1959, U. S. Steel produced and sold more steel than any company has ever produced or sold in a half-year period, and all the companies piled up production and profit records. Steel inventories mounted to some 21 million tons in the hands of customers, and a record 3.7 million tons stashed away in warehouses. After a month of the strike, the auto industry is in the comfortable position that, shut down for model changeover and not due to begin production again for another month, it will be able to produce at peak levels for forty-five to sixty days when they start turning out 1960 models. General Electric reported in mid-August reserves adequate for another five to fourteen weeks. The same is true of major producers in a half-dozen other fields: They claim they can carry on into October or November.

ADDITIONAL facts show how this offensive is being pushed throughout the country. In the early part of this year the rubber industry went through its worst round of strikes since the organizing days of 1937; the issues centered largely around work rules and conditions. The railroads have served notice on the railroad brotherhoods that they intend to overhaul all the work rules and practices in the negotiations this fall. And in many cases, the same kind of coordinated offensive is indicated. The airlines have share-the-profit plans to help competitors grounded by strikes; the railroads are working out a comprehensive "insurance" program for the fall, looking to the pooling of industry funds to help weaker roads and to bar a one-at-a-time strategy by the union.

As the steel strike enters its second month, the ranks are admirably solid and determined to maintain union gains in the mills. Although reports indicate that the seriousness of this particular strike, as distinguished from the many previous, has not yet sunk in, they indicate also that the workers are alerted to the chief issue, and are ready to carry on because they attach a lot of value to the union safeguards they have built up. Despite this solidarity, the steel union is in a weak long-run position.

For years, the top union officials have lost sight of their obligations as the head of what is essentially a combat organization, in the illusion that the union had become some sort of a fraternal lodge for which the bi-annual strike was little more than a quaint ceremonial in labor-management relations, not to be taken too seriously. How else can one explain the lightmindedness with which the union permitted itself to be outmaneuvered by the companies in the choice of a battle-time when stocks had been obligingly piled up by the steelworkers?

More important is the failure of the union heads to understand the scope of the crisis, and the impossibility of meeting it without an extensive union program. The strike, as we have said, is one facet of an enormous shake-out in American industry, in which the industrial working class is being reduced in size and "streamlined" to fit new technological specifications. The unions cannot fight this battle without a broad-gauge view of the emergency and a program to meet it. The battle to simply preserve old practices, while essential for the interim period, is in the long run a losing fight. To ask workers to carry it through blindly is to ask too much of them; it is a fight that has never, in industrial history, been won.

AS we have emphasized repeatedly in these pages, there are two roads open before the industrial unions. One is to take the old AFL path, which John L. Lewis long ago took in coal, of preserving the union as a job trust for a shrinking labor force, protecting conditions at the expense of the large numbers of workers who are sloughed off into low-paying jobs in the service trades or into the ranks of the more or less permanently unemployed. The miserable turn taken by conditions in Michigan, where the auto union has by and large failed to win its fight on in-plant conditions, and where unemployment is at double the rate of the national average, is a sample of what can be expected along this road. Or the unions can take their stand on an imaginative program of shorter hours, government responsibility to expand production fast enough to soak up the dispossessed industrial workers, and similar far-reaching demands. As the old safeguards of labor's welfare are eaten away by the new industrial revolution, the union movement has to develop and enforce new safeguards suited to the new conditions.

None of this is intended to slight the importance of the present steel strike, and the enormous importance of a victory in it. Before labor's new horizons of struggle open out before it, the old conditions must be protected, or the unions will break in a rout. The steel strike is one of the opening rounds in what looks like a severe and protracted struggle, and labor badly needs a victory, as this is a crucial round. But it needs, too, to open its eyes to the requirements of the day, and to devise a program which will prevent it from risking its precious organizations in purely defensive battles, and open up a perspective of new claims on the national conscience, and new contracts which can protect it under the novel conditions that are shaping up.

GENERAL Norstad [NATO commander, in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, June 8] did not think that military action, once begun in so critical an area as NATO's, especially with atomic weapons, could be broken off. He did not think the forces "could easily disengage as if it were a baseball game and say 'we will play it tomorrow afternoon if it is not raining.' "

"I do not agree," General Norstad said, "with those people who say that you can control the size of this fire, the size of this blast, neatly, cold-bloodedly, once it starts. I think it is the most dangerous and disastrous thing in the world. I think you must prevent the thing from starting in the first place because once it starts in a critical area such as the NATO area, it is more likely than not, in my opinion, to explode into the whole thing, whether we like it or the Russians like it or anybody likes it."

I. F. Stone's Weekly

Trotsky's diary for the year 1935: Written at his nadir, when he was most isolated, plagued by illness, and oppressed by the mounting fury of Stalin's terror, it is a remarkable political and human document.

Prophet In Exile

by Isaac Deutscher

TROTSKY'S diary in exile, now published for the first time, was discovered in a "forgotten valise" at his home in Mexico twelve years after his assassination. He wrote it in France and Norway in 1935. This is not, however, as the editors claim, the only diary he has written. Among his published and unpublished papers there are a few others, written at various times; it is surprising that Trotsky's literary executors should be so poorly informed about his literary heritage. But although the claim about its uniqueness is unfounded, this diary is of exceptional interest as a political and human document: Trotsky rarely, if ever, wrote about himself as intimately and self-revealingly as he does here.

"The diary is not a literary form I am especially fond of," he says in the first entry. ". . . I would prefer the daily newspaper. But there is none available. . . . Cut off from political action, I am obliged to resort to such *ersatz* journalism. . . ." This unpromising introduction need not be taken literally. There is much more than *ersatz* journalism here, because Trotsky was in fact far more fond of this particular "literary form" than he cared to admit. True, he usually resorted to it only during a lull in his political activity; but this was probably the only time when he could freely indulge in introspection.

The lull during which he wrote this diary was, for many reasons, his nadir. He had already spent two years in France, enjoying—if this be the right word here—the precarious asylum which the government of M. Daladier had stingily granted him. Paris having been declared out of bounds for him, he had lived *incognito,* under police surveillance, in various places in the provinces. Every now and then his identity was discovered; and, amid an uproar in the press, pursued by crowds of reporters and photographers, hounded by numerous enemies on right and left, he had to escape hurriedly from one place of residence, to look for another and reassume his *incognito*—until the next incident or accidental indiscretion compelled him to take to the road once again. The threat of expulsion from France hung over his head. Only because no other country would allow him to enter was he permitted to stay on, for the time being, in complete isolation at a small village in the Alps, not far from Grenoble. France was just then on the eve of the Popular Front; the Stalinists exercised increasing pressure on the government; and so he had reason to fear final deportation—it could only be to a remote French colony like Madagascar.

IN the Soviet Union this was the lull before the great purges, in all of which he was to figure as villain-in-chief. The Kirov affair was only a few months old. Zinoviev and Kamenev were once again imprisoned and, despite repeated recantations, accused of collusion with Trotsky, counter-revolutionary activity, treason, and so on; Trotskyism generally was under fire. Even from afar Trotsky felt the mounting fury of the terror Stalin was unleashing, although the precise facts were not yet known. Trotsky's family was already affected. His first wife Alexandra Sokolovskaya and his two sons-in-law had been, or were just being, deported to Siberia. He had already lost his two daughters, Zina and Nina—Zina had committed suicide; the orphaned grandchildren were all, except one, in Russia, at fate's mercy. Finally, there came the news from Moscow, ominously vague at first, of trouble with Sergei, Trotsky's youngest son, a promising scientist, who was utterly non-political and was not involved in the Opposition but was now falling victim to Stalin's vengeance. The tense expectation of definite news about Sergei and the anguish of his parents fill many a page in this diary.

For reasons of yet another order, this was for Trotsky a time of acute frustration. He had come to France in 1933, after nearly five years of exile in Turkey, with ambitious plans and sanguine hopes which were now at an ebb. He had been confident that in France he would be able to resume his political activity on a large scale. After Hitler's rise to power and the 1933 catastrophe of the German Left—a catastrophe to which Stalinist policies had greatly contributed and of which Trotsky had been the unheeded Cassandra—he launched the so-called Fourth International. From personal experience I know how great were the hopes he placed on it. A group of his co-thinkers, to which I belonged at the time, warned him in vain that he was embarking on a futile venture. Soon indeed it turned out that the Fourth International was still-born. Trotsky nevertheless desperately tried to breath life into it; and he had just instructed his followers to enter the Socialist Parties and there to try to recruit adherents for the new International.

In any case, Trotsky's presence in France had not made it easier for him to plunge back into political activity. In the turbulent events of the last pre-war decade, especially in those occurring outside the U.S.S.R., his role was that of the great outsider. "For the very reason," he writes,

This discussion of Trotsky's Diary in Exile: 1935 *by Isaac Deutscher, biographer of Stalin and Trotsky and internationally syndicated commentator on Soviet affairs, is a slightly abbreviated version of a talk given by Mr. Deutscher on the British BBC Third Programme. Deutscher's second volume in a three-volume biography of Trotsky will be published in the fall. The* Diary in Exile: 1935 *was published last year at Cambridge by Harvard University Press,* $4.

"that it fell to my lot to take part in great events, my past now cuts me off from chances of action. I am reduced to interpreting events and trying to foresee their future course." Yet, his past which cut him off from chances of action did not allow him to remain inactive either: he, the leader of the October Revolution, the founder of the Red Army, and the inspirer of the Communist International, could not possibly reconcile himself to the role of the outsider.

IF to all these circumstances we add his persistent ill-health, and something as humanly ordinary as a middle-age crisis, not to speak of difficulties in earning a living, we shall get an idea of his mood at this time. The recurrent and mysterious fever from which he had suffered for thirteen years now gave him spells of utter enervation and immobility. But although the strain on his nerves was severe, he still showed astonishing energy and vitality when critical events confronted him with a direct challenge. In the intervals he tended, not surprisingly, to succumb to hypochondria: he brooded over his advancing age and over death. He was only fifty-five, but repeatedly he recalled Lenin's or rather Turgenev's saying: "Do you know what is the greatest vice? To be more than fifty-five years old." Revolution is as a rule the business of the young; and professional revolutionaries age much more rapidly than do, say, British parliamentarians. Trotsky was as little reconciled to growing old as he was to being an outsider.

He had premonitions of his violent death at Stalinist hands. "Stalin," he observed, "would now give a great deal to be able to retract the decision to deport me. He will unquestionably resort to a terroristic act in two cases . . . : if there is a threat of war, or if his own position deteriorates greatly. Of course, there could also be a third case, and a fourth. . . . We shall see. And if we don't then others will." At the same time he began to think of suicide, but the thought was to take a more definite shape only five years later, when he was to write his testament.

Even while his energy was sapped, he could not live in a country without reacting to the political events of the day; and he could not react otherwise than with the full force of all his militant instincts, his mighty passion, his anger, his irony. He watched the maneuvers and the shilly-shallying of the nascent Popular Front, was convinced that they would all end in disaster, and had a clear presentiment of the France of 1940. Without inhibition he expressed his contempt for the official leaders of the European labor movement—Blum, Thorez, Vanderwelde, the Webbs. On a few occasions he drew graphic and devastating thumb-nail sketches, of which one in particular makes piquant reading today—the sketch of M. Paul-Henri Spaak, the present Secretary-General of NATO, who in the early nineteen-thirties was something like Trotsky's disciple, diligently, yet apprehensively, submissive, and overawed by the master.

HOWEVER, the crux of this diary is not in what Trotsky had to say on events and public figures or even on literature—he said it all more fully and much better in other writings. The diary is remarkable mainly because of the pages he devotes to the fate of his family, pages full of tragic pathos and nobility.

Trotsky's anxiety over his youngest son was all the more poignant because he feared that Sergei, in his political innocence and indifference to politics, would not be able to take the blow that fell on him; and in Trotsky's anxiety there was an admixture of a sense of guilt. Natalya Ivanovna, on learning about their son's imprisonment, said: "They will not deport him under any circumstances; they will torture him in order to get something out of him, and after that they will destroy him." The image of their tortured and bewildered son haunted the parents. (In truth, Sergei was not as bewildered as they feared he would be. Recently I have talked with a man who spent twenty-three years in Stalin's concentration camps and prisons and was, he thinks, the last person to share a prison cell with Sergei. Sergei stood his ordeal proudly and, facing death, he not merely refused to bear false testimony against his father, but found himself bound to him by new ties of moral solidarity, although even then Sergei was not a "Trotskyist.")

With sublime tenderness Trotsky watched his suffering wife, recollected various incidents of their common life—they had now lived together for thirty-three years; and he felt that he ought "to fix her image on paper." He did this with undisguised partiality, yet with truth. What he has sketched is in effect the image of the Niobe of our age, as true an exemplar of the countless and nameless martyred mothers of our time as, on a different level, Anne Frank is of the martyred children. Natalya Ivanovna was not to her husband the kind of political comrade that Krupskaya was to Lenin—she was far less politically minded and active than Krupskaya. "Even though she is interested in the small daily facts of politics," Trotsky writes, "she does not usually combine them into one coherent picture." The loving husband could not express more clearly a doubt about his wife's political judgment. But this was not important: "When politics go deep down and demand a complete

reaction," he goes on, "Natalya always finds in her inner music the right note." Of this, her "inner music," he speaks frequently; and, incidentally, when he described her it was mostly while she was listening to some music. He notes with gratitude that she never reproaches him for their son's misfortune, or else that she conceals her suffering even from him. Finally he relates:

> *Concerning the blows that have fallen to our lot, I reminded Natasha the other day of the life of the archpriest Avakuum. [Avakuum was a seventeenth-century rebel against Greek Orthodoxy who had been deported twice before he was burnt at the stake.] They were stumbling on together in Siberia, the rebellious priest and his faithful spouse. Their feet sank into the snow, and the poor exhausted woman kept falling into the snowdrifts. Avakuum relates: "And I came up, and she, poor soul, began to reproach me, saying 'How long, archpriest, is this suffering to be?' And I said, 'Markovna, unto our very death.' And she, with a sigh, answered: 'So be it, Petrovich, let us be getting on our way."*

And so it was to be with Trotsky and Natalya Ivanovna: the suffering was to be "unto our very death." Five years later, writing his testament, he suddenly lifted his head and saw "Natasha approaching the window from the courtyard and opening it wider so that the air may come more freely into my room"; she made him think at this moment of the beauty of life and he "fixed" this image of her in the last paragraph of his testament.

IT is certainly no matter of chance that between his entries about Sergei, Trotsky, unexpectedly and seemingly out of context, tells the story of the execution of the Czar and the Czar's family. At this moment of anxiety and anguish over his own children, the innocent victims of his conflict with Stalin, Trotsky undoubtedly thought about those poor innocent children, the Czar's, on whom the sins of the fathers were visited. He records that he personally had no part in taking the decision about the Czar's execution—the decision was primarily Lenin's; and that he was startled at first when he learned about the fate of the Czar's family. But he does not record this to dissociate himself from Lenin. On the contrary, after seventeen years he defends Lenin's decision as necessary and taken in the interest of the revolution's self-defense. In the midst of civil war, the Bolsheviks could not leave the White Armies "with a live banner to rally around"; the Czar's children, he says, "fell victim to that principle which constitutes the axis of monarchy: dynastic succession." Any one of them, if left alive, would have served the Whites as rallying banner and symbol. The unspoken conclusion of this meaningful digression is clear enough. Even if one granted Stalin the right to exterminate his adversaries—Trotsky was far from granting him that—Stalin still had not a shred of justification for persecuting the children of his opponents. Sergei was not bound to Trotsky by any principle of dynastic succession.

SOME critics, mostly ex-Communists, have, in this connection, commented on Trotsky's "unteachability" and the "arrogance" with which he asserted his Communist convictions to the end. The criticism seems to me particularly ill-founded. If Trotsky had renounced his principles and beliefs from disillusionment, under the lash of persecution and defeat, this surely would not have testified to his intellectual integrity and moral stamina, or even to his "teachability." He would not have been himself if he had done this. At the lowest ebb of his fortunes he was indeed as unshaken in his philosophy of life as he had been at its height. In this I see his strength, not his weakness. When at last, in 1940, weighed down by illness, age, and so many cruel blows, he pondered the possibility of suicide, he was above all anxious that the world should not see the suicide as his moral capitulation and renunciation of principles. He wrote the testament to make it clear that if he were ever to take his life, he would do so from sheer physical inability to carry on the struggle, not from despair or doubt in his cause. He did not commit suicide, however—the axe of an assassin smashed his brain. He penned his testament as he penned this diary, in a moment of all too human frailty; but even the frailty underlines his moral stature.

This is not to say that Trotsky's attitude was invulnerable, but his vulnerability lay not where the critics I have mentioned see it. He belonged to what he himself called the heroic epoch of the Russian Revolution. An intense nostalgia for that epoch swayed him to the end of his days. Through its prism he looked upon all later events; and in his thought and imagination he constantly projected that epoch into the future.

The projection was at odds with the actual course of events, and never more so than in the nineteen-thirtees. The processes of revolution, both within and without the Soviet Union, developed in forms very different from those of the "heroic phase" of 1917-1920, in forms which could not but be repugnant to the adherent of the classical Marxian tradition, in forms which marked indeed a degeneracy of revolutionary politics, in a word—in Stalinist forms. But basically it was still the revolution for which Trotsky stood that had assumed these forms. He considered it to be his mission to expose the "degeneracy" and to create a new Communist party which, he believed, would be capable of guiding the revolution towards renaissance. He overrated his capacity to achieve this; as he also overrated the potentialities of revolution in the West. On the other hand, he undoubtedly underrated the vitality of the new Soviet society, its inherent capacity for self-reform and regeneration, its inherent ability to overcome Stalinism eventually, and to go beyond Stalinism.

Yet, despite all his fallibility and his moments of weakness, Trotsky emerges even from this diary as one of the very few giants of this century. His nostalgia for the heroic period of the revolution, the Lenin era, would have been sheer quixotry if that era had been nothing but the dead past. Yet twenty years after Trotsky's death a new Soviet generation is looking back to that era almost as much as he did, and still seems to find some lessons to learn from it. And so Trotsky appears not merely as the nostalgic survivor of one epoch, a closed one, but as the great precursor of another, which is only beginning.

OPINIONS

Choices Before America

by William Stanley

I WRITE this letter in response to your invitation to comment on two articles that appeared in the July-August issue of the *American Socialist*. Incidentally, I would like to thank you for issuing this invitation, as it is rare nowadays for a socialist publication to express an interest in the ideas of its readers. For my purposes I wish to confine my comments to the article titled "Choices Before America" by Bert Cochran.

The question posed by the article is this: Was Marx, was socialism wrong in looking to the working class to take political power and reorganize society? "Or was the error of the kind that frequently occurs between the theoretical exposition of an idea and its worldly realization, and which with suitable modifications can still retain some historical validity?" Mr. Cochran first examines the possibilities inherent in an affirmative answer to the former question. He thinks that the American capitalist class, torn by crisis and under Russian pressure, may, at a future date, be compelled to nationalize industry and thus establish socialism from the **top down.**

I, for one, reject this possibility. Although the capitalist class may well transform itself into a state bureaucracy as in Russia it would still remain a ruling class by virtue of its monopoly of political power and the consequent ability to dispose of the national product in any manner it saw fit. The arms race with other nations would continue and would provide an excellent justification for not raising living standards and reducing working hours. Marx's view that ruling classes do not hand over their power voluntarily is a valid one. A planned economy is in no sense socialist if the planning is done by a despotic bureaucracy for its own benefit and free from control by the working class.

Let us now examine the working out in practice of Marxian theory and see if we can determine whether it is still entirely valid, partially valid, or totally invalid. First of all, Marx predicted the increasing centralization and monopolization of industry under capitalism. He also predicted that capitalism would suffer from successively severe crises. Both of these predictions have come true. We have gone through two world wars and a great depression. The permanent war economy is presently the only thing that is staving off an even greater depression than the last one. The entire capitalist society is now faced with total physical destruction in case of a new war. In view of these undeniable facts we must conclude that Marx's basic analysis of capitalism has been proven correct.

Marx not only predicted the increasing crisis of capitalism, he also predicted the growing socialist consciousness of the working class. Today, however, this consciousness is at an all-time low. Only an utter dogmatist would deny that something has gone wrong with Marx's revolutionary prophecies.

Mr. Cochran takes up this question in his article. He recalls the corruption and betrayal of the German Social Democracy and all the betrayals that followed and notes that the working class still follows these betrayers today. This brings him to question whether the proletariat will ever rise to socialist consciousness. Trotsky analyzed the crisis as a crisis of leadership. He and Lenin viewed the working class as a force that becomes radicalized only through events. The proletariat attains complete consciousness only through its vanguard. It (the proletariat) can establish socialism only if led by a party that reflects its true interests. If the movement is controlled by Stalinists, reformists, or demagogues, the revolution is always defeated.

WE have had innumerable revolutionary crises in the last forty years. In virtually every case the defeat can be ascribed to the lack of a conscious leadership. The question that comes to mind is why is this leadership always lacking? The orthodox Marxist can only reply by citing the adverse conditions present in each situation. The prewar Social Democracies were corrupted because of the exceptional prosperity prevailing. The Bolsheviks were corrupted after the revolution because of prevailing poverty and the temptation to use political power to better themselves economically. The corruption of the movement during the interval between the two wars is explained by the Stalinization of the Bolshevik party and by the attractive force of a powerful, allegedly socialist state.

No doubt there is a good deal of truth to these explanations. Despite this, however, Marx certainly expected people to react to conditions by changing them, not by always being molded by them. We must look elsewhere for a meaningful explanation of why the advent of socialism has been delayed so long.

I believe that Marx grossly overestimated the rationality in man. He explained man's irrational behavior as a reaction to an irrational society. Once the contradictions of society were laid bare, man's rational nature would reassert itself and he would proceed to reorganize society.

I believe that man is continually being confronted by a short and a long run choice: to fight for socialism and to accept the risks that accompany that fight, or to conform to the status quo and be able to satisfy his craving for pleasure and security. The average man is driven primarily by unconscious, instinctive forces within himself and hence tends invariably to choose the short-run course. It is only the exceptional individual motivated by enlightened self-interest that can take the long view. Marx could be optimistic because he did not look to extraordinary individuals for the solution. The course of events proves, however, that such is precisely what is needed. Socialism is a historical alternative, not an inevitable next stage. At this point it appears as a *less likely* alternative to world destruction or retrogression, but only an apologist for the status quo or a Christian fundamentalist would consider it an absolute utopia.

The political conclusions to be drawn are these: (1) We should change our *attitude* by looking more critically at poltical leaders as well as the organizations being led.

(2) We should blame betrayals on *men* as much as conditions. (3) We should not join groups with the hope of changing them unless they are in a state of flux. (4) We should seek as our political collaborators men who have the character and moral fibre necessary to enable them to stick to their ideas without deviation. (Lenin was betrayed by Zinoviev and Stalin and the course of the Russian Revolution might have been different had he chosen better associates.)

Nationalism and Socialism

by Paul Mattick

EDITORS' NOTE: We are sure that our readers will find many valuable insights in the following article by the long-time socialist writer, Paul Mattick, whose contributions have previously appeared in the *American Socialist*. Mr. Mattick here argues strongly the thesis held by Rosa Luxemburg and others before the first World War, on the so-called "national question."

We do not, for our part, believe it is possible to dissociate the battle for socialism from the general revolutionary wave in the under-developed world, a wave that is powered by aspirations for national independence and a better life. The two currents do not always and at every point coincide, and nationalism at times blocks off the path for socialism. It appears to us, however, that any attempt to avoid the complexities and confusions of living history in favor of an ideally un-marred socialist internationalism would necessarily restrict socialism to small groups of ideologists.

Nevertheless, it is valuaable to be reminded of the doctrinal foundations of socialism and of its continued shining goal: the international brotherhood of man.

NATIONS, whether "knitted together" by ideology, by objective conditions, or by the usual combination of both, are products of social development. There is no more point in cherishing or damning nationalism in principle than in cherishing or damning tribelism or, for that matter, an ideal cosmopolitanism. The nation is a fact to be suffered or enjoyed, to be fought for or against according to historical circumstances and the implications of those circumstances for various populations and different classes within these populations.

The modern nation-state is both a product and a condition of capitalist development. Capitalism tends to destroy traditions and national peculiarities by spreading its mode of production all over the world. But though capital production controls world production and though the "true" capitalist market is the world market, capitalism arose in some nations sooner than in others, found more favorable conditions here than there and was more successful in one than in another place, and thus combined special capital interests with particular national needs.

"Progressive nations" of the last century were those with a rapid capital development; "reactionary nations" were those in which social relationships hindered the unfolding of the capitalist mode of production. Because the "next future" belonged to capitalism and because capitalism is the precondition for socialism, non-utopian socialists favored capitalism as against older social production relations and welcomed nationalism in so far as it served to hasten capitalist development. Though reluctant to admit this, they were not disinclined to accept capitalist imperialism as a way of breaking the stagnation and backwardness of non-capitalist areas from without, and thus to direct their development into "progressive" channels. They also favored the disappearance of small nations unable to develop large-scale economies, and their incorporation into larger national entities capable of capitalist development. They would, however, side with small "progressive nations" as against larger reactionary countries and, when suppressed by the latter, would support the formers' national liberation movements. At all times and on all occasions, however, nationalism was not a socialist goal but was accepted as a mere instrument of social advancement which, in turn, would come to its end in the internationalism of socialism.

Western capitalism was the "capitalist world" of the last century. National issues were concerned with the unification of countries such as Germany and Italy, with the liberation of such oppressed nations as Ireland, Poland, Hungary, Greece, and with the consolidation of such "synthetic" nations as the United States. This was also the "world" of socialism; a small world indeed viewed from the twentieth century. While national questions that agitated the socialist movement in the middle of the nineteenth century had either been resolved, or were in the process of being resolved, and, in any case, had ceased to be of real importance to Western socialism, the world-wide revolutionary movement of the twentieth century opened the question of nationalism anew. Is this new nationalism, which sheds Western dominance and institutes capitalist production relations and modern industry in hitherto under-developed areas, still a "progressive" force as was the nationalism of old? Do these national aspirations coincide in some manner with those of socialism? Do they hasten the end of capitalism by weakening Western imperialism or do they inject new life into capitalism by extending its mode of production all over the globe?

THE position of nineteenth-century socialism on the question of nationalism involved more than preferring capitalism to more static social systems. Socialists operated within bourgeois-democratic revolutions which were also nationalist; they supported national liberation movements of oppressed people because they promised to take on bourgeois-democratic features, because in socialist eyes these national-bourgeois-democratic revolutions were no longer strictly capitalist revolutions. They could be utilized if not for the installation of socialism itself, then for furthering the growth of socialist movements and for bringing about conditions more favorable to the latter.

Imperialism, however, not nationalism, was the great issue around the turn of the century. German "national" interests were now imperialist interests competing with the imperialisms of other countries. France's "national" interests were those of the French empire, as Britain's were those of the British empire. Control of the world and the division of this control between the great imperialist powers determined "national" policies. "National" wars were imperialist wars, culminating in world-wide wars.

It has often been pointed out that the Russian situation at the beginning of the twentieth century was in many respects similar to the revolutionary state of West Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century. The positive attitude towards national-bourgeois revolutions on the part of the early socialists was based on the hope, if not the conviction, that the proletarian element within these revolutions might go beyond the restricted goals of the bourgeoisie. In Lenin's view, the Russian bourgeoisie was no longer able to carry through its own democratic revolution and thus the working class was destined to bring about the "bourgeois" and the "proletarian" revolutions in a series of social changes that constituted a "revolution in permanence." In a way, the new situation seemed to repeat, on a more grandoise scale, the revolutionary situation of 1848. Instead of the earlier limited and temporary alliances of bourgeois-democratic movements with proletarian internationalism, there now existed a world-wide amalgam of revolutionary forces both of a social and nationalist character which might be driven beyond their restriced goals in pursuit of proletarian ends.

Consistent international socialism as represented, for instance, by Rosa Luxemburg, opposed Bolshevik "national self-determination." For her, the existence of independent national governments did not alter the fact of their control by imperialist powers through the latter's control of world economy. Imperialist capitalism could neither be fought nor weakened through the creation of new nations but only by opposing capitalist supra-nationalism with proletarian internationalism. Of course, proletarian internationalism cannot prevent, nor has it reason to prevent, movements for national liberation from imperialist rule. These movements are part of capitalist society just as is imperialism. But "utilizing" these national movements for socialist ends, could only mean depriving them of their nationalist character and turning them into socialist, internationally-oriented movements.

THE first World War produced the Russian Revolution and, whatever its original intentions, it was and remained a national revolution. Although expecting help from abroad, it never extended help to outside revolutionary forces, except where such help was dictated by Russian national interests. The second World War and its aftermath brought independence to India and Pakistan, the Chinese Revolution, the liberation of Southeast Asia, and self-determination for some nations in Africa and the Middle East. At first glance, this "renaissance" of nationalism contradicts both Rosa Luxemburg's and Lenin's positions on the "national question." Apparently, the time for national emancipation has not come to an end, and obviously, the rising tide of anti-imperialism does not serve world-revolutionary socialist ends.

Actually, what this new nationalism indicates are some structural changes in capitalist world economy and the end of nineteenth-century colonialism. The "white man's burden" has become an actual burden instead of a blessing. The returns from colonial rule are dwindling while the costs of empire are rising. To be sure, individuals, corporations, and even governments, still enrich themselves by colonial exploitation. But, this is now due to special conditions—control of concentrated oil-resources, discovery of large uranium deposits, etc.—rather than the general ability to operate profitably in colonies and other dependent countries. What were once exceptional profit-rates now drop to the "normal" rate. Where they remain exceptional, it is in most cases due to a hidden form of government subsidy. Generally speaking, colonialism no longer pays, so that it is in part the principle of profitability itself which calls forth a new approach to imperialist rule.

Two world wars destroyed the old imperialist powers more or less. But this is not the end of imperialism, which, though it evolves new forms and expressions, still spells economic and political control of weaker by stronger nations. Imperialism by indirection appears more promising than nineteenth-century colonialism or its belated revival in Russia's satellite policies. Of course, the one does not exclude the other, as when real or imaginary strategic considerations require actual occupation, such as U.S. control of Okinawa and British military rule in Cyprus. But generally, indirect control may be superior to direct control, as the system of wage labor proved superior to slave labor. Apart from the Western hemisphere, America has not been an imperialist power in the traditional sense. Even here it gained the benefits of imperial control more by "dollar-diplomacy" than by direct military intervention. As the strongest capitalist power, America may well expect to dominate in somewhat similar fashion the world's non-Soviet regions.

NONE of the European nations is actually able to prevent the complete dissolution of its imperial rule except with America's help. But this help subjects these nations as well as their foreign possessions to American penetration and control. In falling "heir" to what is left of the declining imperialism, the United States has no urgent need to rush to the defense of West European imperialism, except where such defense frustrates the Eastern power bloc. "Anti-colonialism" is not an American policy deliber-

ately designed to weaken her Western allies—though it does so in fact—but is adopted in the belief that it will strengthen the "free world." This comprehensive outlook, to be sure, includes numerous narrower special interests which give America's "anti-imperialism" its hypocritical character and leads to the belief that by opposing the imperialism of other nations, America merely fosters her own.

Deprived of imperialist potentialities, Germany, Italy, and Japan no longer have an independent policy. The progressive decline of the French and British Empires reduces these nations to secondary powers. At the same time, the national aspirations of less developed and weaker countries cannot be realized except as they fit into the power schemes of the dominating imperialist nations. Though Russia and the United States share world supremacy for the time being, lesser nations attempt, nevertheless, to assert their specific interests and to some degree affect the policies of the super powers. The enmities and international contradictions of the two great rivals also grant newly arising nations, as China and India, a degree of independence they would not otherwise possess. Under the guise of "neutrality," a small nation like Yugoslavia, for instance, is even permitted to depart from one power bloc and return to the other. The independent but weaker countries can assert their independence—such as it is—only because of the larger conflict between Russia and the United States.

THE erosion of Western imperialism, it is said, creates a power vacuum in hitherto controlled areas of the world. If the vacuum is not filled by the West, it will be by Russia. Of course, neither the representatives of the "new nationalism" nor those of the "old imperialism" understand this kind of talk; since the former displaces the latter, no vacuum arises. What is meant, then, by "vacuum" is that "national self-determination" of underdeveloped countries leaves them open to internal and external "communist aggression," unless the West guarantees their "independence." In other words, national self-determination does not include a free choice of allies, although it does—at times—include preference with respect to "protecting" Western powers. "Independence" of Tunisia and Morocco, for instance, is all right so long as independence from France implies allegiance not to Russia but loyalty to the American-dominated Western power-bloc.

To the extent that it can still assert itself in the two-power-bloc world, national self-determination is an expression of the "cold war," of the political-military stalemate. But the developmental trend does not point to a world of many nations, each independent and secure, but to the further disintegration of weaker nations, i.e. to their "integration" in either one or the other power bloc. Of course, the struggle for national emancipation within the setting of imperialist rivalries allows some countries to exploit the power competition between East and West. But this very fact points to the limitations of their national aspirations, as either agreement or war between the East and West would end their ability to maneuver between the two power centers. Meanwhile, Russia, which does not hesitate to destroy any attempt at real national self-determination in countries under her direct control, is ready to support national self-determination wherever it is directed against Western domination. Likewise, America, demanding self-determination for Russia's satellites, has no hesitancy in practicing in the Middle East what she abhors in Eastern Europe. Despite national revolution and self-determination, the time for national emancipation is practically over. These nations may retain their newly won independence, yet their formal independence does not release them from Western economic and political rule. They can escape this overlordship only by accepting that of Russia—within the Eastern power-bloc.

NATIONAL revolutions in capitalistically retarded countries are attempts at modernization through industrialization whether they merely express opposition to foreign capital or are determined to change existing social relations. But whereas the nationalism of the nineteenth century was an instrument of private capital development, the nationalism of the twentieth century is predominately an instrument of state-capitalist development. And whereas the nationalism of the last century expanded the free world market and that degree of economic interdependency possible under private capital formation, present-day nationalism disrupts still further an already disintegrating world market and destroys that degree of "automatic" international integration provided by the free market mechanism.

Behind the nationalist drive is, of course, the pressure of poverty, which is growing more explosive as the discrepancy between poor and rich nations increases. The international division of labor as determined by private capital formation implied the exploitation of poorer by richer countries and the concentration of capital in the advanced capitalist nations. The new nationalism opposes the market-determined concentration of capital so as to assure the further industrialization of the underdeveloped countries. Under present conditions, however, nationally organized capital production increases its disorganization on a world-wide scale. Private enterprise and government control operate now simultaneously in each capitalist country and also in the world at large. Side by side, there exist, then, the most ruthless general competition, the subordination of private to national competition, the most ruthless national competition, and the subordination of national competition to the supra-national requirements of power-bloc politics.

At the base of the current national aspirations and imperialist rivalries lies the actual need for world-wide organization of production and distribution beneficial to humanity as a whole. First, as the geologist K. F. Mather has pointed out, because "the earth is far better adapted for occupation by men organized on a world-wide scale, with maximum opportunity for free exchange of raw materials and finished products the world around, than by men who insist upon building barriers between regions even so inclusive as a large nation or an entire continent." Second, because social production can be fully developed and can free human society from want and misery only by international cooperation without regard to particularistic national interests. The compelling interdependency implied

in further progressive industrial development if not accepted and utilized for human ends, asserts itself as a never-ending struggle between nations and for imperialist control.

The inability to achieve on an international scale what has been achieved, or is in the process of being achieved, on the national level—partial or complete elimination of capital competition—permits the continuation of class antagonisms in all countries despite the elimination or restriction of private capital formation. To state it the other way around: because nationalization of capital leaves class relations intact, there is no way of escaping competition on the international scene. Just as control over the means of production assures the maintenance of class divisions, so does control over the national state, which includes control over its means of production. The defense of the nation and its growing strength becomes the defense and reproduction of new ruling groups. The "love for the socialist fatherland" in Communist countries, the desire for a "stake in the country," as exemplified in the existence of "socialist" governments in welfare-economies, as well as national self-determination in hitherto dominated countries, signifies the existence and rise of new ruling classes bound to the existence of the national state.

WHILE a positive attitude toward nationalism betrays a lack of interest in socialism, the socialist position on nationalism is obviously ineffective in countries fighting for national existence as well as in those countries oppressing other nations. If only by default, a consistent anti-nationalist position seems to support imperialism. However, imperialism functions for reasons of its own, quite independently of socialist attitudes toward nationalism. Furthermore, socialists are not required for the launching of struggles for national autonomy as the various "liberation" movements in the wake of the second World War have shown. Contrary to earlier expectations, nationalism could not be utilized to further socialist aims, nor was it a successful strategy to hasten the demise of capitalism. On the contrary, nationalism destroyed socialism by using it for nationalist ends.

It is not the function of socialism to support nationalism, even though the latter battles imperialism. But to fight imperialism without simultaneously discouraging nationalism means to fight some imperialists and to support others, for nationalism is necessarily imperalist—or illusory. To support Arab nationalism is to oppose Jewish nationalism, and to support the latter is to fight the former, for it is not possible to support nationalism without also supporting national rivalries, imperialism, and war. To be a good Indian nationalist is to combat Pakistan; to be a true Pakistani is to despise India. Both these newly "liberated" nations are readying themselves to fight over disputed territory and subject their development to the double distortion of capitalist war economies.

And so it goes on: the "liberation" of Cyprus from British rule only tends to open a new struggle for Cyprus between Greeks and Turks and does not lift Western control from either Turkey or Greece. Poland's "liberation" from Russian rule may well spell war with Germany for the "liberation" of German provinces now ruled by Poland and this, again, to new Polish struggles for the "liberation" of territory lost to Germany. Real national independence of Czechoslovakia would, no doubt, reopen the fight for the Sudetenland and this, in turn, the struggle for Czechoslovakia's independence and perhaps for that of the Slovaks from the Czechs. With whom to side? With the Algerians against the French? With the Jews? With the Arabs? With both? Where shall the Jews go to make room for the Arabs? What shall the Arab refugees do to cease being a "nuisance" to the Jews? What to do with a million French "colons" who face, when Algerian liberation is accomplished, expropriation and expulsion? Such questions can be raised with reference to every part of the world, and will generally be answered by Jews siding with Jews, Arabs with Arabs, Algerians with Algerians, French with French, Poles with Poles and so forth—and thus they will remain unanswered and unanswerable. However utopian the quest for international solidarity may appear in this mêlee of national and imperialist antagonisms, no other road seems open to escape fratricidal struggles and to attain a rational world society.

ALTHOUGH socialists' sympathies are with the oppressed, they relate not to emerging nationalism but to the particular plight of twice-oppressed people who face both a native and foreign ruling class. Their national aspirations are in part "socialist" aspirations, as they include the illusory hope of impoverished populations that they can improve their conditions through national independence. Yet national self-determination has not emancipated the laboring classes in the advanced nations. It will not do so now in Asia and Africa. National revolutions, as in Algeria for instance, promise little for the lower classes save indulging on more equal terms in national prejudices. No doubt, this means something to the Algerians, who have suffered from a particularly arrogant colonial system. But the possible results of Algerian independence are deducible from those in Tunisia and Morocco, where existing social relations have not been changed and the conditions of the exploited classes have not improved to any significant extent.

Unless socialism is altogether a mirage, it will rise again as an international movement—or not at all. In any case, and on the basis of past experience, those interested in the rebirth of socialism must stress its internationalism most of all. While it is impossible for a socialist to become a nationalist, he is nevertheless an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. However, his fight against colonialism does not imply adherence to the principle of national self-determination, but expresses his desire for a non-exploitative, international socialist society. While socialists cannot identify themselves with national struggles, they can as socialists oppose both nationalism and imperialism. For example, it is not the function of French socialists to fight for Algerian independence but to turn France into a socialist society. And though struggles to this end would undoubtedly aid the liberation movement in Algeria and elsewhere, this would be a by-product of and not the reason for the socialist fight against nationalist imperialism. At the next stage, Algeria would have to be "de-nationalized" and integrated into an international socialist world.

A Review Article

Evidence and Faith

by Mulford Q. Sibley

AMERICAN LABOR IN MIDPASSAGE, editor, Bert Cochran. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1959, $3.50.

TO a socialist, this book will be both depressing and encouraging. It is depressing because most of the writers of the essays it contains, having carefully examined the outlook and activities of the American labor movement in the middle of the twentieth century, find them grossly wanting. It is encouraging, on the other hand, in that, despite so much evidence which seems not to support them, many of the writers believe that there are still revolutionary potentialities in American labor. Just how one can jump from the depressing evidence of what labor *is* to the belief that it will somehow be other than what it *has been* is a major question which the reader will have to ask himself.

The keynote for the dual theme of depression and hope is furnished by Bert Cochran in his long introductory chapter. After a recital of details which, from a socialist point of view, tend to make one despair, Cochran nevertheless concludes the chapter in these words: "Since no one has yet discovered a new social force—although there have been many attempts to do so—which can usher necessary, and as a matter of fact, inevitable social changes into our rudderless industrial society now gone amuck, the conviction must be retained that after sufficient trial and error, the labor movements, each in their own way and time, will rise to the historic needs of our epoch."

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But the evidence offered in the book hardly supports this hopeful conviction. The general impression which the volume leaves on one is of a labor movement which, while it has some notable successes to its credit, has nevertheless bumbled and stumbled so frequently that, in terms of revolutionary ends, it appears to be getting nowhere. While labor has served its function as a "bread and butter" movement, it seems to offer but little possibility for radical social change—unless major trends revealed by the evidence are to be disregarded.

LET us note how this seeming contradiction between the tendencies in the evidence and the faith in potentialities is reflected in many of the essays.

Cochran, in the introductory essay already referred to, ranges broadly over the whole field of labor history and organization. He treats the growth of unions and the epochs of labor history; the development of business unionism; the problem of organizing the South; the rather poor record of unions with respect to the Negro; and the problem of alleged "American exceptionalism." "Organization, tenacity, and adaptability," he remarks, "have been stronger elements of labor's armor than audacity and vision." Yet despite all this, he maintains, the long-run revolutionary potentialities of the ordinary "grey mass of workers" remain real.

Paul Sweezy examines certain developments in the realm of wage rates and the relation between productivity and wage increases. He points out, for example, that since 1920, with the exception of two relatively brief periods, "output per man-hour has consistently exceeded hourly earnings." He rightly criticizes the contention that there has been an "income revolution" in the United States. His essay ends on a question. Do the workers, he asks, "want to restore full employment, with its concomitant advantages to them, through more war? Or will they finally comprehend the terrible cruelty and irrationality of such a course and set themselves the arduous but rewarding task of building a new social order in which both employment and incomes will be under the planned control of the society of producers?" He does not answer his question—and, indeed, on the basis of things seen in the labor movement, there is no clear answer. Surely it is *not* certain that labor will not "want to restore full employment . . . through more war."

In dealing with "cultural exploitation," Harvey Swados calls attention to the fact that ordinary workers are afforded but little real choice in their cultural life. "The man who leaves the packinghouse or the assembly line is neither physically nor psychically prepared to appreciate the quality paperback or the classical LP." He rightly

asks: "What could be at once more patronizing and more bankrupt than the claim that the flood of swill daily pumped through our cultural pipelines fairly represents all that the ordinary man can ever be expected to appreciate?" But one is left in the dark as to

whether the labor movement can or will change the situation.

Leo Huberman emphasizes that the "class war" still exists and must be recognized as a reality. He reiterates the socialist appeal for a classless society. But he does not tell us how or in what way the present American labor movement is likely to help in the attainment of this objective. Is it not possible, the critic might well ask, that the class war will remain a part of human history indefinitely?

THE most notable point developed by Harry Braverman in his treatment of "Labor and Politics" is the thesis that, despite assertions to the contrary, American labor today does indeed have a political perspective different from that which it possessed in the days of Gompers. The difference lies in the intimate association in our day of the labor movement with the Democratic Party. "The Democratic Party road became an inevitable experience for labor. Judged by comparison with the Gompers era, it represents the claiming of higher political ground." While he admits that partisans of independent labor political activity may see little "current day-to-day motion," he thinks that labor is somehow moving in the direction of separate political action. Labor tends to move, he thinks, "in sudden leaps." But the skeptic might wonder whether, on the basis of present trends, Mr. Braverman is right.

William Glazier is indubitably correct when, in discussing the "automation problem," he maintains that our society today "has no machinery to deal with sweeping technological change smoothly and without bringing about the displacement and unemployment of workers." He is likewise on sound ground when he asserts that so long as the economy is expanding, "the burdens incidental to automation will be solved, or lost, in the general improvement." But when the economy declines, he concludes, "automation will show its other face." And Glazier argues that in that event "American labor will . . . have to find new resources of strength, spirit and ingenuity if it is not to be overwhelmed." But he does not say that there *is* anything in the labor movement today which would lead one to believe that labor *will* find those new "resources of strength."

Douglas F. Dowd deals with the problem of the white collar worker and Nancy Reeves with that of women. From neither of these essays does one emerge with any sense that the labor movement is treating either question intelligently or with vision. Nor is it suggested that things will be radically different in the future.

Shubel Morgan exposes the very mixed record of labor with respect to the Negro. What the future might bring he does not profess to indicate with any certainty, although he emphasizes the relatively small role which unions have played in Negro emancipation.

IN his essay on "Corruption and Racketeering," Dennis Anderson treats the subject frankly and in some detail. He does not spare the unions. At the same time, he concludes that:

> *Labor corruption will not be eradicated by union administrative reform or government legislation. . . . It will emerge again and again while the social conditions which produced it continue to exist. In the absence of a higher ethic, its corrosive influence extends much further than the labor embezzler and the official who invests union funds in a private business. It reaches the leader who consciously sells out his members in return for a favor from an employer, and the one who sells them out unconsciously because soft living has made him forget the pressures of necessity. . . . It is the breeder of cynicism in a movement which thrives only when possessed of a militant faith.*
>
> *To the extent that the labor movement adopts standards different from those of the business community, and a greater measure of participation is exercised by the membership, the carrier of corruption, the "fast-buck" philosophy of a society geared to personal profit will tend to disappear.*

But where, in contemporary American society, *is* the labor movement which is able and willing to adopt "standards different from those of the business community"? This is left a question mark. And Anderson's discussion of the realities of American labor in 1959 leads us to wonder whether, on the basis of present tendencies, such a movement can and will develop.

When David Herreshoff comes to analyze "books about American labor," he is confronted by the problem of classifying schools of thought. In this very difficult area, he succeeds in bringing some order out of the apparent chaos, particularly in his distinction between the "labor liberal" who "inclines to acceptance of the existing labor movement as the norm" and the "radical" whose "criterion for judging the health of the labor movement is his normative conception of its potentialities." Herreshoff enters a strong plea for "new theoretical insights" into the nature of the labor movement.

IN concluding the volume with a discussion of the "Taft-Hartley Decade," Bert Cochran maintains that a "basic redirection of union policies can be visualized only as a consequence of an insurgent mood sweeping the nation, and finding reflection in union ranks. It is hard to see the unions as initiators of such a change. They will rather be beneficiaries of it." What, then, we might well ask, becomes of the notion of the labor movement as a kind of vanguard of social change? Unfortunately, Bert Cochran does not tell us. But he does rightly point out that with government "protection" the unions have been bound down more and more by red tape and legal casuistry; and he questions whether the benefits of labor relations laws have been worth the price. Yet somehow labor will emerge from these administrative and legal mazes and its "political experimentations will eventually culminate with the establishment of some kind of labor party." On the basis of his essay, however, it is difficult to see how and why Cochran can hold to this; it appears to be largely a matter of faith in a transcendentally governed mission of labor. Indeed, he talks of labor's "manifest destiny."

This volume is valuable for the real light it casts on twentieth-century American labor and its historical background. No summary can possibly do justice to the many issues which are treated. It is particularly helpful be-

cause, searching for a new theoretical framework, it is critical of many current theoretical structures—including even the "Marxist," to which it is most closely tied.

Yet as a whole, and with only a few major qualifications, it is difficult to understand how it can square its apparent belief in labor as a vehicle for radical social change with the picture of the American labor movement which it portrays. The key, let us repeat, is in its faith; and faith is defined by the writer of Hebrews as "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."

BOOKS

Prelude to Horror

SARAJEVO by Joachim Remak. Criterion Books, New York, 1959, $5.

IN 1914, the Austro-Hungarian empire embraced much of the territory that now makes up Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Poland, in addition to Austria and Hungary. The dominant coalition of Germans and Magyars, landowners, nobility and bourgeoisie, concentrated in Austria and Hungary, ruled over an assortment of resentful national groups, including Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenes, Serbo-Croats, Slovenes, Rumanians, even Italians. Presiding over the whole in the Hofburg at Vienna was the venerable Franz Joseph, the last of the Emperors, who had ruled Austria-Hungary since the revolutionary year of 1848 and was to surrender the crown to death only in 1916, at the age of 86.

As though in premonition of its impending collapse, the House of Hapsburg had been dogged by a series of catastrophes. Franz Joseph's wife, Elizabeth of Bavaria, had been killed by an Italian anarchist in 1898. His brother, Maximilian, had been shot by the Mexicans, who somehow failed to appreciate the offer of a monarch out of a six-centuries-old royal house. His son, Crown Prince Rudolph, shot himself under mysterious circumstances at his hunting lodge at Mayerling, leaving a gaping hole in the succession while providing a treasure trove for romancers. In the normal course of things, Franz Joseph's younger brother Carl Ludwig would have been next in line, but this pious man took a pilgrimage to the Holy Land where, against all advice, he insisted on drinking from the River Jordan, whereupon he caught dysentery and died.

By this process of elimination, Carl Ludwig's son, the Emperor's nephew, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, became Heir Apparent in 1896. In defiance of all mortality tables, Franz Joseph lived on, through work-days that began at four o'clock in the morning, to survive them all. Even Franz Ferdinand was to miss the prize, being the Archduke whose assassination in 1914 touched off World War I.

While he awaited the succession, Franz Ferdinand prepared himself for kingly pursuits. In 1910, he killed his five-thousandth stag. Single hunts in which he killed up to 2,000 pheasants are on record. A monthly report from the Archducal forest administration informed him: "His Royal and Imperial Highness' most devoted of servants begs to report that in the Kozli district 380 hares have been counted, all of whom are already looking forward with unbounded joy to being shot by His Highness." Harsh and despotic, he did not get along notably well with his court and army associates. He estranged himself from the royal family by contracting a morganatic marriage. Slav nationalists plotted his assassination. Only the animals, it seems, looked forward to his visits with unbounded joy.

JUDGING by the restrained grief with which news of his death was greeted, and by the Emperor's deliberate curtailment of the funeral honors, Franz Ferdinand's assassination was hardly a likely cause for a world war which would cost ten million people their lives. But Europe had arrived at the point where the causes were already fully matured, and only a pretext was needed. Serbia and Austria were undoubtedly animated by their own well-advertised sentiments of nationalism on the one side and the police-administrative requirements of a crumbling empire on the other. But they were only powder trains leading to the central magazines of European imperial rivalry in Germany, France, England and Russia.

In the month after the assassination, the Austrians clearly exposed the fact that the revolver shots at Sarajevo were a pretext rather than a motivation for their headlong course towards war. Investigation quickly revealed that the terrorists who had lined Franz Ferdinand's Sarajevo route were inspired, and perhaps even armed and directed, from the Serbian capital, Belgrade. The Austrians thereupon consulted the German government, which replied in effect that the Serbians needed to be taught a lesson, that the assassination provided a convenient opportunity, that Russia would probably fail to come to Serbia's aid, but that if she did, Germany would honor treaty obligations and come in on the side of Austria. Thus fortified, the Austrians, having long since come to the conclusion that Serbian nationalist agitation threatened the empire, proceeded to hand Serbia an ultimatum. This lengthy series of demands provided that Serbia must suppress, eliminate, and remove all secret societies, propaganda, and officials hostile to Austria, and insisted further that Austrian officials be permitted to take part in this cleansing work. The Serbian government replied within the deadline, accepted all the provisions of the ultimatum except the last, and did not even reject that, merely asking that further information be provided as to the meaning of the final provisions. That the Austrian government delayed no longer, but declared war at once, is ample indication that war had already been decided upon.

DR. Remak's account of Sarajevo is not primarily concerned with this diplomatic history. It is mainly the story of the assassination itself, as reconstructed primarily from the later statements of the terrorists. Dr. Remak does permit Sarajevo to bulk rather larger as a "cause" of the war than realistic history allows, as he apparently believes the drama of his tale is enlarged by letting the reader think that, had it not been for this little episode, there would have been no World War I. But this book was not written to explain why the war happened. It was written rather as an excursion in dramatic or anecdotal history, to tell the complicated tale of intrigue, plot, and counterplot surrounding the assassination. What we get is a large helping of the stuff of which Eric Ambler's thrillers are made, no less interesting for being part of the texture of history.

The central character of the affair was the chief of the Intelligence Department in the Serbian General Staff, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievich, who, from his school days, had been known by the nickname Apis—the bee. In an unoffical capacity, Apis was head of a secret nationalist organization called "Union or Death," but better known as the "Black Hand," which aimed at the creation of a Greater Serbia. When Franz Ferdinand announced his intention of coming to Sarajevo to view the army maneuvers, the Black Hand decided on his death. Historians have long held, following some hints in the record, that Franz Ferdinand was marked for death because he was known to be planning certain reforms that might make the captive Serbo-Croats in the Austro-Hungarian empire more contented with their lot, and less anxious to join a Greater Serbia. Dr. Remak follows that view. Yet he puts little into his narrative to substantiate it. Franz Ferdinand was, after all, the Heir Apparent to the empire, his visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina (where Sarajevo is located) was quite provocative, as that region had recently been annexed by Austria in defiance of its own treaty, and the Black Hand was a terrorist organization actively on the lookout for likely targets. In view of all this, he made a natural victim, apart from any vague presumptions about his "liberal" plans.

Apis chose as his executioners three young Bosnians living in Belgrade, all nationalists, all under twenty, and all tubercular. These three were to carry the arms, bombs and revolvers, to Sarajevo, and there meet up with additional help. On the day of the assassination, seven youths lined the route,

but only two of them used their weapons, and only one to lethal effect.

WELL before the assault, however, events occurred which implicated the Serbian government. The Prime Minister learned of the plot. He sent orders to the frontier to intercept the three travelers, but either his orders were too late or the border guards were more loyal to Apis than to him. He next conveyed to Vienna an unofficial warning that Franz Ferdinand's trip was likely to prove dangerous, a hint that the Austrian authorities chose to ignore, either because they did not understand it, or because they had their own reasons for permitting the provocative trip. Finally, the Central Executive Committee of the Black Hand itself, meeting in Belgrade two weeks before the assassination, voted by a large majority to call the whole thing off. Apis promised to accede to the will of his own committee, but there is little evidence that he tried to stop the terrorists.

Later on, when captured and brought to trial, the killers told conflicting stories, did everything they could to conceal the real origins of the plot, and to this day many of the key events remain shrouded in mystery. Dr. Remak has done an admirable job of reconstructing the chain of events, and of giving the conflicting testimony on both sides of disputed points. His book is marred by a too-evident sympathy for the "peace," "shelter," and "traditions" of the old Austrian empire, as contrasted with "the predictable excesses of modern racialism and nationalism." It is not, however, a work of historical analysis but a dramatic retelling of a tense and exciting event. The prose is not quite up to that of Eric Ambler or Graham Greene, but it serves, and the author has wisely separated his extensive notes on sources from the text.

H. B.

Bellow Out the Truth

REDEDICATION TO FREEDOM by Benjamin Ginzburg. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1959, $3.50.

MOST of the books that have been published in defense of civil liberties in the past decade haven't been anything to brag about. As a matter of fact, to be perfectly candid about it, they have been pretty poor. They are generally dull and boring, predictable and platitudinous. Some of the academic studies have assembled a lot of startling facts, but who reads them besides reviewers and specialists? Others feature passionate liberal rhetoric, but I have never been able to get over the idea that they are singularly unconvincing for the average American, not just because they are too abstract, but chiefly because they fail to meet directly the basic arguments or prejudices upon which the witch-hunt is founded: the "subversive menace" and the security mania. Finally, practically all of the

books have the defect that they show, in themselves, the erosion of the national conscience to the point where even the most assiduous defenders of civil liberties have retreated to second- or third-line trenches.

If any of our readers share this feeling about books on this crucial subject, then I think I can tell them that this is the book they have been waiting for. It is the best book in defense of civil liberties that has been published since the war, and in some ways one of the best that has ever been published in this country. Its author was Research Director for the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. In a foreword, he writes:

> *"He who knows the truth and does not bellow it out," wrote the French poet Charles Péguy, "makes himself the accomplice of liars and falsifiers."*
>
> *It has been my lot to learn the inside truth about the government thought-control activities carried on through the loyalty-security programs, the Congressional investigations, and the so-called anti-Communist and antisubversive legislation. This book is my effort to bellow out the truth I have learned. . . .*
>
> *What I learned as a result of my intimate contact with the security programs was that the whole government anti-Communist campaign was wrong from top to bottom. It was not a matter of incidental abuses in activities that were otherwise necessary or desirable. The whole government campaign was an abuse—a hoax on the American people.*

The very first assumption of this uncommonly hard-headed book is that the civil liberties problem is far from over. As Dr. Ginsburg sees the situation, the crisis of American freedom cannot be over so long as the "antilibertarian institutions which have been created over the past twenty years in the name of fighting the menace of Communism" continue to exist. The Supreme Court decisions which tipped the balance slightly against McCarthyism in recent years, he sees as a "compromise," which has "inactivated some phases of the Federal loyalty-security program in a number of nonsensitive areas, while upholding them, either directly or by implication, in the remaining areas." "Unfortunately," he writes, "this type of compromise . . . is neither a solution nor a step to a solution of the problem of what to do with the Bill of Rights today. It leaves all the antilibertarian institutions, with their aggressive bureaucracies, fully in place, merely inactivating some of the applications of these institutions. The antilibertarian system continues to live in the social body and is poised to resume its aggressive advance." In any event, as the author makes clear, the Supreme Court can only make defensive moves, and "the most important bastion is in the consciousness of the American people and their elected representatives."

STARTING from this vantage point, Dr. Ginzburg unlimbers an attack on the issues that forces some of his colleagues in liberalism, like Max Lerner and Reinhold Niebuhr, to dissociate themselves from his bold conclusions in their jacket blurbs. He is totally unconvinced of the existence of any "Communist menace" whatsoever. He is completely opposed to the use of any ideological tests at all in the hiring of government personnel for any positions, no matter how "sensitive." And, in anticipation of the charge that this stance is too "dogmatic" and "extremist" a solution to the security problem, he answers that while this may be so, he didn't design it as an answer to the problem of security, which he does not believe exists at all, but as an answer to the problem of civil liberties, about which he is profoundly alarmed. I might add that Dr. Ginzburg writes like a man who has real, as distinguished from conventional, feelings about all this, and I don't think I am being deceived by his skill as a writer.

Second in importance only to the book's thesis, is the line of argument adopted. Dr. Ginzburg slugs it out uncompromisingly on the basic and essential issues of "espionage and subversion." It is largely because of this that his book seems to me to be well designed to convince readers who hold the conventional prejudices, instead of merely comforting the faithful.

This is a brief book, the writing is crisp and clear, the arguments are strong and logical, the idealism and fervor uncorrupted. Carey McWilliams says that "Ben Ginzburg may succeed, where others have failed, in convincing the American public that the evil spirit of McCarthyism has not yet been exorcised, that we need a rededication to freedom." There is a limit to what books can do, but of all those that have been published, this one stands the best chance of making a fresh impact.

H. B.

"AMERICAN LABOR IN MIDPASSAGE"

ON page 20 of this issue, there is published a review of "American Labor in Midpassage," written by Professor Mulford Sibley, of the political science department of the University of Minnesota. As regular readers of this magazine know, this is the book that grew out of the joint issue of "Monthly Review" and "American Socialist" in mid-1958. From a number of reviews that appeared earlier this year, we print a sampling of other opinion of this book of essays, which Bert Cochran edited and Monthly Review Press published:

In the "Library Journal" for May 15, Dorothy Kuhn Oko, the labor education specialist of the New York Public Library wrote: "A series of essays by a number of friendly critics of the labor movement. They discuss labor's failure to meet adequately some of its basic challenges, such as the organization of the unorganized, the white collar worker, women, and Negroes. While they approach these and other questions from a socialist point of view, they offer valid insights into many of the difficulties with which the current movement is grappling. . . . For the layman or unionist who is concerned with what is going on. Public libraries and undergraduate colleges would do well to buy."

Bernard D. Nossiter in the "Washington Post" of May 31: "Eleven independent (non-party and non-factional) socialists offer a dozen essays for Bert Cochran's review of labor's present posture. While their vantage point is far outside labor's current drift, they provide some important insights into the movement's present fix. Some of the stronger pieces are editor Cochran's long historical study; Paul Sweezy's statistical appraisal of workers; Harvey Swados on the cultural rubbish fed to workers; and Dennis Anderson on corruption and racketeering."

Arnold A. Rogow, of the political science department at Haverford College, wrote in the "Nation" for May 9: "Cochran's survey of labor history leads him to take issue with the general thesis of John R. Commons et al, which holds, roughly, that union growth and activity are mainly functions of the trade cycle. . . . Cochran's analysis of the major periods of union growth stresses that each of them covered a relatively short time span ,and occurred 'against a background of major social upheavals brought on by depression and war.' Union growth and activity during the two world wars and the depression tend to support this view, and labor history in general, according to Cochran, suggests that 'unionism is a product of social revolt, not of bureaucratic effort . . . of mass insurgency, not slow accretion.' . . . Two conclusions emerge from Cochran's analysis, and they are further developed elsewhere in the book, notably in the essays by Paul M. Sweezy, Leo Huberman, Harry Braverman, and William Glazier. They are, first, that economic and social instability, despite appearances, remains a major characteristic of American society; it follows from this that the essential questions about labor's stake in the system have not been answered but only deferred. Second, when the unions become aware of the underlying instability of a defense economy—for example, through unemployment and the disruptions of automation, perhaps combined with a tougher business line at the bargaining table—the present euphoria will give way to a new militancy whose ultimate expression may well be an American Labor Party. . . . One may disagree with this analysis, and take issue with other points scattered through the book. A few of the essays tend to be rather simplistic in their approach. . . . Nevertheless, 'American Labor in Midpassage' is an important analysis of the present condition of the American trade union movement."

Those of our readers who don't yet have a copy of "American Labor in Midpassage" should order one without delay. You will find it an indispensable guide to the labor movement, and a revealing background analysis for current situations like the anti-labor drive in Washington and the nationwide steel strike. The price is $3.50, but we will send you the copies we have available here in our office at the special price of $2. Send check or money order to the American Socialist, 857 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y.